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International Journal of Literature and Art (IJLA) Volume 3, 2015 doi: 10.14355/ijla.2015.03.003
From Ideal to Reality: Strategy Transformation of Japan’s Diplomacy in the Period of Paris Peace Conference and Washington Conference Taiyong Chen College of History, Wuhan University, Wuhan, China sunbelt777@sina.com Abstract Japan regarded the World War I as “god’s bless in Taisyo”. They took the excuse that allied with England to declare war with Germany within the minimum goal of seizing German’s base in the Far East, to realize the supreme goal—achieve the dominant position in China. Japan tried hard to push the idealism diplomacy in Paris Peace Conference after the war in order to build the new order surrounded with Japan in East Asia. After the war, the United States and England returned to East Asia, Japan had to make a strategic contraction because of the great disparity in comparison with the United States and England. Meanwhile, Japan intended to transform their diplomatic strategy in the Washington Conference, but failed. From then, Japan’s diplomatic strategy became clearer than before, and the Washington Conference had become the start point of their “Shidehara Diplomacy”. Keywords Japan’s Diplomacy; Strategy Transformation; Idealism; Realism
Introduction Regarding Japan’s diplomacy in the period of Paris Peace Conference and Washington Conference, almost all the scholars focused their eyes on the point of diplomatic tussle on the matter of Shandong instead of, the strategic contraction and strategy transformation of Japan’s diplomacy in the establishment of International new order after World War I. This paper takes Japan pushed idealism diplomacy in the Paris Peace Conference as the entry point, focus the concentration on Japan’s diplomacy---strategic contraction and strategy transformation, and take the Washington conference as turning point, making full use of a large amount of diplomatic documents, microfilm, notes and so on to figure out the essence which made the transformation of Japan’s diplomacy in the period of Paris Peace Conference and Washington Conference. Idealism Diplomacy in Paris Peace Conference On Jan. 9, 1917, Motono Ichiro, Japan’s foreign minister put forward the decision on policy toward China, declaring Japan would directly inherit all the rights German enjoyed before in the issue of Shandong after the war [1]. It is visible that before the war ended Japan had ensured the policy to China after the war, therefore, it is dominated exclusively. The reason why Japan insisted on the dominate exclusively policy to China is that, Japan’s economic power was still not strong enough to take a fair competition in the Far East International economic and political landscape with the United States. The only way left was to establish a sphere of influence with exclusiveness, by virtue of timing and place. Actually, Japan initially formed a kind of diplomacy as “ally with England, be close to France, cozy up to the United States, control China” before the war ended, that is, ally with England is the foundation and sign a secret contract with England meanwhile. In February 1917, Ambassador Greene submitted a secret note to Japanese foreign minister Motono Ichiro, on the issue of Shandong, which declares England government had accepted the request from Japan to assist Japan to get the territory of Shandong in German’s hand, and the islands to the north
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of equator. In reverse, Japan should assist England to get the islands to the south of equator [2]. Therefore Japan obtains the powerful support to its diplomacy from England in accordance with the secret contract. Simultaneously, be close to France. On February 19, 1917, Motono Ichiro put forward the same request in the secret conference while meeting France ambassador, hoping France and Russia to make a secret promise to allow Japan to conquer the territory of Shandong and some islands to the north of the equator, which belonged to German. French ambassador in Japan should keep the same opinion with Japanese government [3]. Japan gained the support from France through the secret diplomacy between them. In additional, Japan signed contracts with Russia for many times to get the neutral promise. Regarding the United States, a message from England saying the United States would support China at the beginning [4], which made Japan quite anxious about it. For the forgiveness of the United States, Japan sent an ambassador to the United States to mediate and draw him over to Japan to get the compromise from the United States. At the same year on July 24, the foreign minister of Japan commanded the ambassador in the United States for mediation, Ishii kikujiro, an internal order, saying that, as one of the items in the contract with German, Japan should return the islands lies to the north of equator which belonged to German before, and