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Fraught freight: Why statistics show a record drop in shipping

OCTOBER 2014 VOL. 25, NO. 10

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Q&A: An Asia hand looks back on a career in correspondence

Oh, baby How market forces and marketing added up to a boom in China for diapers and formula 中经评论：透视中企IPO

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THE HOUSE VIEW Published monthly since 1990 Publisher China Economic Review Publishing Staff Writer Hudson Lockett Chinese Editor Liu Chen Associate Editor Skye Sun Contributors Tom Nunlist Interns Doug Strub Art Director Jason Wong Editor at Large Graham Earnshaw Associate Publisher Gareth Powell Director of Sales and Marketing Ralph Wang Account Manager Jerry Cheng CHINA ECONOMIC REVIEW (ISSN: 1350-6390) is published by China Economic Review Publishing Enquiries cer@ChinaEconomicReview.com Subscriptions subscriptions@ChinaEconomicReview.com Addresses The Plaza Building, 102 Lee High Road London, SE13 5PT, England Room 1801, 18F Public Bank Centre 120 Des Voeux Road Central, Hong Kong

04 A ZONE, ALONE | Shanghai’s Free Trade Zone must step out of the shadow of Shenzhen to succeed

MONTH IN REVIEW 06 NEWS BRIEF | The biggest China news stories in September

Q&A AND COLUMNS 08 PRESS UNDER PRESSURE | Doug Young, former China business reporter and financial journalism teacher at Fudan University, discusses the latest developments in mainland media

10 GRAY ECONOMICS | Mario Cavolo, Shanghai-based communications advisor and professional speaker on the media and China, talks about the country’s cash economy

12 WRITING HOME | Tracy Dahlby, former Tokyo bureau chief, National Geographic contributor and author of a new memior on life as foreign correspondent, looks back on a career reporting from Asia

14 FOOTIE, FUNDING & ‘BIRGING’ | Simon Chadwick, a professor of sport business strategy at Coventry University and the editor of The Scorecard, lays out Chinese football’s daunting future

16 SUNLIGHT, SECURITIZED | Chinese solar can pay off big if the industry can take a few cues from America’s approach

18 NORTH BOUND AT LAST | The new Shanghai-Hong Kong

Hong Kong printer 01 Printing Limited Suite M, 3/F, Tower 3, Kwun Tong Industrial Centre, 448 Kwun Tong Road, Kowloon

Stock Connect holds potential profits for sharp-eyed investors

CHINA ECONOMIC REVIEW welcomes letters. Please write to the editor at: letters@ChinaEconomicReview.com

20 TROUBLED DELIVERIES: INFANT RETAIL IN CHINA

COVER STORY Thanks to market forces and marketing tactics, China is now a booming market for two products once considered utterly useless: formula and disposable diapers

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BUSINESS 26 GRASSROOTS POWER | Distributed solar power may aid the growth of an adolescent industry with a troubled past in China

ECONOMICS & POLICY HKABC membership membership approved approved and and certifi certified ed HKABC

30 FRAUGHT FREIGHT | Chinese freight volume showed a record drop this year, but the full story requires digging past official statistics

THE HOUSE VIE W

A zone, alone Shanghai’s Free Trade Zone can’t be expected to match Shenzhen’s success, but it still needs clear goals and transparent administration

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China Economic Review | October 2014

SOMETHING MISSING: Shanghai’s free-trade zone has suffered blowback from the hype leading up to its launch, with much confusion arising from the project’s lack of clear goals and transparency

while, previously discussed plans to allow marketplaces in the FTZ where investors could trade derivatives and foreign shares have yet to materialize, nor have measures to allow banks to trade in foreign exchange or set interest rates arrived – though the ongoing (relative) slump facing China’s economy is perhaps more responsible for the latter’s ongoing absence.

It hasn’t been all bad: A new international trading platform at Shanghai’s gold exchange lets investors swap said metal using the yuan, and companies registered in the zone can transfer yuan-based funds to offshore arms, among other minor measures introduced over the past year. But the reputation of the zone has been dragged through the mud recently by the ouster of its de facto leader, Dai Haibo.

Dai’s technocratic experience was supposed to help bolster the zone’s bona fides and help it thrive. In September the South China Morning Post reported that said executive deputy director of the project would step down amid a graft probe. While that report cited only unnamed sources, it was hard to

stay positive when the government announced his removal soon thereafter without giving any reason for the dismissal. As usual, the authorities held their cards close to the chest.

That’s just the problem. The leadership would do well to communicate more clearly what, exactly, the FTZ is supposed to do. Contrast with another financial project is helpful: October’s Shanghai-Hong Kong stock exchange connection, intended to allow traders in each market to invest in the other.

That is a concrete goal with clearer rules and regulations that can guide capital to its destinations. The project succeeds or fails based on the extent to which it spurs investment. Meanwhile the FTZ is floundering for want of a clear vision and purpose.

It cannot, of course, replicate the incredible success of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, nor is it likely to be replicated across the country at this point. In order to thrive, Shanghai’s FTZ must step out of the shadow of its predecessor and begin to truly embody the market principles that China’s leadership publicly espouse.

Credit: imaginechina

A

year on, Shanghai’s muchvaunted free-trade zone (FTZ) has become muchdaunted. Hopes were high last September among observers that the zone would become a shining beacon on the coast of all that China’s leadership values in an economy: market forces, not quite unleashed, but given freer rein to take the country into the next phase of liberalization. But while the FTZ may have since become a beacon, it’s not so far one of market efficiency and transparency.

Prior to its debut many were quick to compare the FTZ to the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SEZ), launched in May of 1980 as the herald of China’s new age of reform and opening up. But the export-driven model that Shenzhen helped foster, and which has dominated China’s economy to this day, can’t drive growth if the country hopes to truly become the service and consumer-oriented powerhouse its leaders envision. As the FTZ’s launch loomed, rumors flew regarding possible reforms and freedoms in the 28-square-kilometer bloc. Some even predicted that China would allow those in the zone to access the internet free of the filtering inherent to the online experience throughout the rest of the country. That might have been hopelessly naive, but given Premier Li Keqiang’s backing of the project – the subject of sizzling coverage from local media – the zone’s subsequent fizzle has been all the more disappointing.

The chief complaint among investors has been the “negative list” of restrictions on foreign investment in the zone released by the Shanghai government. The initial list of 190 such restrictions prompted pessimism from many as to just how free trade would be in the zone. When the government cut 51 of those restrictions there was little celebration among offshore traders, who had expected more. Mean-

NEWS ROUNDUP

MONTH IN REVIEW Economy

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The People’s Bank of China began providing its five largest banks with RMB100 billion (US$16.27 billion) of liquidity each through standing three-month lending facilities, Bloomberg reported, citing news website Sina.com. The site cited banking analyst Qiu Guanhua at Guotai Junan Securities, and said the PBOC would complete the process on September 17. The government appears determined to support the economy even if it means using broad-based stimulus measures that may exacerbate the country’s mounting debt. Premier Li Keqiang’s stated target of about 7.5% gross domestic product this year is currently threatened by a property slump.

an all-time high of RMB305.8 billion (USD$49.8 billion), which could drive the yuan higher. Some analysts cited a sluggish real estate sector, which accounts for 15% of China’s economic output and is experiencing its worst downturn in two years.

The HSBC/Markit Flash China Purchasing Managers’ Index rose unexpectedly to 50.5 in September from August’s 50.2, though the PMI also showed one measure of employment dropping more than a point to 46.9, its lowest level since February 2009 during the global financial crisis, Reuters reported. That 5-1/2-year low in factory employment reinforced expectations that China would further relax financing conditions in the coming weeks, but stop short of cutting interest rates or loosening the reserve requirement for all banks to support the economy. Economists’ bets that there would be no overt policy easing are in line with recent remarks by senior leaders, though that resolve is likely being tested by a string of economic indicators suggesting a deepening slowdown.

BLURRED LINES: As Xi Jinping and Narendra Modi met to talk trade, troops faced off in thieir countries’ disputed border region

rally in shares in the US, where about US$15 trillion had been added to the value of equities amid three rounds of monetary stimulus from the Federal Reserve, an expanding economy and record profits. The IPO comes after an attempt at listing in Hong Kong, where rules don’t allow the company’s governance structure - a small group of insiders at Alibaba control its board.

Finance Import growth fell for the second month running in August, by 2.4% year on year, Reuters reported, citing the General Administration of Customs. While imports cooled, export growth heated up by 9.4% year on year, though down from the sizzling 14.5% growth rate of July.

This pushed China’s trade surplus to

Alibaba Group Holding (BABA. NASDAQ) and shareholders sold 320.1 million shares at US$68 (RMB417.55) each, raising US$21.8 billion in an initial public offering that values the company at US$167.6 billion, making it the largest IPO by any company in the US, Bloomberg reported. The Chinese e-commerce giant’s ability to close a deal of this size is owed to an almost non-stop

A state investigation begun in April of last year uncovered almost RMB61.36 billion (US$10 billion) in fraudulent currency deals in China, The Wall Street Journal reported, citing Wu Ruilin, deputy director of the supervision and inspection department of China’s State Administration of For-

CHINA BY NUMBERS Value of fraudulent currency deals China uncovered in an investigation

$10bn 06

China Economic Review | October 2014

700 Chinese troops heading to South Sudan to join UN forces there

amount the PBOC gave China’s five biggest banks

RMB500bn

88 financial criminals nabbed abroad by Chinese authorities

NEWS ROUNDUP

eign Exchange. Wu said the crackdown ultimately covered 24 provinces and cities, including Qingdao. Allegations that traders there and in another port city had fraudulently used metal stockpiles as collateral for multiple loans roiled markets earlier this year.

The revelation means that foreign banks and commodities firms have exposure to potential losses there of nearly US$1 billion, while exposure of Chinese banks could stretch into the billions of dollars, according to court filings, public bank statements and analysts’ estimates.

Politics & Society

While Chinese and Indian security forces faced off in the countries’ disputed border region, President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Narendra Modi met to sign a multibilliondollar agreement for Chinese investment in an industrial park in the state of Gujarat, The Wall Street Journal reported, citing an Indian official.

Indian and Chinese companies signed RMB21.1 billion (US$3.43 billion) in deals on the first day of Xi’s three-day visit, with neither leader commenting on the confrontation in the Himalayan region of Ladakh. There, Indian troops faced off against Chinese sol-

$21.8bn Dollar amount raised

by Alibaba IPO

China has stepped up its scrutiny of journalists with at least two editors and other employees of a major Chinese business news website detained and investigated for suspected extortion, The Wall Street Journal reported, citing state media. State broadcaster China Central Television said the chief editor and deputy editor of the 21st Century Business Herald website were among eight people taken into custody. At least two public-relations companies were also facing scrutiny as part of the investigation, CCTV said. The investigation marks the latest instance of police targeting the behavior of the nation’s journalists.

netite, a low-grade ore. Magnetite is more costly to produce than hematite, the ore typically mined by AngloAustralian behemoths BHP Billiton (BHP.NYSE) and Rio Tinto (RIO. NYSE). Worries about a global iron shortfall in 2011 drove Asian investment into Western Australia, but a fall in iron-ore prices to a five year low below RMB509.12 (USD$83) a ton may leave companies like Citic Ltd. (0267.HKG), which poured RMB61.38 billion (USD$10 billion) into one such magnetite project, hoisted by their own petards.

Credit: Nathan Paculba

diers who last week began building a road in an area that India regards as its territory.

Business

China National Offshore Oil Corp announced its discovery of a deepwater gas field about 150km south of the island province of Hainan, South China Morning Post reported. The semi-submersible rig, once at the centre of a dispute with Vietnam but now relocated to undisputed waters, is expected to produce 56.5 million cubic feet of gas per day at an average operational depth of 1.5km.

CNOOC chairman Wang Yilin was quoted by Xinhua as saying the discovery opened the door to deepwater oil and gas resources in the South China Sea. An iron-mining gambit by Asian investors to break Australian magnates’ hold on the industry has backfired, The Wall Street Journal reported.

Companies including China’s Ansteel Mining and Japan’s Mitsubishi (8058.TYO) have halted or scaled back plans to open up a new mining hub in Western Australia for mag-

workers fired from infamous OSI Group factory that fed consumers spoiled meat

340

An investigation by The Wall Street Journal found that many students of China’s vocational schools are being forced to work assembly lines as interns for manufacturers in order to graduate. China’s Ministry of Education, which said in 2010 that vocational schools must supply students to fill labor shortages, said there are at least eight million such student interns each year. Migrant workers remain drawn to coastal factories’ higher wages despite a government push to direct industries inland. That leaves vocational schools to funnel many of their 29.34 million students to internships at undermanned factories that have little to do with students’ majors and often violate labour rules.

3.7% August sales drop for McDonald’s resulting from OSI meat scandal

Average number of breakdowns per week of Beijing subway system

1 China Economic Review | October 2014

07

Q&A: MAINLAND MEDIA

Press under pressure Doug Young, former China business reporter, financial journalism teacher at Fudan University, and author of The Party Line: How the Media Dictates Public Opinion in Modern China, discusses the latest developments in mainland media I your book you talk In a lot about the sort of ssystem that’s in place to iinfluence and control what goes on, or what is w p published in the media here. So what are the h m main tools that are used ffor that today?

You know, nowadays Y Doug Young tthings are much freer tthan they were in the past and the media, you know, has been ordered to be more commercial and print news that people want to read. So it’s a bit more open, especially in terms of reporting local news. But when it comes to bigger stories and stories on sensitive topics basically all the media still follow the lead of the big central organizations - Xinhua, CCTV and People’s Daily, are sort of the big three. And then that’s sort of supplemented with oversight by the propaganda ministry, which, when big news happens, they’re usually very quick to put out directives which they selectively send to top editors and news organizations. Then it’s the top editor’s responsibility to make sure the word gets around to the rest of the staff. And they almost never send anything in writing, they never want to leave any sort of paper trail. It’s all done mostly through phone calls.

In the years since Xi Jinping’s ascension, what are the trends you’ve noticed in Chinese media coverage and control?

Right when Xi came in there was that big Southern Weekend strike, where they all went on strike because the New Years editorial was changed and substituted with some propaganda thing – and [the government] took the unusual step of negotiating with them and trying to make everybody happy, so some people were saying this could be a more open attitude toward media.

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China Economic Review | October 2014

But instead it seems to have really gotten much more repressive. And I think there are probably some real reasons for it. One, it’s a new president and I think they really are trying to reign in the media. But then another thing is that I think things in China’s media sort of were getting a little out of control in terms of people just reporting anything – there’s this whole business with extortion and bribery… the Chinese media were sort of becoming this unruly whatever, so they sort of tried to clip its wings. So part of it is controlling the message, but I think part of it is really just trying to tame this unruly thing, and I think that the 21st Century Business Herald scandal is part of that.

So the CBH scandal, where you’ve got state media claiming the paper’s journalists extorted companies for hundreds of millions, is representative of that problem?

I think unfortunately that’s fairly typical of the kinds of things that happen in this industry. You talk with reporters, a lot of my students, they talk about the terrible pay they get, and the newspapers expect them almost to do this kind of thing to supplement their income. It’s sort of an unspoken deal – we won’t pay you anything and you can say whatever you really want to try and supplement your income A lot of red envelopes.

Yeah, a lot of red envelopes. And that’s probably the more benign of the kind

TOUGH CHOICES: Many mainland papers find their reporters supplementing otherwise meager incomes with bribes and extortion rackets to get by, giving ample excuse for authorities to crack down on the industry

Q&A: MAINLAND MEDIA

of stuff that happens. I mean this whole business of extortion… and I’ve had reporters tell me they let the PR agencies write the news story for them. They just say “write the story for me,” and then they just submit it to their editor, and then they get a nice little payment for that. And then you hear stories also from reporters telling me they’ve been pressured to ask when they go on interviews if they want to buy any advertising, which a total nono in the West. You would never say “oh, I’m writing a story on you, oh, and by the way, would you like to advertise in our…” you know, with obviously the heavy implication being that maybe if you advertise my write up will be a little nicer, but if you don’t my write up won’t be as nice.

So to what extent do news outlets we’d call “professional” from a Western perspective, like Caijing and Caixin, have any real influence on the industry?

Even 21st Century Business Herald is sort of famous for actually giving their reporters decent salaries – they allow them to expense things. All these other publications, if a reporter wants to actually go out and meet a source and try and cultivate some networks they’ve gotta do it all on their own dime, they can’t expense anything.

And I think 21st Century Business Herald and Caixin and Caijing were all trying to be more Western in the sense that they would give their reporters real, livable salaries. I think in some cases they even forbade them – I think at Caixin, Hu Shuli’s publication, reporters were banned from accepting red envelopes. They’re trying to do it.

And that’s why this thing with CBH, in a way it almost looks like the central government trying to discredit a respected publication. Because they are a fairly respected publication.

One of the trends, or maybe aspirations that I was hoping to talk about was the conglomeration of certain outfits into more powerful media groups, as called for earlier this year

by Xi Jinping.

