Editor’s note The occasion of NATO`s 60th anniversary is an opportunity for reflection on the challenges, difficulties and obstacles that lay ahead for an institution that in the past few years was attributed by many as a big white elephant in search of its identity; an institution that couldn’t adjust to the new global order in a constantly changing international environment . In its long history NATO has witnessed an unprecedented shift in mentalities, priorities, approaches. For an international “military” organization of such magnitude, its efforts in the direction of “openness” are at least noteworthy. The tools that public diplomacy offers nowadays are gaining significance in this institution with sometimes impressive results. The use of Public Diplomacy as an element of soft power in international relations is a relatively new concept for states and organizations while the blogosphere, internet, and social media make the whole game far more challenging. In this issue of the Bridge we attempt to contribute to the clarification of this (new?) concept in international relations. Ιn a totally different context a number of contributors from the Western Balkans, take stock of the versatile relationship between the Alliance and the countries of the region. The authors reflect on the status of relations between NATO and their respective countries. They provide an overview of security sector reforms; they also outline the key debates surrounding the relationship to NATO as well as the key political and security concerns in their respective countries. This special section of the Bridge is not intended to provide solutions to complex policy questions. Rather, it is a first attempt at opening up the debate about the difficulties and challenges that the Alliance will encounter in its effort to integrate the Western Balkans. Our hope here at the Bridge is that this special section will kick-start a process of more advanced and sophisticated dialogue about the policy problems and required solutions in the region.
Jelena Radoman Serbia NATO relations A quarterly review on European integration SE Europe & the SE Mediterranean
Evangelos Aretaios Mild Islam and modernity
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Senada Šelo Šabić Croatia awaits green light to join NATO Oguz Demiralp interviewed by Eleni Fotiou Fresh impetus, new dynamics for Turkey dialogues 34 - 35
Julian Memetaj
Albanian regatta towards NATO interview 8 - 9
dialogues 30 - 31
Ilir Deda The view from Kosovo
dialogues 32 - 33
Ioannis Armakolas NATO at 60 and the western Balkans
Darko Ninkov Euro-intergration of western Balkans in times of crisis
dialogues 26 - 29
Damir Hadzic DFID Bosnia & Herzegovina
dialogues 40 - 41
dialogues 36 - 37
contents
s c i m a Fresh impetus, dyn for Turkey w e n What is the image of Turkey in the EU and the EU member states? Is there a distinction between these two images? Ambassador Mustafa Oğuz Demiralp was born in İstanbul on 22 January 1952. After he graduated from İstanbul Saint Joseph High School in 1971 and from METU in 1976 he has served as a diplomat in various positions as Director of Actual Political issues , OSCE and Disarmament in the Department of Policy planning, Consular of Turkish Permanent Representation to the Office of UN in Geneva, Deputy Permanent Representative of Turkey before European Council, Special Advisor to the Minister of Foreign affairs, Ambassador, Turkish Permanent Representative of World Trade Organisation, Vice President of UNCTAD Council, WTO Trade and Investment Division President (2000-2001), WTÖ Trade and Environment Committee President (2002-2003). Since January 2006 he is the Secretary General of EU at the Secretariat General for EU Affairs of the Turkish Republic.
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Legally speaking, there should be no distinction. The EU Council decisions are binding for all EU institutions and member states, but in practice, there are nuances and differences. With the Commission, we have good working relations; it supports the enlargement process and our accession. As to the member states, it depends on the countries; regarding some of them, more than an inconsistency, there is the violation of the pacta sunt servanda clause, that damages the image and the credibility of the EU. On the other side, how do the Turkish political elites and the Turkish public view the EU? There is not an homogenous political elite in Turkey. There are different approaches within the elite as to the EU issues. The majority of the elite and the people aspire to be part of Europe. On the other hand, there is some kind of reaction, because of the attitude of some EU member states, which does not mean that the elites and the public alienated from the goal of full membership. The aspiration is always there. They are critical of the EU because it applies double standards and some politicians from EU member states do not keep their promises. Do you mean that the implementation of the political criteria will not be enough for Turkey’s accession and that promises will not be kept? How important you consider the full compliance to the political criteria for Turkey’s full membership?
Oguz Demiralp Interviewed by Eleni Fotiou The purely political criteria, namely human rights and democracy are sine qua non for accession. They are necessary for the socio-cultural development of a country. And of course we consider their implementation important, since the “to do” list has become shorter and the progress reports thinner. Moreover, Turkey is one of the first members of the Council of Europe and one of the 12 countries which drafted the European Convention for Human rights, meaning that the political criteria are formed by Turkey as well. They are not only the EU’ s criteria, but ours as well and we have to implement them!
Do you agree with the assumption that the reform process has slowed down since 2005? The negotiation process has slowed down, but there is the impression that the reform process has slowed down, because there had been internal problems, which prevented the government from making spectacular moves. In reality, the process of the alignment with the EU acquis is quietly going on, and that is why it does not make the headlines. The slowing down of the negotiation process, however, lies in the scope of responsibility of the EU. That means that you notice a change in the tone throughout the decade since the publication of the first progress report? On behalf of the Commission, no. As to some member states, I would say that sometimes they try to dilute positive decisions that concern the accession of Turkey.
How do you assess the developments that took place in the last year (e-memorandum, presidential and parliamentary elections, constitutional crisis, AKP closure case)? A public servant cannot comment on the political developments, but I believe that after several developments, democracy in Turkey has been strengthened. The adoption of the National Programme, the appointment of a new Chief Negotiator, Mr. Egemen Bagis and the attribution of the status of Minister created a new mood and gave a positive impetus to the EU process. Also the visit of our Prime Minister Mr. Erdogan to Brussels contributed to a better climate. Let us pass to the more report-specific questions. Under the paragraph on public administration, there is some criticism referring to the Law on Establishing an Ombudsman. At which stage we are now? It has been rejected, but we have not yet seen the reasoning of the rejection on behalf of the Constitutional Court. It seems that we will need a Constitutional amendment. And what about the judiciary and the role of the High Council of Judges and prosecutors? As to the judiciary, in the National Programme we have included a very comprehensive strategy on which we are working together with the Commission. All questions will be addressed together; not only the impartiality and the independence of the judiciary, but also corruption, freedom of association, including the financing of political parties and trade unions. In the National Programme, we have addressed the issue of the Ombudsman and we have included the “Personal Data Protection Law”, which will be a major reform with many positive repercussions. Meanwhile, we will continue reforms as to the TV and radio broadcasting and linguistic freedom will be further enhanced.
How do you evaluate the amendment of A. 301 of the New Penal Code that refers to freedom of expression and how do you assess the cases of censorship of the NOKTA Magazine and the Youtube.com? The implementation of A. 301 according to the Ministry of Justice is successfull, but we have to further enhance freedom of expression on other fronts. However, after the amendment, the number of cases has diminished. Regarding the issue of Youtube.com, some legislation needs to be reassessed. As far as the protection of minorities is concerned, there is some criticism by the European Commission, despite the adoption of the “Law on Foundations”. How would you reply to this criticism? The Orphanage case is very complicated, because the new judgment of the Turkish Council of State has different dimensions from that of the European Court of Human Rights, which claims that the Orphanage belongs to the Patriarchate. Our authorities are working on this. As to the Halki Seminary, we cannot make exceptions to our secular system of education and create a precedent for other sects or religions. We have proposed for the Halki Seminary to operate under the auspices of the Istanbul University. It cannot be treated as an exception because minorities are also Turkish citizens. According to the Constitution, religious universities can operate only under the roof of state universities.
Regarding the Cyprus issue, how much does it weigh as an obstacle to Turkey’s accession? It is not the main obstacle, but it has recently been used and misused by some member states, which never in the past 50 years had an interest in the fate of Cyprus. Just suddenly, they are interested. So it is used for ulterior motives, and for those countries, it is not the real issue. The Cyprus issue is anachronistic and that is why all parts involved have to act maturely and solve it in a fair and balanced manner. Recently, the Turkish foreign policy lays special emphasis on Turkey’s regional role as a “soft power”. How do you explain this tendency in the Middle East and the Caucasus? It is not a display of power, or a pretentious foreign policy. In our part of the world, we need cooperation. Turkey is doomed to play that role because of its geopolitical position. It goes without saying that when Turkey becomes a member of the EU, the EU will be capable of projecting its values and “soft power” in a much easier manner to the entire region around the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Middle East which is extremely important also for the EU.
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Mild Islam and modernity Lights turn off and silence spreads. Only the big plastic palm trees in the background of the podium are highlighted by strong projectors. Then, three whirling dervishes appear while the sound of “Allah u ekber” (Allah is Great) spreads through the loudspeakers. After whirling for almost ten minutes, the dervishes vanish behind the scene and a beautiful young lady wearing an elegant headscarf take their place on the podium announcing the opening of “Tekbir clothing summer fashion show”. For the next two hours, the guests applaud with admiration the models strolling around the podium wearing colorful outfits and fanciful headscarves. The lounge, after the fashion show, is full of young and middle aged women who came with their husbands, their parents or their friends to watch “Tekbir's” fashion show. They are dressed with very vivid col-
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ors, wearing rather skin tight long sleeved shirts, elegant long skirts or trousers and fanciful headscarves. To an outside observer unfamiliar with social dynamics in Turkey, this “Islamic” fashion show and all these veiled women taking great care of their appearance might seem as a grotesque and shallow imitation of a modern way of life or even as the sign of a dangerous Islamization of Turkish society, threatening modernity and secularism. However, a deeper look reveals much more complex social, political and economical dynamics that instigated a tremendous change within Turkish society and the subsequent emergence of a new middle class, identifying itself with Islam, in opposition to the secularist republican elites. “Tekbir” clothing was established back in 1982, just when the Turkish economy was entering an era of “liberalization”, which gradually created brand new opportunities for a huge part of Turkish society confined, until then, to the geographical and social periphery, far away from the center, occupied by the secularist bureaucrats in Ankara and the equally secularist business and intellectual elites in Istanbul. Within this new space of opportunities a significant part of the most conservative and traditional layers of the society started inevitably to enter in constant contact with capitalism, globalization and western modernity, quickly planting a strong seed of social and political mobility and eventually of change. Thus, the long and sinuous march of the periphery towards the center started to accelerate.
by Evangelos Aretaios
This march was already prepared by the impressive wave of internal migration from the villages towards the big cities and was in full interaction with what is known as the rise of political Islam. With the successful entrepreneurial mentality and the consequent spread of wealth, coupled with the access to education by the gradually urbanizing masses in the big cities, a new middle class started to emerge in Turkey. Facing condescension and almost total rejection by the traditional elites with their eagerness to keep their supremacy in politics, society and economy, this new class was in desperate need of its own development model, distinct from the exclusive model of authoritative western modernization preached by the secularists. A different model was required -- one that would enable this disparate middle class to survive by creating its own distinct identity and mobilize symbols, and over time, begin challenging the fundamental assumption of the traditional republican secular elite that modernization must naturally lead to westernization. The strongest cohesive force for the different elements of this emerging economic/ social model was religion. Islam was already strongly associated with the segments of Turkish society that had been marginalized
by the secular political and economic elite. Simultaneously, urbanization, education, wealth and consumption had already created a strong link with a more contemporary life style. Therefore modernity per se was impossible to question. The challenge was to reconcile the benefits of the modern world with the social and religious support provided by Islam. Within this scope, Islam, considered broadly as a civilization/culture than a mere religion, is not against modernity, on the contrary, it is a way to deal with and to achieve modernity, but a modernity not defined exclusively by the West. Thus we see in Turkey today a conscious or unconscious blend of Islamic values and principles with modern every day practices and habits. Islamic fashion, Islamic fashion shows, Islamic holiday resorts (where beaches are separated between men and women). Within this process serious discussions of Islam and efforts to reconcile the basic tenets of the faith with modern life have also begun. A clear consequence of this examination of the mutual impact of modernization and Islam is the inevitable emergence of individualism best illustrated by the gradual evolution of women’s fashion. Previously, the height of Islamic female fashion was the mono-colored head scarf flowing into an oversized dark raincoat that ran to the top of very sturdy shoes. Now the streets of Istanbul, if not the interior, are dotted with women wearing multi-colored well tailored long skirts, skin tight trousers, high heels, make up, colorful headscarves, and the latest Ferragamo footwear.
Also intrinsic to this respective re-appraisal is the spread of this Islamic middle class towards universities, down town centers, high class neighborhoods, coffee shops and restaurants, breaching the monopoly of the secularist elites in public spaces. The gradual strengthening of this Islamic middle class not only brought it own political parties in power (like the Justice and Development Party of Tayyip Erdogan) but also created an Islamic counter elite (Islamic bourgeoisie), challenging openly the supremacy of the secularist republican elites in all fields. The secular elites and some of their allies in the United States view this development with great fear and see a slippery slide toward Islamic fundamentalism. The reality is more complex. Turkey is, after all, a Moslem society, and what we see today is a natural, social expansion of a more visible cultural Islam in public spaces monopolized up to now by a secularist minority. Equally lacking insight are the over optimistic comments of some in Washington
that Turkish “mild Islam” can be an export model to the rest of the Middle East. Reform of the interpretation of Islam and its interaction with every day practices is not new in Turkey or in the rest of the Muslim world. What is new and very much unique to modern Turkey and impossible to export elsewhere, is the fact that, for the first time, the dynamics of reform stem largely from a structured middle class. This emerging social and political middle class is indeed looking for a middle way, one that rejects the simple extremes represented by the likes of religious fundamentalists of any faith, and yet allows them the benefits of the modern world without rejecting its natural conservative and religious foundation. Evangelos Aretaios is a journalist based in Brussels.
