Overparticipation? Understanding the historic contribution of eight participatory planning processes

OVERPARTICIPATION

Understanding the historic contribution of nine participatory planning processes in Goa, India

Tahir Noronha, MURP 2024

Overparticipation: Understanding the Contribution of Nine Participatory Planning Processes in Goa, India

by

Tahir Fernando de Noronha

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Urban and Regional Planning, in the University of Michigan 2024

Tahir Noronha, all rights reserved

2000 Bonisteel Blvd Ann Arbor, MI 48109

MURP Thesis Committee:

Dr Ana Paula Pimentel Walker (committee chair) , Urban and Regional Planning

Dr Lesli Hoey, Urban and Regional Planning

©

Acknowledgements

This thesis would not have been possible without the guidance of Dr. Ana Paula Pimentel Walker, and Dr. Lesli Hoey. I am grateful to the MURP Curriculum Committee (2023) and its chair, Dr. Larissa Larsen for approving my thesis application and sharing valuable initial feedback. I would like to thank Rand Makarem, Fabricio Martins Silva, Shubhayan Ukil, Revati Thatte, and Morgan Fett for guiding me with academic writing, sharing resources and proofreading some of my drafts. I am also thankful to Dr. Robert Goodspeed and Dr. Alexandra Murphy for helping me with research methodology, and my friends in the MURP program for supporting me through the semester. I am very grateful to Dr. Solano Da Silva, Dr. Siddharth D’Souza, Edgar Ribeiro FRTPI, Norma Alvares Esq, Sujata Noronha, and Vinayak Bharne, who continuously offered valuable inputs, from conception to final state and helped me shape this study.

Most importantly, I am grateful to all thirteen interviewees, who’s identities have been protected for their privacy, others in Goa, fighting for democracy: especially Anthony D’Souza, Arminio Ribeiro de Santana, Claude Alvares, Dhiren Phadte, Glean Cabral, Judith Almeida, Om D’Costa Esq., Dr. Prajal Sakhardande, Pravinsingh Shetgaonkar, Dr. Sabina Martins, and Swapnesh Sherlekar. Their assistance, be it sharing information; making connections with stakeholders; or broadly working to promote public participation and challenge elite capture in Goan planning is inspiring. This thesis is dedicated to these men and women who quit jobs, and devoted their lives to ensuring a better, planned future.

Positionality

I came to Taubman College to explore frameworks that shape urban and regional planning, and the ways and means that people can engage in planning. I continue to engage in planning and development in Goa, India for the last four years. My integration with development debates started in architecture school when I got involved in an urban design debate around the construction of a new city hall. My experiences in advocacy and historic preservation motivated me to apply for a fellowship at the Charles Correa Foundation for four years after architecture school put me front and center in development, planning and urban design projects as we provided technical assistance and support to the City of Panaji. My four-year association with the Foundation also made me a public figure in historic and environment preservation debates in Panaji.

My personal identity as a minority and indigenous person is an integral part of who I am. I am very aware of my privilege and financial stability, letting me study at an international university. This is a privilege that comes from my family accumulating power and capital over generations. I am conscious that my privilege distances me from most of my community. This realization constantly motivates me to consider how I can use my knowledge and skills to positively impact my home state and work with people from my community. My ultimate goal is to return to Goa and work on improving governance and development structures in a way that meaningfully benefits my community.

Coming to Taubman college and taking coursework in Participatory Planning, Global and Comparative Planning, Indigenous Rights, Negotiation, Planning Methods and Planning Law, made me interested in the processes of planning, methods of public participation and enabling legislation. Over the last six months, I have increasingly become involved in debates around amendments to the Goa Town and Country Planning Act. Many local planners believe that recent amendments dilute a lot of zoning and regulatory powers from staff planners and local government, centralizing them with the state government and its Town Planning Board. As an outspoken local planner, who is not employed by the state, I am now one of the spokespeople in the anti-amendment debates in the local media and politics. The state chapter of the Institute of Town Planners India has refused to comment on the amendments, but members expressed support to this stance in private.

The Goa Town and Country Planning Act was influenced by the State Standard Planning and Zoning Enabling Acts prepared by the United States. While the thesis stresses on looking at the issue of participation mandates, governmental procedure and the role of planners in the Global South from a India-perspective, my learned experiences in the US also plug into this framework. I have opinions on decentralization and planning – believing that planning devolved to local government with high degrees of participative process (Fung 2006), and carried out through a justice & parity lens (Blue et. al, 2019) lead to higher planning outcomes. However, under the guidance of my committee and after discussion

with several outside advisors – several of whom do not share the same opinions as me – I have designed research that is based on documents, interviews and observations, thereby distancing myself from the issue and attempting to use evidence to tell a story.

I have a hypothesis on the current planning scenario in Goa. I am also conscious of my visibility in my hometown of Panaji, and certain sections of Goan society. Keeping them in mind is crucial as I try to separate my views on planning laws and planners’ positions in the governance structure from my research on engaging participation in planning and governance.

I understand that two important objectives of the study interact: the enabling legislation that has important verbiage on mandatory participation processes, and some of the recent amendments that have changed those requirements; my study focuses heavily on the processes and methods adopted by state planners in maximizing public participation in plans.

Because of my constant engagement in planning issues, I propose to structure my thesis as a Participatory Action Research project. I believe that my coursework and advisory committee can help me navigate objective interactions and data collection with the community in Goa. My second reader Vinayak Bharne continues to associate with the state government, and I believe his inputs in particular will be valuable to get counter arguments from the establishment’s perspective. Coming to the US and working over the summer in Detroit, a Geography that has low public participation rates also helped me understand why communities may feel disenfranchised by the planning process. Through the analysis of Goa's plans and my academic and work experience, I will produce a policy brief as a deliverable in the thesis. My hope is that the brief will equip local planners and activists with tools to enhance participation in planning.

Many factors converge to shape my research interests around public participation in urban and regional planning. As I embark on my thesis journey I am aware of the potential biases that my background and visibility may introduce. However, I am committed to approaching my research with openness and a critical perspective. By structuring my thesis as an Engaged Research project, I aim to navigate these challenges by using the study as a contribution to the discourse on public participation in planning. I believe that my academic and work experience, and the diverse views from my advisory committee will orient the thesis towards objectivity. Finally, I see this thesis as a beginning into a broader and deeper understanding of public participation in development, particularly in the Global South. I intend to take this investigation further and develop it into a PhD dissertation – exploring several aspects in greater detail and uncovering more intricacies

List of Figures

Figure 2: In November 2021, over 7,000 people gathered in Old Goa, to protest a construction permit issued to real estate developers Suraj Lotlikar and Manish Munot.

Figure 3: Diagrammatic representation of research methods and sources used for this study.

Figure 4: Participation Cube illustrating two planning techniques on the cube.

Figure 9: Democratic decision-making analysis; Pernem Zoning Plan.

Figure 10: Equitable Recruiting and Communication analysis; Panaji ODP.

Figure 11: Democratic decision-making analysis; Panaji ODP.

Figure 18: Equitable Recruiting and Communication analysis; Neura PBR.

Figure 19: Democratic decision-making analysis; Neura PBR.

Figure 20: Equitable Recruiting and Communication analysis; Panaji CDP.

Figure 26: Public interest rezonings under section 16B process diagram.

Figure 27: Rezoning to correct inadvertent errors in the regional plan, process diagram.

Figure 28 Map of Rezonings between draft and final RP-2011

Figure 29: Extract of public notice under S 16(B)

Figure 30: Map of Goa and chart depicting the 310,245 m2 of land rezoned without public participation under §17(2)

ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates the factors influencing public participation in Urban and Regional Planning, with a focus on Goa, India, exploring how levels of government, plan typology, and planners’ methods affect public engagement. It also attempts to theorize an evolving trend in the planning profession to curtail "overparticipation" (Lemar, 2021), in the larger public or environmental interest. “Overparticipation” is defined as a minority of (often-privileged) residents leveraging their power in participatory systems to hegemonize planning decisions. Goan communities participated actively in historic plans (Raghunathan, 1998; Sampat, 2017; Nielsen et al 2021), often in large numbers. However, a section of policymakers have labeled these incidents as overparticipation by NonGovernment Organizations (NGOs) and activists, seeking to reinvent planning and prioritize “productive participation” (Rane, 2023).

I draw on document analysis, plan evaluation, quantitative mapping, and semi-structured interviews to dissect participatory methods adopted across eight important federal, state and local plans in Goa. Interviews were conducted with 13 stakeholders, including lawmakers, planners, indigenous leaders, and activists, substantiate some of the analyses. The findings indicate that historic participation has not been dominated by NGOs and activists, but rather by state representatives and commercial real estate firms.

The thesis then analyzes a groundbreaking policy from 2023, in which the Goa state legislature authorized the state government to preempt local governments and rezone specific lands. This policy came in response to “overparticipation” allegations by state legislators, with a purported need to safeguard the environment and provide affordable housing. Under this law, state-led rezonings do not need any public input. Findings indicate that the majority of these nonpartitipative rezonings favored the interests of multinational real estate corporations, and aced against principles of environmental protection by upzoning natural, coastal, or agricultural land for sprawled-out development.

Building on this analysis, the thesis presents a nuanced view of the importance of public participation across different plan types. It demonstrates that land use planning is a significant driver for public involvement – and public participation has historically balanced public and private interests. In contrast, for state and federal non-land use plans such as environmental and infrastructure plans, NGOs do overparticipate. Participatory processes and methods do not significantly impact this situation, but can be contained when planning at the local government level and using participatory methods in tandem.

Through this comparative lens, the findings reveal inconsistencies between policy rationales, and outcomes. They also reveal the variation in participation and its dependence on the nature of plan, and role of the planner. It concludes with recommendations for the state, indicating plans where overparticipation is a problem, and other spaces where public participation could be enhanced.

01. INTRODUCTION

This thesis analyzes the public participation component of government plans, through a case study of Goa, India. There are many benefits to encouraging public participation, accessing community knowledge and building resilience for climate adaptation. Planning scholars also express a concern of “overparticipation”, defined as as a minority of (often-privileged) residents leveraging their power in participatory systems to hegemonize planning decisions (Lemar, 2021). In the last decade, there have been several mass movements against plans in the state of Goa (Neilsen et al, 2023), several of them were confrontational. This is prompting a section of lawmakers to allege overparticipation and pursue legislation curtailing requirements for citizen engagement. I argue that past planning agitations are not overparticipation , but rather a form of insurgent planning (Miraftab, 2010), and studying the plans that prompted them, focusing on the participatory techniques and activist perceptions will lead to a more nuanced understanding of where participation works – and where it fails.

Public participation is mandated in all Indian planning laws, yet communities – particularly indigenous communities – are disillusioned by the way participation is employed by governments. Over the course of this study, I seek to understand triggers in the planning process that could contribute to public participation, or disenchantment with planning. The literature points to three factors influencing public participation, namely: plan typology, level of government driving the plan, and participatory techniques adopted by planners. I ask: What do planners and activists think is the most important? What does the planning history of Goa show? Do the two align?

I hypothesize that the public are most motivated to participate in land use planning; techniques adopted by planners also play a role in shaping public support; while the level of government factors in to a lesser degree. While Goan communities participate in large numbers in land use planning, they are the least satisfied by participatory processes of this typology of plan. I argue that this conflict comes from the state’s millennia-old practices of share-cropping and communal land management (Alvares and Gadgil, 2002) fostering a distinct Goemkarponn,(trans. Goan-ness), a regional identity integrally linked to land and at odds with private property and zoning (De Souza, 2000; Trichur, 2000; Nielsen and Bedi, 2017). Beyond the contentious, but highly participative preference for land use, planners’ proactive engagement techniques should lead to better participation and less distrust. I do not hypothesize significant differences in local and state government plans but believe there may be significantly less enthusiasm and more apprehension over plans implemented by the central government.

OBJECTIVES

This thesis has three goals:

1. Contextualizing the anti-planning movement in Goa, by elaborating on historic plans and a planning timeline, and identifying key points of contention.

2. Examining if there is a correlation between the type and scale of plans and participatory outcomes.

3. Highlighting current planning methods in Goa that seem to be working well, and capacity in the planning agencies that could be leveraged to enhance participation in planning.

WHY GOA?

I focus on Goa because it is a unique case. As India’s smallest state, with a population of around 2 million spread over 3,702 km2 (1,429 mi2), Goa has some of India’s highest property values (Kandolkar, 2023; Neilsen and Bedi, 2017). It still contains tracts of undeveloped land along the Arabian Sea shore, estuaries and in the Western Ghats forests. It was the third state in the nation to fully embrace land use planning and zoning in 1986 (Da Silva, 2018), and planning-related agitations in Goa have been written about extensively in academic literature because of the scale, and the political ramifications of some of these movements (Raghuram, 1998; De Souza, 2000; Alvares a and Gadgil, 2002; Sampat, 2017; Nielsen and Bedi, 2017; Levien, 2018; Da Silva, 2018; Da Silva et al. 2021; Nielsen et al. 2023). This contest over planning spills beyond the legislature, at present there are over 12 Public Interest Litigation challenges in the apex court of the state of Goa to various plans for the capital city of Panaji– a significant amount of litigation for a city of just forty-one thousand residents.

PAPER STRUCTURE

The findings of this paper are presented in three chapters. They attempt to show what the plans say, what people engaged in planning say and what new legislation is doing respectively.

Chapter 2 “Methodology” contains research design, case study selection, and research methods adopted across the thesis.

Chapter 3 “From Paper to Action", looks for public participation processes as reflected in planning documents, scrutinizing eight key plans through theoretical perspectives to extract insights on their outcomes.

Chapter 4 “Stakeholder Perspectives on Participation” presents insights from 13 in-depth, semistructured interviews with stakeholders, including lawmakers, planners, and activists, complementing the document analysis to provide a comprehensive understanding of the factors influencing public participation and buy-in.

Chapter 5, "Participation, Activism, and Corruption," shifts the focus to initial findings from a significant policy in 2023, where the Goa state legislature authorized the state government to rezone specific lands without public input, purportedly to address alleged "overparticipation" and ensure environmental protection and affordable housing. This chapter is split into three parts, as it attempts to conceptualize the impacts of the policy in the context of participatory planning in Goa. Part I draws connections between state legislators’ business interests and broader perspectives by Goan citizens vis-a-vis land use. Part II comprises participant observation of activist efforts to engage in public participation, despite statutes no longer compelling the government to collect feedback. Part III is quantitative evidence of the beneficiaries of the policy.

Chapter 6 looks back at the hypothesis, attempting to focus back on the key questions of what motivates participation, and highlighting potential for further research on insurgent planning by activists, questioning politicians overparticipation allegations, going deeper into anti-participatory policies like Goa’s new rezoning statute, and documenting the negotiations between planners and activists.

Background

Goa, a coastal state along the West of India, covers 1,429 square miles (Census 2011). It is on most metrics the wealthiest state of the nation per capita, with the highest human development indices across its population of two million (Economic Survey of India, 2024). An important tourist destination, the state welcomed nine million tourists in 2022 (Statistical Hand Book of Goa, 2023); over four times its native population. Goa is also the second-most urbanized state in the country, behind the national capital region of Delhi. And its urban patterns are uniformly distributed: 52 out of the 205 municipalities designated as “urban areas” (Census 2011) accommodate over 62% of the population with excellent infrastructure availability across urban and rural municipalities in the coastal regions of the state (RP-2021, 2011).

Goa is also interesting as a case study because it has robust local and state governments. Both levels have historically made plans. Even rural jurisdictions in Goa do some degree of planning. This is an anomaly in the Indian context. A 2020 report by the National Institute for Transforming India found that planning was sparingly employed across the country, finding that only 37% of the 4041

Figure 1: Map of India with Goa inlay (red)

statutory urban municipalities have some sort of forward plans (Patel et al, 2021). Additionally, within the 1,429 sq mi of Goa there is also a major navy base, one of India’s largest ports, India’s second busiest rail line, and large tracts of protected forest and coastland, prompting the central government to also initiate plans in the state.

