R2P+BP+ver+2

TEIMUN 11th July - 17th July 2011

GENERAL ASSEMBLY (GA)

Topic III:

The Concept of Responsibility to Protect

Introduction The end of the Second World War marked a new era for the development of international law, and the developments in the immediate aftermath of the war formed the foundation of the concept referred to as the Responsibility to Protect (henceforth R2P). The attempt to ensure that the horrors of the Second World War would not be repeated propelled the international community to initiate an effort to prevent mass atrocities, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The first attempt at this was the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948. Yet, albeit all the good intentions, 50 years on, as renowned scholar William Schabas curtly puts, the Convention failed to achieve what it was set out to do.

‘Some must have believed, in 1948, that the unthinkable crime of genocide would never recur.

Perhaps the gaps in the convention are only the oversights of optimistic negotiators, mistaken in the belief that they were erecting a monument to the past rather than a weapon to police the future. Their naiveté may be forgiven. A failure to learn the lessons of the fifty years since its adoption cannot.’1

Indeed it is difficult to prove Schabas wrong when one takes a brief look at our near history. The Rwandan Genocide of 1994, the conflicts in Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo, and Sudan are all but a few examples that the ‘resounding promise of ‘Never Again’ proved to be hollow’2. In fact, Barbara Harff asserts that 37 genocides and politicides occurred between 1955 and 2001.3 The aforementioned certainly reflects a trend in the changing nature of warfare. With large inter-­‐state wars replaced with lengthy and violent internal conflict, there is a need to reframe the debate regarding the prevention of mass atrocities and crimes against humanity. This necessity makes the concept of R2P all the more relevant in the era of modern warfare where civilian fatalities overwhelmingly outweigh military casualties.

Accordingly, discussions in the international arena shifted their focus from the Genocide Convention to finding sustainable ways to deal with situations where States failed in protecting their populations and sometimes even intentionally or negligently harmed civilians. The concept that took the center stage at the time, i.e. throughout the 1990s, was that of humanitarian intervention. Yet, the implementation of the concept satisfied neither the proponents nor the critics. External military intervention for human protection purposes has been controversial both when it has happened -­‐ as in Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo -­‐ and when it has failed to happen, as in Rwanda.4 UN action, if taken at all, was widely seen as ‘too little too late, misconceived, poorly executed’5 by the proponents of humanitarian intervention, whereas critics have pointed out that the concept of humanitarian intervention was a convenient way to

1

William Schabas, The Genocide Convention at Fifty, Washington: United States Institute of Peace, Special Report, 7 January 1999, p. 8.

2 International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (ICRtoP),website: www.responsibilitytoprotect.org, Accessed: 1 June 2011 3 Barbara Harff, ‘No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder since 1955’, American Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No.1, 2003, pp. 57-­‐73.

4 The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. “The Responsibility to Protect”. December 2001.

5 Evans, Gareth and Mohamed Sahnoun. “The Responsibility to Protect”. Foreign Affairs, Volume 81, No 6. Pg. 99-­‐110

interfere with national sovereignty. As Evans also points out, the fate of the concept of humanitarian intervention was sealed by ‘cantankerous exchanges in which fervent supporters of intervention on humanitarian grounds, opposed by anxious defenders of state sovereignty dug themselves deeper and deeper into opposing trenches.’6

Troubled by this divide, the by then Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, made pleas to the United Nations General Assembly, first in 1999 and then again in 2000 asking states to come up with a new consensus on how to approach situations where grave harm was done to civilian populations, and asked ‘if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica -­‐ to gross and systematic violations of human rights that affect every precept of our common humanity?’7 In response to this, in September 2000, the Canadian Government announced at the General Assembly that it would undertake the establishment of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS).8 Building on Francis Deng's idea of sovereignty as responsibility, the Commission addressed the question of when state sovereignty and produced one of the more influential works in the field of R2P.9 Upcoming sections of this Background Paper will discuss the developments in the international community after the release of this influential report in detail. Yet, it is important to note already at this stage that it was four years after the release of this influential report that the UN took steps to commit to the concept of R2P at its 2005 World Summit.

