Keeping Pace

Strategic Vision vol. 9, no. 48 (December, 2020)

ROC defensive posture must continue to evolve as US-China rivalry grows

Ying-yu Lin

Ongoing US-China tensions have covered areas of contention ranging from trade, foreign relations, technology protection, to military muscle-flexing. Although the militaries of the two sides show enough restraint to refrain from taking each other on, both sides have expanded their freedom of action in airspace and underwater management and other areas through military exercises or alternative feigning action. In Taiwan, there is a strong consensus to not take the initiative to start a war because of sufficient knowledge of defense matters and a lack of a militant mindset. Nevertheless, Taiwan has to guard against possible use of force by China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA), since the PLA might opt to do so under pressure at home and abroad. Despite the fact that China now mainly employs “gray zone” strategies in its approach to the Taiwan issue, Taiwan still cannot rule out the possibility of China’s use of force against the island. The PLA as we know it now is not what it was before the most recent military reform that kicked off in 2016. The PLA has been holding frequent military exercises in recent years to achieve intimidation in politics and foreign relations and also to support military reforms. These developments have become a serious threat to Taiwan.

Ordinary Seaman Gordon Garner stands watch during sunset aboard HMCS Regina (FFH 334) during Exercise Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2020.

photo: Dan Bard

Judging from the PLA’s most recent exercises, it is evident that invading Taiwan will no longer be the job of any single theater command. It will be executed in the form of a joint attack from the “four seas,” namely the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, Taiwan Strait, and South China Sea. The Northern and Southern Theater Commands are most likely to be responsible for blocking access to the Taiwan Strait to carry out a strategy of blocking enemy reinforcements and encircling enemy positions. The Eastern Theater Command is still the main force to engage in an invasion of Taiwan. However, if the PLA wants to launch naval blockades in the East and South China seas, it will surely face the US military head-on. Whether an armed conflict will ensue is a political decision to be made by either side.

The PLA has adopted a new slogan: “First battle as decisive battle (or final battle)” for its upcoming campaign against Taiwan. If an armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait drags on too long, it will increase the odds of international intervention and produce negative variables for China’s domestic politics. Therefore, time is a key factor in the armed takeover of Taiwan.

Dictums from Sun Tzu’s Art of War are applicable here, such as “subdue the enemy without fighting” and “the highest form of war-fighting is to frustrate the enemy’s plans; the second best is to engage the enemy diplomatically; the next is to engage the enemy in the field; and the worst option is to besiege walled cities.” The best option for Beijing leaders is to unify Taiwan without having to resort to force. If the goal of “peaceful unification” cannot be achieved anytime soon, a possible option is to intimidate Taiwan through military strength but without deploying a large number of troops in the process. This may be the reason why the PLA now greatly relies on gray zone strategies in its intimidation against Taiwan, hoping to improve its battlefield management in the region and reduce Taiwan’s strategic response time. If the strategy of unifying through military force does not work, China might seek to raise tensions in the Taiwan Strait once again by launching simultaneous air and naval blockades. The PLA might even try to encircle Taiwan’s offshore islands or block access to them. The old tactic of encircling enemy positions and attacking their reinforcements might be used against Taiwan. If all the methods mentioned above fail to achieve their designated goals, the PLA will then likely opt to attack Taiwan proper.

A serviceman with the ROC military takes part in combat exercises in Taiwan. As the PLA evolves, the ROC military must adapt to new challenges.

photo: ROC MND

Beijing would gather a sizable concentration of troops to intimidate Taiwan militarily, but it still hopes that the goal of unifying Taiwan can be achieved through limited use of force. Whether this can be done depends greatly on the willpower of the Taiwan people. Do people in Taiwan have the strength of will it would take to support their military and help it defend against the PLA? This question helps explain why China has recently been using proxy methods such as misinformation, public-opinion warfare, and cognitive warfare against Taiwan’s public—to divide and conquer. The goal is to take advantage of a division of opinion among Taiwan’s people, and to prompt a call for surrender shortly after firing the first shot in the Taiwan Strait. These efforts also contribute to the attainment of the goal encapsulated in the aforementioned motto, in that the first battle must be a decisive battle.