Goa’s former Chief Minister and later Defense Minister of India, Manohar Parrikar, called Goa a “microcosm of the best things in the nation” (Parrikar, 2012). The national perception of Goa aligns with Parrikar’s statements: Goa has led the way in many planning and urban reforms in India. Panaji, the capital city is a site for one of India’s first ‘Smart Cities’ and the state is the first in the nation to adopt several sustainable plans such as a ‘Circular Economy Plan’ and a ‘Low Carbon MasterPlan for Urban Freight’ (NITI Aayog). Rural communities in Goa are preparing India’s first ‘People’s Biodiversity Registers’ at a state level and Goa was the first state to constitute a wetland authority in 2019. National agencies like the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEFCC) are also attempting environmental plans around the coast, the forest regions, and one of the largest unobstructed rivers, the Mhadei .

Concurrently, Goa has witnessed massive urbanization and development in the last three decades. Studies indicate that natural land cover has shrunk 35% since 2004 (Kerkar et al, 2018). All recent contemporary statutory plans place climate adaptation among the top-level goals.This aligns with climate science. 45% of Goa is projected to be submerged by 2050. Frequent mudslides and flooding plague nearly every property owner in the state (Goa State Biodiversity Board 2020). Research from the United States Environmental Protection Agency (2014) and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration show that public participation and community knowledge are necessary to implement any resilience and adaptation mandates (Gardiner et al 2022).

Goa’s large (over 11%), indigenous population hold traditional knowledge that they leverage in coastal adaptation. These groups also participated actively in past plans (Sampat, 2017; Da Silva, 2018). There's a risk that new laws and processes may alienate them. If they get disillusioned with planning, the state is losing out on the ability to holistically address climate concerns.

2: In November 2021, over 7,000 people gathered in Old Goa, to protest a construction permit issued to real estate developers Suraj Lotlikar and Manish Munot

Source: Rhea D’Souza (2021)

Lotlikar is a former member of the state planning board. Activists allege that there were archaeological remains in the site, and permits should not have been given in accordance with prevailing archaeological laws. They alleged that Lotlikar destroyed the remains. In December 2021 the permit was revoked.

Figure

02. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The question ‘What are important factors influencing public participation in plans?’ is multi-layered. In my literature review, I will explain how the level of government, plan typology, and planning methods can all reasonably impact public participation in Urban and Regional Planning. Examining these factors through the lens of planning in Goa I answer this question using three methods, namely: document evaluation of nine important plans; legal and administrative analysis of amendments to planning laws; and interviews with important stakeholders about participating in varied planning processes.

Research Design

As indicated in the first chapter, Goa is an ideal place to study urban, rural, and regional planning. Unlike much of the rest of the country, there is capacity in communities, and interest and funding from central, state, and local governments to plan. Because of the state’s history with planning and land (Alvares and Gadgil, 2002; Nielsen et al, 2023), Goan news and reporters take an active role in researching and spotlighting community and economic development issues, providing a wide knowledge base and public record of past plans (see: Fernandes 2021, 2022; Katkatam, 2023; Sequeira, 2023a, 2023b, 2023c; Hegde, 2024; DeSouza 2023, 2024a, 2024b; Nandrekar, 2023). Finally, the recent allegations of overparticipation by state lawmakers – directed at NGOs and indigenous activists, prompting questions over democracy, the power of elected officials and the role of minorities in making land use decisions. In many parts of the world, legislatures have been pulling back the rights of the public to intervene in land use decisions at the same time as financialization of real estate has become increasingly important (Lemar, 2021; Scally and Tighe, 2015; Murray and Frijters, 2016). Zoning has long provided a tool to manage the value of land (Moore, 1978). Public participation is an essential check and balance on politicians' ability to change land and pass on externalities to vulnerable minorities (Kronk Warner et al, 2020). These factors make Goa a rich and dynamic context for studying the complex interplay between democracy, land use decisions, public participation, and minority rights.

Research Methods

1. EVALUATING PLANNING DOCUMENTS

The lack of existing research on evaluating plans for public participation (Guyadeen and Seasons 2015; Burby, 2016), the availability of documents (Bowen, 2009), exactness and detail within accessed documents (Yin 1994), and the unique ability of documents to help set context and frame questions (Bowen, 2009) collectively make document analysis an effective method for this thesis.

Document analysis, especially in case studies like this thesis, has limitations, including insufficient detail, low retrievability, and biased selectivity (Yin, 1994; Bowen, 2009). I attempt to circumvent these limitations by adopting a “triangulated” approach (Bowen, 2009). Supplementing document analysis with quantitative data collected on “who participates” (Fung and Wright, 2003; Burby, 2003; Fung, 2006) and in-depth, semi-structured interviews (Bernard, 2017) with stakeholders, collectively providing meaningful analytics into the question.

The majority of documents I analyze are “plans”. Thus, adopting a method of Plan Evaluation while analyzing them. This is a relatively underexplored realm of Urban and Regional Planning (Guyadeen and Seasons, 2015). Evaluation itself is often of two types, the “rational approach” and the “communicative approach” (Guyadeen and Seasons, 2015). Rational evaluation looks at plans through the lens of performance, asking how much of the plan has been realized through projects and investment. I focus on the communicative approach, evaluating the planning process from a public policy (Fung, 2006) and dialoguing (Sandercock, 2000) lens. In doing so, I treat the plans as tools of democracy, asking what processes and methods are adopted to engage the public, and how participants' suggestions are integrated into the final policy (Arnstein, 1969; Faludi, 2000; Fung, 2006).

The initial phase of my research employs a comprehensive document analysis. I draw on published plans, minutes of meetings that went into finalizing the plans, judicial records in instances where plans have faced legal challenges including sworn statements from both activists and governmental entities and journalistic coverage that emerged in situations where plans have incited public disputes or prompted demonstrations

1.1. Selecting Plans to Evaluate

Land use, environment, and investment plans make up the core of urban and regional planning in Goa. I chose nine (9) of them that had visible, documented public participation. Some of the plans have been controversial and occupied social media and news archives. Four have been litigated in court

Considering hurdles in data availability, I started with a list of 15 plans: five land use, investment, and environment plans. Many of my applications under the Right to Information Act were dismissed due to not specifying the precise information required for my research. Nonetheless, discovery procedures employed in the High Court of Bombay at Goa for legally contested plans, coupled with records placed in the Goa Legislative Assembly, furnished me with valuable data on nine significant plans, placed in Table 1. This collection comprises four land use plans, three dedicated to environmental concerns, and two focused on investment schemes. Plans span across the past decade – the most recent being completed in 2023. Planning authorities range across local, state, and national governments. Planners range from officials with the designation “planner” employed with the state planning department but also include municipal and village councilpeople, project managers, engineers, and community engagement officers in local governments, the state fisheries, water resources, public works and finance departments, and officers of the central government concerned with coastal regulation.

Most plan evaluations look at plans of a similar typology, made by peer communities. Comparing plans of different typologies is rarely done in academic studies (Berke & Godschalk, 2009; Guyadeen and Seasons, 2015). I'm conscious of the limitations that may arise from a comparative study like this, evaluating plans across three typologies. I attempt to bring uniformity by adopting a communicative evaluation approach, and relying on similarities across public participation mandates for all the selected plans. Public participation statutes align over both land use and environmental planning – all essentially stemming from common law principles of “fairness” and “nuisance” (Jorden & Hentrich, 2003). This makes rationalaspects of the plan – visions, goals, and performance –secondary to procedural aspects within the scope of the study; thus, providing relative comparison despite the variances in typology.

Table 1: List of Plans analyzed in this study.

1.

3.

4.

5. Coastal Zone Management Plan

6. Comprehensive Plan for Fishermen Community

7. Neura Village People’s Biodiversity Register

8. Panaji City Development Plan

9. Neura Village Gram Panchayat Development Plan

Sources: Above Plans

1.2.

Environment, Land Use Central with state input

Environment Central

Environment

Investment, Transportation and Housing

Government (Biodiversity Commission)

- for central grant

(Village Development Commission)

Data Analysis of Planning Documents

I report my findings by first breaking the public participation elements of a plan, focusing on quantitative participation metrics from Burby (2003) and Burton and Mustelin (2013), namely, the number of groups engaged; variety of participatory techniques used, and diversity of feedback received. First, I identify stakeholder groups, listing their drive to participate in respective plans. My second step is highlighting the de jure requirements and the de facto opportunities for participation in every plan. Third, I report the degree of information dissemination (Faludi, 2000; Innes, 1998), and level of decision-making (Arnstein 1969) included in the public participation phases of the plans. The findings are further expanded through an in-depth analysis of participatory procedure, expanding on Fung (2006) highlighting participant recruitment, and modes of influence and authority. Participation procedure is examined through a justice framework (Blue et al. 2019), constantly asking whether plan process tends to parity or not. Finally, I quantitatively analyze every comment received in the Panaji ODP and Goa Coastal Zone Management Plan; highlighting the nature of participation received in different typologies of plans.

2. ANALYZING NON - PLANNING DOCUMENTS

In an attempt to understand motivations of stakeholders, and public perceptions on land use and environmental planning I also review the following sources: News articles detailing public meetings, or carrying interviews with activists and politicians around planning and development; The Goa Good Governance Survey (CSDS, 2002), showing in quantitative terms people’s perceptions on rezoning and preference for agricultural land uses; The Goa Real Estate Regulatory Authority (RERA) records, comprising registration details of every real estate developer licensed to build and deal in Goa and; Financial disclosure affidavits submitted by politicians when contesting elections in 2022, exposing their personal business interests.

These non-planning documents are extremely important when analyzing stakeholders. In order to understand the varied interests of the broader public in Goa (CSDS, 2002), people creating planning laws (Altschuler, 1985; Forester 1989), setting agendas for public participation (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962), thus understanding planner’s techniques from outside perspectives.

3. SEMI - STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS

Plans in Goa have historically generated public agitation (Raghuram, 1998; Alvares & Gadgil, 2002; Sampat, 2017; Nielsen and Bedi, 2016; Da Silva, 2018; Nielsen et al, 2021). Yet, literature does not amplify the voices of actors who participate in plans. Planning is political (Forester, 1989) and planning agitations have led to political upheaval, or novel laws in Goa (Da Silva, 2018). Thus, past literature on the subject focused on capturing post-planning outcomes, rather than documenting the planning, advocacy, and agitation process. This is a gap in the formal knowledge that warrants study, as outcomes are only replicable if the systems leading up to them can be understood (Christensen 2007). Laurian & Shaw (2008) further highlight how even less attention is given to government planners who design and self-evaluate the effectiveness of public participation programs in plans.

I use semi-structured interviews (Adams, 2015) because they offer an opportunity to ask structured questions, allowing me to code respondents' answers – while still affording opportunities to follow up. My position in Goa, gives me the aura of being the “expert”, with foreign training from an elite university. Eliciting honest responses from the stakeholders, especially stakeholders from marginalized groups was a key focus in my interviewing technique. The structured questions and opportunities to press respondents for more honest answers by reframing some of my questions made the interviews flow much smoother than other formats.

3.1 Interview Participant Selection

While recruiting stakeholders I targeted individuals from indigenous communities, government planners, and reporters’ activists engaging in planning issues. Caste was an important determinant for my recruitment. “Scheduled Tribe (ST)” (Constitution of India), members are impacted in land use planning in Goa, and they are often well-organized in resistance to plans and policies that are seen as harmful to their ways of life. They make up 10% of the state’s population (Census 2011), so I made sure to interview two tribal leaders. Other Backward Castes (OBC) add up to approximately 50% of the population of Goa (Mandal Commission, 1979), these are a mix of Indigenous People not on the first schedule and other historically disadvantaged groups. The state of Goa reserves quotas in Government service for ST and OBC totaling 50% and I followed this criterion, ensuring that stakeholders from the privileged castes (Savarna) do not exceed 50% of my interviews.

Reservation and Goa’s high education and social indicators ensured that I had ample stakeholders to recruit, fitting my caste criteria. I also tried to ensure representation from three broad groups: Government, Grassroots Activists and External Experts. ‘Government’ included a total of six individuals, including lawmakers and planning staff engaged in state and local governments in Goa. ‘Grassroots Activists’ comprised four activists, working as grassroots organizers, advocating for their communities in the planning process and at times, agitating. ‘External Experts’ is a catch-all for my last three stakeholders, comprising an experienced environmentalist dealing with coastal issues, a senior lawyer pursuing constitutional due process cases around public participation at the Supreme Court of India, and a planning researcher working in the field of open data and justice in Goa.

Table 2: Interviewee Profile - for in-depth interviews about Public Participation

Source: Self-reported by Respondents

Finally, I attempted to identify stakeholders who worked on plans I studied in the Document Evaluation section of the Thesis. I had trouble finding people working on investment plans. I have participated in plans of this typology. Much of the input pertaining to these plans is informed by my own participant observation.

3.2

Supplemental Interviews

I also separately interviewed five stakeholders about the politician-real estate relationship in Goa. These were much shorter, unstructured interviews focused on getting peripheral information. Three of the interviewees were journalists who write about real estate, one was a member of the GBA who served on planning boards in the past and the last was a real estate developer.

3.3. Interview Schedule

The information collected in my semi-structured interviews seeks to validate my hypothesis by inquiring about the conditions that shape public participation: namely, typology, level of government and planning methods. By asking all three groups a similar set of questions I attempt to situate my findings within larger debates of decentralization (Tiebout, 1956; Cohen and Hook, 1987; Ramanathan, 2007; Muriu 2013; Ribeiro, 2016; Sivaramakrishnan, 2013), community knowledge interfacing with technical knowledge (Ribeiro, 2005; Rydin and Pennington, 2000; Corburn 2003; Natarajan 2017), over participation by privileged groups, (Forester, 1988; Nightingale, 2002; Scally & Tighe, 2017; Balakrishnan 2019; Lemar, 2021) and radical and insurgent planning by non-government actors (Appadurai, 2002; Kudva, 2005, 2009; Miraftab, 2009).

3.4 Interview Data Analysis

The interviews were analyzed using a thematic analysis approach (Clarke and Braun, 2006). I transcribed interviews, around half (6) were in Konkani and I ended up translating them. Thus, quotes aren’t verbatim in all cases. I generated initial codes based on recurring ideas and concepts covered in the literature, along with themes that also shaped my interview structure. These codes were then organized into broader themes, which were refined through an iterative process of comparing them with the document analysis and revising as necessary.

Figure 3: Diagrammatic representation of research methods and sources used for this study.

03. FROM PAPER TO ACTION: EVALUATING PLANNING DOCUMENTS

Introduction

As explained in Chapter 2, my research begins with a thorough document analysis, delving into published plans, meeting minutes, judicial records, and journalistic coverage to evaluate planning documents' public participation aspects. I will be looking at eight plans and analyzing three factors, namely typology, level of government, and planners' techniques influence on participation. A brief review of the literature on these three factors follows.

Factors Influencing Participation

1. BENEFITS OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION ACROSS VARIED TYPES OF PLANS

There are numerous benefits to enhancing public participation across plans. A major study by The National Science Academy concluded that public participation, “when done correctly,” improved the quality of public decisions. It also found that “well-managed public involvement” increases the perceived legitimacy of public policies and eases implementation (National Research Council, 2008). These findings are important across typologies of plans, but to varying degrees: Land use plans often bring legal sanction through zoning (Jurgensmeyer et al, 2019). Public participation becomes an essential conduit to understand community needs, preferences, and concerns (Steele, 1986; Rydin and Pennington, 2000), and institutionalize local knowledge (Corburn, 2003; Kronk, Lynn and Whyte 2020). These inputs are necessary as Zoning could potentially dispossess communities (Sampat, 2017; Levien 2018), trigger gentrification (Murray & Frijters, 2021), or transfer negative externalities onto neighbors (Moore, 1978).

Infrastructure or financial planning historically contained lower rates of public participation than land use. Infrastructure planning is a constantly evolving process, more so than other plans (Beard and Sarmiento, 2017). Public input to federated infrastructure planning has traditionally been handled through the democratic process (Beard and Sarmiento, 2017). Even within Indian institutions, statutes like the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments (1992), and programs like the JNNURM and AMRUT are dependent on local and state representatives to provide the bulk of public participation (Gauba, 2017; Vijaybhaskar et al. 2014).

Environment plans are usually considered hardest to implement (Berke and Godschalk, 2009; Daniels, 2017) and arguably need the most public participation. The US Environmental Protection Agency suggests that public participation can include additional information in plans, better reflect public interest, and develop long-term problem-solving capacity in communities (EPA, 2024). Similarly, rational plan evaluation studies by Brody et al have also indicated far better implementation when environmental plans have had higher degrees of public participation vis-a-vis Arnstein’s ladder (Brody, Godschalk and Burby, 2003).

2. LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT, REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

There is a conception that planning at the local government level offers several benefits, but the effectiveness of decentralization in enhancing accountability, transparency, and public participation depends on various factors. Proponents find that local governments can make detailed and contextspecific policies, and local representatives are easily accessible and more accountable to residents (Diamond, 1999; Blair 2000). However, merely devolving power from state to local government does not increase accountability, transparency, and avenues for public participation, but is dependent on a variety of factors (Miraftab, Beard and Silver, 2008).

For example, Kohl (2003), studying Bolivia, found that decentralization helped amplify community voices in municipalities with strong NGOs and grassroots organizations, but concentrated capital with local elites elsewhere. Similar findings were noticed in Kenya (Muriu, 2013). In the United States, the birthplace of decentralization policies (Diamond, 1999; Campbell and Marshall, 2000), research indicates that local government-led participation ends up amplifying a vocal minority (Brody et al, 2003; DuVivier & Witt, 2016), restricting non-resident participation, and hindering green energy and affordable housing projects (Lemar, 2021; Scally and Tighe, 2015; Monkonnen, 2021). In a study of Nepal’s decentralization policy, Pandeya (2015) and Bienen et al. (1999) both found that the advent of local government in Nepal led to centralizing power with local elites. There are also stark differences in rural and urban participation across state and local government led planning. Pandeya found that the negative effects of decentralization were connected to conflict between local and state

governments, and more visible in geographies where there were large power differences between the have and have-nots (Pandeya, 2015).

India’s 73rd and 74th constitutional amendments (1992) attempted to fill some of the aforementioned gaps while empowering local governments (Ribeiro, 2005, 2016; Sivaramakrishnan, 1997). This has led to increased women's participation (Kudva, 2003), and a degree of participatory budgeting in rural areas pan India through Gram Sabha meetings (Fung and Wright, 2003; Ramanathan, 2008). In particular, the state of Kerala expanded beyond infrastructure planning, setting up effective and accountable municipal and rural land use and environmental planning institutions (Fung and Wright, 2003; Heller et al. 2007). However, Heller, Harilal and, Chaudhri acknowledge that the Kerala experience was possibly uniquely influenced by socio-cultural pressures that installed a leftist government, and robust grassroot organizations and NGOs, ensuring transparency and participation, akin to several other findings mentioned above (Kohl, 2003; Miraftab et. al, 2008; Muriu, 2013; Fung and Wright, 2003; Heller et al. 2007, Sampat 2017). In recent years the central government of India is beginning to reverse decentralized processes, concentrating public finance and decision making through laws like the Coastal Zone Notification 2011 (Krishnamurthy et. al 2014) and programs such as the Smart City scheme (Ribeiro, 2016; Idiculla, 2023).

India has a long-standing tradition of NGOs and grassroots Member-Based Organizations (MBOs) playing pivotal roles, including bridging gaps between state and local governments (Kudva, 2002), assisting local governments in planning, and providing states with crucial local knowledge and social capital connections (Miraftab, Beard, and Silver, 2008). However, in recent years, there has been a decline in the influence of NGOs and activist MBOs (Chaudhry, 2022). Scholars have expressed concerns about elite capture (Bannerjee-Guha, 2014) and reduced participation (Vijaybhaskar et. Al. 2015) arising from the weakening of these organizations. Moreover, since 2014, there have been instances of the Indian government using statutes like The Foreign Contribution Regulation Act to suppress Member-Based Organizations perceived as opposing their development agenda (Chaudhry, 2022).

Understanding the dynamics of public participation in planning across levels of government is crucial for this study, as it allows for a comprehensive examination of how decentralization, state politics and the role of NGOs and grassroots organizations impact public engagement in Goa’s plans.

3. PLANNERS PARTICIPATION TECHNIQUES AND PLANNING PROCESS

Participation in planning projects emerged in the USA (Jorden and Heintrich, 2003). Arnstein categorized the degree of participation in different plans, policies and projects as rungs on a ladder, with higher levels aligned with increased participation (Arnstein, 1969). Several planning theorists used these principles to push for planners to move beyond the role of mute technicians, towards a progressive approach including aspects of scenario, transactional (Friedmann 1987) and advocacy planning (Davidoff 1965, Mazziotti 1982), approaching all issues from the perspective of amplifying underprivileged voices (Forester 1989).

Arnstein's ladder continues to be the seminal theory rooting public policy research on participation, but it has faced criticism for its oversimplification and failure to fully acknowledge social diversity and inequality (Blue, Rosol, & Fast, 2019). This critique has prompted scholars to explore alternative lenses, such as Nancy Fraser's justice framework (2016), to analyze and enhance participation frameworks. Fraser's framework highlights principles of justice, including redistribution, representation, and recognition, as essential for meaningful participation. These principles aim to ensure that planning processes address the needs of marginalized groups and incorporate diverse perspectives into decision-making.

Archon Fung (2006) looks at public participation procedures and outcomes, offering suggestions on how to achieve outcomes on the higher end of Arnstein’s Ladder. He draws out three dimensions, namely: the scope of participation, mode of communication, and decision-making power. Fung states, “Properly deployed, community knowledge, commitment, authority, and rectitude can address wicked failures of legitimacy, justice, and effectiveness in representative and bureaucratic institutions.”

Fung's "democracy cube" creates a simple yet effective framework to evaluate public participation in governance along three metrics.

Literature puts planners in an important position when ensuring public participation (Arnstein, 1969; Forester 1989; Davidoff, 1965; Miraftab et al, 2008). By analyzing plans through this lens, I attempt to understand if this parameter is leading to meaningful public buy in.

Plan Selection

Given that most documents analyzed were plans, I focus on the public participation components accessed from the plan reports, legal documents arising from challenges to aspects of certain plans, and accompanying minutes and records of public participation that did not make it into the final plan documents. I refer to all the above documents as plans, for clarity purposes, even if some of the information is not published in the plan report, and in the public domain. I selected eight plans (table 3) with visible, documented public participation, ensuring a comprehensive evaluation of various planning aspects in Goa.

Sources: Relevant plans

Table 3: Details of plans evaluated in this study

EVALUATION APPROACH

The nine plans are analyzed using two methods of communicative plan evaluation (Guyadeen and Seasons, 2015), this entails assessing how well the selected plans help make communities aware, equip and facilitate communication, and reach agreements. Success is measured by plans use in decision-making, even if outcomes differ from the plan's goals (Faludi, 2000). I do this by examining public participation components through materials published within them and accompanying documents.

The first method draws from two plan evaluation studies done by Raymond Burby (2003) and Burton and Mustelin (2013). Burby analyzed 60 local government environment and land use plans in Florida. He categorized participants into 15 distinct stakeholder groups, finding that plans engaging multiple stakeholder groups, and with varied participatory techniques had better participatory outcomes (Burby 2003). Burton and Mustelin analyzed four environmental plans prepared by different levels of government in Australia. They found plans that motivate citizens to engage, had diverse avenues and stages of planning to participate in, and granted opportunities for citizens to participate in developing policies, led to better outcomes (Burton and Mustelin, 2013). Therefore, I analyze all the plans by categorizing the level of government making the plan, stakeholder groups that participated, motivations for participating, de jure opportunity for participating as stipulated in the law, de facto opportunities enhanced by planners instituting participatory techniques and the stages at which participation was accepted. Most of the data for this analysis was self-reported in the plans, embellished by information drawn from interviews.

While my first method looks at semi-quantitative public participation. My second method examines the governance aspect of planning, using an analytical framework from Fung (2003); assessing the procedural aspects of plans, analyzing participant recruitment, information exchange and decisionmaking power across three axes of a “democracy cube” (Fung, 2006). Participant Recruitment asks the question, “who participates?” This axis categorizes stakeholders from elected representatives and administrators comprising the “state”; lay stakeholders, NGOs, and technical expert “minipublics”; to more encompassing “diffuse[d] public sphere[s]” (Fung, 2006). Information exchange asks, “how people can participate?” This axis spans modes of communication and decision, from nonparticipative listening; to developing interests; bargaining; and on to intense engagement using the public's “technique and expertise” to co-create plans (Fung, 2006). Decision making power asks about the link between participatory processes and policy outcomes. This final axis covers policies with minimal community influence beyond education; limited influence through advising and consulting; and direct authority granted to the participants (Fung, 2006). Figure 4 is a diagram of the three axes.

Source: Fung, 2006

The benefit of this analytical framework is providing a nuanced perspective to public participation that moves beyond Arnstien’s unidimensional approach (1969), incorporating several of the justice parameters highlighted by Nancy Fraser’s work (Blue et al, 2019). For example, inclusion and representation are analyzed through participant recruitment; recognition is captured through communication and decision making; and redistribution of power from top-down planning structures to community can be explained through the authority or decision-making power vertical.

Figure 4: Participation Cube illustrating two planning techniques on the cube.

Findings

1. QUANTIFYING PUBLIC PARTICIPATION ACROSS PLANS

The first analysis describes the diversity of “stakeholder groups” participating in a plan, as well as the variety of de-jure and de-facto opportunities to participate in said plan. Finally, it also addresses the ratio of formal participation vis-a-vis the population affected by every plan.

1.1

Identifying Stakeholders

Literature on stakeholder analysis generally suggests identifying groups who should be part of the decision-making process, because they represent vulnerable communities, economic, governance or broader public interests (Reed et al, 2009). I use a framework developed by Burby (2003), identifying fifteen (15) stakeholder groups, having a considerable role to play in the nine plans studied. These groups interact with each other and participate covering a variety of interests (Reed et al. 2009). The list consists of: Property Owners, Tenants, Affordable Housing Advocates, Real Estate Developers, Business Confederations, Professional Groups engaged with Development (Architects / Engineers), Coastal Industries (Fishing, Ports, Navy), Agriculture and Forestry Industries, Environmental Interests, Advocates and Representatives of Indigenous and other disadvantaged people, Local Governments, State and National Governments, The Media, Cultural and Historic Preservation Associations, and Neighborhood Groups. Figure 5 is a diagrammatic representation of the varied stakeholder groups and some of the participants in the studied plans. APPENDIX _ contains additional information about stakeholder identification.

Figure 5: Stakeholder mapping.

Legend: Red = powerful institutional stakeholders; Yellow = motivated private stakeholders; Green = important but underrepresented stakeholders.

1.2 Opportunities to Participate

Here I follow the ‘opportunities’ as defined by Burton and Mustelin (2013), which aligns with the International Association of Public Participation’s toolkit for participatory planning techniques (IAP2, 2021). Simplifying some of the “opportunities”, the final list of criteria consists of collaborative visioning; stakeholder interviews / focus groups; public hearings at initial stage; written comments at initial stage; public hearing at final stage; written comments at advanced stage; presenting scenarios or alternatives; planning workshops and charrettes; and citizen-selected taskforces or planning committees. Table 4 illustrates the variety of opportunities provided by reviewed plans.

Table 4: Planning opportunities across the study area

Source:Reviewed plans

1.3

Quantum of participation

Every plan clearly indicates the population it is catering to in its fact-base. Using this information, I analyze the gross number of public comments received for each plan, against the catered population to come up with a plan response ratio (PRR). A ratio of 1.000 means that the plan has received a response for every 1,000 people it impacts. The findings on the metrics can be found in table 5.

As the data indicates there is a clear correlation between land use plans and a high PRR. This occurs despite land use plans not engaging a variety of stakeholders and giving limited opportunities for participation. As the following section will indicate, there are several issues in the procedural aspects of participation in the land use plans. Despite these non-participative elements, the fact that the plans received a high participation ratio indicates that there is some willingness to participate in land use planning.

Table 5: Plan Performance across participation indicators

2. DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE THROUGH PLANNING PROCESS

Looking deeper into the plans, through a lens of justice (Blue et. al, 2019) and democratic governance (Fung, 2006), I isolate each plan, explaining who participated, how information was disseminated, and the level of authority given to plan participants outside of the government agency driving the plan.

2.1 Regional Plan for Goa 2021 (RP-21, 2011)

Who participated, and how? Residents of Goa’s villages and towns, self-selected and participated through the quarterly town-hall Gram Sabha meetings. They elected “Micro Planning Teams” from among their own population who were present at these meetings. Planners made appeals over the radio and in the newspapers to participate and visited every municipality, making presentations. There were no registrations required to attend and participate in village-level planning meetings. A detailed case study of RP-21 is at APPENDIX _.

Figure 6: Equitable Recruiting and Communication analysis; RP-21.

Did participation achieve a degree of parity? Despite high degrees of participation stemming from the integration of planning with existing participatory institutions functioning under the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments (Kumar Chandra, 2016), critics believe that the participation was subverted through opaque decision making and allegedly arbitrary decision making by the State Level Committee that reviewed plans made by MPTs and “rationalized” them into a single land use plan for the state of Goa. It appears* that most comments were accepted (SLC Member, Interview, 2023).

Figure 7: Democratic decision-making analysis; RP-21.

* Details or minutes of the SLC deliberations were not provided by the government to the author on grounds that the data is “voluminous”.

2.2

Pernem

Zoning Plan (2023)

Who participated, and how? Residents of Pernem block (county), containing 20 villages and one towns were impacted by this plan. Notice for public comment to this plan was limited to two advertisements in the newspaper. Copies of the plan were not uploaded on the website, or even taken to any communities in Pernem, with only a hard copy available, 60 miles away in Panaji. A court soon enjoined the government to upload a soft copy of the plan to the website (Katkatam, 2023). Initial participation was limited to two state legislators representing the block, who gave several representations “on behalf” of the people (Activist 3, Interview), and a few activists. Eventually local governments participated as they feared their authority getting preempted by the state government (Nandrekar, 2023). A detailed case study of Pernem Zoning Plan is at APPENDIX _.

8: Equitable Recruiting and Communication analysis; Pernem Zoning Plan.

Did participation achieve a degree of parity? At first glance, this plan appears to actively exclude the public and severely restrict participation. However, people power prevailed, and this plan was suspended, and then revoked by the Governor of Goa, with a promise that it would be re-started and the public engaged from inception (Katkatam, 2023). This was a landmark victory for the activists and residents of Pernem, and from an insurgent planning perspective, a high degree of public influence and authority (Miraftab, 2008)

Figure

Figure 9: Democratic decision-making analysis; Pernem Zoning Plan

2.3 Panaji Outline Development Plan-2021 (Panaji ODP, 2012)

Who participated, and how? Residents of Panaji city could participate. Notice for public comment to this plan was limited to two advertisements in the newspaper, and a copy of the plan was put up in city hall and the state Planning department and on the department website Interested locals could file comments in writing. A sub-committee reviewed all written representations and invited certain individuals to present their views in private meetings. A detailed case study of Panaji ODP is at APPENDIX _.

Figure 10: Equitable Recruiting and Communication analysis; Panaji ODP

Did participation achieve a degree of parity? Not necessarily. Once again, the proceedings of the Subcommittee were opaque. The minutes provided only summarize the comment and the decision. Rationale for accepting and rejecting public input is not given. Edgar Ribeiro, retired chief planner of India challenged these processes in the Bombay High Court, pointing out that significant portions of land were upzoned between the draft and final plan, and the zoning ordinance immediately updated, taking away the public’s opportunity to comment on the properties upzoned through private application (EdgarRibeirov.NGPDA) . The court issued a partial injunction, practically downzoning all areas that appeared from draft to final and set up a committee to review rezonings and permits in properties that were proposed to be upzoned in the final plan. ,

Figure 11: Democratic decision-making analysis; Panaji ODP

2.4 Calangute-Candolim Out Line Development Plan-2028

(Calangute ODP 2018)

Who participated, and how? Residents of Calangute and Candolim towns could participate Notice for public comment to this plan was limited to two advertisements in the newspaper, and a copy of the plan was put up in the state Planning department, 20 miles away. A NGO called Goencho Avaaz worked to encourage turnout, and successfully got the plan uploaded to the website, put copies in both town halls and extended the comment period from two to four months. Interested locals could file comments in writing. A sub-committee reviewed all written representations and invited certain individuals to present their views in private meetings.

