The Bridge Magazine - Issue 13 by Vassilios Loukanidis

8â&#x201A;Ź

A quarterly review on European integration SE Europe and the SE Mediterranean

European Elections June 7th

2009 - issue 13

VOTE

Editor’s note In this issue of the Bridge we take a stand. We choose to vote on the upcoming EP elections. And here are 10 reasons why to do so. Yes, you. You decide. By voting. By voting in EP elections, you choose who influences your future and the daily life of close to 500 million fellow Europeans. If you don’t bother, somebody else will - and decide who represents you at the only directly elected Pan-European assembly. Elected MEPs shape the future of Europe for 5 upcoming years. Get the Europe you want! If you don’t vote, don’t complain. MEPs – Your voice in Europe Your MEP is your voice in Europe - why would you let it go to waste? Elected every five years, the European Parliament is a major and powerful player in European Union decision-making. Its votes shape final EU legislation that influences our everyday life, be it the food on our plates, the cost of our shopping, the quality of the air we breathe, or the safety of our children’s toys. It’s your right to vote! As a European citizen, voting in EP elections is your fundamental right and the means to have a say in how the EU works. By voting, you participate in determining who will represent real people like you, your family and friends, your neighbours and workmates in Europe. And as an EU citizen you can vote (or stand for election!) in whatever EU country you live, even if you are not a citizen of that country. And, what’s more, it won’t cost you a penny! It’s for people and prosperity! Young or old, student or retired, man or woman, employed or independent, mainstream or alternative, town or countrydweller, Europe concerns all of us, often without us realising! Thanks to Europe, we can easily travel, study and work abroad. The EP works tirelessly for a cleaner environment, safer chemicals, better services and jobs. It is an ardent defender of consumer rights, equal opportunities and human rights both in the EU and abroad. One poll - 375 million voters In June 2009, You will have a unique opportunity to go to polls along with 375 million fellow European voters. What for? To elect both the world’s only directly elected transnational and multilingual parliament, and the EU’s only directly elected institution. Elected by the people since 1979, European Parliament represents today almost half a billion citizens.

Heavyweight MEPs In most cases, MEPs have as much weight as the Member States in EU decision-making. Most laws that concern our daily lives are legislated side by side by MEPs and ministers at EU level. Many, probably most, laws enacted in your country are a transposition of European acts voted by MEPs - your representatives. And it’s not just laws: money for new roads, cleaner beaches, research, education, development aid? MEPs also decide where our EU money goes. In the pipeline, even weightier MEPs With the new Lisbon Treaty, once it can be implemented, MEPs’ decision-making powers over EU affairs will once more increase. It will place the Parliament on an equal footing as lawmaker with Member States’ ministers in virtually all areas of EU policy. The Parliament will also elect the President of the European Commission, strengthening its control over the EU executive. Furthermore, you as an EU citizen will have a right to initiate European laws. Your vote for diversity Europe elects its new members in June 2009. Coming from 27 countries, these MEPs represent a wide range of national political parties, constituencies and views. In Parliament, most Members then organise themselves in political groups according to their political affinities. So Parliament, like Europe, is about diversity, prizing it and accommodating it - it even speaks 23 languages. It’s politics! It’s democracy! Love the EU? Hate it? Want it to turn to the right? Or the left? Is there some issue you care passionately about? Are there changes you want to see? Action that can’t wait? Investments that should be made? Elect MEPs who see it your way and you could make it happen. That’s what democracy is all about. Make the difference. It’s a small effort for a big outcome Come on! It’s just a few minutes, maybe you can combine it with a walk in the park or a drink in a café. Not much effort to tell Europe what you want. 10 good reasons to vote: www.europarl.eu

A quarterly review on European integration SE Europe & the SE Mediterranean

Dushana Zdravkova The Committee on Petitions: Best practices from Bulgaria

Dimitris N. Chryssochoou Debating Europe: A Critique

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Panagiotis Koutsoumpelis The importance of Euroelections

Publishing and Business Development Director: Kostas Tsaousis

Eleni Fotiou Does Foreign Policy Shift?

Editor in Chief: Dimitris Maziotis Scientific Coordinator: Ioannis Armakolas Editorial Consultants: Eleni Fotiou Kostis Kapopoulos Editorial Team: Constantinos Angelopoulos Ali Osman Egilmez Maria Katechi Alexandra Sarmas Simos Ververidis Academic Suport: Hellenic Centre for European Studies (EKEM) Project Director: Victor Dhimas

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Besnik Mustafaj Welcome to Albania, “Anna Lindh” Foundation!

dialogues 44 - 45

Ambassador Ahmet Acet Mentality shifts, conciliation prevails

Internet Edition Manager Vasilis Loukanidis

Hugo Brady Why the European elections matter

Copy Editing: ICET Artwork team: Dimitris Stergiou Rubini Natsi Advertising Executive Manager: Christy Sotiriou Montage-Printing: Bibliosynergatiki S.A. ISSN 1791-2237

frontlines 38 - 42

interview 33 - 35 © The bridge.. All rights reserved. Neither this publication nor any part of it may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of The bridge.. Where opinion is expressed it is that of the authors and does not necessarily coincide with the editorial views of the publisher of The bridge.. All information in this magazine is verified to the best of the authors’ and the publisher’s ability. However, The bridge. does not accept responsibility for any loss arising from reliance on it.

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Rodi Kratsa New European Union. New European reality. New responsibilities for the citizens.

Daniel Daianu What is peculiar about these elections? Yordan Dimitrov

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A view from Bulgaria

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Aleksandra Boskovic Welcome to Montenegro, “Anna Lindh” Foundation!the Euro-Muslims

Georgi Kamov East of Eden How is the EU going to deal with its Eastern neighbours?

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Francisco Oom Peres “The young blood doesn’t obey to anold Treat”

Stavros Kourtalis European elections and the economic crisis: Put the blame on me

Giorgos Kentas and Christina Ioannou "What else can the EU do for us?" cover story 24 - 25

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contents

The importance of Euroelections In a few days, European citizens will be asked to cast their vote for the nomination of the new members of the European Parliament. They will be asked to decide what kind of Europe they want, what kind of Europe they need. Today, being at a crossroads of crucial decisions regarding the future of the “old continent”, European citizens acknowledge that what they need is a more democratic, more social, more interactive Europe. To put it simply, they need more Europe in their everyday lives. European citizens are aware of the fact that their participation in the Euroelections will have a crucial effect on their everyday lives. They also understand that the nominated members represent more than 400 millions citizens. Their vote in these European elections may ensure exactly everything they need. They know that the voice of European citizens is better heard in the European Parliament, whose competence will broaden.

by Panagiotis Koutsoumpelis

With the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament -the only directly elected body of the European Union- will gain bigger participation in the legislative process and will be co-legislator with the Council for 95% of the community legislation. At the same time, the process of codecision will comprise of about 40 new political fields, such as the field of asylum and immigration, areas of major importance for Greece. The members of the Parliament which we are going to elect on the 7th of June will be then asked to form European Union’s legislation, for a series of crucial issues, such as the Union’s role within the new international setting, the Euro-Atlantic relations, the quality of the air we breath and the food we consume, the security of our children’s toys etc. These are issues of direct and vital importance for all of us.

In an economically and politically difficult circumstance, the vote of 7th of June is particularly important. No doubt, the opinion of a “loose vote” or “vote for protest” cannot and should not be adopted by any European citizen. We all comprehend that new members of the European Parliament will be asked to take crucial decisions for the future of Europe, serving the Union’s principles, values and goals. For this reason, they should be elected on the basis of right criteria. The European Union, its bodies, the European Parliament, concern us all. They affect us. Let us not lose our right to select them. Panagiotis Koutsoumpelis is President and Director General of the Hellenic Centre for European Studies (EKEM).

The Committee on Petitions: Best practices from Bulgaria

by Dushana Zdravkova

The Bulgarian Accession to the European Union was a process of long negotiations, involving harmonization of legislation with the Acquis communautaire within the 31 negotiation chapters. Part of the process involved monitoring the transfer of the legal acts in the Bulgarian legislation by the civic society organizations. Thus was created a new actor - the civic society as a "watch dog" of the process of implementing the transfer of the legal acts. Moreover since Bulgaria has joined the European Union on 1st January 2007, Bulgarian citizens have actively used their right to send petitions to the European parliament. The right to petition was created to provide EU citizens and residents with a simple way of contacting the institutions with a request

or complaint. This right is embodied in the EC Treaty in Articles 21 and 194, and in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. It is a corollary of European Union citizenship. To be declared admissible, the petition must relate to a subject falling within the sphere of activity of the European Community and concern the petitioner directly. Overall the European Parliament has a legislative, political and budgetary role as an institution of the EU. As a member of the Committee on Petitions, judge, lawyer and as an activist in various NGOs, I have always been involved with the issues set by the citizens. Making a comparative analysis of the Bulgarian experience with the Committee on the Petitions so far, we can see that the Bulgarian citizens very fluently started to use their rights and to alert the Institutions of the different problems within their country. The Committee on Petitions has

so far received 115 petitions from Bulgarian citizens, and more of them have been forwarded to the European Commission for further investigation. The Bulgarian petitions vary in terms of topics and issues â&#x20AC;&#x201C; ranging from environment to competition to social affairs and more. Since the beginning of the mandate in May 2007, we have got petitions on environmental issues. Such a petition is Petition â&#x201E;&#x2013; 0745 from 2007 on behalf of Balkani Wildlife Society about the failure of the Bulgarian government to live up to commitments under Natura 2000 environmental network. The petition was declared admissible, because it claims that there is violation of Directive 92/43 for the preser-

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vation of natural habitats of the wild flora and fauna. The European Parliament and its Committee on Petitions embody citizen control that spreads further to the work of the European Commission as well. Very often during our sittings, when we are disenchanted with the feedback from the European Commission, we demand more information or more details. The Committee on Petitions is assigned with studying facts from the standpoint of the institution that belongs to the citizens; with coordinating the discussion of the problem with the European Commission, and when violations are too serious and the petition is of great public relevance, like for instance the Polish petition about the bird route Via Baltica, then it may urge the European Commission to start an infringement procedure before the European Court of justice. In this particular case a road has been built going across a nesting territory. Meeting the Committee

on Petitions, Polandâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Transport Minister explained how the road had been built and why requirements had been neglected. There is another method of action when petitioners submit very important complaints. It is the so-called fact-finding mission. A working group appointed by the Committee on Petitions among its members goes on a mission to the respective country and gets acquainted on the spot with the claims of petitioners and with the stance of state bodies and institutions. After that a detailed report is prepared and presented to the Committee on Petitions. In this context in 2008 a delegation of the Committee, first led by Marcin Libicki, chairman, and later by Kathy Sinnott, vicechair, visited Bulgaria in order to meet with different representatives of petitionersâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; claims and to discuss the questions raised by petitioners in Sofia, Rila, Chelopech, and Gabrovo. The visit to Bulgaria aimed to get a more thorough understanding of the situation in Bulgaria and the problems described by Bulgarian citizens in their petitions, but also to publicize the work and the remit of the Committee on Petitions. The visit also gave the participants the opportunity to meet with Bulgarian authorities in the specific case where we suppose a violation of the law by the Ministry of Transport, Ministry of Environment and Ministry of Social Affairs.