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American s public d n i m d n a t r a e h diplomacy s ’ e l p eo by Yannis Piliouris
The term public diplomacy has attracted lots of attention in recent years. As once smartly put, it is about an old wine in 1 a new bottle , an old practice favored nowadays by the expansion of communications instruments and the democratization of information. The term was first used in 1965 by Edmund Guillon, and it concerns the pursuit of certain foreign policy objectives by dealing directly with the people of foreign countries, using modern instruments. Many questions arise regarding the above definition. Is there a difference between propoganda and public diplomacy? Do cultural relations overlap with public diplomacy?
The major difference with propaganda is that it aims at convincing people of how to think, and is connected with monologues and manipulation. On the contrary public diplomacy is about broadening the audience’s perspectives, engaging in dialogue and honest opinion exchange. Additionally, cultural diplomacy is mainly practiced by non-state actors -- financed indirectly from the state -- trying to build trust. But public diplomacy has long-term objectives, which are also policy-oriented, and among the instruments they employ is cultural relations. As means of public diplomacy, are considered cultural diplomacy as pictured very clearly by “Frankfurt school” idea about culture (Kultur) and educational programs supported by the state or private funds aiming at educating foreign leaders in the American system. Last, but equally important, is the informational service and access to it. It was really easy for people from Eastern Europe to tune into Western radio or become fascinated by western cultural products rather than the other way round. 1. Jan Melissen, May 2005, Wielding Soft Power: The New Public Diplomacy, Netherlands Institute of International Relations.
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A brief history of US public diplomacy structures One of the first modern states which created structured public diplomacy was the US during the World War I. The prime objective was to legitimate the US intervention and influence public opinion toward the necessity to enter WWI. The Committee on Public Information recruited the cinema industry, radio, telegraphs and negative images and stories of German soldiers to broadcast its message. The committee dissolved with the end of WWI. Two decades later, as bilateral relations with Latin America were expanding rapidly, a need to formalize and better facilitate educational programs with the region created the Division of Cultural Relations. The division was first introduced as an organic part of the State Department. The next emergence of public diplomacy formalization was WWII and the need to counter-balance the propaganda war coming from the well-prepared Nazi disinformation machine. The US government reaction was to found the Office of War Information, which urgently established Voice of America radio, employing modern methods to illustrate the nation’s wartime policies and American vision of the post-war world. After the end of war, Voice of America's operation was transferred to the State Department.
The turning point of American public diplomacy was the ideological struggle between the US and the USSR over “winning the hearts and minds” of people. From this severe battle was born the US Information Agency, which played a leading role in US public diplomacy for almost half a century (1953 – 99). The agency integrated educational programs and broadcasting services, and, along with informational activities and public libraries with American books in embassies, was extremely successful in “telling America’s story to the world.” The Agency’s “golden age” was when John Kennedy appointed well-known journalist Edward Murrow as director and consulted him before major decisions. It was the first time that public diplomacy was officially incorporated and integrated into the decision-making process of American foreign policy. It is true that after the end of the Cold War, the USIA lost its significance and focused more particularly in empowering local initiatives of NGO’s and civil society. The reason for this was that the ideological battle was over. The US won the war without using hard power and the upris-
ings of people in the Baltic region, Czechoslovakia, and Poland proved that the USIA had fulfilled its objectives by simply raising people’s awareness. It was the same time that a Harvard University professor, Robert Nye, introduced the “soft power” concept. His definition was that “soft power is the aspect of power in getting others to want what you want.”2 Nye was proposing that soft and hard power should be combined, to dominate the international system and persuade others of the fairness of one's argument. The new era of American Public Diplomacy The gradual dismantling of the USIA lead the Clinton administration to reshape the agency, turning it into a foreign policy instrument and merging it with the public affairs department for better coordination. 2. Joseph Nye, 2002, The Paradox of American Power, Oxford University Press.
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Although the reorganization plan was very well structured, it was not before 9-11 that the Bush administration decided to appoint someone to secure American interests and raise the US' profile abroad. The first person appointed was Charlotte Beers who was quite successful in the advertising industry. Her campaign tried to illustrate the peaceful integration of Arabs into a tolerant American society. Exorbitant amounts of was spent to broadcast her message. She created extra TV and radio networks to address Arab youth and engage them in the American lifestyle. Her efforts were totally unsuccessful, since Arab youth proved less easy to manipulate than American consumers and her campaign and the radio station failed to have any serious impact. Karen Hughes, the next person appointed, was considered a communication guru and a representative model of American society (a working mother, devoted wife, and successful career woman). She set as cornerstones of her approach the 4 E’s strategy: engage, exchange, educate, and empower. The strategy proved very superficial and American-centered, not really engaging and was found to be inconsistent with the rest of the public diplomacy tools in play. Observations One of the most crucial factors in the failure of public diplomacy during the George W. Bush era has been American foreign policy
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itself. It was not fruitful to try to change the perception of the US, when the dministration at the same time had employed a massive amount of resources to fulfil American objectives abroad and supported pariah-allies. It was impossible for even the most capable communication magician to convince the Arab world how democratic America was, when at the same time the US was prosecuting and detaining people against all international conventions and violating international laws. It was a clear-cut contradiction for the US, to be trying to convince people of successful integration models and democratic values when at the same time America was fighting to expand its hegemonic expansion and ensure, in the long-term, its wealth and high living standards. It is a completely different case from the Cold War, when the US was legitimizing everything with values and freedoms, trying to save the world from the violent expansion of communism. Another argument that can be raised from the American public diplomacy paradigm is the same mistake that Europeans very often make in their criticisms toward the US; There is an unwillingness or inability to conceive different cultures in terms of otherness, of its difference from the logic of American culture. They weighed different audiences against their standards and found them wanting. "Engaging and exchanging" means being open-minded and trying to speak in different languages.
Conclusion When planning public diplomacy strategy there is very often a mistake. We want to sell an idea or convince people of the importance of our argument. Edward Murrow has said: “Truth is the best propaganda, and lies are the worst. To be persuasive we must be believable, to be believable we must be credible, to be credible we must be truthful. It is as simple as that.” USIA employees were feeling the ambassadors of the American civilization abroad and this was their perception. That they were helping to spread the American message and Western democracy across the world. At the same time, policy makers and secretaries of state were using USIA to spearhead their expansion or containment. What is needed is a good manager to coordinate soft and hard power effectively. Because at the end of the day, “everything is about the policies.” Yannis Piliouris holds an MA in Comparative History from the University of Utrecht.
The term “public diplomacy” did not exist until very recently in the political vocabulary of most states, and so often when it is used it causes confusion for the public. Following a round-table discussion on “The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations,” which took place a few months ago under the auspices of the Hellenic Ministry for Foreign Affairs, this issue of The Bridge launches the debate about “public diplomacy,” as a notion, as a term, as a dimension of foreign policy. This platform was an initiative of the NATO Public Diplomacy Division and The Bridge in an attempt to contribute to the clarification of this new concept in international relations. The valuable contributions of policy-makers, experts and academics, such as Mrs. Stephanie Babst, NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy; Mr. George Koumoutsakos, Spokesman of the Hellenic Ministry for Foreign Affairs; Mrs. Ino Afentouli, Information Officer Greece & Regional Coordinator for the Caucasus at the NATO Public Diplomacy Division; Dr. Kostas Ifantis, Associate Professor of International Relations at the Department of Political Science and Public Administration of the University of Athens; and Mr. Fanis Papathanassiou, journalist, shed light on some keywords and meanings that define what “public diplomacy” is nowadays.
The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations tion”? Is this concept a new “inven diplomacy ” first appear? When did the term “public ance. It was al concept is old in the NATO alli Stephanie Babst: This politic ited States the Second World War by The Un established in the aftermath of ts in Eudomestic and economic interes and icy pol ign fore US e anc adv to world has , to put it in a nutshell. Today the rope, and to help rebuild Europe changed; so did the term.
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Is it a more sophisticated way to refer to propaganda? How do you distinguish public diplomacy from propaganda?
What it is about? Is it about the need to sell a country, an organization or an idea? Ino Afentouli: It is about seeking legitimacy from our publics. The public element is very important nowadays. All political activities need to be legitimized by the public, and we need the support and the consensus of public opinion for these politics to be successful. Many policies have failed because they lacked consensus. So public diplomacy is a consensus-driven process, and it reveals the need to engage civil society actors. Diplomacy is not behind closed doors any more. Stephanie Babst: It is about communicating; it is a communication tool. We need to communicate to audiences, because we want to seek a particular degree of support for the policies we are pursuing. George Koumoutsakos: The term remains a little bit blurred. Actually, the term in itself tries to combine and to bridge two contradictory things that are different according to the traditional perception: diplomacy -- which in traditional thinking is closely associated with secrecy and confidentiality -- and public.
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George Koumoutsakos: Propaganda tries to tell people what to think. Propaganda strives to narrow the minds and the options of people; public diplomacy is fundamentally different from propaganda because it also listens to what people have to say. Public diplomacy is interactive; it is democratic, open communication based on a pluralistic approach to exchanging information, while propaganda is very much targeted. There is a one-way message from the center that propagates a message, and this center ignores or does not want to receives feedback. Propaganda’s sole purpose is to disseminate a message and brainwash the audience. It [Public Diplomacy] is a good thing because it is very democratic, interactive; a free exchange of views and information. So it has nothing to do with propaganda. Propaganda is often based on distortion of the truth, while public diplomacy cannot afford to lose its credibility -- it cannot afford not to tell the truth. The example of the Cold War shows precisely what public diplomacy is not, because during the Cold War there was no communication between the two publics, the two blocs: the peoples of the West and the peoples of the Soviet bloc. There was no communication; there was no interaction. Actually, there were only messages coming and going from government to government, governmental
messages, or propaganda messages. So there was no real debate among societies. But now, in our day, what we do, what NATO does, what several European ministers of foreign affairs do, is precisely interacting and discussing -- or trying to persuade, but in a very democratic way -- by listening and debating and arguing with broader audiences. So this is the conclusion from the previous exchange of views: that it was precisely during the Cold War that we had the golden age of propaganda, while nowadays, after the Cold War, it’s the golden age of public diplomacy, because first of all we have the explosive growth of non-state actors -- this is important. So you have other actors coming to the forefront of international relations. You have the meteoric rise of the new media. So there is no more lying. I mean you cannot lie; you cannot distort the truth. People and the media can check your credibility. Stephanie Babst: We are living in democracies, in stable democracies, and that’s a contradiction per se to propaganda. There may be spinning. Ther e may be an attempt to twist a little bit around truth. And I think if we are honest with ourselves, we see that in not only the political sphere of our countries; we see that in the financial and the economic sphere. We have left that behind; we are not living in totalitarian states where you can have state-run machinery that pumps out messages and then there is a consumer audience that has no alternative optioin to access other information. So this is really the wrong framework.
More intellectually put, which are the constituting elements of “public diplomacy”? Kostas Ifantis: We can trace three elements: the perception of the public, the political element, and the strategic element. • Perception of the public It has been said that there is a need to distinguish public diplomacy from propaganda. That’s vital, for those who are engaged in public diplomacy. It’s not only about seeking and securing legitimacy, but it’s about sustaining a steady flow of legitimacy in what they are doing, in what they do, actually, every day. So perception is extremely important, but it’s the public's perception. The public tends to perceive public diplomacy as more or less propaganda. There is always a suspicion of publics, and especially foreign publics, if we agree that public diplomacy is a government process of communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about a better understanding of nations, of countries, of ideas and ideals, of its institutions, as well of its national goals and current policies. There is always a suspicion; suspicion is inherent in international politics, I am afraid, so there is not much we can do about it, except to alleviate this suspicion to a certain extent. So for me, my understanding of public diplomacy is as a manifestation of political communication at an international level, or is a manifestation -- or a new style, if you like -- of managing information at an international political level. So it is basically political communication that encompasses the creation, the distribution, the control, the processing, and the effects of information as a political resource. I mean, that’s how I would define it. • Political element By political, I mean in politics, and in international politics as well, in foreign policy -- which is above all public diplomacy -there is always a notion of political decisions. Our understanding of a political decision is that it’s a decision that is not entirely right, but is right to a certain extent. That’s why all politicians tend to say, that this is a political decision.
How do you communicate something that is not accepted as entirely right or true sometimes? It relates to the notion of political cost. • Strategic element In the literature, you will find that the classical era of public diplomacy was the Cold War, for obvious reasons. Now because of the terrain in which public diplomacy had to evolve during the Cold War, we can certainly talk about strategic public diplomacy. In the sense that is what happened during the past 50 years; a scientific knowledge base was created in such disciplines as communication, journalism, political science, psychology, a knowledge base that was more or less sufficient to guide relatively sophisticated efforts at strategic communication, on a global scale, in an attempt to further the interests of the two superpowers. So there is an inherent strategic dimension in the meaning of public diplomacy. And that creates difficulties for smaller and medium-sized nations in transplanting this knowledge base of public diplomacy that was applied during those years. The other problem is that today things are much more complex. There is a lack of focus. Things are much more blurred after the Cold War, and in most cases there is a need to identify the conditions under which the effectiveness of public diplomacy is minimized or maximized, or even eliminated. And that has to do very much with the attitude of the media, because the media share the perception of public diplomacy as not so much distant from propaganda. They tend to undermine efforts towards public diplomacy, and the effectiveness of very legitimate activities undertaken by governmental communication agencies. Public diplomacy is a government process of communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about better understanding of ideas, ideals, policies, institutions -- and that’s why the job is hard: There is a perception in a large part of the public that public diplomacy borders dangerously on propaganda. That’s why your job is so hard. It’s not just about seeking the truth, otherwise we can take a philosophy course at the university. But it’s also about furthering national interests. And that by definition can generate some degree of suspicion. So to get the message across is structurally hard.