it had been kept as a promise among England, France and German. Thus the only need to do is to get the forgiveness from the United States [5]. It is clear to see that the minimum goal of Japan to join in the World War I is to inherit German’s colony in Shandong and islands in Pacific Ocean, in that to get rid of an important competitor in the invading process to China and expand all the benefits in China, finally to consolidate the status in East Asia [6]. The supreme goal, is to achieve the dominant position in China while the United States and Europe paying no attention to the east, even exceed the United States and U.K [7]. Japan had made full preparations on diplomacy at wartime. Cheating and seducing in the United States and U.K, conducting large amount of secret diplomacy, which aimed to gain support and forgiveness from England, France and Russia on the issue of Shandong. Ally with England, be close to France, cozy up to The United States, and control China—the idealism diplomacy of Japan had almost been ready before the eve of the start of Paris Peace Conference, and the fundamental keynote of which had formed while attending. On November 27, 1918, a delegation from Japan consists of more than 60 government officers within the leadership of Saionji kinmochi, Makino nobuaki, Chinda sutemi (Japanese ambassador to U.K), Machui keishiro (Japanese ambassador to France) and Ijyuin hikokichi (Japanese ambassador to Italy), would attend the Paris Peace Conference. Some young and competent diplomatic officer who will bring about impact influences in the future also attended this conference, such as Konoe fumimaro, Yoshida shigeru, Ashida hitoshi, Matsuoka yosuke, etc. According to the large scale and amount of attendees, it is obvious to see Japan had mde full preparations for this conference and its ambition on the issue of Shandong. This thus had been the start point of its idealism diplomacy. On December 2 of the same year, Uchida kosai, foreign minister of Japan, commanded an order to the leader of delegation, Makino nobuaki, that, all the members of delegation should try hard to achieve the goal of gaining the forgiveness and support from England, France, Russia and all the territories in Shandong conquered by German should be taken over by Japan without any benefits [8]. On September 18, the day when Paris Peace Conference started in 1918, ministry of Hara takashi made a secret contract with German, and one of the most important clauses is that, Japan will take over all the territories and benefits in Shandong conquered by German [9]. On the morning of January 27, representative of Japan Makino nobuaki requested German to make over all the territories and benefits to Japan without any benefits returned on the tenth conference when Shandong issue was put forward in the supreme conference of Paris Peace Conference [10]. Although the United States showed some mercy on China sometimes, Japan always drew him over to his side with benefits and threatens outside the conference, which led a rather bad situation to China. On January 29, the representative of Japan, Chinda sutemi indicated that the United States should be responsible for the matter once Japan could not gain the benefits in Shandong from German, when met the state secretary of the United States, Robert Lansing [11]. From then on, the United States began to compromise to Japan. On January 28, Five Country Conference is continuing, however, representatives from Japan and China made a struggle argument among them on the issue of Shandong. Weijun Gu demanded to respect the political independence and territorial integrity of China, as well German should return all the territories and benefits in Shandong to China directly, while Makino nobuaki resolutely opposed it for the excuse Japan and China had made a contract on Shandong issue before [12], but the contract referred by Makino Nobuaki is Sino Japanese treaty in 4th 13
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year of the Republic of China and its exchange of notes made with Japan on May 20 of 5th year of the Republic of China [13]. Japan claimed that China had issued a manifesto and admitted this contract; it thus will worsen the relationship between China and Japan when representatives of China put forward to abolish this contract in Paris Peace Conference [14]. On April 21, Uchida Kosai gave an order to Makino Nobuaki, saying Japan would refuse to sign the Covenant of the League of Nations without any compromises if the goal to govern Shandong couldn’t be achieved [15]. Simultaneously, Uchida Kosai also commanded Matsui Keisiro to inform France that it is the final decision of Japan with no changes [16]. Uchida Kosai took that he would not sign the covenant as threatens to make the United States, England and France compromise to Japan. At the same day, Chinda Sutemi met with President Wilson to request the United States to support Japan on the issue of Shandong, while