Impacts of the Ebola epidemic on the food and nutrition situation and resilience

N°1 MAY 2015

RPCA

THE FOOD CRISIS PREVENTION NETWORK’S POLICY BRIEF

ANALYSE INFORM PREVENT www.food-security.net

CONTENTS 1.

An unprecedented epidemic with consequences that are diffi cult to assess

2.

Impacts

3.

Lessons for the RPCA

This note is based on an investigation conducted by the Food Crisis Prevention Network (RPCA) in October/ November 2014. Co-ordinated by the SWAC Secretariat and CILSS, the investigation consisted of: i) a review of available literature from technical services and other stakeholders; ii) collection of qualitative data from economic operators in the relevant markets; iii) contributions from partners in the international community involved in the countries concerned; and iv) processing, analysis and synthesis the information and data collected. Due to the impossibility of travelling to the Ebola-affected areas, the data collected is very incomplete; this is one of the limits of the investigation.

Phases of food insecurity

I

MPACTS OF THE EBOLA EPIDEMIC on the food and nutrition situation, resilience and the regional agricultural market

1. An unprecedented epidemic with consequences that are difficult to assess Two co-existing factors may provide an explanation, or at least a partial explanation, for the unprecedented magnitude of the epidemic. Both must be taken into account when the time comes to look at lessons learned in relation to resilience as well as food and nutrition security.

The fi rst of these two factors is the isolation area where the epidemic originated. We now know that the

fi rst case appeared in Guinea on 6 December 2013 in the village of Méliandou, near Guékédou, 60 km from the Liberian border and 100 km from the Sierra Leone border. More than three months after the fi rst death, the Ebola virus was not showing up on any radar screens. Because the area is isolated and has few health centres with properly trained and equipped staff, the virus had a number of weeks to spread unchecked.

February-March 2015

June-August 2015

2 areas in crisis phase in Sierra Leone

11 areas in crisis phase in Guinea and Sierra Leone

Guinea

Guinea

None or minimal Stressed Crisis Emergency Famine

Source: Regional analysis of the Cadré harmonisé (CH), Dakar, 22-25 february 2015.

Map adapted from CilSS/Agrhymet.

Original version: French

Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone

Liberia Liberia

iMPACT OF THE EBOLA EPIDEMIC

RPCA

The second factor is the cross-border nature of the area concerned. While located in Guinea, Guékédou is the market town for a number of villages in the border areas of Sierra Leone and Liberia. While the government in Conakry officially acknowledged the presence of the epidemic in Guinea in March, the disease had long since crossed the border. However, the first cases in the border area of Kailahun in Sierra Leone were officially recorded

on 27 May. On a number of occasions, the Guinean authorities thought they had won the war, but new ”unexplained” cases kept appearing. In reality, the virus was spreading from neighbouring countries. In mid-2014, experts noted that it would be impossible to control the virus in Guinea unless the number of cases in neighbouring countries was reduced.

2. Impacts agricULTURAL Production

HOUSEHOLD BudgetS

The areas most affected by the epidemic are among the most agriculturally productive. The disease has had the following specific impacts:

•

Loss of farming income. Households in production areas experienced a loss of income due to the drop in production, the sharp decrease in prices and a lack of other opportunities. In Guinea, the shortfall in rice production (estimated at close to 150 000 tonnes), is estimated at more than 800 billion GNF for producers alone. Similarly, thousands of pounds of potatoes, fruits and vegetables rotted before leaving the premises of producers and vendors after prices dropped; this situation, and a lack of other opportunities, resulted in huge income losses. In the agricultural district of eastern Sierra Leone, the majority of cash crops could not be harvested (coffee, cocoa, rice and cassava) and producers saw their income simply disappear.

•

Huge impact on commercial activities: The closing of the border between Guinea and Senegal had a negative impact on trade in potatoes and palm oil from Guinea. The quantity of palm oil traded dropped by 87% along the Diaobé trade route and by 97% in the Kédougou area. Along the same trade route, reductions in the quantities of potatoes, fruits and vegetables ranged from 80% to 100%. At the same time, palm oil and potato prices in the Kédougou market increased by 58% and 54%, respectively.

•

Loss of salaried employment. Large private companies reduced or halted their business activities in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone; some or all local staff lost their jobs as a result. All sectors of the economy were affected, including mining and tourism. In the first quarter of 2014, hotels in Conakry lost an average of 22% of their business, as compared with 2013. This resulted in a loss of jobs and income for many heads of households, which had a negative impact on their livelihoods.

•

Loss of income from traditional mining activities.

The Ebola crisis led to the closure and abandonment of a number of traditional cross-border gold mining sites. This resulted in a substantial loss of income for women in the Kédougou region of Senegal, who had invested heavily in providing services to those involved in mining activities (food services in particular).