One of the first petitions, which gives me a great assurance in the role of the Committee in bridging the distance between Citizens and the Parliament, is the petition by Ivan Shumkov (Bulgarian), on behalf of the Initiative Committee against the Terror of Long Vehicles in Transit through Gabrovo,

on Fighting the Terror Long Vehicles Transiting Gabrovo. The petitioners from Gabrovo in 2007 established an Initiative Committee, which addressed the minister of transport, the minister of regional development and public works, the director of the Road Infrastructure Fund and the Bulgarian Ombudsman, demanding a suspension of transit traffic at night and

on weekends in the city, an efficient safety conditions and ban on stopping and parking of long vehicles along the thoroughfare. As their requests were not followed up or not even replied to, they subsequently petitioned the European Parliament. As a result, the Committee worked on the case and alert calls on the Bulgarian Government to respect the EU legislation in the environmental area and to evaluate and analyze the pollution problems and the impact on the health of citizens in the concerned regions were made.

Analyzing the different petitions, coming from Southeastern Europe, it is inevitable not to mention the petition, from Greece by Theodoros Tenezos on behalf of IRON TENCO A.E., on the Hellenic Competition Commission and the Greek steel market, presenting an interesting case on how small entrepreneurs are not protected. The petitioner draws the attention of the members of the Committee on Petitions to the handling of his complaint by the Hellenic Competition Commission concerning an alleged cartel in the steel market in Greece. Also from Greece, was the petition on environmentally damaging activities in the Leonti Kipselis area of the Greek island of Aigina. The numerous petitions from the citizens of the European Union from Southeast Europe, present a variety of issues of concern. The final decision on them leads, as it

is the procedure to a stand on the petition. All those mechanisms seek not so much to identify culprits, but rather to exert pressure on institutions and thus make them carry out better work. The European Parliament brings the citizens closer to different policies, which is one of the main objectives of the Committee on Petitions. My position as a member of the European Parliament, elected by the citizens, underlines the need the politics to be made of and with the involvement of the citizens. In addition, I hope that the future members of the EP will continue with their efforts to get closer to the citizens and their problems, and will continue to respond to the emerging problems, presented in the petitions. Dushana Zdravkova is Member of the European Parliament, Chairwoman of the Association â&#x20AC;&#x153;Citizens for European Development of Bulgariaâ&#x20AC;? (GERB), Vice-Chairwoman at the Committee on Constitutional Affairs and Substitute at the Committee on Petitions of the European Parliament.

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Debating Europe: by Dimitris N. Chryssochoou

As the first decade of the 21st century comes to a close, so is the idea of European integration as a federalist or even potentially federalizing project. Whether or not this is an easy conclusion to be drawn, there is evidence to suggest that the European Union (EU) still remains a states-led affair. From this angle, the Lisbon Treaty is yet another compromised structure among divergent and often conflicting state interests. Despite the undeniable importance of having reached an agreement over the content of a Reform Treaty after the abandonment of the constitutional project, too many reservations, opt-outs and references to the retention of state prerogatives in relation to competences and reform practices

deprived the EU from consolidating its political identity. Hence the critical assessment expressed by a notable number of analysts that the Lisbon Accords were on a par with the rather unimaginative Amsterdam and Nice reforms, failing to ignite the public’s interest in EU affairs. Like previous reforms, Lisbon amounted to a cautiously negotiated deal of ‘partial offsets’ to key democratic issues facing the EU. For what it failed to produce was not only a common democratic vision per se, but also a belief that such a vision remains without reach, at least in the foreseeable future. This view is justified further by perceiving the Lisbon reforms as the product of a utilitarian calculus among competing national governmental elites. What started more than fifty years ago as an essentially functionalist-driven enterprise of a considerable federalist potential, has produced a uniquely observed –historically and institutionally– synthesis of forms of polity and governance which, at this particular junction, resemble an advanced system of horizontally co-operating states: a statecentric regional formation which ef-

A Critique fectively defies any pre-existing categories of political organization. In attempting to define this unprecedented form of union, one could argue that an organized synarchy has come into being, composed of highly interdependent still though co-sovereign polities, whose operations reflect the practice of political co-determination. Even though the controversy over the EU’s ambivalent political ontology will continue to exist for some time in the future, the EU will refer less to the subordination of states to a superior political authority, and more to the preservation of those qualities that would allow the component parts to survive as distinctive polities through their participation in the common arrangements. These critical reflections on the current state of the integration process suggest that, in a setting of sovereign nation-states, any changes to the governing norms and rules of the general system that may disrupt –actually or potentially– the emergent equilibrium of forces and interests among the subunits must be considered as a distant possibility. Another unsettled political issue crucial to the upcoming European Parliament (EP) elections concerns the extent to which the EU can motivate action by engaging with feelings of community. This brings us to the idea of European civicness and to the relevant question of how to link the issue of public participation in EU affairs with certain

confirmations of belonging to a larger polity. What is at stake is the extent to which a ‘Republic of Europeans’ can emerge in the form of a res publica composita: an extended public space, within which a multitude of normative commitments can generate higher levels of European civicness. This is of importance to the making of a European demos defined as a community of citizens capable of directing their interest to, and via, the central institutions. It is also crucial to the development of a democratic deliberative process in EU decision-making in order to promote certain public goods, whose relevance extends beyond electoral politics or issues of collective policy co-ordination. Such goods exemplify the significance of civic engagement

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in the affairs of a polity and, in the case of Europe, the search for active citizenship at a level, if not beyond, at least parallel to the state. From that regard also, a European res publica is not just any kind of political association set up ‘for narrowly instrumental purposes’, but rather it is a democetric system of participative values and practices. What conclusion might be drawn from the above? To start with, the need for a comprehensive discursive agenda addressed directly at a European audience becomes manifest. This is also linked with another requirement on the part of the EU: to clarify and, where necessary, redefine, the content of its ‘constitutive mission’ – what it actually stands for today and what should it stand for in the future in relation to its citizenry. The proposed discursive agenda would have to address the questions ‘what kind of Europe we want’ and ‘what kind of Europe we need’, in the sense that the latter kind is based on a new vision of politics that treats ‘politics’ as a fundamental form of civic engagement and, hence, of democratic empowerment. Put differently, what we need is what we ought to be aiming at: an open, tolerant and vibrant European civic space composed of free and equal citizens, in the sense of a self-

conscious, composite but discernible demos. In allowing such a plurinational demos to engage actively and decisively in EU affairs, the question is not only how to bring about the envisaged civic space, but also how to define its content – the democratic premises upon which it should be based. Such an agenda should take the form of a democratic blueprint for a new ‘civic contract’ between the EU and its nascent demos: to revive and at the same time to offer a sense of direction for a collective vision. In that regard, there has to be a clear conception of what EU-level democracy means and requires, as there has to be a clear enough, yet flexible, indication of what kind of demos is needed for Europe in order to acquire its own distinctive political subject. The idea here is not a single or for that matter an undifferentiated European demos inspired by ethno-cultural notions of unity, but rather a certain conception of ‘demos-hood’ that could realize what political theorist Philip Pettit calls ‘a democracy of ideas’. The underlying rationale is that the EU should not be taken only or even primarily as a states-led project, but also, of not essentially, as an active polity in its own right, composed of free and equal citizens. Accordingly, the envisaged discursive agenda for Europe should aim at capturing the democratic imagination of a composite citizenry that feels detached from publicly binding decisions taken ‘somewhere out there’, lacking the possibility of entrusting its expecta-

tions to a larger polity that can act on issues and with means crowned with the appropriate levels of social legitimacy. Yet, for a polity that was founded and still rests on an international treaty, and whose incipient but fragmented citizenry lacks the attributes of a self-identifying demos, the transition from an aggregative to a deliberative model of governance is neither easy nor linear. Not without good reasons, therefore, the Lisbon Treaty gives credit to those who argue that the EU is closer to a statecentric form of polity in the sense of a synarchy of entwined sovereignties. This, of course, is not an ideal state as it hinders the emergence of a European demos. Like any other polity that aspires to becoming a democracy, the EU has to bring about a framework of participatory politics, ensuring that its decisions are informed by a principled public discourse. In that sense also, the idea of European ‘demos-hood’ becomes the normative equivalent of a ‘Republic of Europeans’ inspired from a novel conception of democratic civitas. Dimitris N. Chryssochoou is Associate Professor of International Organization at the University of Crete, author of Theorizing European Integration, 2nd ed., London and New York: Routledge, 2009.

New European New

Union.

European reality.

New responsibilities

for the citizens. by Rodi Kratsa

The European Union (EU) is at crossroads. It faces the challenge of achieving a more cohesive, democratic and effective governance, with enhanced visibility. These changes and achievements can be realized through the Lisbon Treaty that we hope to be implemented within the new year 2010. Within this framework, the legislative role and value of the European Parliament - the only european institution that is directly elected by the citizens - are significantly upgraded. On the days of the european elections 4-7 June, the citizens are called upon to respond to this challenge. It is essential, on the occasion of this election, to clarify what each vote will mean for the present and the future of the EU. This clarification is even more imperative given the oxymoron that despite the high levels of trust that european citizens show to the european institutions and especially to the European Parliament (EP), only 34% of the european citizens have the intention of actually getting into the “trouble” to cast their vote, as demonstrated by the recent eurobarometer.

The problem seems to be that european citizens do not realize how important european elections are. They do not realise how much the European legislation and decisionmaking actually affects their every day life. Imagine that only 36% of the citizens have read, heard or watched on TV, news relating to the European Parliament. Lack of information and lack of direct connection with the european political arena is one of the major reasons that keeps european citizens away from the polls. Thus, this challenge needs to be redressed dynamically and responsibly with the action and contribution of the national and european political parties, the members of the EP (MEPs) themselves and the media, even more for this year’s elections. That is because the 2009 european elections acquire an added importance due to the strengthened legislative role that the Lisbon Treaty will accord to the European Parliament. Thus, this time an informed and responsible citizens’ vote is more important and more imperative than ever!

