Questionable Commitment

Strategic Vision vol. 6, no. 32 (April, 2017)

Willingness to supply arms is the key measure of US commitment to Taiwan

Kitsch Liao & Michal Thim

US President Donald Trump, seen here greeting an airman at MacDill Air Force Base, has vowed to increase support and strengthen the military.

photo: D. Myles Cullen

The election of Donald Trump as the 45th President of the United States introduced a new element of uncertainty into the TaiwanUS relationship. Early into his presidency, and even before assuming office, Trump stirred US-China relations with a congratulatory phone conversation with Republic of China (ROC) President Tsai Ing-wen on 2 December, 2016, and a subsequent phone call with People’s Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping on 9 February, in which the new US president pledged to abide by Washington’s One China Policy. The commentariat in both China and Taiwan exploded on both occasions with what was perceived as a challenge or outright change to the current status quo, and then its subsequent restoration. It was neither. The former was certainly unusual considering how the United States has traditionally communicated with ROC government officials, yet these conventions are largely the result of self-imposed restrictions serving no real purpose. The call had no potential to redefine the status quo across the Taiwan Strait.

Trump’s relatively minor intrusions into how the status quo is perceived notwithstanding, it is the issue of arms sales that will provide a real litmus test of the US commitment to Taiwan and its continuing adherence to the One China Policy (as opposed to the One China principle as perceived by Beijing).

Previous administrations have more or less followed the playbook of the US One China Policy, which includes maintaining a strong bilateral relationship with Taiwan. US policy toward Taiwan is that its status is not settled: as far as the United States is concerned, it acknowledges that Beijing sees Taiwan as part of China, but Washington neither supports nor refutes that position, holding instead that this is a question that both sides must settle peacefully among themselves.

So far, the Trump administration’s approach to foreign policy has not significantly deviated from the previous administration. However, Trump’s usual business practices aggressively reach for potential concessions from opponents without realizing the commitments made. Hence it is possible that Trump could put US support for Taiwan and Beijing’s position on Taiwan as bargaining chips while remaining just short of committing, or perhaps even reneging, and have Secretary of State Rex Tillerson clarifying the US position afterward, just as in the case of the phone call with President Tsai.

The debate on Taiwan-US-China relations prior to the Xi-Trump summit is a case in point. During the week before the summit, the White House held a briefing on the Xi visit and the expected agenda of the meeting. When asked about how the issue of Taiwan would be handled, a senior White House official replied that the United States adheres to its One China Policy and that this policy is “based on the three joint communiqués with China, as well as the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). That is a longstanding policy of the United States. That is a policy that the president has reaffirmed.” That was a clear suggestion that there is no consideration of change in US Taiwan policy.

The key quality of Taiwan-US relations is that it is not the exclusive prerogative of the executive branch, unlike most of the foreign policy agenda. Via the TRA, the US Congress can prevent a president from making one-sided concessions on Taiwan. Thus, whatever deal Trump’s administration may try to make at Taiwan’s expense, it would need Congressional approval. To signal Congress’s resolve in upholding and improving relations with Taiwan, the Taiwan Caucus co-chairs in the House and Senate urged Trump, prior to the summit with Xi, to adhere to the TRA and the Six Assurances as the cornerstones of US Taiwan policy, and to refrain from consulting China on arms sales to Taiwan prior to their approval. The letter was signed by 147 members of the Congress from both sides of the aisle.

The key quality of Taiwan-US relations is that it is not the exclusive prerogative of the executive branch, unlike most of the foreign policy agenda.

With the first major meeting between leaders of the US and China out of the way, the next test will be the Trump administration’s handling of arms sales to Taiwan. Prior to the Xi-Trump summit, there was much speculation. According to the Japan Times daily, weapons under consideration included the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system and F-35 fighters, though there was no indication that Taiwan made an official request for these items or had been consulted. This raises suspicion that the information about planned arms sales was released specifically to perturb Beijing, as a negotiation tactic.

While the Taiwan air force desperately wants (and in a few years may need) the F-35, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) has rejected the deployment of THAAD under current conditions. But the United States could try to combine key technology transfers for Taiwan’s indigenous submarine program as a way to push Taiwan into purchasing THAAD, complementing other existing BMD assets in the region, and decreasing the utility of the People’s Liberation Army’s Rocket Force.

ROC Military Police special forces disembarking from a UH-1H helicopter from the ROC Army 602nd Air Cavalry Brigade during a counter-terrorism exercise.

photo: ROC MND

Attempts made by the Bush administration attempts to normalize US-Taiwan arms sales and make them similar to America’s foreign military sales (FMS) with other nations did not quite work out as intended. They do provide flexibility for Taiwan to acquire low-priority systems in conjunction with US acquisitions, such as with the proposed Anti-Submarine Warfare helicopter acquisition alongside the US Navy, which saves money for both sides. However, major acquisitions such as jets and submarines have been continuously deferred, or denied outright by both Bush and Obama.

