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Xi Thought implies ‘new normal’ for Taiwan
Xi Imposes ‘New Normal’
Yuan-chou Jing
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The 20th national Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which determined if Xi Jinping would win an unprecedented third term in office, was held in mid-October. Before the high-level confab, maintaining a stable environment both domestically and internationally no doubt constituted Xi’s center of gravity. However, in addition to dealing with the challenge posed by the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in Shanghai, Beijing, and other cities, Speaker of the US House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August provided Xi with another dilemma. Xi was obviously very upset about Pelosi’s visit, and decided to retaliate against both the speaker and her hosts by holding a large-scale military drill, shooting missiles into the waters surrounding Taiwan. This drill has broken the long-standing tacit military understanding in the Taiwan Strait, and, in the meantime, an unprecedented landscape being called a “new normal” was created by these circumstances.
The Two Establishes
During its Party Congress, the CCP approved amendments to its constitution, including the socalled “Two Establishes.” This four-character phrase means “to establish the status of Comrade Xi Jinping as the core of the party’s Central Committee and of the whole party” and “to establish the guiding role of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era.” This amendment was aimed at cementing the core status of Xi and the guiding role of his political thought within the party.
In addition, judging by the results of the reshuffle in both the Communist party and its Central Military Commission (CMC), Xi has undoubtedly become an unchallengeable supreme leader.
It is fair to say that a gray zone tactic in which the drills and drone harassment by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) are executed simultaneously will be a regular approach used by China to coerce Taiwan. The most significant impact of China’s military drills on Taiwan has been to terminate a previous tacit understanding wherein the median line in the Taiwan Strait was respected by both sides, as well as to try and mount a big enough military threat to deter intervention by either the United States or Japan. All of the drill zones extended across the median line in the Taiwan Strait, and even intruded into Taiwan’s territorial sea. China abandoned the usual practice of using the median line of the Taiwan Strait as a buffer. In the future, it is anticipated that China will continue to unilaterally change the status quo as it attempts to create a so-called new normal which uses the contiguous zone, 24 nautical miles from the territorial sea baseline, to replace the median line as the extent of its operations. This move will sharply reduce the strategic depth of Taiwan’s defense.
Beijing deliberately fired PLA missiles in an attempt to intimidate the island nation; some of them passing over Taiwan’s landmass and splashing down off the east coast (see Figure 1 on page 51). It was the first time for China to practice anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) tactics on the ground, and the purpose of this move was to send a political signal to the United States and Japan not to intervene militarily in Taiwan’s security affairs, as Beijing considers Taiwan a core national interest and an internal matter.
From this point forward, military drills and PLA activities that cross the median line of the Taiwan Strait can be expected, which is what Beijing leaders see as normalized military operations organized according to the changes in the situation in the Taiwan Strait. In addition to military drills, China has been using drones to harass Kinmen and Taiwan’s other offshore islands. Those military drills and drone harassment constitute psychological warfare and are an attempt to fatigue and frighten Taiwan’s military and civilian population. Moreover, since these exercises are carried out in a realistic manner, they can be quickly transformed into an actual attack at any time, not unlike how Russia’s recent invasion of Ukraine used the pretext of a military exercise to pre-position its troops, and therefore these drills should not be taken lightly.
Secondly, the results of military drills and the CMC reshuffle show that the PLA is still under the control of Xi. The PLA has adopted a strategy of brinkmanship, and is going to have to be careful to avoid having an accident that could precipitate a full-scale war. What’s more, Xi’s changes to the country’s laws and traditions not only allowed him to seize his third term at the 20th National Congress, but it also suspended retirement rules and thereby allowed General Zhang Youxia to be promoted to first-ranked CMC vicechairman, despite him being 72 years old. In terms of leadership, it appears that Xi, who is also the chairman of the CMC, has no problem fully controlling the gun.
Xi has called for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, and he sees Taiwan as an indispensable part in accomplishing that rebirth. Some observers have expressed concerns that Xi’s unbridled ambition will lead to an attack by the PRC sooner, rather than later. Admiral Philip Davidson, for example, the former commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command, testified in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee in March 2021 that, “China’s aggression in the region” leads him to believe “its goal of seizing Taiwan is a more imminent issue.”