I think it was even in the last couple months that he said something about

“Where else would something like a skirmish at a local park turn into such a huge story involving so many people?” creating these media conglomerates.

It’s been talked about a lot, you haven’t seen much. I mean the big one that happened that I know of was here in Shanghai. Shanghai had three big media groups: one was SMG, which is the big TV operator, and the two old newspapers, one was the Wenhui, and the other was Jiefang Daily. They merged into a single company called Shanghai United Media or something like that. But that was sort of the first step.

They’re trying to do something similar right now in terms of China’s cable TV industry, to consolidate all these regional cable companies into one big single national operator. Sort of like what happened in the US. You used to have all thesse little cable operators and now there’s like three or four big ones: Comcast and Time Warner and so forth. But what happens in all of these cases, with the media and cable, is that you have really stiff resistance from local interests, because the Hunan provincial government doesn’t want to lose control of the Hunan cable TV companies to some company in Beijing that’s gonna try and operate the whole thing. So I think there’s been a lot of resistance at the local level. And that this particular Shanghai deal, they could pull it off because it was all engineered, I think, by the Shanghai propaganda ministry.

But I think there was even a lot of resistance to that.

The only media group you I ever really hear much about is the Southern Media Group, and they’re considered to be a relatively prestigious outfit.

Yeah, cutting edge. They’re not afraid to push the envelope, they’ll stand up

for their reporters. They’re definitely considered to be probably the most cutting edge, at least of the mainstream.

Aside from the Southern guys and magazines like Caixin and Caijing, which have adopted basically Western reporting standards, do think that anybody else comes close?

You see publications that are… ok.

But yeah, nothing that’s super cutting edge. Nobody really great there, and I don’t see it getting any better anytime soon, to be honest.

No? Well it’s just that these old media, they’re sort of torn between two masters… well, lots of masters. I gave a lecture about that, about how these media just have so many different masters to answer to. On the one hand they’ve been told to be commercial, on the other hand they have their local stakeholders who want them to be their propaganda mouthpiece, and on the other hand you have the national propaganda guys who want them to advance the Party’s national agenda.

They’ve just got too many different things that they’re trying to be, and a lot of times there’s conflict.

The other day at Lu Xun Park here in Shanghai – they closed it for one year for renovation, and it reopened and the local government in Hongkou, which is where I live – they held this big grand opening gala, and they wanted all the media to come and show how beautiful it was and everything. And this turf war broke out between these two groups of retirees who wanted the same area for their little singing performances, and all the media zoomed in on that. And apparently the Hongkou government was all upset, and they called the propaganda ministry, and the propaganda ministry was trying to squash the story in the media. Only in China. Where else would something like a skirmish at a local park turn into such a huge story involving so many people? But that’s how Chinese media are. Unless there’s some real reform to kick the government out of the media completely, which I don’t see happening anytime soon, it’s not gonna change.

China Economic Review | October 2014

09

Q & A : C A S H C U LT U R E

Gray economics Mario Cavolo, Shanghai-based communications advisor and professional speaker on the media and China, talks about his book on China’s cash economy, The Big Lie

W What is the “big lie”?

The “big lie” is the misT understanding u that China is poor. The deC ggree to which we think tthat we should follow aand believe, and thereffore forecast, on official sstatistics that we typiccally hear from governMario Cavolo m ments and institutional aanalysis-type organizations. We hear the information about things like China’s annual per capita income is US$3400 per year, and the Gini coefficient is double what the Gini coefficient of the United States is. Fortunately, a deeper look shows that that simply isn’t the case.

Your book discusses the emergence of this shadow cash culture that you’ve estimated at US$6 to US$10 trillion. Could you explain how and why this culture has developed?

I want to first point out the idea that in fact it hasn’t emerged as something new. And that’s a big part of the misunderstanding. China for the last couple of decades, if you talk to any Chinese person or businesspeople, has very much been a cash culture. And so much of that cash culture is in fact off the books by its very nature. We can talk about the negatives of course. For example, when you have such a large cash culture, it makes all kinds of corruption a lot easier. But the positives are that it is a huge economic force that no one is including when they’re doing their analysis and forecasting and estimates of what GDP is in this society.

So with your estimate of US$6 trillion you’re not looking to put a precise figure on this cash economy – it’s more that you want people to understand just the enormity of 10

China Economic Review | October 2014

what’s going on, and you’re trying to give a figure that is in some way acceptable to the public?

That’s right. And we do have some references to work with on that. We have the reference from Professor Wang Xiaoli with the China Reform Foundation, who in 2010 worked with Credit Suisse. Now, Credit Suisse, working with Professor Wang, produced the first official report on China’s shadow economy. The reference on that also would be Dr. Edward Feige from the University of Wisconsin, who’s the world’s most famous researcher on shadow economies, and who talks about how in the United States the shadow economy is US$2 trillion. And we’re not talking about the black economy, or illegal things.

The gray economy is the shadow economy of workers who are working off the books, and this money is not being reported to Uncle Sam. So we’ve got US$2 trillion in the US, and that’s relative to GDP of US$16 trillion. In China, let’s just call it US$10 trillion of GDP. And even Credit Suisse at that time estimated the lower range of what I’ve said, which is US$6 trillion, as being the size of China’s shadow economy.

So we’ve got a good reference there.

I trust that Credit Suisse did a lot of work in figuring out and looking deeply in terms of analysis and surveys and things to be able to reach that number of US$6 trillion. When I look at it a little bit further, I see US$6 trillion as being the low end of the range.

It could be as high as US$10 or US$12 trillion. And again, why do I say it?

There’s deductive reasoning—three to four hundred million rising middle class Chinese. Now, if you look at 20% of that population, you’re looking at 80 to 100 million people. And if you look at the nine stories of the nine people in the book, who are very common

people that I know, who are very much average and part of that middle class, these people have, without any question, US$100,000 to US$500,000.

And nobody realizes that they have this money. So if these nine people, the stories in the book, are representative of this 80 to 100 million people, we can easily deduce and say okay, so Mario’s saying there’s 100 million people out there who are just like these nine folks. The thing is, a lot of these people that I know have a lot more than US$100,000 in the bank. It’s really kind of miraculous. And the idea of having this much cash, to a Chinese, is not as shocking as it is to an American.

So it’s a very different thinking in the society behind what might be driving this kind of behavior and driving these kinds of numbers.

And just to be clear, when you talk about cash, you’re not including property wealth. You actually mean cash.

Absolutely true, what you said. I am not in any way, shape or form including property wealth in what I’m saying. It’s very natural psychologically for us to assume that China’s street vendors are earning RMB3000 to RMB6000 a month. I mean, you can look at them and see the shoddy state that they’re in and think, yeah, they’re making US$500 to US$1000 a month and they’re barely getting by. And this is proven to be very, very incorrect by personal and direct observation. You’re welcome to go out and just sit down outside a dumpling street vendor and watch for three hours and informally count how many dumplings they’re selling. We’re thinking that they’re only selling 100 a day. Actually, they’re selling closer to 300 a day. So 300 a day times RMB10 of zhayanrou or jipai or whatever it might be, this is RMB3000. Not RMB1000. So the

Q & A : C A S H C U LT U R E

BENEATH THE MATTRESS: Cavolo believes excluding China’s cash economy from GDP underrepresents its wealth

revenue that they’re actually taking in, Oliver, on a daily basis, is triple. And this is very common and, again, easy if you just take the time to take a look and watch and see what’s really happening.

I’ve gone a step further because I’ve known many of the street vendors, they’ve become lao pengyou, you know, I’ve known them for many years, and I would talk to them and I would ask them. And they say, oh yeah, we sell 250 of these dumplings a day and we sell 50 of these chickens a day. And you just pull out your calculator and figure out that that’s US$500 a day of revenue, so we’re going to say that that’s five days a week, even six days a week, so this is US$6000, US$12000, volume revenue per month operating—and I’m speaking in dollars—and now we look at their cost of doing business. Well, we know their cost of doing business is extremely low because they’re a street vendor. They have their food cost, and you can deduct food cost out of that of about 30%, it’s very common, commonly understood, so now we’ve got US$8000 left. And what other expenses do they have, they’ve got some expenses to their equipment, the use of the gas, the use of the electricity, they don’t have rent, they’re collecting cash all day long so they’re not paying taxes. So we have a street vendor we thought was poor, and actually we found out they’re clearing US$5000 a month. And it’s in cash off the books, and they’ve been do-

ing this for 10 years. So US$5000 a month, 10 months out of the year, is US$50000.

What are the implications of this cash economy? What are the implications of so much cash being available?

The implications are, for the most part, very very positive. I’m going to go very much along the lines of the other folks that we know who are positive on the Chinese economy, and I’ll paraphrase Jim O’Neill, the former chairman of Goldman Sachs. When asked about this idea of whether China’s economy is going to crash, whether there’s some kind of an economic disaster on the horizon, his answer is: I think it’s ridiculous. China is clearly slowing in certain areas, but most of the reason it’s slowing is because the policymakers deliberately want it to slow, and get China readjusted. So as I’ve said for the past two years, China is never going to land anytime soon. So no hard landing in China, and I agree with that 100%.

What other things about the Chinese economy should readers be aware of?

I don’t think anybody realizes that China’s private sector GDP as a percentage of total GDP is now larger than manufacturing, and larger than agriculture. You keep hearing in the newspapers and in a lot of official analysis from official statistics that China’s domestic economy needs to grow, and

needs to decrease its reliance on the national-level infrastructure spending, and government spending and SOEs. You still read this in mainstream media articles, as if it hasn’t happened yet.

And I’m telling you it’s already happened. China’s private sector GDP is now the largest sector and percentage of GDP compared to any other sector in the country. The private sector is booming. The private sector is also three times more profitable, for example, than SOEs. Another example is China’s exports. So we say, oh, we’re worried about China’s exports, China’s exports are declining. Well, we know China’s exports are on a decline, and we know that there’s rising labor costs in China, so China’s products are getting more expensive, so China’s exports are declining because they’re not as competitive as they were. And that’s all we hear in the narrative. But what we need to remember in the narrative is that China’s export sector, as a percentage of GDP, is half of what it was ten years ago. Ten years ago China’s exports were 23% of GDP. Today they’re only 11% of GDP. So you can talk to me about how exports are declining, but in terms of how much of an impact that makes on overall GDP, and how much it tells us about the overall health of the economy – it’s half as important as it was just ten years ago. These are things, I believe, very few people factor into their fundamental understandings and forecasting of what’s happening in China.

China Economic Review | October 2014

11

Q&A : FOREIGN CORRESPONDENCE

Writing home Tracy Dahlby, former Tokyo bureau chief, National Geographic contributor and author of the new memoir Into the Field: A Foreign Correspondent’s Notebook looks back on a life reporting on Asia

Credit: Rebecca Davis

Y got your start as a You rreporter for a financial newswire in Japan durn iing the 70s, back when iit was still big on heavy iindustry, but had begun sshifting toward a conssumer economy. China sstories often echo that narrative these days, n Tracy Dahlby b but was Tokyo ever so polluted? p I’d say “not as” but it could be pretty grim. I remember being profoundly disappointed when, in 1976, I climbed Mount Fuji for the first time only to stumble upon slopes strewn with trash.

I wondered how the Japanese, who had a reputation, in poetry and prose, as world-champion lovers of nature could let their iconic mountain go to hell like that. So Fuji was my reigning metaphor. And it’s true that Tokyo often choked under a blanket of industrial smog. I don’t think it ever reached what China is coping with today. But it pays to remember that Japan got its pollution problems under control and, with the right policies, China has a shot at doing so too. How China does that while maintaining economic growth and meeting rising popular expectations is, of course, the compelling mystery.

Much is still made of the apparent economic similarities between China now and Japan during the boom years. You write in your book about covering both during your career – what comparisons hold up, and which strike you as misguided?

During my brief time at the financial news wire in Tokyo, I took the stock market closings in my shaky Japanese and wasn’t always sure I’d got the decimal point in the right place.

Frankly, I’m still a little amazed that 12

China Economic Review | October 2014

the global economy survived. In writing about those times today, however, I very much feel China looking over my shoulder because there are the obvious similarities between Japan then and China now—the active, pointed pioneering of overseas markets and the gobbling up of vast sources of raw materials, the frenetic building of roads, dams, bridges and airports and, above all, the psychological transformation that comes to a country with rapidly rising consumer expectations.

The big difference, of course, is a matter of scale and scope. What China has undertaken dwarfs other models and that’s what makes it such a wonderful, wrenching, gripping story to behold.

When and why did you first come to China as a journalist?

I made my first trip to China in January of 1978, about 14 months after the death of Mao Zedong. Beijing was a city of bicycles, Mao suits and, for foreigners, a Friendship Store that was not exactly consumer-friendly. It wasn’t easy for an American to get a visa back then. But a friend of a friend in Hong Kong, a wonderful local businesswoman, insisted that I apply and that I turn over my passport to her. It turns out she had been at school with a man who worked the other side of the fence for China travel and presided over the tourist visa stamp. So I found myself headed over the border by train to Guangzhou and then Beijing with a group of Japanese, American and Australian tourists. I somehow managed to report a story for The New York Times travel section on that jaunt at a time when China had become an alluring ticket for American travelers.

So I guess you could say I started my China watching as half tourist, half hustling hack, and that’s pretty much the way I proceeded in my career, as

a friend recently put it, letting myself “wander and wonder.”

There were earlier motivations, too. I was a typically restless undergrad in Seattle, Washington, living at home and eager to trade a ho-hum life for the excitement and adventure of the wider world. I’d heard reports of the Cultural Revolution on a radio in my bedroom that was ridiculously large—the size of a shoebox. Today, we can dial up tons of information about China on our smart phones or tablets. In those days, China was a black box, information was scarce, and what there was required strenuous decoding. That of course meant that China was a tremendous mystery that fired your imagination. You really wanted to get out to Asia and take a crack at trying to figure it out.

It’s rare to go a week lately without a dust-up between China and any of the countries that ring the South China Sea. Did the region always seem destined for conflict, or did most seem to buy into China’s “peaceful rise” sales pitch?

It’s remarkable to me how little has changed in the fundamental terms of that dispute over the last two decades, despite today’s frenetic foreign press coverage of China’s new harder line.

I open “Into the Field” by recounting a nearly three-month reporting swing I took through the South China Sea immediately after Handover in Hong Kong in 1997. With the help of friends in Manila, I managed to talk my way out to the Spratlys with a transport plane full of rifle-toting Filipino military men. It was starkly beautiful out there but blessedly little was going on, at least on the surface.

Then as now, the billion- or maybe trillion-dollar question was the extent of resources that might rest on the sea

Q&A: FOREIGN CORRESPONDENCE

become an intensely observed gauge of how and to what extent America will be able to maintain its pride of place in world leadership.

What we tried to do at Newsweek, back in the day, was to help provide readers with the context they could use to develop a clearer understanding of complications of U.S.-Japan relations—the historical, political and, I dare say, some of the psychological factors that not infrequently contributed to one of the two sides not really hearing what the other side was trying to say. Fast-forward 30 years, and the U.S. media faces a similar challenge in preparing Americans for China’s rise and how it will affect the way we live our lives and do business in this country.

PORT OF IMPORT: Dahlby’s months-long reporting excursion in the South China Sea began in Hong Kong, whose location has allowed it to take full economic advantage of those politically tempestuous waters

floor. Such visions, part analysis, part ambitious national dreaming, will, I’d wager, continue to ratchet up tensions as China continues to rise, peacefully or not.

China is the clear center of attention for the financial press in Asia, but reporting long-term can create something like tunnel vision. Where in the region, if anywhere, do you see untapped economic potential on the level of a China or Japan?

That’s a good, tough question and journalists have a lousy track record when it comes to accurate prognostication, at least this one. I’d venture to say, however, that once investment and infrastructure gain even more traction in a place like India, China’s neighborhood becomes an even more competitive place. Add to that improvements in intra-regional trade and marketing ties between and among the countries of Southeast Asia and, barring the unfortunate and unforeseen, you have a recipe for sustained growth that will include China, perhaps be dominated

by China, but will by no means rely on China alone.

In the mid-80’s you were brought in from Tokyo to eventually serve as managing editor for Newsweek

International. How did the view of Asia from NYC differ from your own when you returned?

It reminds you just how much times have changed. Back then America was focused on what was generally perceived as a Japanese economic juggernaut and the challenges posed by Japan’s ballooning trade advantages vis-à-vis the United States. Japan’s economic advance had energized a group of formidable “Japan-bashers” in business, government and the media that made the Japanese seem ten feet tall. The economic challenge was real enough but there was something else at work, too. By the end of the decade, the Soviet Union was into its final fizzle, and imploding, and America needed a new focus for its ambitions and anxieties, and Japan was “it.”

As time went on, of course, Japan proved a disappointing bogeyman. Its economy had bottomed out by the early 90s and lapsed into a marathon, years-long recession. China began to emerge as a new focus of concern. The 9/11 attacks and the aftermath shifted America’s central preoccupation to the war on terror, which may have deflected an even more intense focus on China as America’s new rival for superpower status. Today, of course, bilateral relations with China have today

Freelance, especially in China, is the name of the game for many aspiring foreign correspondents these days.

