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Shifting Winds

Shifting Winds

Strategic Vision vol. 6, no. 32 (April, 2017)

Taiwan faces continued challenges against PRC efforts at international isolation

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JS Bajwa

ROC President Tsai Ing-wen reviews an honor guard during an official ceremony.

photo: ROC Presidential Office

On May 20, 2016 President Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was sworn-in as President of the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan after winning the elections in January that year. Just days after naming two parliamentarians to attend the events, India backtracked on its decision, and declined to send any official government representatives to attend the inauguration. There was subsequently no official representation at the swearing-in of President Tsai, or at the dinner banquet later that evening. However, some Indian scholars, as well as a Delhi-based BharatiyaJanta Party (BJP) leader, attended in a private capacity. India’s decision not to attend these events was done in deference to Beijing’s coercive dictates, which demand that all countries endorse its One China Policy and refrain from engaging in any official contact with Taiwan.

In her inaugural address, President Tsai said that the Taiwanese people were “committed to the defense of our freedom and democracy as a way of life,” adding that a “stable and peaceful cross-strait relationship must be continuously promoted.” Tsai called upon the governments on either side of the Taiwan Strait to “set aside the baggage of history and engage in positive dialogue, for the benefit of the people of both sides.” What President Tsai said in her inaugural speech likely irked Beijing, particularly her focus on Taiwan’s democracy and freedom, saying that it is every Taiwanese person’s responsibility to safeguard this progress.

Sailors aboard the destroyer USS Sterett (DDG 104) prepare to join USS Dewey (DDG 105) for a replenishment-at-sea.

photo: Byron Linder

The DPP has held the presidency only once before, while the Kuomintang (KMT) has held power for most of the past 70 years. The outgoing president, Ma Ying-jeou, lost public support largely due to perceptions that he had an overly friendly approach to Beijing, as well as his poor handling of the economy and the nation’s widening wealth gap. President Tsai belongs to the DPP, a party that has traditionally leaned toward self-determination—widely interpreted as meaning outright independence—and it is therefore viewed unkindly by China, which sees Taiwan as a breakaway province and vows to achieve unification in the future. Beijing has been demanding that Tsai acknowledge the One China principle under a framework known as the “1992 Consensus:” a tacit understanding between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the KMT that there is only one China, and that Taiwan belongs to it. The two parties, though, have different interpretations about just what “One China” means.

The DPP has always rejected the 1992 Consensus. Interestingly, President Tsai has emphasized the importance of maintaining the amorphous status-quo relationship with China while also alluding to the concept of One China, though she has fallen short of explicitly accepting it. She has also claimed that cross-strait relations have become an integral part of building regional peace and collective security.

Bedrock principle

China has pressured the Tsai administration to stick to the One China principle, which formed the basis of cross-strait relations under the KMT. China has, in the past, threatened to take the island by force should it became more vocal in expressions of independence. Even today, China has thousands of conventional missiles deployed within striking range of the island. While India officially endorses its One China Policy and, like most of the rest of the world, does not recognize the ROC as a country, the reason for initially accepting and then ultimately declining the invitation to send government representatives begs explanation. One possibility is that the government realized that China could use it as an excuse to create a diplomatic embarrassment and snub the Indian President, who made a visit to Guangzhou and Beijing in May 2016.

Their vibrant democracy has given Taiwan’s people a voice: the island’s leaders are their representatives and are expected to govern by the will of the majority.

So it was likely a prudent, realist diplomatic move. It is unprecedented in world political history for a nation like China to have so successfully coerced every nation it deals with to isolate another nation (Taiwan) because it considers it to be a part of its territory. China’s seat on the United Nations Security Council and its huge economic power and market clout have forced these nations to subscribe to Beijing’s agenda. It is a tragic collective travesty of justice with regard to human rights.

Developed nations and democratic nations that pretend to care about human rights cannot give a satisfactory explain for why, in exchange for some economic gains, they have agreed to treat a free and democratic nation as a pariah at the behest of another, albeit larger, nation that is far less free and decidedly not democratic.

