Median-line incursions change cross-strait status quo

China unilaterally changes cross-strait status quo with median-line incursions

Shao-cheng Sun

In response to US Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) conducted several waves of military exercises that began on August 4, 2022. This latest Chinese military coercion against Taiwan has been dubbed the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis. During the crisis, Beijing launched provocative military exercises, punitive economic sanctions against Taiwan, and canceled dialogues with the United States. On August 3, foreign ministers from the Group of Seven (G7) countries expressed their concern about China’s “threatening actions” which risked “unnecessary escalation.” This article explores the 2022 Taiwan Strait Crisis by examining China’s reactions to Pelosi’s visit, Taiwan’s response to China’s threats, and the future of crossstrait relations.

On July 19, The Financial Times reported that Speaker Pelosi would visit Taiwan in August. The PRC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that if she went through with her planned visit, China would take determined and forceful measures. A week later, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) warned that they would not stand idly by. When Chinese President Xi Jinping held a phone call with US President Joe Biden, he asked Biden to prevent Pelosi from making the trip. President Biden responded that Congress was an independent branch of government, and that he would not intervene. Biden advised Xi not to take provocative actions if the visit happened.

However, before Pelosi even arrived on Taiwan, the PLA took several military actions in an attempt to deter her from setting foot on the island. These included conducting military drills across multiple theater commands. On July 28, China began testing Taiwan’s defenses by sending drones over Taiwan’s offshore islands. By August 1, China had placed the PLA Eastern Theater Command on high alert.

Support for democracy

Nancy Pelosi’s delegation landed in Taipei on August 2, stating that their visit was in honor of US support for Taiwan’s democracy. The US ambassador in Beijing, Nicholas Burns, was called to the PRC foreign ministry around midnight, to receive an official protest. Beijing suspended or canceled a series of planned bilateral exchanges with the United States. Economic sanctions were levied against the Republic of China (ROC). More than 2,000 Taiwanese food products were suspended from importation into China. Beijing also suspended exports of natural sand to Taiwan. Actions taken against the United States included canceling three military meetings, planned for the second half of 2022. The PLA conducted large-scale military actions around Taiwan. Chinese missile tests were targeted around Taiwan’s territorial waters (see Figure 1 on page 51). Chinese naval ships and airplanes passed across the median line in the Taiwan Strait. On August 4, the PLA held live-fire rocket and missile launches. Joint military operations were performed from August 4 to 7. An aggressive disinformation operation accompanied these military actions to exaggerate China’s military capabilities.

photo: ROC MND

ROC Army personnel during training.

photo: ROC MND

Beijing admitted that the military drills were conducted in response to Pelosi’s visit. In early August, the PRC conducted a series of provocative naval and air exercises in the vicinity of Taiwan. In the weeks following her visit, PLA military activity around Taiwan remained tense. This was due to continuous visits by American politicians to Taiwan. The increased frequency of PLA aircraft and ships crossing the median line of the Taiwan Strait indicated that China would no longer respect the status quo.

Beijing’s strong military reaction signaled that China is prepared to use force against Taiwan. The PLA fired missiles targeting seven areas of the waters surrounding the island. This included the far side of Taiwan facing the Pacific—a region through which US naval vessels often navigate, as a move to prepare a military blockade.

Deterrence and signaling

These military exercises had the following objectives. First, they were intended to undermine support for ROC President Tsai Ing-wen among Taiwan’s public. President Tsai would pay the price for seeking closer relations with the United States, Beijing hoped. Second, the exercises were part of Chinese deterrence and signaling efforts toward Washington and Taipei, demonstrating how capable and determined Beijing was to exert control over the island. Third, these exercises allowed the PLA to practice various military operations against the ROC military.

President Tsai signaled that people in Taiwan would not shy away, but would also not provoke China. While some Taiwanese people called on the Biden administration to engage US forces in response to PLA exercises, these requests reflected only a minority view. However, most Taiwanese suggested that the United States and Taiwan work together to strengthen bilateral security relations and solidify Taiwan’s international support.

Both major political parties, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT), presented themselves as guardians of the status quo. The opposition party, the KMT, argued that it could deal with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to lower the risk and preserve cross-strait stability. As ruling party, the DPP’s response to Beijing’s pressure was to strengthen Taiwan’s relations with the United States and Japan.

Taiwan’s military was on high alert, tasked with monitoring the situation closely. During the PLA exercises, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense announced that its missile defense capabilities were activated. The armed forces continued to assure the public that the ROC military had everything under control. They emphasized that the situation was being monitored, and Taiwan was strong and prepared. They would not back away from a fight.

The ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) portrayed the events as proof of China’s military aggression and as evidence that Beijing was attempting to unilaterally change the status quo. The finance ministry appealed to the international community to stand with Taiwan, just as they have been supporting Ukraine against Russia’s military invasion.

Lack of creative thinking

Ryan Hass of the Brookings Institution, writing about his recent visit to Taiwan shortly after the Pelosi trip, reported finding a lack of creative thinking about Taiwan’s defense reforms or a sense of urgency among the elected and appointed officials, opposition party leaders, business executives, public intellectuals, and members of civil society he met. While military planners and government policymakers pointed to plans to raise Taiwan’s defense spending in 2023, they uniformly seemed to favor a mix of conventional and asymmetric defense investments. According to Hass, “Most also acknowledged that Taiwan’s war reserve stockpiles are inadequate and that Taiwan must increase its supplies of fuel, food, medicine, and critical munitions.”

An ROC Air Force pilot during training.

photo: Office of the President

By learning lessons from the recent Russian invasion of Ukraine, Taiwan’s top leaders have grudgingly become aware that the people of Taiwan must play a part in their own defense. Still, they continue to hope that the United States and the international community will do more to deter the Beijing regime from trying to take the island by force.

“If Zhongnanhai believes that Taiwan’s leaders will continue to resist a voluntary unification with China, then they will most likely make good on their oft-reiterated promise to annex the island by force of arms.”

Beijing created the tensions in the Taiwan Strait with its provocative military exercises surrounding Taiwan. Even in the aftermath of the exercises, China’s military pressure on Taiwan remained strong. The impact of the crisis has only served to strengthen the US government’s resolve to counter China’s challenge of Taiwan.

The Biden administration has deepened unofficial ties with Taipei and is preparing to help build Taiwan’s defense so that it can deter a PRC military move. The United States is concerned that the shifting military balance of power in China’s favor will make a military invasion of Taiwan more likely. This crisis incentivized the ROC government to actively coordinate with Washington. This impulse has deepened private coordination between senior US and Taiwan officials.

This crisis occurred on the eve of 20th National Congress of the CCP, at which Xi Jinping retained his hold on power for an unprecedented third term in office, after having changed the PRC Constitution in 2018 to remove the term limits on his office. In a speech at the opening ceremony on October 16, Xi said that China would work for peaceful unification with Taiwan, but that it reserved the right to use force. “This is directed solely at interference by outside forces and a few separatists seeking Taiwan’s independence,” Xi warned.

Under Xi, Beijing sees Washington as moving away from its “One China” policy and coming dangerously close to an official relationship with Taipei. In Beijing’s view, public discussion of stationing US military forces on the island, and repeated assertions from President Biden that the United States is willing to defend Taiwan, all provide evidence of this shift.

Domestic factors in China, Taiwan, and the United States have played a key role in creating this crisis. China’s reliance on nationalism puts pressure on the regime, risking its self-proclaimed status as defender of China’s unity. What social media the CCP allows is already grumbling about Beijing’s weak response. In the United States, maintaining a defiant approach against Chinese aggressiveness has bipartisan backing. The people of Taiwan’s deepening identification as Taiwanese, rather than Chinese, will continue to upset leaders in Beijing, which will make managing cross-strait relations difficult.

Taiwan Policy Act

Tensions in the Taiwan Strait could see another upsurge if Congress passes the Taiwan Policy Act, which would provide security assistance for Taiwan, a provision that has significant bipartisan support. This is despite the fact that the Biden administration pulled some of the strongest proposals in the bill, such as mandating senate confirmation of Washington’s representative to Taipei, renaming the representative office in the United States, and designating Taiwan as a “major non-NATO ally.” Despite these omissions, Beijing is widely expected to use passage of the bill as an excuse to take a more aggressive stance on Taiwan. If Zhongnanhai believes that Taiwan’s leaders will continue to resist a voluntary unification with China, then they will most likely make good on their oft-reiterated promise to annex the island by force of arms. If statements made by Xi Jinping are to be believed, this means it will be an all-out invasion of Taiwan. The ROC government certainly does not want a war, but if we take Xi Jinping at his word, they had better start preparing for one.

ROC Air Force chief engineer and pilot carefully check every detail of their fighter at a military base in Taiwan.

photo: ROC MND

About the author

Dr. Shao-cheng Sun is an assistant professor at The Citadel specializing in China’s security, East Asian affairs, and cross-strait relations. He can be reached for comment at ssun@citadel.edu.