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Moreover, the EP, ie. the citizensâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; representatives, is given the responsibility to elect the President of the European Commission. What is most significant though is the enhancement of the cooperation among the European Parliament and the national parliaments. The national parliaments will have the right to responsibly express their positions on the necessity of european proposals, giving the national parliaments the possibility to better oversee the implementation of the principle of subsidiarity. These new powers accorded to the national parliaments are of high importance in promoting the common european reform strategies in economic, social or environmental areas, due also to the close relationship they have with their citizens and the local society. At the same time, the Treaty foresees more opportunities for peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s active participation, giving the possibility to 1 million citizens to call on the European Commission to submit a legislative proposal on a topic that falls under the Commissionâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s competence, instituting thus the principle of participatory democracy. The Lisbon Treaty also brings about a legally binding Charter of Fundamental Rights. The competences of the EU as a whole are extended to crucial areas, such as climate change and civil protection, immigration and asylum, external borders control and energy security, in order to provide the base to better deal with the challenges of today. The Treaty also consolidates the social, economic and territorial cohesion of the EU, strengthens the role of the regions and provides a new legal basis for action to promote

complementary measures for tourism at european level. Moreover, the Presidency of the EU becomes permanent for 2,5 years and a special position is created for the High Representative for the Union in Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who will also be VicePresident of the Commission. That will help increase the impact, the coherence and the visibility of the EU's external action in an area where the EU is in need of coordination and a common voice. This change will benefit the relations of the EU with our neighbours, our partners as well as with third countries. The EU should have a decisive impact of the international political scene. However, the Lisbon Treaty is not a panacea. It constitutes a framework that provides new possibilities for the European Union, its Member States, its citizens and its partners. The development and the success of this process, as for every political process, depends on how much its citizens will embrace, enrich, utilize and support it. The participation in the european elections on 4-7 June provides a generous step for the building up of a new Europe, open, sufficient and useful for its citizens and the rest of the world. Rodi Kratsa is the Vice-President of the European Parliament.

What is

peculiar

about these

elections? by Daniel Daianu

There is some gloom on the anticipated low turnout of voters for the European elections, which are to be held in early June this year. A self serving argument about this forecast would point the finger at traditional low participation rates in these elections for many years, even decades, now. And some of the reasons are pretty well known and, clearly, would define the next elections too. Citizens are much more concerned about local politics, which deal with issues that impact on their lives more visibly and strongly. It is true that much EU legislation has roots in the activity of the European Parliament (EP) as well, but, at the end of the day, what matters is how national governments do their job in implementing policies. The European Commission is not seen, arguably,

as a EU wide executive that can match the prerogatives of national governments. The EC can put pressure, can start infringement procedures, can try to realize compromises on policy issues (to be submitted to the EU Council), but the national governments are those that spend the money raised from taxpayers. Let us not forget that the EU budget is a minuscule cca 1% of the cumulated EU GDP. In addition the EC is quite far away from most EU citizens and the work of most MEPs is not sufficiently known (or at all) to them. EU wide debates do take place, but much

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more glamour accompanies statements made by national politicians in various forums including European summits. Geography also plays a role in this respect, since EMPs have less room to interact with their constituencies as national parlamentarians do. And as much as technology can improve communications the fact stays that the human touch can not be substituted easily. It may be that charisma can be capitalized by the TV weapon for those politicians who do possess it, but most of them are ordinary political animals, who do need to shake hands and make promises, or explain why previous pledges were not observed. And I could continue with this type of explanations for low turnouts, which are not of recent vin-

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tage. Maybe one additional explanation deserves a remark, for it regards national elections as well. Public disenchantment with politics has been on the rise in many EU countries for years. The â&#x20AC;&#x153;democratic deficitâ&#x20AC;? is a sintagma which has triggered volumes of academic debates and political infighting. And it goes without saying that this feature of modern politics in the EU and outside it can be examined in the way the EP fulfills its mandate. Though I would not find low turnouts surprising I would still be disappointed. Because I believe that these elections are special in several regards. One is linked with the unusually severe unfolding economic crisis, that would influence, tremendously, which way our capitalist societies will be evolving. Bank bailouts, nationalizations of large financial entities, expanding public sectors,

rapidly rising budget deficits which would strain our welfare systems even more, highlight an inflexion point in the dynamics of capitalism in mature economies. This dynamic implies a redefinition of the social contract as well –just consider the frustration of “Main street” vis a vis the need to bail out those who have caused the debacle. MEPs have a role to play in devising new legislation and EU wide policies that should combat the effects of this crisis. I was a coauthor of the EP report on the reform of the regulation and supervision of financial markets and I can tell how important progress in such fields is. But keep in mind that MEPs would also have to tackle the issues of climate change, renewable energy sources, the safety of energy procurement, fending off begger your neighbor policies, xenophobia and racism, etc. And all this during a period which is validating the new status of Asian powers, China and India, in particular, in the world economy. The public agenda for MEPs will be increasingly influenced by the tectonic shifts in global power distribution. Let us hope that The Lisbon Treaty will come into force and EMPs will make good use of their enhanced prerogatives. Here a qualification is badly needed: what national governments will decide to do about the Lisbon Treaty matters hugely. The MEPs who come from the New Member States bring with them policy concerns which reflect development gaps, the controversy over the future of the CAP and regional aid and, neighborhood policies

and, not least, the fact they most of them do not belong to the eurozone. We are living through a period of great uncertainty and, as a have tried to underline, above, a change of course in the evolution of capitalism. NMSs, including Romania, would have to find ways in order to revamp their growth model; they need to save more and rely less on external borrowing. They need to undertake reforms which should keep them competitive in a world which is under the pressure of the new global powers. Likewise, they have to pass the test of this crisis in a deep political sense. For this crisis will test the strength of liberal democracy (to use Fareed Zakaria’s concept) in both old and new members of the EU. We shall all see what the future holds for us and, also, what the MEPs will be capable of doing. Daniel Daianu is Professor of Economics at the SNSPA in Bucharest, Member of the European Parliament, and former Finance Minister of Romania.

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A view from by Yordan Dimitrov

On 7 June 2009 Bulgaria will elect its 17 Members of the European Parliament. As from this year, the Bulgarian MEPs will serve for the first time a full five-year term in office. After accession to the EU in 2007, the country sent its representatives to the European Parliament just for the remaining two years of its life. Under the Election of Members of the European Parliament from the Republic of Bulgaria Act, the elections are held according to a proportional representation system with preferential voting for national ballots of political parties, coalitions and independent candidates, the countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s territory being one multi-member constituency. The law provides for a possibility

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to reorder the party ballots. Each voter is entitled to a preferential vote for one candidate regardless of the place assigned to him/ her on the ballot by the party leaders. Under the law, a candidate who gets at least 15 per cent approval (preference) from the voters moves up the ballot, irrespective of the original order determined by the respective party leadership. Fourteen parties, coalitions and independent candidate nomination committees have been registered for the 7 June European elections at the Central Election Commission for European Parliament. Pollsters predict that Bulgariaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s new MEPs will represent the same political forces as their predecessors: the Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB) political party, Coalition for Bulgaria, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, and the Ataka political party. Voter turnout in the European elections in Bulgaria is not likely to vary widely from the 34 per cent forecast for the EU

as a whole. Bulgarian voters are expected to show a heightened interest in the 2009 European Parliament elections compared to the first elections in 2007, when just 29.22 per cent of Bulgarians went to the polls. For several reasons, voter turnout is expected to be higher this time. In the first place, unlike the first voting, which was for complementary elections, the 2009 voting will be for the first regular European elections in which Bulgarian voters can participate. Next, Bulgarians now feel far more European citizens than in 2007 and are starting to realise the significance of their vote for the future of a United Europe. Still, sceptics note that the turnout may nevertheless remain low, due to insufficient information about the work of the EU institutions in Bulgaria, about the issues discussed there and how far they are important for each Bulgarian citizen.

Bulgaria Bulgarian nationals abroad are also entitled to vote for members of the European Parliament. Fifty-two polling stations have been established at the diplomatic and consular missions of the Republic of Bulgaria in 30 countries. Bulgarian citizens, who are eligible voters and who have a permanent and current address within the territory of the Republic of Bulgaria or a residence address in another Member State of the European Union for at least 60 days of the last three months before 7 June 2009, may exercise their voting rights there. An important feature of the European elections in Bulgaria is that they will be followed by national parliamentary elections in less than a month’s time, and there the stakes of the principal political forces are much

elections as a “dress rehearsal” for the real race for the national parliament, which will finish in early July 2009. Therefore, the political parties are doing their utmost to mobilise the largest possible part of their electorate, so as to gain momentum at the European elections, and this will inevitably raise voter participation. National and European messages in the campaigns intermingle, which is nothing new because Bulgarian voters are used to making their European choice on the basis of the candidates’ positions on domestic issues. Thus, despite the gradual cultivation of a sense of European identity in Bulgarian citizens, Bulgarians have arguably not yet started to perceive the problems of United Europe as their own, and continue to vote driven by domestic motives.

Curiously, the European Parliament elections will be the first virtual elections in Bulgaria. The political forces will clash above all in the social networks, and above all on the Internet sites and blogs, rather than in the country’s streets and squares. A group of active Internet users is organised around each political force, and they take care of the good showing of their candidates. By this campaign stratagem, parties seek to attract apolitical voters and to win over the “undecideds” who will be of decisive importance. Yet another novelty has been introduced in Bulgaria for the 2009 election campaign: the possibility to vote electronically. The Central Election Commission said that electronic voting will be carried out on an experimental basis at the European elections in 50 voting sections countrywide, which have not yet been specified. Yordan Dimitrov is Junior Expert at the Information, Public Relations and European Communication Directorate, Bulgarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

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higher. Some analysts describe the European

East of How is the EU going to deal by Georgi Kamov

For the European Union, these are turbulent times not only because of global issues such as the financial crisis or internal problems such as the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. It is enough to look at the media headlines from the past several months in order to get the picture of an unstable and problem-ridden Eastern neighbourhood from Zagreb to Astana. Some of its highlights include a conventional war between Russia and Georgia, gas conflict and political instability in Ukraine, violent protests in Moldova and Georgia, territorial tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan, stalemate in the accession hopes of the Western Balkan countries and Turkey, uncertainty over the security system in Europe and Russiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s role in it, fierce competition for energy resources in Central Asia.