Figure 12: Equitable Recruiting and Communication analysis; Calangute ODP

Did participation achieve a degree of parity? This was a visible case of “therapy” and “manipulation” (Arnstein, 1969) not meeting any justice and parity goals. Calangute is one of the fasting growing areas in Goa, known for its thriving nightlife (Kandolkar, 2023). While the public, including Goencho Avaaz and other NGOs made several detailed representations, the sub-committee’s deliberations were opaque and allegedly in self-benefit. On February 14, 2024, the High Court of Bombay admitted a petition filed by Goa Foundation, and suspended the plan, and reversed all rezonings made following this plan, flagging major irregularities These included low lying agriculture land belonging to the chairman of the planning board that was upzoned to commercial, 40 acres of communidadeland upzoned to residential without the consent of the ganvkars , and around 23 acres of steeply sloping land, protected from development under another state law (Goa Foundation v. Goa Town and Country Planning). Other arguments made by the petitioner were about the opaque nature of processing public input, with the court raising concerns of arbitrary acceptance and rejections of public comments by the subcommittee.

2.5 Goa Coastal Zone Management Plan (2021)

Who participated, and how? The national government got the consultant to do an hour-long program on television explaining the importance of coastal planning. The state government organized ten awareness workshops in all 10 counties of the state in 2019, even though only seven counties were affected by the plan. These were mainly attended by local governments, who subsequently requested two planning NGOs: RainbowWarriorsand GoaBachaoAbhiyan(GBA) to conduct workshops during a Gram Sabha meeting and assist the villagers in ground-truthing and drafting suggestions to the plan. 52 out of the 74 affected communities had workshops [I facilitated four workshops in Tiswadi block, as a resource person for GBA] Villagers self-selected to attend two large public hearings that ran till the early hours.

Figure 14: Equitable Recruiting and Communication analysis; Goa Costal Zone Management Plan.

Did participation achieve a degree of parity? It appears that most suggestions pertaining to groundtruthing of coastal assets: incorrect or missing mapping of marsh lands; fish breeding areas and nesting areas of seabirds were accepted and incorporated into the final plan.

Figure 13: Democratic decision-making analysis; Calangute ODP

Interestingly, representations concerning missing sand dunes were not accepted, despite the state government also concurring that there were around 600 acres of dune that the consultants missed mapping. Critics of the plan allege that this is to ease rezoning of seafront land, on low sand dunes, to commercial and tourism uses (Environmentalist, Interview, 2024)

2.6 Comprehensive Plan for Fishermen Community (Fishing Plan, 2020)

Who participated, and how? The Environment Protection Act mandates indigenous representation on planning commissions set up for federal environmental plans. The state government nominated three indigenous fishers to an 11-member fishery planning commission. The commission had eight open meetings. Planners invited state government agencies, NGOs engaged in beach cleaning and 40 fishing co-operatives and unions. There were no uninvited attendees. A detailed case study of the Fishing Plan is at APPENDIX _.

16: Equitable Recruiting and Communication analysis; Fishing Plan.

Figure 15: Democratic decision-making analysis; Goa Coastal Zone Management Plan.

Figure

Did participation achieve a degree of parity? Very few members of the ‘public’ participated in this plan, but those who did achieved some degree of parity with the commission. Participants could bargain with the commission and negotiate for their wants, and it appears that most of the feedback was addressed. Eight fishing unions boycotted the plan, alleging that the committee was overly represented by the watersports and tourism industries. The plan’s primary output of mapping fishing wards was accepted by the national government and zoning restrictions eased in these areas. Other outputs of the plan remain unaddressed.

Figure 17: Democratic decision-making analysis; Fishing Plan

2.7 Neura People’s Biodiversity Register (Neura

PBR, 2021)

Who participated, and how? The PBR is a pilot project of the ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, Government of India. Goan communities that complete these plans can avail funds for biodiversity management and conservation. Neura village was the fourth community to complete its plan. Planners worked with the local biodiversity commission, farmers, fishers, herbalists and village elders to map the flora, fauna and their uses. The draft plan was presented in the GramSabha and interested villagers could integrate their ideas into it at that time.

18:

Did participation achieve a degree of parity? The Neura PBR comes close to being a truly participative plan, this is possibly because the plan isn’t associated with any major infrastructure or threat, but rather incentive through federal grants; and the alignment of biodiversity with Neura village council’s political agenda. The local government had full autonomy over the planning process. The village has also been fighting the expansion of a highway that passes through it, many village leaders believed that having a robust Biodiversity Register would help their challenge to the highway expansion (Planner 6, interview).

Figure

Equitable Recruiting and Communication analysis; Neura PBR

Figure 19: Democratic decision-making analysis; Neura PBR

2.8 Panaji City Development Plan - 2041 (Panaji CDP, 2014)

Who participated, and how? The City of Panaji prepared this plan to qualify for central government funding under the JNNURM program. Under the JNNURM program, a consultant was hired and briefed by the central government, to assist the City in planning. JNNURM guidelines required two stakeholder oversight committees as well as several participation meetings. The city limited participation to professional advocacy organizations, staff and representatives from various state government departments who were required to implement the project. In all deliberations the state government administrators dominated, leveraging their power in implementing public works for the City.

Figure 20: Equitable Recruiting and Communication analysis; Panaji CDP

Did participation achieve a degree of parity? Interviews reveal that City staff attempted to counter the dominance of state government agencies by setting the agenda beforehand, and strategically scheduling planning meetings at times that conflicted with powerful state secretaries and ministers’ schedules. However, the agenda was apparently set in New Delhi, by the central government through their consultant planners. The exclusion of marginal stakeholders, such as low-income residents and people with disabilities, and the limited power of participating stakeholders to only express preferences to infrastructure goals set by central government policy makers, rather than contribute to redesigning the plan significantly impacted the implementation. A decade later, around 40% of the infrastructure identified in the plan was never implemented due to public protests and changing priorities. (Planner 5, Interview)

2.9

Neura Gram Panchayat Development Plan (Neura GPDP, 2023)

Who participated, and how? The GPDP is a novel planning statute, stemming from devolution policies introduced in the 73rd Constitutional Amendment (1992). In the village of Neura, Goa, the GPDP is conducted through a Gram Sabha meeting, and is open to all residents above 18 years old, who must pre-register to attend. Registration can be online or at a help desk in the village even on the day of the meering. This special Gram Sabha, is held at least once a year, typically on Sundays to maximize attendance, allows residents to discuss and vote on the Gram Panchayat Development Plan (GPDP) and other local issues. Participants are informed of the meeting's details 15 days in advance via newspapers and public notices. Residents are given roll numbers for the meeting, can speak on agenda items, and vote on decisions. Non-residents and the press can attend but cannot speak or vote.

Figure 22: Equitable Recruiting and Communication analysis; Neura GPDP

Did participation achieve a degree of parity? The Gram Sabha format aims to ensure all residents can voice their opinions, with a moderator overseeing the proceedings. While decisions at the Gram

Figure 21: Democratic decision-making analysis; Panaji CDP

Sabha are subject to resident turnout, community organizations like the Catholic Church and Hindu Nationalist Youth Corps (RSS) actively encourage participation. Despite the open nature of the meetings, actual influence is limited for two reasons. GPDP plans cover a small percentage of the village budget, and some GPDP projects, even if rejected in the Gram Sabha, can be implemented through other funding sources. The meetings are video-recorded but not conducted in a hybrid model, limiting remote participation. While the system fosters open discussion, the true impact on governance is constrained by external funding and varying degrees of resident engagement.

Figure 23: Democratic decision-making analysis; Neura GPDP

3. BROAD CONCLUSIONS

Broadly, it appears that plans having distinct land use or infrastructure outcomes succeed in engaging the public in Goa. Considering the state’s high density, limited availability of land and history of dispossession (da Silva et al, 2021; Kandolkar, 2023), citizens have opinions on these plans, and attempt to express them when given an opportunity. Table 6 presents some of the information conveyed above, essentially communicating the power dynamics in planning (Fung, 2003; Forester 1989). Note that participation varies in local government driven plans like the Neura GPDP vis-à-vis Central government plans like the Panaji CDP.

Table 6. Plan Evaluation through a democratic governance lens.

1. The Regional Plan for Goa - 2021 (2011) State + Local More Public Intense (several techniques) Consultative with some Manipulation

2. Pernem Zoning Plan (2023) State Very Exclusive Negligible (plan obscured) Non-Participation public killed the plan

3. Panaji Outline Development Plan (2015) State Very Exclusive Restricted (written form only) Reporting to the public

4. Calangute-Candolim Outline Development Plan (2018) State Very Exclusive Restricted (written form only) Manipulation stayed by court

5. Coastal Zone Management Plan (2021) National + State Public

6. Comprehensive Plan for Fishermen Community (2020) National Minipublics

7. Neura Village People’s Biodiversity Register (2021) Local Minipublics

Moderate (express preferences) Consultative

Moderate (bargain for interests) Consultative partnership on paper

(several techniques) Direct Authority

8. Panaji City Development Plan (2014) National Exclusive Moderate (bargain for interests) Reporting to the public

9. Neura Gram Panchayat Development Plan (2023) Local More Public Intense (co-governing) Direct Authority

04. PERSPECTIVES ON PARTICIPATION

introduction

Across thirteen interviews with important stakeholders engaged with one or more of the nine plans in the scope of the study, I notice the following commonalities: Planners feel restricted by state statutes; the public engage positively with planning staff, struggling to reach the decision makers in planning boards; boards and commissions are overrepresented by state legislators and their aides; Goan NGOs historically filled gaps, facilitating participatory planning at grassroot levels; However, there is a dearth of neighborhood NGOs, with most working at a city or regional scale; tribal activists advocate deliberative public participation; all oppressed classes are concerned about the top-down nature of planning; and push for developing robust grassroot institutions; level of government and participation outcomes is contested, activists interviewed advocate for decentralization, planners disagree. The following sections expand on the themes mentioned above.

Stakeholder perceptions

1. BLACK LETTER INTERPRETATION OF PLANNING LAWS OBSTRUCTS PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

When asked in the legislature about public participation techniques used by planners across the state of Goa the Minister for planning replied “Under the Town & Country Planning Act, 1974 there is no such provision to hold any public hearings and meetings [...] before publishing any draft Plans.” (Rane, February 8, 2024).

The Minister’s thought process resonated across planners interviewed for this study. For example, a planner in the department said:

“I wanted to make a presentation about the plan to the residents. Seniors restricted me, as there was no scope within the Town Planning Act to do that.” (Planner 3 interview)

Despite planning literature constantly discussing ways for planners to adopt a variety of participatory methods (Davidoff, 1965; Arnstein, 1969; Forester, 1989; Fung, 2006; Burton & Mustelin, 2013; Blue, Rosol and Fast, 2019), Goan planners express concerns about being overly constrained by the Act. When asked about public participation techniques adopted in RP-21, another planner said that the department faced threats of lawsuits for having more than one round of public consultation.

“Some NGOs wanted to sue [us], they said, why are you delaying the process with all these meetings. You are definitely trying to [grab land].” (Planner 2 interview)

While no lawsuits were filed in response to the multilevel consultations used in RP-21 it’s evident that planners feel restricted and curtailed. Two other interviewees disagreed, taking time to explain how varieties of participation are in-fact allowed within the TCP Act, 1974.

Section 13 of the TownPlanningActstipulates that “[plans shall be published], in the Official Gazette, and also in one or more local newspapers indicating therein the place or places where copies of the same may be inspected and inviting comments in writing from the public.” Nowhere does it say at what stage or how many times the plan can be published.” (Planner 4, interview)

“Just because an Act says that you must have ‘a’ hearing does not mean you need to have only one [hearing]. Mandates are minimums [...] I ascribe to the legal theory that government officers working in the public interest should aim to go beyond mandates.” (Lawyer, interview)

In rare occasions like RP-21, planners took advantage of the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments (1992). These amendments introduced two provisions of participatory governance at local government level, town hall meetings where infrastructure decisions are taken by voting, called GramSabha , in rural areas, and municipal WardCommitteeshaving similar responsibilities and participatory requirements in urban areas (Ramanathan, 2007; Sivaramakrishnan, 2013). Planners used these institutions to pursue land use planning in a participatory framework (Kumar Chandra, 2016). When questioned about how they did this, considering similar deliberative methods for planning were not followed elsewhere in India, a planner said:

“The 11th schedule of India’s Constitution grants local governments the responsibility for land use planning. We used that [verbiage] in parallel with the 73rd amendment to ensure that every village GramSabhamade a plan as part of RP-21.” (Planner 2, Interview)

The 11th Schedule does not specifically enumerate ‘land use planning’ powers to local governments, however it uses the following terms ‘Land improvement, implementation of land reforms, land consolidation and soil conservation’ (The Constitution of India, 1950).

Kumar Chandra (2016) notes that this is a novel constitutional interpretation that could open the door to participatory planning in most Indian states but has never been used outside this plan. A detailed case study of the methods and processes followed in RP-21 are illustrated in Appendix _.

2. THE PUBLIC EXPRESS POSITIVE INTERACTIONS WITH PLANNERS BUT ARE CONSCIOUS OF THE SHRINKING

ROLE OF BUREAUCRATS IN CONTEMPORARY INDIA

Many interviewees express confidence in planners' abilities to consider their suggestions, but lament that decisions are often overruled by higher authorities, particularly politicians.

"[I’m] Impressed by the planners and very confident after ground-truthing that my suggestions would be accepted. Unfortunately, they were overruled. I wish I knew by whom"

(Environmentalist, Interview)

"In my experience across plans: Government planners try to help. They listen to us, but the ministers overrule them. Earlier, bureaucrats used to have a say. In the last 10 years it has got really bad. Power is increasingly centralized with politicians. Projects all benefit those at the very top. " (Tribal Activist 1, Interview)

"Often, the government planners themselves are as confused as we are. I am very convinced that many plans and projects are worked out […] between ministers and consultants, and the staff themselves have to then face the people. I don't blame them for the inaction. The corruption happens above them, by the politicians, this is the unique nature of Goa where MLA's are involved in everything. " (Tribal Activist 2, Interview) This sentiment was not unilaterally expressed by activists, but planners also had similar things to say.

“I think the government planner is put in an awkward situation. We have to work within an Act that is very restrictive, and under constant pressure from MLAs. Even opposition MLAs interfere. The board is stacked with builders and MLAs who disregard all planning concepts and only focus on personal gain." (Planner 3, Interview)

“In full clarity [RP-21] was the only time I did not get political interference in my decades at the department. The political circumstances of that time gave us autonomy to do things. The Chief Minister, he stood as a buffer between the task force and the other MLAs. It's not the same anymore…” (Planner 2)

Politicians too are proud of their planner’s acumen, especially when it comes to ground truthing.

“[Despite it not being required, my planners] went and met every biodiversity committee of concerned villages, while ground truthing [after the public hearing], to see if there were things missing. [Regarding omitted sand dunes] I called up [planners] and requested them to go do a resurvey on the ground of all the dunes. And almost all of the dunes [environmentalist] mentioned, we found, and we gave that data to the central government! That was a good, useful suggestion.” (Lawmaker 1, Interview)

Despite these challenges, there is also recognition of the efforts of government planners, with some suggesting that middle-management within the bureaucratic setup can be a useful avenue for engagement.

"Honestly, connecting with government planners was very difficult. I tried to go through personal connections, but [the] government is amorphous. I learned that empathizing with middle-management gave me a little headway in my efforts. Small things like: who decides, who interrupts, how are decisions enabled can be navigated through middle-management in the Indian bureaucratic set up. " (Researcher, Interview)

NGOs have played a significant role in filling the gaps left by government planners (Kudva, 2002), particularly in facilitating participatory processes at grassroot levels. For example, despite interest from state planners in assisting local governments by making participatory village-level CZMP maps, the government did not permit them to do so. In the absence of government planners, NGOs stepped in, working with villagers to crowdsource corrections in the CZMP.

“We did [the planning]. When the [planners] couldn't come and make village maps. We went and made them with the villagers. Villagers had so many corrections to the mapping work done by the consultant… [We also] co-created suggestions on policies in the [CZMP], and recommended that the government pursue ones that target climate adaptation instead of mitigation" (Environmentalist, Interview)

A state lawmaker agreed that the efforts of NGOs were essential in getting ground truthing and community knowledge into the plan saying:

“ …this is where people like you can come in. Who speak to both the public and to the government and are also experts. People like you need to be the middleman, explain to the public how they should participate, so that the plan can be better. Convince the people to continue to participate but only submit useful things. Think about their ideas and their issues and write them in a constructive way so that development can also happen.” (Lawmaker 1, Interview)

Planners have expressed concerns of overparticipation by NGOs. Ribeiro (2006) defines three types of participation: “[Individuals] suggesting out of personal self-interest for properties under their ownership, [neighborhood organizations] suggesting from a neighborhood need, and NGOs looking at the bigger picture” (Ribeiro, 2006; 112). In Goa, interviews indicate that NGOs working at regional and community scales prevail over neighborhood groups, to the detriment of holistic participation.