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What does NATO mean by using the term “public diplomacy”? Stephanie Babst: Informing; transmitting certain facts and figures. Engaging; with a longterm effect, building sincere two-way relationships. Interactive; not only telling, but also listening. Advocating; trying to seek the public’s support for a particular policy that the organization is deciding upon.
Are there any pr inciples that guide “pub lic diplomacy”? Stephanie Babs t: Truth; accuracy ; responsiveness; timel y information, espe cially to the media.
What is the relationship between traditional diplomacy and “public diplomacy”? George Koumoutsakos: Traditional diplomacy is about the relationship between the representatives of states or other international organizations or actors, while public diplomacy targets the general public and is about a relationship or creating a relationship between diplomats and foreign societies, and, more specifically, non-official groups, organizations, and individuals. Public diplomacy, at the end of the day, is the relationship between diplomats and the foreign publics with whom they work.
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Who exercises “public diplomacy”? Is it more difficult for a state or for an international organization to exercise “public diplomacy”? Stephanie Babst: Each and every government communicates and needs to communicate, in order to generate adequate public support, parliamentary support, and the like. Yet for international organizations to c ommunicate, and for NATO especially, it is much harder, because their memberstates pursue very different national interests, and generate different national messages towards their audiences. International organizations, including NATO, apply public diplomacy in order to help their political stakeholders, their member countries, to seek the necessary public and parliamentary political support needed for a particular action, for a particular policy, for a particular operation. And that ultimately leads, obviously, to enhancing legitimacy, as part of the normal democratic process. George Koumoutsakos: Defining and exercising public diplomacy for a country, a government, is completely different from what an international organization has to do in this field of public diplomacy. Normally it is much easier for a government or for a ministry to elaborate and develop public diplomacy supporting a policy. But for NATO, where you always need a consensus -- not only a consensus, but unanimity of all member states -- then the process is harder, it’s time-consuming, and sometimes I feel that you have the risk: in order to achieve consensus and unanimity, your message becomes more, not blurred, but you know, this constructive ambiguity thing, so that all people agree. Then the message is not as sharp as it should have been in order to come across and to reach broader audiences. This is a challenge that governments, countries, do not face, because if I want to make a very strong statement, I have to discuss it with my minister, and if it is a very strong message, this should probably be discussed between the minister and the prime minister, but I mean today it takes, at the most, two days of discussion. But for NATO, in order to come to a very clear message, people have first of all to discuss the policy first -- for days and days and weeks, probably months -- and then, probably for weeks and months, discuss the message that you need to build on this message. Fanis Papathanassiou: Public diplomacy in the government or in a ministry is more difficult as a task because one has to deal with very sensitive national issues and the fact that some moves of the government might create problems in terms of its stability. George Koumoutsakos: Actually, the biggest challenge for a spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is that he or she addresses a message to two different audiences: the domestic audience, with all the sensitivities, the taboos, or the preconceptions and everything, and at the same time, the foreign audience; an audience of diplomats, professionals, or think tanks. So a statement that a spokesperson of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs conveys should be very balanced, because, for instance, if you take the name issue, it would be the easiest job for a spokesperson to use a very strong statement when talking about the government of our neighbouring country or about the policies that they implement on this particular issue. And the statements, sometimes, are the easiest thing. You go and you make a very strong statement and everybody in Greece is happy. But the message that goes to the ministries of foreign affairs of other partners, allies, friends, neighbors -- to the professionals that start elaborating and analyzing the statement -- it’s probably not the right message. This is a message that you didn’t want to send. So you need to strike a balance. And this is intellectually a very challenging job, because you cannot afford to lose either of the two audiences; two audiences that have completely different priorities and sensitivities.
Is it an alternative way to pursue foreign policy objectives? Is it a “soft power”? Fanis Papathanassiou: It is clear that “soft power” has redefined America’s policy during the current global financial crisis. Economy is “soft power,” and the American president has no choice but to seek international cooperation in order to control the damage of the international crisis on the American economy. President Bush therefore met in Camp David with President Sarkozy and the president of the European Commission, Mr. Barroso, and they discussed efforts on how to coordinate themselves and methods of cooperation. Europe has in the past used “soft power” to develop its political and economic integration, and under the current circumstances, with the global financial crisis affecting almost every country, Sarkozy and the other European leaders think that it will bear an advantage, while trying to find a modus vivendi with the new kid on the block -- the new American president -- as both sides will rather try to build their relationship on a new basis. The European Union, under the chairmanship of President Sarkozy, gained points for Europe during the past months, due to Sarkozy’s initiative on the conflict between Russia and Georgia; there is no doubt about that. And that happened in a game where the United States is considered as the bigger player in international politics. That was another proof that Bush’s pistol was back in the holster, along with the decision to begin low-level talks with the government in Iran, without any impressive announcements. After many years, the United States has signaled that it now prefers international cooperation instead of explicitly imposing their will on
other countries. America’s foreign policy is changing. It started changing after the congressional elections in 2006, after the Democrats gained control of the Congress, and also when the administration in the United States began to realize that its policy in Iraq had been a failure. Under the Bush administration, the State Department lost its leadership in American strategic foreign policy planning, since neoconservatives like Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Pearl, who treated diplomacy as a waste of time and saw the military pre-emptive strikes as America’s fundamental right, pushed the United States into two wars after the terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre. The campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan resulted in operational and financial catastrophes, and have seemingly been pushed off the neo-conservative agenda. Presidential candidates John McCain and Barack Obama were both interested in a return to diplomacy. Both said that they would shift to rebuilding the image and influence of the United States in the world, and restoring disrupted alliances. Today's agenda for the American president is overloaded: finding common ground with the Europeans on major issues like relations with Russia, NATO expansion, the crisis in Afghanistan and Iran’s nuclear program. Professor Joseph Nye, former chairman of the United States National Intelligence Council, is the man who is going to face the politics of soft power. He said that it’s not going to be easy for Obama and that it will need some time for him to gain Europe’s trust so they can cooperate on various issues. He thinks that the symbol of Obama’s election will do a great deal toward
recovering America’s soft power. But he will have to follow through his policies that show a continuing commitment to Europe and interest in working with Europe, as a partner on the issues. I think the issue for the American president is Russia. And how the two, America and Russia, will compromise; how they will work on regional issues; and finding common ground with Moscow on issues such as terrorism, nuclear weapons and other issues. Their debut will probably be in a NATO Conference -- and the relations with Russia, and membership with Georgia and Ukraine will top of the agenda. The new American president talks a lot about freedom and democracy, he prefers to avoid confrontation, and he builds a consensus around common objectives. He wants the emphasis on issues that appeared after the collapse of the Soviet Union: terrorism, biological warfare, poverty, global warming. So the stakes are very high and he has to work hard by using a new soft power to rebuild the superpower's image. Stephanie Babst: The Nye concept of “soft power” is much broader than “public diplomacy.” I think what Nye means is that as “soft power” seeks to build alliances, I mean through non-coercive means -- and non-coercive means are the absence of military “pressure” type of means. But again, the concept that Joseph Nye has put, in fact, on the table some almost 15 years ago is clearly much broader than “soft power.” So in our debate it’s not really helpful to mix these two terms.
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How can “public diplomacy” reach the “public”? How can the agents overcome the problem of limiting discussions within elite circles? George Koumoutsakos: Only by using all the means that modern technology gives to you. But of course you need a strategy. “Public diplomacy” cannot be just responsive; a reaction -- something happens and you just issue a statement or answer questions from the press. This is the tactical thing. In order to reach broader audiences, you need to have a strategy, to have a clear message. Some people call it branding, but I don't want to go into this. You need to have a clear message, and all the arguments, based on real facts, supporting this message. And then you make use of the possibilities that modern technology gives you, which demands resources and money.
Does the assum “diplomacy is the patription that otic art of lying for one’s co untry” hold true for “public di plomacy”? George Koumouts akos: You cannot lie anymore. What you try to do is to find and propagate, sending out the more interesting and the more conv incing arguments about our policies, and not just trying to influence people. But we spend a lot of tim e trying to find the necessary answers to very important questions, and these an swers should be, and they are, based on rea l facts. Our arguments are based on truth and on real facts, because otherwise we are going to lose our credibility. And then the message does not get across. You lose your audience, you lose your interlocutors, you los e everybody. And this affects your foreign policy negatively.
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If we attempt to avoid any abstract definitions, what does “public diplomacy” mean in practice, and how is this interpreted in our every day lives? Stephanie Babst: In my life, public diplomacy means facilitating dialogue. You know, my division sponsors overall -- in NATO partner countries, in NATO member countries, all across the board -- I would say probably 350-400 conferences, workshops, and seminars. And guess what? There is not only a NATO representative. There is a pluralistic array of representation and viewpoints. And so you may ask, why are you doing that? Why are you facilitating these platforms, these discussion forums? We are doing this because we obviously like to find a forum where we can get our own message across. My message would be, for instance, to talk about Afghanistan, and eventually correct some misperceptions or provide some additional information. But as I said at the very beginning of my remarks, any form of public diplomacy is a two-sided street. So how can I possibly ignore other viewpoints? So clearly I would like to invite the strategic thinkers, the journalists, the academics, the parliamentarians, to have that kind of dialogue. That is public diplomacy. I’ll give you another example. Yesterday, in fact, in our task force on public diplomacy in Afghanistan, we discussed a project that we are very close to implementing, which is a very simple one. Public diplomacy in Afghanistan means opening up Internet cafes for women. Why is that? Not because I want these
women in Herat or Jalalabad to sit there and only Google on the NATO website. I hope they would come across the NATO website, but my message, my public diplomacy message to them is: I want you to access the digital free world of information on the Internet. And as you don’t have the facilities to do that, I make sure that you have that. That’s the public diplomacy project. And I come to a third example; and I can obviously go on and on and on. The let’s say ordinary work of a journalist is obviously to seek up-to-date, timely information as well as background information. So how do I do that, if I would like to not only offer traditional press briefings and press releases and an updated website? I take the journalists, for instance, to the operational theater. You know, we gather a group of journalists and I take them to Afghanistan. And I not only take them to Kabul. I would like to give them a diverse viewpoint. So I take them Jalalabad, I take them to Herat, and even to Kandahar, where it’s really, really tough. You know, it’s a tough place to be. What I am trying to get at here is I think that we have to really get away a little bit from this kind of propaganda-like style -- you know, this is some kind of not really honest notion. No, I think in order to achieve what I think we all agree on, namely to achieve a higher degree of legitimacy, of accountability, of credibility, of transparency, we need to find a way of communication that allows us to get our message across, but at the same time also offers opportunities for others to express their viewpoints. That’s public diplomacy as I understand it, and as I have the pleasure to actually execute.
Is “public diplomacy” perceived the same way in the United States, or is it a rather “dirty job”?
What if the public does not like the political decisions communicated? Stephanie Babst: There is always a political process, and the political process automatically subscribes to our priorities in terms of public diplomacy. We are talking about operations, Afghanistan in the first place; we are talking about enlargementrelated issues, we are talking about relations with Russia, we are talking about what allies are actually concerned with. And that needs to be underpinned with public diplomacy messages. What I unfortunately haven’t yet succeeded in persuading nations is, to get a little bit away from this, old-fashioned focus on messages. Here is the political decision of 26 allies. We want to kind of have a, let’s say, selective form of engagement with Russia. This is the decision, just to come up with an example. Now, do I need to have a political message that is articulated in a typical diplomatic, wishy-washy language, and that I need to then post on the website? If this is the kind of message we are talking about, then yes, for the communication practitioner, for the spokesman, that’s very, very difficult. That’s the political message that allies agreed upon, because it’s the result of consensus-building. But that’s nothing I can sell. If I would speak like that, people would think that I am nuts. So what we need is not a message; it’s a narrative. I need to put the decision in a context. And I, as a communication representative of NATO, need to have the “leeway to put the decision into an explanatory context.” That’s the narrative. That’s also what makes people interested. A narrative seems to me a much better way to do that than to talk about communiqué-type, press release-type messages that you look at eventually, or not.