Wilson advised Shandong should be managed by Five Countries, which of course was resolutely opposed. Chinda Sutemi considered that Japan would not accept it no matter to apply the Mandates System to Shandong, or returned Shandong on behalf of Five Countries [17]. Since then, the United States began to appease to Japan. On April 28, representatives of Japan put forward to cancel the racial equality in order to gain the support from England and the United States on the issue of Shandong. The diplomatic investigations of Japan also declared they would not sign the covenant if their proposition cannot be passed, without any compromises [18]. The United States began to be partial to Japan because they were afraid of the plan of alliance would be failed, resulted the issue that Japan would abandon the military power but keep the economy right in Shandong was adopted by the supreme conference, referred by Wilson [19]. The United States sacrificed the sovereignty of China to exchange the promise of Japan, who will sign the covenant and join in the alliance. Meanwhile, the delegation of Japan made a phone call to Tokyo, President Wilson agreed all the proposals Japan put forward, in general [20]. On April 30, three countries included the United States, England, France transferred the possession of all the territories and benefits conquered by German to Japan secretly, behind China’s back. Japan’s idealism diplomacy gained a complete victory in the conference and inherited all the benefits from German in the Far East area, successfully achieved their minimum goal and the supreme goal was also be realized to a large extent. Simple Adjustment on the Diplomatic Strategy of Japan after the Paris Peace Conference Compromising by the United States to Japan in the Paris Peace Conference, gaining support from England and France, sacrificing the sovereignty and benefits, made Japan grown to be a strong competitor with them in the area of East Asia to achieve the benefits, as well Japan had grown to be a strong power among five countries and seized all the territories and benefits in Shandong and the South Sea islands from German’s hand. However, Japan was condemned by International society day after day about their policy in the war, so did the United States, which made Japan was isolated by International society [21]. The conflict between Japan and the United States became more and more serious, that the condition “United States attack, Japan defense” appeared, leading to the slow expansion of Japan in China. Although the idealism diplomacy was realized in the Paris Peace Conference, Japan also knew it was a success on the basis of the temporary compromise from the United States and England, which was weak and could not fight against while facing the strong power, finally had to make a strategy contraction. After the war, the United States and England staged a comeback that Japan thus was highly contracted in expanding in China. Japan had to make a strategy contraction under the compression of the United States because of the great distance of military power between them, and the idealism diplomacy on the fundamental of the alliance of United States and England was thus impacted due to the expiration. The third alliance between England and Japan should have expired on July 13 in 1921. According to the clauses of contract, it would still be effective if none of the contracting parties put forward to abolishing this contract before one year of the deadline [22]. Hence whether the contract of the alliance should be continued had been the focus on the International platform, and conflicts between United States and Japan became more and more seriously. In the time of World War I, Arms Races happened several times between United States and Japan; President Wilson announced a five-year development plan on naval construction in 1916 while Japan went after to declare one named “August Plan” to augment their navy. If the August Plan would have come true, Japan will own 25 capital ships consists of 8 new battleships and 8 new cruisers, with this condition Japan will catch up with United States as soon as possible and the military of whom will form a threaten to United States. In additional that, United States did not satisfy with the