“I think the threat is manifest during this decade, in fact in the next six years,” Davidson predicted. Given Xi’s consolidation of absolute power in China, and especially over the military, the PLA will become a mere extension of Xi’s power. It is speculated that Xi wants to effect the annexation of Taiwan by 2027—or at least force Taipei to sue for peace—as this would be the crowning achievement of his unprecedented third term as absolute ruler of China, as well as placing himself in good stead in preparation for a fourth.
Although Xi still pays lip service to the need for a peaceful unification with Taiwan, the majority of Taiwanese people are too proud of their democracy and their freedoms to consent to be put under the rule of a communist regime, and thus reject the idea of a voluntary unification. This may disappoint Xi and push him to use military force against Taiwan instead. The bottom line is that the military drills in August were just the beginning of a renewed crisis for Taiwan’s security. The intensity of the crisis will increase, step by step, and may reach a peak before the 21st CCP National Congress.
Lessons from Ukraine
At the same time, the United States might become more actively engaged in Taiwan’s military affairs. After the Russia-Ukraine war broke out in February, the United States suddenly vetoed the sale of 12 MH60R anti-submarine warfare helicopters without advance notice, on the grounds that Taiwan should focus on asymmetric weapons systems such as shorebased anti-aircraft missile systems, armed drones, and naval mines. It is generally believed that the lessons being learned from the Ukraine war have motivated the United States to seriously review Taiwan’s buildup of capabilities for asymmetric operations. Once again, the United States has learned from China’s military drills that the threat against Taiwan is real. It is expected that, from now on, Washington will engage actively in Taiwan’s security in areas such as military strategy, and weapons production and acquisition.
Taiwan’s operational plans must be re-examined. During the PLA’s military demonstrations against the Pelosi visit, the drill zones were located to the north, southwest, and southeast of Taiwan’s airspace and maritime territory. This demonstrates that the PLA navy and air force will quickly seek to win air and sea dominance during wartime. In addition, the test launch of short-range missiles and long-range firepower demonstrates the PLA’s capabilities to suppress or even destroy Taiwan’s coastal defense capabilities, thereby paving the way for an amphibious landing. Finally, the former median line is not a boundary for PLA fighter jets any more, meaning that Taiwan’s strategic depth has been reduced.
Taiwan’s strategic concept has long been conceived of as force protection, decisive battle in the littoral zone, and destruction of the enemy at the landing beach. In light of this new situation, the focus of military readiness should be shifted from the littoral zone or beachhead to incorporate training in urban warfare.
In the event of an invasion across the Taiwan Strait, the United States will likely take action to support Taiwan, if only to avoid losing the trust of its other allies in the Indo-Pacific region. However, to sidestep a direct conflict with China, Washington is more likely to use the Russia-Ukraine war as a model for its intervention. That is, not to send in forces to intervene in a cross-strait conflict, but to impose international sanctions on China and, at the same time, to provide weapons and intelligence support to Taiwan’s forces. Therefore, Taiwanese need to learn lessons from the people of Ukraine and prepare to fight independently. Additionally, an intelligence-sharing and information-exchange mechanism with the US-Japan alliance should be developed and implemented as soon as possible.
Beijing’s violent response to the Pelosi visit is an indication that the China-US relationship is being redefined and dangerously impacted by the current so-called strategic competition. Because Xi has defined unification with Taiwan as a “core interest,” and given his belief that the United States is sending the wrong signals to the “separatist forces of Taiwan independence,” Taiwan is therefore being blamed for the mounting US-China tensions. This will push Xi to keep Taiwan at the top of his agenda and increase the urgency with which he pursues the island’s annexation. It would be foolish to expect this trend to subside, rather than to grow in intensity. Both Taipei and Washington must make preparations now if they don’t want to see a radical redrawing of the map of Asia before the end of the decade.
About the author
Dr. Yuan-chou Jing is an associate professor and director of the Graduate Institute of China Military Affairs Studies, NDU, Taiwan.