How did you make the jump from part-time to full-time reporting, and to what extent is the path you took still open to would-be journalists here?

My advice on that score never varies. As I say in my book, “Pick a part of the world you can fall in love with and plant yourself there for at least two years. Try your hand at freelancing. Teach English, tend bar, or give body modification classes—whatever it takes to ward off starvation. Meanwhile suck the place into your bones.

Absorb its language and politics, its loves, hates, and idiosyncrasies, the alarming as well as the charming….

The place doesn’t have to love you back, at least not right away. But if doing journalism is your goal, make sure it’s somewhere the rest of the world wants to know about too.”

I think China admirably fills that bill. It’s both a place of endless fascination, big and small, and somewhere people who aren’t in China want and need to know about. In my case, in Japan, I used my freelance assignments to try to hone basic skills (and I had precisely none to start with), while I worked at the art of becoming pleasantly annoying until sources would agree to talk to me and somebody finally gave me a regular job.

China Economic Review | October 2014

13

O P - E D : S P O R T A N D S T R AT E G Y

Footie, funding & ‘BIRGing’ Simon Chadwick, professor of sport business strategy at Coventry University and the editor of sport business issues site The Scorecard, talks about the future of Chinese football and the challenges that await its fans I a survey you did In rrecently of over 16,000 ffans in China it came out that Germany was the most popular w national team among n ffans surveyed, followed

by Italy, England and b Spain. The conclusion S was that Chinese basiw Simon Chadwick c cally pick the winning tteams. Why is that?

I’ve done various pieces of research over the years looking at Chinese fans’ support for club teams and Chinese fans’ support for national teams, and I think in both cases obviously Chinese fans don’t have necessarily a national team, or a strong national team or a strong domestic team to follow. And I think what they have a tendency to do is really to select on the basis of two things.

I think the first one is to select on the basis of success. The second factor I would say is really based on history.

I think Chinese fans like a history to their clubs. At the national team level if you look at the likes of Germany, Germany has this long track record, going back over several decades, of performing well at the international level.

Do you think that means that if China does field a World Cup team again, Chinese won’t support their own team?

In lots of other sports China has been hugely successful, and there is a psychological phenomenon among sports fans called ‘BIRGing,’ Basking In Reflected Glory. I think what sports like table tennis enable Chinese fans to do is to BIRG. In football, it’s different. Because in spite of the efforts of the Chinese government and of the Chinese state to promote football, the national team and the domestic teams 14

China Economic Review | October 2014

just haven’t become more successful.

Another of the big problems is that Chinese football is seen as being very corrupt. And I know the Chinese government has tried very hard to address that matter and is continuing to do so, but it does foster a degree of cynicism and suspicion amongst football fans.

You could support German soccer which is clean, or you could support Chinese soccer which is not.

On that note, why even support football—why not pick a sport that’s more successful?

I think we’ve started to see some changes recently that potentially will have a profound effect on Chinese football. In particular, I refer to the case of Guangzhou Evergrande, because the Evergrande Real Estate Company, which has owned the Guangzhou club, has invested heavily—not just in terms of buying players and recruiting

good coaches, but they’ve also set up the Guangzhou Academy, which currently has 2,000 kids attending it. This is very much based on a long-term view of developing Chinese playing talent, and Guangzhou became the first Chinese club to win the Asian Champions League earlier this year.

So they’ve made really large and tangible strides in terms of improving both the performance level and the image of Chinese football, not just domestically but overseas, too.

I’ve been told that Beijing Guoan is the most popular club team among fans. Given that and its location, why is it not receiving more funding? Why is it not more supported?

Beijing Guoan has a very different ownership structure to other clubs.

Obviously in the case of Guangzhou Evergrande, what you’ve got over the last decade is Evergrande is the owner,

MOMENT OF TRUTH: As Football’s popularity continues to soar in China, the country faces tough decisions on how to develop domestic talent in a sport plagued by opacity, graft and interference from the state

O P - E D : S P O R T A N D S T R AT E G Y

and now Alibaba is moving in, whereas Beijing Guoan, historically it’s got large state involvement in the club.

The state is the majority shareholder of Beijing Guoan. So in some ways Beijing Guoan is almost a reminder of how things used to be. But I think what it doesn’t have because of that ownership structure is the commercial focus and entrepreneurial spirit you might see at other clubs.

So it’s almost state-owned enterprise versus private enterprise.

Yeah, and I guess that really is the juxtaposition, and the crossroads that Chinese football is at right now. Because there is the old world, which to a certain extent which is represented

by Beijing Guoan, and then the new world, which to a certain extent is represented by Guangzhou Evergrande.

And I think this is not just an issue for fans, for clubs, it’s an issue for the government and for the country, too. And it needs to ask itself: Which way do you want to go?

I was doing some interviews at the Shanghai Shenhua game the other day, and some people were saying they would basically never support the national team because it was overly politicized. What is the story behind that?

There are various ways to look at this.

The first thing to say is that the world governing body of football is FIFA. Under FIFA rules, domestic football associations must be immune from interference from state governments.

Now obviously in China, it’s different: it is normal for the state to intervene.

And so typically what you have seen is the government influencing who becomes the president of the football association, influencing who buys a football club, influencing the kind of decisions that are made about national football.

And so I think what China needs to go through – and I’m talking about the government, the football association, and the fans themselves – is almost a re-negotiation of what happens in football in China. In international terms it’s acceptable for the Chinese government to set performance tar-

“I think this is not just an issue for fans, for clubs, it’s an issue for the government and for the country, too.

And it needs to ask itself: Which way do you want to go?” gets, and to allocate resources that ensure that football gets better. But I think at that point it has to step back and leave the football association and the clubs themselves to make the best decisions for Chinese football.

You’ve done some research on the social media aspect of fandom here – is there anything interesting to say about how social media has affected Chinese fan behavior?

I think there are two things. Firstly, a broader media issue, and secondly a more specific social media issue. I think as far as broader media is concerned it’s really interesting, because obviously the first point of engagement for Chinese fans with European football very often comes through television. And European football first was broadcast in China during the 1980s. Now at that point Italy’s La Liga was very active in selling television rights in China. And during the mid-to-late 80s the two Milan clubs, Inter Milan and AC Milan, were very, very successful, so they were successful internationally. And what you tend to find is, particularly among men in their middle ages, a strong fan base, firstly for Italian football, and secondly for AC Milan and Inter Milan. Now the Italian Super Cup, the game that’s played just before the season starts between the previous season’s League winners and the previous season’s Cup winners, has been taking place in Beijing. So such is the strength of the predisposition towards Italian football amongst certain target markets, certain key fan markets in China, that Italian games

have actually been played in China as a result. And so Italian football, in general terms Italian football is in a very bad state right now, but in China there’s still a very strong and healthy interest in Italian football that comes from the 1980s, comes from these middle-aged men in particular, also their kids who are now growing up and becoming Italian football fans too. So the point I would make about broadcasting in general is for some people, still, the first point of engagement with football, particularly European football, comes through TV. So this is why broadcast content and broadcast markets are very important, particularly in China.

As regards social media, this is obviously really, really interesting, because with the massive growth in mobile technology and handset ownership, the initial rise of the likes of Tencent Weibo and Sina Weibo and now the likes of WeChat, what that has enabled is for actual fans and prospective fans to talk about and to share content around football. And what we found particularly interesting is, in a society where standing out from the crowd is not necessarily socially desirable, what you can actually do in social media is you can stand out from the crowd. So you can say things and you can post content, you can share content, that marks you out as being different. So you can mark yourself out as being a Manchester United fan. Or you can mark yourself out as being a Lionel Messi fan.

And so the research that we’ve done and the fans we’ve talked to – social media, amongst football fans, allows these people to construct an identity for themselves in a way that in broader society they’re denied. So in other words they can speak how they want, they can act how they want, they can appear how they want, they can share things that they want, and this is very, very different to their normal, everyday, face-to-face lives. It’s almost like social media is a virtual sanctuary where you can be yourself.

An unabridged version of this interview can be found at http://www.chinaeconomicreview.com/footballBIRGing China Economic Review | October 2014

15

OP-ED: SECURITIZATION

Sunlight, securitized Bryane Michael, senior fellow at the University of Hong Kong Law Faculty’s Institute of International Financial Studies and co-author of a new paper on solar securitization in China with Simon Zhao and Dariusz Wojcik, discusses how regulators can make the industry into a world-beater

C

hina represents one of t h e w o r l d ’s llargest solar energ y m markets – potentially p providing a revenueggenerating bonanza for w willing investors. Estim mates of current solar ((photovoltaic) producBryane Michael ttion on the Mainland p place the value China’s solar industry at about EUR37 billion (RMB300 billion) – representing roughly 40% of the world’s solar panel production. Geometrically extrapolating China’s photovoltaic sector production at current growth rates leads to market sizes of at least EUR100 billion by 2017. For financial firms that can provide the money to grow out this sunrise industry, the profits could be staggering. Securitisation (or “chopping” solar companies’ assets and liabilities into papers which investors can trade) can provide the resources the China’s solar industry needs. Yet its financial centres – like Shanghai and Hong Kong – seem unable and unwilling to provide the services necessary to do this. What can China’s aspiring financial centres (and particularly Hong Kong) do to provide funds to this infant industry? How can regulators help encourage China’s financial firms to securitize solar assets -- before US firms swoop in?

Just How Big is the Funding Opportunity?

China’s solar panel exports represent the tip of the iceberg for China’s solar energy industry. Market sizes of EUR100 billion only take into account revenues from the sale of solar panels. China also represents 16

China Economic Review | October 2014

an important market for solar energy consumption. Like in the US (think about SolarCity), China will need companies which provide panels, install capacity, provide finance for customers, engage in research and development and other activities.

The development of a domestic market could add another US$100 million in revenue opportunities. Yet, to seize these opportunities, China’s solar companies will need to find financiers which are willing to take risks today.

Securitisation allows China’s solar companies to sell their current and future assets and liabilities to a wide range of investors. In our full paper (available online) we describe the range of things, such as intellectual property and even loans from banks, which China’s solar industry can “chop up” into pieces of paper and sell as securities. The example of their plant, property and equipment (PPE) provides an example. Looking at the value of these companies’ PPE based on their riskiness. we found that companies belonging to the safest and riskiest tranche had returns on their PPE assets of around 13% and 7% respectively in 2012. Imagine if these companies could “sell off” – in the form of securitisation – these assets instead of hold them on their balance sheets. Investors win because they get access to the assets they want. The companies win because they get more working capital. For financial intermediaries offering these PPE securities, they can earn commissions on the trade of US$7 billion in the value of these assets. As we describe in our longer paper, the value of all securitizable assets and liabilities easily comes to US$100 billion.

If financial firms can capture solar financing across the Asian region, the value of photovoltaic energy revenues in Asia alone could top half a trillion dollars. As we show in our paper, if countries like the Philippines, India and others manage to expand access to electricity beyond current levels (rather than simply replace coal, gas and oil with solar), market sizes could be much bigger.

Thus, the market for solar power could be much, much larger if financial institutions in places like Shanghai and Hong Kong could figure out ways of providing flexible and lowcost finance to solar technology producers and users.

The United States provides more finance to China’s Solar Industry US-based financial intermediaries have captured a far greater share of China’s solar industry finance than one might expect. The Hong Kong-listed Hanergy and Xinyi have market capitalisations in excess of other companies. Yet US listings comprise a large part these companies’ equity finance. Moreover, US intermediaries have inserted themselves into funding channels – even when those channels involve mostly Chinese (including Hong Kong) listed or funded solar panel companies. US-based solar funds have plugged themselves into the centre of equity and lending relationships going through Hong Kong. Hong Kong broker-dealers like HSBC and Standard Chartered hold a relatively larger value of Hong Kong-listed Mainland solar companies’ shares than US broker-dealers with specific solar offerings like Blackrock (iShares), Van Eck (Market Vec-

OP-ED: SECURITIZATION

tors), and Guggenheim. Yet these broker-dealers have positioned themselves in investment networks more centrally – that is, with holdings in the widest number of mainland solar companies. They hold relatively large concentrations of these companies’ shares and hold larger ranges of solar companies’ shares than Hong Kong-based intermediaries. Clearly Guggenheim Solar and Market Vectors Solar ETF represent go-to funds for investors looking to invest in global solar. Funding centred around Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen for these companies remains extremely low.

Something about Chinese (including Hong Kong) financial law clearly impedes the packaging and distribution of solar investments.

Most academic authors argue that China’s securitisation law does not allow Chinese-based financial intermediaries (including Hong Kong based ones) to compete with their

London and New York-based rivals.

What can these financial centres do to tap into this trillion dollar industry which they are losing to the US? Making Chinese financial centres hubs of solar securitisation If Hong Kong (or Shanghai for that matter) can implement the innovations made in the US, their banks and brokers stand a chance at taking back the securitisation money they are losing. Our study describes just how easily investors can obtain information about US-listed Chinese solar companies – and how difficult they find it to obtain such information for those listed in Hong Kong.

Regulators like the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission place high barriers for companies looking to educate investors about investing in productive solar securitisations, but they do not need to. The California-based crowdfunder site

Mosaic provides a prime example of a financial intermediary – and the financial laws governing that intermediary – that encourages the securitisation of solar company assets and liabilities.

From Mosaic to the Guggenheim Solar ETF, the US provides numerous examples of the kinds of innovations needed in China. Such innovations start with changes in Chinese financial law, particularly for securitization. With the proper changes in financial law, explained in full in our paper, investors would be able to buy the risks and returns they want in China’s solar industry right at home, be that in Shanghai, Shenzhen, or Hong Kong.

For a link to the full paper and to view this article online, head to chinaeconomicreview.com/solarsecuritization

China Economic Review | October 2014

17

OP-ED: SH-HK STOCK CONNECT

North bound at last CapitalVue’s Elias Glenn explains how to own a piece of a Communist Party Newspaper or Zhou Enlai’s favorite liquor with SH-HK Stock Connect

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China Economic Review | October 2014

amount is hit, the daily quote will not be available.

About half of Shanghai-listed companies will be available to Hong Kong investors, though the entire Shenzhen Stock Exchange and its 1,600+ companies are still off limits.

Many of China’s most interesting, high-growth companies are listed on Shenzhen’s growth boards. The expectation is that if things go well, the program will be expanded with higher quotas and more stocks available for investment. Reports say the Shenzhen Stock Exchange has already begun exploring setting up a similar program.

Despite the limited scope, the connection has sparked renewed interest in poor-performing mainland equity markets. Since the program was announced on April 10, the benchmark SSE Composite Index has gained 9.7%, while the SSE 380 Index, whose constituents will be included in Stock Connect, has risen 17.8% Perhaps even more important, trading volume has increased significantly since early August (see chart), when a clearer schedule for the launch of the Stock Connect was announced, showing that local investors are finally coming back to the markets.

The program is important for the

A-share Daily Turnover (RMB100mn) 2,500.00

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1,500.00

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500.00

Heng Seng China AH Premium Index 105

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80

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aijiu is going global: Under a program to be launched l in October, individual i investors in Hong Kong will be able H to t finally buy stock in Kweichou Moutai, the K world’s biggest seller of w Chinese baijiu liquor, C with over 550 a Elias Glenn along other companies listed o on China’s domestic Shanghai Stock Exchange. The program, dubbed the Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect, allows Hong Kong and Shanghai investors to trade certain shares listed on each other’s stock exchanges for the first time.

Interest in the program is high, as market participants we talk to on both sides are rushing to add Hong Kong or mainland market data before the fast-approaching deadlines. The linkup marks a key step in the evolution of China’s financial and capital markets, and presents opportunities for individual overseas investors to buy into leading Chinese companies for the first time.

The program, however, will not provide a massive influx of funds to either market. There are significant limitations to the Stock Connect—a total of RMB300 billion in investment is allowed into Shanghai (the Northbound link), and RMB250 billion into Hong Kong (Southbound).

The RMB300 billion for Shanghai is equal to less than 2% of the total market capitalization of A-shares listed in the city.

The daily amount that can be invested into Shanghai is RMB13 billion, with Hong Kong’s daily quota set at RMB10.5 billion. The Shanghai amount accounts for about 14.7% of average daily trading in Shanghai Ashares this year, though once the total

OP-ED: SH-HK STOCK CONNECT

further opening of China’s financial markets as well as the internationalization of the yuan. Chinese investors have famously lacked options to invest their money outside of property, and there are tight restrictions on moving funds outside of China’s borders. The Stock Connect will not allow mainland investors to move funds outside of their broker accounts holding Hong Kong shares, and there is no yuan convertibility, but it marks a move towards opening financial markets and allowing individuals to directly invest in assets outside the mainland.

The program will also encourage further use of the yuan outside of China. It will be needed to trade A-shares, and there are reports that the limit for yuan conversion will be raised. The Stock Connect, and other developments, are all part of the longterm goal of free yuan convertibility and market-driven financial markets in China.

