Limited blockade seen more likely than PLA assault

Limited blockade more likely than PLA assault

Ruei-lin Yu

Since 2013, the national defense strategy of the Republic of China (ROC) has been one of “innovative asymmetric warfare.” Taiwan’s military preparations have been driven by this strategy in particular since the onset of the Russia-Ukraine war. Indeed, if the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) launches a full-scale invasion of Taiwan, asymmetric warfare—the so-called porcupine strategy—will be the best way to defend the island. Unfortunately, due to Taiwan’s limited defense budget, investing in asymmetric warfare will crowd out the needs of other defense affairs, in particular the high-profile, conventional platforms that are so often criticized in Taiwan’s security community as being useless acquisitions. If the PLA uses a different strategy to attack Taiwan, however—one other than a full-scale invasion—and the porcupine strategy reliant upon asymmetric weapons fails to work, Taiwan’s national security will be in danger.

In order to register China’s displeasure at US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s August visit to Taiwan, Beijing reacted by launching missiles into the waters surrounding the island in its biggest- (and nearest-) ever live-fire drill in the Taiwan Strait area. The missiles were targeted at six military exercise zones (see Figure 1 on page 51) located on important sea lines of communication (SLOCs) around Taiwan, stimulating discussions about the possibility of a PLA blockade. This article will argue that such a blockade strategy would be more consistent with China’s national interests than a full invasion of Taiwan. The purpose is not to argue against the strategy of innovative asymmetric warfare, but to provide an alternative scenario and food-for-thought for ROC military planners.

The argument advanced here relies upon a set of assumptions. First, the leaders of China still expect that they can effect a peaceful unification, but that they will not give up the option of using force to effect a military occupation if the stalemate drags on for too long. Second, Beijing is fully aware that the United States represents the biggest obstacle to annexing Taiwan. From their perspective, Washington recently has been playing the “Taiwan card” to undermine China’s peaceful rise. Third, the concept of the Thucydides Trap teaches us that a rising power inevitably threatens to displace a ruling one, the most likely outcome of which is war. To leaders in Beijing, the inevitable conclusion, therefore, is that the rising power (China) must be prepared for war with the United States. In short, if the People’s Republic of China (PRC) wants to unify with Taiwan, it is bound to go to war with the United States, and this war seems to be unavoidable.

In his timeless The Art of War, the master strategist Sun Tzu avers that “the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.” If Chinese leaders wish to complete their “historical task of the reunification of the motherland,” i.e., to make Taiwan a part of China and govern it successfully, then a PLA attack on Taiwan causing heavy casualties on a massive scale is not the answer. For one thing, over 90 percent of the world’s most advanced chips are made in Taiwan, if Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. Ltd. and the island’s other chipmakers suffer heavy collateral damage from a PLA attack, this would, according to US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, be “devastating” to the global economy, including China. Therefore, a prudent planner would find a way to unify with Taiwan with as few casualties as possible, truly serving China’s long-term interests. A blockade would be well-suited for this goal.

There are two main reasons cited by those who argue that China would not try to blockade Taiwan. The first is that the PLA does not have the ability to mount such a blockade effectively. The second is that blockade operations, by their very nature, take a long time to be effective, during which time China will be vulnerable to international sanctions.

The ROC military performs tank exercises.

photo: ROC MND

During the August show of military force, the PLA only dispatched around ten warships and a few dozen aircraft to encircle Taiwan—a relatively small part of photo: ROC MND China’s Eastern Theater Command (the PLA have five Theater Commands). They combined this with some precise guided missiles strikes by the PLA Rocket Force to achieve a certain degree of blocking of Taiwan’s SLOCs. By some accounts, these activities could be seen as the PLA successfully demonstrating the capability to effect a limited blockade.

All necessary means

In addition to the PLA Navy (PLAN) ships that would be dispatched to enforce such a blockade, Beijing would doubtless beef up that force with China’s Coast Guard ships, as well as the fleets of fishing vessels that make up the maritime militia that has become notorious for harassing ships in the region on behalf of the PRC. On January 22, 2021, the PRC National People’s Congress passed a new law giving its coast guard license to demolish structures built by other countries on reefs claimed by China, and to use “all necessary means” against foreign vessels in waters claimed by China, including boarding and “inspecting” them. According to Ambassador Robert Blackwill and Professor Philip Zelikow, the bill would empower the PRC coast guard to create temporary exclusion zones “as needed” to keep other vessels from entering. The gray zone tools authorized by this law can be deployed to disrupt maritime shipping.

“China has known from the beginning that a military conflict between China and the United States is doomed to occur.”

An ROC servicemember inspects a jet fighter at a military base in Taiwan.

photo: ROC MND

ROC soldiers train in urban combat in preparation for a PLA invasion of Taiwan.

photo: ROC MND

China currently has the world’s largest number of naval ships, the second-largest number of coast guard ships, and an uncountable number of fishing boats deputized as assets for its maritime militias. In addition to these, the PLA’s guided missiles, such as DF-21D and DF-26, can precisely hit targets at sea. In terms of capability, therefore, there is no doubt that China has the ability to conduct limited blockade operations. Admiral Sam Paparo, commander of the US Pacific Fleet, concurs, telling Nikkei Asia that “China certainly has the number of vessels, and the capability at sea to execute a blockade.”