Does Taiwan exist at the pleasure of its giant neighbor? Would this have still been the case if China’s economic rise was not of the magnitude as it has been? It may be conjectural to say so, but if there is a downward slide in China’s economy and crippling internal unrest in its society, will Taiwan’s geopolitical fortunes change? This may, at some future point in time, become a scenario that is far less hypothetical.

Their vibrant democracy has given Taiwan’s people a voice: the island’s leaders are their representatives and are expected to govern by the will of the majority. When the people ousted the KMT, it was because they felt it had deviated from their collective wishes. They ushered in a party which understood their concerns. This concept is alien to the ruling elite in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Only CCP members can become PRC leaders, and these members represent the Party hierarchy, which is detached and insulated from the common citizen.

China does not appear to have formulated a policy for unification that appeals to the majority of the citizens in Taiwan. When faced with questions about Taiwan’s democracy and quest for international space, PRC-based scholars typically repeat official-sounding rhetoric by proclaiming that the government in Taiwan is illegal, that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China, and that the unification of Taiwan with China will be beneficial for Taiwan.

Arbitration

In July 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s tribunal in The Hague ruled against China in the South China Sea arbitration initiated by the Philippines. Taiwan was not invited to join the arbitration, nor was an opinion sought from it. However, Vietnam did file a statement giving three points which included its support of the Philippines in filing the case and rejecting Beijing’s Nine-Dash Line. However, China aggressively trashed the judgment despite international opinion in favor of it. Since then it has continued to callously disregard the rest of the world and gone about building military assets in the South China Sea with a snooty nonchalance. The whole exercise by the previous government of the Philippines to bring the case to the Permanent Court of Arbitration was practically given a boot when newly elected Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte began cozying up to China, causing the rest of the world to squirm embarrassingly.

Indian Navy Vice Adm. Harish Bisht, Rear Adm. Koji Manabe from Japan, and Rear Adm. Brian Hurley from the US shake hands and pose for a photograph.

photo: David R. Krigbaum

With a new incumbent in the White House in Washington there was a mellifluous drama played out when President Donald Trump spoke directly to President Tsai after taking office. The telephone conversation shook the Chinese who reacted with a measure of aggressive diplomacy and reiterated that the basics of US-China relations hinged on Washington’s One China Policy. Since that jolt, Trump has appeased Chinese President Xi Jinping, starting with a telephone conversation wherein he acknowledged the US commitment to the policy. For a couple of weeks it prompted the community of nations to do some soul searching on the plight of Taiwan. With Trump looking inwards to a phase of consolidation and less military commitment globally, the rest of the world may be sympathetic to the situation confronting Taiwan, but they are not likely to adopt a militarily protective stance toward it.

Another important decision by President Trump was the withdrawal from the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP). Earlier, Beijing had advocated the rival Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) as a counter. With the TPP in the doldrums, China’s ominous shadow over the Asia-Pacific Region looms larger. The US Pivot to Asia now seems a mirage. With all these dynamic geopolitical, economic, and strategic developments, the situation does not auger well for a diplomatic—much less a military— intervention by the global powers or regional alliances to protect Taiwan from being forcefully annexed to China.

Some scholars from Taiwan opine that the Chinese leadership only understands how to deal with other dictatorial and military leaders, So they do not look at Taiwanese leaders in a different way from their own. Accordingly, they expect the Taiwanese government to make decisions without regard to civil society and public opinion. Chinese leaders do not factor in the opinion of the people since they are not accustomed to accepting versions from outside the CCP narrative. In their view, the concept is alien and disruptive. Thus, there is little expectation that PRC leaders will respect the will and interests of the citizens of Taiwan. With regard to the future, many scholars in Taiwan have no opinion or do not express much optimism. It appears then that Taiwan will have to continue to fight for recognition, and bear the burden of being largely excluded from the international community.

Lieutenant General JS Bajwa is the current editor of Indian Defence Review. He can be reached for comment at jsbajwa@indiandefencereview.com

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