The Bridge Magazine - Issue 17 by Vassilios Loukanidis

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Editor' s note Newest Odyssey Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz fears that we are on the cusp of a double-dip global recession because global aggregate demand is lacking. Jacques Attali, founder of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, recently lamented that Europe has grown to be a “strange animal” — a union with a central bank and single currency, but without a ministry of finance to coordinate fiscal and tax policies across independent sovereign states. Economist Nouriel Roubini argues that Greece’s sovereign debt crisis is only “the tip of the iceberg. It is obvious that the current economic crisis has hit all countries. It is, however, particularly painful for the weaker economies, consequently for the most countries in the region. In this era of global economic crisis, when all political and economic analysts underline risks prevalent in the global sphere, The Bridge adopts an optimistic stance. It is a chance to build links across the Mediterranean, creating a new sense of stability in the Eastern Mediterranean and Balkans: Kosovo, the Middle East, policies in the Balkans, Greek-Turkish relations, EU enlargement, and raised subjects ranging from climate change to green growth and development. What about the EU? EU’s neighbourhood includes countries which will one day become members, as well as its other immediate and close neighbours around the Mediterranean, and in South-Eastern and Eastern Europe. The cooperation with these countries aims at dovetailing their policies with those of the EU in trade, environmental and business regulation, energy, communications, education, training and immigration while providing support for infrastructure. By helping reform their economies, create security and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, the EU also helps to make life safer within its own borders. In this issue of The Bridge, we try to reveal the challenges and the opportunities that this turbulent era is creating.We try out to find out the window of opportunity-that is now open-and to use it in order to catch up the major changes. It is a matter of effective doing, a doing which will create opportunities.

Corporate Responsibility assured under AA1000 International Standard

TE’s 2009 Corporate Responsibility Report, which has just been published, is externally assured under the international AA1000 AccountAbility Principles Standard. This is the fifth annual review of OTE’s economic, social and environmental activities.

OTE's 2009 CR Report is one of the first by a Greek company to apply the AA1000 AccountAbility Principles Standard and develop its approach in terms of its three principles, namely inclusivity, materiality and responsiveness. For the first time, the 2009 CR report was subject to external assurance by Deloitte, providing additional validity and valuable feedback on OTE’s approach and constantly evolving performance on CR issues. As a result, the report was also upgraded to GRI G3 B+ rating. For the last four years, OTE has been applying to its CR report the G3 guidelines of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), while the last two it was rated at B level. Also, since 2008, OTE has also been included in the FTSE4Good Index. On this occasion, OTE’s Corporate Communications Director, Mrs Deppie Tzimea, commented: “Despite the tough times, due to the major economic crisis, we move forward with actions rather than words, based on a specific plan & targets, while our commitment for responsible action in favor of all stakeholders remains unchanged. The external assurance of our 2009 CR report under the international AA1000 standard is a result of systematic efforts and constant development of our programme, which is an integral part of OTE’s business plan."

Both the report and the videos related to the supplements are available on-line at the microsite http://www.ote.gr/cr2009/ PUBLI

The report details OTE's contribution to sustainable development through its “Building Ties” programme - in the marketplace, with employees, with society and for the environment. However, this year, on top of that, OTE attempts to inform and motivate all stakeholders towards a more responsible attitude by suggesting simple ways through which anyone can help society and the environment. In special supplements, included in the report, OTE Group employees give simple advice on how to surf the internet safely, how to recycle properly, how to be “green” at work etc.

A quarterly review on European integration SE Europe & the SE Mediterranean

Balkan Express-NEWS

www.bridge-mag.com

The bridge is a publication of the “Agora Ideon” forum www.agoraideon.eu Project Manager: Metropolis Publications S.A.