However, for all this apparent progress, the concept of R2P could not escape harsh criticism and an uncertain outlook. Some critics argue that R2P is an imperialist doctrine that threatens to undermine the national sovereignty and political autonomy of the developing or less developed countries. On the other hand, critics have also argued that the concept of R2P promises little protection to vulnerable populations.10 In addition, disagreements regarding the precise function and the proper use of R2P persist. For instance, some scholars argue that France (in relation to Myanmar) and Russia (in relation to Georgia) used R2P to justify the actual or potential use of coercive force in contexts where there was no apparent inability or failure to protect the respective states’ populations. On the other hand, R2P was not invoked in the context of Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq regardless of the commission of grave atrocities against the populations of these countries.11

The aforementioned criticisms are exactly why the United Nations General Assembly has an indispensible role in making R2P functional. As the current Secretary General Ban Ki-­‐Moon states in his 2009 report to the General Assembly, ‘the best way to discourage States from misusing the responsibility to protect for inappropriate purposes would be to develop fully the United Nations

6

Ibid.

The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. “The Responsibility to Protect”. December 2001 8 ibid.

9 International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (ICRtoP),website: www.responsibilitytoprotect.org, Accessed: 1 June 2011 10 Bellamy, Alex. “The Responsibility to Protect—Five Years On”. Ethics & International Affairs, 24, no. 2 (2010), pp. 143–169.

11 ibid.

7

strategy, standards, processes, tools and practices for the responsibility to protect.’ 12 Accordingly, that is the role of the General Assembly in TEIMUN 2011; to fully define the scope and proper use of R2P, a task especially relevant given the commission of mass atrocities in Libya and Syria in the past few months.

Responsibility to Protect in the United Nations

As briefly outlined in the introduction, the principle underlying the concept of R2P is the idea that sovereignty is responsibility. Although this idea was previously elaborated upon in academic circles, it was the report by the ICISS that formally introduced the idea to the discussions of the international community. In its report, the ICISS suggested that it was desirable to frame the international discussion regarding the prevention of mass atrocities in the language of a ‘responsibility to protect’ affected populations rather than a ‘right to intervene for human protection purposes’. The Commission believed that the latter term was not suited to the purposes of prevention of mass atrocities because it focuses on the ‘claims, rights and prerogatives of the potentially intervening states much more so than on the urgent needs of the potential beneficiaries of the action’. Additionally, by making intervention the main point of discussion, the Commission asserted, the term humanitarian intervention unfairly disregards ‘the need for either prior preventive effort or subsequent follow-­‐up assistance, both of which have been too often neglected in practice’.13 In other words, the Commission saw R2P as an umbrella concept that embraces not only the ‘responsibility to react’, but also the ‘responsibility to prevent’ and the ‘responsibility to rebuild’, whereas the term humanitarian intervention only implies a ‘responsibility to react’. Although the report itself is fairly extensive, for the purposes of this background paper it suffices to state that after establishing a need to change terminology, the ICISS report continued to discuss the more substantive aspects of the concept of R2P. It contains sections on when military intervention is justifiable, possible preventative measures, and measures for post-­‐conflict reconstruction.

Although the report by the ICISS is rather detailed in nature, it was not until 2005 that the United Nations took action regarding the concept of R2P. It was during the drafting of the ICISS Report that the 9/11 attacks occurred and when the report was released in December 2001, the attention of the international community had already ‘shifted away from consideration of measures to prevent genocide and mass atrocity toward measures for the prevention and preemption of terrorist activities and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction’.14 What was even more detrimental for the concept of R2P was the fact that the US intervention in Iraq was carried out with the premise of humanitarian intervention.

‘‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Report of the Secretary-­‐General,’’ A/63/677, January 12, 2009.

The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. “The Responsibility to Protect”. December 2001.