Stephanie Babst: There are countries, individual governments, who look at public diplomacy a little bit differently than we have discussed it here in this context. And the United States has, right after 9-11, invested a lot of effort, significant, considerable efforts, and resources, into what they now call strategic communications. And strategic communications is a little bit different, I would argue, from our “public diplomacy” understanding, in the sense that it combines the idea not only of advancing interests and getting the message out, but also looking at “public diplomacy”, as the Americans say, as strategic communications, as a key instrument in fighting terrorism. This is what the Office of Strategic Communication has defined as one of its key messages, and if you read the speeches or the statements of Jim Glassman, who was appointed in June to the position of Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy, following Karen Hughes, you find some of his statements a little bit, let’s say, difficult to understand. He for instance said that he would understand himself as the supreme allied commander in the war of ideas. I would never say so about myself , even though I am the Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy of NATO. I would not say my primary purpose is to fight ideas, even though some of these ideas may be extremely bad, like terrorist ideas. So I think you have here a little bit of a different connotation of what strategic communications should actually achieve; and in the Western context it’s clearly, clearly aimed also at fighting international terrorism. And that’s different in Greece, it’s different in my country, it’s different obviously in the overall context of NATO. I think it’s a particular challenge for journalists, for media to cover operations. Here I think it’s much, much harder to sit in Kabul, in Herat or in Kandahar or in Kosovo, and try to get a grip and a good sense of what’s going on, on the operational side, on the military side, than to sit in a nice, Brussels-based bureau and talk about the 150th meeting of the North Atlantic Council; that’s obviously a different thing. And countries have a different approach in NATO, for instance about the policy of embedding. You know, should they offer embedding journalists, in order to actually take them to the front and expose them to Taliban real fighting, real-time fighting? Or is this something that is not really, really wanted? There is a different policy in the member countries; that is to say there is no overall NATO policy. Some countries do it, but the effect is that sometimes stories have not been very favorable for NATO. But you risk that the journalist that you take aboard a helicopter or a tank actually writes what he sees. At least he should write what he or she sees. But that’s just an aspect of the broader problem, I think, but clearly media nowadays trying to cover operations in faraway places such as Afghanistan, in very, very complex, very complex environments, is obviously a hard thing to do. And for organizations such as NATO or the EU, the challenge is to think creatively of what we could do to help the media to get the full story. I mean not one side, but the full spectrum of the story that you will see; and that’s clearly not always easy.
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How do information technology and the speed of media affect “public diplomacy” today? We hear all about good stories; isn’t there a bad one? Stephanie Babst: Well, an example from not too long ago; There was the story of a Canadian embedded journalist, who happened to be part of an ISAF convoy that was ambushed by OMF (opposing military forces) that is the Taliban. The Canadian soldiers weren’t able to defend themselves, so they called close air support. Close air support provided in that respect by our American or British or other friends meant that at the end of the day there were civilian casualties, local civilian casualties. I am not saying that there is an automatism whenever there is close air support that you get automatically civilian casualties. Nor am I am advocating that it was the journalist's fault. Absolutely not. But he just experienced what none of the military would like to really say with great pleasure and great joy: that unfortunately people died from the provision of close air support. Were the guys in the aircraft the guilty ones? No, because the Taliban were the ones attacking the convoy. But that’s the story. The media, in that respect, the journalist, is not interested in it. He’s not interested to say here I am with my Canadian colleagues, and see how they were ambushed and how they were threatened. No, the sexiest story that he can sell is here is NATO one more time producing civilian casualties. That’s a bad media story for us. So that’s why I’m saying countries are ambivalent about, whether they should embed journalists or not.
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Stephanie Babst: Public diplomacy in the 21st-century is much harder to do than it was in the ‘90s. We all know about the evolution of information technologies. You know that the global information environment has become so speedy, so diverse, so pluralistic, and had never been like that before. And all these new media applications, the Facebooks, the LinkedIns, on the social network applications that do exist, offer totally new forms of communication. And that form of communication is a very personalized, a very customized, a very interactive form of communication. The old government-to-government style information cannot be applied in a digital world. “Here I am, telling you what you need to think.” And eventually you buy it or you don’t buy it. We would need to come to grips to use some of these new media applications that would help us reach out to broader, large audiences other than the strategic narrowly defined communities that we used to interact with for some time. George Koumoutsakos: It is true that with the spectacular development of the various media -- you mentioned some -- the communication environment has become and is becoming more and more chaotic. So you have many sources disseminating messages; most of the time contradictory messages. You have different tools to do your job, but these tools are also the tools of the other side -- I mean in this dialogue and argument and counterargument. So the communication environment is really chaotic. But when dealing with day-to-day public diplomacy, one should not be overwhelmed by this reality. This is the reality; these are the rules of the game. You should not lose your temper, and you should never lose sight of what you want to say. So of course the environment is chaotic, but we have to deal with it. And probably sometimes it’s a positive thing, because it’s more democracy, more dialogue, more discussion. But the direct result is that you need to be more prepared. Let’s say your arguments need to be well structured; you need to be more prepared for this chaotic dialogue. Otherwise, you are running the risk of not getting the message across. It is a challenge, but it is a challenge that we have to meet in our daily jobs. It’s the same challenges for journalists. Because when they want to cover a story -- and at the same time that they want to cover a story in a proper way, in a professional way -- they have to elaborate various messages coming from all possible sides. So if you want to cover an event with some credibility, from a press point of view, you have to be in a position to distinguish what is serious, what is not serious, what is trustworthy, what is not. So this chaotic communication environment is a challenge for us. It’s a challenge for the press. It’s a challenge for the audience, for the public, because they need to be in a more alert position, and try not to become the victims of this chaotic environment. So it’s difficult, but this is the reality. You cannot change reality. And since we are talking about public diplomacy and instruments of public diplomacy, I would dare to say that Barack Obama personified, is himself a tool of public diplomacy. Ino Afentouli: He is the medium and the message, at the same time. Stephanie Babst: What we suffer, and I’ll be absolutely frank with you, is from a totally old-fashioned technology of data management that doesn’t allow the current website, as it is, to do a lot of interaction. If I or we put on a nice 10-minute video, and I added a second and a third, it would crash. It’s very, very simply said. So what I mean is that we don’t lack the general understanding to really also offer these kinds of more interactive things, but we simply don’t have the technical facilities at this stage to do that.So what we have started doing is to outsource blogging to those sites where we think the people interested in transatlantic issues would actually go to. And they are numerous in the field of academic strategic community, they are in the Atlantic Treaty Association. So we try to outsource that a little bit to offer these fora.
What is the state of affairs in “public diplomacy” in Greece? What are the contemporary challenges of “public diplomacy”? How can you always be the “good guy”? Ino Afentouli: We are talking about a different international environment, so different tools. And the roles are different. In the Cold War era, you had defined roles, in a way: the bad guys, the good guys, and so on. For a country or for an organization, roles can alternate in a few months’ time. One semester you can be the good guy, and one semester you can be the bad guy. So if you would like to constantly be the good guy, which I very much doubt, you have to work on that, not only in terms of image; you have to work in terms of substance as well. So the new international environment, the media, and the non-governmental actors push the international organizations and the national actors to act reasonably and to add substance to their policies, because otherwise they are going to lose the game. Another difficult challenge for all of us, both national and international actors, is that we must at the same time defend both national and supranational interests. And this goes for NATO and it goes also for the EU. And if NATO is “the bad guy,” the EU normally is the good guy, but the EU has an image problem as well. So this is why we have to defend both national and supranational interests, and this is more complicated. And this is why we need, for common policies, a common language. And to seek a common language is by definition a more democratic process. Fortunately, you are knowledgeable about the processes in NATO and in the EU, and you know that for a comma or for a word, nations can spend more than one session to come to agreement. So this is not what a democratic process should be.
George Koumoutsakos: In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece, four years ago there was the Department of Information and Communication. Actually, that was a very small department; a five or six-person department that actually was the support staff of the spokesperson, and that was all. Slowly, and having very much debated the notion of public diplomacy, we have started changing the way we go about our daily business -- we have started changing our working culture. And after four years, now we are in a position to say that we see some progress. Actually, in the new organogram of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece, now this old Information and Communication Department has been renamed, and the department is actually the Information and Public Diplomacy Department. And we have incorporated into this department the ministry's website; we organize some side events -- for instance, inviting foreign speakers or ambassadors. We have now launched this initiative of organizing these Ambassadors’ Forum meetings where we give the floor to other ambassadors of other countries. This is exactly what I said before. It’s not propaganda, because now we have asked other people to explain to us their views about important foreign policy issues, in trying to build bridges and increase understanding. So this is a completely new field of action for us, and I know that many ministries in the EU and in NATO countries -- some of them are much more developed in this particular field; others, like us, have recently started working on this. But I hope that, at least for our ministry, we will slowly reach a change of working culture. At least the young diplomats and the young generations are much more receptive to this new dimension of their mission and their work. But, for instance, just to mention something, we need to have a media training program for our diplomats, because when they are posted abroad, they will meet the press. They will face some cameras or questions. Not all diplomats have the skills to be cool when meeting the press. They don’t know the techniques. They give long answers. They cannot sell the right message. So this is a question of training. And so far, we have not had a media training program in the ministry. We have slowly started debating, and there is a lot of discussion inside the ministry on how we can do it, when we can do it, if we have the resources, if we have the money to start such a program. But I think that this is a positive message: that we have started talking about it. So this is what I could contribute at this stage of the discussion, from a very practical point of view.
Is “public diplomac
y” necessary?
Kostas Ifantis: I ve ry deeply believe that public diplomacy is an essential tool in foreig n policy and internatio nal politics, because it can sort of fight off the inherent uncertain ty that exists in international politics and it can be blamed for disputes, competition and conflicts sometim s es. Public diplomacy, when conducted at a professional level, can make international po litics less foggy.
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NATO at
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The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has in its 60-year history seen several successful rounds of enlargement. In the post-cold war era, NATO enlargement could for some time be seen as an unproblematic endeavor. It was quicker than the process of EU enlargement and required fewer and more easily accomplished reforms. But after 2004, when, among others, Romania, Bulgaria and Slovenia were brought in, further NATO enlargement became more complicated. NATO enlargement is gradually entering the grey zone of political uncertainty and tough political choices. And the complex reality of the Western Balkans means that there are no easy answers to policy problems. Enlargement to the Western Balkans: the current state of play One needs to be careful from the outset when considering NATO enlargement. Is this a strategic choice that states and societies do? Does it have the same meaning for all? Or even is it desirable by all? The very use of the uniform term ‘Western Balkans’ does not do justice to the plurality and complexity of the different accession cases. Croatia has successfully reformed but has questionable public support for accession. Albania is close to joining the Alliance but the sustainability of its reforms is questionable. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has serious internal problems and at the same time it has
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and the
by Ioannis Armakolas
failed to strike a compromise with Greece on the name dispute. Bosnia and Herzegovina has serious internal divisions that seem only to grow with time. Similarly, newly-independent Kosovo is internally divided; despite the pro-Western orientation of its Albanian majority, Kosovo is unlikely to intensify formal relations with NATO, not least because it is still not recognized by all Alliance member states. Montenegro does not have the internal problems of other countries but its population is clearly opposed to accession. Finally, Serbia is even uncertain about the level of relations it wishes to maintain with NATO and is the country least likely to join the Alliance in the near future. The cases of Serbia and Montenegro already introduce us to the riddles of NATO enlargement. Serbia is a pivotal country for the security and stability of
the whole region; Jelena Radoman’s article in this special section provides an overview of the current status of the multifaceted relations with NATO. And the puzzle of Montenegro’s internal politics with regards to NATO accession is presented in this special section by the article of Nedjeljko Rudovic. Both authors demonstrate the obvious point --which is often overlooked: the integration of the whole Western Balkans in the Alliance is neither a straightforward task nor necessarily a development desirable by all. By outlining the state of play the authors in this special section also provide insights into the intricate relationship between the accession process and the actual appeal of the Alliance. The latter is not a given. Unlike EU membership, which evokes economic benefits, visa free travel and tangible improvements to ordinary people’s
lives, NATO membership often makes more sense to policy makers versed in the realities of international politics. Accession to NATO is often an elite sponsored and a leadership driven process. Still, it is a process not always adequately and effectively managed by political leaderships. The public opinion is often formed in complete isolation from real policy dilemmas and in ways not favorable for Euro-Atlantic integration. This can be seen in Montenegro where a clear majority of the political personnel is pro-accession but is failing to properly inform or persuade the anti-NATO Montenegrin public; in contrast to the strong leadership exhibited during the independence drive the leading Montenegrin parties seem to follow public opinion in the question of NATO accession. Public support for NATO accession What is then the level of public support for NATO accession? The complex picture of the Western Balkans is reflected in the differing rate of public support in different countries. In Croatia public support for NATO accession was generally below 50 percent until early 2009 when the Slovenes threatened to block Zagreb’s NATO accession; the recently observed inflated support of around 60percent is a reflection of the dispute with Ljubljana. In Bosnia and Herzegovina the generally high public support of about 74percent is
broken down to 89percent among Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats and only 34percent among Bosnian Serbs; this is telling not only for the serious internal divisions still troubling the country but also of the controversies surrounding the Alliance’s enlargement. In the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia the support rate is generally high, but consistently and significantly higher among Albanians than among Macedonians. In addition, there is a huge divide in opinions between the two nations when it comes to the name dispute with Greece. 69 percent of Albanians are willing to accept a name change for securing NATO accession, while only 3 percent of Macedonians are ready to accept the same. In Serbia, public support for NATO accession is at 26.1percent with half of the population being against it. In Montenegro public support for NATO accession has been in steady decline since independence and has recently reached 26.9 percent; having started from a slight disadvantage, opponents are now nearly twice as many as supporters of NATO accession. In contrast, public support for NATO accession is overwhelming in Kosovo and Albania. It is not difficult to outline a continuum of Alliance appeal; this continuum further illustrates the complexity of the policy questions in the region. It is also a reminder of the fact that, unlike the situation in other regions, perceptions of NATO are also formed through traumatic experiences of the postcold war era. The tragic Balkan wars of the 1990s were terminated after concerted efforts by the Western-led international community. The trajectory of the Balkan conflicts, the way these were put to an end, the ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’ the West made