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How does the EU respond to all of these events, happening right next to its borders? In general, the Union works on three levels in order to deal with its prospective members, neighbours or partners to the East. The first one is through the big and comprehensive policies of enlargement, the newly initiated Eastern Partnership for the Eastern ENP countries, the strategic partnership with Russia and the strategy for Central Asia. These are long-term frameworks of cooperation, using similar instruments but providing quite different final results in terms of moving the countries closer to the EU. The second level involves small and short-term steps such as the creation of monitoring and/or fact finding missions to deal with particular circumstances, such as the ones in Georgia and Ukraine. In parallel, the EU has a number of ESDP missions with specific tasks and several Special Representatives with broad mandates related to the region or the country concerned.

The actions of individual Member States or a group of them represents the third level of involvement. These actions could lead to different results â&#x20AC;&#x201C; from the initiation of whole new policies, such as the Eastern Partnership in the case of Sweden and Poland, to conflict-mediation efforts such as the actions of France in the aftermath of the August war in Georgia. With so many instruments at its disposal, it might seem that the EU is perfectly equipped to influence events and processes originating from its broad Eastern neighbourhood. However, this multilevel approach was not enough to prevent instability and conflict. Neither the longterm policies nor the short-term actions proved effective enough, and quite often the blame falls on the inability of the EU to speak in one voice or act as a single, coherent entity. Or, in other words â&#x20AC;&#x201C; that the EU lacks a common strategy.

Eden with its Eastern neighbours?

Such an opinion might be valid to some extent, but fails to acknowledge that the decision-making process in the EU institutions involves arduous exercises of coordination, bargaining, package deals and compromises. Therefore, it is quite hard to steer all Member States and institutions in one direction and to expect clear-cut and concrete results, especially concerning actions related to more than one policy. If we take the enlargement process – EU`s biggest “carrot” – there are difficulties even when it comes to the most advanced countries such as Croatia. Yet the European Union might not need a common strategy for the broad Eastern neighbourhood. What is needed is a common approach towards it – an approach, based on connecting EU`s policies and the three levels of EU involvement mentioned above. This idea goes along the same lines as a recent paper by the Centre for European Policy Studies, arguing “whether and how the EU might, in its pol-

icies towards Russia, the Eastern partner countries and Central Asia, build stronger common programmes and projects across these three political ‘spaces’”1. The geography is a bit different, but the argument is the same – it is not enough to have a number of comprehensive, separate policies targeted towards different countries and regions. What the EU needs to do is to establish linkages between these policies in order to deal with issues that do not respect the geographical span of the enlargement area, the Eastern Partnership zone or the relations with Russia. The recent gas cri1. Emerson, Michael et. al. Synergies vs. Spheres of Influence in the Pan-European Space. Centre for European Policy Studies, April 2009, http://shop.ceps.be/downfree. php?item_id=1831.

sis between Russia in Ukraine is one of the most recent examples exposing the lack of mechanisms for dialogue and cooperation out of the main EU policies. Sometimes it is indeed useful to enlarge the context in order to resolve a certain issue – in this case, to sit together with Russia and Ukraine on one table and not to discuss with them separately. This is what initiatives such as the Black Sea Synergy or the Northern Dimension are supposed to do – deal with issues such as environment, transport, energy and soft security that require joint efforts from countries belonging to different EU policies. If such initiatives are coupled with concrete and visible projects that provide short-term impact and efforts to strengthen the coordination between the Member States, the EU might be in a much better position to address the challenges originating from the Eastern neighbourhood. Georgi Kamov is Consultant at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria in the fields of the Black Sea region (BSEC, Black Sea Synergy), energy projects in the Black Sea and Caspian regions and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).

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“ young blood The

doesn’t

by Francisco Oom Peres

Distance… Looking for the proper word to describe the feeling about the European Union (EU) to the Portuguese youth; distance is the answer. Distance I – The people – Who are those nice ladies and gentleman who are going to leave for 4 years on Strasbourg? The knowledge they show before they became the chosen about the European institutions, the European role, the father of all the political projects implemented at the European continent in history, is proportional to the knowledge that the people who are electing them have about the elected. The European tasks are still the destiny for “second line” politics in Portugal, or even to the ones who

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are inconvenient so near to the Portuguese press Headquarters. Even with Barroso in the top of the pyramid… Without “one of us” in Strasburg, the European Parliament will not have a true Portuguese deputy. Distance II – The Money Flow – Why so much money is send continuously to our country? There is a cost to pay for all the development that the European Integration brought to our country. And that “cost” is integration. There is a generalized feeling that our European partners keep developing their economies, creating wealth and work, get more and more included at the global market. But in Portugal, since the middle 90s, after the big economical boom, everything seams frozen. We lost the feeling that “Anybody is left behind”. The Portuguese political class never had the capability to explain to the people the two sides of the balance on the European integration.

Distance III – The Partners – The last decade, brought back to Portugal the chance to become once more a priority partner of some of our old colonies: Brazil, Angola, Mozambique, Timor, Cape Green, San Tome… Investment and work are again available on our historical partners. The strong and continuous development on these countries is moving most of the Portuguese economical and social attention from the European Countries to the “returned” partners. A 10 millions citizens and 150 million Euros GDP can’t hold alone two similar major networks as the EU and the Old Portuguese Empire. It’s a dangerous game, but legitimate. This privileged position, must be faced as an amazing

obey to an

chance to put Portugal as a main dealer in the map. Portugal must concentrate is actions opening the doors of these historical connections to the European Partners, and not as an advantage that is only Portuguese. Portugal is the better positioned member of the EU to open and continuously represent the mutual interests and demands of these two continents. Distance IV – The Calendar – European Election in June. Summer holidays in July/August. Local Elections in September/ October. Parliament and Government Elections in October. Who cares about Europe? The priorities… Distance V - 1,709 km – Obvious. Everything happens too faraway from home to be important. It’s our second capital (or first, after the “Lisbon Treaty”? Ironic…) the geographical position of Portugal left Lisbon to many steps away from Brussels. I can’t go walking and there is no TGV. Yet… But it’s

old Treaty ”

easy today to run this distance. How? Taking a flight on low cost airline. These are the true “European feeling” makers! Everyone is so near now for 50 Euros! Curious… A full capitalist company model, where everything is more important than the person, the opposite of the EU ideal, opened the doors for the European true integration to so many millions of people! Something that the National Airline Companies never truly cared about. My generation is the first in Portugal who has born, grown studied and looked for the first worked always has a European Citizen, after the Portuguese integration in 1986. We are the privileged Portuguese generation that doesn’t know what is to have war in “our doors”. We have the Erasmus program. I can travel all around Europe just with my ID card. All my Rights as Man and Citizen are ensured by the law, in Lisbon as in Brussels. Everything is so simple these days.

But, the origins and the purposes of the EU existence must be very well clarified to the Portuguese youth. Our privileged position being a Member, if not well explained, will bring for sure in a near future unrepairable breached between Portugal and EU. And the older generations are failing on that purpose. This is a dangerous game. Remember William Shakespeare: “The young blood doesn’t obey to an old Treaty”. Francisco Oom Peres is member of the Youth of the Social Democratic Party of Portugal.

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"What else can the EU by Giorgos Kentas and Christina Ioannou

In the last couple of months, political parties in Cyprus strive to make their case for the upcoming European Parliament elections. On 6th June 2009, the electors are called upon to cast their ballot that will determine the 6 Cypriot Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). These elections, however, seem to be quite peculiar for Cypriots. To begin with, voting in Cyprus is compulsory in all cases, save in the case of European Parliament elections. This year, the electionsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; date coincides with a period of holidays. Polls and various other surveys

show that some electors, especially the younger people, will opt for a long weekend vacation (that will incorporate the Holy Spirit Holiday of 8th June), instead of attending a polling place on the voting date. What is more, Cypriots are becoming somehow skeptical about the EU and this seems to militate against their participation in the upcoming EP elections. Bearing all this in mind, the leaders of political parties in Cyprus, as well as the candidates, attempt to shift the debate on issues of national interest and domestic consumption, so that Cypriots will be persuaded to turn up and vote on 6th June. Their effort exemplifies some similarities with the ef-

fort they exerted last time when they had to persuade Cypriots to cast their ballots in the European Parliament elections. Five years ago, when the electorate in Cyprus participated in European Parliament elections for the first time, the campaign took place under the shadow of the Annan Plan. Just a week before Cyprus joined the EU, on 24th April 2004, Greek and Turkish Cypriots were asked to vote on a comprehensive plan for the settlement of the Cyprus problem, as it was finalized by the former Secretary General of the UN, Mr. Kofi Annan. 76% of Greek Cypriots overwhelmingly rejected the Annan Plan,

do for us?"

while 65% of Turkish Cypriots and Turkish colonists who reside on the occupied north approved that Plan. As a result, the Republic of Cyprus joined the EU under the provisions of Protocol 10 of the Treaty of Accession. All the territory of the Republic is considered territory of the EU, though the acquis communautaire is suspended in the areas which are not under the effective

control of the government of the Republic of Cyprus. Consequently, on 13th June 2004, the voters who reside in the areas under the control of the government of Cyprus -483,311 out of which 2054 were EU nationals and 503 Turkish Cypriots- elected 6 deputies who represented the Republic of Cyprus to the European Parliament. The right-wing party (DISY) and the commu-

nist Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL) won two seats and the Cyprus Democratic Party (DIKO), as well as the adhoc coalition For Europe (GTE), reserved one seat in the European Parliament. This year, however, the Cyprus problem is just one of the issues of public concern. The debate over European Parliament elec-

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tions centers on various issues, such as the current economic crisis, Cyprus’ potential participation to the Partnership for Peace, and the performance of Mr. Christofias’ administration. If compared with the public debate of 2004 and the ongoing debate on European Parliament elections, there seems to be a shift in the agenda. In 2004, Cypriots asked, “how can the EU contribute to the settlement of the Cyprus problem.” In other words, 5 years ago Cypriots thought that they would elect some deputies who would promote the solution of the Cyprus problem in Brussels via the European Parliament. With the wisdom of hindsight,

Cypriots do not seem to believe any more that the EU is a catalyst or panacea for the settlement of their political problem. This time, Cypriots ask a different question: “What else can the EU do for us, if not settling the Cyprus problem.” This is indeed a difficult question which entails a demanding task for political leaders and candidates who endeavor to persuade Cypriots to show up and cast their ballot on 6th June 2009. In the last European elections, 72.5% of the Cypriot electorate turned up to vote. The question is, to what extent, will this relatively “Euro-optimist” result change? What levels will the turnout reach this year and to what extent will this convey the message of a more Euro-skeptic society?