Thus, a Trump administration committed to speeding up needed arms sales would be a welcome change. However, it would not be an improvement if the Trump administration used arms sales as mere leverage in its dealings with Beijing. Such a course of action would be in serious breach of standing US Taiwan policy and a direct violation of the Six Assurances.

The three most prominent defense items promoted by Taiwan and speculated on the US side are the fifth generation F-35 stealth fighter, the THAAD missile defense system, and technology transfers for Taiwan’s indigenous defense submarine (IDS) program. A closer look at each of the three is therefore in order.

The DIA observed in its 2010 Taiwan Air Defense Status Assessment that the combat potential of the current ROC Air Force (ROCAF) fleet is somewhat less than its numbers would suggest. The 66 F-5s are nearing the end of their operational life, the F-CK1s lack endurance, and the Mirage 2000’s exorbitant maintenance costs affect their operational readiness. The proposed temporary solution of 66 F-16C/Ds, both to boast the average operational sortie rate of the entire fleet and to accommodate the planned transition of half of the F-CK-1 fleet into Lead-in Trainers, was consistently denied by the Obama administration. However with the severe shortage of pilots that the ROCAF is currently experiencing, an increase in airframe numbers may not solve the problem.

Instead, qualitative solutions such as the ongoing upgrade of the current Viper fleet to F-16V standards and the eventual acquisition of F-35s may be required. The latter is a more capable platform which can also function as a force multiplier due to its capability to function as individual intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) nodes for land-based sensors, since the E-2T AWACs would be a target of Chinese electronic warfare countermeasures and kinetic strikes.

Tactical acquisitions

While the acquisition horizon may stretch past the delivery of tier-4 participants of the original JSF program such as Singapore, with potential delivery nearing the end of the 2020s, the acquisition of the F-35 would be consistent with Taiwan’s strategic and tactical requirements.

The acquisition of diesel-electric submarines is another long-standing issue. The Bush administration approved the project in April of 2001 but continuously deferred it afterwards. The Obama administration blacklisted these items in any future arms acquisition talks. Yet the need for this asymmetric platform was suggested in internal assessments by the US Defense Intelligence Agency and ROC Navy. Hence, the IDS program was launched last year.

Taiwan’s China Shipbuilding Corporation (CSBC) is the principal contractor for the project. However, critical technology transfer requirements remain problematic, including periscopes and the torpedo tubes. With the prospect of acquiring such technologies from European sources looking slim, and the Japanese requiring consent from the United States, both President Tsai and Commander in Chief of the Navy Huang Shu-kuang made it a priority item in their recent visit to America.

Bolstering Taiwan’s missile defense by acquiring the THAAD system is perhaps the least pressing issue among the three. China’s concern, and the US plan for the deployment of theater missile defense in Taiwan can be traced back two decades. There is no doubt that the deployment of THAAD against Chinese ballistic missiles, especially the short-range models, would be tactically effective, albeit expensive. The existing deployment of 10 Patriot batteries supplemented by future indigenous Tien Kung 3s, and the new strategic planning as laid out in the 2017 Quadrennial Defense Review, have led to a statement from the MND rejecting the possibility of acquiring THAAD for Taiwan in the immediate future. Another potential concern, and the reason for likely US interest in a deploying the system in Taiwan, is that the X-band fire-control radar of the THAAD system—currently the largest in the world—would allow detailed information-gathering on all future Chinese ballistic missile tests.

This would create an escalation with China that would provides little tactical advantage for Taiwan at a high cost. However this does present the MND with leverage during arms sales negotiations if efforts to acquire critical technologies for the indigenous submarine program fail.

Shirley Kan, formerly a Taiwan expert with the Congressional Research Service, once remarked that the TRA was an ingeniously crafted piece of legislation in that it has successfully provided Taiwan with what it needed throughout the varying agendas of different administrations. However the transition from an annual arms-sales talk model to the “as-needed” FMS model has yet to resolve the issues of Chinese resistance and mismatched procedural timing. It has also failed to prevent succeeding administrations from interfering with the process for political reasons. A return to regular arms-sales talks (provided they take place more often) would be helpful in resolving some of the issues mentioned above.

The Trump administration’s approach to Taiwan (and by extension to China) will be demonstrated by its actions on arms sales. The US Congress has stressed that the arms sales part of the TRA must be upheld due to the pressure that Chinese military modernization is putting on Taiwan’s defense. Failure to address the arms sales issue head on or, worse yet, treating it as leverage in dealings with Beijing would be an ill-advised approach.

A Mirage 2000-5EI of the ROCAF at Kangshan Air Base. While effective, their high maintenance costs affect their operational readiness.

photo: Xuan shisheng

Kitsch Liao Yen-fan is a Taipei-based analyst for the Cyber Security firm Team T5, specializing in cyber security, air power, and the ROC military. He can be reached at charlie_1701@msn.com

Michal Thim is a fellow of the Metropolitan Society for International Affairs (US) and a research fellow of the Association for International Affairs (Czech Republic). Michal tweets @michalthim