11 minute read
Undermining Resolve
Strategic Vision vol. 6, no. 32 (April, 2017)
China’s united front warfare activity seeks to divide and weaken Taiwan
Advertisement
Ching-kuo Liu
ROC forces drill in preparation for an attack from China. Beijing has sought out allies, including in the Taiwan military, in an effort to divide and conquer.
photo: ROC MND
Since the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) defeated the Kuomintang (KMT) in the presidential campaign on 12 January, 2016, the political winds in Taiwan have changed dramatically.This is especially true regarding the fundamentals of Taiwan’s relationship with China, with the KMT’s“One China, Respective Interpretations” paradigm giving way to the DPP’s preference for maintaining the cross-strait status quo. This change is due to the difference in core values between these two parties: The KMT’s China-oriented trade and investment policies are in obvious contradiction to the DPP’s preference for diversification of economic activity— as evidenced by President Tsai Ing-wen’s Southbound policy—and the latter party’s aim for Taiwan to be perceived as a country in its own right, legally recognized as such by the international community, and not as a mere province of China.
The realism that drives global politics could prove to be an obstacle to this intention, however, especially as the other player across the Taiwan Strait, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), has shown an intolerance of the DPP view and adopted a series of punishing measures against Taiwan. Given that these measures have been extended from decreasing domestic economic exchanges to increasing international suppression, this article aims to review the political transformation taking place in Taiwan and with respect to what vulnerabilities it may have to the CCP’s time-honored method of defeating its enemies by use of the “united front” strategy.
The united front, along with “armed struggle” and “party buildup,” are the so-called Three Magic Weapons enunciated by Mao Zedong that derived from the historical experiences of the Chinese Communist Party’s 18-year revolutionary struggle. However much he liked using it, though, Mao was not the originator of the united front concept: It was originally adopted by Vladimir Lenin and the Russian Comintern during the 1917 Russian Revolution. According to the CCP’s explanation, “The united front is how the proletariat organizes and leads its allies. It is a powerful revolutionary force of the proletarian organization and a powerful weapon for attacking all enemies.” In less euphemistic terms, it is a strategy by which temporary alliances are formed with political foes in order to jointly defeat a major rival of the CCP. However, those political forces are not real allies for the CCP, but rather secondary enemies in the context of its ultimate political dominance. Only after the joint effort to defeat the major enemy does the party then turn its attention to defeating these weaker foes. Part of the process involves finding contradictions and conflicts within the enemy’s ranks, and using those divisions and separations to create a joint object, on the one hand, to unite forces as far as possible. The use of the united front by the CCP was even more extensive and brilliant than Lenin’s own employment of the strategy.
Boundary condition
The One-China principle has been a boundary condition effective in banning the ROC (Taiwan) from taking part in international society since losing its seat in the United Nations to the PRC in 1971. After a long history of separation from China—both since the 1949 split, but also during the 1895-1945 period of Japanese colonization—the vast majority of Taiwanese people no longer self-identify as Chinese, having developed their own lifestyle, culture, and identity. The victory of the DPP in the last presidential campaign is evidence of this weakening link to a Chinese identity. Thus, the One-China Policy is seen by many as an attempt to constrain Taiwan not just politically, but in terms of identity as well: by supporting the view that the Taiwanese are, in essence, Chinese, the CCP is employing the united front strategy to leverage the emerging rift between those on Taiwan who see themselves as Taiwanese and those who see themselves as Chinese. The more the CCP urges the DPP to agree publicly to the “1992 Consensus,” for example, the deeper the wedge is being driven between these two factions of identity.
During the Mao era, the united front strategy was used in support of the CCP’s military struggle to overturn the ROC. However, in the context of increasing cross-strait exchanges since the 1980s, although the CCP has never renounced the use of force to annex Taiwan, Beijing would prefer to achieve unification with the island without bloodshed, and hence the creation of a pro-unification united front within Taiwan, and internationally. Beijing’s united front efforts toward Taiwan are diversified in a multidimensional way.