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condition Japan held the dominant position in Far East area, led to the serious confliction between Japan and United States on the issue of Asia Pacific area, plus that England also intended to returned to the Far East area in order to recapture their benefits in China. Due to the consistency on the issue of Asia Pacific area between United States and England, they allied together to announce to hold the Washington Conference, then took an attack to the supremacy of Japan in the area of Far East. Such pattern changes as United States attack, Japan defense had made Japan have to adjust their strategy from dominant position to a balance position. Foreign minister, Uchida Kosai, commanded an order to the Japanese ambassador to China, Yukichi Obata, to take conciliation as main method in each aspect of the policy to China [23], meanwhile had to slow down the expansion in China. Japan’s diplomacy was hesitated and did not dare to move forward between the ideals and realities, who also tried to take the Washington Conference as a touchstone for its transformation on diplomatic strategy. “Touchstone Diplomacy” on Washington Conference In the early July of 1921, president of United States initiated a proposal on arms limitation. On July 11, charge d’Affaires of the United States embassy, Bel held a meeting with Uchida Kosai within an informal invitation and Uchida Kosai agreed to take part in this meeting. For the suggestions recommended by United States, an accusation of destroying the International Peace would be put on Japan’s head once refused; therefore the government of Japan considered it is acceptable to take part in the Washington Conference [24]. The proposal put forward by United States in Washington Conference shocked Japan; proposal brought out by Harding just like a bolt from the blue, which made Japanese all over the country consider the national disaster is coming. What Japan anxious about were the special benefits in Manchu and Mongolia [25]. Kaneko Kentaro, who was the advisor in Privy Council, together with some other related officers worried about that United States and England will make a total liquidation to Japan once the issue of Far East and China began to be checked [26]. This kind of panic spread not only in folk, but also in political circles, so that third-class clerk named Ishii itaro took the Washington Conference as “Army of Yuan Dynasty attacked Japan”, and Japan always be in a constant state of anxiety [27]. Japan was facing a danger to be highly isolated [28]. At that period of time, the politicians with the leadership of Ugaki kazushige were full of hostility towards to the United States, but nothing can be done. Because the United States was arrogant then and the president had issued the Far East problem by himself, likewise it was the man who was the controller hiding behind on the issue of Asia [29]. Japan government had regarded the United States as the real controller in the conference and took the policy towards to him as the main steps to do, since United States initiated the Washington Conference [30]. Matsudaira Tsuneo, director general of foreign ministry in charge of the United States and Europe, deemed that the first thing at present needed to be done was to prevent the war between them [31]. Due to the great distance of military power between Japan and United States, Japan government reached a consensus to grasp the opportunity to avoid the war between them and took the Washington Conference as a touchstone of a kind of new diplomacy [32]. As well as, it should make full use of Washington Conference and take it as a perfect chance to get rid of the isolation by other countries and improve the relationship with United States and England [33]. On July 22, Hara Takashi Ministry decided to take full use of this opportunity to try hard to eliminate their misunderstanding and dislike of all the countries all over the world [34]. On August 13, United States formally invited Japan to participate in the Washington Conference and Japan accepted with pleasure. So far the condition in Japan changed from anxiety to positive attempt, as well the guiding principle for positively attended the Washington Conference was established. Japan government sent a rather large delegation within the leadership of Kato Tomosaburo, included some powerful and influential people likewise Tokugawa Iesato, Shidehara Kijyuro and so on. On November 12 of 1921, Washington Conference started. On the same day, Hughes declared on the first conference that arms should be limited, and the first thing of which is to abandon the competition in ship construction, who is the United States Secretary of State [35]. That is to say, abandon the ship construction plan; reduce the number of current existing ships and the proportion of navy. On the conference after three days, Kato Tomosaburo accepted Hughes’s proposal, declared Japan would also begin to highly reduce the amount and navy and arms [36].