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Contact: 12A Kyprou Street, Moschato, 18346 Athens, Greece tel: +30-210.482.3977 fax: +30-210.483.2447 e-mail: info@bridge-mag.com Publishing and Business Development Director: Kostas Tsaousis

Thanos Triantafyllou EU renewable energy policy

Editor in Chief: Dimitris Xenakis Scientific Consultants: Kostas Lavdas Michael Tsinisizelis Panayiotis Tsakonas Kostas Yfantis Dimitris Chryssochoou Christos Paraskevopoulos Dimitris Bourantonis

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Editorial Consultants: Eleni Fotiou Thanos Triantafillou Editorial Team: Constantinos Angelopoulos Ali Osman Egilmez Maria Katechi Kostis Kapopoulos Alexandra Sarmas Simos Ververidis

Upcoming Events

Project Director: Victor Dhimas Internet Edition Manager Vasilis Loukanidis

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Copy Editing: ICET Artwork team: Rubini Natsi Dimitris Stergiou Advertising Executive Manager: Emmanouela Cheirakaki Montage-Printing: Bibliosynergatiki S.A. ISSN 1791-2237

© The bridge . All rights reserved. Neither this publication nor any part of it may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of The bridge . Where opinion is expressed it is that of the authors and does not necessarily coincide with the editorial views of the publisher of The bridge . All information in this magazine is verified to the best of the authors’ and the publisher’s ability. However, The bridge does not accept responsibility for any loss arising from reliance on it.

Stavros Kourtalis & Gerasimos Tsourapas A step in the right direction Kostas A. Lavdas Crisis management & political rhetoric in Greece cover story 14 - 15

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Dimitris Droutsas Practicing foreing policy in times of economic crisis

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Alexandros Arvanitakis Roadmap to EU EU-Albania relations

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Thanos Triantafyllou Israel-Palestine talks

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contents

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By Kostas A. Lavdas

To manage a socio-economic crisis in a politically sound manner, you need to come to terms with three sets of issues. First, you need to know, however vaguely, what brought it about. Second, you need to have a more or less clear view of objectives and priorities. Finally, you will have to try to penetrate the cognitive and sociocultural context of the crisis in question. Back to basics. Modern economic and social life is dominated by complex and intricate organizations. Perhaps paradoxically, this complicates things when it comes to crises. As Charles Perrow so brilliantly argued, even slight mishaps within these massive and intricate infrastructures can rapidly escalate in unforeseen ways. And as far as ‘crises’ are concerned, the very

terminology needs examining. Arjen Boin and Paul ’t Hart have shown that we need to abandon the notion that crises are events that are neatly delineated in time and space. We need, instead, to treat crises as extended periods of high threat, high uncertainty, and high politics that disrupt a wide range of social, political, and organizational processes. In short, crises are dynamic and chaotic processes, not discrete events sequenced neatly on a linear time scale. On to Greece. What happened in the last couple of years? To begin with, the fundamentals of the Greek economy did not change between 2009 and 2010. What did change, was the way in which the prolonged crisis – because that’s what it was – was dealt with. A textbook application of Naomi Klein’s ‘shock doctrin’ (i.e., using a phase of collective vulnerability as a window of opportunity to usher in change) got out of hand. The point is rather simple. As Robert Putnam explained a few years ago, the politics of international negotiations can

usefully be conceived as a two-level game. At the national level, interest groups pursue their goals and politicians seek power by forming coalitions among those groups. At the international level, governments seek to maximize their ability to satisfy their own coalitions, while pursuing objectibves which appear to correspond to perceptions of ‘national interest’. Neither of the two games can be ignored by national politicians, so long as their countries remain both interdependent and ‘sovereign’. Problem is, each of these national politicians appears at both game boards simultaneously. Give too much attention to the national game,

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and the international gets side-tracked. And vice versa. In short, while the government in Athens, preoccupied with the domestic game board, was busy trying to persuade the public that things looked ugly and big change was needed, governments in places like Stockholm, Paris and Berlin were busy finding ways to safeguard their banks, whose lending to Latvia, Greece and other EU states presaged trouble. Still, there is a window of opportunity that is now open – even if the actors that actually did the job of opening it are not the ones the governments in Athens or Riga would have us believe. We need to use this window, in order to curb some of the structural constraints on large-scale reform while at the same time reassuring Greek citizens