14 International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (ICRtoP),website: www.responsibilitytoprotect.org, Accessed: 1 June 2011 12 13

Unfortunately, it was not until the initiation of mass atrocities in Darfur carried out in the course of a conflict and killed an estimated 300 000 Darfuris15 that the international community took up the debate regarding the responsibility to protect yet again. Accordingly, the Secretary General at the time, Kofi Annan, made a new pledge to Member States to include protection from genocide as a part of a new UN reform agenda and formed the High –level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. In December 2004, this High-­‐level panel released its report; A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, which included the endorsement of an international responsibility to protect populations from grave threats.16 Following this, the Secretary General at the time, Kofi Annan, published his own report titled In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, where he also remarked the need for governments to take action in cases of grave human rights violations and large scale violence towards the civilian population, and called on governments to embrace the responsibility to protect.17

Following this report, in the 2005 World Summit, the historic commitment to the responsibility to protect was finally made, spearheaded, in particular, by Argentina, Chile, Guatemala, Mexico, Rwanda, and South Africa. In Paragraphs 138-­‐139 of the World Summit outcome document Member States agreed to the following:

138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic

cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.

139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplom atic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to

help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-­‐by-­‐case basis and in cooperation with

relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.

Despite the progress made in the 2005 World Summit, it took the Security Council six months to reaffirm the commitments made to R2P in the Summit. Russia, China and three of the non-­‐permanent members of the Council at the time, Algeria, the Philippines and Brazil, initially asserted that the outcome of the World Summit only made it necessary for the General Assembly to deliberate on the issue and that it

15

International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (ICRtoP),website: www.responsibilitytoprotect.org, Accessed: 1 June 2011 16 Ibid.

17 ibid.

was premature to make a commitment to the concept in the Security Council.18 Changes in non-­‐ permanent membership of the Security Council and a reformulation of the language of the resolution prompted the Security Council to finally refer to the concept of R2P in Resolution 1674 on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict. Since then, the Security Council reaffirmed its position in another thematic resolution passed in 2009, Resolution 1894.19 However, the only instance when the Security Council openly referred to the responsibility to protect relating to a specific conflict has been in Resolution 1706 regarding the situation in Darfur.20 Additionally, even though Resolution 1706 referred to both Resolution 1674 and paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document21, at the time of its adoption several Security Council members, including China which abstained on Resolution 1706, expressed concern about ‘the diplomatic pressure brought to bear to secure this reaffirmation, and subsequent resolutions on Darfur have shied away from reiterating it.’22 Therefore, a paragraph referring to the responsibility to protect was removed from Resolution 1769 (2007) on Darfur, while Resolution 1814 on Somalia referred to the protection of civilians and Resolution 1674 without any reference to the concept of responsibility to protect.23

Alex Bellamy argues that the aforementioned instances point towards a clear trend; even though the Council initially displayed a willingness to use the concept of R2P in the evaluation of ongoing crises, it now has a tendency to refer to R2P only in thematic resolutions, which he argues is a way of recognizing that the use of the principle is not appropriate ahead of further consideration by the General Assembly.24 If that is indeed the case, the United Nations General Assembly has immense responsibility to provide the Security Council with a framework to work with when dealing with crises that might call for the invocation of the principle of R2P.

Regarding the aforementioned necessity, it could be stated that the appointment of Ban Ki-­‐Moon as the next Secretary General of the United Nations in October 2006 has been detrimental to the development and acceptance of R2P. In February 2008, Edward Luck was appointed Special Adviser to the Secretary General with a focus on the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Following his appointment and extensive consultations with Member States, the Special Advisor proceeded with an approach whereby he made a sharp distinction between what has been agreed by the Member States and alternative formulations including the recommendations of the ICISS.25 The aforementioned approach has also largely shaped Ban Ki-­‐Moon’s approach in discussing R2P. He identified a ‘narrow, but deep approach’ whereby the idea of R2P would be wholly limited to what was agreed in 2005 in the World Summit, but would utilize ‘the whole

UNSC, S/PV.5319, December 9, 2005, pp. 10, 19; and UNSC, S/PV.5319 (Resumption 1), December 9, 2005, pp. 3, 6.