China’s capital markets have been effectively cut off from the rest of the world, and the Stock Connect program opens up many large, industry–leading companies to a much larger group of foreign investors. We are already seeing increased interest in mainland stock markets because of the program. After being overvalued relative to other markets for many years, several years of poor performance (the Shanghai Composite Index has fallen 62% since the 2007 peak) mean that Shanghai-listed A-shares were valued at only 11.11 times earnings as of September 23, compared to an average of 23.4 over the last 10 years. The Dow Jones U.S. Industrial Average is currently valued at 16.2 times earnings.

In April 2007 the Heng Seng China AH Premium Index, which measures the difference in price between companies listed on both mainland and Hong Kong exchanges (known as A/H shares), showed A-shares were valued over 40% higher than their corresponding H shares. As of September 23, A-shares were 4% cheaper than H shares. This disparity will move toward equilibrium with the launch of the Stock Connect, leaving the most interesting opportunities in sectors not heavily represented by companies listed overseas or in stocks that are un-

DRINK IT IN: Moutai, long a favorite of China’s elites, is now open to investment from Zhou Public

dervalued compared to peers in Hong Kong or other markets.

The companies available to individual Hong Kong investors for the first time include the aforementioned Kweichou Moutai, China’s mostfamous baijiu brand. The company generated liquor sales of RMB30.9 billion in 2013 and profits of RMB15 billion. While the baijiu sector has been battered during the last year by Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign, strong brands such as Moutai stand to come out the other side stronger after sector reshuffling.

Another first-time offering is Shanghai Automotive, China’s largest automaker and a partner of Volkswagen and General Motors in China.

The company sold 5.1 million cars in 2013, is valued at less than 8 times earnings. General Motors sold 9.7 million cars last year and has a P/E ratio of 12.

Bright Dairy, meanwhile, has a high valuation at almost 50 times 2013 earnings, but it is part of one of the big 4 dairy groups in China, giving it a strong position in a major secular growth story, and has a strong outlook with state-owned enterprise reform and overseas expansion. BesTV is a

Shanghai-government-backed new media company that is Microsoft’s partner to bring the Xbox to China.

And who wouldn’t want to own a piece of People.cn, the online arm of the official Communist Party mouthpiece? The company’s profits grew 29.75% last year.

Investors, both QFII and locals, have shunned the local stock markets in recent years due to a lack of transparency, poor performance, and a perception that it is not market-driven, but the SH-HK Stock Connect has rekindled interest and may finally shed some well-deserved light on A-shares.

Investors will need to do their homework, but there are likely quality opportunities waiting for those that do.

Cassie Xing helped research this article.

CapitalVue is a Shanghai-based provider of data and content on China’s local financial markets.

For more information about Chinese A-shares, including company tearsheets and financials, news and market data feeds, email info@capitalvue.com.

China Economic Review | October 2014

19

BOTTOMS UP: A nurse in Hangzhou feeds a newborn baby with formula, which the World Health Organization discourages during a child’s first six months

Troubled deliveries: Infant retail in China THE LATEST GENERATION OF CHINESE PARENTS, RAISED ON BREASTMILK AND TOILET TRAINED IN OPEN-CROTCH PANTS, NOW DEMAND DISPOSABLE DIAPERS AND FORMULA THANKS TO MARKETING AND MARKETIZATION

Credit: imaginechina

COVER STORY: INFANT R ETAIL

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abytree, one of China’s most popular sites for expecting and new mothers, has a dedicated nursing app for the iPhone where worried moms can solicit and give advice. That alone says something, but a quick scan of the latest queries says much more: “Seeking advice: Enough breast milk or not?”

“Seeking help: Amount of milk drunk by newborn child” “My quest for milk may finally be over” ...To give only a few examples. Meanwhile, at a Shanghai supermarket the disposable diapers aisle is running low again, prompting a restock of Huggies.

Between these apparent dual dearths of milk and diapers, it would seem the poster image of the fat, diapered baby is in imminent danger in China. But until about a decade ago, neither formula nor disposable diapers had much of a market on the mainland.

Nor did mothers feel particularly put out by a lack of either.

To create demand, Western companies deployed tactics tried if not necessarily true, nor particularly brand-new, to convince parents here that both are sina qua non for raising a healthy child. For both diapers and formula, this was accomplished in part by taking advantage of the common fear among recent generations of mothers in China that their child is at risk of falling behind immediately after it slips from the womb.

Whether the China market will always be quite so kind to global purveyors of milk powder and disposable diapers is a question of politics, marketing, culture and demographics. At the nexus of all these issues sit China’s newest generation of parents.

“Because of globalization and because of changes in culture, this is a period of confusion for Chinese women,” said Kelly Dombroski, a lecturer at the University of Canterbury New Zealand with experience researching both formula and diaper use in China. How the country’s mothers deal with that confusion will move mountains of white powder and paper, and direct corresponding avalanches of the China Economic Review | October 2014

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Credit: imaginechina

COVER STORY: INFANT RETAIL

GOLDEN SLUMBERS: A display for Proctor & Gamble’s Pampers-brand disposable diapers promises parents their infants can have ten hours of dry, and assumedly uninterrupted, “golden sleep”

pink RMB100 notes used to pay for them.

Growing demand Formula is not necessary for most women, provided they are able to stay with their child and nurse uninterrupted. The World Health Organization (WHO) calls colostrum, the yellowish, sticky breast milk produced at the end of pregnancy, the “perfect food” for a newborn, and recommends exclusive breastfeeding for up to six months. However, from the 1980s onward, domestic consumption of milk powder, or formula, in China has seen ravenous growth. During the first year on record, 1986, 13.5 million tons of dry whole milk powder was consumed in China according to official statistics. That may seem like a lot until compared with last year’s total tonnage of 178 million.

Even the infamous 2008 tainted milk powder scandal – when melamine added to Chinese-made milk powder sickened 300,000, hospitalized 54,000 babies and killed six infants – resulted only in a temporary dip in domestic consumption. It also caused an enduring surge in demand for foreign formula: In 2013 alone, 22

China Economic Review | October 2014

China consumed 53.5 million metric tons of foreign formula.

Farmers in China and elsewhere have ridden that demand to the bank: From 2008 to 2013 New Zealand’s annual milk powder exports more than doubled to 1.35 million tons last year, exceeding even China’s domestic production of 1.22 million tons.

The country saw exports to China rise 45% year-on-year in 2013 to US$7.696 billion (NZ$9.9 billion).

Demand for foreign formula is so great that Hong Kong enacted a limit on how much of it could be bought in the territory by mainland mothers, though milk powder mules now simply smuggle the white powder north over the border.

The role of foreign enterprise in such a key industry has not gone unnoticed. Last year, China both unveiled subsidies and other support for domestic milk powder producers like Mengniu and Yili, and also fined six foreign companies a total of US$100 million for price fixing.

In May of this year the second shoe dropped when it announced additional restrictions requiring foreign milk powder producers to register before being allowed to sell in China.

Fattening up Officially, China’s government supports breastfeeding in line with WHO recommendations. A 1995 regulation barred companies from offering free formula or samples to pregnant women, their families and hospitals; it also forbade hospitals from promoting infant formula or accepting gifts or help from formula companies. UNICEF’s international initiative in support of exclusively breastfeeding infants for the first six months claimed that as of 1994, China had 6,000 “Baby-Friendly” hospitals. It asserted that exclusive breastfeeding in rural areas rose from 29% in 1992 to 68% two years later, while in urban areas the increase was from 10% to 48%.

A 2004-2005 study of infant feeding practices in Zhejiang province found nowhere near that level of breastfeeding during the first six months, exclusive or otherwise.

While non-exclusive breastfeeding rates before discharge from the hospital for urban, suburban and rural mothers were all above 96%, exclusive breastfeeding rates before discharge were only 38%, 63.4% and 61%, respectively. By the sixth month, exclusive breastfeeding rates had fallen to 0.2%, 0.5% and 7.2%, respectively.

Last year, a Reuters investigation laid bare how commonly the 1995 regulation is flouted as companies push formula on new or expecting mothers. The Reuters investigation found violations commonplace, with doctors giving out discount cards for infant formula, hospital staff strapping identity bands branded with formula companies’ names to newborns, and formula representatives distributing samples to mothers recovering from childbirth. Pediatrician Sheng Xiaoyang at the affiliated hospital of Shanghai Jiaotong University Medical School told China Economic Review she had only rarely been approached by formula companies, but said she believed a lack of education among low-level staff also played a part in staffers’ eagerness to push said goods.

“For some primary-level doctors, because they don’t know much about

COVER STORY: INFANT R ETAIL

breastfeeding, they may suggest more milk powder,” Sheng said. That fattens up infants and increases their risk of diseases like diabetes, problems familiar in the west and which are currently exploding in China. “The kids in big cities like Beijing and Shanghai, when you compare them to the kids in Europe and America... they’re a bit fatter, a bit bigger,” she said.

Stork stalkers That suggestion matched up with the experiences of Tang Wangwen, mother of two and breastfeeding class leader at La Leche League in Shanghai. Tang recalled meeting mothers who were advised by nurses to give their children formula in the first three days of life in order to ensure they had enough food, and being told that herself. But she also related pressures more akin to those described in the Reuters report. During her first pregnancy she said she attended breastfeeding lectures that barely mentioned breastfeeding.

“Maybe they would mention only one or two sentences about breastfeeding, ‘breastfeeding is good,’ ‘breastfeeding is best for your baby,’ and then they’d say ‘but if you don’t have enough milk you have to add formula,” Tang said. After the lesson, she said, the doctors would give the expecting mothers formula advertisements.

Another common practice, Tang said, is for formula companies to cold-call new mothers at their phone numbers, using lists purchased from someone at the hospital or a pharmacy. Formula hawkers tell mothers if their baby can’t sleep for more than three hours straight they should supplement with formula; people claiming to be doctors call asking for an address to which they can ship free formula samples.

These schemes recall a phase of invasive marketing that American mothers went through during the country’s baby boom in the 1950s.

In an exposé of the US prenatal retail industry’s questionable advertising tactics, the muckraking periodical Collier’s found that drugstores commonly sold lists of expectant or new

“It’s very common for factories to find a way to not force, but encourage female or pregnant employees not to take maternity leave.” - China Labor Watch program coordinator Kevin Slatern mothers across the country to prenatal retail giants. The companies then flooded parents’ mailboxes with ads for everything from diapers to cradles to baby clothes. Those little booties meant big business: the magazine estimated the net worth of the industry (adjusted for inflation circa 2014) at around US$6.47 billion.

Over-labored, labored over However, Lua Wilkinson, a PhD student of nutritional sciences at Cornell University whose research involved years of work in China, suggested that although aggressive advertising played a part in the boom, it wasn’t the whole story. While women in the US adopted formula in part because of marketing that vaunted its scientific veneer, Wilkinson said, “from what I saw it was much more that women were working outside of the home, and they didn’t have the support or the time to breast feed.”

Women made up 45.3% of China’s workforce in 2010, according to World Bank statistics. They have been legally entitled to 98 days of maternity leave since 2011, with 100% of wages for this period paid by their employer and public maternity insurance. However, Wilkinson saw little enforcement of this policy during her time here – comments echoed by Sheng, the local pediatrician.

That means exclusive breastfeeding for a full half year is impossible for most mothers, particularly women from a rural background who work as migrant laborers.

Kevin Slaten, program coordinator for China Labor Watch, said it was difficult to say how prevalent denial of maternity leave was on the mainland in lieu of a comprehensive study, but was familiar with the hoops employers often hang high to keep women on the assembly line.

“It’s very common for factories to find a way to not force, but encourage female or pregnant employees to not take maternity leave,” Slaten said.

For example, even if it’s a woman’s first child, many factories require evidence that the birth is legal, citing the once child policy. “That’s very difficult because they might have to go back home to get this sort of evidence. They’d have to take off work, and it costs a lot of money,” he said.

With mothers at work, many grandparents turn to formula to feed their grandchildren.

Finally, the traditional post-delivery practice of “sitting the month” gives yet another opening for formula. After giving birth, Chinese mothers are expected to spend a full month doing absolutely nothing to recover from the ordeal. During this period Chinese medicine forbids many ordinary foods and drinks including any cold liquids, raw fruits and vegetables, all in pursuit of restoring balance to the mother’s body.

The restrictions on physical activity give family members ample opportunity to swoop in and take the mewling babies away for formula rather than trouble the recovering mother for her milk, said Kelly Dombroski a geography lecturer and PhD candidate at the University of Canterbury, New Zealand. Dombroski, who spent over a year in Qinghai studying infant raising practices there, said that’s the gap where formula (or sugar water) is often introduced.

Open minds, open trousers Dombroski’s thesis, currently unpublished, focuses largely on the toilet training practices in western China (known in Mandarin as ‘ba-niao’) and their potential lessons for the western world of child rearing. There, as in most other mainland cities, opencrotch pants remain in popular use among the masses as they have for China Economic Review | October 2014

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COVER STORY: INFANT RETAIL

ages. The special pants allow parents and grandparents to train children in China much earlier than their western counterparts, sometimes by as early as six months old.

The practice is pavlovian: older relatives keep an eye out for behavior from the baby associated with imminent discharge, such as handling of the crotch. Relatives will sweep the baby or toddler up and position its thighs within their own as they squat.

Then they will either whistle to or shush the baby, which promptly looses its little bowels all over whatever it’s been positioned over – sometimes a trash can, other times a gutter and occasionally, a sidewalk.

As more mainland parents bring their babies with them on trips to Hong Kong, the practice has led to blowback from locals who consider it unsanitary and backward. The other disparity with more westernized civilizations is that the practice renders disposable diapers largely unnecessary, provided cloth diapers are on hand for nighttime misshaps and the neighbors don’t mind an occasional land mine. And until recently, most in China didn’t.

When Proctor & Gamble first attempted to penetrate the China market late last century, the company quickly learned it simply didn’t exist. Yet in 2011 disposable diaper market penetration in China had reached 39.1% according to a report in Nonwovens Industry magazine.

In 2012, Proctor & Gamble (P&G) was sitting pretty at number one with a value share of 46% of the Chinese diaper market, which that year sold RMB31.6 billion.

How P&G created, then dominated a previously nonexistent industry is an impressive tale of marketing prowess combined with a consumer base desperate to try anything that might give children a leg-up in the cutthroat, cram-fest competition of Chinese education. After the company botched its previous attempt, which relied on low-grade diapers aimed at low-income households, P&G introduced a new nappy that was softer, more absorbent and manufactured locally to cut costs. But an angle was needed, and the company furnished 24

China Economic Review | October 2014

the perfect one: more sleep.

According to a report by CBS Moneywatch, P&G researchers conducted two studies between 2005 and 2006 involving 6,800 home visits and over 1,000 babies in eight Chinese cities. The babies wore diapers to bed and, according to P&G, fell asleep 30% faster and slept 30 more minutes each night. The master stroke was connecting those extra minutes to improved cognitive development.

That made Pampers a path toward better brains for China’s babies. From there the chain of conclusions leaps onward to better academic achievement, a better university, better career prospects and a better salary that can help take care of Pampers-wearing babies’ parents in their old age.

P&G also took full advantage of the emerging social media sphere in China. The company launched its “Golden Sleep” campaign in 2007, asking parents to upload photos of sleeping babies and driving home the campaign’s message linking diapers to better sleep. The company took the 200,000 photos and created a 660-square-meter photomontage at a retail store in Shanghai; ads in the campaign boasted that babies wearing

Pampers slept “with 50% less disruption,” according to Moneywatch.

Adaptive adoption While diapers in China weren’t nonexistent before the Golden Sleep campaign, they were used mostly at night, and made of reusable cloth.

Sheng Xiaoyang, the pediatrician, said the appeal is obvious for anyone willing to pay rather than wash soiled rags every day – an especially common calculus in top-tier cities like Beijing and Shanghai.

“It’s a normal choice for a mom to pick disposable diapers over cloth, because when using cloth you need to wash it, clean it, hang and dry it — it’s very inconvenient,” Sheng said. “Disposables are more convenient, and for many families, they can accept the cost.”

Kelly Dombroski, the PhD candidate who spent a year researching ba-niao in Qinghai, found the practice potentially useful worldwide as an alternative to disposables and cloth diapers, in that it saves water and resources and helps babies become more aware of their own bodies at an earlier age. In addition to ba-niao-ing all three of her own children, she fol-

DECISIONS, DECISIONS: A mother browses a Shanghai pharmacy for foreign formula, which in recent months has seen increased restrictions from regulators as the government tries to boost the scandal-ridden domestic industry

COVER STORY: INFANT R ETAIL

lowed as part of her research a group of mothers from New Zealand and Australia who were attempting to do the same, despite the view that diapers were the more modern, civilized option. Mostly this involved voiding over toilets and behind bushes instead of on the sidewalk, and covering babies’ genitals rather than embracing split-crotch pants.

