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Tripwire Tricks
Strategic Vision vol. 9, no. 48 (December, 2020)
Examining covert deployment of tripwire force in Taiwan for de-escalation
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Kitsch Liao
China’s unilateral escalation of tensions across the Taiwan Strait has intensified over the second half of 2020, with increased crossing of the midline by warplanes and incursions of the Republic of China (ROC) ADIZ on an almost daily basis. The United States has employed largely political measures in response, including high-level visits by US officials, an increase in arms sales, and public announcement of political and military dialogue, to signal its support for Taipei. Though important and welcomed by the government and people of Taiwan, such oblique measures would do little to deter an armed invasion by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and analysts have suggested various measures to provide a more stable deterrence mechanism, one of which is the idea of placing a tripwire force on Taiwan.
A US soldier in Baghdad, Iraq reconnects a simulated tripwire as part of a counter-improvised explosive device course in preparation for missions.
photo: Samantha Simmons
An overt tripwire deployment represents a discrete, non-continuous level of escalation that might spur further escalation by Beijing, and increases the cost for all sides should any side choose to back down. Therefore a salami-slicing approach to covert US force deployment to Taiwan, buttressed by credible communication channels to China, such as Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), would constitute a superior option for eventual de-escalation.
A successful tripwire’s primary mechanism of deterring an invasion operates on the logic of deterrence by denial; by directly making a PLA invasion of Taiwan unlikely to succeed instead of threatening punishment, such as retaliatory attacks against civilian infrastructure in Shanghai. The measure’s credibility relies on two components: the nationality threshold/audience cost and an established capacity to escalate (C2E). The nationality threshold refers to the effects of a country’s own uniformed military personnel dying at the hands of another country’s uniformed military, and the associated public outcry, that would force the government’s hand in honoring the commitment represented by the tripwire force. In the words of Thomas Schelling, the mission of a tripwire force is to “die heroically, dramatically, and in a manner that guarantees the action cannot stop there.” This is also referred to as a “tying-hands” signaling mechanism.
Simply having resolve is insufficient without concomitant capacity, however, and C2E is defined as the capability of the defender—in this case the United States—to project a second echelon force into the theater to continue the fight, since the tripwire force was never expected to stop the enemy advance alone. This calls into question America’s capacity to project significant amount of force to Taiwan and its vicinity without prior preparation.
A multitude of issues
The employment of a tripwire force presents a multitude of issues that may instead exacerbate current tensions. Prime among these is that such a deployment could be misinterpreted as tacitly acknowledging Taiwan’s sovereignty. It could also be seen as a violation of the primary condition underlining the original Sino-US rapprochement, which included the withdrawal of US forces from Taiwan. A reintroduction of US forces permanently stationed on the island may very well unravel a process that took decades to achieve, and making de-escalation all but impossible.
A Lockheed F-104A with the 83rd Fighter Interceptor Squadron at Taoyuan Air Base, Taiwan, on September 15, 1958, during the Quemoy Crisis.
photo: USAF
Second, by making the possibility of American intervention more explicit, this strategy would sacrifice Washington’s flexibility of response. Third, it is hard to withdraw openly deployed forces without incurring an audience cost, consequently endangering deterrence against Taiwan independence: Should there be a significant move toward de jure independence that requires the pulling of tripwire forces, the cost in reputation and domestic audience would both be great. Fourth, the Chinese may nonetheless doubt US resolve, both for enduring the shock of suffering severe losses within a short time frame, and for an extended confrontation.
A final issue with the tripwire strategy is its very nature: to effect a conventional escalation of hostilities should it fail to serve as a deterrent. The Chinese could choose to respond to a tripwire deployment in a like escalatory manner, such as by moving against one of Taiwan’s outlying islands, for example; a move that a small tripwire force on Taiwan proper would be powerless to deter.
Facing the dilemma posed by deteriorating credibility and the many negative implications of an overt tripwire force, recent studies on covert action could shed some light on an alternative strategy that seeks to extract much of the benefit of a tripwire force, but which may alleviate many of the aforementioned negative consequences.
By its very nature, covert action reduces the external audience cost, the reputational cost, and the domestic stakes involved, thereby alleviating much of the cost for de-escalation on both sides. Additionally, covert action creates the illusion of a limited war that is helpful in avoiding further open escalation, specifically through the mechanism of plausible deniability. Much of the military relationship between the ROC and the United States is, if not covert, certainly under the radar.
Red line
Basing US military personnel on Taiwan openly is equivalent to a red line that would force China’s hand into an invasion. Yet, since 1979, the US military presence in Taiwan has ranged from nonuniformed advisors as part of arm sales programs, to uniformed servicemen on low-key training exercises. ROC forces also train in the continental United States, with the most visible example being an entire squadron of Taiwanese F-16s and pilots participating in US exercises and training in advanced beyond-visual-range tactics and air refueling techniques. This and other ongoing exchanges are an open secret, never officially acknowledged by Washington, thereby avoiding charges that the United States is supporting Taiwan sovereignty, and so therefore failing to solicit the usual blustery public condemnations from Beijing.