Bellamy, Alex. “The Responsibility to Protect—Five Years On”. Ethics & International Affairs, 24, no. 2 (2010), pp. 143–169.

20 ibid.

21 International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (ICRtoP),website: www.responsibilitytoprotect.org, Accessed: 1 June 2011 22 Bellamy, Alex. “The Responsibility to Protect—Five Years On”. Ethics & International Affairs, 24, no. 2 (2010), pp. 143–169.

23 ibid.

24 ibid.

25 Ibid.

18 19

prevention and protection toolkit’ available to the United Nations.26 Therefore, it could be stated that Secretary General Ban Ki-­‐Moon’s approach to R2P is principally focused on implementation of the concept as it seems to be accepted, rather than reopening the thematic discussion on R2P.

Accordingly, in his Berlin speech in July 2008, and the report on Implementing the Responsibility to Protect issued on 12 January 2009, the Secretary General identified three pillars relevant in the implementation of R2P.

PILLAR 2 PILLAR 1 PILLAR 3

International assistance The protection Timely and decisive

responsibilities of the and capacity-­‐building response State

According to this three pillar approach, pillar one is ‘the enduring responsibility of the State to protect its populations, whether nationals or not, from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and from their incitement.’ This pillar of R2P, the Secretary General stipulates, derives from the nature of State sovereignty and pre-­‐existing legal obligations, rather than the recent acceptance of R2P. The second pillar of R2P is ‘is the commitment of the international community to assist States in meeting those obligations’. This pillar seeks to involve regional and subregional arrangements, civil society and the private sector, as well as take advantage of the institutional strengths of the United Nations system. In his report, the Secretary General stresses that this often neglected pillar is critical in forging a sustainable policy in the implementation of R2P. He further reminds that pillars one and two are indispensible in formulating a successful strategy for the prevention of mass atrocities before they occur. The third pillar of R2P ‘is the responsibility of Member States to respond collectively in a timely and decisive manner when a State is manifestly failing to provide such protection.’ 27 Regarding pillar three, in his report Secretary General Ban Ki-­‐Moon asserts that this pillar, although widely discussed, is in general understood too narrowly. He emphasizes that for the achievement of this pillar the only way forward is not military intervention, but ‘a reasoned, calibrated and timely response’ could involve a variety of tools. There tools include ‘pacific measures under Chapter 6 of the Charter, coercive ones under Chapter 7 and collaboration with regional or subregional arrangements.’28 Indeed, one of the most celebrated examples of a pillar three approach without military intervention is the events that followed post-­‐election violence in Kenya which is detailed in the upcoming sections of this background paper.

This three-­‐pillar, ‘narrow, but deep’ approach gained widespread support in the subsequent General Assembly Debate on the Responsibility to protect held in July 2009. Out of the ninety four speakers, representing 180 governments, that participated in the debate, only four (Cuba, Venezuela, Sudan and Nicaragua) called for a renegotiation of the 2005 agreement reached in the World Summit.29

26

Ban Ki-­‐moon, ‘‘On Responsible Sovereignty: International Cooperation for a Changed World,’’ Berlin, SG/SM11701, July 15, 2008.

27 ‘‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Report of the Secretary-­‐General,’’ A/63/677, January 12, 2009.

28 Ibid.

29 Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, ‘‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Responding to the UN Secretary-­‐ General’s Report,’’ June 2009, p. 1.

Following the July 2009 General Assembly Debate, on 14 September 2009, the General Assembly adopted its first resolution on R2P introduced by the delegation of Guatemala and was co-­‐sponsored by 67 Member States.30 Resolution A/RES/63/308 on the Responsibility to Protect took note of the report of the Secretary-­‐General and decided to continue its consideration of R2P. That is why the General Assembly of TEIMUN 2011 is trusted with the task of advancing this discussion and further defining the framework in which R2P can be implemented. The delegates are invited to take a more through look at the 2009 report by the Secretary General and analyze the suggestions it makes for the implementation of each pillar.