on the way, and the feelings of victimhood created, all have bearing on the way that the Alliance is perceived. NATO in the Western Balkans is not merely a security organization; it has a recent history of policies and involvements in the region. Going back to the continuum, at one end we find the Albanian populations in several Western Balkan states, who are overwhelming supporters of accession. The Albanians remain the most pro-Western and pro-American nation in the region; this is a legacy of both the developments during the 1990s wars and a history of leaving together with more powerful and often aggressive neighbors. At the other end of the continuum stand the Serb populations in four Western Balkan states and a good part of the Montenegrins, who are overwhelmingly against accession. Despite the positive developments and the improvements in the relations with the West in recent years the two nations remain largely impenetrable for the Alliance. The experience of the 1990s and the opposition, political and military, to the West still influences the Serbian, and to a lesser extent Montenegrin, public opinion; at the same time, the handling of the Kosovo
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status issue also contributed to the alienation of especially the Serbs. In between the two sides of the continuum stand the rest of the groups, such as Croats, Bosnian Croats, Bosniaks, and Macedonians, who are largely in favor or NATO accession but not always strongly so. The relative appeal of the Alliance depends on the perceived advantages that the accession will bring with regards to the key concerns of the different groups. Thus, Croats, being more affluent and not having serious internal security problems, have the luxury to have a more dispassionate view of NATO membership; Bosniaks, fearful for the future of their country and knowing that the West has kept it together in the most difficult of times, are much more supportive of accession. Providers and consumers of security, and the role of reforms For the Western allies, anxious to mobilize resources for other military hotspots, it is important that the future Western Balkan members are in position to provide security outside their borders. The NATO aspirants have tried in recent years to lobby for faster accession by showing their readiness to take part in Western-led out of area operations. Armies that until a few years ago were still fighting civil wars have more recently tried to find new roles in places such as Iraq, Af-
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ghanistan and The Democratic Republic of the Congo. The NATO aspirants, including Kosovo which is still to reach the starting point of formal relations, stress their potential contribution to the Alliance’s military goals. The promise of soon becoming net providers of security though is largely misplaced. Status issues remain open and tensions with neighbors are still commonplace; leaderships still routinely resort to ethnonationalist populism in response to policy problems; elites and societies have failed to initiate processes of dealing with their traumatic past; reforms remain weak and often unsustainable; and almost all the countries in the region have failed to spark extensive economic growth and as the global economic crisis looms, societal divisions are more likely to further sharpen. Despite the wishes of the NATO aspirants the complex balance sheet of security remains negative for the region. It is still much more likely that the Western Balkans will in the foreseeable future remain a net security consumer. And what is the role of security sector reform in the NATO accession process? Do reforms actually matter? All articles in this special section present a series of extensive reforms undertaken by the NATO aspirants. In some countries, like for example Bosnia and Herzegovina, these constitute key post-war success stories. But the champions of reform are still held back but seemingly unrelated points of contention. Neighboring member states seem to have the upper hand; even if, as in the case of Slovenia, they joined the Alliance only very recently. The bitterness felt in countries like Croatia and the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is understandable. So is the realization, as in the case of Croatia, that the reforms are better seen as necessary for the country itself rather than for NATO. But the question remains: do reforms actually matter for enlargement, and if so, how? When it comes to enlargement, what balance can be struck between the interests of the Alliance as a whole and those of its individual member states? Expectations Differing views and historical trajectory of different nations in the region point also to different expectations from the accession process and the Alliance itself. The articles by Boris Georgievski and Julian Memetaj capture the high expectations that Skopje and Tirana respectively confer to their relations with NATO and the eventual membership. For both countries NATO membership is an affirmation of their Western orientation and the securing of their place in the turbulent Balkan neighborhood, which has historically produced tensions and conflicts. The expectations from membership are also tied to the different security concerns. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, which experienced a bloody civil war at the onset of its
independence, as well as in the newly-independent Kosovo, NATO membership is often perceived as an affirmation of statehood and territorial integrity. Similarly, in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia stability tops the list of positive outcomes expected from NATO membership. But Ilir Deda’s article on Kosovo in this section points also to a different set of expectations; the current politico-security predicament in Kosovo is linked to the incomplete implementation of post-Kosovo war Kumanovo agreement and the UN Security Council Resolution 1244. For Ilir Deda the current state of division in Kosovo can be traced back to NATO’s “unfinished business” in the country. Incorporating new disputes Interestingly, future Western Balkan enlargements will create a situation whereby the new allies’ security concerns will come from within the Alliance. A common point for Western Balkan countries is that the threats (real or perceived) to their security come either from within or from the immediate neighborhood comprising fellow NATO aspirants. This is of course quite a departure from the situation that NATO encountered in its 1999 and 2004 waves of enlargement. But it is not a novel situation for the Alli-
ance. Greece and Turkey have been members of the Alliance since 1952. For most of this period, and especially after the Turkish intervention in Cyprus in the 1970s, Greece has considered the threats to its security coming not from the Warsaw Pact countries in its north but from its eastern NATO ally. Analysts point to the fact that joint membership in Western institutions did much to ameliorate Greek-Turkish tensions. Still, the EU accession of Cyprus casts doubt over the argument that the membership in such institutions will contribute to the resolution of internal conflict. It is of course too early to reach definite conclusions about Cyprus. But, as things stand at the moment, one cannot but be pessimistic. Far from contributing to a quick resolution, Nicosia’s EU accession strengthened the rejectionists and led to the wasting of the best chance for re-unification that the divided island had for decades. If membership fails to diffuse tensions, or may even potentially contribute to their persistence, then the complex politico-security situation of the Western Balkans has the potential to create an explosive mix within the Alliance. The NATO accession of the Western Balkans will signal the multiplication of disputes or potential disputes that will have to be dealt with within the Alliance. A preview of this maybe the disputes between Alliance aspirants Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and members Slovenia and Greece respectively. The articles by
Senada Šelo Šabić and Boris Georgievski in this section powerfully capture the mood in the two candidate states after 2008 Bucharest summit. Senada Šelo Šabić in her article on Croatia correctly stresses the fact that the Alliance does not possess mechanisms to deal with such disputes. The prospect of a further enlarged NATO, and the subsequent multiplication of local and regional disputes, will make the devising of alternative mechanisms an imperative. In conclusion, the road for the next NATO enlargements may prove bumpy. The task of incorporating the Western Balkans will be a challenging one for the Alliance. But as Damir Hadzic points out in his article, people tend to forget the horrors of war and the benefits of peace. European and EuroAtlantic integration of the region, which has gone through the tragedy of the 1990s wars, is imperative for its final stabilization and normalization. Sustained efforts from both the Western institutions and the candidate states themselves have to be pursued. And the challenges, problems and obstacles have to be put on the agenda and openly discussed. This special section hopes to contribute to the opening up of the debates. Ioannis Armakolas holds an ESRC Post-Doctoral Fellow, in the Department of Politics and International Relations & Research Fellow, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
dialogue
Albanian Regatta towards NATO by Julian Memetaj
It is often asserted that Ottoman Empire legacies and communist regime policies had profoundly weakened the institutions and administrative capacity of Albania. In 1912, Baron d’Estournelles thought that Ottoman-ruled Albania was “more widely separated from Europe than Europe from America.” Notwithstanding this, nowadays the democratic forces risen from the “ashes” of the old regime have considerably overlapped the trap of historical determinism and unanimously pledged the range of joining the Euro-Atlantic institutions. As a matter of fact, for democratic elites, anchoring Albania firmly to NATO -- the world’s most successful military alliance -- constitutes a laudable aim. In April 2008 Albania was invited to
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start accessions talks with NATO; and on July 9, 2008, NATO allies signed protocols on Albania’s accession to the North Atlantic Treaty. However, prior to this status, NATOAlbania relations date back to 1992, when Albania joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC, later renamed the EuroAtlantic Partnership Council in 1997). The NACC was created by NATO as a means of reaching out to the countries of the Warsaw Pact (Albania was a founding member of the pact), as well as the new states born from the demise of the Soviet Union. NATO-Albania relations
evolved further when Albania joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 1994. During this time span, Albania has been regarded as an important actor in supporting Allied efforts to end the humanitarian tragedy in Kosovo and establishing peace after the air campaign. Additionally, bilateral cooperation has been decisively forged after the country’s membership aspirations and its participation in the Membership Action Plan (MAP) since April 1999. Last but not least, while the ratification process remains ongoing, it is expected that Albania will manage to fulfill the required criteria in time for the StrasburgKehl Summit so that it can be a full member of the Alliance. Lastly, NATO HQ Tirana was established in 2002 to contribute to the KFOR command and also provides advice, assistance, and support to the Albanian
government in its defense efforts. Extending a “hand of friendship” across the old East-West divide, NATO is trying to integrate former adversaries into Euro-Atlantic structures. Post-Cold War developments shifted the interest of the international community toward closer cooperation on security issues and democratic reforms. In this context, pursuing an open door policy, NATO provides transatlantic political-military framework for managing security challenges, linking European and North American interests as well as balancing those of its individual member countries. For Albanians, Euro-Atlantic integration, based on solidarity and democratic values, constitutes a necessary asset for long-term stability and prosperity. Respect for democracy and human rights and
combating international terrorism and the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction echoes the joint political willingness in domestic affairs. Furthermore, the sense that a Balkan country belongs to the Euro-Atlantic family, if not an end in itself, certainly marks a milestone in the history of the country. And that striking political contingency and aspiration by elites is matched by the overwhelming support of the Albanian population. Still, transition is easier said than done. Political culture, the impact of the wars of the 1990s, political fragmentation, bitter tribal feuding, social parochialism, and chronic backwardness hang over Albania’s wide network of security relationships. President Berisha hopes that joining NATO will help him change Albania’s reputation for corruption and lawlessness. Sui generis, the sharpest Euro-Atlantic criticisms of the country’s successful entry into NATO are directed at the country’s judicial system and Albania’s effort to dismantle the obsolete arsenal. The outcomes related to the blast of army depot in the village of Gerdec signals a credibility test for NATO. The general election is scheduled to take
place in four months. The governing parties will capitalize on the success achieved in the field of economics. At the same time, the success of joining the Alliance in the next summit will give robust credentials to the governing parties in their competition with the opposition; and so far, there is no reason to believe that Albania will not join the Alliance. The notion that the “future of Albania is in the Euro-Atlantic community” is articulated broadly on the domestic front. However, as in all post-communist transition countries, the political losers (former communist nomenclature) seek to become the economic winners. In addition, in the long run, they never overcome the stigma of being agents of foreign domination in the eyes of the majority of the people. Albanians must consciously understand that security reform is as much about trust, dialogue, and mutual cooperation, as it is about interdependence and integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. Julian Memetaj holds an MA in Political Science, University of Nottingham.
dialogue
The View from Kosovo by Ilir Deda
Ten years ago, on the eve of its 50th anniversary, NATO conducted an air campaign against Serbia (then the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, FRY) to end crimes against humanity, and the war in Kosovo. NATO’s intervention in Kosovo marked the introduction of the doctrine of “humanitarian intervention” in international affairs. Ten years ago, at the Washington Summit, NATO adopted a new strategy concept envisaging NATO intervention “out of area” in a caseby-case manner, without the approval of United Nations Security Council (UNSC). This was a major shift in NATO’s post-Cold War policy. Nevertheless, this provision has been used only once so far, in the case of Kosovo. NATO finished the war with the FRY by signing the Military-Technical Agreement (MTA)
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in Kumanovo (Macedonia) in 1999, which asked for full withdrawal of the Yugoslav and Serbian security and military apparatus from Kosovo. UNSC Resolution 1244 mandated NATO with the “enforcement of peace, external security and joint exercise of law enforcement with UNMIK.” Ten years later, NATO still has unfinished business in Kosovo. On the eve of its 60th anniversary, NATO’s role in Kosovo is changing after Kosovo’s declaration of independence. Technically Kosovo fulfills the necessary conditions to become a member of Partnership for Peace (PfP). It has democratically elected institutions, a free market economy, and a comprehensive legal framework which protects human and minority rights. Furthermore, unlike many PfP members, Kosovo also has civilian and parliamentary oversight mechanisms to monitor security forces and agencies. In addition, the new Kosovo Security Force (KSF) -- an emergency response and gendarmerie-style force comprising 2,500 active members and 800 lightly armed reservists -- is in the process of development under the full auspices and supervision of KFOR/NATO. The KSF is expected to become fully operational by 2013-2014. Kosovo’s political elite and public opinion
entirely support Euro-Atlantic integration for the country (almost 80%). Kosovo, along with Albania, is the only country in the region which does not have dilemmas of identity and political orientation in terms of belonging to the East or the West. ProWestern forces are established across the political spectrum, and no political figure questions the state’s Euro-Atlantic integration. Also, the role that the United States of America has played in Kosovo’s recent history has imbued in the people and political leadership a strong feeling of friendship and pro-American sentiment unprecedented in Europe nowadays. Some influential members of the US Congress, like Eliot Engel, think that “an independent Kosovo will be the best US ally in Europe.” Kosovo is the single state in the wider Euro-Atlantic area that is not a PfP member. Kosovo’s progress toward NATO integration
is blocked by four member countries which oppose its independence -- Spain, Greece, Slovakia, and Romania. This may have negative consequences for the state-building process in Kosovo, and regional security. Being isolated from defense and security cooperation, Kosovo is disabled from becoming a net provider of security, and instead remains a long-term bargain for NATO as a major absorber of security in the Euro-Atlantic area. Also, the lack of perspectives for NATO (and European) integration will encourage Serbia to take concrete steps which already are undermining Kosovo’s security and stability, and thus that of the region. In this respect, Serbia’s end goal -- partition of Kosovo along the Ibar River -- will gain importance. One of the biggest failures of KFOR/NATO was full implementation of the provisions of Article 1, point 3.c of the Military Technical Agreement of Kumanovo (1999). This point of the agreement calls for full withdrawal of, among others, all personnel of the “intelligence services, Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs local, special and other police.” During the last decade, Serbia’s police and intelligence services members have operated throughout Serbian settlements in Kosovo, whereas in northern Serbian-controlled Kosovo, they have openly exercised police and intelligence activities. This has resulted in a complete lack of rule of law and security in northern Kosovo. Numerous incidents and violent acts have taken place in the first three months
of 2009, especially in northern Mitrovica. This part of Kosovo has become a haven for organized crime and smuggling. Success in establishing the rule of law in this area will also determine the success of KFOR and the EU’s largest ESDP mission -- EULEX Kosovo. The prevalent attitude of KFOR and EULEX is to maintain the status quo that is turning the north of Kosovo into a quite “frozen conflict,” supervised by the international community. This division on the ground will have a longterm impact on the stability not only of Kosovo, but of the overall region, considering the fragility of Macedonia and Bosnia. This situation will prepare the ground for a rise of desire among nationalist camps in the Balkans for the region-wide redrawing of borders along ethnic lines. Aware of the major threat that Kosovo’s continued division poses for regional stability, Albania, Macedonia, and Montenegro have jointly opposed any possible scenario for the partition of Kosovo. But the Balkans ought to be
the success story of NATO and the EU, not only for the sake of the region, but also for these institutions’ current and future missions in the world. The supervisory role of NATO and EU should change from one of supervision to one of partnership with Kosovo. The capacity of Kosovo’s authorities, their political commitment, as well as the level of unity of the EU and NATO in supporting the independence of Kosovo will determine when the level of supervision will be diminished in favor of increasing the partnership and eventual full integration of Kosovo within these two organizations. Ilir Deda is Research Director, KIPRED.
