Xi’s third term seen as countdown to invasion

Gathering Storm - Will Xi invade Taiwan during his third term?

Amrita Jash

The wheels of history are rolling on toward China’s reunification and the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. These are the words of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping who, giving the opening address at the 20th National Congress of the CCP on October 16, 2022, vowed that “Complete reunification of our country must be realized.”

Xi once again affirmed that China would never renounce the use of force to annex Taiwan, and that it reserves the “option of taking all measures necessary.” Xi gave greater prominence to the Taiwan issue than he did at the 19th Party Congress, which highlights not just China’s anxiety over its own progress toward this so-called reunification, but an undeniable growing momentum in Taiwan’s pro-independence sentiment. Security was the watchword in the 20th Party Congress report, with 91 mentions. National security has been described as the “bedrock of national rejuvenation.” Undoubtedly, in Xi’s third term, Taiwan will be the top priority both for China’s foreign policy as well as its military. Hence, the prominent query: Will Xi invade Taiwan during his third term?

This question has been on the lips of analysts and policymakers throughout the international community, especially given the backdrop of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war. This has been further exacerbated with increased interactions between Taiwan and the United States in terms of arms sales and highprofile visits, which Beijing denounces as “interference by outside forces.” With tensions around the island intensifying, speculation is rife about China’s own invasion of Taiwan.

A new report claims that some in the US intelligence community assess that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) could attack Taiwan as soon as 2024, presumably around the January 2024 elections. Others anticipate that Xi may attempt to take Taiwan by 2027, on the centenary of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Along similar lines, in 2021, the Republic of China (ROC) Defense Minister Chiu Kuo-cheng remarked that China will be ready to mount a full-scale invasion of Taiwan by 2025, stating that by that date, “China will bring the cost and attrition to its lowest. It has the capacity now but will not start a war easily, having to take many other things into consideration.”

A weakened economy

Some analysts suggest, however, that Xi is not likely to launch a costly military operation to unify Taiwan for the next five years as China is currently suffering from a weakened economy. Others predict Xi will take a wait-and-see approach during his third term, in the event there is new leadership in Taiwan in 2024. This only adds to the ambiguity of China’s action plan on Taiwan.

What is evident is that China’s recent military maneuvers in uncomfortably close proximity to Taiwan, while not full-scale, nevertheless lay bare Beijing’s intentions. This has been strengthened with the resolution endorsed at the 20th Party Congress, with a new mandate added to the military section of the Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party on “opposing and containing Taiwan independence,” making it the first such direct reference to Taiwan in the basic law. In addition, the new composition of China’s Central Military Commission (CMC) under the chairmanship of Xi Jinping, who secured his third term both as party leader and CMC chairman, has a strong Taiwan bearing. The appointment of General He Weidong as the second-ranked vice chairman of the CMC is crucial as he served as the former commander of the Eastern Theatre Command, which oversees Taiwan and the East China Sea. He is also reported to have planned the military exercises around Taiwan in response to the August 3, 2022, visit to Taiwan of US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi.

Beijing responded to Pelosi’s visit by taking eight countermeasures against the United States, with the PRC foreign ministry calling it “a serious violation of the one-China principle.” But what really made headlines was the PLA’s military response. The PLA Eastern Theatre Command conducted joint combat exercises and training in the waters and airspace over Taiwan, as well as conducting a series of ballistic missile launches—for the first time since the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995–1996 (see Figure 1 on page 51). More importantly, PLA aircraft and warships set a new precedent by repeatedly crossing the median line—an unofficial barrier midway between the two countries that has been tacitly observed by both sides for decades.

US, New Zealand, Korean and Australian fighters rehearse an amphibious assault in South Korea during Exercise Ssang Yong.

According to the ROC Defense Ministry, an unprecedented 68 Chinese fighter jets and 13 warships crossed the median line on August 5, clearly changing the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. Given this context, the key query that demands significant attention is: how soon, and under what pretext, can China be expected to use force?

“The military exercises served as a litmus test for the PLA to take stock of its own operational capabilities.”