R2P in Practice

Bellamy holds that R2P has been referred to in nine crises and the tables that he has prepared to summarize those crises are quoted in Appendix C. The variety of situations where the concept of R2P was invoked also gives a good idea about the limitations of the concept, or issues regarding the concept which need to be further defined or specified. There are several criticisms derived from past instances where R2P was invoked that are worth mentioning.

The first criticism is regarding the rather narrow scope of R2P. R2P only relates to the four crimes specified in the various UN documents; genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. Yet, some proponents of the concept argue that limiting the applicability of R2P to these four crimes renders the concept less beneficial than it can be. In Myanmar, for instance, a relevant discussion was brought up when the government refused humanitarian assistance in the wake of Cyclone Nargis in 2008. The cyclone devastated the Irrawaddy delta area leaving 138 000 people dead or missing and 1.5 million displaced.31 Regardless of the scale of the disaster, Myanmar’s military regime denied access to humanitarian aid agencies and inhibited the delivery of much needed aid materials, even though offers of assistance poured in.32 Accordingly, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bernard Kouchner, suggested invoking R2P in the Security Council to force Myanmar into accepting humanitarian assistance. The suggestion was fiercely opposed by China and ASEAN which argued that R2P did not apply to natural disasters.33 The aforementioned position was shared by UN officials since they believed such a reframing of the concept could jeopardize the consensus already reached regarding R2P.34 Thus, it can be stated that the international community, regarding the scope of R2P, largely upheld Secretary General Ban Ki-­‐ Moon’s approach to R2P, ‘narrow, but deep’, at least with regards to the former part of the statement.

Even though the international community has agreed with a narrow approach to R2P, it is not yet clear if it can uphold its promise for an approach that is deep i.e. extensive and effective in its implementation, as well. In his report of 2009, the Secretary General calls upon a variety of efforts to be undertaken

30

International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (ICRtoP),website: www.responsibilitytoprotect.org, Accessed: 1 June 2011 31 Jurgen Haacke, ‘‘Myanmar, the Responsibility to Protect and the Need for Practical Assistance,’’ Global Responsibility to Protect 1, no. 2 (2009), p. 156.

32 Bellamy, Alex. “The Responsibility to Protect—Five Years On”. Ethics & International Affairs, 24, no. 2 (2010), pp. 143–169.

33 Ibid.

34 Julian Borger and Ian MacKinnon, ‘‘Bypass Junta’s Permission for Aid, US and France Urge,’’ Guardian

under the three pillars of R2P. The range of measures he proposes in his report range from further research into why some states fall to conflict while their neighbours do perfectly fine, and assisting the Human Rights Council to sharpening its focus, to creating a standing or standby rapid-­‐response civilian and police capacity for emergencies.35 When one looks at the suggestions made by the Secretary General, one also wonders under whose authority and direction these suggestions will be implemented and if there is political will to actually make all these mechanisms functional. One of the best examples for a lack of political will to actually implement R2P is Somalia in 2006. This particular conflict has not commonly been viewed through the prism of R2P, despite the commission of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing.36 In fact, international response was slow and fragmented. Even though after months of diplomatic talks, the United States introduced a draft resolution authorizing the deployment of peacekeepers under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development37 and won the support of China, Russia and African members, European governments expressed certain concerns.38 In the end, the peacekeeping mission was a lost cause from the beginning given a gap of almost $300 million between the mission’s projected annual cost and Western donations.39 Accordingly, the General Assembly must consider the practicality of the suggestions for the implementation of R2P.

