US FONOPs and the Taiwan Strait

The US Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer the USS Milius sailed through the Taiwan Strait April 16 in a Freedom of Navigation Operation (FONOP) that the US Navy has begun referring to as “routine” transits. That the US Navy itself has begun to publicize these specific individual operations is an indication of its willingness to demonstrate its commitment to maintaining stability in the region, and that the best way to do so is not to give in to the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) increasingly bellicose claims in the region’s bodies of water. This follows the sentiment, enunciated in the US-Japan Joint Leaders’ Statement issued after last year’s summit, underscoring “the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.”

Strait peace

It is therefore worth revisiting what FONOPs are, and why they are so important. First initiated in 1979, these deployments are designed to exercise the right of any vessel to navigate freely in contested or dangerous bodies of water. They have since become a valuable tool that the United States uses to challenge various excessive maritime claims and to serve the US interest in upholding international law.

In conducting these operations, Washington is demonstrating its resolve to “fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows, regardless of the location of excessive maritime claims and regardless of current events,” according to statement by the US Navy following a South China Sea (SCS) transit by the USS Milius. Critics of the US FONOPs point out that they are limited in their ability to challenge territorial claims. In fact, they are not designed to make such challenges; their purpose is only to contest excessive maritime claims that are inconsistent with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

Three pillars

When The Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy was unveiled by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in August 2016, it rested upon three pillars, the first of which is predicated on the establishment and promotion of the rule of law, freedom of navigation, and free trade, with cooperation being paramount among nations that share fundamental principles and a vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific. The second pillar defended the pursuit of economic prosperity, which is dependent upon improving physical connectivity including energy, information, and communication technologies, and infrastructure development such as ports, railways, and roads. It also involves people-to-people connectivity, such as through human-resources development, and institutional connectivity. The third pillar is a commitment to peace and stability. This latter involves strengthening capacities of maritime law enforcement, maritime domain awareness, and other human-resources development, as well as cooperation in such fields as anti-piracy, counter-terrorism, non-proliferation, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, or HA/DR.

Abe’s new paradigm presented an attractive alternative to the conceptualization of the Asia Pacific region then being promoted by the PRC, which previsioned a Beijing-centric international order operating according to the value system of the Chinese Communist Party, and realized through the costly and ambitious Belt and Road Initiative. Thus, in late 2017, the administration of US President Donald Trump—recognizing the threat posed by a resurgent and revanchist China—adopted the FOIP concept and presented it as its own. It only made sense that the epicenter of conflict between these two competing perspectives should be in the Taiwan Strait.

As the body of water separating the free and democratic Taiwan from the authoritarian, one-party China, there are inevitably huge problems in this area, encompassing the economic, political, and military spheres. The Taiwan Strait plays a decisive role in the Indo-Pacific region because it is a major international waterway connecting the SCS to the East China Sea, and thus part of one of the busiest shipping routes in the world. According to Bloomberg, almost half of the world’s container ships passed through the Taiwan Strait in the first two quarters of 2022. Ships departing from China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan carry commodities from Asian production centers to markets in Europe, America, the Middle East, and beyond, stably supplying apparel, home appliances, mobile phones, semiconductors (Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company alone supplies over half the global market) and other products. A regional conflict, therefore, would force ships to ply longer routes, increasing transit times, disrupting shipping schedules, raising costs and severely impacting shipping capacity. If the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) were to blockade the Taiwan Strait, countries throughout the world would face a round of serious supply chain disruptions and further inflationary pressures similar to the ones that followed the COVID-19 lockdowns.

Because of Taiwan’s geostrategic location on the first island chain, both the United States and China have interests there. The current international status of Taiwan is a result of World War II, the second phase of the Chinese Civil War (1945–1949), and the Cold War. Under Xi Jinping, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regards “complete unification” as a “historic mission and an unshakable commitment.” The status quo is accepted in large part because it does not define the legal or future status of Taiwan, leaving each side to interpret the situation in a way that is politically acceptable to its members.