Acclimating to sanctions

As for international sanctions (or, to be more precise, Western sanctions), many are already in place. That is to say, even if Beijing does not launch a campaign to invade Taiwan, US sanctions currently on China have already been increasing gradually over the past few years, slowly acclimating the Chinese economy to being sanctioned. Moreover, the Russia-Ukraine war has taught Beijing how to prepare, adjust, and counter those possible sanctions. Unlike Russia, China has a vast domestic market and manufacturing industry, so the effect of international sanctions on China may be much more limited than they were on Russia.

Members of the ROC Armed Forces perform a drill routine to celebrate Double Ten National Day at the Office of the President.

If the PLA wants to launch Taiwan blockade operations, it will never follow the traditional form of a blockade, designated as an act of war that is regulated by international law. Rather, it would try to conceal its harassment of Taiwan’s maritime access. According to an unnamed US official interviewed by Nikkei Asia, China could accomplish this by repeatedly holding constant military exercises that force civilian air and sea traffic to reroute to avoid areas of closure, and “through the repeated imposition of these kinds of closure areas, legally, safely, and in a way that would be extraordinarily difficult, either for Taiwan or the United States, to challenge and to counter.”

In The Science of Strategy, a key textbook for PLA officers, a strategic blockade is described as a way to “destroy the enemy’s external economic and military connections, degrade its operational capacity and war-fighting potential, and leave it isolated and unaided.” If the generals planning the annexation of Taiwan follow the doctrine as laid out in this volume, the PLA can be expected to respond to escort operations and blockade running by carrying out precision strikes on selected ROC targets. In a worst-case scenario for the PLA, the US military would insist on helping Taiwan to carry out such anti-blockade operations. Should this happen, Beijing would likely accuse the US military of ignoring Chinese warnings and entering Chinese (read: Taiwanese) territorial waters and airspace, then order the PLA to attack.

Conflict inevitable

As mentioned earlier, China has known from the beginning that a military conflict between China and the United States is doomed to occur. It would therefore be justifiable, in the eyes of Beijing leaders, for China to attack the US military for intrusions into China’s territorial sea and airspace. As long as the PLA does not attack targets outside of the blockade zone around Taiwan (the area of operations for the ostensible military exercise), Beijing thinks it will be procedurally difficult for the United States and its allies to declare war on China.

graphic: US Gov

Meanwhile, China will declare to the world that US military support for Taiwan has failed, saying that instead of using international sanctions, the United States can no longer provide subgraphic: US Gov stantial help to Taiwan, so as to isolate Taiwan and completely destroy the Taiwanese will to fight. At this time, China will force a political negotiation and persuade besieged authorities to accept a “one country, two systems” accommodation. If the ROC government accepts it, China will immediately provide sufficient food and resources to the people of Taiwan, thereby—in Beijing’s view—winning hearts and minds with its largesse.

After launching the limited blockade and controlling the SLOCs, China will also seek to control the information landscape. It will use propaganda, disinformation, cyberwarfare, and other tools in the hope of drumming up support at home while sowing fear and discord in Taiwan. During the military operations that followed the Pelosi visit, Taiwan experienced cyberattacks on at least four ROC government websites. Hackers also took over electronic displays at several 7-Eleven convenience stores on the island, as well as one at a train station in Kaohsiung, to display messages condemning Pelosi, it was reported in The New York Times. In other words, the PLA demonstrated that there will be a cyber component to any move against the island, and that ROC defense planners must expect China to conduct information operations against Taiwan.

Starting from encircling Taiwan through the deployment of vessels ostensibly conducting a military “exercise,” Beijing could leverage this limited blockade to force Taipei to make concessions, or use it as a precursor to a full invasion. China’s military strategists see blockade operations as a strategic tool that gives them flexibility to tighten or loosen the noose around Taiwan’s neck, depending on Beijing’s specific objectives and the US response.

While Paparo admits that China has enough ships to execute such a blockade, he adds that the United States and its allies certainly have the capability to break it. Moreover, US President Joe Biden clearly stated recently that the United States will help in defending Taiwan, though he has provided no concrete details. It is clearly the strategic intention of the United States to deter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Keeping some measure of ambiguity is surely in the US national interest, but the United States must consider how it will respond if the US military is attacked by the PLA when it aids Taiwan. The result of this campaign will be critical in determining the regional, even the global political landscape of the future. It would therefore seem necessary for Taiwan and the United States to jointly discuss various levels of cooperation for different scenarios. Deputy Economics Minister Chen Chern-chyi was quoted in The Times as saying that the nation needs to stockpile reasonable stores of important supplies. “We have made preparations for food and for energy and critical supplies, including manufacturing supplies. We have a system — we do an inventory every month,” he said.

“We want to ensure that we have a certain period’s worth stockpiled in Taiwan, including food, including critical supplies, minerals, chemicals and energy of course,” Chen added. Recently, the ROC Navy also made some quick adjustments in its shipbuilding plans to cope with the potential for a blockade. In addition to looking at strengthening the reserve forces, the ROC Ministry of National Defense has started to discuss the possibility of extending the duration of compulsory military service. As illustrated by the August PLA military drill, such changes are sorely needed.

Members of the ROC Armed Forces wear personal protective masks during the COVID-19 pandemic.

photo: ROC MND

About the author

Dr. Ruei-lin Yu is an associate professor and director of the Graduate Institute of Strategic Studies, College of International & National Defense Affairs, National Defense University, ROC (Taiwan).