Dombroski also witnessed adaptive adoption taking place with disposables during her time in Qinghai: “People were using them, but they weren’t using them all the time,” she said. “They were just using them one a day, overnight, to get more sleep at night, or they were using them if the baby was sick with like diarrhea.” Even the wealthy parents she observed weren’t using them all the time thanks to a continuing belief in the principals of Chinese medicine. Diapering babies wouldn’t allow heat to escape, but Chinese medicine demanded keeping the bottom area cool to avoid colic and skin problems.

That’s in line with the Moneywatch report’s claim that diaper use in China was less than even one per day. The report went on to quote P&G’s then-vice chairman of global

Credit: imaginechina

household care Dimitri Panayotopoulos as telling investors during a 2008 analyst meeting the company had “only just begun to scratch the surface [in China].” The company has also looked beyond the mainland since its success with the Golden Sleep campaign: marketing materials and press releases show that it has since deployed the same strategy in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Australia and Ireland.

Growing pains For both formula and diapers, though, the China market will soon change. The country’s baby boom is set to subside thanks to the one-child policy’s decimation of the birth rate.

With it, the core demographics for both products will face a shake-up.

Daxue Consulting’s Matthieu David told The Financial Times last year that the formula market is expected to stop growing soon, with a steep drop in the number of Chinese women in their 20s after 2017.

Assuming China’s central government succeeds in altering the country’s economic engine from exportheavy manufacturing to a consumer-centric, middle-class-fostering marketplace, the future for both industries may lie upscale in premium goods. But the recent circling of domestic wagons in the formula industry – not to mention others – raises questions about how certain the future is here for international brands.

Even Pampers may not be safe from regulators’ wrath.

Whoever ends up selling them, another boom in diapers may yet await. China’s economy, famously graying, may become a hotbed of incontinence as its elderly population skyrockets. Estimates currently peg China’s over-65 cohort reaching 26% of its total population by 2050. As the middle classes have turned to infant diapers for convenience recently, they may also eventually turn to adult diapers for the same reason. That’s particularly true in highly-developed cities like Shanghai, where disposable income is high and the birth rate is particularly low. Whether aged urbanites will be willing to risk losing face by wearing them, though, remains to be seen.

China Economic Review | October 2014

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BUSINESS: DISTRIBUTED SOLAR

SPREAD IT OUT: While previous projects came at solar on a mass scale, the future of the industry may lie in distributed panels

Grassroots power Distributed solar could rewrite the rules of energy in China if it can overcome the industry’s troubled past and old infrastructure

L

ast year China leapfrogged past Germany to become the world’s largest market for solar equipment, according to industry figures. True, a September report showed the former is also set to push global carbon emissions to a record high in 2014, but the current and potential immensity of its solar market is no less staggering for that.

According to solar manufacturer Hanergy and the China New Energy Chamber of Commerce, the country installed 12 gigawatts (GW) of solar power in 2013 – a 232% increase over 2012. Of the total installed solar gen26

China Economic Review | October 2014

eration capacity of 140 GW worldwide last year, China contributed about 20 GW, while world leader Germany had 35.7 GW. But Germany managed to derive 29% of its total power from solar last year; China barely eked out 1%.

Undeterred, China’s National Development and Reform Commission has set a goal of installing 100 GW of solar capacity by 2020. That will require a ferocious installation rate of more than 10 GW per year, but previous solar power pushes have ended in oversupply and bankruptcy for many local panel manufacturers. (The re-

sulting glut of panels was actually key to making solar cheap enough to revolutionize Germany’s energy sector.) As part of the state’s new strategy to reach its lofty gigawatt goal, it is rethinking how it wants to encourage solar power installation across the country.

In September the National Energy Administration published a policy document that officially laid down its strategy for the next stage in national solar energy development. The fifteen-point document prioritizes distributed photovoltaic (DPV) – that is, power generated near the consum-

BUSINESS: DISTRIBUTED SOLAR

er, such as through rooftop arrays or ground-mounted systems. The shift is designed to help address numerous problems that have plagued the young industry in China and to help boost the domestic market for solar power equipment that will be key to a clean energy future.

Whether DPV will become a financially attractive prospect for buyers remains unknown, but perhaps not for too long.

“It’s a new business,” said Frank Xie, a senior analyst of power and energy at IHS Technology. “The extent to which [distributed solar] can reach depends on how attractive it will become in the next five years.”

Burned at both ends China’s solar industry is about ten years old – past its infancy, but not yet beyond a rocky adolescence. While manufacturing is reaching the end of a consolidation process, the government’s efforts to encourage DPV are attempting to chart a path away from a collapsed foreign market, and seek to avoid the past mistakes of failed initiatives at home.

Solar manufacturing’s first growth spurt occurred in the mid-2000s, mainly in response to foreign demand as renewable energy gained policy momentum in the West. In 2005, Germany overtook the US as the largest producer of solar energy. The boom years of 2008-2012 saw solar installation increase more than eightfold over 2007, with Italy experiencing a lesser boom in 2011-12 quintupling its capacity. All told, Germany and Italy added over 45 GW of total solar power in that period. Last year, though, it added only about 4.5 GW, with slowing growth forecasts, plus added anti-dumping tariffs on Chinese equipment. In other words, the foreign market largely disappeared.

Meanwhile from 2009-12, China undertook the large-scale Golden Sun project, whose failures in quality are now influencing the refocus to DPV. The government shelled out nearly US$3 billion in the initiative, mostly to pay for large, utility-scale projects.

The foreign and domestic cash flood predictably resulted in many new

As part of the state’s new strategy to reach its lofty gigawatt goal, it is rethinking how it wants to encourage solar power installation across the country players diving into the manufacturing space – some less well-equipped than others. When the flow of funds foreign and local wrenched shut almost at once, the result was an overcapacity crisis and subsequent consolidation.

While consolidation continues, the manufacturing sector as well as overall quality of solar equipment produced has already stabilized significantly.

“The market has already entered the second phase of development,” said Frank Xie. “Downsteam users are starting to note of the merits of tier-one suppliers. Tier-two module suppliers are selling more cheaply.”

The dominant, quality producers, including Yingli, Canadian Solar and Trina Solar, are here to stay. What remains is the matter of encouraging buyers.

Home-grown business The lessons of Golden Sun are now being brought to bear in the form of China’s distributed solar strategy.

Broadly speaking, there were two core problems with the old approach.

First was the program’s design.

Golden Sun focused specifically on the quantity of solar power installed, with subsidies going to developers of large, utility-scale installations. But this incentive to install for capacity meant there was little or no oversight on quality. With the concurrent entrance of many manufacturers, a wave of cheaply made panels entered the market which has proved a lasting problem. Shen Yongbing, a senior expert at consulting firm Tellus Energy, said that it can take up to five years to

gather enough energy output data to really identify an installation’s level of inefficiency.

The second, more intractable issue is the distance of utility-scale plants from end users, combined with the current state of China’s power grid.

Utility-scale solar installations require plenty of space and sun, both of which are typically far away from China’s densely-packed cities. Because the grid hasn’t yet been built out to many of the areas where big solar farms were constructed – or even to places that have the potential for such farms – the panels often sit idle.

Or worse: the power they create can overload and damage the local grid.

Distributed solar power solves the distance problem because it is close to end users by definition. For example, rooftop panels that can generate electricity for their host building. The problem of subsidizing the construction of big installations is also obviated by offering payment for power generated. Through the use of a “feed-in tariff ”, unused power produced by the owner of the solar panels can be sold to the grid at large. That’s the idea at the heart of current policy encouraging the developing of DPV. In that respect, one of the biggest changes made by the September document was an increase in the price paid per kilowatt-hour produced by distributed panel installations from 0.78 RMB to nearly one RMB. That might sound slim, but it brought the price into line with utility-scale installations already earning as much.

It also expanded the official definition of “distributed power” to include some smaller ground-mounted systems, such as those that can be placed on unused urban land, assorted empty lots, or even floated on fish ponds.

That gives potential investors in these systems more options.

Go green, see red?

It all makes for a promising hypothesis, but serious obstacles could yet stunt solar’s growth here. Among them: exactly how to make people buy into the new push.

While the National Energy Administration policy paper expandChina Economic Review | October 2014

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BUSINESS: DISTRIBUTED SOLAR

END USERS: Distributed solar’s advantage lies in its proximity to users, which are often producers, potentially with the ability to sell excess watts back to the grid for a tidy profit

ed the scope of possible projects, many of them will be still be rooftop installations, for example, on top of factories. That begs the question of ownership. Jenny Chase, manager of Solar Insight at Bloomberg New Energy Finance, pointed out that the average company life in China is eight years. A company might move, shut down or otherwise cease to occupy a building where it installed solar panels. Where that leaves the panels and their erstwhile energy production remains unclear.

Another snag is the institutional structure of the State Grid Corpo28

China Economic Review | October 2014

ration of China, which has many smaller subsidiaries throughout the country. Although the new policy paper raises payments for feed-in tariffs, State Grid subsidiaries – especially those farther away from big cities, where officials are more apt worry about problems connecting DPV units to the grid – might not agree to connect distributed solar panels to the public grid once they’re installed.

Third, because distributed solar is new and untested in China, equipment suppliers are taking a bigger risk with system owners by paying

up front for the equipment’s production. Frank Xie said Huawei, which supplies an integral piece of tech that converts solar panel electricity into a usable form, is skittish about supplying their products to DPV projects because it can’t be certain of when the equipment will be fully paid off by buyers or investors. It currently takes about five years to learn if a given DPV installation is profitable, or can even pay for itself. Very few systems have been around that long.

“There is no data,” Xie said. “Many investors and banks are still pending to see if [DPV systems] will be profitable,” he noted, adding that he could foresee an established market in 2-3 years’ time, provided the current projects are still running smoothly.

Finally, current DPV installations are concentrated in densely populated eastern cities, where conditions help keep solar energy competitively priced. To meet its install target, though, the government will have to look to untapped cities in China’s West. Relatively cheaper conventional power sources inland make solar less attractive, and could prove a serious long-term barrier to its adoption further from the coast.

With the decline of solar power installation rates in Europe and slow movement in the US, China is likely to remain the largest market for solar equipment. It will probably overtake Germany as the top solar powerproducing country before the end of the decade, even as the European powerhouse continues an unrelenting push into renewable energy. Whether China attains the goal of 100 GW of solar power installed by 2020 is much less clear. For his part, Xie at IHS is pessimistic, expecting 50-60 GW installed by decade’s end, tops.

But even if China does reach 100 GW, that would still only add up to 8% of last year’s total nationwide power capacity of roughly 1,250 GW. And the US Energy Information Administration predicts that 66% of China’s electricity will still come from smog-belching, carbon-spewing coal in 2020. For now the future of solar in China remains hazy, bright spots aside.

ECONOMICS & POLICY: SHIPPING STATISTICS

BIG DIP, OR LITTLE DIPPER?: Official numbers for freight volume this year seem to show a massive fall

Fraught freight Why do official statistics show a record drop in highway shipping volume this year?

F

reight shipments, along with everything else in China, are subject to seasonal changes.

None is more important or disruptive than Spring Festival, when the entire country drops everything to spend a week ringing in the lunisolar new year back home with the family.

Every January or February highway freight, which takes the vast majority of goods from point A to B domestically, takes an especially big hit, as passenger numbers skyrocket in rough proportion to the number of people headed home for the holiday.

This year was different: while 2013 saw a fairly typical Spring Festival dip of 519 million tons, this year highway freight appeared to have fallen a staggering 1,812 million tons according to official statistics. It has seemingly 30

China Economic Review | October 2014

yet to fully recover.

Highway freight is a useful indicator of activity for an economy like China’s, whose manufacturing focus means things need hauling cross-country year round. But while truck drivers are certainly feeling the squeeze these days, perhaps even enough so for many to give up the game, this year’s dip and subsequent anemia almost certainly doesn’t reflect the reality on the ground. The more likely explanation is that the government changed definition of what freight is, and with it the scope of what is being measured.

No official explanation has been offered, nor have previous measurements been adjusted to take this change into account. This is all standard practice, but it leaves out-

side observers to puzzle out for themselves the real state of China’s highways, or something close to it. The results, useful if imperfect, testify to the enduring opacity of official statistics here, even as accuracy seems to improve over time.

Uneasy riding Today’s highway freight industry,and its vast labor glut have their roots in the late 80s and early 90s, when flexible one or two-man trucking outfits began to overtake lumbering stateowned shippers. Back then, with only a truck and a license one could easily join the influx of drivers hitting China’s ever-expanding highway system for wages far higher than anything available in the countryside. But most of those highways were tollways, and

ECONOMICS & POLICY: SHIPPING STATISTICS

between growing tolls and rising diesel prices, drivers’ profits began to fall.

Today many of China’s truck drivers live on the ragged edge of bankruptcy, fighting for shipment offers from intermediary companies big enough that they can afford to fork over the money necessary to cover a factory’s shipments up front. In a typical shipping center middlemen scrawl freight rates on blackboards outside their company, usually one in a long line of small offices in front of which drivers gather to prospect. This imbalance of information further drains drivers’ pockets, since middlemen are free to lowball the real rates and pocket the difference. If one driver won’t take the offer, another probably will.

Economists are likewise at a disadvantage when the Transport Ministry decides to upend its old definition of highway freight. It famously (probably) did in August of 1998, which saw an increase of 751 million tons over the previous month’s 35 million. The ministry gives no reason for these changes publicly – nor, it’s worth noting, have their underlying calculations for freight growth ever been made public. But the common understanding among China economists is that revisions have been made either to the scope or collection method of the data in question.

That makes data for the revised figures impossible to compare to that from years prior to the change, mucking with a useful cross-check against more closely watched economic indicators. This year’s timing has been particularly bad, as China faces a property slump whose knockon effects have been felt throughout the economy. All eyes are on the publicly-announced target of 7.5% GDP growth for the year, which some believe the government has fudged the numbers on in the past. Among those skeptics is Thomas Rawski, economics professor at the University of Pittsburgh. But Rawski cautioned against conspiracy theorizing based on a single data shake-up.

“NBS is a slow-moving bureaucracy that tries to upgrade and improve their product,” he said. “Changes have a long lead time – they cannot forecast where things will stand

when they introduce new definitions, which often happens without public announcement.”

Coping mechanisms China hands are not completely helpless in the face of such changes. Julian Pritchard at Capital Economics suggested one resource that can be relied on to deliver less stochastic statistics, albeit while relying on a few assumptions. Alongside the freight data released most months, the Ministry of Transport also provides monthly year-on-year growth rates for both total freight and the different sectors (highway, rail, waterway, civil aviation). Many believe these rates are adjusted to take the changes in data scope into account.

With the data for both growth rates and the reported freight volume for 2013, it’s possible to extrapolate forward into this year to get an idea of what freight volume might look like if the powers that be hadn’t changed the definition. Using that year’s stats as a basis to project forward from late last year into the Spring Festival season of 2014 on the basis of growth rates actually charts a trajectory much like that seen in recent years. Since highway freight accounts for the overwhelming majority of total freight in China, it makes sense to apply the same method to this sector to check and be sure its adjusted figures show the same mitigation. The results are encouraging: much of the apparent weakness in this year’s figures disappears when highway freight is adjusted, though not quite all of it.

As for the remainder, rail freight volume has been slow in 2014. Part of that may be due to slow growth in electricity, suggested China economist Ryan Rutkowski at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. Coal makes up a full 52% of railway freight volume, Rutkowski said, and thermal (coal) power generation only grew by 1.4% in the first eight months of this year. The National Bureau of Statistics claims the slowdown is due to seasonal differences.

The east coast was particularly hot in 2013, the argument goes, so demand last year was greater rela-

tive to this year. This year coal power grew a third slower than electricity as a whole, meaning other forms of power grew faster. Because the east coast is more heavily reliant on coal than other regions, a cooler year might have lowered demand for power and with it coal shipments, Rutowski said. “This could explain why the other forms of power generation continued to increase at a faster pace, such as hydro.” Hydropower’s share of total energy production rose from 11% at in the beginning of the year to 17% in August.

Blind spots Thus, while freight data overall may point to weaker economic activity, it’s not necessarily a cause for serious concern all on its own. It may simply reflect the ongoing slowdown in the property sector and heavy industry, both of which have been sluggish lately. Even so, the full story – including how freight growth rates are calculated, how that changed between this year and the last, and why it changed at all – remain a mystery.

That means the method of baseyear extrapolation recommended by Pritchard is not without its problems, as he readily admits. “The method is not perfect since it assumes that the series would have grown at the same rate if they hadn’t changed the scope of the data and this may not be true,” he said. Still, the growth rates remain a solid starting point because they take into account not only changes in the scope of data, Pritchard noted, but also revisions to data from the previous year not yet made public.

That might be one reason why even when calculating year-over-year growth rates for a given month, the official rates can vary from what the official stats on freight volume suggest – sometimes substantially. But, while perhaps maddeningly obtuse, the current system is better than nothing, and the shake-ups from time to time in the scope of a figure’s data are, assumedly, meant to improve their accuracy. Like truckers eyeing the latest chalkboard freight rates, observers will either have to be content with what they can get, or give up the business.