Preventing the battle

Taiwan cannot pin its hopes for peace on the goodwill of China. Some people argue that if the first battle is indeed to be a decisive battle, then preventing that battle from ever happening is of critical importance. Maintaining peace in the Taiwan Strait is, of course, one way to achieve this goal, but if the Republic of China (ROC) military is greatly inferior to the PLA, or if the Taiwan people lack the will to fight, then this decisive battle will be lost before it begins. As Mao Zedong put it, “Fight no battle unprepared and fight no battle you are not sure of winning.”

Since war is always evolving and changing, adapting to new threats and technological advances and making self-improvements is critical. Taiwan should observe recent developments in the PLA (as well as the US military) and be mindful of the implications thereof, especially with respect to command mechanism changes of the post-reform PLA, wherein the PLA has made progress in improving its joint operations capabilities, and has adopted new war plans for use against Taiwan. Moreover, the US Indo-Pacific strategy will surely be adjusted to keep up with new technological applications and international competition.

During the international maritime exercise Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2020, for instance, the United States and its allies adopted a strategy that was markedly different from anything used the past. An important change was the absence of aircraft carriers from the exercise, a move indicating the US military’s seeming departure from the decades-old practice of counting on the aircraft carrier as the central focus of the strike group. Does this mean that the US and its allies have started to probe into the possibility of a carrier-free strategy against China? There is indeed that possibility, since the PLA has been focusing its efforts on the development of anti-access and area denial capabilities against US aircraft carriers since the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996.

Is it possible for the US military to win a battle without the use of carriers? The USS Essex (LHD-2) amphibious assault ship can also serve as a carrier and provide similar services to the United States and its allies. The focus of RIMPAC 2020 was on coalition cooperation operations and distributed lethality. So, will carriers play a feigning attack role, as US marines did in the Gulf War of 1991, to divert the attention of the PLA and achieve the effect of distributed lethality against the PLA through coalition cooperation with other friendly militaries? All these issues deserve further study.

Has Taiwan adjusted its defense strategy to effectively react to political and military changes in China and the United States? This is of critical importance to Taiwan’s national security. Support from Taiwan’s public will be a key determinant in whether Taiwan can survive as an independent country. The national defense education program that the ROC Ministry of National Defense has been promoting is intended to increase the general public’s understanding of national defense, which comes from a growing familiarity with defense issues in general. However, quite a few people are still skeptical about what the military is doing, or has done. They even hold a negative view of their military.

These negative views provide a good opportunity for China to launch cognitive warfare operations against Taiwan. US arms sales to Taiwan has been one area where the public has been misinformed. A lot of misinformation, and information taken out of context, is being circulated on social media and in chat groups. Advances in digital technology contribute to the spread of such misinformation and the general public’s misunderstanding towards the government. Taiwan’s national defense has concentrated on building combat strength, but it has not reacted to the invisible war already being fought—a war that seeks to undermine the will and morale of the Taiwan people. In the near-term, Taipei must do more to defend against the challenges from Beijing’s cognitive warfare campaigns. The national defense education program must include a comprehensive plan to raise public awareness about these problems, and to provide accurate information to counter Chinese propaganda.

The Wasp-class amphibious assault ship USS Essex (LHD 2) transits the Pacific Ocean during Exercise Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2020.

photo: John McGovern

Taiwan can also play a larger international role in providing expertise and insight into the increasingly powerful PLA. Regardless of how cross-strait relations develop, PLA studies will always be a critical subject for Taiwan, and many other nations in the Indo-Pacific region. According to former US Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, “PLA modernization is a trend the world must study and prepare for – much like the US and the West studied and addressed the Soviet armed forces in the 20th century.”

Esper also noted that the PLA does not serve the state; rather, it serves the Chinese Communist Party. They PLA is therefore different from most other militaries in the world. Interpreting developments in the PLA from a Western perspective can easily lead to misjudgment and error. Taiwan, and Taiwanese PLA scholars and experts, are well-positioned to help provide insight into the PLA because they share a common language with China, and have a long history of observing and analyzing China and the PLA. With its unique expertise on the PLA, Taiwan must assume a larger role in international academic and government forums on the PLA.

Dr. Ying-yu Lin is an adjunct assistant professor at the Institute of Strategic and International Affairs at National Chung Cheng University in Chiayi, Taiwan. He can be reached at singfredrb@gmail.com