“All are important, but the middle scale is the most valuable to me. Goa has too many individuals and state-scale NGOs interfacing with planning. Neighborhood participation is lacking. " (Planner 1)

“Mostly in Goa, NGOs oppose the plan. They don't have the numbers so they go to court. Occasionally residents also feel hurt or spot an incidence of corruption, causing public outrage and opposition. It is increasing recently.” (Planner 2)

“If poor people’s interests are satisfied, overrule the NGOs” (Planner 3)

Solutions to this “Glut of NGOs and dearth of [neighborhood] organizations” (Planner 1); could be addressed through empowered local government institutions, like the Gram Sabha in rural and Ward Committee in urban areas (Ramanathan, 2008).

“The ward is extremely important. It is the core of the 73rd and 74th amendment. Grassroots CBOs egg on the ward councilor, without losing sight of the big picture. NGOs look at the state picture and end up dispossessing local communities and neighborhoods because they can't see the specificities.” (Planner 1)

Stakeholders argue that 2000-resident ward represented by a single councilor provides a neighborhood-level advocacy lever plugged into Indian governance structures.

“In 2023, the MLA put an aide up for [local body] elections in every ward of [my] village. He went and campaigned for them, told me my work will only happen if I vote [for] his person! This is not a decentralized democracy. Our NGO supported independent candidates in all wards –we needed to make sure that there was independent, accountable local government.” (Activist 3)

3. SUBALTERN STAKEHOLDERS ADVOCATE FOR MORE COMMUNICATION

AND DIALOUGE

Tribal activists are particularly interested in deliberative governance (Innes, 1998), transforming public hearings into dialogues, and instituting free prior and informed consent though early discussions, targeted notices and communication, veto powers, and shifting power in planning to marginalized groups (Rice, 2018; Kronk et al, 2020):

“Is a plan or project totally harmful, beneficial or something in between? The public must understand the core vision at least! Draft plans are too late. Bring projects to the people earlier at a very nascent stage [. .] Cultivate a feeling of co-development" (Tribal Activist 1)

“We have a lot of good ideas on how to improve our [communities]. But so long as the government is chasing quick money, they will continue to fall into the cycle of plan-protestcourt. If we can bring everyone along in a bottom-up development, and plan together from the start these issues will not even arise!” (Tribal Activist 2)

Every quarterly Gram Sabha [town hall], if participation is mandated, and every state department comes and presents their vision for our community, we will participate. Plans must evolve and constantly be shared. The government must skill people to make them competitive for jobs in new development. (Tribal Activist 1)

Tribal activists dedicated time in the interviews to go into power and process, at times seeking to understand statutory requirements that shape participation. All oppressed castes [including government planners] advocated for some degree of resistance against paternalistic top-down planning practices. including post-facto participation:

“Technically sound people should make studies and explain them to the villagers. Visions, projects, and solutions must come from residents, at most the expert can give several options. Plans must be bottom-up.” (OBC Activist 3)

“People can’t participate with half knowledge; it is on the state to provide information and alternatives.” (OBC Activist 4)

“Planner's role is just to help the villager put their information in a report, use scientific names, and make a presentation. Teaching them how to survey and training them to be self-capable in the future is the best role we technicians can play.” (Planner 5)

4. STAKEHOLDERS DELIBERATED ON WHICH LEVEL OF

GOVERNMENT SHOULD PLAN, BUT OPINIONS DIFFERED

Activists advocated for activating and empowering local governments. Several interviewees cautioned against the ‘oversimplification’ of governance into concerns between local, state, and national governments. Many stakeholders referred to the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment. On the surface, almost all stakeholders supported for decentralization and devolution of planning powers to local government. Examining their responses carefully, the definition of devolution appears to differ from person to person. Some activists and planners think that self-selected GramSabha’sare the ideal decision maker, envisioning all planning along the lines of the GPDP; others ascribe to Ribeiro (2005) and Sivaramakrishnan’s (2013) approach, maintaining accountability through democratically elected councilors from small wards.

“The Central Government advocates for Local Government planning, high degree of research, and multiple avenues for public participation. Goa does the opposite, centralizing planning with the state government, forcing us to participate after a draft is already prepared, and giving no data-based justifications for upzoning forest and farmland.” (OBC Activist 3)

“ The planner cannot be on field all the time, but I worked closely with municipal councillors, who took responsibility for ground truthing their respective ward. After all, a mistake in the ward could lead to lost votes in the next election, and margins are small. ” (Planner 1)

“Land Use Planning should be initiated at the local government level, along the lines of the Gram Sabha. State government should be excluded altogether.” (Planner 5)

In some of the plans studied, the state of Goa adopting collaborated with local governments for ground truthing while retaining the power to prepare draft plans as well as decide to accept or reject ground truthing feedback from local governments. The government has maintained that “for a small state like Goa, [this is] the limit to how much power we can give local governments, even if the [11th schedule] specifies more… [As the state] government, we are merely providing services that local governments lack the capacity to do, on behalf of them.” (Lawmaker 1) Other concerns expressed by stakeholders included a concerns over parochiality of local government, as well as a trend in some communities where influential state legislators are beginning to sponsor “proxy” local government candidates (Times of India 2017). At times these candidates are former staffers of legislators, and there have been cases of proxy candidates relocating to communities to be eligible for election from a specific village or town.

“I don't trust local governments to plan either. Panchayats are now controlled by the local MLA, and act as subordinate bureaucracy for him. They aren't financially self-sufficient so they are increasingly dependent on state politicians. We need to develop alternate ways of grassroots development planning, at the state level, where we have capacity.” (Planner 2)

“Only at the state level can send our fact-finding teams into the villages to ground-truth suggestions. Tell me a [local government] that has the qualified staff?” (Lawmaker 1)

“The best success story I have is RP-21, where we retained veto power at the state level but gave out all the planning responsibilities to local governments. That way we were only responsible to ensure coherence and not given the onus of satisfying developers or communities.” (Planner 4)

5. STATE LEGLISLATORS OVERLY EXERT INFLUENCE IN LAND USE

PLANNING

Arguably the strongest theme across all interviews concerned the state government influencing and driving planning and decision making. This was especially evident in land use matters. While zoning is commonly seen as a legislative action (), it is often left to local government, on the assumption that they are closer to community and can take intimate decisions (). Some theorists advocate for state executive to drive environmental planning (), but in Goa, state legislators intervene actively in land use issues.

STAFF ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

05. PARTICIPATION, ACTIVISM, AND CORRUPTION: REZONING WATERFRONT, FOREST AND AGRICULTURAL LAND IN GOA

Introduction

Zoning is central to land-use planning practice. Most comprehensive planning and zoning decisions involve public outreach and participation, though the degree of participation varies (Jorden & Hentrich, 2003). The global shift towards more flexible zoning and land use regulation (Manville et al 2021) though dynamic “rezoning” policies (James et al 2018) is raising debates about the role that participation should play in local land use decisions (Lemar 2021; Ostrow 2021). Faced with obstructions by Not in My Backyard (NIMBY) activists, some planners advocate for expanding their discretionary powers, preempting or centralizing rezonings with higher levels of government (DuVivier and Witt, 2016; Ostrow, 2021) and enabling rezonings without stringent public participation mandates (Lemar, 2021; Mualam, 2018). On the other hand, advocates of participatory planning worry that if left unchecked, rezoning policies could further concentrate power in the hands of an elite few (Forester, 1988) leading to land dispossession (Levien, 2018) and incentivizing corruption (Chiodelli and Moroni, 2015).

Academics and policymakers debate reducing participation, and preempting local zoning (Scully and Tighe, 2015; DuVivier and Witt, 2016). However there exist few cases of such policies being implemented in the US, aside from the Fasano judgement in Oregon (Steele, 1986) and limited state preemptions for environmental protection (Ostrow, 2016, DuVivier and Witt, 2016). Other nations like

Israel (Mualam, 2018) and Hong Kong (Lo, 2021) are experimenting with curtailing participation in housing programs, but global literature is limited.

This article introduces a case study of Goa, India, an extreme example of the dual trend to reduce public participation in planning decisions and to centralize local land use decisions. The power to rezone in India belongs to the states and it is enabled or delegated through state Town and Country Planning Acts. In 2022, the Goa state assembly inserted section 17(2) into the Goa Town and Country Planning Act, 1974 (TCP Act), allowing the rezoning of properties on the grounds of administrative “correcting errors”. Public participation is not necessary in such cases, which are handled at the state government level, bypassing local government. Goan housing and environmental activists have condemned this policy, cautioning of adverse repercussions that could impact communities and favor corruption given the high cost of housing and active real estate market in the state, shrinking natural areas, and food security (Katkatam, 2023).

Through the Goa case study, my research investigates the impact of formally waiving the participation requirement for rezoning. I ask: what types of land uses prevail and who benefits from rezonings, particularly in the context of regions with growing real estate markets? Concretely examining how rezonings under §17(2) have unfolded in Goa, I attempt to understand whether centralized, nonparticipatory processes lead to planning outcomes that benefit the public interest, or if they create additional avenues for capital accumulation and corruption.

I start this paper by reviewing literature on the intersection of (re)zoning, public participation and corruption. I highlight the phenomena of “legal corruption” and “land dispossession” showing how unfair and possibly corrupt land policies can be legitimized through legislation. Identifying actors who formulate legal and zoning decisions within the within the Indian political system, I try to highlight varied motivations for enhancing or reducing participation and set forth my research methods to analyze these processes and stakeholders. I then provide some background to my case study of Goa, establishing the socio-political context and aspirations of the Goan community vis-a-vis land preservation, and reviewing literature on dispossession through zoning in past Goan policies. By plotting the impacts of two historic policies that led to allegedly “corrupt” rezonings, I highlight trends in land use that appear to contrast with visions in plans and public sentiments. My findings are split into three parts: Part-I contextualizes the mismatch between broader Goan community aspirations and the business interests of the political elite. Part-II highlights the role activists play in enhancing public participation in rezoning. Part-III is my investigations into stakeholders, projects and outcomes from rezonings made under §17(2) of the Goa TCP Act. I conclude by discussing the broader implications of centralized, non-participative rezonings, suggesting that these types of policies create new avenues for potential corruption and exacerbate inequalities.

Literature Review

CHANGING DYNAMICS BETWEEN REZONING AND PARTICIPATION

Globally, zoning is the act of government-initiated parceling and regulation of land use (James et. al., 2018). Zoning arose to combat unintended spillovers or externalities from unplanned development, and adjacent nonconforming land uses (Moore 1978). The US-initiated State Standard Zoning Enabling Act formed the basis for Euclidean zoning statutes and land use regulation in many countries around the world, including Australia (Whittemore & Curran-Groome, 2022) and India (Kumar et al., 2017).

In the 21st century, economic shifts and academic understanding is shifting away from single-use zoning (Manville et al, 2020; James et al 2018). Conscious of the restrictions in land use regulation, there is an increasing pressure to enable a more dynamic system of ‘rezonings’ – defined as assigning land to a different planning zone, changing the governmental classification and permitted uses of the piece of land (James et al., 2018, 7). Advocates of affordable housing in the Global South suggest that strict zoning restricts the availability of affordable housing (Dowall, 1992; Manville et al, 2020).

Monkkonen argues that land “not used” particularly benefits speculators and prevents efficient land use decisions based on the “highest and best use” principle (Monkkonen, 2023). Conversely, the primary criticism of rezoning is the significant increase or decrease in property value that follows changing its “highest and best use”. Often this entails windfall profits that surpass the normative constraints of the market, raising ethical and economic concerns (Gardiner 1985, Murray & Frijters 2016, Levien 2018, Murray 2021). The delicate balance between fostering flexibility in land use and mitigating the potential for speculative gains poses a pivotal challenge in contemporary urban planning (Jordan & Heinrich 2003, James et al 2018). In India, planning and zoning policy is devolved to state governments, and mechanisms to rezone land differ from state-to-state (Kumar et al., 2017). Most Indian states follow a “comprehensive rezoning” (Bronin, 2019) process – where land use elements in state-initiated plans immediately become zoning after the approval of the plan.

Spillovers from zone changes impact the community, prompting the need – many scholars and practitioners argue – for public input into rezoning (Lemar, 2021, Jorden & Hentrich, 2003), with most governments mandating at least one round of public input before finalizing a rezoning (James et al., 2018). This is usually “post-facto”, where planners unilaterally prepare a plan or rezoning proposal, which is then placed before the public, in contrast to participatory visioning (Pimentel Walker & Friendly, 2021), or obtaining prior consent. Post-facto participation originated from standards set in the early 1900’s when zoning laws were developed and continued to be widespread till the 1990s (Jorden & Hentrich, 2003). There are many flaws with post-facto participation. Critics alleged that the agenda is set beforehand (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962), and the public are often forced to react to information,

rather than co-creating it, shifting the power balance away from them (Forester, 1988). These planning practices were criticized by Arnstein as “tokenistic” (1969).

Another criticism of post-facto participation, particularly prevalent in the US is that wealthy, privileged communities can “overparticipate” in land use planning and zoning (Lemar, 2021; Camacho 2005; Forester, 1988) leveraging their power in participatory systems to hegemonize the status quo (Lemar, 2021). This form of NIMBYism results in cementing racial segregation (Lemar, 2021), slowing down renewable energy (DuVivier & Witt, 2016; Ostrow, 2021) and affordable housing projects (Scally and Tighe, 2015; Lemar, 2021).

The response is twofold. Many community members and activists demand that the government increase avenues for, and the quantum of participation, while making zoning decisions. In 1974, Oregon became the first government to mandate prior consultation, in the form of citizens advisory committees (Jorden & Hentrich, 2003). And in the last 30 years there has been an effort to include the public in more ways, while lessening the power difference between developers, planners and the public (Glovin 2021; Camacho 2005).

Conversely, some American planners appeal for moderated or reducing participation, (Rydin & Pennington, 2000; Lemar, 2021) or pre-empting local governments from excluding certain land uses at a state level (Ostrow, 2021, Lemar, 2021). The first approach, especially popular in climate adaptation and environmental planning, is founded on the argument that “society’s values and preferences” may not be in line with “the most efficient [land use] decisions” (Rydin & Pennington, 2000, 156). The second approach is becoming popular in the case of affordable housing preemptions, arguing that it provides a way to advocate for people outside the jurisdiction (Ostrow, 2021). Globally, Israel has taken the second approach, with its affordable housing program. This ambitious effort centralizes zoning with the national government, greatly reducing public participation in its quest to address acute housing shortages. Despite resistance and protest the policy has apparently significantly sped up housing production in Israel superseding “the ‘older’ routes of plan-preparation” (Mualam, 2018).

However, Israel is an outlier. While scholars like Forester (1988) critique “overparticipation”, they often advocate for communicative, participative solutions instead of preemption or centralization. (Scally and Tighe, 2015). Global public participation varies across nations, but often aligns with national and state mandates. (James et. al, 2018; Workineh, 2021; Lo, 2021; Sivaramakrishnan, 2013; Rice, 2020). Parts of the Global South, such as Hong Kong have stayed at the level of consultation and tokenism (Lo, 2021; Tang et al., 2012). On the other hand, Latin America has made considerable efforts to increase representation and maximize public participation and consent in zoning processes. Brazil’s 1988 constitution enabled the creation of urban policy councils. In cities like Porto Alegre, where these councils are active, they obtain prior public input and inform zoning decisions (Pimentel Walker & Friendly, 2021). Notably, Ecuador’s 2008 constitution mandates “informed consent” for extractive activities and land use change, which has led to a multi-layered public participation process (Rice, 2020). India used public participation as a rationale for decentralization. The 73rd and 74th

Constitutional Amendments sought to increase prior participation by devolving land use management from state to local governments (Ribeiro, 2005). Supporters argued that existing public participation measures like gram sabhas could provide municipalities with constant public input (Ramanathan, 2007; Rajasekhar & Manjula, 2021). However, most local governments in India have relinquished rezoning responsibilities back to state governments (Sivaramakrishnan 2013). State Acts and Planning Departments have not deviated from the mandatory post-facto participatory framework for rezonings (Coelho, Kamath & Vijayabhaskar, 2020; Sharma et. al. 2022, Idiculla, 2023). Recent national programs like the JNNUR Mission have instead reduced public participation mandates for urban infrastructure planning (Coelho et al, 2020) while several states have amended their planning laws to preempt central government projects from local zoning ordinances (Idiculla, 2023; Times of India, 2011).