dialogue
Croatia awaits
to Join NATO Since the year 2000, when it joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP), and since 2002, when it joined the Membership Action Program, Croatia has undertaken a series of critical steps to reform its military and bring it in line with NATO standards. The military structure formed in the war proved inappropriate for the country’s security needs in peacetime as well as for its new role on the regional and international levels. The need for deep structural reforms was essential for Croatia, with or without the vision of NATO membership. The prospect of joining NATO, however, gave these necessary reforms context and a timetable, a framework which facilitated the process of transformation that would have otherwise lacked vigor and genuine commitment. The goal of joining NATO and the European Union has been a strategic priority of the Croatian government and is supported by all major political parties. In the context of military reform, Croatia has fulfilled a series of tasks -- some of them quite painful, particularly in the light of the recent war. Yet key objectives -- such as downsizing the number of troops (an agonizing task),
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shortening the chain of command, professionalizing the army, reorganizing reserve troops, introducing a comprehensive military education system, building up the military infrastructure, integrating logistics, and overall modernization -- have largely been accomplished. The initial reform stage also concentrated on restructuring, equipping, and training individuals and troops that could take part in NATO/PfP missions. Thereafter sustaining and expanding this training unit has remained the strategic orientation. Croatia has been contributing troops to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan since 2003, initially with a 50-member unit, increasing over time its contingent and making further pledges. Recently, the Croatian government listed troops and equipment that it will make available to collective defense once it is a full member of NATO. The list also contains 50 partnership goals that Croatia will realize by 2017. The Croatian government misses no opportunity to stress that, once a recipient of military intervention, the country has turned into a provider of the same. In
by Senada Šelo Šabić
other words, Croatia has made a full swing from an importer to an exporter of security. Yet taking part in military missions has been the most contested issue in Croatia’s public debate over joining NATO, the prevalent theme being the concern that Croatian soldiers would be dying for other countries’ goals. Apart from those who a priori reject any military engagement, particularly in the NATO context, there is a substantial and quite stable percentage of citizens who reject NATO membership out of fear of the cost of membership, its potential effect on tourism, the possibility that it would create security threats that Croatia would not otherwise have to contend with, and so on. The government does not address these concerns efficiently, leaving it to external dynamics to shape public opinion. The level of support never rose over
50% until the beginning of 2009, when it escalated due to the crisis caused by the decision of the Slovenian nationalists led by Marjan Podobnik to initiate a procedure to collect signatures to hold a referendum to bloc Croatian accession to NATO. The first opinion polls on NATO accession were run in 2003, and since then, the number of those for and against accession increased, respectively, while the number of the undecided decreased. In 2008, opinion polls showed that 43% were in favor of Croatia joining NATO, 34% opposed this, and roughly one-fifth was undecided. In February 2009, however, a new poll registered a significant rise in the number of those in favor of NATO accession, with nearly 60% support. This result should be interpreted in light of the abovementioned crisis in relations between Slovenia and Croatia, and therefore understood as temporary. The inability of the Slovenian parliament to ratify the accession protocol without impediments so that Croatia and Albania could join NATO at the summit in April highlights the fact that NATO possesses no internal mechanisms to deal with situa-
tions like this. The capacity for one member to veto a move approved by the rest of the organization’s members, as was previously the case with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and now with Croatia, brings into question the entire accession procedure -- if a country satisfies all conditions only to be denied entry over an unrelated issue, what message does this send to other candidates? Do your homework, carry out painful reforms but bear in mind that accomplishing
all prerequisites may not matter, for in the end your entry may hinge on any superfluous issue an existing member of the organization decides to deem as pertinent. The only consolation may come in a form of self-rationalization -- reforms were first and foremost for us, with or without NATO. Although a widespread opinion is that this crisis will be successfully resolved, a bitter aftertaste will remain. It will certainly contribute to the debate on the future of NATO. Senada Šelo Šabić is a research fellow, Institute for International Relations Zagreb.
dialogue
DFID
Bosnia Herzegovina
Some memories fade with time. Not this one. What just a few minutes ago sounded like distant thunder is now the distinct sound of explosions. In the midst of the war, the Bosnian Army and Croatian Defense Council are fighting with the Republika Srpska Army for the control of a near-empty city. Villages around town are almost all destroyed, with scores of people killed or forced to leave. We take our positions in near darkness behind the burned shell of a former spa and wait and listen. Thunder is nearing and we take shelter… and then it started… It is winter 2009, and my car follows the winding road, between orchards and empty fields. I let my mind wander back to 1993 and the first trip to Gradacac, a small town in northern Bosnia. That winter, Gradacac was the scene of some of the fiercest fighting during the war in Bosnia. Almost 14 years since the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord, military reform is one of the few post-war success stories. Following demobilization of more than 200,000 combatants, in 2001 the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) issued a white paper expressing clear political will to work toward full NATO membership.
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Despite demilitarization, the three armies that fought the war maintained their structures. While NATO-led forces were guarantors against reemergence of conflict, it was evident that such a situation is not viable and represents a potential security risk. The presidency acknowledged the need to reform existing military structures, improve civilian oversight, and bring all aspects of military organization in line with NATO standards. Early in 2003, the BiH Defense Reform Commission was formed, and soon after, in December 2003, the first BiH Law on Defense was enacted. The law set a legal basis for establishment of the BiH Ministry of Defense in March 2004. The first public sign that the reform is taking the right direction occurred in May 2004. For the first time since the war, the three armies met in the battlefield, this time to conduct a joint military exercise. It was a telling sign for BiH citizens that a new phase of interethnic relations, growing confidence, and a joint vision of future was taking the place of past animosities.
by Damir Hadzic
The 2004 NATO summit sent a clear message to Bosnia and Herzegovina to maintain progress toward the establishment of unified armed forces. In 2005, the BiH Presidency decided to send the country’s first delegation of armed forces to support operation Iraqi Freedom. BiH also contributed troops to UN missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Ethiopia/Eritrea, and is currently considering sending troops to Afghanistan. The final structure of the BiH Armed Forces was established in July 2006. It was decided that the optimal structure would have 10,000 professional soldiers, 1,000 civilian personnel, and 5,000 reserves. That same year, BiH was formally admitted into the Partnership for Peace (PfP). Currently, BiH has fulfilled around 85% of the obligations from the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP). The 2008 NATO summit called on BiH to continue intensified dialogue with NATO in order to meet all the preconditions for the Membership Action Plan (MAP). Ever since the reform began, the general public was overwhelmingly in support of NATO membership. However, as with many other segments of life in BiH, opinion polls vary based on ethnicity. Recently conducted polls suggest that 74% of BiH
citizens support accession to NATO. That support is close to 89% among Croats and Bosniaks, while only 34% of Serbs support NATO membership. This difference is easily explained when taking into account the role NATO played in ending the war in 1995, during bombing campaigns against Serbia and in Kosovo. Recent, closer economic and political ties between Serbia and Russia, and speculation over Serbia’s military neutrality are affecting the sentiments among Serbs in BiH. Croats’ support is closely linked to the expectation of full membership for Croatia, while Bosniaks’ support of NATO ascension recently experienced a gradual decline as a result of Bosniaks’ perceived solidarity with fellow Muslims in Afghanistan. It is clear that this trend will continue for the time being and that external influences will shape public opinion in BiH. Nevertheless, of all the challenges ahead, two seem to be predominant: constitutional reform and fiscal stability. In order to become an EU and NATO can-
didate, BiH has to reform its constitution and ensure lasting stability for state structures. At the moment, there is no political consensus over the scope of constitutional reform. Similarly, the effect of the global economic downturn will significantly affect BiH’s ability to maintain the operational capabilities of its armed forces. It is evident that spending will have to increase in order to ensure full compliance with NATO standards. As with the constitutional reform, political consensus for any increase in military spending will be difficult to achieve. …I stop at the traffic light. Instead of going straight to Gradacac’s center, I turn and instantly I am in front of the reconstructed spa and garden overlooking the town. Today, Gradacac is a center of economic revival, and a place where people come from all sides to do business. Scars left by the war are still visible, but nobody seems to notice them. Normality has replaced war
and destruction. The political and military reforms of the past decade are far from people’s minds, regardless of how much they contributed to the remarkable transformation the city has experienced since winter 1993. And I can’t help but notice how easily we tend to forget the horrors of war and the benefits of peace… Damir Hadzic is a public sector reform specialist based in Sarajevo.
dialogue
gilding by Boris Georgievski
It’s been almost a year since the last NATO summit in Bucharest. Three Balkan nations were eagerly awaiting the verdicts from the Romanian capital on April 3 of last year. All of them had invested a lot in the “project” called NATO membership. Eighteen years have passed since the fall of communism in Croatia, Macedonia and Albania, in which years those three nations have made a somewhat successful transition from civil war and chaos into more or less modern democracies, with all of their imperfections and flaws. Croatia and Albania got their prize for almost two decades of painful institutional reforms and transition from planned to an open market economy. Macedonia didn’t. For Albanians and Croatians, the invitation to join NATO was the final step toward their membership in the free and modern world; for Macedonia it represented even more. It was seen as a final step toward the recognition of the sole existence of their country and their nation after spending centuries as a fuse for the Balkan powder keg. It was simply meant to cement Macedonia’s existence as one of the rare and truly multiethnic
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states in a region built of pure nations with a history of ethnic cleansing and bloodshed. Ever since the breakup of former Yugoslavia in 1991, Macedonia’s name and history has been the object of a dispute between Athens and Skopje. After Greece strongly objected to Macedonia’s entry into the United Nations under that name, the country was admitted in 1993 under the provisional term “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” (FYROM) pending a solution to the dispute. The Skopje government insisted it had no territorial claims over Greek territory, while Athens for its part pledged not to block Skopje’s accession to international organizations as long as it remained under the provisional name. Almost one year after Athens blocked Skopje’s application to join NATO, insisting Macedonia had to change its name first, the ghosts of Balkan nationalism are on the rise in Macedonia. After almost two decades of
intensive political, military, and economic reforms, in the last couple of years, and especially after the Bucharest fiasco, the government in Skopje has decided there is only one thing left to reform. History! Since then, everything that connected with the NATO accession process has been associated with only one issue -- the socalled name dispute with Greece, which in the meantime perverted into a “debate” by nationalists on both sides about which nation has deeper roots in antiquity and even further in history. With the solution of the dispute no closer than in the last 18 years, it seems that Greece has finally succeeded in dealing a severe blow to liberal thought in Macedonia and opened the doors to nationalist interpretations of its history and identity, imposing its nationalism. What we have now on both sides of the border is a grotesque nationalism feeding itself from the wells of the past, a Monty Python sketch in which ancient Athenians are preaching about their democratic values and the barbarian tribes from the “other” side are sharpening their spears by digging holes all the way to Pakistan.
