Drone Warfare

Beijing seen likely to rely heavily on UAVs in South China Sea, Taiwan Strait Moh’d Ali Khawaldeh

Of all the countries in the South China Sea (SCS) with whom China has territorial disputes, Taiwan is especially targeted, because the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) considers it to be part of Chinese territory. In addition, Taiwan represents the cornerstone of the global competition between the United States and China. In light of the availability of advanced levels of combat and military technology capabilities on both sides, it is worth seeking the most appropriate mechanism for preserving the rights of all parties to the SCS disputes. Currently, each party seems to have resorted to protecting its perceived rights by using combat and reconnaissance drones, a strategy of which the effectiveness has yet to be determined.

China is embroiled in SCS sovereignty disputes with Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei, Vietnam, and the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan. While international law has mechanisms for determining the answers to such questions, such as the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), China predicates its claims on a historical argument, and at present the disputes over the ownership of these islands has not been resolved. Therefore, countries with a foothold in the South China Sea must practice constant vigilance and pay close attention, regularly updating information about the activities of the other side and closely monitoring them. This matter can be cumbersome for countries using traditional tools, and many are seeking more effective and modern technological means to accomplish this goal. The use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) offers a promising avenue.

The role of drones in this conflict, as well as in the conflict across the Taiwan Strait, will become increasingly important. Military observers of the state of combat readiness across the Taiwan Strait anticipate several possible scenarios that Beijing may pursue in its cross-strait ambitions. This is especially true since the CCP is not satisfied with the current administration in Taipei, and has frozen official communications across the strait since President Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party—a party that does not support political unification with the authoritarian state—won the presidency in 2016. After her electoral victory, Beijing took escalatory measures against Taiwan, impairing the political, economic, and military aspects of the cross-strait relationship.

The measures on the economic and political fronts ranged from limiting the number of Chinese tourists that the CCP allowed to visit Taiwan, to poaching some of the ROC’s few remaining diplomatic allies.

On the military side, the People’s Liberation Army

(PLA) began ramping up the number and intensity of its military operations, such as the repeated and ongoing deployment of PLA air force fighters conducting incursions into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ). These and other attempts at intimidation are designed to underscore the CCP’s oft-repeated assertion that it reserves the right to use force to effect the island’s annexation.

Direct confrontation

It is expected that China will take multiple preliminary steps, starting with a blockade of Taiwan’s ports, before reaching the stage of a clear and explicit invasion. Beijing’s leaders know that by launching such an endeavor, it may precipitate a third world war and a direct confrontation with the military might of the United States, which will not stand idly by, especially as this would conflict with US interests and threaten America directly.

Each of the parties seeks to hide its actual military capabilities from the other as much as possible, and at the same time tries to obtain intelligence about the other party. The Chinese side knows that the level of continuous and long-term readiness is stressful for its forces, especially if we take into account the multiplicity of China’s conflicts with various countries in the South China Sea such as the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei, in addition to conflicts with other countries such as Japan and South Korea.

The Chinese side possesses distinction in the manufacture of UAVs, such as the new Caihong 6 (CH 6), characterized by a classic dynamic design. Its weight ranges from 300 kg to 2000 kg, it has a fuel reserve, and it can stay in the air for about 20 hours, with a speed that approaches 800 km per hour. Americans showed a special interest in the CH 6 due to its interesting and distinctive design. China has increasingly resorted to using drones to harass Taiwan’s air defenses, and to perform intimidation, intelligence, and psychological operations widely referred to as grey zone tactics.

In this conflict, each party is trying to reduce the threat to its actual forces by adopting inexpensive methods such as using UAVs for reconnaissance, and potentially for combat operations. One of the most important advantages of this practice is the low cost and long period of operation. Moreover, there is the ability to use it on a large scale, and in large numbers. Any party can, using UAVs, confuse the calculations of hostile countries in the SCS disputes. The combat operations and military display of the PLA’s power demonstrated the potential intensity of drone attacks against Taiwan. This makes it an attractive option for China.

On the Taiwan side, it is no secret to anyone how much technological progress Taiwan enjoys at the global level. Through excellence in the technological field, it can add drones to operate effectively, especially after China increased the use of this type of aircraft in its ongoing harassment campaigns. In a brave and daring example of pushback against these tactics, Taiwanese soldiers managed to shoot down a Chinese drone when it entered restricted airspace off the Taiwan-controlled islet of Shihyu.

In addition, it was recently announced that the US Air Force had ordered four MQ-9B SkyGuardian drones from General Atomics Aeronautical Systems

Inc. for the ROC armed forces, boosting the ROC’s strategic military and security cooperation with the US side. These aircraft can fly over the horizon via satellite for more than 40 hours, even in adverse weather conditions, and will be used to support electronic warfare, airborne early warning, and anti-submarine warfare missions against the PLA.

Drone countermeasures

Many countries have adopted several strategies to combat the rising drone threat, but most of these rely on electronic countermeasures without considering much in the way of human capabilities. There is a large and growing market for anti-drone systems such as the Sky Wall 100, DroneDefender, the Anti-AUV Defense System, SkyFence, and other countermeasures. It is possible to mitigate the threat posed by drones using other methods as well, however. These methods consist in studying the nature of the drones, as they largely depend on advance information that is available about the area they intend to attack in order to reach their targets. Accordingly, the most appropriate strategy is to make the best use of the nature of the terrain.

This strategy is based on the adoption of two important options to conceal the locations of likely military targets: First, adopting procedures based on the nature of the land and studying these in depth to hide military sites. The war in Afghanistan demonstrated the resilience of Taliban fighters in defending against air attacks, which allowed them to hold out for a long period of time. They exploited the high altitudes of the country’s mountainous topography—a feature that is shared by Taiwan. Second, the exploitation of well-designed cities in which civilian infrastructure and structures are separated from military facilities.

As evidenced by the frequent use of drone strikes not only by the Russians in Ukraine, but by the Americans in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, it seems likely that the Chinese will adopt the strategy for the invasion they keep threatening to launch against Taiwan. It therefore behooves Taipei defense planners to prepare for this contingency by purchasing electronic countermeasures, taking advantage of Taiwan’s mountainous terrain, and hardening as well as camouflaging military sites. n