After Tsai assumed office on 20 May, 2016, Beijing launched a series of hard measures trying to push her endorse the aforementioned 1992 consensus, which Beijing considers synonymous with “one China.” In the political sphere, Beijing initially cut all official communication channels between the two sides of the strait, expressing its dissatisfaction with Tsai’s refusal to accept the consensus. In the diplomatic sphere, because of Beijing’s interference, Taiwan was rejected from taking part in the annual conference of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Moreover, nearly 200 Taiwanese fraud suspects arrested in Armenia, Cambodia, Kenya, and Malaysia found themselves extradited to China, instead of Taiwan. In the economic sphere, Beijing sharply reduced the number of Chinese tourists to Taiwan, as well as suspending a milkfish export deal with aquaculturists in southern Taiwan. Consequently, tourism and aquaculture business-owners held a series of protests, attributing their losses to the DDP government’s intransigence on the cross-strait issue. As predicted by pundits and the media, Taiwan’s over reliance on cross-strait economic ties became a lever wielded by Beijing to exert political pressure on the government in Taipei—a lever that could be harnessed further if bilateral relations worsen.
Although official and quasi-official communication channels across the strait have been shut down, Beijing will not cut itself off from the Taiwanese people. On the contrary, it has emphasized its intention to maintain and even expand people-to-people relations to advance its political objectives. The Sunflower Movement that took place two years ago heavily affected Beijing’s perceptions of Taiwan society. The movement demonstrated the influential political potential of a younger generation that has long been ignored by leaders, both in Taiwan and China. It also contributed to Beijing’s adjustment of its Taiwan policy, turning its focus onto young Taiwanese. Beijing knows that it is crucial to win the hearts and minds of Taiwan people, as this is the most effective way of influencing Taiwan’s election-based politics.
The ROC Legislative Yuan is quiet one night during the Sunflower occupation as everyone heads to bed in anticipation of a march on Ketagalan Blvd.
photo: tomscy2000
In 2015, during the 5th plenary session of the 18th Central Committee, Beijing officially proposed that bilateral economic cooperation across the strait should be deepened to benefit more ordinary people (mostly those living at the low- to mid-income level in central and southern Taiwan), youth, and small and-medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Taiwan. The proposal was incorporated in the CCP’s 13th Fiveyear Plan. For instance, Beijing has launched a plan to rope in young Taiwanese entrepreneurs, providing them not only with opportunities to create their own businesses, but also providing facilities, funding, housing, and even childcare services.
An MV-22B Osprey, assigned to Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM), 163 flies past Wake Island in the Pacific Ocean.
photo: Matthew Diendorf
Larger intentions
The enticements that Beijing offers can seem irresistible to young Taiwanese, even though they may often remain skeptical about Beijing’s larger intentions in cross-strait economic cooperation. The latest poll released by the Association of Foreign Relations shows that young Taiwanese between the ages of 20 and 29 show more favorable views toward China in the aspect of helping Taiwan’s economic development.
The result of this survey may not be evidence of Beijing’s success in winning over the hearts and minds of young Taiwanese, nevertheless, the consequence is not hard to predict: Beijing has a great possibility to achieve its expected outcome in the long run. In fact, the aforementioned groups targeted by Beijing were first identified by the KMT government in 2011 as a socio-economic issue due to long-lasting recession, and to be prioritized in its economic policy. Unfortunately, Taipei failed to deal with the issue properly, leaving Beijing room to exert influence over these groups.
The CCP’s united front tactics have also been working to penetrate other layers of Taiwanese society. As part of an operation called Collecting Stars, it has targeted military veterans in Taiwan, inviting them to China for visits. Recently, according to media reports, there were 32 high-ranking retired ROC generals in attendance in Beijing in November of 2016 during the CCP’s commemoration of the 150th anniversary of Sun Yat-sen’s birthday. It seems inappropriate for retired ROC generals to participate in the official activities of the CCP, especially since, strictly speaking, the two sides of the strait are still in a state of military hostility. Perhaps, as some media commentators have suggested, they merely lack political sensitivity. But the issue demands a closer look.