China Economic Review | October 2014

31

2014ฤ10Ꮬఓ

www.cerchinese.com

透视中企IPO 移动智能新浪潮 房地产基金何去何从

目录

ቤ਋‫ފ‬ 34 数字化

35 ௡ୡ ॖෂ৺ူ 36 透视中企IPO

જᄌ 38 解构阿里神话 40 移动智能新浪潮 41 欧亚货运辟通途 42 房地产基金何去何从 44 住宅市场冷眼观

36

ॖෂ৺ူ

45 资产管理大众化

ᅀ၁ᒦ໩JQP

ఘᒦਪ 46 异乡异客

数字化

新观察

借助于大数据的泛商业化加深了异化现象 文 | 海风

几

千年前的周易八卦用两个最简单

人类的未来，但并非数据本身改变了我们

咨询专家比约·布劳卿提出“以数据为基

的符号创造出一套数字结构，据

的世界，起决定作用的是我们对可用知识

础的营销活动必须是透明的，这样才能获

此推演事物的运转规律。老子《道德经》

的增加。”

得客户的信任”。要让公司自觉做到透明

断言“道生一，一生二，二生三，三生万

他的一个主要“发现”是人类93%的

谈何容易，有时甚于登蜀道之难。传统商

物”。西方也有类似的理念，古希腊哲学

行为是可预测的，“数据科学让我们越来

业既未能践行，新商业形态在道德上并不

家毕达哥拉斯所谓“凡物皆数”已是千古

越多地从数据中观察到人类社会的复杂行

独具天然优势。

名言。

为模式”，这个观点倒有点与八卦暗合。

互联网时代的数字化生存确实让人们

不过今天“八卦”这个词的含义差不多就

受益非浅。但如果只是惑于沸反盈天的表

是“捕风捉影”。

象，就会忽视数字化背后非人性化的那一

德国科学家莱布尼茨发现八卦与二进 制暗合，但也有研究者认为，二进制其实

然而，依靠利益驱动的商家并不在

建立的布尔代数在基于集成电路的电子计

乎。互联网海量信息被嗅觉灵敏的他们视

算机上大放异彩。然而，数字化如水银泄

为有待挖掘，可转化为巨额利润的潜在客

数字貌似客观抽象，人人可见，对其

地般渗透到各个领域却要拜互联网所赐。

户数据。于是，千奇百怪的数字营销无孔

内涵却不可不细察。正如周易八卦的各种

不入，凡涉及大数据就必与营销挂钩，因

卦象，就看怎么解读。“对于那些不能言

为商家信奉的是“凡物皆商”。

说之物，我们必须保持沉默。”（维特根

一些乐观主义预言家为人类描画出信 息时代的美好图景。美国网络研究专家巴 拉巴西称，“以数据为基础的技术决定着

34

面，看不到泛商业化导致的种种困境和迷

是受了八卦启示后才创立的。依据二进制

China Economic Review | October 2014

数字营销的底线在哪里？德国籍管理

失，尤其是人性异化的加深。

斯坦）谁又能说得清数字的本质？

聚焦

市场化并购重组可以促进证券行业更好的发展

市场与产业

稳如磐石的金融行业亟需寻找新出路，以

慧生活解决方案，提供支付结算、售后服

房地产业转变思维

便在互联网金融时代扎稳脚步。此次收购

务、社交推广等整套闭环式的移动解决方

全国工商联房地产商会副秘书长王玉清近

正是方正证券经过深思熟虑之后做出的重

案。微信与支付宝的扫码支付在技术上都

期在清科房地产基金高峰论坛上表示，新

大举措，也是行业内第一例市场化并购案

不存在明显优势，未来推广主要看支付场

常态下中国房地产的发展面临着产业升

例，将开启行业并购新浪潮，为转型和创

景的构建，也就是地推团队和线下商家的

级、新型城镇化和互联网融合发展的背

新打下坚实基础，提升全行业集中度和市

合作进展。支付宝更偏重支付实用性，微

景，房地产生产和经营方式都在发生深刻

场竞争力。目前行业正处于拐点升级期，

信支付则在社交用户粘度方面更擅长。

的变革。房地产业不仅是开发和销售，房

市场化并购作为证券行业发展主线的特征

地产开发的产业链在加长，分工在细化，

将逐渐显现，不仅可以使行业获得整体发

家族财富管家市场

无论是生产方式、产业方式和成长发展都

展，还可以优化行业结构的生态环境。

诺亚财富家族财富管理总监刘思嘉近期撰 文探讨了家族财富管理问题：目前全世界

面临着新机遇和新问题。要把房地产做成

微信支付深入线下

大约有1000家运营中的单一家族理财室，

平台，房地产的核心功能就是要建设成整

微信钱包将开放新功能— 微信刷卡支

服务对象为资产不少于1亿美元的富有家

合资源和提供服务的平台，实现良性互动

付，即消费者可在指定商铺出示条码付

族。而国内的家族办公室雏形早期多为与

和长久持续增值。为此要变革房地产传统

款。这个功能直接与微信支付相连接，用

所服务家族组建合资公司，以家族办公室

的开发思维，从项目思维转为平台思维，

户可以选择使用钱包里的零钱或绑定的银

形态为高净值客户提供中国式家族办公室

变开发思维为服务思维，变产品思维为资

行卡和信用卡进行支付。易观分析师李烨

相关服务，目前约有40-50家。在家族办

产思维。在当前房地产经济进入下行通道

分析认为，此举是微信支付深入线下支付

公室业务相当纯熟的美国拥有高达2500-

的时候，要找准定位和发展的新渠道。

市场的又一大进展。是在政策调整后，微

3000家单一家族办公室，管理着约1.2万

信开始变主动扫码为被动扫码，并加入支

亿美元资产。中国目前A股2470家上市公

金融业掀起并购风

付密码，提高了支付安全性。可以看出扫

司中属于家族企业的有747家，已经交棒

清科研究中心数据显示，今年8月金融行业

码支付技术手段，在政策调整后的发展方

给第二代的仅75家，因此尚有很大的发展

并购披露总金额位居第一，披露金额案例

向。线下超市、便利店这类排队较多而且

潜力与空间。家族办公室的作用在于满足

有16起，交易总金额为35.56亿美元。最

消费不高的场所，商家和用户可以获得更

家族专业化管理企业及个人财务的需求，

惹眼的是方正证券收购民族证券，两家都

加快捷便利的支付体验。微信具有极强的

而非家族企业的代际相传，所提供的服务

是证监会批准的综合类证券公司。清科研

用户关系管理功能，通过微信，用户的信

除了核心资产配置投资管理服务之外，也

究中心分析师李群认为，今年互联网金融

息流和资金流形成闭环，可以直接做CRM

包含了家庭成员教育、慈善捐赠、税务规

风暴席卷大江南北，面对猛烈冲击，一向

服务和客户营销。未来微信希望通过智

划和高端医疗等增值服务。

生活、产业发展和城镇发展的载体和服务

China Economic Review | October 2014

35

封面故事

透视中企IPO 海外上市的互联网企业突破了传统企业难以走向世界的困局

里巴巴于9月19日在纽约交易所上

阿

挑战，自身的机制属于平台机制，不是自

认为此举不仅是电商成熟的标志，对中国

市，创造了美国资本市场规模最大

采购自销。决策权和处罚权都不在淘宝手

经济秩序的积极推动作用也不止于电商领

的融资案例，马云也一举登上内地富豪榜

里，所以卖假货的第一责任人不是淘宝，

域。从有形商品交易开始，阿里推动了若

的首席。就在同一天，国内最大租车公司

而是商家要负直接的法律责任。但是淘宝

干行业的迅速变化，导致了很多政策变

神州租车也在香港联交所挂牌交易。阿里

作为平台经营者要提供便利以达到协助监

化。阿里是一种经济力量和经济思维的代

成功上市也带来了一系列的看点：是否会

管的目的。张鹰表示，阿里的主要职责可

表，对以前的体系起到很大的鞭策和推动

对中概股产生强烈影响？在监管严格的美

以通过三个方面来实现：一是提供各种产

作用。阿里代表的是互联网力量，一定会

国股场，阿里将会面对哪些问题？是否会

品技术条件以保全证据，提供举证；二是

渗透各种各样的行业，不仅在交易一个环

带动国内企业新一轮的海外IPO热潮？可

接受投诉之后配合执法部门调查，以及主

节起作用。阿里的未来肯定不会局限于商

能会对国内电商行业产生怎样的影响？

管部门的监管；三是为消费者提供足够的

品流通，有向全行业拓展的可能性。而在

信息警示，供其判断、辨别。

电商领域，不是阿里一家就能解决所有问

投资并购步伐快

国内电商行业继续保持上升势头。易

题。对阿里是否会再进行一轮布局扩张，

易观商业解决方案执行总裁张鹰分

观国际数据显示，今年上半年，中国网上

张鹰的预测是“阿里上市后，拥有巨额资

析，阿里上市对于中概股的影响，短期内

零售市场交易规模达12万亿元，环比增长

金，阿里一定会用资本的力量快速打通市

会有溢出效应，在美国上市的以电商为主

9.8%。网上零售市场呈现较为明显的周期

场，投资并购的步伐一定会更猛更狠”。

题的股票短期内会往下跌，短期内一部分

性，下半年增速高于上半年，主要是受季

投资者卖掉与阿里有直接竞争关系的小股

节性因素以及年末电商促销活动的影响。

票，买进阿里的股票。

从市场格局看，阿里（淘宝+天猫）占据

根据清科私募通数据显示，今年7

75%以上的市场份额，京东商城紧随其后

月到8月已先后有19家国内企业在海外上

据第二位，苏宁居第三位。

市。7月共有23家中国企业上市，其中9家

张鹰认为，阿里会面临集权合伙制、 海外拓展不顺、支付宝被拆分以及淘宝假 货等问题。淘宝想消除假货还是有一定

对阿里上市张鹰给予了正面评价，

海外上市赢回报

企业登陆内地资本市场，13家企业登陆港 交所，1家企业登陆法兰克福交易所。根

9,000.00

中国企业IPO数量及融资额月度比较 （2013.8-2014.8）

据清科研究中心观察，境内上市的9家企 60

8,000.00 50 7,000.00

业平均首日上市表现均稳守住44%的定格 涨幅，市场炒新热度不减。8月共有14家 中国企业上市，其中境外IPO数量明显回 落，境内IPO基本持平；其中有9家企业登

6,000.00

40

陆内地资本市场，3家企业登陆港交所，1 家企业登陆纳斯达克证券交易所，1家企业

5,000.00 30 4,000.00

登陆伦敦AIM市场。8月份国内IPO趋于正 常化，香港IPO数量减少明显，境内上市

3,000.00

20

2,000.00 10

的9家企业平均首日上市表现依然稳定在 44%的涨幅。

1,000.00

在美国上市获得巨大回报的国内企业

0.00

何止阿里巴巴一家。今年8月7日美国纳斯

0 8月 9月 10月 11月 12月 1月 2月 3月 4月 5月 6月 7月 8月 融资额 (US$M) 融

上市数量 上

达克证券交易所迎来一家中国手机游戏企 业—深圳市创梦天地科技有限公司（乐 逗游戏）。根据清科私募通数据统计，历

私募通 2014 2014.8 8

36

China Economic Review | October 2014

史上一共有2家中国手游企业实现了IPO，

透视中企IPO

另有2家企业在新三板挂牌。掌趣科技是 第一家实现IPO的中国手游企业，于2012 年5月11日登陆深圳创业板。根据清科研 究中心观察，中国网游及手机游戏企业正 在经历老牌网游企业告别资本市场、而新 兴的手游企业积极准备上市的转型期。曾 经的网游中概股巨人网络、盛大游戏分别 退出美国资本市场，而触控科技、乐动卓 越、蓝港在线等手游企业在VC/PE的支持 下准备以IPO方式冲击资本市场。深圳市 创梦天地科技有限公司正式成立于2011 年，主要从事手机游戏和软件的研发与经 营业务。公司运营的乐逗游戏于2009年在 深圳创立，拥有百款精品版权智能手机游 戏产品。 乐逗游戏在纳斯达克证券交易所实现 IPO，背后的VC/PE和天使投资人也浮出 水面。2010年12月，乐逗游戏获得了北京 联想之星创业投资有限公司旗下联想乐基 金的天使投资，投资额为800万人民币。 对于2010年11月刚刚成立的联想乐基金， 乐逗游戏是他们第一个TMT投资项目，而 不到4年乐逗游戏迅速成长，并成功在纳斯 达克上市。乐逗游戏自成立后4年内，获得 了3轮VC/PE和天使投资人的投资，投资 总额达1600万美元。

国内资本市场对中国企业的吸引力也在增强

根据清科研究中心观察，移动互联网 领域所有历史上拿到过投资的企业，截至

股中，5只登陆上交所，分别是福斯特、

今年8月中旬，其中不到10%的企业（或

亚邦股份、节能风电、华懋新材和重庆燃

全国中小企业股份转让系统（即新

电信增值业务企业）实现了退出。2013

气；登陆深交所中小板1只，为好利来；

三板）于8月25日正式实行做市商交易制

年至今，并购风潮袭卷手机游戏行业乃至

登陆创业板有5只，分别是中来股份、天和

度，42家做市商为首批43家挂牌企业做市

整个移动互联网行业，再加上IPO屡次暂

防务、菲利华、腾信股份和迪瑞医疗。根

转让。做市商制度指的是以做市商报价形

停、VC/PE对IPO退出表示无望、业内公

据证监会发布数据，截至8月21日，已经

成交易价格、驱动交易发展的证券交易方

司盈利模式不清晰的大环境下，乐逗游戏

有128家企业处于IPO正常审核状态，同

式。郑银珠认为，这一制度将有效增加活

在不到5年时间内创建直到赴美上市，成为

时，中止审核的企业为490家，较之前一

新三板市场的流动性，满足投资者的投资

手机游戏行业乃至整个移动互联网行业的

周少了40家。另外，发审委的审核也回归

需求，提高新三板换手率，从而激发新三

传奇。联想乐基金通过对乐逗游戏的天使

正常化，并且审核速度有望加快。与此同

板市场的活力。

投资，获得巨额回报，也成为投资圈里议

时，在IPO重启后第三批新股即将开始申

虽然国内股市也在不断改革和进步，

论纷纷的案子。

购之际，于8月25日，证券业协会公布了

但目前多数互联网企业还是倾向于在海外

首批IPO网下配售对象45家黑名单，监管

成熟市场进行IPO。阿里巴巴拥有的惊人

力度有增不减，对于券商规范其业务和行

市值显示中国互联网企业的影响力大为增

激发活力谋突破

火态势有望减弱。

国内资本市场对中国企业的吸引力也

为起到积极作用。清科研究中心分析师郑

强，开始在世界崛起。目前千亿级的中

在增强。今年8月份，国内第三批IPO正

银珠表示，国内IPO已趋于正常化，预计9

国互联网公司已有3家，百亿级也有10多

式拉开帷幕，11家企业成功拿到第一轮批

月起在上述条件无大变化的条件下，新股

家，这些互联网企业通过海外上市突破了

文，并于8月底到9月初开始申购。11只新

上市对于市场冲击相对有限，资本市场过

传统企业难以走向世界的困局。

China Economic Review | October 2014

37

话题

解构阿里神话 对这家最大电商企业进行多层次解读

里巴巴这个名字源自阿拉伯故事集

阿

中国网上零售B2C市场首位多年，远超排

资源涅磐重生。随着阿里平台中小企业卖

《一千零一夜》，在中国也被称为

名第二的京东。阿里在2010年推出相关平

家资源的沉淀积累，及激增的业务量，软

《天方夜谭》，而后者是一句成语，意为

台，进军国际零售市场。

件、阿里云、中小企业融资、物流等电商

无稽之谈。据说，马云之所以给公司起这

阿里初期的商业布局多为水到渠成，

服务类业务相继应运而生，阿里巴巴的发

个名字，是因为阿里巴巴（Alibaba）在

随着2003年淘宝上线以来的快速发展，在

展战略逐渐向电商服务端转移，至此阿里

全世界都是大名鼎鼎，而且读起来琅琅上

线支付的安全问题日渐突出，为了解决中

以电商为核心的生态闭环初具雏形。

口；尤其是阿里巴巴凭着“芝麻开门”的

国市场诚信问题，阿里于2004年推出第三

阿里巴巴除了深耕电商产业链建造闭

密码打开了通往财富的大门，而马云的宗

方支付产品支付宝，涉足互联网金融，依

环生态、开发卖家资源外，充分利用其在

旨正是要为商人们推开财富之门。从股票

托海量交易及电商的独特场景，在很长一

金融、技术、广告等领域的资源及经验，

市值来看，他和几个财务投资人已经率先

段时间内保持一家独大的局面。2007年，

融会贯通，十余年用户行为及交易数据资

赢得了令人咋舌的巨大财富。那么，神话

阿里巴巴网络有限公司在香港联交所上

源的积累是其未来业务跨界扩张的源动

般的阿里巴巴究竟是怎样的企业，它的成

市，充沛的资本资源推动阿里步入高速发

力。2012年，阿里提出“平台、金融、

长和现状，目前的股权结构，还存在哪些

展阶段。同年阿里妈妈广告平台推出，虽

数据”战略精准卡位，一方面深化对中小

弊端？诸如此类，易观国际分析师唐佳对

在刚推出时并未获得显著成效，但在2008

企业的增值服务，一方面积极寻找跨界业

其展开了多层次的解读。

年被收编淘宝麾下后，专注于服务阿里平

务结合点，挖掘买家资源，撬动消费者市

台上的卖家广告主，借集团庞大的卖家

场。随着智能手机的普及和移动互联网时

成长路径和商业模式 创立于1999年的阿里巴巴集团 （NYSE：BABA）是当前中国最大网上 贸易市场，也是中国最具影响力的互联网 公司之一。 阿里巴巴作为中国电子商务的第一 批探索者，带动贸易向线上转移的产业变 革，见证中国电子商务本土化的演进历 程。同时，由于其独特且有预见性的战略 眼光，及在模式上的持续创新力，阿里以 领跑者的身份，在多个行业掀起颠覆热 潮，使其在成立后仅用几年的时间就由一 家名不见经传的小公司成长为世界级互联 网巨头。 阿里巴巴专注于电子商务领域多年， 旗下平台包括面向产业链中前端原料、设 备、成品采购批发的B2B平台，及末端直 接面向终端消费者的B2C、C2C零售平 台，旨在打造贯穿全产业链的B2B2C融合 型商业模式。批发业务作为阿里最老的业 务，已有15年历史。网上零售是当前阿里 巴巴目前体量最大的业务，淘宝、天猫在 交易规模上分别蝉联中国网上零售市场、

