Locking Horns

Strategic Vision vol. 9, no. 48 (December, 2020)

Chinese, Indian troops clash as border tensions flare up in Eastern Ladakh

Amrita Jash

Border tensions between India and China that have troubled the region since May 2020 took a violent turn when troops of the Indian Army and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) clashed in the Galwan Valley on June 15 in Eastern Ladakh, resulting in the most serious military casualties seen in 45 years. Up to this point, border frictions had been characterized by a lack of weapons fire, but the recent spate of casualties threw a spanner into the works. While the Galwan clash occurred in Indian territory, Beijing put the blame on New Delhi: The PLA’s move was “a response to India’s actions;” specifically, what the Chinese leadership consider “illegal construction of defense facilities across the border into Chinese territory in the Galwan Valley region,” according to Beijing’s state-run media outlet, the Global Times.

The Shyok River (The River of Death) flows through northern Ladakh in India and the Ghangche District of Gilgit–Baltistan of Pakistan.

photo: Eatcha

This has resulted in troop buildups and high alert on both sides of the contested border given the ongoing face-off at two points: the Galwan River (which last witnessed tensions in 1962) and Pangong Lake in Eastern Ladakh. In addition, the eight rounds of talks between the two militaries have fallen into a deadlock, signaling a potential breaking point in the fragile peace.

US and Indian soldiers take part in the closing ceremonies for exercise Yudh Abhyas 14.

photo: Arctic Wolves

The US factor

Adding to the intensity at the border is the US factor. Taking a stand against China, US Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Alice Wells issued a strong statement suggesting that Chinese aggression is not “rhetorical,” given that India on “a very regular basis has to experience the pinpricks of the Chinese military.” Furthermore, on the Galwan clash, the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission in its 2020 Annual Report to Congress stated that, “some evidence suggested the Chinese government had planned the incident, potentially including the possibility for fatalities.”

India-China tensions will also feel the heat of stronger Indo-US ties. Under such dynamics, the big question remains: How sustainable is peace given the changing circumstances, and how long can any form of confrontation be avoided?

The critical importance of the unresolved border issue can be argued in a three-fold perspective. First, 22 rounds of Special Representative (SR) Talks (last held in December 2019) have failed to reach any resolution. The SR mechanism—one of the key confidence-building measures between India and China—was established in 2003 to resolve the boundary issue. Second, increasing incidents of friction in areas along the de facto Line of Actual Control (LAC), which is disputed in three sectors: the eastern sector in Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh; the central sector in Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand; and the western sector in Aksai Chin. Third, the increasing military build-up is having a spiraling security-dilemma effect, prompting the action-reaction behavior witnessed between India and China.

A P-8A Poseidon, a militarized version of the Boeing 737 commercial aircraft, taxis down the flight line at Misawa Air Base, Japan.

photo: Jan David De Luna Mercado

In this context, the impetus to the ongoing stand-off in Eastern Ladakh was provided by the twin incidents of border clashes along the LAC. On May 5, around 250 Indian and Chinese troops clashed at Finger 5; one of the spurs that descend to Pangong Lake along its northern bank. This was followed by an incident near Naku La Pass in the Sikkim sector. On May 17, Indian intelligence agencies reported incursions into India’s air space by PLA helicopters in the LAC in North Sikkim. Adopting a guarded reaction, China responded by saying its “troops there are committed to uphold peace and stability.” Indian Army Chief General Manoj Mukund Naravane announced that Indian troops were maintaining their posture along the border with China, and that infrastructure development in the areas was also on track. What caused the setback was the Galwan Valley incident in June.

In seeking to understand Beijing’s behavior along the LAC, four key aspects must be highlighted: First, China intends to change the status quo at the border: compromise is not in China’s interests. Second, the Chinese transgression exemplifies a pattern that is continuous, cyclical, and violent in nature. Third, unlike past stand-offs, Eastern Ladakh brings forth a marked change in terms of simultaneous engagements at multiple points, as well as an increase in force posturing. Fourth, areas such as Sikkim and Himachal Pradesh, which remain comparatively less disputed, are also targets for China flexing its military muscle. Thus, the net effect is an erosion of the salience of the existing confidence-building measures and protocols between India and China.

Chinese adventurism

The question remains: what is the reason for Chinese adventurism in Eastern Ladakh in times of the COVID-19 crisis? For India, two reasons stand out for the Chinese trigger in Eastern Ladakh: First, China’s sensitivity to India’s abrogation of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution in August 2019, which opened the door to the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganization

Act. As a result, the former state of Jammu and Kashmir was reorganized as the new Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir and the new Union Territory of Ladakh. Beijing is opposed to this development, as it perceives it to have undermined China’s territorial sovereignty—Beijing considers Ladakh to be a Chinese territory in the western section of the ChinaIndia boundary. Thus, Eastern Ladakh can be seen as China’s reciprocal response to India’s action. Second, China is sensitive to India’s infrastructure development along the LAC. In this case, the trigger was the 255 kilometer-long Darbuk-Shyok- Daulat Beg Oldi road (completed in 2019 after 18 years of construction), which is a key strategic highway to the north of the Karakoram Pass. China also harbors resentment over India’s long-standing opposition to joining the Belt and Road Initiative: a position that is hindering China’s ability to press its interests in South Asia, particularly the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.