that national democratic accountability is not a thing of the past. The point, then, is to use the current juncture in order to achieve two distinct but closely linked objectives. First, we need to privatize and liberalize, deep and fast. Second, we need to remain steadily fixed in the absolute necessity – for a small state with an open economy and a precarious geopolitical position – of the existence of a capable public sector and powerful regulatory agencies. Not all the interests – domestic and transnational – that have been involved in opening (and attempting to exploit) the ‘window of opportunity’ will be happy with this combination of strategic objectives. Yet it is the combination that is crucial. Its attain-

ment and sustainability will depend on particular policy coalitions. In what way a new politics could construct a coalition between entrepreneurs, professional strata and qualified public servants, and whether a majoritarian government could be the medium of such a coalition, are questions to which it would be difficult to attempt a confident answer in the present situation. These, however, are the questions that matter. Kostas A. Lavdas is the Professor of Political Science at the University of Crete.

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By Dimitris Droutsas

Many see something of a contradiction in the phrase “foreign policy in times of economic hardship”. The first thing that comes to mind is that the one thing – economic hardship – precludes the other: the practice of foreign policy. In other words, conditions of economic hardship place limits not only on economic activities, but also on range of movement in the international arena. There are those who take this thought further. They say that under these conditions “we must first put our house in order”, and only then make fresh forays into foreign policy. They say that right now “we are at a disadvantage in terms of international power interrelations”, and thus we must leave things as they are if we are to avoid having to back down due to our position of weakness. They are intimidated. And they want to keep themselves to themselves. Prime Minister Papandreou’s government took office in October 2009. The numbers we faced were harsh: a deficit of over 13% and public debt of over 110%. Apart

from the financial debt, we were facing a competitiveness deficit. And most of all, there was our credibility deficit in international markets. The “spreads” – a word now in the working vocabulary of every Greek – jumped higher from one day to the next, enabling speculators to siphon off national revenues. So we had to act – and fast. We started with a huge effort to restore financial health – with the aim of cutting the deficit from about 14% in 2009, to under 3% by 2014 – and reduce the debt as a proportion of GDP after 2013. In 2010, we will cut the deficit by 5.5 percentage points, from 13.6% to 8.1% of GDP. To do this, we had to take very harsh measures for the greek society, for every greek citizen. But we have already seen encouraging results: in the first 5 months, the deficit fell by 40% year-on-year, revenues increased, and expenditure has been reduced significantly. So we are well within the framework of the goals we set, and we have yet to begin implementing many of the new measures passed by the Hellenic Parliament.

In the context of this effort, our foreign policy has a special mission: to create more opportunities for our country. In a truly globalized economic and political system, the winners are those who are most fully integrated into that system – not those who are isolated from it. Opportunities come to those who dare to open up, not to those who close themselves off. That is why we ourselves are taking initiatives and supporting the efforts of third parties who are promoting an environment of stability and prosperity in our wider region, which includes the Balkans, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, the Black Sea and the Caucasus. In the Balkans, Greece was once the principal advocate for our northern neighbours’ regional integration into and accession to the European Union. In word and indeed. With initiatives that led to what is today the South East European Cooperation Process. With the drawing up of the Thes-

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saloniki Agenda in 2003; an Agenda that is still the core of the European Union’s policy on the Balkans. With the promotion of investments in every sector of the economy; investments that have created tens of thousands of jobs in Balkan economies. With the promotion of the Southeast European Energy Community. And we are returning to this policy today. The announcement of our new initiative – Agenda 2014 – was among the government’s first actions, and Agenda 2014 is aimed at reinvigorating the European perspectives of all the countries in the region. 2014 is a very important year, it is one hundred years from the beginning of the First World War, and we think that we have to remind to the public opinion what the European Union is all about. It is the most successful peace project and we think that it can guarantee peace and stability for all the countries of the western Balkans. This is the aim of our Agenda 2014, we want to promote the accession of all the western