38

China Economic Review | October 2014

阿里巴巴成功登陆美国股市为公司管理层和投资人打开了财富之门

话题

代的来临，移动支付已成热点，支付宝的

2013年第二季度起，营收同比增速出现明

金融贷款均为阿里巴巴围绕其电商主营业

作用也早已不是专门为阿里平台交易服

显下滑趋势，2014年第一季度同比增长

务，为卖家提供的技术、金融方面的增值

务，非阿里平台业务已占据主流。线下支

率更是从2013年第四季度的62%下降至

服务。随着卖家资源的积累壮大及交易规

付丰富的场景及市场机会推动阿里迅速进

38.7%。得益于天猫战略初见成效带来的

模的增长，阿里巴巴电商协同效应初现端

行移动端的布局。通过数十起横向收购，

佣金增长，及国际零售业务高速增长的推

倪，加之阿里妈妈广告系统的支撑，以数

阿里的触角已深入娱乐、金融、生活服

动作用，2014年第二季度总营收同比增长

据为核心、电商为业务主体的B2B2C/2C

务、医疗等多与消费者息息相关的领域。

率回升至46.3%。

生态闭环已接近成熟。

以数据为核心的多元化大生态正在形成。

阿里巴巴营收主要由中国零售营收、 国际零售营收、B2B业务营收、阿里云及

主要构成和发展版图

互联网基础信息营收，及其他营收构成。

股权结构和利弊分析 目前股权结构中，马云8.8%，雅虎

2014财年阿里巴巴实现总营收525.4

中国零售业务主要包括淘宝、天猫

22.4%，软银34.1%，蔡崇信3.6%。阿

亿元人民币，较2013财年上涨52%。营

及聚划算三部分，分别作为C2C、B2C、

里现在是合伙制，中国的上市公司是不认

收与其主业电子商务具有强关联性，季度

团购三项业务的运营平台，是阿里巴巴最

合作制度的。中国的股市是同股同权，但

性变化趋势明显。受“双十一”、“双

主要的收入来源，连续三个财年占比逐年

是合伙制可以不同股同权，而美国股市是

十二”等年末促销活动影响，每年四季

上升，2014财年营收428亿元人民币，

认可合伙制度的，所以阿里在美国上市，

度营收增长明显，次年一季度呈现明显

占总营收比81.6%。与京东、当当、亚马

创始人的股份占比虽然少，但是可以拥有

回落。2012年第二季度至2013年第一季

逊、eBay等大部分电商的商业模式不同，

更高投票权，可以用少量资本控制公司管

度，阿里巴巴营收规模同比增长率均保持

目前阿里巴巴在中国零售方面的营收除少

理权。

在65%以上，释放出平台型电商巨头以

部分来自天猫交易佣金、旺铺、增值服务

在合伙人制度中，上市公司董事会的

流量带动广告变现的盈利模式取得巨大成

等外，主要来源于广告推广营收。广告营

大多数董事人选由阿里巴巴内部老人组成

功、且持续支持业绩强劲增长的信号。自

收在2014财年达到297亿元人民币，占

的合伙人群体提名，而不是按股份多少分

中国本土零售营收规模的69.4%，占总营

配董事席位。

收规模的56.6%。佣金及服务费收入近年

易观国际分析师唐佳揭示了存在的

来占营收比呈上升趋势，得益于天猫B2C

弊端：管理层一直把控公司，普通投资者

交易规模的快速增长，显示出阿里巴巴近

对公司的控制力度小，公司的经营更多的

年来在品牌B2C方面的发力与重视颇见成

依赖于管理者的管理水平。VIE（可变利

效。

益实体架构）是所有互联网公司在境外上 作为发家业务的B2B业务包括国际

市的的共有问题。VIE不是直接的股权关

批发与中国批发，历经多年的高速增长已

系，而是通过一系列的质押、服务等协议

趋于平缓。由于发展速度远不及天猫及淘

构成的协议控制关系。在控制力上，不如

宝，占营收份额逐年下降。

直接股权控制关系来得直接。而且阿里巴

阿里云及互联网基础服务主要提供弹

巴大部分在中国的资产没有披露其股权关

性云计算、数据库及大型计算服务。2014

系，是马云通过基金或直接持股的。只有

财年营收为7.73亿元人民币，较2013财年

通过直接控股VIE协议和关联交易的资产

增长18.9%，占总营收比1.47%。

才披露股权结构。投资者无法获得公司的

其他服务主要为小微企业金融贷款， 是当前阿里巴巴所有业务中增速最快的业

整体股权关系，且存在受政策影响的潜在 风险。

务。2014年第2季度营收达到7.18亿元人

当年，“阿里巴巴是个快乐的青

民币，占总营收比达到4.55%，与第二大

年……芝麻开门”的歌声曾唱彻大街小

收入来源国际业务在总营收中的占比差距

巷。而今，阿里巴巴从老板到普通员工的

逐渐缩小。小微企业贷款业务（已经卖给

身价一夜暴涨，他们的快乐是可想而知

小微金融服务集团）的体量无论从绝对值

了。那么，“芝麻开门”以后该怎么办？

还是增速的角度看均不容小觑。

相信马云和他的伙伴们应该早就思考过并

阿里云、互联网基础服务及小微企业

已在付诸行动了。

China Economic Review | October 2014

39

话题

移动智能新浪潮 国产厂商有望登上智能手机市场龙头位置

期各手机厂商都在发布新品，包括

近

养消费者支付习惯的能力。目前在美国地

户的日常使用。且健康运动检测是该款设

三星、华为、魅族、苹果等，迎来

区Apple Pay已支持许多线下连锁企业，

备所强调的重要功能之一，这也迎合了现

一年中最密集的手机新品发布会。其中苹

包括大型超市Target和快餐巨头麦当劳。

今智能穿戴设备市场的主流功能设计。另

果于北京时间9月10日发布了iPhone 6系

这种利用NFC做快速支付有效的化简了用

外，该款智能手表能够通过自定义桌面和

手机、Apple Watch、Apple Pay等一系

户购物的操作成本，所以对于普及信用卡

更换手表表带做用户定制化改变，为产品

列新产品，中国却不在首发之列。

的地区，这款应用预计会获得很好消费者

赋予了丰富的时尚属性，更有助于影响年

的支持。

轻消费者。

易观智库分析认为，伴随着iPhone 6 发布的还有最新的iOS 8系统，在许多展示

但是对于中国消费者而言，信用卡并

但是Apple Watch同样也受制于手

细节中都显示出苹果已不再是一家只懂生

不是主流支付方式，目前中国市场商家并

机附属设备的定义。因为其大部分功能仍

产硬件的公司，而是在产品设计中融入了

不具备支持Apple Pay的能力，而本土支

然需要依托智能手机，或者在Wi-Fi环境

更多的互联网基因，包括生活服务、社交

付类应用的市场份额较大，Apple

Pay的

才能发挥，但是对于一款独立手表而言这

和大数据应用等。

市场份额将受到本土应用的挤压。李烨判

些功能上的限制将给用户体验带来负面影

断，Apple Pay如果想在中国市场流行将

响。所以Apple Watch在产品发展上仍然

需要很长的一段时间。

有更多改善空间。徐昊如是分析。

易观国际分析师李烨认为，Apple Pay培养用户支付习惯，在中国发展需要 长时间验证。由于Apple Store的消费需要

Apple Watch依托iPhone切入可穿

此次苹果发布会所表现出来的就是苹

绑定信用卡，所以依托Apple Store庞大的

戴设备市场，健康理念必不可少。易观国

果更注重于本土用户体验的提升。对于大

信用卡信息库，Apple Pay本身就具备了

际分析师徐昊认为，Apple Watch作为一

陆市场，销售数据连续两个季度的同比大

发展优势，且对于欧美经常使用信用卡的

款智能手表，拥有很好的应用拓展能力，

幅增长使苹果对自己的产品更有信心，但

国家而言，Apple Pay有能力做到快速培

且作为iPhone的附属设备能够更方便用

是对于欧美等发达市场，销售数据同比增 长维持在较低的水平。对苹果而言，保护 好这些发达市场的销量同样重要，所以其

2014年第2季度中国智能手机市场厂商份额

产品的用户体验设计方面更贴近于发达市 场的用户。 易观智库分析认为，中国虽没有成为

其他 21.6%

三星 15.4%

小米 13.5%

三星 15.4%

苹果的本次首发市场，但由于iPhone 6的

小米 13.5%

发售，旧款iPhone手机价格会相应下调，

联想 10.8%

这种策略也会提升一部分消费者的购买欲

酷派 10.7%

望。在全球范围，中国消费者的购买力同

华为 8.3%

样会渗透到其他首发地区，对苹果全球市

苹果 6.9%

场的销量仍然会有促进作用。

OPPO 4.4% 联想 10.8%

中兴 3.1% 金立 2.8%

华为 8.3%

酷派 10.7%

天语 2.5% 其他 21.6%

易观最新数据显示，今年第二季度中 国智能手机销量为10298万台，占比整体 手机市场达到91.9%。三星15.4%、小米 13.5%、联想10.8%、酷派10.7%和华为 8.3%，分别占据中国智能手机市场份额前 五位，而苹果占比6.9%，仅列第六位。易 观智库分析认为，智能手机市场整体格局

来源：易观国际 · 易观智库 Source: Enfodesk © Analysys International

40

China Economic Review | October 2014

已趋于稳定，国产厂商有望登上市场龙头 位置。

话题

欧亚货运辟通途 DHL推出铁路快运新线路拓展中欧货运市场

中

国和欧洲在历史上曾由于丝绸之路 而在商贸领域往来频繁。而今，

新丝绸之路经济带的构想正在逐渐成为现 实，从中国通过泛西伯利亚北部走廊直达 欧洲腹地的DHL铁路快运起到了推波助澜 的作用。近日，欧洲与亚洲领先的海陆空 货运服务供应商DHL全球货运在上海宣布 了其领先的多式联运服务在中国市场拓展 的新业务以及在北亚的扩张计划。DH将新 增每周从苏州始发的铁路定班货运服务， 沿泛西伯利亚北部走廊直达位于波兰的国 际联运中心，将苏州和欧洲连接在一起。 作为一项针对性和性价比都很高的货运服 务，铁路货运的运输时间仅为海运的一 半，而且其成本也仅为空运的六分之一。 这项新业务是对目前上海至欧洲每日的单 节车厢服务（同样沿北方走廊）以及沿中 国西部走廊铁路线经哈萨克斯坦进入欧洲 的每周定班中欧国际直达班列—蓉欧快

从苏州到华沙的DHL铁路货运线路示意图

铁的有力补充。 新增的定期班列服务经中国满洲里和

“北部走廊服务主要满足了上海与

货运量需求较大的客户，则可通过整柜服

俄罗斯贝加尔斯克（Zabaikalsk），连接

苏州这两个繁荣的产业与商业中心及其周

务-DHL Railline，预订单个铁路集装箱、

DHL 在欧洲的货运网络以及位于马瓦谢维

边地区的货运需求。西部走廊由成都始

单节车箱甚至整个班列的货运服务。

切的多式联运枢纽，将苏州到华沙的平均

发，主要在华西最重要的集散中心满足高

DHL全球货运中国区首席执行官黄

中转时间控制在14天。

科技产品、汽车与其他工业中心的货运需

国哲（Steve Huang）表示：“我们看到

此次业务拓展着眼于苏州在江苏省内

求。DH是铁路货运服务的先锋企业，我们

了客户的需求在不断增长，因此我们也在

的战略核心位置，因为这里是工程设备、

的服务可以为客户创造诸多优势，包括缩

通过持续地创新来满足日益增长的客户需

制造业、高新科技产业、汽车及零售业的

短中转时间，降低运输成本，减少二氧化

求。就在今年年初，我们率先在中欧国际

重点区域，货运需求快速增加。

碳排放等。”DHL全球货运亚太区行政总

直达班列上推出了铁路运输温控服务，为

DHL全球货运、运输首席执行官罗

裁梁启元（Kelvin Leung）介绍道。DHL

温度敏感型产品生产企业提供专属的全年

康旭（Roger Crook）表示：“苏州在江

多式联运铁路解决方案的客户有望将交货

全天候且高性价比的运输解决方案。”

苏省的战略性位置使其成为始发地。货物

时间提前10到21天（与海运方式相比，具

DHL全球货运的中欧多式联运铁路解

能够直接由本地接入国际铁路货运线路而

体取决于始发地和目的地）。而寻求环境

决方案已发展成为一项成熟的服务，据透

不必千里迢迢经由成都中转，使得在苏州

友好型解决方案的客户还可减少高达90%

露，目前正试图将中国的一些邻国纳入到

及其周边地区的客户大受裨益。同时，对

的二氧化碳排放量（与空运方式相比）。

该网络内。希望通过驳船服务连接中日韩

于DHL，能够在中国境内提供多个铁路货

DHL推出的Railconnect拼箱

三国，将来自韩日的货物转运到中国铁路

运装卸点，则能为客户创造更多的业务机

（LCL）服务能够让大型跨国企业和同

网中，以此构建起强大的北亚多式联运网

会，这也是我们加大发展多式联运业务投

类型小型企业都可随时按需求发送小批量

络，满足这三大主要经济体巨大的进出口

资的原因所在。”

货物，从而实现更好的库存管理。对于

货运需求。

China Economic Review | October 2014

41

话题

房地产基金何去何从 私募房地产基金将迎来大转型

地产市场凉风袭来，房地产基金也

房

邀请众多行业专家与会，解读中国房地产

而清科集团执行副总裁、清科研究

感受到了阵阵寒意。近年来，中国

基金的现状，特别是新形势下房地产基金

中心董事总经理符星华认为，房地产基金

私募房地产基金规模不断扩大，但影响有

发展之道，探索行业未来趋势，并发布了

已经进入2.0时代。清科数据显示，2014

限。2013年私募房地产基金融资的比例有

上述白皮书。

年上半年整个私募房地产基金完成接近44

所提升，但相对于房地产开发贷款余额依

房地产的严峻形势预计会持续到

亿美元的基金募集。但募资的基金总数呈

然十分小，规模仅相当于后者的12.6%，

2016年，全联房地产商会创会会长聂梅生

现大幅度下降，仅完成了47支房地产基金

相当于信托融资的9.6%。相比欧美等成

女士在高峰论坛上如是表示。她分析了当

的募集。符星华归纳了中国私募房地产基

熟市场，国内私募房地产基金融资占房地

前房地产行业形势，“首先，目前房地产

金市场的几个典型特点：“第一、资金募

产市场融资比例依然较小。在中国房企的

形势依然严峻，而这个严峻的形式还要持

集方面，在2014年有了一些新的渠道和

资金结构中，以银行贷款为主的间接融资

续，可能会持续到2016年。房地产市场已

策略，更多低成本资金进入到了市场；其

方式仍居主导地位，但直接融资所占比重

经高位盘整，各项指标涨幅下调，进入负

次，资金来源更加广泛，包括非常多的险

连续多年来一直处在不断攀升的状态。而

增长，也就是下跌。第二，城市、地区、

资，富有的个人包括大学的一些捐赠资金

直接融资是指投资者直接承担风险的融资

企业间差异化加大。资本追逐什么？回避

也参与其中；专家管理方面，专业房地产

方式，包括股票融资、债券融资、信托融

风险，追逐安全。在差异化情况下，回避

管理机构越来越多，交易成本也在降低；

资、房地产私募基金、资产证券化等。以

风险、追逐安全要差异。不要风险最大的

同时，投资者进入房地产基金的股权交易

上是由清科集团《2014中国房地产基金白

地方你去投。第三，资金链全面趋紧。最

更具流动性，机构间交易和二级市场这块

皮书》披露的。

后，去库存压力继续加大。从经济、房地

已经建立了三个全国性的平台，交易的活

产层面，房地产对宏观经济的情况是负拉

跃度已经开始逐步提升。”