CORRUPTION AND ZONING

Zoning is especially vulnerable to corruption. This is largely because of two conditions: the characteristics of zoning to dramatically increase or decrease the value of private property, and the unique nature of planning institutions that instill significant power to take zoning decisions with government officers or committees (Gardiner 1985, Chiodelli & Moroni 2015, Murray & Frijters 2016). In 1978 a landmark, 259-page study was prepared by the US justice department, exploring corruption in land use planning. The findings indicated that the potential for corruption in land use is inversely proportional to its visibility, and increases with increased legal and administrative requirements. Further, the probability of a property owner to initiate corruption increases in competitive industries and markets. Finally, corruption prevails if both parties' perceived gains, less risk from the illicit activity, exceed the perceived gains from legitimate activities (Gardiner & Lyman 1978). One way of mitigating risks is through “intermediary diversion’ – creating anonymous shell corporations to hold and hide land assets distancing the act from the actor (Jansics 2016).

While there is a standard institution of ‘western’ land use planning and accepted steps to decision making (Altshuler 1965) the impact of land use decisions still holds considerable power and economic weight. In the absence of controlling mechanisms like land value taxes that recoup the value of the resulting price-differential, there is scope for bargaining between decision makers and property owners (Murray & Frijters 2016, Chiodelli & Moroni 2015). The extent of finance needed to develop land, often means that investors and financial institutions are also affected in land use decisions, leading to “growth coalitions” seeking a common goal of increasing development potential of land parcels through rezonings (Murray & Frijters 2016).

An interesting parallel between rezonings and corruption is that both are expressly prevalent in competitive real estate markets (Gardiner & Lyman, 1978; Gardiner, 1985, Sundaresan, 2018). The limited availability of land commodifies it, forcing speculations (Levien, 2018)

Legitimizing corruption

In the global south context, another major hurdle between rezonings and participation are structures established by capital and power (Harvey 2003) that help the elite, or growth coalitions consolidate land and capital through legitimate structures like zoning (Manville et al, 2020). This ‘dispossession of land through corruption’ can be summarized in a quote from a Mumbai-based activist saying that “Land which has to be used for public purposes and for poor people has been grabbed by powerful people. This is wrong. This is corruption." (Doshi & Ranganathan 2017, 184). A primary tactic in dispossession is ‘agenda setting’ – formulating planning and zoning processes to benefit or hinder certain groups (Bachrach & Baratz 1962).

A way of understanding the complexities in agenda setting is looking at the concept of ‘legal corruption’ (Kaufmann & Vicente, 2011) defined as “acting within the law but doing so in ways that could be considered illicit or illegitimate” (Lambert, 2020, 26). Researching potentially illicit land laws in Poland and Brazil and applying the learnings to a policy to regularize illegal constructions in Peru, Lambert posits that illegal and legal corruption are intertwined further arguing that legalization of the illicit relies heavily on technicians and technical arguments (Lambert 2020, 36), aligning with concerns around rezoning motivations being technical (Mualam, 2018; Lemar, 2021). Similarly, Gibson discusses a statute encouraging “unsolicited proposals” in the state of New South Wales, Australia. The law enables developers to introduce major commercial projects on public land bypassing competitive bidding processes as well as some avenues for public notice and hearing (Gibson, 2020). This “deal-making”, between lawmakers, planners, consultants and developers, opens avenues for rezoning-linked corruption around real-estate projects, including some of the examples documented in Murray & Frijters research (2016).

These covert activities and the resultant legitimizing of illicit zoning actions lead to distrust of rezonings in general. A study of citizens, planners and administrators’ perspectives on rezonings in Injibara, Ethiopia found that only 56% of respondents believed rezonings pursued the “highest and best use” of the property, while 93% of respondents felt the (re)allocation of land was done for corrupt interests (Workineh, 2021).

Shifting policies, shifty policymakers

Similarly, within the federated Indian context, the government controls the “release” of agricultural land for development through a constant maneuvering of laws and policy, putting planners and planning boards in a position of power, even while dealing with major corporations (Sud 2014). Research on the application of eminent domain for housing in Mumbai, showed how the state’s policies constantly shifted, resulting in growing distrust for the planning process (Doshi & Ranganathan, 2017). Similarly, Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in India are a very striking example of “legitimized land grabbing”,

making India the epicenter of land-grab protests, driven by the dispossession of land for commodification by neoliberal intentions (Levien, 2018).

One reason for the excessive contestation around zoning and land grabs in India is the prevalence of the “real-estate politician” in Indian state and city governments (Balakrishnan & Pani, 2020) These lawmakers are able to hegemonize power and dictate terms, even when their policies are contested by their own voters. In Bangalore for example, local government politicians are often the primary facilitators of corruption, being the first at the site of an illegal construction while facilitating bribe collection and “management” of regulatory systems such as rezonings (Sundaresan, 2018). This phenomenon is not restricted to India, but finds parallels in Australia, Brazil and Peru (Murray & Frijters, 2016; Lambert, 2020)

There aren’t many steadfast ways to reduce the incidence of corruption without completely overhauling the rezoning process. The literature repeatedly suggests increasing transparency around rezonings, encouraging public participation, and taxing windfalls from rezonings, through property tax (Chiodelli & Moroni, 2015; Murray & Frijters, 2016; Murray, 2021). These two methods reduce the opacity and perceived gains of rezoning. Within the Indian context, former chief planner of India, EFN Ribeiro seems to believe that decentralized governance, enabled through elected ward councilors, is also another form of transparency. (Ribeiro, interview, 2023)

Methodology

RESEARCH DESIGN

For this chapter, I attempt to understand motivation and opportunities for corruption in the land use planning and zoning processes in Goa using stakeholder analysis, six unstructured interviews with three journalists, two planners and a real-estate developer, participant observation, secondary data analysis and document analysis of surveys, court records, media and published meeting minutes.

Part-I is secondary data analysis of the 486-respondent Goa Good Governance Survey (2002) and a document review of the business interests and assets of the 40 incumbent state legislators. The latter consisted of reading all candidate affidavits from the 2022 1 elections, and cross checking their business interests with the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) records and the Goa Real Estate Regulatory Authority (RERA) register. Election affidavits are self-sworn, and only contain assets and liabilities of the politician, their spouse and dependent children. MCA data does not record certain business structures such as sole proprietorships and non-profit trusts. Interviews with the three

1 I also looked at the affidavits from 2012 and 2017 if available.

journalists covering politics and real-estate directed me to the MCA profiles of the adult children of some politicians providing additional data beyond the affidavits.

Part-II comprises participant observation, accompanying an activist affiliated with the Goa Bachao Abhiyan (GBA) to a Gram Sabha in Parra village and observing him present details of a §16B rezoning to the public and council. I also analyzed unpublished research filed in GBA’s court brief challenging the constitutionality of §16B rezonings, corroborating some facts with journalists and planners interviewed.

Part-III is data based on aggregating and tabulating 72 rezonings made under §17(2) from the government gazette. Starting with the very first rezoning on April 6, 2023 until October 19, 2023, I georeferenced the rezonings to municipalities on GIS based on survey numbers. I also listed the original and final zoning categories. Information on the rezoning applicants is not published in the gazette so I filed a discovery application in the High Court of Bombay at Goa, accessing documents from Pravinsingh Shetgaonkar v The State of Goa. I obtained the petition, an amicus brief filed by 3 NGOs, and reply briefs from the state government and seven beneficiaries. I also obtained complete packets for the first 26 rezonings under §17(2), comprising 20 unique property owners. I then used these documents to trace the connections of the 20 beneficiaries to the real-estate industry through three interviews with journalists, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) records and RERA register.

CASE STUDY SELECTION

I focus on Goa, India as a case study of rezoning, activism and corruption because recent policy represents a rare instance of the government curtailing public participation, leading to litigation, and contention from activists and planners alike. Land use planning is a contentious issue in Goa. This subject evokes a high rate of public participation, and allegations of corruption in the media and public discourse. India’s smallest state, with a population of around 2 million spread over 3,702 km2 has some of India’s highest property values (Neilsen & da Silva, 2017), and it still contains tracts of undeveloped land along the Arabian Sea shore, estuaries and in the Western Ghats forests. Further, Goa’s urban patterns are well-distributed with 52 out of the 205 municipalities designated as “urban areas” (Census 2011), accommodating over 62% of the population with excellent infrastructure availability across urban and rural municipalities in the coastal regions of the state (RP-2021, 2011).

Real estate development in the state is active. One factor influencing high property values is strict zoning, particularly for natural, coastal and agricultural zones. The central government further regulates all development within 200 meters of the coast, only allowing residential or occupational structures of “traditional community” (Alvares and Gadgil, 2002). This strict zoning categorization has led to increasing pressure to rezone natural and agricultural land to settlement (Sardessai, Goa Assembly Speech 2018; Rane, Goa Assembly Speech 2023, Katkatam, 2023; DeSouza, 2023). This follows a trend

from other coastal regions of India with high quality infrastructure (RP-21, 2011). Most real-estate transactions in Goa fall in the luxury sector with houses selling for ₹10Mn to ₹50 Mn (Sequeira, 2023), and located along the coastal belt (Kandolkar, 2020; Savills, 2021). Further, over 20% of the housing is vacant (Census 2011) – indicating capital investment from outside the state into speculative “commodified” housing (Bannerjee-Guha, 2014; Neilsen et al, 2020). This is linked to an international trend of markets leaning towards investment in touristic areas known for their natural beauty (Murray & Frijters, 2016; Gibson 2020). The concept of Goa Dourada, an orientalist idea of the state as a window to Europe situated in South Asia (Trichur, 2013) also channels into the Indian investor’s aspirations (Kandolkar 2023).

Goa’s history of activism around zoning and land (da Silva, 2018; Alvares & Gadgil, 2002), activist allegations of corrupt practices in rezonings and distribution of development rights (Rane, 2023; da Silva, 2018; Pravinsingh v Goa 2023; GBA v Goa, 2018) and significant investment into real estate mostly located in already saturated coastal areas (Kandolkar, 2023) make it and exemplary case to conduct an in-depth analysis of participation, rezoning and corruption.

The Legal and Political Context of Rezonings in Goa

STATUTORY ZONING AND PLANS

There are four provisions for obtaining a rezoning under the Goa TCP Act, 1974. These are divided into en-masse, comprehensive rezonings of a district through a comprehensive plan; and piecemeal, caseby-case individual rezonings of private properties.

Comprehensive Rezonings

1 - Regional Plan (State government)

Due to its diminutive size, the entire state of Goa has a single “Regional Plan” (RP). This plan is a guiding document for land use, transportation, investment and environmental policies on a 10-20 year horizon. The state government has to initiate this plan, and the state Town Planning Board dictates the planning process. Local governments may only participate in a limited manner – as the primary goal of

the RP is aligning state land use and environmental priorities with concurrent federal transportation and industry infrastructure. Figure 1 illustrates the RP procedure. RP leads to comprehensive rezoning.

The Outline and Comprehensive Development Plans (DP) were conceptualized to address “critical areas” that need urgent attention or detailed land use policies, beyond broad-brush zoning from the RPs. DPs provide opportunities for Local Governments to exert some authority in regulating development within their jurisdiction. They supersede the RP. However, the state cabinet and planning board still exert considerable power and oversight on the planning process. Firstly, the state appoints a “Planning and Development Authority” (PDA) to prepare the plan and hear suggestions, objections and rezoning requests. The state government decides the composition of a PDA, which can consist of any number of representatives from the local government, state legislators representing districts impacted by the DP and “expert members”. Secondly, the state cabinet must approve the final plan, and local government zoning is forced to comply with the final plan. Very few municipalities have resolved to prepare DPs. Figure 2 illustrates the DP procedure.

Figure 1 : Regional Plan Process diagram

2- Outline / Comprehensive Development Plan (local government initiated; state government approved)

Piecemeal Rezonings

3- Section 16B - Public Interest Individual Rezoning

Section 16B was introduced in 2018. It follows a relatively standard rezoning process, allowing private property owners to request rezonings to their properties. However the decision on the rezoning is taken by the State Planning Board. Figure 3 illustrates the process for public interest rezonings.

4- Section 17(2) - Correction Clause (no need for public participation)

Figure 2: Development plan process diagram

Figure 3 : Public interest rezonings under section 16B process diagram.

Section 17(2) was introduced in 2022. It is among the first legislation of its kind in all Indian Planning Enabling Acts. It allows private owners to request rezonings by citing “inadvertent errors” made by planners while preparing the RP. In §17(2), rezonings are viewed as purely executive decisions, with the state government. Figure 4 illustrates the process for processing rezonings under the correction clause.

Figure 4: Rezoning to correct inadvertent errors in the regional plan, process diagram.

Out of 205 local governments in Goa, only 19 have asked for a DP (Government of Goa, 2023). Thus, 92% of Goa’s land follows zoning in the Regional Plan for Goa, 2021 (RP-21, 2011), falling into four main zoning categories, namely: Settlement, Industrial, Agriculture and Natural Cover / Forest. Residential, commercial, recreational and public uses are permitted within ‘Settlement zones’. Commercial and industrial uses within ‘Industrial’ zones. Approx 25% of agricultural zoned land in Goa is classified as ‘paddy’ lying below sea level, no construction is allowed on this land. On other ‘orchard’ agricultural land, permits farmhouses – restricted to one per parcel. There are strict subdivision regulations disincentivizing fragmenting parcels of orchard land (Sardesai, Speech Jan 2018). No construction of any kind is permitted in ‘Natural Cover’ and ‘Forest’ zones (RP-21, 2011).

CONFLICTS BETWEEN PLANS AND ACTIONS

While media coverage and grassroots voices lament the death of Goa’s green areas, a perusal of Goan plans may lead readers to a different opinion. Almost all land use plans in Goa center around three repeated themes. The first is a desire to strike a judicious balance between economic progress and

preserving the state’s natural environment. This theme is expressed as the overarching motivation in all RPs. RP-01 has ‘conservation of natural areas’ as its first objective (RP-01, 1986) while RP-11 has it as the second (CES, 2006), and RP-21 addresses it in it's vision statement acknowledging that the ‘ecosystems that make Goa what it is… must be protected’ (RP-21, 2011). The second recurrent theme concerns the slowdown in agriculture, reflected in objectives and action statements on increasing agricultural output, countering rising demand to convert agricultural land to other (non-agricultural) uses. For example, RP-01 states that ‘Agriculture occupies an important position in the economy of the district… Goa is supposed to be self-sufficient in agriculture by the end of the VIIth five-year plan’ (RP01, 1986). Similarly, the third objective of RP-21 is addressing ‘the growing tendency of farmers to convert their land into urban real estate… the agricultural sector… must be made viable in order to halt this trend.’ (RP-21, 2011). The third recurrent theme relates to social and environmental issues associated with the mining industry. The plans recognise mining as an important economic activity but also point out its associated problems for the settlements near mining pits and the environmental degradation created by this activity. (RP-01, 1986; CES, 2005; RP-21, 2011).

Despite the proclaimed objectives of balancing economic, agricultural, and environmental values, state legislators devised a set of ‘policy maneuvers’ (Sud, 2014) enabling select individuals to upzone their properties, aiding their personal economic interests. I outline how these policy maneuvers unfolded and their implications below.

EN MASSE OR COMPREHENSIVE REZONINGS

The first instance of maneuvering in comprehensive rezonings occurred in the Regional Plan-2011 (RP11). With the first regional plan (RP-01) nearing its horizon, the state hired Consulting Engineering Services to prepare a new plan with a horizon of 2011. The planning started in 1997, but only concluded in 2005 – largely because of political interference in the process (Da Silva, 2014).

Journalists, and research by Sampat (2017) and Da Silva (2018) explain how the manouver exploited post-facto participation. After the draft zoning map was prepared, the TCP Board invited written representations from the public and processed them. 2 Land owners holding agricultural land, realestate brokers and private developers submitted numerous requests for rezoning (Sampat, 2017) that were accepted and made “under the guise of requests from the public” (GBA 2006). The final plan, incorporating these changes was not put to the public before notification (Kumar Chandra, 2017; Sampat, 2017; Neilsen et al 2020). Upon notification in August 2005, the entire state was comprehensively rezoned to comply with the land use element of RP-11.