The Cyprus problem will remain the first priority for Cypriots, though, bearing in mind that they seem to gradually lose faith in the EU, they are left with two options: Either to believe in a different mission for their MEPs or to discredit the importance of European Parliament elections. This remains to be seen. Giorgos Kentas is lecturer at the University of Nicosia and Research Associate at the Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs and Christina Ioannou is lecturer at the University of Nicosia.

European elections and the economic crisis: Put the blame on by Stavros Kourtalis

The European Parliament elections on 4-7 June 2009 will take place against the backdrop of economic and political turmoil. By the time voters go to the ballot box, many of them will have felt the consequences of the financial and economic crisis first-hand. Will any of this have an impact on the European elections in June? While it is difficult to predict precisely how it will affect the turnout and outcome of these elections, one of the most worrying trends in EU politics has been the widening gap between the ever-decreasing number of citizens who bother to go to the polls on the occasion of the continent-wide elections for the European Parliament and the ever-increasing powers of the assembly. While the Parliament has constantly strengthened its prerogatives in each Treaty reform since Maastricht, its â&#x20AC;&#x153;inputâ&#x20AC;? legitimacy has simultaneously diminished: voter turnout was particularly low in 2004, especially in the new Member States which had officially joined the Union just a few weeks earlier. Why, then, given the increasing power and relevance of the European Parliament, is voter turnout so low at European elections? There are a number of factors to consider:

1. European elections are still fought mainly on national issues. Most academics â&#x20AC;&#x201C; and more crucially, politicians themselves - actually consider them to be "second-order national elections". 2. There is, as yet, no real European political sphere to speak of. In effect, the vast majority of European voters remain unaware of the policy issues and fights that are taking place at the European level. As a result, the national level tends to step in as a substitute. To make matters worse, it appears that voters use European elections as a means to punish their governments mid-term, attesting to the weak politicisation of European integration in most EU countries. 3. Politicians therefore tend to base their campaigns on national issues and seek recognition for things that matter to their national parties and constituencies. This is also due to the way the elections are organised as the election lists are determined according to national or regional parties. 4. There is a widespread perception among voters that their voice will not make a

ME? big difference. Many do not feel an incentive to go to the polls because they do not see direct consequences in terms of power-sharing at EU level. 5. Essentially, voters do not feel they understand what the Parliament does, let alone what it does for them, and they stay at home on Election Day as a result. A recent Eurobarometer poll indicated that EU citizens largely consider the European Parliament to play an increasingly important role within the Union, but the majority also admit that they are not well-informed about its role and functions. For example, 73% of the people interviewed admitted that they feel fairly or very badly informed about the Parliament's activities. And only 10%

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Source: European Parliament (2004-2009)

of those surveyed were actually aware that the next elections will take place in 2009. 6. Consequently, lack of interest in European elections is rife among media professionals who find it difficult to "sell their story" to editors, particularly to the national media and television. For all these different but convergent reasons, the forthcoming European elections are likely to remain a collection of 27 separate "national" campaigns. The current worldwide economic downturn will be a common theme everywhere, but coupled with distinctly national debates over who is to blame for it, and how to respond.

While a variety of factors are expected to further affect the turnout and outcome in individual EU countries (a referendum here, a local or even national election there), another opportunity to promote a crossnational discourse and campaign will be missed – despite the last-ditch call from some leading Europeans for the European parties to "nominate" their candidates for President of the European Commission and engage in a EU-wide competitive campaign capable of making the vote more significant and appealing to the citizens. As a result, the next European Parliament is likely to suffer from a similar divergence between the assembly’s powers and its public support – and possibly an even wider one, if turnout keeps plummeting and, in a few months’ time, the Lisbon Treaty provisions do enter into force.

In terms of "input" legitimacy, the hope is that the opportunity missed this year to launch a truly European debate will not be missed again in 2014. In terms of "output" legitimacy, the post-enlargement adjustment and learning process of the past five years should help to raise it significantly over the course of the next parliamentary term. If so, the long-standing "accountability deficit" that affects virtually all EU institutions may at last begin to be tackled effectively. Stavros Kourtalis is Research Fellow at the Hellenic Centre for European Studies.

s n io t c le e n a e p o r u Why the E Between June 4th and June 7th, Europeans will cast their votes to elect a new European Parliament (EP). Recent opinion polls indicate that they will do so without much enthusiasm. Indeed, there is every chance that the average turnout will be the lowest ever – it has fallen at every election since the first time that Europeans directly elected their MEPs in 1979, and sank to 45.6 per cent in 2004. But despite the prevailing apathy, this election matters. During its next fiveyear term, the EP will influence what the EU decides in areas as diverse as financial services, trade, climate change, energy security and immigration. Why do European elections so often struggle to capture the public imagination? Evidently, voters think the stakes are lower than in national elections – or at any rate less clear. Unlike legislative elections in a member-state, European elections do not, strictly speaking, lead to the formation of a new government. Moreover, the EP can often seem distant because few voters know what it actually does. And even if they do, the areas where the EP exercises most influence seem technical and dull. Voters tend

r e t t ma

by Hugo Brady

to be less interested in arguments such as home versus host regulation of service companies, or the pros and cons of ‘unbundling’ vertically-integrated energy companies, than in the subjects which dominate domestic elections – tax and spending, health and education policy, foreign and defence policy and so on. And on those issues the EP has no say. MEPs are remote from most voters. The party list system used in most countries means that few electors know the names of their MEPs. European constituencies are huge, making it difficult for any voter to meet an MEP; in national politics members of parliament can more easily hold ‘surgeries’ to meet constituents. Furthermore, the process-heavy, non-adversarial way in which the Parliament operates attracts little media, and voter, attention. Political groups in the EP stand out less clearly than in most

national assemblies. Although they are organised on a conventional left-right spectrum, they are composed of MEPs from very different national traditions, which makes them less monolithic. And there is not a great difference between the policies proposed by the three biggest groups, the centre-left European People’s Party (EPP), the centre-left Party of European Socialists (PES) and the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE). Finally, the parliament

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lacks political theatre. Many of its proceedings revolve around consensus-building and horse-trading in specialist committees. Eurosceptics sometimes argue that these flaws weaken the legitimacy of the EP as a representative institution. That argument is unfair for two reasons. The first is that the EP’s job is not to replace national assemblies but to complement them, by providing an additional layer of democratic representation in EU policy. The second is that the EP has become a serious actor. During its 2004-2009 term, it influenced EU policy in areas as diverse as climate change, energy, the cross-border provision of services, telecoms regulation and the authorisation of chemicals. This trend is set to continue, especially if – depending on Ireland’s autumn referendum – the Lisbon treaty enters into force. The EP would then have the power of ‘co-decision’ – an equal say to the Council of Ministers – over virtually all legislation, instead of around 70 per cent as is now the case. In particular, the Lisbon treaty would give the EP much more legislative power on justice and home affairs. The future political balance of the EP will be largely determined by the outcome of

voting in the big six member-states: Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Poland and Spain. The EPP seems likely to remain the largest political group in the Parliament, albeit with a reduced majority, despite the fact that Britain’s Conservatives are due to leave it. The Party of European Socialists (PES), for its part, should increase its representation, but only a little. When other groupings are taken into account – including the new group that the British Conservatives plan to lead – the centre-right is likely to dominate the EP. If current opinion polls are to be believed, the mainstream centre-left will fail to draw much advantage from the current ‘crisis of capitalism’. In the largest memberstates, centre-left parties are either unpopular incumbents (as in Britain, Germany and Spain), or in opposition and disarray (as in France, Italy and Poland). The great unknown is how well populist fringe groups of the left and right – those who are really opposed to the current political and economic system – will perform. It would still be a major surprise if fringe parties won much more than 50 seats in the 736-seat EP. The balance of the parties matters for the leadership of the European Commission. In June the European Council is due to nominate the Commission’s next president. EU leaders are likely to offer José Manuel Barroso, who

is affiliated with the EPP, a second five-year term. But if the PES becomes the largest group in the EP, they will try and insist on one of their own. The newly elected Parliament is due to approve the European Council’s nominee for Commission president in July. Assuming that the centre-right dominates the Parliament, Barroso will be voted in. In the autumn the EP will hold hearings on the individual commissioners proposed by governments. These hearings matter. Five years ago, the EP did not like the look of Silvio Berlusconi’s nominee, Rocco Buttiglione, on account of his views on gays and women – and it forced Berlusconi to withdraw him. In January the Parliament will vote to invest the entire team of commissioners. If it is implemented, the Lisbon treaty will make more explicit the need for the appointment of the Commission president to ‘take into account’ the results of the European elections. In the long run, whatever happens to that treaty, the Commission is likely to become more directly accountable to the Parliament. But whether that makes Europeans any more willing to vote for MEPs is another matter. Hugo Brady is a research fellow at the Centre for European Reform. This article is found at http://centreforeuropeanreform.blogspot.com

Mentality shifts, conciliation prevails Ambassador Ahmet Acet Interviewed by Eleni Fotiou

How important you consider the fulfillment of political criteria for Turkey’s accession in the EU? Is their implementation sufficient or there are other issues that have to be dealt with? If we go by the book, there is a big checklist that has to be fulfilled. This is very apparent in the Accession Partnership Document, according to which Turkey produces its National Programme and in the technical details of the 35 chapters of negotiations. All these constitute a very big homework. We often hear about double standards and that Turkey, even if it does fulfil the criteria, it won’t be a full member. I deeply believe that this is not true. There have always been talks about double standards, but when you talk about democratic standards in the real sense of the word, it is not easy to claim this. Turkey has its own

peculiarities which have to be understood by our European friends, for example, the importance of the Lausanne Treaty and how it applies with regards to minorities. In addition, the Cyprus issue is a political issue that cannot be part of the criteria and that has to be resolved when the time comes, pending a final settlement. This is one topic where double standards apply. How does the Turkish public view the EU? Is this view different from that of the political elites? The Turkish public has always been supportive of Turkey’s western orientation. However, I have to confess that we were not very successful in raising awareness among the Turkish public about the benefits of the EU for Turkey’s modernisation process. On the one hand, the Turkish public does not receive quality information about Turkey’s accession process in the EU. On the other hand, a wide margin of the elite knows how important it is for Turkey to join the EU, so usually constructive criticism comes from the elite more than from the general public. However, the more effective civil society becomes, the better the public is informed.