严峻形式与基金转型 由清科集团主办的2014年中国房地 产基金高峰论坛于近日在上海召开，论坛

国内私募房地产基金将面临新形势下的大转型

42

China Economic Review | October 2014

动，它的指标在整个经济指标之下。如果

房地产进入更珍贵的白金十年，地产

这个情况经济没有好转，不要期望房地产

基金或将大转型。长富汇银投资基金管理

好转，这两个已经是负拉动。”

（北京）有限公司总裁张保国在谈到房地

话题

产行业变化时表示，“中国房地产市场不 会进入持续下跌的通道，而是仍处于高基 数低增长的稳定上升趋势中。”张保国同 时分享了应对措施，“第一、把握商业地 产的并购机会；第二、房地产基金参与海 外投资；第三、产品创新，以前房地产私 募基金是比较单一的，主要为有限合伙， 现在不只是单一的有限合伙、而是与契约 性基金、基金专户等进行结合。另外是强 化风险管理。一是专注优质项目，我们也 在看无论行业表现好与坏的时候，优质项 目都有不错表现。二是耐心选择时机。” 地产进入新常态弱周期，大并购将 是趋势。德信资本董事长陈义枫认为，地 产现在处于长周期、新常态。“房地产价 格走势从快速上升转为窄幅波动缓慢上 行，这是一个长周期的趋势。房地产行业

清科集团白皮书剖析了中国房地产基金市场的特点和未来走势

的盈利状况从暴利行业和正常利润率的行 业。从房地产行业的区域发展格局来看，

般不需要披露交易细节。其二，资金来源

房地产市场不景气时，其投资的外在风险

行业从全国齐涨齐跌的全国一盘棋转为区

广泛，如养老基金、保险公司、富有的个

更大。私募房地产基金可以通过运用各种

域分化加剧，不同区域苦乐不均这样一个

人、大学捐赠基金等；私募房地产基金多

投资交易安排来主动控制投资风险。

状态。还有地产企业所处的生态环境，从

采取有限合伙制，这种企业组织形式有很

中国私募房地产基金的法律地位还

全行业比较景气转为竞争比较激烈，两极

好的投资管理效率，并避免了双重征税的

没有完全确立，房地产资本市场的投资主

分化严重加速整合，这是我们认为的地产

弊端。其三，专家的专业化管理，在房地

体—机构投资者还没有形成，缺少私募房

行业的新常态。现在我们进入了地产的新

产行业，知识和经验很难从一个地区转移

地产基金的合格基金管理人才等。私募房

常态，在新常态里面我们又进入弱周期，

到另一个地区、从办公大厦转移到商场。

地产基金尚处于发展的萌芽阶段，正在探

因此现在是新常态和弱周期叠加的产业环

若没有私募房地产基金，机构投资者只能

索的发展初期。

境。在这样的产业环境中，并购的机会多

从事直接的个案投资，但是经由专业性投

白皮书认为，虽然目前在中国推行

多。”他说道。

资管理的私募房地产基金，机构投资者可

REITs存在法律、税收等诸多问题，但是

论坛还发布了2014年度中国房地产

以投资于不同地区和不同类别的房地产。

在中国发展REITs，至少有三方面意义：

基金综合排名榜，榜单前10名是：信保

其四，降低交易成本，房地产市场不仅是

首先是拓展房地产企业融资渠道，其次是

（天津）股权投资、信业基金、鼎信长城

不完全竞争的市场，而且也是信息高度不

投资者可充分享受房地产行业发展的红

基金、鼎晖地产投资、稳盛投资、中城投

对称的市场。在房地产交易中很容易无形

利，最后是产品本身良好的流动性可丰富

资、远津基金、新沃资本、盛世神州和建

中付出多重成本，而由多数投资者以“集

多种资本的投资要求。

银精瑞资本。

合投资制度”形式设立投资基金，并聘请

白皮书预测，房地产行业未来将更

专家管理，将形成规模优势，降低信息不

加成熟，从而助推地产基金发展。理由如

对称，进而大幅降低交易成本。其五，多

下：第一，房价增长逐步回归理性，呈现

市场特点与未来趋势 清科集团上述白皮书分析了中国房地

采取权益型投资方式，较少涉及债权投

平稳渐进发展的趋势。第二，保障性住房

产基金市场特点与未来趋势。中国私募房

资。私募股权投资机构也因此对被投资企

将得到加强。第三，中国房地产市场未来

地产基金市场的七个发展特点是：其一，

业的决策管理具有一定的表决权。其六，

的扩张会更加理性。第四，当前房地产市

在资金募集上，主要通过非公开方式面向

投资者投入私募房地产基金的股权流动性

场的不景气，很大程度上是过去开发商及

少数机构投资者或个人筹集，它的销售和

差，属于长期投资范畴，所以投资者会要

部分地方政府不合理的扩张导致市场供需

赎回都是基金管理人通过私下与投资者协

求高于公开市场的回报。其七，分散风

失衡，未来房地产将以去库存，行业整合

商进行。另外在投资方式上也主要以私募

险，房地产本身的特点决定了房地产投资

为主，以期在竞争环境恶化的背景下实现

形式进行，很少涉及公开市场的操作，一

是一个很难中途抽回的长期投资。尤其在

规模经济效应，提升投资效率。

China Economic Review | October 2014

43

话题

住宅市场冷眼观 一些细分市场仍有需求和潜力

鉴

于国内房地产市场出现的需求、 供应、库存、价格涨幅的不均衡

现象，目前全国已有数十座城市取消或大 幅度松绑住宅限购政策，各地在结合当地 实际调整住宅市场政策方面也获得较大灵 活度，大多数低线城市已放宽或完全取消 了住房限购政策。诺亚财富旗下歌斐资产 估计，全面取消住房限购政策已是大势所 趋，但北上广深四大一线城市可能例外。 迄今上海并未放松限购政策，也无在 短期内做出调整的迹象。高力国际近期市 场分析显示，上海高端住宅市场持续录得 增长并持续吸引投资者。在诸多高端项目 的价格调整至与预售证审核目标达至相对 平衡后，高端楼盘陆续获得审批并入市。 今年7月及8月期间，上海高端市场供应有 所增加。仅在8月获得预售证的高端楼盘就

一线城市短期内可能不会放松限购政策

有6个。

44

整体住宅市场成交量明显下降，高端

设。受刚需支撑以及青年奥运会举办的积

成本加之持续的需求，杭州高端住宅成交

住宅成交量却稳中有升，高端住宅成交量

极影响，南京商品房整体市场呈现出量价

价格预计将继续小幅上涨。展望未来6个

在整体市场占比也有提升。截至今年8月

齐升的趋势。下半年南京住宅市场将面临

月，基于现行相对宽松的购买资格政策，

底，上海高端住宅占整体市场成交面积的

诸多考验及潜在刺激因素，包括后青奥影

多个项目将加快开发和入市节奏。然而，

比重由去年11.3%攀升至约18.1%。8月

响、去库存化以及限购政策何时松绑等。

考虑到下半年将近有62个新项目入市，

高端住宅均价同比上升2.9%，至每平方米

高力国际中国区研究部董事谢靖宇认

加之上半年主城区同比上涨43%的住房库

53775元。高端住宅板块的量价齐升使整

为，南京商品房市场形势就目前而言仍属

存量，今年该市普通住宅库存量仍维持高

体市场均价被拉高。8月上海整体住宅市

可控，近期出台完全取消限购政策的可能

位，住宅均价上行面临压力。

场成交均价从去年同月的每平方米23551

性较低。但鉴于当前南京住宅市场存在一

由于住宅市场持续低迷，私募房地产

元，上升至每平方米26290元，同比上升

定的库存压力，或将根据8月份青奥会举办

基金的投资兴趣相对较小，国内房地产基

11.6%。

后的市场表现，改善型购房者的需求，以

金投资策略是投资标的重商业轻住宅。清

展望未来，即便住宅市场限制政策维

及其他城市限购松绑或完全放开后的楼市

科研究中心在近期发布的白皮书中作了策

持不变，高力国际预计上海高端住宅板块

表现，在下半年后期对南京住宅限购政策

略分析：住宅市场关乎民生和社会稳定，

仍呈乐观增长趋势。而且鉴于8月有6个高

做出一定程度的调整。

面临较大调控压力，具有较大不确定性；

端项目获得预售证，以及“金九银十”到

鉴于杭州完全取消了限购政策，加

房地产基金一方面会向一二线等真正具有

来等因素，高端住宅市场成交量应将继续

之此前被压抑的购房需求，高力国际预计

需求基础的城市集中，另一方面也会以中

攀升。

近期杭州住宅市场整体成交量有望显著回

短期债权投资为主，避免承担过大风险。

高力国际也分析了近期南京和杭州住

升。由于去年杭州主城区住宅用地成交平

在房地产经济整体下滑的背景下，

宅市场的表现。南京是全国仅有的8个限

均楼面地价达每平方米13778元，同比上

取消限购政策也难以在短期内重振住房市

购政策尚未松绑的城市之一，继续贯彻宏

升28.5%，其中一些定位高端的项目计划

场。但对投资者而言，某些细分市场仍有

观调控政策，加快住房保障和供应体系建

将在接下来若干个月内入市，高企的购地

一定需求和潜力，如何去发现才是关键。

China Economic Review | October 2014

话题

资产管理大众化 新型理财产品推动资产管理行业发生变革

中

国财富市场按财富总值排名世界第

品线，强大自身的资产管理能力，形成综

产管理能力，强大的产品设计研发能力。

三，按财富人口（大于10万美元）

合资产管理集团。

劣势是产品发售渠道有待构建，资产规模

数量则是第七市场，这是Globe Wealth

证券公司的优势是具备深厚的投资研

缩水。基金正处于转型创新时期，如果能

Databook的数据。从财富人口结构的角

究实力，专业的产品设计开发团队以及全

顺利完成向资产管理的转型，势必会成为

度看，中国人口占全球约19%，财富总值

业务链条的支持。劣势是业务通道单一，

一支强大的力量。

仅占世界9.2%；拥有10万美元以上的财

存在同质化竞争，资产规模较少。未来发

第三方理财机构的优势是独立于金融

富人口为2496万，占成人比重2.5%，而

展是整合自身的投行和研究方面的能力，

机构和客户，能更好地整合金融产品，为

全球平均指标为8.4%；国内近100万高净

形成其他金融机构不具备的优势。

客户提供更加客观的理财计划。劣势是公

值成人（拥有100万美元以上），仅占成

信托公司的优势是产品较多，可投资

信度相对较低，缺乏专业理财经理，没有

人总数0.1%，而全球平均指标为0.7%。

范围广泛，信托财产具有独立性、权利主

自己的产品和掌控权。如能建立并发展独

也即人均拥有财富偏低，富裕群体的占比

体与利益主体相分离，责任有限性。劣势

立服务模式，未来有很大上升空间。

也不高。

是销售渠道多来源于银行，不能与客户建

清科研究中心数据显示，截至去年

这些数据对资产管理行业而言似乎

立全面直接的关系。未来发展是应该开展

底，国内商业银行理财产品余额逾10万亿

并非佳音，但其他一些因素起到了促进作

直销模式，与客户建立密切的关系来提高

元，信托产品资产规模超12万亿元，主权

用。清科研究中心近期发布的中国资产管

自身的竞争力。

投资基金资产规模在4万亿元以上，证券

理研究报告指出，自2012年5月以来，

保险公司的优势是拥有庞大的客户群

公司资产管理规模约5万亿元，保险公司

中国资产管理行业迎来一轮监管放松、业

体和营销人员，广阔的销售网络。劣势是

可投资的资产规模在8万亿元以上，相比

务创新的浪潮。新的监管放松，在扩大投

销售渠道层次相对较低，市场认可度有待

2012年，均出现快速增长。财富市场含金

资范围、降低投资门槛，以及减少相关限

提高。一些大型的保险公司在资产管理转

量的日益增强，诠释了各机构进行争夺的

制等方面，打破了资产管理机构之间的竞

型和业务开张中具有天然优势，在资金实

动因。

争壁垒，使得资产管理行业进入竞争、创

力、产品设计、营销渠道、客户规模等方

新、混业经营的大资管时代。特别是近年

面具有比较优势。

来，依托大数据和电子商务的发展，互联

基金管理公司的优势是拥有专业的资

大资管时代，资产管理公司只有提升 资产的获取能力、金融工具创新能力和风 险管控能力，才能更好的生存和发展。

网金融体现出巨大的发展潜力和经济价 值，随着余额宝等新型理财产品的出现， 小额投资让资产管理这个以前被认为是有 钱人的专属领域开始大众化和平民化，工 薪阶层的散钱和小钱也可通过资产管理实 现财富化。 国内资产管理机构主要包括商业银 行、证券公司、信托公司、保险公司、基 金公司以及第三方理财机构等，上述报告 分析了这些机构的竞争力。 商业银行的优势是具有庞大的客户 资源、强大的销售渠道和公信力，资产规 模庞大。劣势是设计和开发的产品不够丰 富，专业性上与专门的资产管理机构还存 在一定的差距。未来发展是建立专业的团 队，不断拓展新业务，丰富和完整各类产

新型理财产品推动了资产管理的平民化

China Economic Review | October 2014

45

看中国

异乡异客 生活在中国的外国人是否已充分融入了当地社会 文 | 晏格文 (Graham Earnshaw)

最

近我应邀在扶轮国际中国地区的年会上发 言，我所选的演讲主题为“异乡异客”，

谈论外国人为当地提供的社会价值，以及生活在 异乡为个人产生的人生价值。以下是我演讲中谈 到的一些要点。 “我”是谁？“我”既不是一本护照，也 不是一个国籍，当然更不是一种肤色。每当被问 晏格文

及“你是哪国人”时，我的回答通常是—“我 出生在英国”。具体来看，我认为一个人的基本

文化背景并不取决于出生地，而在于幼时性格形成期所生活的地 方，例如在3岁到9岁之间。当我幼年时，我在英国汲取了关于文 化、社会、人际交往的基础知识。在12岁时，我离开了自己出生 的国家。今年我62岁，依然说一口纯正的英式英语，也依旧喜欢 享用英式菜肴，比如烘豆配土司。但是，我也并不将自己视为一 个“英国人”，我就是“我”。如果硬要下个定义，我更倾向说 自己是一名中国居民。 在中国，当然在世界许多地方也不例外，人们往往喜欢将 事物细分归类。所以“我出生在英国”这样的表述可能使不少中 国人感到困惑不解。在农村，当我这样回答，有时得到的反应会 是“鸦片战争”。好吧，但毕竟鸦片战争与我无关。 所以我到底是以怎样的身份和状态生活在中国？这并没有明 确的答案。 中国人移民国外定居的历史已有数百年，由于当地社会的 包容，大多数中国移民都能很快融入其中。纽约被视作“世界中 心”，因为在这座城市的街头，无论你来自索马里还是韩国，人 与人之间都没有任何区别。我们与他们之间的差异也是微乎其

外国人可以增加当地社会的丰富性和多样性

微。 那么中国呢？在这里，外国人被称作“老外”，差不多就

祖国？我的答案是丰富人生和体验未知的愉悦。在中国已生活了

是“外人”的意思。这个词语的使用就代表着中国人和外国人之

40多年，我始终不能真正了解她，这也是我选择留在这里继续生

间差别的存在。我的中文水平无论听说读写都相当不错，有时我

活的原因。40年来，我从未停止学习中文，我曾徒步穿越中国，

刚开口说了几个字，就会有人说我像半个中国人。非也，我就是

我撰写和出版有关中国的书籍，我写有关中国的歌，但这个国家

我，和你们一样是中国的常住居民。

于我，仍是一个未解之谜。

外国人为当地社会创造了哪些价值？为何要让他们生活其

我透过自己的文化看中国，因此我能看到中国人所看不到

中？因为外国人能够增加当地社会的丰富性和多样性，带来影响

的。而在英国的中国人，则透过自己的文化看英国，看到我所不

和挑战，因此也创造了推动社会前进发展的机会。美国社会的生

能看到的。这一切的观点都是有效而不矛盾的。

机勃勃，一定程度上便得益于对外来移民和外来文化的非凡包 容，即使明知这样会致本国文化也随之改变。 生活在异国又能为外国人带来哪些好处？为何不留在自己的

46

China Economic Review | October 2014

中国拥有足够多的外国人吗？不。生活在中国的外国人充 分地融入了当地社会么？答案同样也是否定的。互相尊重才是关 键，毕竟过去的都已成为历史。

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China Economic Review | October 2014

Q&A: A state-owned hospitality giant turns to the middle class

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