Taipei Air Station in 1975. Taipei Air Station was located off Roosevelt Road, close to National Taiwan University, in Gongguan, southern Taipei, Taiwan.
photo: ROC Presidential Office
It seems likely, therefore, that in lieu of an overt deployment of a tripwire force, the adoption of a salami-slicing strategy on a US military deployment in the country could have a higher chance of success. Covert deployment of rotational forces could first be increased, with occasional, controlled leaks of information acting as probing and signaling mechanisms. Depending on the need for stronger deterrence toward China, or communication against de jure independence in Taiwan, the force deployment and level of cooperation can be adjusted without incurring an unwanted audience cost in Taiwan, China, or the United States.
Furthermore, depending on the circumstances and results of such covert action, further escalation into the pre-positioning of material, or logistics hubs enabling power projection, could be attempted. Such actions need not be military in nature: joint response teams for regional HA/DR operations of the type proposed by retired USMC Lt. Col Grant Newsham can be attempted alongside US allies in the region. Such dual-use hardware and personnel could represent a form of further escalation that would remain below the level of overt military deployment, and may have the additional benefit of reassuring US allies in the region of US resolve in maintaining regional order.
Badge of the United States Taiwan Defense Command (1955-1979)
These courses of action would provide a way to fine-tune signaling mechanisms and buttress US resolve, as well as having the potential to reinforce the US capability to escalate in a Taiwan-invasion scenario. Since the nature of the initial presence would be covert, or at least discrete, the audience cost can be avoided. In countering Beijing’s current intensification of cross-strait tensions, intentional leaks and subsequent action leading to just short of a full reveal can be manipulated to fine-tune escalation, while eventual reveal can achieve the desired deterrence effect of a tripwire through the tying-hands and nationality-threshold mechanisms.
Before the outbreak of a crisis and full revelation, plausible deniability of covert deployments and the non-military nature of overt activities would afford Washington continued flexibility to shift its deterrence posture—flexibility that would otherwise be lacking with the public deployment of an overt tripwire force.
ZTZ96 battle tanks are disgorged onto the enemy’s shore by a Zubr (Bison) class hovercraft purchased from Russia in a PLA amphibious landing exercise.
photo: PRC Gov
The salami-slicing approach however—marked by small steps, each too minor to constitute a casus belli—only constitutes half of the equation. Assurances must also be conveyed to the Beijing regime for there to be any hope of eventual de-escalation. To this end, re-establishment of hot-line and various confidence building measures is of paramount importance. Unfortunately, the Chinese tend to use the establishment and discontinuation of CBMs as a signaling mechanism, calling into question their utility in a crisis. This does not diminish the importance of establishing such a channel, but it does reinforce the urgency of reaching a consensus on its use and importance with China.
The exact sequence of the establishment of CBMs and covert deployments is beyond the scope of this article. However, once acknowledged in covert negotiations, the “facts on the ground” of deployed US forces would function as a bargaining chip in negotiations to facilitate de-escalation, while a further escalation into full revelation would allow the force to function as a tripwire during a crisis. This would naturally rely heavily on an accurate reading of Chinese signaling and communication mechanisms. Consequently both the studies on Chinese signaling, as well as the establishment of reliable hot lines, are urgently required.
photo: USAMHI
Urgent and severe challenge
China’s unilateral escalation of tensions across the Taiwan Strait, particularly in the past six months, presents an urgent and severe challenge to the continued efficacy of Washington’s strategy of dual deterrence through strategic ambiguity. Should the Chinese be successful in establishing this escalation as the new norm—essentially the method that won Beijing control over the South China Sea—China could then leverage the situation and inflict everincreasing coercive actions against Taiwan, damaging both US credibility and Taiwan security. The deployment of a covert tripwire force would communicate a strong signal regarding US resolve in protecting Taiwan without violating pre-established tacit understandings with China since 1972. Depending on the method employed, this could also have the secondary effect of reinforcing America’s capability to escalate and therefore increase the credibility of its security commitment.
A salami-slicing approach to the deployment of a tripwire force, which grants finer control over escalation and de-escalation through a lower audience cost, with the option to escalate into non-military deployment or full revelation during a crisis, represents a potential strategy for credible yet reversible escalation while sidestepping the political fallout that would be associated with a sudden and overt force deployment. However, to get to de-escalation and restore the status quo ante, establishment of a clear channel of communication incorporating reliable CBMs need to be simultaneously pursued.
The ultimate goal of a successful deterrence strategy across the Taiwan Strait would be to prevent a military confrontation, and particularly one involving the United States, as well as preserving Taiwan’s freedom of self-determination. Accordingly, any use of force and escalation into a crisis would constitute a failure of general deterrence, necessitating a dangerous escalation into immediate deterrence. In the context of the proposed salami-slicing strategy, this would involve the public revelation of a uniformed US tripwire force stationed in Taiwan. Such an immediate deterrence usually puts both sides’ actions in the spotlight, and increases the audience cost of de-escalation and backing down. Consequently, the deployment of covert forces to Taiwan, and the communication to China through credible channels, must be accomplished in such a way that it avoids triggering the crisis it seeks to prevent. Covert deployment, as proposed herein, represents a possibility that is worthy of further discussion.
Kitsch Liao is an independent defense analyst who is currently based in Taipei, Taiwan. He can be reached for comment at kitschquixote@gmail.com