•

A significantly reduced labour force. The epidemic emerged at a key point in the agricultural season harvest time for essential crops such as cocoa, rice, etc. Large numbers of agricultural workers left the affected areas, traditional communal work came to a halt and working household members died

•

Disruptions in the agricultural support system.

Support/advisory activities normally conducted by national support/guidance services and international agencies (NGOs, United Nations, etc.) were halted.

•

Cessation of development programmes/projects.

The situation brought investments to a standstill.

All of this had a negative impact on the acreage planted and on agricultural production. For example: •

Impact on acreage planted. In Guinea’s Guékédou region, where 102 villages and 512 households were affected by the disease, the acreage planted dropped by 36% from 41 673 ha in 2013 to 26 811 ha in 2014.

•

Impact on agricultural production. In Guinea, the production target for paddy rice was set at 2.2 million tonnes; however, only 2 million tonnes were produced.

The production deficit is, for the most part, concentrated in forested areas where production accounts for as much as 22.8% of the nation’s rice production, which dropped by 38 % from 491 900 to 304 978 tonnes.

Moreover, the epidemic created enormous problems with transporting agricultural products in the affected countries: border closures, travel restrictions, local market closures and the discontinuation of exports (several airlines suspended flights). Significant quantities of perishable agricultural products were lost, followed by lower production targets. Numerous contractual arrangements between producers and traders could not be implemented. In Sierra Leone, for example, these contractual constraints had a significant impact on cocoa in the Kenema, Kailahun and Kono districts, and on vegetables in Koinadugu. In August alone, members of the women’s co-operative in Kabala registered losses close to 200 million Leone, or USD 47 620.

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RPCA Policy Brief / N°1, May 2015

© Food Crisis Prevention Network (RPCA)

iMPACT OF THE EBOLA EPIDEMIC

•

Higher cost of living. The cost of transportation, for merchandise and passengers, rose by 30% to 40% in Sierra Leone. The volume of products transported dropped dramatically (less than 50% of the volume transported prior to the crisis). In the affected countries, blocked supply channels led to price hikes in high consumption areas due to a decrease in supply and high transaction costs. In Guinea, the price of gari — a cassava-based product imported from Sierra Leone — increased by more than 150% (from 710 to 1 907 Guinean francs) as compared with the price in the third quarter of 2013. In all three countries, some weekly markets were deserted or suspended. There was a significant drop in the agricultural products trade between the various regions; consequently, the volume of sales was low and consumer prices were high in remote undersupplied markets.

•

Rebuilding the livelihoods of affected households will take time due to: i) job losses; ii) deterioration of the means of agricultural production; and iii) economic and commercial isolation of the affected areas. The after-effects of such a situation on income and livelihoods could have long-term effects on food and nutrition security.

•

The level of distrust could persist. Due to fear of contracting the disease, the attendance rates of educational institutions and health facilities remain low. This environment of fear could have a long-term impact on the implementation of nutrition programmes and on provisioning other health departments and services such as family planning.

FOOD AND NUTRITION Aid

rEsilience AND THE FOOD AND nutrition Situation

Food aid has been severely disrupted due to:

•

•

Fears connected with organising large gatherings of people eligible for aid; distrust and lack of motivation on the part of those responsible for distribution; a lack of logistical means; and an unwillingness to visit health centres. A combination of all of these factors has prevented food and nutrition aid from being distributed as it normally should.

•

All of this confirms that Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone are not prepared to manage urgent food security situations on their own and heavily rely on the good will of external partners.

•

Decline in the food and nutrition situation. The populations of the three most affected countries are among the least structurally resilient in the region and the continent. Faced with a sharp drop in income and increases in the cost of living, a large proportion of people - starting with the most vulnerable experienced a significant deterioration in their food situation. In addition, the most affected populations were forced to reduce or eliminate their consumption of bush meat. A short survey conducted in Sierra Leone showed that more than 94% of households stopped hunting; this reduced the amount of animal protein consumed and further reduced household income from the sale of bush meat.

Negative impact on visits to health centres. The resilience of populations has no doubt been affected by less frequent visits to health facilities. Most sick people chose to stay at home instead of going to a hospital or health centre. In addition, those who did visit a health facility were received little or no attention from health workers, who were afraid of becoming infected with Ebola. Lower attendance rates for schools and other educational institutions were also noted, even when they were not officially closed.

In Sierra Leone, schools and other educational institutions were closed due to fear of spreading the Ebola virus.

Factors that could have an impact on household livelihoods and resilience over the medium- and long-term include: •

Difficulties faced by farmers returning to abandoned fields and re-establishing their means of production (seeds, supplies, etc.). In addition, the return of labourers to the production areas could require some time and will involve intensive information and communication campaigns. This situation could affect subsequent agricultural production seasons and the livelihoods of farming households.