In looking back at history—the CCP’s past actions such as intervention in the Korean War, the 1962 War with India, the 1969 Sino-Soviet border conflict on the Ussuri river, and the 1979 Sino-Vietnam War, to name a few—two common motivators are evident: a focus on national interests, and a penchant for strategic signaling. This also applies in the Taiwan case. PRC leaders’ paramount consideration when choosing whether or not to use force is based on protecting China’s national interests, which in this case is ostensibly its territorial sovereignty. Taiwan, which the PRC has deemed a “core interest,” has been denoted as “an inalienable part of China.”

This objective is well-coordinated with the two key strategic tasks of the PLA. The first is to deal with a wide range of military threats (including Taiwanese independence), and to effectively safeguard the sovereignty and security of China’s territory. Concomitant with this task is to resolutely safeguard the unification of the motherland. The second motivator is to signal an adversary to change its behavior through the use of intimidation—to either deter or compel the adversary to behave in a certain way. In this case, the military activities were a clear signal to both the United States and Taiwan, and an attempt to deter them from taking any action that might hinder or challenge Chinese interests. According to the PRC foreign ministry: “The actions are aimed at deterring the ‘Taiwan independence’ forces, so they are legitimate and necessary … both as a response to the major provocation of the US side and the ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist forces.”

Furthermore, the PRC also released its first White Paper on Taiwan in more than 20 years. The document, titled “The Taiwan Question and China’s Reunification in the New Era,” pointedly mentions that “External forces have encouraged and instigated provocative actions by the separatist forces; these have intensified cross-strait tension and confrontation and undermined peace and stability in the AsiaPacific region.”

In addition to these two motivators, the Chinese leaders’ behavior in response to the Pelosi visit was influenced by the catalytic effect of the PRC’s ascending status as a great power, and the need to project that power.

The Goldilocks principle

The PLA’s joint military operations near Taiwan also highlighted the calibrated use of force. That is, applying the Goldilocks principle of getting it “just right:” keeping it below the threshold of war but raising the risks of escalation. China’s actions therefore illustrate, to the careful observer, the amount of risk that Beijing is willing to take on Taiwan. It is clear that China has limitations, as there is yet no guarantee of Chinese success. Invariably, the military exercises served as a litmus test for the PLA to take stock of its own operational capabilities and combat readiness. This showcase of hard power by the PRC further proves that China under Xi Jinping has departed, both in theory and practice, from Deng Xiaoping’s famous dictum, “hide your strength, bide your time.”

The PLA’s sword-rattling demonstration offered some clarity, allowing analysts to better assess Beijing’s current level of motivation on the Taiwan issue. First, China is no longer avoiding the possibility of real combat over the island. This highlights that CCP leaders may no longer hold out hope for a peaceful unification. It also suggests that the PLA today is both willing and prepared to engage in combat with other militaries if the situation demands it, to wit: the ROC and American armed forces. For instance, even before Pelosi’s visit, in January 2022, the PRC ambassador to the United States Qin Gang issued a stern warning, threatening a “military conflict” over the status of Taiwan. This threat was reiterated in the CCP White Paper, which states, “we will not renounce the use of force, and we reserve the option of taking all necessary measures.” China’s attitude seems clear: war is now only a matter of time.

Second, Xi is resolute in his desire for unification and will not give up his quest to rule over Taiwan. “Never before have we been so close to, confident in, and capable of achieving the goal of national rejuvenation. The same is true when it comes to our goal of complete national reunification,” the White Paper reads. Xi has made Taiwan a priority on which there can be no compromise. This is exemplified by Beijing’s hardened official position, as testified by the PLA’s recent military exercises.

Third is the Xi Jinping factor, which has become synonymous with an assertive and aggressive China. As argued by Suisheng Zhao, a professor of Chinese politics and foreign policy at the University of Denver, Xi has relied on brinkmanship to pressure Taiwan into accepting his unification ultimatum. This puts into perspective that there remains no confusion: to Xi, the “Taiwan question is China’s core national interest and essentially non-negotiable, important enough to go to war if pushed,” explained Zhao. While there is no doubt that China will continue to use coercion to attempt to deter independence forces in Taiwan, a worse-case scenario would see the PRC use military force in an attempt to annex the island.

US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, left, and ROC President Tsai Ing-wen pose for photographers during Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan.

About the author

Dr. Amrita Jash is an assistant professor in the Department of Geopolitics and International Relations at Manipal Academy of Higher Education in Manipal, India. She is author of the book The Concept of Active Defence in China’s Military Strategy.