Disputed terminology

Even the terminology used to discuss the situation is fraught with pitfalls. The PRC refer to Taiwan’s controversial status as the “Taiwan question,” the “Taiwan issue,” or the “Taiwan problem.” The Republic of China (ROC) government in Taipei, however, does not use such terms, and sees the PRC as the aggressor standing in the way of Taiwan being treated as a normal country. Others use the term “Taiwan Strait issue” because it implies nothing about sovereignty, and because

“cross-strait relations” is a term used by both the ROC and the PRC to describe their interactions. However, this term is also objectionable to some because it still implies that there is, in fact, an issue, which they feel has been fabricated solely by the PRC.

At its narrowest point, the Taiwan Strait is about 160 kilometers across, or 86 nautical miles, making it too wide for one state to claim all of it as a territorial sea under UNCLOS, even if that state held unquestioned sovereignty over both sides. While foreign military vessels are not required to use “innocent passage” rules to pass through the international seas in the middle of the Strait, political sensitivities demand that they take care when doing so. Also, in 2021, the activities of PLA military aircraft and naval ships around Taiwan significantly increased over levels seen in 2020. The number of military aircraft entering the southwest airspace of Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) alone reached 961 sorties, which is more than two and a half times as many as in 2020. Clearly, the CCP is trying to create a new normal with these aggressive military actions against Taiwan.

Beijing’s attempt to create a new normal in the

Taiwan Strait poses a danger to Taiwan’s continued sovereignty. It was a similar strategy that allowed the CCP to slowly take control over the South China Sea. The PLA declared a four-day drill in the Taiwan Strait on the day US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan, initiating the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis. While the drill officially ended on 8 August, 2022, incursions have continued unabated, and have become a daily norm. PLA assets continue to cross the median line in the waters and by air. The 180-kilometer gulf that separates Taiwan from China has become a stage for Beijing’s power theatrics. The median line, which Beijing is currently refusing to recognize, was for decades a tacit frontier respected by both sides until Pelosi’s arrival in Taiwan. The Chinese have continually attempted to set a new normal for military activity in the strait.

It is difficult to say whether the Taiwan Strait today remains safe for civilian ships. No body of water is completely safe or completely dangerous: rather, seamanship is always an exercise in risk management. Doubtlessly, civilian ships could avoid the increased risk by choosing other routes, but the increase in transit times would disrupt shipping schedules and incur greater fuel costs.

Moreover, these PLA incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ are categorically different from US FONOPs, it should be emphasized. The whole point of a FONOP is that it is conducted in waters that, according to UNCLOS, are open to global usage by any party. Despite this clear distinction, the CCP routinely feigns offense with each new US FONOP and accuses Washington of provocation, and of endangering the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait.

At the time of Pelosi’s visit, PRC Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying said in a press conference that China “again urges the US side to stop falsifying, hollowing out and distorting the one China principle.” In response, White House National Security Council spokesman John Kirby responded by reiterating that nothing had changed with the US legal obligation under the Taiwan Relations Act to help Taiwan defend itself “as well as to defend our own national security interests in the region.” the United States will “continue to abide by international law. We certainly urge the Chinese to do the same,” Kirby added.

Despite these assurances, a new normal is indeed metastasizing. While China’s incursions increase, US FONOPs are reducing in frequency. The armed forces of the United States conducted fewer FONOPs through the Taiwan Strait in 2022 than in any of the preceding four years, it was reported by Bloomberg, with just nine vessels of the US 7th Fleet transiting the strategic body of water 2022. This represents a decline from the US Navy’s 11 transits through the strait in 2021—a year that saw five FONOPs conducted through the SCS, according to the Japanese Defense Ministry’s policy research institution, the National Institute for Defense Studies.

Solidarity

It would therefore be advisable for America to increase its patrols in the region, and to make FONOPs through not just the Taiwan Strait but the SCS as well into a new normal. Moreover, other like-minded countries that share the American and Taiwanese values of democracy, freedom, and respect for international law should deploy their own naval assets to do the same. Indeed, this has begun to a small extent, with recent years seeing Taiwan Strait transits by warships from France, Canada, and the UK. This trend should be encouraged in order to establish the Taiwan Strait as a free and open waterway for all the world’s ships, regardless of registry. n