2 Applications by the author for the minutes of the sub-committee that processed these plans, and for copies of the representations were declined on grounds that the information is not traceable.

As shown in Table 2, after processing rezoning requests, land classified as “settlement” increased from 303.03 km2 in the draft RP-11 to 375.58 km2 in the final RP-11 (Da Silva, 2018). This is a 23% increase, implying that 72.55 km2 of land across the state was rezoned for residential or commercial development. There was no accompanying table in the final RP-11 document, so the public at large or concerned parties could not easily identify the changes. As a result, NGOs recalculated the areas of the respective rezoning to settlement using Computer Aided Design (CAD) software to compare maps and land-use tables from draft to final (Da Silva, 2018, Sampat, 2017). Figure 5 is a map, prepared by NGOs as a part of the public outreach around RP-11 indicating upzoned land (in red) changed between draft and final. Most of the upzonings appear to be in coastal areas. From the calculations, Da Silva concludes that most of the zones diverted to settlement were agricultural or forest land (Da Silva, 2018). This data gave credence to activists who alleged that the real estate industry was overriding the visions of the community and due process, imposing their interests on an unwilling populace. Tampering with the draft of the RP 2011 led to public agitations, explained in more detail below, and its withdrawal (Sampat 2017, Nielsen et al, 2020)

Table 2 Comparison of Settlement Zones in Draft and Final RP-11 (in hectares) Taluka /Block

*Calculated from the maps accompanying the final plan using Computer Aided Design (CAD)

Source: Goa Bachao Abhiyan, “Independent Analysis of Regional Plan 2011” (2006) consisting of data analyzed by Solano da Silva, Dean D’Cruz and Reboni Saha as a part of the advocacy efforts in 2005 to repeal RP-11.

1 hectare = 10,000m2

Source: GBA (2006)

When the information on RP-11 got out about the “back-door” upzoning, the public was furious. A show of strength in opposition to the plan manifested in a public meeting attended by over 100,000 people. This represented close to 8% of the state's population, collectively on the street, protesting rezonings. The Goa Bachao Abhiyan (GBA) arose from this public resentment. GBA was an umbrella organization of NGOs, politicians and civil society (Da Silva, 2018). RP-11 was withdrawn within a few months.

Figure 5 Map of Rezonings between draft and final RP-2011

Angered by the audacity of the zone changes, the GBA agitation escalated, demanding the resignation of planning minister Atanasio Monserrate. Monserrate was a coalition partner of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). In 2006 Manohar Parrikar, BJP chief minister tried to come to a compromise. He offered Monserrate several lucrative portfolios including finance and public works, but Monserrate insisted on holding on to the Planning ministry. Ever since then the planning portfolio has been seen as “the most lucrative cabinet position.” (Da Silva, 2018). At an impasse, Monserrate finally withdrew support to the BJP. The opposition Indian National Congress party (INC) formed a fragile coalition government and the state had to go for fresh elections in 2007. (Fernandes, 2017; Da Silva, 2018)

After the polls the INC emerged with a full majority, and Digambar Kamat – a politician with no visible connections with the real estate industry – was made chief minister (Fernandes, 2017). Kamat’s first order of business was placating GBA and showing Goans that the government would not repeat RP2011 (Da Silva, 2018). In 2007, he constituted a Task Force (TF) to prepare guidelines to formulate a fresh regional plan for the state. The TF consisted of internationally acclaimed architect Charles Correa as vice chairman, recently retired chief planner of India EFN Ribeiro, and GBA board members Dean D’Cruz and Oscar Rebello as members. A Draft Regional Plan 2021 (DRP-21) was prepared in October 2007 (Da Silva, 2018).

RP-21 a repeat of en-masse zoning changes

In the RP-21, the maneuvering re-started and was allegedly done (to a lesser extent) during the preparation stage (Da Silva, 2018). The TF was disbanded immediately after handing over DRP-21 to the TCP Board. A State Level Committee (SLC) consisting of a few TF members, and other government and private representatives was constituted to hear objections and suggestions. 8,500 objections and suggestions were received, most of which were requests for rezonings (Da Silva, 2018). The SLC heard every rezoning application and took a decision to incorporate the rezoning or not (D’Cruz, Interview, 2023). While SLC members insist the proceedings of the hearings were recorded in a detailed spreadsheet, correlating every address and argument, data was never made available. 3 This led to allegations of corruption by SLC members during the opaque case-by-case procedure (Rane 2023, Da Silva, 2018). Just like RP-2011, the final plan, incorporating the rezonings that came from the SLC was approved, before going to the people.

Evidently, this led to protests after the notification of RP-21. These protests coincided with the state elections in 2012. Once again, this public perception led to a thumping loss for Kamat’s INC

3 Applications by the author for the minutes or correspondence of the SLC while processing RP-21 was not provided on grounds that the information is “voluminous” and would entail significant government time to trace.

government, and the BJP came to power, for the first time in its history with a full majority, on the back of a promise to investigate the plan. This was never done (Da Silva, 2018). Reporters interviewed believed that a major reason for the non-investigation of the SLC was the prevalence of real-estate interests in the newly elected BJP government, notably, Michael Lobo, Pramod Sawant and Dilip Parulekar. (Interview, 2023)

Findings

PART I: CONFLICTING PERSPECTIVES ON REZONING: RESIDENTS,

PLANNERS, AND ELECTED OFFICIALS

While the majority of Goans are concerned about agriculture and natural land preservation, the political class is not. In a large state-wide Good Governance survey, 72% of Goans said they were against upzoning of natural / agricultural land, 15% did not respond to the question, and only 13% supported upzoning (CSDS, 2001). On the other hand, an overwhelming number of Goan legislators, at all levels of government are alleged to be directly or indirectly involved in the real estate business (Prabhudesai 2022, pp. 313-358).

Scrutiny of election affidavits of the current legislative assembly appears to verify the claims made by Prabhudesai (2022). Table 1 indicates that over 62% of the current legislature are directly invested in real estate or development, while a further 22% are indirectly linked though loans or ancillary industries. This industry is overwhelmingly invested in rezoning. It is ironic but unsurprising when considering that the average Goan struggles to access an affordable home – the last Census identified 22% of the state’s housing stock as vacant (Census 2011). Research indicates that the majority of these properties are purchased as second homes or investments by out-of-state residents (Savills, 2021; Kandolkar 2023, Nielsen & da Silva, 2017; Kakatam, 2023)

Source: The author. Based on affidavits submitted at the time of contesting elections, cross checked with records of the Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Government of India and the Goa Real Estate Regulatory Authority

The perceived unfairness in Goa’s land use distribution has elicited several major demonstrations often in the form of large public meetings, street marches and occasionally rioting. The most notable of the demonstrations are the agitation against eminent domain to construct the Konkan Railway (Raghuram, 1995). illegal mining (Alvares & Gadgil, 2002) and the Regional Plan-2011 in 2004-2007 (Chandra 2017, Sampat 2017, Nielsen et al. 2020). Protests against eminent domain for the railway brought thousands on the street and resulted in several compromises, making it one of the most-expensive build outs in the Indian Railways history (Raghuram, 1995). Pickets of illegal mining operations led to injuries to several indigenous protestors illegal ore-laden trucks, driving over the picket lines. This resulted in a blockage of the state mines department, and the Supreme Court of India taking cognizance and suspending all (legal and illegal) mining in Goa (Kamat, 2018). The agitation against Regional Plan 2011 was the largest public movement the state has seen since Goa’s referendum (Nielsen & Bedi, 2017). At one meeting, the press reports that over 100,000 people were present, representing over 8% of the

entire state’s population. Today, any planning policy elicits serious public outcry. (Sequeira 2023, Katkatam 2023, De Souza, 2023)

PART II: PIECEMEAL REZONINGS, ALLOWING “SUITCASE - TOSUITCASE” CHANGES IN PUBLIC INTEREST

Recent policy maneuvers have enabled piecemeal changes to RP-21 after it was operationalized. In August 2018, the assembly amended the TCP Act introducing section 16B, permitting case-by-case zone changes upon request from private landowners “if in the public interest.” As a requirement for public participation, the government is required to publish rezoning details in a newspaper, however the paper and form of publication was not specified in the Act or administrative rules. All proposed rezonings were published as tables in papers with limited coverage, and deliberate obscuring of data (Interview, 2023). As figure 6 indicates, the tabulated information spans remote parts of the state, and the absence of an address, with the department preferring to show survey numbers (parcel ID) make it nearly impossible for a reader to pinpoint the property seeking a rezoning.

Figure 6: Extract of public notice under S 16(B)

GBA analyzed rezonings processed under §16B for just two years (January 2019 to December 2020) as a part of their litigation against the statute. (Goa Bachao Abhiyan v State of Goa 2018). Documents indicate that over 7 km2 were sought to be rezoned under this provision, amounting to 1.89% of the total area in the state. As Table 3 indicates, a vast majority of rezonings proposed converting agricultural land. 90% of all §16B rezonings seek upzoning of agricultural or natural land towards settlement or commercial zoning, for real estate or housing development reasons.

Table 3 Rezoning data processed under §16B of TCP Act (Jan 2019 – Dec 2020)

Source: Research by Solano Da Silva and Anupreet Bhatia for the GBA. Mentioned in GBA petition challenging the constitutionality of 16(B) Goa Bachao Abhiyan v State of Goa (2018)

Community organizing to represent public interests

Given the state’s attempts to aggregate data and discourage public participation, GBA had to play the role of the planner. Researchers sifted through the notified changes and correlated them with addresses. Then GBA representatives went into communities, informing the local government of the proposed rezonings and demanding gram sabha meetings. §16B corrections were processed at the state level, and many local governments felt overruled. GBA sources say many municipalities did not even know about the rezonings within their jurisdictions, so it was easy to build consensus.The efforts of GBA and municipalities led to the filing of considerable objections against the proposed changes.

As a pre-emptive measure, GBA and several other NGOs challenged the constitutionality of §16B in the High Court of Bombay at Goa. In 2020, the government agreed to stay all zone changes being

processed under this section until the court passes its verdict (GBA v Goa, 2018). As of December 2023, the court had not yet passed a verdict.

PART III: REZONING SANS PUBLIC, SECTION 17(2) OF THE TCP ACT

Hindered by the court proceedings, and under pressure from growth coalitions, the assembly looked for another policy maneuver through which it could exercise rezonings, without being indicted for contempt in the §16B case (Aleixo Sequeira, Assembly Debate, 2023). Thus, in 2023, the assembly introduced a separate clause into the TCP Act – section 17(2). This provision enabled private property owners to request changes of zoning, this time by alleging “errors” in the preparation of RP-21 as applied to their specific properties.

This part takes a deep dive into §17(2) rezonings. It looks at the actors using this statute, the benefits they are allegedly deriving, and possible reasons for opting to take this procedural route to obtain a rezoning of their property.

Using 17(2) to do what 16B cannot.

Prima Facie, 16B and 17(2) are very similar. An interview with a real-estate developer who obtained a rezoning under 17(2) revealed their confusion about the difference between the two provisions. This developer owns land in a village, which was zoned as natural cover in RP-21. The developer had attempted to rezone the property under section 16B, indicating that surrounding properties had settlement classifications. They accompanied their 16B application with a bribe, paid in cash to an aide of the former minister for planning in 2020. Their rezoning was stayed as a part of the legal challenge to 16B.

After 17(2) was introduced, the developer contacted the planning minister, inquiring if their property would qualify for a rezoning under 17(2). The minister replied that it would be difficult, and suggested a consultant who could help the developer present their case for a rezoning. The “consultant” , a civil engineer with no urban or regional planning background, charged the developer a fee of ₹10 million to prepare a report. The developer indicated that the “fee” was significantly more than other consultants charge for similar work stating “I don’t think it was a fee, it was a bribe for the rezoning.” (Interview, 2023) Despite the double-charging they paid the fee, anticipating windfall profits from constructing and selling homes once they obtained development rights. In 2023, the developer’s rezoning was approved under §17(2).

Unlike §16B, §17(2) rezonings do not require any public participation. The state government has increasingly used the argument that the rezonings under §17(2) are administrative “corrections” not

“legislative, zoning actions” (Jordan & Heintrich, 2004). These corrections are further evaluated by “experts” in the planning department and the appointed TCP board (Rane, Goa Assembly Speech, 2023). In line with the trend of contesting rezonings, §17(2) was immediately challenged by villagers from Morjim, Goa. NGOs like GBA also filed amicus briefs in the court (Pravinsingh Shetgaonkar v State of Goa, 2023).

Pravinsingh v Goa provided detailed documents contesting the first 20 rezonings made under §17(2). The evidence presented indicates that rezonings convert agricultural or natural land, are in favor of an elite few, can be exploited for windfall profits and are strategically situated in municipalities with historic public activism as outlined below.

What is getting rezoned?

The first evidence presented in Pravinsingh v Goa, as illustrated in Table 4, is that all rezonings continue compromising agriculture and natural zones

Table 4 Rezonings using Section 17(2) of TCP Act (Apr – October 2023)

Notes: * Settlement rezoned to industrial to take advantage of larger lot coverage ** Industrial rezoned to settlement to take advantage of higher permissible height

Source: Research by author from arguments in favor of §17(2) rezonings, and amicus briefs challenging the application of §17(2) in Pravinsingh Shetgaonkar v State of Goa (2023).

Who is reaping the profits of rezoning?

Most of the applications for rezonings under the new statute were in the name of individuals or obscure corporations. Most of the corporations that applied for rezonings appear to be ‘shell companies’ (Jansics, 2016), relatively unknown entities, with no major presence in Goan markets. The journalists interviewed helped connect three of the individuals to major real-estate firms. However, they had never heard of nine out of eleven corporations that applied for rezonings.

The second evidence indicates that the successful rezonings are led almost exclusively by one industry – real estate. Scrutiny of documents, particularly details of respondents in Pravinsingh v Goa conclude that from March to June 2023, 182,000m2 of farm and forest land was rezoned primarily to benefit real estate stakeholders. In particular, 52% of the land rezoned was done at the request of real estate corporations or developers, with a further 42% done in favor of three individuals, all listed as directors of real estate firms. The balance 4.8% amounting to around 8,700m2 could not be linked to any registered real estate firm.

Within a few months of operationalizing §17(2), there is evidence of windfall profits. One applicant, Mahavir Nadar 4 purchased 1,770m2of agricultural land for ₹7.4 Million in December 2022. The property was rezoned in March 2023, and promptly sold for ₹68 Million in June 2023 – a profit of 919%.

Where are the rezonings happening?

Another trend that is observed in the data is the geography of projects. 89.71% of all rezonings processed under §17(2) are in the four coastal blocks of Bardez, Pernem, Salcete and Tiswadi. Bardez, Goa’s fastest growing block (Kerkar et al, 2020; Census 2011) accounts for the most rezonings at 36%. Tiswadi, which competes with Bardez for the highest land values (Kerkar et al, 2020), collectively make up over half of all rezonings. Figure 7 is a map illustrating §17(2) rezonings vis-a-vis the geography of Goa.

Figure 4 also indicates that the majority of rezonings are in villages in the coastal region with strong activist ties. The villages of Anjuna and Assagao are where the Goa Foundation – Goa’s largest environmental advocacy group is located. Similarly, Benaulim is the headquarters of the Colva Civic and

4 This person could not be traced to a formal real-estate business, and therefore falls in the balance 4.8%

Consumer Forum. Morjim – the site of the is an important Sea Turtle nesting site with several active NGOs. These NGOs have litigated almost a thousand land use cases between them. The minister mentioned Goa Foundation by name, and NGOs in general in a speech in the assembly while justifying 17(2) saying “they are a fraud, stopping all development in Goa in the name of [farmland and] environment [preservation]” (Rane, 2023). Similarly, the municipal authorities of Morjim promptly filed complaints against the “illegal construction” being pursued in connection with the rezoning, illustrating the lack of information sharing between state planning departments and local government (Pravinsingh v Goa, 2023).

4: Map of Goa and chart depicting the 310,245 m2 of land rezoned without public participation under §17(2)

It is evident that the state government sees a connection between resistance from NGOs like the GBA, the autonomy of local government to manage land, and public participation as a hurdle in rezoning agricultural and natural land for “development” purposes.