Even the term “balkanization” doesn’t sound so bad now, after the few liberal intellectuals left in Macedonia came up with a new, less “modern” one. They call it “antiquization” (widespread obsession with ancient myths and heroes), or even “bucephalization” (after the name of Alexander the Great’s horse) of the country’s history and people’s identity. After 17 years of listening about reforms and transition, the Bucharest summit finally brought some new lines to the evening news for the Macedonian people. Now they are bombarded with news that Macedonians are the oldest nation in the world, that they are the direct descendants of Alexander the Great, that new historical artifacts are being excavated daily and shown as strong evidence of their deep past. Airports and highways are proudly renamed after Alexander, and many are eagerly waiting for his 30-meter-high monument to be erected in Skopje’s central square. It is seen by many as a replica of the Greek frenzy during the beginning of the 1990s, when the same process was taking place in the northern Greek region of Macedonia. Not many, though, fear that it is only a matter of time before Macedonians succeed to excel the Greeks and become older than the Siberian amoebas! In this race over who has deeper roots, both countries are losing. The Republic of Macedonia has already had its invitation to become a NATO member delayed, and
Greece is threatening to block its European Union aspirations, too. For a country deeply divided along ethnic lines, politically and economically weak, with an unemployment rate near 35%, bordering a country (Kosovo) that will remain in a limbo for at least the next couple of years -- and facing two other neighbors in Bulgaria and Serbia that also object to various aspects of its identity -- the Republic of Macedonia has no other alternative but to work on its Euro-Atlantic integration as the only viable solution for its peaceful existence. On the other side, Greece has nothing to gain by continuously blocking its neighbor’s path. Playing the nationalist card on this foreign policy issue in order to preserve a tiny majority in the national parliament cannot last forever, and as former Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis’ experience demonstrated during the early 1990s, it can only lead to growing nationalist sentiment amongst ordinary people and bring them further away from compromise. Greek businessmen have also made significant investments in the last two decades in the Republic of Macedonia. Therefore having a stable and developed neighbor on its northern borders can only complement the Greek
policy that so openly supported Balkan integration into the EU during the Thessaloniki summit in 2003. The so-called name issue between Greece and Macedonia has hit a dead-end, and moving it forward will be very difficult for the governments in both Skopje and in Athens. According to a recent poll, only 3% of the majority ethnic Macedonian population thinks Macedonia should join the EU and NATO at the expense of changing the country’s official name. Less than six months ago, that percentage was around 10, and even higher a year ago. There are people on both sides of our Balkan borders who can change this, but only, as former Macedonian Foreign Minister Denko Maleski said in speech at the American College of Thessaloniki in 2008, if we cross the borders of our minds first. “If we want to join a community of democratic states that does not go to war with each other, we in the Balkans must disarm our minds. In order to do that, politicians must lead their peoples across the borders of fear, hate, intolerance, prejudice, and supremacy that have shaped people’s characters for centuries,” Maleski said. Instead of bronzing the past, we must start working on gilding our future. Boris Georgievski is a journalist based in Skopje.
dialogue
uro-integration of Western Balkans in times of crisis
by Darko Ninkov
During the previous years, the European Union (EU) has been for the region of Western Balkans (WB) an idea of right direction for their transition processes, a model they chose to orientate to, a perspective of better life and a vision of way of solving problems. This vision helped the normalization of relations and the development of cooperation in the region; an obvious progress in the WB has been made - there are no open conflicts even where disagreements of states exist1, multilateral Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) has been in effect in the WB from 2007, the Pact for Stability was transformed into the Regional Cooperation Council a year ago and the web of regional mechanisms has been expanding. The fact that political opposition to the EU integration in the countries has weakened over time shows that wide consensus has been reached. 1. Particularly indicative is the case of Serbia, which, after unilateral and illegal declaration of independence of its southern province Kosovo by its interim authorities, continued to defend its interests by diplomatic, political and legal means.
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Further efforts of the WB states to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria and reach the required political, economic and technical standards are necessary. However, in this specific and peculiar moment, we can notice new circumstances that might put on a test the EU itself, too. These include the global economic and financial crisis, the changes in the world politics, euro-scepticism, uncertainty with further reforms inside the EU and the Lisbon Treaty, challenges for the economic liberalism and possibility of coming back to the concept of protectionism. The main dilemma and concern of the WB governments is whether the mentioned phenomena will influence the further process of the enlargement and make their homework more difficult. The idea that WB countries should reach full membership was confirmed by the 2003 Thessaloniki Agenda and a great number of documents and initiatives that stemmed from it, many member states strongly support it and one of the priorities of the current Czech EU presidency is enlargement toward the WB, however it is now a matter of real possibilities, will, mood and priorities of all sides in the new situation.
Not only that further reforms and transformation of the WB are still needed, but now also of the EU. The EU has to solve its inner issues and in that way show its vitality, strength and role in the international scene. In the efforts to face the new challenges, however, the EU and its member states should also continue to send to the WB clear signs that these countries are still wanted as members, under just, principled, clear and transparent conditions and criteria. This would continue to support their path towards the standards and achievements that the EU symbolizes. It is important to avoid new uncertainties emerging inside the EU, apart from the ones that already exist in the region, because such situation might possibly lessen the attractiveness of the EU in eyes of an average
WB citizen. Not only that the WB has to fulfil the conditions of the EU and win member states’ governments trust, but it seems that the EU needs to work more now in order to avoid the loss of trust and motivation for the further reforms in the countries of the WB. During the process in which the EU will be solving its own issues, the WB will still see, just like in the previous two decades, a model and a promise in it, wishing that it is proved once again that the EU still has the capacities, strength and capability to adjust to new needs while preserving its basic values, believing in and expecting the great creativity and vitality. Also, we should not forget the problems that still exist in the region, and which should be faced, first of all by the WB countries themselves, but again with support of the EU. The most dangerous generators of potential crises are the tendencies for secession and ethnic divisions, weak institutions, economic problems, lack of respect for international law, European values and human rights, unilateral and uncompromising steps
and illusion that sustainable solutions can be found without negotiations and dialogue. The EU here should be clear in setting the standards and should insist on its basic values, which, among other core elements, include the rule of law (both domestic and international), respect for human rights and condemnation of violence threats, pointing out that unilateral solutions and ethnic exclusivity or expansionism in the region are not wanted nor acceptable. Full EU membership of all the WB countries would probably solve a lot of regional problems. Their inclusion to the “white Schengen list�2 would make it easier for the citizens of the WB countries to get more 2. In the region, visa is not required for travelling to Schengen states only for the citizens of the Republic of Croatia.
ideas and knowledge about what would the membership mean and offer in everyday life. More integration in educational systems is another major step that would help the region and further strengthening of will and decisiveness of average citizens for the EU membership. But moreover, the WB countries should continue their reforms and adjustment to the European standards3 with all their strength, no matter what turbulences the crisis brings. They need to search for new chances of consolidating cooperation and linking their economies. This long term investment would show that they are firmly on the path to the EU, that what they do is sustainable and that they maturely understand these processes. 3. Like Serbia did with the decision to start the implementation of the Interim Trade Agreement before the Stabilization and Association Agreement is ratified in the EU member states. Darko Ninkov is Third Secretary at the Embassy of Serbia in Athens.
dialogue
MONTENEGRO
DED
DIVI Podgorica – The Montenegrin government is resolute in its intention for Montenegrin entrance into the NATO alliance as soon as possible. But in the last half-year, Montenegro has more often been confronted with NATO officials’ warnings that this wish must be supported by a high percentage of the Montenegrin public. Very low public support of NATO ascension for Montenegro, which is according to the latest polls 26.9%, represents an almost paradoxical situation -- the coalition in power lead by Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic, which is supported by more than half of electorate. The minority Albanian and Bosniac-Muslim Parties are openly proNATO oriented, the two biggest opposition parties are conditionally in support of NATO entrance, and only the parties which have 1/6 of all MP's are against that. Nevertheless, the public does not overwhelmingly see NATO membership as the future of Montenegro. What is the catch?
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According to all research, the greatest opponents are members of the Serb minority which represents 32 percent of population. The vast majority of them still see NATO as an enemy group, mostly because of the NATO bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was formed from Serbia and Montenegro untill a referendum in May 2006 changed this. Montenegro was also a victim of NATO bombing, even though it didn't participate in the execution of Albanian citizens in Kosovo, organized by the Serbian Goverment, lead by Slobodan Milosevic. Very strong Serbian sentiments in one part of Montenegro will probably be the reason that most of the Serbian population in Montenegro disagrees with that governmental policy. Since one part of the Serbian minority supports the governmental parties, that simply means that they do not consider the determination of leading Democratic Party
by Nedjeljko Rudovic
of Socialists (DPS) and Social-Democratic Party (SDP) as the most valuable parameter, but they lend their support to parties in power because of other circumstances affects their everyday life. In the rest of the population, the primary reasons for anti- NATO sentiments involve the fear that it will cost Montenegro more than, remaining neutral. The other reason is the inveterate opinion that NATO is actually a tool in the arms of one super-force -- the US. For that reason, it is thought that Montenegro must send its soldiers to Afghanistan to fight for US interests. Also, in Montenegro there is a distinct political division, so strong opposition parties such as the Socialist People Party (SNP) and the Movement for Changes (PZP) do not want to participate in NATO promotion, even if they openly say that they are for membership of Montenegro in the alliance. All parties in Montenegro support its entrance to the EU, while as for NATO a sort of atmosphere has been created in which opposition parties are trying to adjust their opinion according to the public opinion, and therefore do not play an active role. On the other hand, parties that oppose NATO
m accession, led by the New Serbian Democracy (NOVA), the People’s Party and the Democratic Serbian Party, divulge their attitudes in 2007 after innitial research of the public opinion showed that there are more opponents than NATO supporters. Because of these reasons, the image of the DPS and SDP as only NATO promoters has been created, as well as the image that this process is the parties’ interest. That is why it is very important that the opposition SNP and PZP join the campaign to explain NATO’s role and what benefits Montenegro stands to gain from NATO membership. It would certainly change the picture of the public opinion, because in Montenegro voters tend to follow parties that they are members of, even though they don't agree with all of their policy proposals. Also, there are many prejudices in Montenegro concerning NATO, which means that communication with citizens should be enhanced to open up a space for independent intellectuals and respectable organizations to be the bearers of the explanation of NATO membership. Additionally, debates with opponents of this concept should be opened. Arguments that NATO promoters give are mostly focused on maintaining the greater safety of Montenegro, improving of Montenegrin international image, creating the favourable ambient for foreign investments, faster and cheaper professionalism and modernization of the Montenegrin army. In fact, the debate over advantages and disadvantages of NATO accession is at its very beginning in Montenegro. This is understandable, since Montenegro made tighter connections with the Alliance after regaining its independency through a
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referendum in May of 2006 following 88 years of federation with Serbia in different frameworks. Not long after that, on Dec. 14, 2006, Montenegro signed the Framework Document and became a member of the Partnership for Peace (PfP); on April 25, 2007 Montenegro signed an Agreement on Information Safety with NATO, and on Nov. 26, 2007 an Agreement on Transit Arrangements for the support of peace operations. In February 2008, NATO approved the start of an IPAP (Individual Partner Action Plan) with Montenegro, and on April 3, 2008, at a NATO Summit in Bucharest, leaders of NATO member states issued an invitation to Montenegro to start the “intense dialogue” phase. Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic delivered to NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer Montenegro’s official application to become the part of the Membership Action Plan(MAP). The Montenegrin prime minister expected that Montenegro, even at the Strasbourg and Cehl summit, move forward toward the NATO integration process.
And while the official policy from 2006 until the end of 2008 continued to develop, public opinion in support of it continued to decrease in that time period. According to research conducted by the Centre for Democracy and Human Rights (CEDEM) in February 2007, 36.6 percent of Montenegrin citizens supported NATO accession, 34.6 percent opposed it, and 28.8 percent were undecided. Already, in July 2007 32.9 percent were supporters and 39.7 percent opponents, while in November 2008, the result of the opinion poll showed 46.9 percent “against” and 26.9 percent “for” NATO membership, while the number of undecided were approximately the same -- 26.1 percent. Nedjeljko Rudovic is president of the Centre for Euro-Atlantic Politics (CEAP) in Podgorica.