What remains apparent is that, in the aftermath of the 1962 Sino-Indian War, the border dispute has not just become protracted, but is constantly witnessing new signs of unrest. Incidents of transgressions have also become rampant. This intensification runs counter to the “Wuhan Spirit” that called for a strengthening of military communication and building trust and mutual understanding, with the aim of enhancing predictability and effectiveness in the management of border affairs. Thus, the India-China border dispute is not just protracted but has become volatile, making it a potential hotspot in Asia.

Boosting India-US ties

An Indian army paratrooper exits a CH-47 Chinook helicopter during a partnered airborne training exercise with US Army paratroopers at Fort Bragg.

photo: Michael J. MacLeod

The ongoing India-China crisis along the LAC in Eastern Ladakh has provided a boost to India-US ties. This is evident from the inking of the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) on October 27, during the Third India-US 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue. Arguably, it was the tensions with China that provided an impetus to the signing of BECA, completing the mandate of the four foundational agreements to enhance interoperability between the two militaries as well as promoting exchange of high-end military technology. The other three agreements include: the 2002 General Security of Military Information Agreement; the 2018 Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement; and the 2018 Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement. Two key aspects make BECA especially significant: first, the exchange of maps, nautical and aeronautical charts, and other unclassified geospatial information with the United States helps India to effectively track the Chinese footprint along the LAC and in the Indian Ocean. Second, the sharing of sensitive US satellite and sensor data will provide a significant boost to India’s military capabilities, especially, in striking targets with pinpoint accuracy. Thus, it remains clear that every step forward in India-US ties will only be a challenge for China in its quest for great power status.

An Indian soldier with 12 Madras looks down the sight of his rifle in a cordon and search training demonstration at Chaubattia Military Station, India.

photo: Samuel Northrup

Change in mindset

With no breakthroughs despite eight rounds of commander-level talks, it is clear that India’s China policy needs a serious rethinking and a change in mindset. The old ways of assessing China need to be dismissed and replaced with a new paradigm, based on the following benchmarks: First, following the adage that there are no permanent friends or permanent enemies, but only permanent interests, India should always act from a position of strength when dealing with China. Second, there should be no doubt about Chinese intentions to change the status quo along the border in favor of Beijing. Third, the recurrent ingress is a sign of Beijing’s reluctance to resolve the boundary disputes with New Delhi, be it now or in the future. Fourth, China’s acts of transgression are no longer local or normal, but have become premeditated and top-down in their approach, and used as a means to test India’s resolve. Fifth, China’s actions are guided by the salami slicing strategy, which is an incremental approach towards securing its claims. This was the strategy used so effectively by Beijing to take control over the South China Sea, and it is now being applied against India along the disputed border. Finally, deception is the most important tool of Chinese warfare, thus one must expect there to be a sharp difference between what is said and what is done by Beijing. Galwan was another example demonstrating Beijing’s strategy of keeping the LAC active, despite its calls for resolution through an early harvest. Thus, rather than being worried, India should be prepared.

INS Rana of the Indian Navy’s Western Fleet leads a passing exercise formation behind the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan.

photo: Gary Prill

Recent episodes further signify that the COVID-19 pandemic has failed to tone down behavior on the border. This also dampens the celebratory spirit for this year’s anniversary of 70 years of India-China ties, with 2020 having been designated “India-China Cultural and People to People Exchanges” year. With the high stakes involved and no resolution in sight, the border dispute between the two countries remains far from settled. Furthermore, the pandemic has not made much of a difference in averting the risks of contingencies. Rather, if relations take a further downturn under the virus outbreak, like that between China and the United States, the border flare-ups will only become a routine display of power between New Delhi and Beijing. It is the lack of consensus between the two powers along the LAC that has increasingly contributed to the distrust of the other’s intentions. Hence, a timely check of perceptions can aid in avoiding misadventures which can arise when two actors assume the worst of each other. It is in the best interests of both New Delhi and Beijing to refrain from adding new issues to the old disputes, which only makes the case more complicated and further delays any potential boundary settlement, protracting the disputes.

Dr. Amrita Jash is a research fellow at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) in New Delhi, India. She holds a PhD in Chinese Studies from Jawaharlal Nehru University.