Did the process of the implementation of criteria slow down after 2005 as stated in the EC Reports? We can talk about a slow down after 2005. But relatively speaking, so many reforms took place between 2002 and 2005 that there is no chance that reforms today would be comparable with the scope and pace of what happened then. How do you evaluate the recent boost given to the process with the adoption of the National Programme and the appointment of Egemen Bagis in the position of Chief Negotiator? It constitutes a clear signal that the current government has the will to carry on the reforms according to the European standards with a very strong interest. The adoption of

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the National Programme early this year and many other minor reforms that took place in rather turbulent and crucial political times domestically show that the interest remains. Compared to past practice, now that the Chief Negotiator is tasked with a single duty, it will allow him to focus all his attention on negotiations. As with all change, expectations rise. And, we all predict that after the municipal elections in the end of March new reforms will be developed. How do you explain that almost the 47% of the July 2007 elections did not give legitimisation to the AK Party government to move forward with reforms? Remember the pre-election atmosphere. As it is everywhere, so much energy was consumed on domestic issues that there was not much space either for the government or the Parliament to conduct reforms. Reform-making requires self-confidence, full focus and full participation of all actors like civil society. Hence, the slow-down. However, there is always the invisible side of the reforms, which went unnoticed, i.e, implementation. Today, no one can deny that there is a steady downward trend in the shortcomings in, or for that matter, violations of fundamental rights, something we are all proud about. Of course, we still have a lot to do: we have to instil upon the

minds of the people in Turkey that the reforms strengthened democracy and the rule of law. Once the elections are over and the dust settles down, we should be seeing substantial progress again. How do you assess the turbulent period with the Presidential election, the constitutional crisis and the ememorandum, the early elections, the Ergenekon case, the headscarf issue and the closure case? Most of these issues were drawbacks with regard to the momentum we needed to move forward with EU reforms. Some of them have to do with the breaking of taboos which existed for such a long time. But, again, compared to the past, free, transparent and vigorous debate are all healthy signs of change taking place in Turkey. Taken the clash between â&#x20AC;&#x201C;roughly defined- the Kemalists and the Islamists within the Turkish society and the several dynamics that the process of Europeanisation revealed, how can a liberal consensus be reached? Any observer can judge from the debate that is going on in Turkey that lessons are being drawn from experiences of the past. Democracy teaches the art of conciliation. The more it flourishes the more progress will

be made on bridging differences. Certainly, setbacks need to be addressed, starting from perfecting the Constitution. But, we are on the right track, because much of the restrictive aspects of the Constitution have already been amended. Other basic laws were totally overhauled with a view to provide all the fundamental rights of the individual as it exists in any modern democracy. Will the newly adopted National Programme guarantee the fighting against corruption, judicial reform and freedom of association, which are among the priorities? It should. The most important aspect of the new Programme is judicial reform, the efficiency and independence of the judiciary and access to justice. This will solve many issues. Despite the amendment of A. 301 of the new Penal Code about freedom of expression, there were cases of censorship regarding the NOKTA Magazine and the YouTube. How do you assess the situation? All these are more related to the efficiency of the judiciary rather than freedom of ex-

pression. One of the biggest reforms in the judiciary was the new Criminal Code and the laws with respect to its implementation. Change cannot take place overnight. Awareness raising among all judges and prosecutors is one of the pillars of good implementation of judicial reforms. Recently, there has been an increase in the activity of Turkey’s foreign policy: the “Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform” initiative, mediation between Syria and Israel, changing relations with Armenia and Russia. Is this a shift of foreign policy from hardcore strategies to a “soft power” regional role and strategically from the West to the East? There has not been a real shift, because Turkey was also in the past interested in this area. These regional issues always existed, but the new understanding has to do with the winds of change that are evolving around the world with regard to conciliation, promoting peace for the economic benefits that come along with it. That is one reason

why Turkey believes that problematic issues around the borders should be solved and prefers to be proactive rather than remain an observer. For example, in the past we could not offer our mediation to Syria and Israel, because we had problems with Syria. Today, Turkey is a common denominator for all countries in its neighbourhood. That is where the stratejic interests of the West coincide with Turkey’s interests. The West is interested in a more proactive Turkey, because the EU does not have much power in solving these issues. Is this new understanding a result of the Europeanization process, of globalisation, or it is a bargaining card for the EU? It is related with all these, but maybe the least with trying to convince the EU that Turkey would be a great partner, because of its influence in the region. The EU already knows that. When Turkey was given

candidate status back in 1999, this assumption helped to a certain extent. It is related probably more to globalisation and the shrinking of the universe with regards to human contacts. It is also connected with how Turkey can be a source of inspiration for the countries around it, which have not really been able to benefit from democracy. And this goes beyond the region: people as far as Indonesia and Malaysia show interest in Turkey’s developments. Turkey’s accession to the EU will provide a beacon to other countries in the region and to those that have not witnessed the benefits of good governance. A country that is predominantly Muslim and secular can become part of a system of universal values. This is a signal that Turkish democracy is an institution more and more acknowledged by countries around. Ambassador Ahmet Acet joined the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Turkish Republic in 1973, and today he is the Ambassador of Turkey to Berlin. Between 2003 and 2005, he served as Deputy Secretary General at the European Union Secretariat General (EUSG), and between 2005 and 2008, as Deputy Undersecretary in charge of European Affairs.

interview

Does Foreign by Eleni Fotiou

As of late, an interesting activity has been taking place in Turkey’s foreign policy sphere. Since the start of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government’s second term in office (2007 to date), which coincided with an upgrading of PM Erdogan’s Senior Advisor Ahmet Davutoglu’s role, and due to the contemporary challenges in its immediate neighbourhood -such as the “frozen” or “unfrozen” conflicts in the Caucasus and the Middle East, the energy game, and the European Union’s top prioritisation of the need for energy diversification, stability, and security in its wider neighbourhood- Turkey seems to be pursuing a regional “soft power” role. Indications of such an aspiration are its mediation efforts between Syria and Israel, Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the US and Iran, as well as its “Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform” initiative during the Russian-Georgian crisis, signs of rapprochement with Armenia, warming relations with Russia, its role in Sudan, its co-chair in the “Alliance of Civilisations”, as well as its contacts with Khaled Meshal and Hamas, and the Iraqi Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr.

This activity can be explained as a result of the Europeanisation process and the gradual transformation of Turkey’s political culture, as a globalization trend, and/or possibly as a bargaining card aiming to substitute for the political criteria required for full membership in the EU. Some analysts even argue that the intensification of Turkey’s efforts to implement a foreign policy agenda with Eastern orientation can be perceived as a change of direction, an alternative to the EU path. What can be safely seen is the impact of AKP, essentially Davutoglu’s foreign policy vision for the development of an independent and global role for Turkey. The expression of the claims for such a role seems to be more convincing than in the past, due to the country’s rising self-confidence, which has been further boosted by the EU process. First, is it possible that the Europeanisation process has affected Turkish political culture to the extent that the creation of foreign policy is gradually being alienated from the use of “hard power” and is becoming more prone to the use of “soft power”?

And is this transition taking place only at the level of discourse, or also at the policy level? Turkey’s European Union bid has deeply affected its political identity in terms of the society’s democratic opening, the enhancement of a cooperative culture, and an increase in participation levels.1 Moreover, Europeanisation has considerably expanded the agents in foreign policy-making by introducing new players, such as business associations and civil society groups. In the case of Turkey’s policy toward the EU, the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association (TUSIAD) and a number of trade unions and NGOs have pushed Turkish governments for reforms since 2000. Today, some advocacy groups, such as the Federation of Caucasian Associations, the Friends of Abkhazia, and the Turkish Georgians, are promoting a proactive Turkish foreign policy toward the Caucasus and the Black 1. For an extensive account on Turkey’s political culture and Europeanisation see Ioannis Grigoriadis, Trials of Europeanization: Turkish Political Culture and the European Union, London & New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2008.

Policy Shift? Sea. What can be safely argued is that today there is polyphony in policy-making and the Turkish political elites have a greater number of interests to accommodate while making policy decisions. There are a considerable number of sources that reveal the increasing involvement of the government and non-state actors in foreign policy decision-making matters. The developments in the Cyprus issue in 2003, the fact that the 2008 “Operation Sun” in Northern Iraq against the PKK was proposed by the Government and approved by the Parliament, and the recent initiative for a Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform are supportive of the argument that the government is more in a position to form the foreign policy agenda than in the past. While the impact of the Europeanisation process on Turkey’s foreign policy cannot be estimated -since the transformation of political culture is a long-lasting process, let alone its impact on foreign policy making- globalization and security threats in Turkey’s neighbourhood have demonstrated

that contemporary challenges cannot be addressed by states themselves, and that regional cooperation is necessary. Turkey’s new foreign policy approach could be thus assessed under this realist prism. Energy interdependence, terrorism, and ethnic and religious conflicts in the Caucasus, the Balkans, and the Middle East highlighted the quest for Turkey’s security and the importance of the core role of the military establishment as the main player in security issues, and raised the need for a more proactive foreign policy agenda including the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Russia. The implementation of such a foreign policy happens to be in line with Davutoglu’s theory of “Strategic Depth” and to create a broader consensus among the Turkish political elites, be it the elected government or the secular establishment.

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Another dimension is the negotiation process with the EU. It is widely opined that Turkey views the negotiation process with the EU as a bargaining process. Due to the fact that the reforms have reached a point of saturation, because of the intensity of the process until 2005, domestic turmoil, and the political cost of the “reform fatigue,” the reasons behind Turkey’s recent foreign policy activity may include the “bargaining card” factor. By enhancing its position in the turbulent -but energy resource-rich- regions of the Middle East, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, Turkey seeks to provide the EU with a reliable partner capable of ensuring Europe’s security and transmitting European values to the EU’ s wider neighbourhood. The opposite argument lies on the assumption that given the stance of some EU member-states’ leaders towards Turkey’s position in the West and its compliance with the European value system and their hesitance to promise full membership upon fulfilment of the political criteria and requirements, Turkey is in the process of pursuing an alternative foreign policy option. It

is true that the Turkish political elites believe that they have done everything possible to rise up to the European standards and often claim the use of “double standards” throughout the negotiation process. Such claims have led some analysts to the conclusion that Turkey is in search of other partners in the East and that it seeks to appease its security considerations by promoting its role beyond the European setting. Interestingly, at least at the discourse level, Turkey’s activity in its Eastern neighbourhood seems to confirm such expectations. However, Turkey behaves as being fully aware that its regional weight derives from its relations with the West, and as expecting that by strengthening its international position and by acting as the bridge between the West and the Orient,2 it is paradoxically becoming an even more attractive partner for the EU and the United States. On the one hand, as already said, Turkey aspires to add value to European security and energy diversification, as well as to the transmission of European values to 2. “We have said for centuries that we were the bridge between the West and the Orient, but we attached more importance to the West”, speech delivered by Egemen Bağış at the Izmir Atatürk Industrial Zone, March, 23, 2009.