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In the meeting, the United States insisted on the proportion of navy power should be 5:5:3 among United States, England and Japan. In other words, the number of capital ships of which should be 22, 18 and 10, as well the tons should be 604,450 ton, 500,650 ton and 299,700 ton, and promised no ships will be added in ten years. Tons for the additional ships of them should be 500,000 ton, 500, 000 ton, 30,000 ton [37]. The military power of England was much weaker than before because of the wars happened in Europe and had no way to keep it stronger than the United States, therefore the superiority in navy was taken place of by the United States and they hoped to recover from the disarmament. In the meantime, England did not want the Japanese navy to be the strongest, thus allied with United States to compress Japan after the immediate reconciliation. It was when Japan was carrying out the August Plan to enlarge the navy, intending to build another six new battleships and eight cruisers, which aimed to be the first class country in navy and politics. The military expenditure of Japan in 1920 occupied 46.8 percent [38] in gross national expenditure, and increased to 48.7 in 1921 [39]. However, a proposal put forward by United States was a hard attack on the head of Japan. Japan proposed the proportion compared with United States should not be less than 70%, United States refused. At that period of time, Japan met difficulties in economy, that August plan would not be done until 1927 as soon as possible even if they tried their best, while the Three-year Plan will be finished no later than 1924 [40]. On that condition most of Japanese considered it is a big threatens by United States day and day due to the great distance of military power between them. Thinking of the bad consequences cause by failing to make the contract, Japan would rather to accept this proposal although the proportion of 5:5:3 is difficult to accept [41]. Japan had to admit they were in the dry tree when facing the new International order in the capital world leaded by the United States, caused to compromise to United States and England, and had to make strategy contraction. Kato Tomosaburo thus accepted the proposal with pleasure by principle, and declared Japan had never intended to build the same amount of navy as United States and England, as well as no plan was prepared to attack them [42]. So far Japan was compelled to accept the proposal 5:5:3, which was a big shame for Japan. Kato Hiroji, minister of the Japan navy, screamed out with tears, saying the war between Japan and the United States had begun, we must revenge for it in future [43]. For the issue in China, the policy made by Europe and United States towards to Japan became to transform from indulge and compromise to containment. Especially the United States who conducted the “U.S. dollar output” and put forward some new principles likewise open-door policy, equality of opportunities and so on to impact the dominant position of Japan in China. Japan government regarded the issue on Shandong as something immutable [44], also failed. On February 4 of 1922, Japan signed a contract with China named Treaty to resolve unsettled issues on Shandong, since then so far China got back the territory and benefits of Shandong after passed through difficulties. For Japan, touchstone diplomacy absolutely failed and had to compromise to United States and England. Explicit Transformation of Japan’s Diplomatic Strategy after the Washington Conference Washington Conference made Japan’s navy plan for enlarging failed, also frustrated its ground force plan for enlarging. In June 1922, 56,000 soldiers and 13,000 horses were reduced for the ground force. Moreover, 1,200 military officers, 36,000 soldiers together with 5,600 horses were reduced again in 1925, which equaled to four divisions [45]. Alliance between Japan and England broke up in the conference. United States took the Four-country contract to replace the bilateral treaty of Japan and England, abolished the alliance between Japan and England which was the foundation for Japan’s continents expansion. Shidehara Kijuro had ever suggested England delegation to put forward a proposal to sign a bilateral treaty to take place of the alliance that bilateral negotiation can be conducted on the important issue, which was so flexible that both of them won’t be constrained but within the fact of alliance [46]. But Shidehara Kijuro failed and Japan lost a powerful support for military expansion. After the abolishment of alliance between Japan and England, Japan became much more isolated and dejected than before that almost all Japanese considered it is resulted by United States and England who sacrificed Japan [47], resulting Japan hated United States with a great deal of hostilities. Washington System formed a new political pattern in Far East area. Alliance between Japan and England was abolished, totally bankrupted in their International support from England for continents expansion; the dominant position achieved in China in the World War I was negated; all the supreme goals were destroyed, as well as the minimum goals. From then on China went back to the condition dominated by several imperial countries and the