© Food Crisis Prevention Network (RPCA)

RP

regional agricultural market •

In the Guinea – Senegal corridor, the movement of goods was severely disrupted in two commercial hubs (Diaobé and Kédougou) due to the border closure. The average unit price (FCFA/litre) for palm oil at the Diaobé market went from 687.5 FCFA/litre in 2013 to 825 FCFA/litre in 2014 (an increase of 20%). Diaobé is the main wholesale market for palm oil for Senegal, The Gambia, Mauritania and Mali. The average unit price of honey went up from 1 057 FCFA/litre in 2013 to 1 233 FCFA/litre in 2014 (an increase of 17%), while that of honey rose from 600 FCFA/litre in 2013 to 725 FCFA/litre in 2014 (an increase of 21%).

•

In the Guinea – Mali corridor, there were no significant fluctuations in prices or trade flows (fonio, palm oil, honey, soumbala, etc.). In Niaréla (a Bamako neighbourhood known as “Guinea’s dry port”), large warehouses for agri-food products from Guinea did not experience any stock-outs. Imports of Guinean products into Mali were not disrupted.

RPCA Policy Brief / N°1, May 2015

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IMPACT OF THE EBOLA EPIDEMIC

RPCA

3. Lessons for the RPCA 1.

While it is impossible to quantify anything at this stage, it is clear that the epidemic will leave in its wake populations that face a worsened food and nutrition situation and are even less resilient to shocks (including the possible resurgence of the epidemic) than they were in 2013.

2.

By early February 2015, the epidemic seemed to be stabilising, but the crisis is far from over.

It is very likely that, for the second year in a row, the agricultural season will be severely disrupted in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. A specific analysis of the Cadre harmonisé (CH) for the affected countries will help assess the magnitude of the after-effects and any long-term impact on food security and population resilience. This crisis is an indication that the Network needs to have the ability to quickly analyse any devastating crises such as Ebola.

The methodological approach to developing the capabilities for a rapid analysis should be discussed in the very near future.

3.

Restricted travel associated with the atmosphere of fear has made it difficult to collect data using traditional surveys and has also impeded the mechanisms for dialogue/collaboration, quality control and consensus building as stipulated in the PREGEC Charter. This means that the Network will have to invest more in the search for innovative tools — capable of handling similar crises — that are built around local networks and make use of the possibilities offered by new information and communication technologies (mobile phones, Internet, etc.).

4.

This crisis has pointed to the importance of early warning and health response systems in terms of the resilience of populations, especially in isolated areas. These lessons are also relevant for the Network in terms of the central question of national food security governance, especially regarding support for building and strengthening effective and sustainable PREGEC mechanisms capable of facilitating the implementation of the Cadré harmonisé, as stipulated in the framework of the Global Alliance for Resilience (AGIR) — Sahel and West Africa. Making the Cadre harmonisé operational in the medium term in all ECOWAS, UEMOA and CILSS member states will require ongoing political and financial commitments from RPCA members.

5.

Regarding negative factors that could have long-term effects on the food security and resilience of the affected populations, it appears that the Network will have to call on all PREGEC Charter stakeholders for the implementation of commitments for post-crisis structural programmes. It is crucial that the three countries affected the most, their closest neighbours and partners in the international community address together - at the regional cross-border level, which is also the level of the problem - the issues of food emergency and (re) building the resilience of the more vulnerable populations.

6.

Measures such as closing borders, and other mechanisms designed to limit travel, have no doubt contributed to limiting the spread of the disease. However, they have also had a negative impact on population resilience. By weakening the means of production, incomes and livelihoods of the affected populations, these measures could well have lasting effects on food security and resilience. In the affected areas, this could result in limited access to food and basic social services for vulnerable populations. It is essential that countries and their inter-governmental organisations - without infringing on the sovereignty of any state consider alternative mechanisms to limit the spread of disease in the event of similar epidemics, while minimising as much as possible the immediate and long-term effects on food security and the resilience of populations

ABOUT THE RPCA Created in 1984, the Food Crisis Prevention Network (RPCA) is an international network for co-operation and co-ordination in the field of food security, nutrition and resilience in West Africa. Based on consultation, dialogue and analysis, the Network brings together the region‘s main food security stakeholders. It is placed under the political leadership of ECOWAS and UEMOA. The CILSS Executive Secretariat and the Sahel and West Africa Club Secretariat provide technical and operational support for the Network. www.food-security.net

SAHEL AND WEST AFRICA

CILSS Address

CilSS executive Secretariat 03 BP 7049 ouagadougou 03 Burkina faso

Phone +226 50 37 41 25/26 E-mail cilss.se@cilss.bf mahalmoudou.hamadoun@cilss.bf

Club Secretariat

SWAC Address

Phone E-mail

SWAC/oeCD 2, rue André Pascal f–75775 Paris, Cedex 16 +33 (0)1 45 24 89 87 swac.contact@oecd.org sibirijean.zoundi@oecd.org