Figure

Discussions and Conclusions

DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

Planning in Goa has been accused of corruption and ‘dealmaking’ (Gibson, 2020) by journalists (Prabhudesai, 2022; Interviews, 2023), activists (Alvares & Gadgil, 2002; GBA, 2006; GBA v. Goa, 2018; Pravinsingh v. Goa, 2023) and researchers (Neilsen et al, 2020; Sampat, 2017). Recent policy maneuvers, especially the introduction of the §17(2) “corrections clause” into the TCP Act, are alleged to be a form of legitimizing corruption (Lambert, 2020) facilitating bribes and ‘dispossessing’ (Harvey, 2003; Sampat, 2017; Levien, 2018, Neilsen et al, 202) land from the people to the real -estate industry, which incidentally is also the political elite. The findings indicate that this statute in particular, has several of the traits of corrupt land use practice identified in the literature, as the following discussion will expand.

Revisiting the idea of GrowthCoalitions(Murray and Frijters, 2016) we see a coalition emerge in Goa, empowered by unrestricted capitalism – leading to speculative housing construction, including vacation homes for India’s rich and famous. Other researchers demonstrate that much of this is fueled with capital from outside the state, outpricing local Goan communities (Kandolkar, 2020; Nielsen et al, 2020). It is aided and enabled through legislation influenced by a group of real-estate politicians (Balakrishnan & Pani, 2020), who make up the majority of the state legislature. Interviews strongly suggest that real-estate professionals play a pivotal role in executing rezonings in Goa, allegedly facilitating bribes for favors. (Interview 2023). Interestingly these scenarios mirror examples presented in the literature of cases in the US and Australia (Gardiner & Lyman, 1979; Murray & Frijters, 2017; Gibson, 2020)

The literature depicts a direct connection between competitivemarketsand corruption (Gardiner, 1985). Strict zoning, and high land prices indicate an especially active and competitive real estate market in Goa. The supply of developable land in Goa is further curtailed by public aversion to sprawled out development, and concerns about activist protest in several coastal municipalities. (CSDS, 2002; Sampat 2017). The existence of the growth coalition around speculative housing is another indication of a competitive market. Literature in other states of India and internationally suggest that such a curtailed supply prompts “policy maneuvers” such as §17(2) as a means of dispossessing land, “opening it” for real-estate development and capital accumulation. (Harvey 2003, Sud 2014, Levien 2018)

Similarly, this case study of Goa lends evidence to arguments that increasedlegalandadministrative requirementsalso lead to more opportunities for corruption (Workineh, 2021; Gardiner, 1985). The

processes illustrated in the chapter include several bureaucratic hurdles imposed on property owners seeking rezonings such as: the quasi-judicial State Level Committee hearings in DP and RP driven “comprehensive rezonings” and public notice compliance in pursuant of §16B rezonings. When court and political delays are factored in, property owners are more likely to seek corrupt ways of obtaining rezonings. Even a fast-track to rezoning, like §17(2) imposes its own administrative requirements in the form of making technical justification for correcting inadvertent errors, putting unilateral power in the hands of the Goa Town Planning Board. As Gardiner & Lyman (1979) & Workineh (2021) highlights the correlation between unilateral zoning actions, such as §17(2) and the incidence of corruption.

Arguably one of the major correlations to corruption is the lackofvisibility(Gardiner, 1985). The data presented in the case of RP-11 depict how the public had no opportunity to review 19% of the total rezonings, covering 72.5 km2 of agricultural land. These were made behind closed doors, and directly appeared in the final map. The public were forced to deal with the externalities from poorly thought out land use changes, and it resulted in the comprehensive rezonings being reversed in totality. Tactics of obfuscation are also used in the formatting and processing of public notice in §16B rezonings. §17(2) goes a step further completely eliminating the need for public notice and comment in any rezoning leading to even more chances of corrupt activities being linked to rezonings under this provision.

Gardiner (1979, 1985), Chiodelli and Moroni (2015) all highlight that corruption prevails if bothparties' perceivedgains,lessriskfromtheillicitactivity,exceedtheperceivedgainsfromlegitimateactivities

Two findings from the §17(2) rezonings appear to indicate windfall profits from rezonings under this statute. The case of Mahavir Nadar in particular is telling, considering he made a windfall profit of 919% by purchasing, rezoning and “flipping” the property, without the need to make improvements to the property that is incidentally associated with flipping in real estate. (Pravinsingh v Goa, 2023) The case of the developer paying two bribes over three years to obtain a rezoning of their property also indicates large benefits coming from corruption (Interview, 2023). Both cases, though anecdotal, indicate that §17(2) rezonings in particular grant massive perceived benefits from engaging with corruption vis-a-vis costs sunk into corruption.

CONCLUSION

In 2022, policymakers pushed amending the Act, incorporating §17(2). Legislators suggested that the statute would prioritize affordable housing and social justice for the “poor person who does not have a voice today” (Rane, 2023), combatting Local Govt parochialism, “over participation" by grassroots NGO (Rane, 2023), and incentivizing “technical” rezonings through the state Planning department (Government rejoinder in Pravinsingh v Goa), all in the interest of streamlined development. Less than a year later, my findings show that removing participation and promoting a purely technical approach to rezonings is not a viable solution in Goa, and probably could be scaled up to any active, competitive

real-estate market in the Global South. The statute has several hallmarks of corrupt land use practices, and the outcomes do not appear to benefit affordable or social justice goals, rather dispossessing more land from local communities and accumulating capital with elites.

Across the world, the elite class and agenda setters, don't have the same motivations as the broader public (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962; Arnstein, 1969; Forester, 1988). In urban India, and other Global South nations, the mismatch between planners, politicians and locals is more stark ( Balakrishnan & Pani, 2020; Workineh, 2021; Levien, 2018; Sampat, 2017; Coelho et al, 2020). The planner sits on this threshold, negotiating and "speaking truth to power" (Forester, 1988). These arguments form the core of why public participation is necessary in planning and zoning (Arnstein, 1969; Scally & Tighe, 2015; Glovin, 2021). Erasing public participation in Goa, though legislation, has essentially “legalized corruption” (Kauffman and Vicente, 2011; Chiodelli and Moroni, 2015; Lambert, 2020; Gibson, 2020)

One industry is greatly benefiting from the new statute, and possibly opening up several avenues for corruption. While planners have noted concerns and objections to some §17(2) rezonings, they have been overruled by the minister and the board (GBA affidavit in Pravinsingh v Goa). Despite individual concerns, the Institute of Town Planners of India is noticeably silent on this statute.

The pressing concern for planners today is being wary of new legislation enabling multiple routes to rezoning, especially broad rezoning statutes that exclude public participation. The findings in Goa could easily be applied to other geographies, and suggest that without mechanisms to balance windfall profits, similar policies will ultimately lead to more corruption and inequity in an already harsh housing and real estate market.

06. CONCLUSION S

Planning is primarily dependent on power While procedural mechanisms aim to balance power structures, they do not offer a guarantee. Planning education and theory emphasize the importance of procedure, the level of government, and the role of planners in ensuring equitable practices and addressing the issue of “overparticipation”. However, this study of Goa, India, reveals distinct insights that challenge and enrich our understanding of these dynamics.

Professionals worldwide can draw valuable lessons from these findings, applicable when similar contexts and circumstances exist, namely: high historic participation, active real estate and development sectors, and decolonial, liberal democratic institutions.

Firstly, plan typology emerges as the crucial factor influencing public perception of citizen participation in urban and regional planning. Different types of plans land use, infrastructure and environment plans elicit varied responses from the public. Land use plans encourage a high degree of participation by developers, politicians and NGOs alike. There are concerns of overparticipation by NGOs and certain sections of activists in environmental and infrastructure plans. Understanding the plan typology is necessary to adopt processes balancing power differentials. These acts directly result in how participation is perceived and practiced.

Participatory techniques alone do not necessarily ensure public buy-in and compliance However, they do play a role, when formulated in tandem with devolution and decentralization policies. The study finds that these techniques are more effective when coupled with the active engagement of local government. In infrastructure and environment plans, where participation rates are low, local government planners can play an important role in ensuring equitable engagement.

Eliminating public participation through state preemptions and advocating for a purely technical approach to rezonings is not a viable solution to overparticipation in Goa. The idea that technical expertise alone can drive planning decisions fails to recognize socio-political realities and overly benefits the real-estate sector, driving profits and windfalls from land use into the haves, instead of the have nots. This insight likely extends to other active, competitive real estate markets in the Global South. In regions where real estate markets are dynamic and competitive, ignoring public participation can exacerbate inequalities and fuel discontent.

Finally, the study highlights a concerning trend: state representatives creating a new ecosystem of participation exclusive to themselves. This elite-driven process bypasses formal methods such as public hearings, Gram Sabhas, and other deliberative forums. They opt for “back-door” advocacy, often contacting planners directly, and changing laws to ensure their representation of land-use planning boards across the region. Instead of fostering inclusive participation, these representatives engage in selective and often opaque decision-making practices. Globally, the elite class and agenda setters do not share the same motivations as the broader public, leading to a disconnect in participatory processes. This exclusivity undermines the principles of democratic governance and alienates the very stakeholders whose involvement is crucial for sustainable and equitable urban development.

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APPENDIX _

Table 5: How did communities participate in plans and to what extent?

Plan Information Dissemination, Who participated and how?

RP-21 Self-selected

Planners and the task force made appeals on news and radio.

No registration needed for village-level meetings.

Level of Decision Making

Uncertain. Nearly all village comments were accepted.1

Exact details denied to the researcher on the grounds that the data is “voluminous”

Panaji CDP (JNNURM)

No public notice besides targeted invitations

Final Plan posted on local gov website

Most stakeholder comments and proposals appear to be incorporated in the plan.2

Panaji ODP 2021

Public notice posted in two newspapers and the gazette

Copy of the plan placed in Planning Dept and City Hall

Calangute ODP 2028

Public notice posted in two newspapers and the gazette

Copy of the plan placed in Planning Dept in Panaji (20 km away) and Village Halls in affected communities

Sub committee appointed by the gov examined all suggestions

Certain upzonings were accepted

Challenges to the plan were rejected

Sub committee appointed by the gov examined all suggestions

Certain upzonings were accepted

Challenges to the plan were rejected

Goa CZMP

Self-selected participation

Fishing plan

Awareness camps in all 10 blocks in 2019

One presentation on important facets of CZMP made on state TV just prior to Public Hearing in 2021

Self-selected attendance to Public Hearings

Representation of three indigenous fishers on an 11-member commission.

Targeted recruitment of fishing unions

Self selected participation of others

Pernem ZP Self selected

Villagers organized themselves

Collaborated with local governments who felt jilted

Won over state representatives from the block

GPDP Self selected (village council comes door to door)

Villagers elect a Village Development Committee (VDC) among themselves

High Court order that the process was opaque & arbitrary4

Plan scrapped

Suggestions regarding environmental assets and fishing ward boundaries accepted.

Suggestions regarding marking houses, adding sand dunes and removing port limits from maps accepted by state CZMA, but rejected by Central Government

Suggestions regarding marking of fishing wards accepted and incorporated into Goa CZMP ordinance, exempting nearly 27,000 households from zoning

Several other proposals and policies from people incorporated in the plan. But never implemented

Originally, very limited scope for public input.

After civic organizing, the residents of Pernem scrapped the plan in entirety: Example of citizen control

Projects voted on by all present

Only approved items allotted funding

Residents can recommend new projects, VDC must investigate the feasibility within 3 months.

Neura

Local Government set priorities and develop GPDP with VDC.

Plan presented at Gram Sabha

Neura PBR Targeted recruitment. Farmers, fishers, elders and medicine people most preferred.

Planner works to inform local government, local biodiversity commission and engage the public.

Plan is constantly evolving.

Villagers who participate get credited as authors of the PBR.

Plan has to be approved by voting at a Gram Sabha by a majority of attendees.

Appendix : The current Goa State Assembly and their Land Use interests

Constituency Nameofrepresentative

1- Mandrem Jit Arolkar Daha Realty & Dereck Developers Pvt Ltd

2- Pernem Pravin Arlekar First Choice Real Estate Pvt Ltd

3-Bicholim Dr. Chandrakant Shetye Vivid Realty Pvt Ltd

4-Thivim Nilkanth Halarnkar - Halarnkar Industries (Mining & ore transport)

5-Mapuca Joshua De Souza Gao Realty LLP

6-Siolim Delilah Lobo The Lobo family self-own real estate assets worth ₹ 1 bn

7-Calangute Michael Lobo

8-Saligao Kedar Naik - Owes money to D. Parulekardeveloper from Saligao.

9-Porvorim Rohan Khaunte Shiv Samarth Real Estate Development Pvt Ltd

10-Aldona Carlos Alvares Ferreira - Land use attorney

11-Panaji Atanasio Monserrate Raj Developers Pvt Ltd.

12-Taleigao Jennifer Monserrate

13-St. Cruz Rodolfo Fernandes Real Mark Property Consultants Pvt Ltd

14-St Andre Viresh Borkar - -

15Cumbarjua Rajesh Faldessai - Aparanta Mines and Minerals Pvt Ltd (Quarrying)

16- Mayem Premendra Shet Civil Contractor (self employed)

17- Poriem Deviya Ranea Golden View Realtors, Marco Polo Estates, Handsell Pvt Ltdb

18-Valpoi Vishwajit Ranea

19Sanquelim Pramod Sawant Jay Ganesh Developers Pvt Ltd

20- Priol Govind Gaude Civil Contractor (self employed)

Continued….

21- Ponda Ravi Sitaram Naik Sungrace Estate Developers Pvt Ltd

22- Shiroda Shubash Shirodkar - Kalanath Minerals, Sateri Mines Pvt Ltd

23- Marcaim Sudin Dhavalikar Saad Infrastructurec

24- Mormugao Sankalp Amonkar - Lent ₹50 million to Dhaku Madkaikar (Madkaikar Estates)

25- Vasco Krishna Salkar Landlord with property assets over ₹100 milliond

26- Dabolim Mauvin Godinho Owns ₹ 130 million worth of real estate. Brother Wilson owns Arondha properties and Gomantak Ores

27- Cortalim Antonio Vaz -

28- Nuvem Aleixo Sequeira Tonia Estates Pvt. Ltd

29- Curtorim Alexio Reginaldo Lourenco Jose Inacio Lourenco LLP

30- Fatorda Vijai Sardesai Matrix Realty

31- Margao Digambar Kamat Balaji Kripa Propertiesc

32- Benaulim Venzy Viegas -

33- Navelim Ulhas Tuenkar -

34- Velim Cruz Silva Civil Contractor and Structural Engineer (own business)

35- Quepem Altone D’Costa Grace Construction Pvt Ltd

36- Cuncolim Yuri Alemao - Chinmol Mines, Paradise Retreats Pvt. Ltd

37- Curchorem Nilesh Cabral - Fabrizio Industries (Ore Handling & Transport)

38- Sanguem Shubhash Faldessai Shubhashakun Real Estate Developers, Shubayog Real Estate Developers Pvt Ltd.

39- Sanvordem Ganesh Gaonkar - Ore transportation, (own business)

40- Canacona Ramesh Tawadkar -

Source: Based onaffidavits submitted at thetime ofcontestingelections,crosscheckedwithrecords oftheMinistry ofCorporateAffairs,GovernmentofIndiaandtheGoaRealEstateRegulatoryAuthority.

Notes:

a TheRanefamilyisGoa’sthirdlargestlandowner,aftertheCatholicChurchandtheGovernment.VishwajitRaneis theincumbentministerforPlanning.

b TheRane’sarenolongerdirectorsoftheabovecorporations,butaninvestigativereportbytheNDTVin2006 uncoveredthat15realestatecorporationswerefoundedinoneyearinDeviyaRane’sname.Allthesecorporations appliedforrezoningsduringRP-11.

c SudinDhavalikarandDigambarKamat’sreal-estateholdingsareregisteredinthenameoftheiradultsonsMithiland Yogirajrespectively.Neitherhascontestedelections,sotheirexactassetsarenotknown,butbothareveryvisibleand

activeintheirfather’spoliticalactivities.

d TheSalkarfamilyaremajordevelopersinVasco-da-gama.Krishnahasnodirectrealestatedirectorships,andunlike theothermajorreal-estatepoliticians,allhispropertiesareinheritedfromhisfather.Heearnsmillionsofrupeesin rentannuallyfromthebuildingsconstructedbyhisfamily.