A businessperson might go to China attracted by commercial interests, while a politician, from either the blue or green camp, might also go there seeking political gains. What advantage did those generals seek by participating in the commemoration? According to Vice Admiral (ret.) Lan Ning-li, “Why are those veterans, who fought against CCP aggression their entire military careers, willing to participate in the commemoration on the other side of the strait? What is it that drives them to go over there?” The answer may lie in the fact that the legacy of Dr. Sun Yat-sen speaks more to the erstwhile enemies across the strait than it does to the current generation of Taiwanese people and the political party they voted into power.
We can see through this incident that the CCP has successfully used the symbol of Sun Yat-sen to attract patriots loyal to the ROC who feel that their Chinese identity is eroding due to the growth of localization movement and the recent political victories of the DPP that, along with other independence-leaning parties, keep questioning and challenging the legitimacy of the view of the ROC as a Chinese state. For instance, some pro-independentists, media commentators, scholars, and even government officials, have articulated the idea that the ROC is a government-in-exile, or eben a colonial ruler over the Taiwanese. Others have manipulated public opinion to the effect that the ROC is synonymous with the KMT, thereby attempting to deny the legitimacy of the KMT regime by denying that of the ROC itself.
A World War II poster celebrates cooperation between the United States and the ROC
photo: Wikmedia Commons
Aside from downgrading the ROC politically, in order to give birth to a Taiwanese nation, the old Chinese nation, the old Chinese history and traditional culture must be consigned to history, thereby repelling the CCP's appeal for reunification on the basis of ethnic kinship, shared culture, and history. This is not to critisize the pro-independence forces' own vision of Taiwan as being as culturally distinct from China as it is politically distinct, but rather to illustrate the fault line of national identity on the island that has already been causing an internal split, the severity of which would have been hard to imagine just a generation or two ago.
From a semiotics perspective, the ROC's national emblem, flag, and anthem are meaning-making symbols which ignite patriotism: so too does the image of Sun Yat-sen, the nation’s founder. Thus, it is too simple an explanation merely to conclude that the retired officers’ actions constitute apostasy: rather, a more nuanced explanation would have to take into account the transferral of these generals’—and by extension, many others’—sense of belonging. A sense of belonging to the ROC is gradually disappearing in Taiwan, but among the old-guard patriots, it is finding a new link to the mainland, largely through the symbol of Sun Yat-sen. This will potentially have far-reaching effects, such as whether the transfer of this sense of belonging will lead such patriots into a “deal with the devil” in exchange for the continued existence of the Republic of China.
Immediate danger
The CCP’s united front tactics against Taiwan as described above, however, will only continue, and indeed increase. Comparing the CCP’s threat of force and its united front efforts, the latter poses a greater and more immediate danger to Taiwan, and is far more difficult to cope with. Since exchanges between two sides of the strait cannot be avoided, Taiwan must always be vigilant about such united front tactics, however benign cross-strait exchanges do indeed contribute to development on both sides. To be immune to the CCP’s united front tactics, internal reconciliation of Taiwan society is the best cure.
The CCP is good at spotting and even creating fissures and then using them to divide its enemy from within. Nowadays, there are many ideological disputes in Taiwan. The people of Taiwan, regardless of their different political tendencies or cultural and ethnic identities, must find common ground, and a common identity, around which to rally in order to rob the CCP of its united front opportunity. What form that identity will ultimately take is an issue that is up for discussion—will it be a return to the concept of a Free China, or a sense of Taiwanese identity, or something else, something new entirely? It is impossible to say. But this is a conversation that the people of Taiwan should be having, as their continued freedom depends upon it.
ROC Marines display intensity and discipline during the 2016 ROC National Day Parade in Taipei.
photo: ROC Presidential Office
Lt. Col. Ching-kuo Liu is a PhD student at the Graduate Institute of Strategic Studies, National Defense University of the ROC. He can be reached for comment at: liuching@rocketmail.com