This links in strongly to another concern brought about by critics of R2P that the concept could be used as an ‘excuse’ by more economically and militarily strong states to intervene in states that are weaker in terms of the aforementioned aspects, and the selectivity of the Security Council. Surely, the former concern has been brought up many times with regards to humanitarian intervention as well, and it would indeed seem like a consideration if one would take a look at how Russia invoked R2P in the context of Georgia. Following a military assault by Georgia’s nationalist government to restore ‘order’ in the region of South Ossetia, Russia responded by quickly routing and pushing the Georgian army back into Georgia proper, taking the city of Gori.40 Subsequently, Russia argued that the intervention was carried out in the light of commission of mass atrocities by Georgia, which she claimed amounted to ‘genocide’.41 Additionally, in an interview given to BBC Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov stated that they acted in their responsibility to protect the Georgian population from the commission of mass atrocities.42 Yet, these arguments won little support in the international community, which can be said to prove the aforementioned assertion by Secretary General Ban Ki-­‐Moon that ‘the best way to discourage States from misusing the responsibility to protect for inappropriate purposes would be to develop fully the United Nations strategy, standards, processes, tools and practices for the responsibility to protect.’ 43

35

‘‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Report of the Secretary-­‐General,’’ A/63/677, January 12, 2009.

Bellamy, Alex. “The Responsibility to Protect—Five Years On”. Ethics & International Affairs, 24, no. 2 (2010), pp. 143–169.

37 Intergovernmental Authority on Development is a sub-­‐regional organisation in East Africa 38 Colum Lynch, ‘‘U.S. Peacekeeping Plan for Somalia Criticized,’’ Washington Post, November 29, 2006.

39 Bellamy, Alex. “The Responsibility to Protect—Five Years On”. Ethics & International Affairs, 24, no. 2 (2010), pp. 143–169.

40 Ibid.

41 International Crisis Group, ‘‘Russia vs. Georgia: The Fallout,’’ Europe Report no. 195, August 22, 2008, esp. pp. 2–3.

42 Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov, interview with the BBC, Moscow, August 9, 2008.

43 ‘‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Report of the Secretary-­‐General,’’ A/63/677, January 12, 2009.

36

The selectivity of the Security Council, on the other hand, is another discussion. Critics refer to the selectivity of the Security Council as an obstacle before the effective implementation of pillar three as permanent members can veto the declaration of certain crises as situations needing the endorsement of R2P. Indeed, there is truth in this statement. However, it should be noted that the approval of the Security Council is not the only way the United Nations can legitimize the use of force. The ‘Uniting for Peace’ procedure by the General Assembly, for instance, is an equally legit way of authorizing military intervention in cases of mass atrocities.

Even though in the previous sections this paper has continually referred to criticisms regarding R2P in practice, it should be noted that there are also instances where the international community has asserted that the implementation of R2P has been vastly successful, most notably during the post-­‐ election violence in Kenya. Following the eruption of ethnic violence in the aftermath of the elections was promptly addressed by the involvement of eminent persons mandated by the African Union and led

by Kofi Annan, with the support of Ban Ki-­‐Moon. These efforts were also supported by a Presidential statement issued by the Security Council and pleas by the Secretary General’s Special advisor for prevention of genocide, Francis Deng, who reminded Kenyan leaders of their responsibility to protect their population. As a result of all these efforts, the country’s president, Mwai Kibaki, and his main opponent, Raila Odinga, were eased into concluding a power-­‐sharing agreement, which prevented what most observers feared to be the start of yet another violent and drawn out conflict.44

As the quoted examples show there are many difficulties associated with the effective implementation of R2P. Yet, good examples also prove that if R2P can be properly framed and effectively defined, it can prevent conflicts that could otherwise prove deadly for many. It is the task of the General Assembly to clearly draw the lines that demarcate the borders of R2P and discuss the aspects of R2P not generally recognized or well understood.

Conclusion

This Background Paper attempted to provide a brief history of R2P, clarify its definition and demonstrate the concerns R2P raises in practice. From that analysis, it could be stated that R2P is a relatively new concept that is firmly grounded in principles which are much older. It stems from the idea that with sovereignty comes responsibility, and for that reason R2P manages to escape most criticism its close cousin humanitarian intervention needs to endure with respect to sovereignty. Additionally, it is heralded as a concept superior to humanitarian intervention when it comes to the prevention of , war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, as it has more tools available to it.