Balkans countries and put this subject higher on the European agenda. We want to say to the peoples of the countries of the western Balkans that the future, their future, lies within the European Union. In the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, Greece has a special place and role that derive from our geopolitical position and our traditionally very good relations with the Arab world. We are utilizing this store of trust to launch new cooperation on a broad range of issues; cooperation with new partners and old friends. But in this region there are two open wounds that have been festering for years now. Two situations – unique unto themselves – that generate instability. And until we resolve these situations, they will block the whole region’s course toward real peace and lasting prosperity. The first is the Middle East issue, in all its aspects. We recently experienced yet another flare-up. This one arose from the ongoing humanitarian crisis created by the

blockade on Gaza. Greece and its partners reacted responsibly, trying to safeguard the fragile peace process while also guaranteeing the flow of humanitarian aid. But we must confront the root of the problem. In Greece, we place great hope in the proximity talks and we fully support them. The solution can be none other than that already described by the international community: A solution based on two states that will coexist in security and stability. The second major issue is Cyprus. We cannot close our eyes to the flagrantly unjust and illegal state of affairs that has persisted for 36 years now. In Cyprus – a member state of the European Union – there are Turkish occupation troops to this day. There is a great wall – a wall of shame; the last wall in Europe – separating the Cypriot people and holding them back from their joint European future. And Turkey bears a heavy responsibility for this. The position of Greece is a very wellknown one, we want a Cypriot solution. We must leave Greek Cypriots and Turkish

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Cypriots to decide on their joint future in the European union, to decide without external pressure or any kind of artificial deadlines. We also want a European solution, meaning that the Republic of Cyprus is an EU member state and so after the solution will be found the country must be able to function efficiently within the European Union. That is why we always say that when negotiating, when dealing with the settlement, we must fully respect the “acquis communautaire”. In the Black Sea region, Hellenism has deep historical roots. On the first of this month, Greece assumed the Chairmanship of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), presenting an ambitious agenda. Our priorities are focused on green development, renewable energy sources, and the promotion of two major projects that will benefit all the peoples in the region: the Black Sea ring road and the development of maritime links.

When speaking of the Black Sea region, I cannot but refer to the neighbouring Caucasus, a critical zone of interests that in future will be of increasing importance to the European Union and its member states – if for no other reason than the energy corridors that will criss-cross the region. And here there are issues that touch upon justifiable sensitivities, but that nevertheless need to be dealt with to the benefit – first and foremost – of the peoples of the Caucasus. Greece is pursuing the humble role, if you will, of the honest broker. I think that our recent Chairmanship of the OSCE left a legacy that will be of some use in confronting the issues plaguing this region. How analogous to all this is the current state of affairs in the European Union? What does the economic crisis mean for the future of the European Union? Or is this, perhaps, an opportunity? After a long – and for some partners, painful – debate, we concluded on an institutional mechanism that will support the European Union for the foreseeable fu-

ture. After much compromise, we ended up with the Lisbon Treaty, which establishes an inter-institutional balance that we all hope will enable the European Union to play its rightful role in the international arena. It was for this reason, after all, that the Lisbon Treaty endowed the EU with a new foreign policy tool: the position of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and the European External Action Service, which we are now building up. And the member states entrusted new responsibilities to these new institutions. We put it into their hands to deal with certain very important matters. And we did this based on our acceptance of one fundamental thought: that the interests of the member states are also the interests of the Union. So, when the Union’s institutions speak, they do so in the name of the 27 member states, who will be greater in number tomorrow. They express this common interest. Indeed, the leaders of the new EU institutions created by the Lisbon Treaty have taken on no

small responsibilities. They have to rise to the trust that we have put in them. Otherwise, the leaders of these institutions and these institutions themselves will find their credibility compromised, perhaps beyond redemption. It was at this historic stage in European integration that we were hit by the global economic crisis. We feel the repercussions in our national economies and, by extension, in our societies, which are witnessing the collapse of fundamental covenants that had been in place long enough to be taken for granted; to be seen as a social acquis. The shortcomings in global financial governance – shortcomings that we now all agree exist – have reached the point, according to some, of threatening our common currency: the euro. Faced with this challenge, the European Union rose to the occasion and replied in a coordinated manner. It acknowledged that

the challenge was and is a common challenge. It answered to the volatility of markets by announcing and institutionalizing a support mechanism, from which of course Greece benefited. But I think the most important thing is that in the global dialogue that has begun on confronting the shortcomings of global financial governance, the EU is speaking with one single voice. From Brussels – in the name of the 27 member states and the EU – the President of the Council and the President of the Commission sent a single message to the G-20 meeting in Toronto. Was that not a genuine expression of truly common EU foreign policy? I maintain the hope that perhaps as a result of this crisis the European Union will once again find its stride on the path to its original goal: A great and strong Europe with a discrete and important position in the international system. The international system without a strong Europe is simply a system without equilibrium. The world needs Europe. But