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pattern of East Asia returned from dominated exclusively by Japan to the origin, conquered by several countries. Japan was quite angry about this; the ground army regarded the Washington Conference as a conference which made them lose the power, and put on the shackles and manacles on their expansion [48]. Tanaka Kunishige, leading representative of the ground force wrote to chief of the general staff Uehara Yusaku, said Japan was taken as a defendant and made a concession again and again in Washington Conference, finally had to make a concession on the issue of Shandong, which destroyed the prestige of country. It was regretful for Japan to give up most of the territories and benefits in Shandong managed since several years ago [49]. Army headquarters of Japan always awaited an opportunity to break the constraint of Washington system. Within the hostility to United States, Japan intended to fight with the United States to rebuild the new order in East Asia, which sowed the seeds of wars in Pacific Ocean. Still and all, Japan had to compromise to the United States because of the great distance between them in the military power, take the dormancy for the future breakthrough. Japan gained a complete victory in the competition with the United States, principles likewise open-door policy, equality of opportunities provided convenience for the expansion of United States in China, therefore the Washington system, a kind of new International order concentrated on the United States was established. Japan’s Monroeism in Asia suffered a serious defeat, touchstone diplomacy failed, idealism diplomacy failed in the Washington Conference, in that had to accept the United States is omnipotent and enjoyed the peace under the governess of United States. Since then, diplomacy of Japan had transformed from ideal to reality and the diplomatic strategy changed, Washington Conference became the start point of Shidehara Diplomacy [50]. Conclusion Still the confliction between Japan and the United States had never stopped, though it was eased by Washington System seemingly. The system only had restrained the expansion of Japan in the area of Far East, slowed down its speed to push the continent policy, but did not bring the long peace for Far East area. Strategy contraction and transformation made by Japan didn’t mean he would give up the special rights and benefits gained in the World War I, the reason is the great distance in military force between Japan and the United States, and England. Japan had to take a Janus-faced policy in the Washington System, one side to show compromise to the United States, the other is to be hostile to him. Hiding the truth in its compromise, expanding in the contraction, going to autonomously from coordinately, it must can break the limit of Washington system and establish the new order surrounded with Japan in East Asia, while time is ready. REFERENCES
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，1965年，第611頁。 [28] 角田順(Tsunoda Jyun)校訂：『宇垣一成日記』（第一巻），みすず書房(Misuzu Shobo)，1968年，第350頁。 [29] 日本外交史料館蔵：外務省記録：内田康哉より駐英大使林権助への電報，1921年7月27日，第460号電報。 [30] 入江昭(Irie Akira)，有賀貞(Aruga Tadashi)編：『戦間期の日本外交』，東京大学出版会(University of Tokyo Press)，1984 年，第24頁。 [31] 日本外交史料館蔵：外務省記録：松平恒雄報告『太平洋会議二関シ帝国政府ノ執ルベキ方針』，1921年7月7日。 [32] 日本外交史料館蔵：外務省記録：亜細亜局報告『支那問題ヲ中心トシテ見タル太平洋会議方針』，1921年7月末。又『日英 同盟ト日米協調』，1921年7月6日。 [33] 外務省百年史編纂委員会：『外務省の百年』（上巻），原書房(Hara Shobo)，1979年，第802頁。 [34] 外務省百年史編纂委員会：『外務省の百年』（上巻），原書房(Hara Shobo)，1979年，第831頁。 [35] 外務省編纂：『日本外交文書———ワシントン会議』（上巻），外務省発行，1969年，第261頁。 [36] 外務省百年史編纂委員会：『外務省の百年』（上巻），原書房(Hara Shobo)，1979年，第832頁。 [37] 依田憙家(Yoda Yoshiie)：『戦前の日本と中国』，三省堂(Sanseido)，1976年，第47頁。 [38] 伊東六十次郎(Ito Rokujyujiro)：『満州問題の歴史』(下巻)，原書房(Hara Shobo)，1983年，第565頁。 [39] 日本国際政治学会編：『太平洋戦争への道』（資料篇），朝日新聞社(Asahi Shimbunsha)，1963年，第3頁。 [40] 日本国際政治学会編：『太平洋戦争への道』（資料篇），朝日新聞社(Asahi Shimbunsha)，1963年，第4頁。 [41] 外務省百年史編纂委員会：『外務省の百年』（上巻），原書房(Hara Shobo)，1979年，第833-834頁。 [42] 三宅正樹(Miyake Masaki)：『昭和史の軍部と政治』，第一法規出版(The first Regulations Press)，1983年，第195頁。 [43] 外務省編纂：『日本外交年表竝主要文書』（上），文書「山東善後交渉問題に関する政府方針」，原書房(Hara Shobo)， 1965年，第531頁。 [44] 信夫清三郎(Shinobu Seiszaburo)：『日本外交史(The Japanese Diplomatic History)———1853－1972』（Ⅱ），毎日新聞社 (Mainichi Shimbunsha)，1974年，第482－503頁。
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International Journal of Literature and Art (IJLA) Volume 3, 2015
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[45] 幣原喜重郎(Shidehara Kijyuro)：『幣原喜重郎日記———外交五十年(The Fifty years of Diplomatic)』，読売新聞社(Yomiuri Shimbunsha)，1951年，第53－57頁。 [46] Ian Hill Nish: Japanese Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2004,P45. [47] 緒方貞子(Ogata Sadako)：『満州事変—政策の形成過程』，原書房(Hara Shobo)，1966年，第20頁。 [48] 上原勇作(Uehara Yusaku)関係文書研究会編纂：『上原勇作関係文書』，東京大学出版会(University of Tokyo Press)，1976 年，第259頁。 [49] 入江昭(Irie Akira)，有賀貞(Aruga Tadashi)編：『戦間期の日本外交』，東京大学出版会(University of Tokyo Press)，1984 年，第23頁。 Taiyong Chen Ph.D in History College in Wuhan University, borns inYunnan. Now is the doctoral candidate of grade 2013 of Japanese history of the College of History of Wuhan University. Research direction: The diplomatic history of Japan; The Japanese lexicology; The study of the Japanese-Chinese translation; The study on comparison of Japanese-Chinese.
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