Yet, the aforementioned is also where R2Ps weakness lies since there are so many possibilities under this concept, it is not clear under whose authority and direction these possibilities might be turned into reality, and maybe more importantly it is unclear when and in what order those possibilities should be employed. As some critics suggest, the aforementioned does make R2P more susceptible to abuse. Yet,

44

Bellamy, Alex. “The Responsibility to Protect—Five Years On”. Ethics & International Affairs, 24, no. 2 (2010), pp. 143–169.

as Secretary General Ban Ki-­‐Moon also asserts, this is not a problem that is impossible to overcome through solid formulation of policies, standards and tools to implement R2P, the effective implementation of which can prevent the suffering of many. That is where the role of the General Assembly comes in. The General Assembly is the single most suitable forum to formulate the aforementioned standards and policies, and that is the task entrusted to the General Assembly in TEIMUN 2011.

References 1. Ban Ki-­‐moon, ‘‘On Responsible Sovereignty: International Cooperation for a Changed World,’’ Berlin, SG/SM11701, July 15, 2008.

2. Barbara Harff, ‘No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder since 1955’, American Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No.1, 2003, pp.

57-­‐73.

3. Bellamy, Alex. “The Responsibility to Protect—Five Years On”. Ethics & International Affairs, 24, no. 2 (2010), pp. 143–169 4. Colum Lynch, ‘‘U.S. Peacekeeping Plan for Somalia Criticized,’’ Washington Post, November 29, 2006.

5. Evans, Gareth and Mohamed Sahnoun. “The Responsibility to Protect”. Foreign Affairs, Volume 81, No 6. Pg. 99-­‐110 6. Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, ‘‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Responding to the UN Secretary-­‐General’s Report,’’ June 2009, p. 1.

7. Julian Borger and Ian MacKinnon, ‘‘Bypass Junta’s Permission for Aid, US and France Urge,’’ Guardian 8. Jurgen Haacke, ‘‘Myanmar, the Responsibility to Protect and the Need for Practical Assistance,’’ Global Responsibility to Protect 1, no. 2 (2009), p. 156.

9. Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov, interview with the BBC, Moscow, August 9, 2008.

10. ‘‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Report of the Secretary-­‐General,’’ A/63/677, January 12, 2009.

11. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. “The Responsibility to Protect”. December 2001 12. International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (ICRtoP),website: www.responsibilitytoprotect.org, Accessed: 1 June 2011 13. UNSC, S/PV.5319 (Resumption 1), December 9, 2005, pp. 3, 6.

14. UNSC, S/PV.5319, December 9, 2005, pp. 10, 19 15. William Schabas, The Genocide Convention at Fifty, Washington: United States Institute of Peace, Special Report, 7 January 1999, p. 8.

Appendix A – Relevant Documents 2001 – the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) Report on The Responsibility to Protect

2004 – The High-­‐level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, "A More Secure World, Our Shared Responsibility" 2005 – The Secretary-­‐General, "In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All" 2005 – Responsibility to Protect in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document 2008 – Secretary General Ban ki-­‐Moon's Berlin Speech 2009 – Secretar y General Ban ki-­‐Moon's Report "Implementing the Responsibility to Protect"

Appendix B – R2P in the African Union While the United Nations was discussing various formulas regarding the concept of R2P, the African Union was having a seperate, yet relevant discussion on the concept. In 2000, the African Union was already working to include the principles underlying R2P in the Charter of the African Union.45 Accordingly, Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union affirms the ‘right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.’ Although the latter does not convey the full meaning of the R2P, which establishes a responsibility not only to react, but also prevent and rebuild, it still is significant given the evolution of R2P as a concept.

Following this endorsement, the African Union embraced the concept of the responsibility to protect and accepted the Security Council’s authority to decide on the legitimate use of force in cases of genocide and crimes against humanity in a document known as the Ezulwini Consensus. This document was presented at the African Union’s 7th Extraordinary Session of the Executive Council of 1-­‐8 March 2005, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.46

45

International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (ICRtoP),website: www.responsibilitytoprotect.org, Accessed: 1 June 2011 46 ibid.

Appendix C The following is taken from Alex Bellamy’s article titled The Responsibility to Protect—Five Years On.