dialogue
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SERBIA o relati NATO by Jelena Radoman
Serbia stands as a distinguishing exception among the other Western Balkan states when it comes to relations with NATO. Unlike Croatia and Albania, which have been invited to join the alliance, Macedonia, which failed to receive the same invitation due to its name dispute with Greece, and unlike Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which have clearly stipulated that achieving full membership in the alliance is among their top priorities, NATO membership is not on Serbia’s political agenda. The membership in the Partnership for Peace Program (PfP) which Serbia joined in December 2006 is claimed to be “the proper scale” of its relations with NATO nowadays. Although in its PfP Presentation Document submitted to NATO in September 2007, Serbia declared its intention to actively use the PfP’s mechanisms of cooperation, the
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conclusion is that the cooperation remained limited. After both Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which were invited to join the PfP at the same time Serbia was, Serbia submitted its Individual Partnership Program (IPP) at the beginning of 2009, in which preferred areas of cooperation with NATO were indicated. Unlike IPP documents submitted by the other Western Balkans states, Serbia’s IPP does not envisage membership in the Alliance as an endpoint of cooperation with NATO, which is excluding Serbia from participation in the Membership Action Plan (MAP). At the moment, Serbia is considering establishing a diplomatic mission at the NATO headquarters. Serbia’s officials are straightforward in conveying that future relations with NATO and the possibility of Serbian NATO membership depend primarily on the future status of Kosovo. In light of those statements,
NATO’s role in establishing the Kosovo Security Forces (KSF) has highly burdened these relations. Serbian statesmen regard NATO’s role in that process as a wrong move which is increasing mistrust between Serbia and the alliance. The current government is unanimously declaring rigid resistance to recognition of Kosovar independence, and any expectations that this position will become more flexible in a near future are not realistic. One of the factors limiting the flexibility of diplomacy is the still-vivid, fresh memory of the 1999 bombing campaign against Serbia and the link between NATO’s role and the current debate on Kosovo’s status existing in the mindset of a huge majority of Serbian citizens. According to the latest surveys, 50.1% of Serbian citizens claim that Serbia should not seek NATO membership and only 26.1% is supporting it. This kind of data is at the same time limiting Serbian potential for
diplomatic maneuvering, but also serving as a good excuse for Serbian decision makers to maintain silence over the issue of future relations with NATO. Before the declaration on the independence of Kosovo was passed, cooperation with NATO gave few good results, especially in a field of defense reform which is one of the core elements of the cooperation. The Defense Reform Group (DRG) consisting of both the Serbian Ministry of Defense and NATO representatives worked together on a number of defense-related issues. Currently the work of DRG is stalled. The cooperation in the area of defense reform is facilitated by NATO’s Military Liaison Office in Belgrade. The resolution on the protection of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and constitutional order of the Republic of Serbia, adopted by the Serbian Parliament in December 2007, attempted to remove the issue of NATO membership from the Serbian political discourse for a longer period of time. However the politics of military neutrality
as related to the existing military alliances -- which was introduced by the resolution -- has been clearly defined neither by the resolution nor by any ensuing document. Therefore the adoption of this document has not helped to clarify and clearly define Serbia’s strategic orientations and modus vivendi of cooperation with today’s most significant political–military organization. Serbia still lacks the documents that are supposed to outline the guidelines for security politics, e.g., security interests, risks, and resources available for the achievement of the state’s interests. The drafts of the National Security Strategy and Defense Strategy, prepared by the Ministry of Defense and available for public discussion at the end of 2008 and the beginning of 2009, do not refer to the term neutrality and do not provide guidelines for the country’s relations with NATO. Out of line with the concept of neutrality, these drafts stressed the need to cooperate in a field of security, since Serbia
alone is unable to cope with security threats with regional and global dimensions, e.g., terrorism, organized crime, human trafficking, etc. Despite stressing the significance of security cooperation, the drafts have not highlighted the importance of cooperation within the PfP or with NATO through other mechanisms. This inconsistency could be explained with the controversy linked to the issue of NATO, which prevented the authors of the most important documents on security policies to define Serbia’s future relations with the alliance. Jelena Radoman is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Civil–Military Relations in Belgrade.
dialogue
book reviews Greeks and Turks revising nationalism Lately, both Greece and Turkey are suffering from their own respective domestic crises: Greece was shaken by violence and demonstrations in its capital and other major cities against not only state institutions like the police but also against wider mainstream politics, while Turkey has been faced with rounds of conflict over the ideological foundations of its state and the role of religion within the public sphere. While the two crises might not have much in common, they do alert us to the fact that relations between the two countries have had to operate within the context of their frequently volatile domestic political systems and in the larger political and institutional framework of Europe and the European Union. The latter has often acted as a prime mover and shaker, sometimes as a benign one, sometimes fuelling the flames of conflict and sometimes surprising observers with its absence. In the long Shadow of Europe, we set out to explore how Greek – Turkish relations have evolved since the 19th century and how Europe, historically, and the European Union, recently, have shaped this interaction. We were particularly eager to see how consequential the ‘rapprochement’ of the late 1990s has been, and whether it has been able to establish a long-lasting context for cooperation. Searching for answers, we have mapped the longterm transformation of relations by looking at three broad themes: “tormented histories”, “conflicts and openings” and “beyond high politics”, extending from the history of the two countries to current political relationship and, finally, to the sphere of civil society and economic relations. Exploring the torment of history that has shaped both nations, our contributors discuss how the respective national identities came about through nationalising projects and the exchange of populations, how different conceptions of the state emerged and were solidified, and how these differ-
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ent national identities were reflected in literature and public debate. In the second section, the volume explores how the political spheres of the two countries have been shaped by the differential impact of the European Union, and how it brought about different state policies towards religious freedom or minorities. The spectre of ‘reciprocity’ that held minorities hostage to the course of bilateral relations still reigns high in this debate, even if Greece’s EU anchor has ensured a timid move towards more accommodating policies for its Turkish and Muslim minorities, while Turkey has remained unsympathetic to its dwindling Greek Orthodox community. It is here, however, that we also discuss to what extent the EU has had a positive impact on the mediation of contested questions such as the status of Cyprus or the Aegean disputes, as well as the convergence of Turkey with Europe. In the final analysis, the EU’s impact appears ambiguous, as it has to reconcile the roles of impartial mediator and interested party, a dilemma which becomes more and more apparent in the case of Cyprus. In the third theme, we moved beyond high politics and looked into the spheres of economy, NGO activism and popular culture in order to establish whether we can expect impulses for a continued rapprochement in these areas, even if relations slow down in the world of high politics. While the authors agree that the rapprochement
and the ‘earthquake diplomacy’ of the late 1990s sparked off a wide range of civil society interactions, relations remain volatile, dependent on either EU funding in the NGO sector or on continued economic growth for the development of economic relationship. In the rather gloomy environment of the global economic crisis and Turkey’s increasingly contested European future, civil society relations remain important, yet subordinate to stronger forces. In the Long Shadow of Europe provides often surprisingly candid insights into these debates, reflecting the intellectual interests and fields of expertise of their contributors. They include academics, researchers and practitioners from different disciplines ranging from history, social anthropology, comparative politics and political sociology to international relations and economics. Together with a comprehensive introduction by the editors, scholars of South East European Studies at Oxford, we believe that this book is a required reading for all those who wish to make up their own mind on the complex past and present of Greek Turkish relations and for those, who want to have a say in the shaping of their future. Othon Anastasakis, Kalypso Nicolaidis, Kerem Oktem (ed.), In the long shadow of Europe: Greeks and Turks in the age of Post-Nationalism, 381 pages, Brill, Leiden, 2009, ISBN: 9789004171121
Turkish political culture to the fore In this book, Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, examines the impact of improving EU-Turkey relations on Turkish political culture since Turkey became a candidate for EU membership in 1999. While a multi-party political system was introduced in Turkey in 1946, political liberalism was the missing part of Turkey’s democratic consolidation. Turkish political culture valued submissiveness toward state authority and did not favor citizen participation. This study evaluates the impact that Turkey’s EU-motivated political reform had on civil society, state-society relations, the role of religion in politics and national identity. Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, Trials of Europeanization: Turkish PolitiThis leads to an assessment of cal Culture and the European Union, 248 pages, Palgrave Macwhether Turkish political culture millan 2008, ISBN: 9780230612150 has become more participant.
COSMOTE Group Dynamically approaching the 20 million customers milestone, COSMOTE Group exceeded 18.65 million at the end of September 2008. During the 3rd quarter of 2008, COSMOTE posted significant growth in all markets of operations, with its revenues rising to 876.2 million euro (+6,2%) and its EBITDA at 331.8 million euro.
AMC During the third quarter of 2008, AMC, COSMOTE’s Albanian subsidiary pursued its positive and steadily improving performance, adding about 36 thousand new subscribers, a 15.9% increase y-o-y, bringing its total customer base to approximately 1.32 million. The company sustained its leading position with an estimated 52% market share, despite the entry of a third mobile player and the increasing competition. Among the highest in Europe, AMC’s Q3 EBITDA margin skyrocketed to 67.4%. The company’s revenues reached 53.4 million, posting a 10% y-o-y increase. COSMOTE’s oldest subsidiary is a pioneer in providing advanced products and services, as well as attractive tariff plans and offers, responding to the consumer needs. AMC continues to enhance its network’s coverage and capacity, aiming to address the needs of its growing customer base and achieve increased usage. Currently, the company’s network provides over 98.91% population and 86.24% geographical coverage.
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AMC, striving for continuous growth on all levels, meets the increasing demands of the Albanian market, as well as international standards, with its targeted commercial policy. Furthermore, the company, demonstrating active social involvement, has developed a comprehensive CSR programme and implements various social and environmental initiatives, addressing the acknowledged needs of the Albanian society and people.
2ND INTERNATIONAL
BLACK SEA
SYMPOSIUM “THE BLACK SEA REGION: THE STATE OF PLAY AND THE WAY FORWARD” Kalymnos, Dodecanese, Greece; 30 June – 5 July 2009 The International Centre for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS) will host the 2nd International Black Sea Symposium on “The Black Sea Region: the State of Play and the Way Forward” to be held on the island of Kalymnos, Dodecanese/Greece, on 30 June - 5 July 2009. The International Black Sea Symposium (IBSS) provides a forum for study, dialogue and networking in a multicultural and interdisciplinary environ-
ment, thus contributing to understanding and cooperation in the Black Sea region and beyond. Young professionals primarily from the countries of the wider Black Sea area, EU member states, the United States and Central Asia are the Symposium target group. They have the opportunity to learn about issues of importance for the future development of the Black Sea region during a four-day intensive course of interac-
tive sessions that will be lead by prominent experts. Sessions will alternate with conflict resolution workshops guided by expert facilitator Prof. Benjamin Broome of the Arizona State University. For more information and to apply, visit www.icbss.org. Applications are welcome until 31 March 2009.
With the support of: Bertelsmann Stiftung; Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV); Harvard Black Sea Security Program; Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Hellenic Observatory, London School of Economics; Institute for Regional and International Studies, Sofia; Postgraduate Programme on “Political, Economic and International Relations in the Mediterranean”, Department of Mediterranean Studies, University of the Aegean.
St Antony’s College SEESOX/Alpha Bank Fellowship on the Political Economy of South East Europe Following a donation from Alpha Bank, Greece, we are pleased to announce a Visiting Fellowship for 2009-10. We seek a candidate who will undertake research on the political economy of SE Europe, in one of the following indicative areas: post-communist political, economic and/or social developments; foreign direct investment in the region; reform and European integration; developments in transport, energy, migration; regional cooperation and regional initiatives. The candidate must submit a full research proposal which should be related to at least one of the above areas. Applicants must have completed a PhD study in one of the following fields of social sciences: politics, economics, political economy, international relations. They should also have a good working knowledge of English. The fellowship is for three terms, starting October 2009, and carries a stipend of £21,500 per annum.
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Further details are available on the St Antony’s College website: www.sant. ox.ac.uk/seesox Informal enquiries may be made to Dr Othon Anastasakis at: othon.anastasakis@sant.ox.ac.uk The closing date for applications is Friday 1st May 2009. Candidates should submit a curriculum vitae (including the names, addresses and telephone numbers of two referees), and an outline of their proposed research to: The Director South East European Studies at Oxford European Studies Centre St Antony's College Oxford OX2 6JF United Kingdom Fax: +44 1865 274478 or email: julie.adams@sant.ox.ac.uk
GLOBUL GLOBUL’s Q3-08 performance demonstrates ongoing growth. COSMOTE’s Bulgarian subsidiary exceeded 4 million customers, further enhancing its postpaid-prepaid mix that currently stands at 48%-52%. During the third quarter, the company added about 105 thousand new contract subscribers, sustaining a market share of approximately 39% despite the growing competition. In the same period, GLOBUL delivered 10.7% revenue growth, maintaining its share in the highly competitive Bulgarian market, while its service revenues increased by 8.4%, driven mostly by contract outgoing revenues (up by 12.9%). Focusing on a customer centric policy, the company has developed a wide range of end-to-end, high quality mobile services, available through a retail network of over 800 stores, the most extensive in the country. GLOBUL deploys an integrated 3G portfolio as well as attractive fixed-mobile solutions. In 2008, the company introduced Frog postpaid brand.
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Its network currently offers 99.95% population and 98.68% geographical coverage.
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Polifitos bridge Kozani, Greece by G. M.
COSMOTE ROMANIA COSMOTE Romania is for yet another quarter Group’s front runner in subscriber net adds, contributing about 604 thousand additions (vs. COSMOTE’s 490 thousand new subscribers in Greece), leveraging its dynamics as the fastest growing mobile operator in Romania. In Q3 (for the second consecutive year), COSMOTE’s Romanian subsidiary posted positive EBITDA and increased its revenues by 108.4% to 86.6 million euro. During the same period, its customer base reached 5.3 million, of which 18% postpaid. COSMOTE’s estimated market share currently stands at 21%. On December 6th, the company celebrated its 3-year anniversary. Its third year of operations was marked by continued investment in the country, new commercial initiatives and offers as well as better capitalization of Group synergies which the introduction of cutting edge products to the market. Aiming to make mobile telephony accessible to all, COSMOTE has heavily invested in network expansion and optimisation, now offering over 98% population & 87% geographical coverage, the most extensive in Romania. The company has also developed a wide retail network with 880 stores across the country. Group synergies offered Romanian consumers new, innovative products, tailored-made to cover all telecommunication needs. COSMOTE and Romtelecom introduced two highly successful bundle products for both residential users and business clients. COSMOTE’s key 2008 commercial milestones include the re-launch of the postpaid portfolio under the COSMOTE Full Option concept and the introduction of unique pre-paid bundles, offering the lowest rates available in the market.
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GERMANOS’ contribution in all countries (excluding Albania) remains of capital importance in terms of customer additions, which, during the 3rd quarter of 2008, rose to 811 thousand (68% of COSMOTE Group’s total net adds).