Europe’s Eastern and Southern neighbourhood; on the other hand, the US’s energy stakes in the Caucasus and the Middle East, as well as the quest for combating religious fundamentalism and restoring peace in the region are fully compatible with Turkey’s role as the bridge between the West and the East and its self-promotion as a role model and regional leader. At this point, it is worth noticing that Turkey is the only NATO ally bordering the Caucasus, necessary for the access of US vessels to the Black Sea and for the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq, a US ally in Afghanistan, important because of its mediation services between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and between Iran and the US, and crucial for counterbalancing Russia’s resurgence and involvement in the Caucasus. The pursuit of a regional “soft power” role came to the fore significantly after the recent revision of the cabinet and the appointment of Professor Davutoglu as For-

eign Minister. Despite European media’s discourses, Davutoglu is not expected to bring a drastic foreign policy shift in Turkey’s foreign policy at the real level. As the PM’s Senior Foreign Policy Adviser, he was behind the scenes throughout the AKP’s governments in office. A change may be more evident at the discourse level, since Turkey is expected to overplay the fact that “In terms of its sphere of influence, [Turkey] is a Middle Eastern, Balkan, Caucasian, Central Asian, Caspian, Mediterranean, Gulf, and Black Sea country all at the same time”. Indeed, Davutoglu is characterised as “Neo-Ottomanist”; a term which seems to be far-fetched, if the overall policy is taken into consideration. The question is whether Turkey has the capability to play a regional leadership role. From a geostrategic and economic perspective, Turkey is of incontestable importance to the region, the European Union and the United States: it provides the EU with an alternative energy corridor, which will eventually reduce Europe’s dependency on Russian natural gas, and it is a US ally in a position to serve as a supply route for the American troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as

to counterbalance Iran’s nuclear ambitions and the rising power of Russia. Long-lasting economic ties with the West and military cooperation with Israel cannot easily be put at stake, and the fact that Turkey, as a predominantly Sunni-Muslim country, is the most suitable mediator between Israel and Syria or Hamas cannot be challenged without effort. Arguably, in the aftermath of the Russian-Georgian war and by maintaining an equidistance policy, Turkey managed to ameliorate its image in the Caucasus and reminded all regional stakeholders that no conflict-resolution and peace-building efforts can take place without Turkey’s participation. Turkey’s recognition as a regional leader and “soft power” is subject not only to international actors -in Europe and beyond-, but also to domestic political developments. Are the US, Russia, the EU and its member-

states, as well as Turkey’s neighbours willing to afford and/or accept such a role for Turkey? Are all the political forces within Turkey willing to promote AKP’s agenda and not use its mistakes and achievements for their electoral goals? However Turkey’s image as a “peacemaker” and an honest broker suffered severe damage due to Erdogan’s stance at the World Economic Forum in Davos. Additionally, Turkey has to resolve a number of pending issues, such as the state’s relations with the Kurds of Turkey and Northern Iraq, the reopening of borders with Armenia, the implementation of the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement, the eventual recognition of Cyprus, and the Aegean dispute with Greece. In the Caucasus, Georgia and Russia are both Turkey’s strategic -economic and energy- partners, but they are not willing to cooperate with each other. An agreement on a Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform is not easy to reach due to the

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Nagorno Karabakh conflict and Azerbaijan’s agitation against any potential rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia and/or Russia. On top of all this, Turkey’s domestic issues and the global economic crisis that precipitated an additional IMF deal further worsen Turkey’s image in the West. The risks are high and the challenges may be too big; but as former Minister for Foreign Affairs Yasar Yakis successfully commented, paraphrasing a Chinese proverb, “It is up to the Turkish leadership to transform these risks into real opportunities.” Eleni Fotiou is Research Fellow at the International Centre for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS). The views expressed in this article are personal and do not necessarily represent those of the ICBSS.

Welcome to Montenegro, “Anna Lindh” Foundation! Foundation! “Anna Lindh”

by Aleksandra Boskovic

After the proclamation of independence in May 2006, Montenegro has been establishing its pace to follow the European integration path, struggling to adjust to demanding European requirements and standards. However, step by step Montenegro opened new doors and possibilities for cooperation with the countries constituting European family, through different dimensions. Culture, a dimension acting as a national identity carrier, ‘suffered’ an important impact in Montenegro of not only being an internal matter, but a factor that represents a way of understanding different cultures as well. This idea was explored even further on the day when Montenegro had the opportunity to join ALF family, arising from membership of the Union for the Mediterranean. It was a logical step to make, a step that signified the strengthening of Montenegro’s desire to turn its inner cultural spirit to the outer view of cross-culture understanding. Cherishing its own values Montenegro joined Network of Networks with hope to make a strong contribution to what ALF stands for.

It was clear from the very beginning that the starting point of this journey was to raise a public awareness of the importance of the intercultural dialogue, and its role in the process of mutual understanding and reconciliation of the differences between cultures. The sole challenge of bridging the long distance gap between Montenegro and Mediterranean countries acts as a stimulator to its aspirations to create a connection with all the member countries of ALF. As a concrete action, Montenegro has adopted the national document recognizing the needs and a role of the civil society sector which as a leading stakeholder in the process of developing the national network of ALF requires encouragement to be able to carry out its mission. Therefore, by helping the organizations willing to participate in ALF activities, thus promoting its values, a safe zone of trust is being formed between each and every stakeholder.

Not many people know that Montenegro is harbour for different cultures and religions, which can serve as a fine example of coexistence. In such environment it is not difficult to make an effort and break the cultural and religious prejudices, which is a key factor for a successful intercultural cooperation and understanding. In such an atmosphere Montenegro is looking to promote ALF values, giving its own contribution, through learning about each other, and exploring the possibilities of making the world a better place. After all, that is what really counts. Aleksandra Boskovic is Advisor for International Cooperation at the Ministry of Culture of Montenegro, which is the Head of the Montenegrin Network of the Anna Lindh Foundation.

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Welcome to Albania, by Besnik Mustafaj

There are a thousand reasons highlighting the fact that it is extremely beneficial for the Albanian civil society to join the network established by the Anna Lindh Foundation and to develop there an active and ongoing cooperation. Most importantly, such a cooperation would mark a new opening horizon for the Albanian non-governmental organizations on the cultures of the peoples on the other Mediterranean coast. Our civil society is quite a new occurrence. It was born 19 years ago, following the collapse of the dictatorship. The emergence from the longdrawn stalinist isolation and the fear of the recidive of the past made the new network of non-governmental organizations and the entire politics orient themselves exclusively towards Brussels, both in view of the EU and the NATO membership goal. Now this fear is non-existant anymore. The Albanian non-governmental organizations are mature enough; they have gained experience and are ready to approach the new goal, i.e the Euro–Mediterranean Dialogue. This dialogue is equally useful for Albania and for all other European countries, both EU member or non-member states But there is another additional ground in the Albanian case, which is explained again with history. For over five centuries, our country was part of the Ottoman Empire, just as the largest part of the countries of the Mediterranean Southern Coast. Such a long co-existence in the same state could not pass without leaving behind its footprints into the spiritual and cultural heritage of Albanians; they could easily serve as common points of contact for more sub-

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stantial exchanges with the nations on the other side of the coast. The most significant fact in this complex heritage is the Moslem affiliation of nearly 60 per cent of Albanian population. This reality makes the crosscultural dialogue among Albanians and Morrocoos, Algerians or Egyptians even more significant and more far–reaching all over the Euro–Mediterranean space. Accordingly, being a deeply-rooted European nation, Albanians have multifaceted potentials to serve as a sample in the broadranging frame objective of Anna Lindh Foundation for the Inter-Cultural Euro– Mediterranean Dialogue.

The Albanian population consists of three faith communities –Moslems, Catholic Christians and Catholic Orthodoxes.This population presents a unique pattern of harmonious co-habitation among these three communities. There was never any conflict among them in history and no tensions are noted even today. In the context of the current global developments, this represents an example that merits to be generalised. To this end, the Albanian Network has proposed to the Anna Lindh Foundation

“Anna Lindh” Foundation!

the organization of a large international conference on religious tolerance in Tirana, in Autum 2009, as a significant part of the cross– cultural dialogue. The further future goal is the organization of a annual conference on this topic, so that the relevant preparations would be associated with wide – ranging researches in this area and with other events during the whole year, seeking the mobilization of the largest possible number of networks in both Mediterranean coasts. The extension of such events on this issue, both in terms of time and geography would certainly help to produce a general climate of tolerance and cooperation. To conclude with, emmigration is another pending area for Albania, whereby it could render a valuable contribution within the objectives of the Anna Lindh Foundation. Only in Western Europe there are nearly 1.5 milllion Albanian residents, who have left their native country about 20 years ago. Most of them have settled in Greece and Italy, but there are others also in Belgium, Germany, the UK, the Nordic countries and elsewhere. We are convinced that their involvement in a well-structured

inter-cultural dialogue, with the participation of their relevant associations, non-governmental organizations of the host countries and Albania, as the country of origin, would serve a great deal their healthy integration to the societies they have chosen to make their own lives. Albania has already submitted its application for the EU candidate status. It is also member of the Union for the Mediterranean. This is a significant fact that brings to evidence the political facilities of the Albanian network in its cooperation with all other networks that are members of the Anna Lindh Foundation. On the other hand, Albania has not a single unsettled political or diplomatic issue with any of the UfM member states. On the contrary, our country maintains very good relations with all countries of the Southern Mediterranean coast, including the State of Israel and the Palestinian Authority. This positive reality is very helpful for the Albanian networks in establishing wide-ranging exchanges and in cultivating a peaceful dialogue, both with Arab and Israeli or with the European networks, with a view to meet the goals of Anna Lindh Foundation. Besnik Mustafaj is President of the Albanian Forum for the Alliance of Civilizations, which is the Head of the Albanian Network of the Anna Lindh Foundation.

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book reviews Integration policies and the

Euro-Muslims â&#x20AC;&#x153;I have always perceived Migration Studies as an interdisciplinary field providing me with the tools to scrutinize not only the life worlds of immigrants and their descendants, but also the ways in which the receiving countries have politically, socially, culturally, economically and legally changed over time vis-a-vis immigrant origin populations. This is why I have preferred to understand the transformation of the modern nation-state through the lens of Migration Studies. And I have chosen to try to grasp the changing habitats of meaning of migrants and minorities in order to actually comprehend majority societies. Although this book seems to be on Muslim origin migrants living in the West, it is actually not. This book is about the changing face of the nation-state in Germany, France, Belgium and the Netherlands at a time distinguished with (marked by) securitization, prudentialism, Islamophobia and violence. I claim that the fear of migrants and Muslims prevalent in the West cannot have material sources; it is in fact a constructed and fabricated fear, serving the interests of nation-states which are no longer equipped with the tools to redistribute justice and peace relatively equally. Migration has for a long time been a source of

content and happiness for the West. But now it is seen as a source of instability and insecurity, or it is portrayed as such by parochial political elites as a form of governmentality to maintain their power. I have come to the conclusion that most of the controversies and debates on migration have essentially been designed to conceal the most persistent structural problems leading to inequality, poverty and discrimination. I also find it very worrying to see that migration is being very disapprovingly perceived at a time when net migration is becoming even (-) minus in most of the European Union countries. This book has written itself over the years in so many different places and occasions. Berlin, Paris, Brussels, Amsterdam, New York, London, Florence, Istanbul, Diyarbakir, Mersin, Bairut, Jerusalem, Nalchick and so on. Every single individual I met in the fieldworks, interviews, conferences, workshops and lectures have taught me a lot. All these journeys have given me the chance to learn from the act of migrating and travelling. I believe that the act of migration was my own Ithaca which gave me a 'marvellous journey', and I know that 'without her I wouldn't have set out' as the prominent Greek poet Constantin P. Cavafy once said in his poem 'Ithaca'. The whole journey was 'full of adventure' and 'full of discovery'...â&#x20AC;?

Ayhan Kaya, Islam, Migration and Integration: the Age of Securitization, 304 pages, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, ISBN: 9780230516793.

ESME 2009

The Euroscience Mediterranean Event 2009, ESME 2009 will take place from 15 to 19 October 2009, in Athens, at the "THEATRON" cultural centre "Hellenic Cosmos". ESME 2009 is organised by Euroscience Greek Regional Section, under the auspices of Euroscience, the European Association for the promotion of science and technology. It is the first in a series of biennial events, dedicated to scientific research and innovation. ESME provides a platform for dialogue on science and technology, society and policy, following the pattern of the Euroscience Open Forum, while focusing on the specific characteristics and needs of

the Mediterranean region. Euroscience Mediterranean Event 2009 aims at bringing together scientists and young researchers, senior government officials, policy makers, NGOs, academics and science communicators from all fields of science, thus providing a unique networking opportunity for all interested parties. Through keynote lectures, selected workshops, papers and exhibition sessions, ESME 2009 intends to assess the

The Anna Lindh Foundation has the pleasure to announce the online launch of the "Restore Trust, Rebuild Bridges" Initiative, which was discussed and agreed on by our advisory council during its last meeting in February. It represents part of the contribution dedicated by ALF to address the very critical situation affecting the Euro-Mediterranean region and its institutional framework since the beginning of the year 2009. This initiative will have a total budget of 330 000 â&#x201A;Ź. The Initiative includes two Calls for co-organized local and regional actions in the fields of culture of peace and co-existence and taking place between July 1 and September 21, 2009. On September 21, which marks the International Day of Peace, the Anna Lindh Foundation will hold a visibility action to present the results of the Initiative. With this Initiative, the Foundation seeks to revitalize confidence in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, by fully playing its role as

challenges facing the Mediterranean area's scientific development and to focus on the future opportunities while featuring the best practices. We look forward to receiving your proposals for presentations during the Event, as this will constitute a pivotal part of the programme which is designed to encourage your representation and active participation in the dialogue. http://www.esme2009.org/

a facilitator and as a major instrument for exchanges between the peoples, promoting a culture of peace and coexistence in the Region. The Initiative consists of: a. Co-organized local actions in the Euro-Med Region; b. Co-organized regional actions in Palestine and Israel; c. Activities carried out by the ALF Headquarters in the framework of "Restore Trust, Rebuild Bridges", including the Euro-Med Award for Dialogue, the "Sea of Words" Literary Contest, and specific cultural events. The Initiative is open to the participation of Network members as well as to organizations from outside the National Networks which however must be based in one of the 43 countries of the Union for the Mediterranean. You will find more information by logging on to www.euromedalex.org/restoretrust.

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Talking Turkey in Europe WITH THE SUPPORT OF: Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB) German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF-US) Open Society Institute Assistance Foundation (OSIAF) – Turkey In 2008 the “Talking Turkey” project launched by the Istituto Affari Internazionali and the Turkish Economic Policy Research Foundation published its new book “Talking Turkey in Europe: Towards a Differentiated Communication Strategy”. The book analyses the positions of national stakeholders within each member state on the Turkey question and the implications for a Communication Strategy on Turkey. Member states covered include Turco-sceptic member states (Austria, France), Turcophile members (Greece, Italy, Poland and the UK) as well as member states that are either lukewarm or divided on Turkey’s EU prospects (Denmark, Germany). The book also includes a chapter on Turkey, assessing the reactions of Turkish stakeholders to these multifaceted European debates; as well as three chapters accounting for the impact of the

US on European debates on Turkey. Finally, policy aim of the book is to develop ideas for an EU Communication Strategy on Turkey. The idea is that such a Strategy ought to be differentiated and dynamic in order to be effective. It must target the right audience, with the right message, delivered by the right messenger, at the right time. More controversially perhaps, we argue that a credible Strategy should not blindly promote Turkey’s accession process but should engage in a genuine two-way dialogue with all interlocutors, including those who hold the most implausible and prejudiced views. It is only by engaging with all these arguments, that an EU Communication Strategy can help inform, enrich and influence European debates on Turkey, and thus indirectly promote Turkey’s European future.

*Tocci, N. (2008) (ed.) Talking Turkey in Europe: Towards a Differentiated Communication Strategy, Quaderno IAI 13 (http://www.iai.it/sections/pubblicazioni/iai_quaderni/Indici/Quaderno_E_13.htm)

EuroMeSCo, the network of research institutes dealing with policy and security issues around the Mediterranean Basin, brings together institutes from the member-countries of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), the European Union's comprehensive policy for its relations with the southern Mediterranean region. It functions both as an official confidence-building measure within the EMP and as a source of analytical expertise in the policy and security fields with which it is concerned. It was established in June 1996 with an inaugural conference in the Portuguese town of Sesimbra organized by the Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais (IEEI), which is based in Lisbon and now serves as the EuroMeSCo Secretariat and operational base. Since its establishment, EuroMeSCo has, with financial support from the European Commission, engaged in several research programs, undertaken regular meetings with senior officials of the EMP to discuss policy and security matters, and maintained close contacts with the European Commission and the Council of Ministers of the EU.

EuroMeSCo Secretariat Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais (IEEI) Largo de Sao Sebastiao, 8, Paço do Lumiar 1600-762 Lisboa - Portugal Website: www.euromesco.net

New era of cooperation The agreement foresees a two-year collaboration during the two academic years starting from 2008 to 2010 for the mutual advancement of the purposes of both institutions. The Kokkalis Foundation will be supporting Greek-Turkish studies at Istanbul’s Bilgi University by offering scholarships and fellowships to Greek citizens pursuing a Master’s Degree in International Relations with a concentration on Greek-Turkish relations at the university. For more information please see: http://www. kokkalisfoundation.gr and http://eu.bilgi.edu.tr.

FEMISE The FEMISE network involves more than 70 member-research institutes in economics, representing partners of the Barcelona Process. Supported by the European Commission within the framework of the MEDA regional program since 1997, the FEMISE is co-managed by the Institut de la Méditerranée (France) and the Economic Research Forum (Egypt). The network aims at taking part in the strengthening of the dialog on the economic and trade section of the Partnership, in particular between FEMISE member institutes, relevant ministry officials of the Mediterranean partner countries and the Commission representatives. In doing this, the network will pay close attention to identifying and following the progress of the Mediterranean partner countries in the way of transition. Particular attention will paid to the opening of the free trade area and South/South co-operation, as well as amplifying economic research on priority subjects for the partnership. One of the principal activities of the network is to undertake socio-economic research on topics defined as a priority for the future of the Euro-Mediterranean region. The various results are presented to the governmental partners of the Barcelona Process. Among these broad topics, one will notice in particular: — Agricultural challenges, — Development and the solution to poverty, — Policies as regarding health and work, — Education, training and the role of women at work, — Integration and cooperation between the countries of the southern Mediterranean, — Role of the State.

FEMISE Network Institut de la Méditerranée Palais du Pharo 58, Boulevard Charles Livon 13007 Marseille Website: www.femise.net

French and German Studies at Bilgi “Interact -EU, France, Turkey- Universities Dialogue” Upon the successful implementation of the Turkish-Greek Studies Project, Istanbul's Bilgi University’s European Institute is now conducting a project for the “EU-Turkey Civil Society Dialogue Universities Grant Program 2007” in partnership with l’Institut des Sciences Politiques, Paris and IFEA. Supported by the European Union, the “Interact-EU, France, Turkey - Universities Dialog” project will last for 18 months during which a large number of joint activities such as scientific exchanges of academics, two weekend schools, a summer school, meetings of an experts network, three thematic conferences, a multidisciplinary joint research project and a variety of publications (working papers, books, reports) as well as a final Evaluation Conference will take place. This project will also institutionalize collaboration between Bilgi’s European Institute and l’Institut des Sciences Politiques-Paris and IFEA, by the launch of a French Studies Unit at Bilgi. On a larger scale, the project will aim at contributing to the strengthening of contacts and mutual exchange of experience between civil society in Turkey, France and EU Member States; providing for better understanding of Turkey, its culture, history and values within France and the EU and ensure better understanding of EU values and common culture as well as its policies and institutions in Turkey.

German Studies In November 2007, the German Studies Unit was selected for funding by the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) starting from September for a period of 2 years, which may be extended to 5 years. In the framework of this program, Dr. Jörg Baudner has been charged by the European Institute to establish German Studies at Bilgi. For more information please see: http://eu.bilgi.edu.tr.

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Old stone middle age bridge Visegrad, Bosnia by Pavle Marjanovic