Europe, too, must open itself up to the world. This means two things: First, that we must complete the Union’s enlargement. There can be no “black hole” in the single European space of security, justice and prosperity to which we aspire. The countries of Southeast Europe are waiting on Europe’s doorstep. We can’t leave them outside any longer. Second, that we need to sustain the momentum of the Union’s political deepening. Lisbon is a station, but not the terminus. And if something good can come out of this crisis, let it be this: the realization that we are better fortified against the challenges of our times when we have more Europe, not less. Dimitris Droutsas is Alternate Minister of Foreign Affairs

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!©QREN©I ©RHE©PIGHR©DIPECRIM By Stavros Kourtalis & Gerasimos Tsourapas

''In the European Union's [EU] latest effort to deal a blow to irregular migration across its southern borders, Frontex (established in 2005 as the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union) will inaugurate its first Operational Office in Piraeus, Greece, on 1 August 2010. Centrally located in Greece's largest seaport and one of South-East Europe's major transport hubs, the new Piraeus Operational Office will be in charge of coordinating Frontex's actions across Eastern Mediterranean countries (Greece, Italy, Cyprus and Malta), as was decided at a Madrid EU summit in May 2009. Neither the decision to add to Frontex's institutional capacities nor the particular choice of Piraeus should come as a surprise; since as early as 1999, at the European Council meeting in Tampere, Finland, the EU has striven to develop a proactive migration policy, of which the fight against irregular migration constitutes a central pillar. Two years ago, based upon the 2004 Hague programme that had aimed for the creation of a common EU immigration and asylum policy, the Council of Ministers ad-

opted the so-called 'Return Directive', standardising procedures regulating the return of illegally staying third-country nationals. More recently, in May 2009, the European Parliament adopted a directive on imposing sanctions for employers who hire irregular migrants. The choice of Frontex's Operational Office location also makes perfect sense, given that the latest Frontex Annual Risk Analysis argues that, by 2010, 75% of total illegal EU border crossings take place through Greece. In fact, it has been argued that tackling the 'Eastern Mediterranean' route (crossing Turkey to eastern Greece, southern Bulgaria or Cyprus) constitutes one of the Agency's top priorities, given that migration waves have slowed down in the two other major routes, the Central Mediterranean (Northern Africa to Italy and Malta) and Western African (Western African countries to Spain via the Canary Islands) ones. To what extent does the inauguration of a new Operational Office in Greece merit optimism in the fight against irregular migration? On the one hand, the numbers seem to agree that the new Office will most likely augment Frontex's already successful role: according to its Deputy Executive Director Gil Arias-Fernandez, a 33% reduction in to-

tal illegal entry detentions (from 166,000 to 106,000) has already been registered. A drop also took place in terms of sea border arrests between Greece and Turkey, from 56,000 (in 2008) to 49,000 (in 2009). Land border arrests between the two countries were also decreased, from 14,000 to 10,000 under the same time period. Across the Mediterranean basin, a number of bilateral agreements (such as the one signed between Italy and Libya, Spain and Senegal, and so on) have also helped stem the tide of arrivals: in West Africa, only five detentions took place in the first three months of 2010, as opposed to a staggering 31,700 detentions during 2006. The above numbers, however, hide the much more sober picture of immigration waves in South-Eastern Europe: the absence of a working agreement on immigration prevention and control between Greece and Turkey (only recently have political steps been taken towards the activation of the 2001 bilateral Re-Admission Protocol) has helped encourage Eastern Mediterranean immigration as other routes have been more effectively patrolled.

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European NGOs continue to lament the lack of reliable quantitative data on irregular immigration, which, in turn, help promote unfounded stories on 'floods of illegal immigrants', on the loss of jobs to immigrants, or on exorbitantly heavy strains on public services. At the same time, Frontex has been frequently confronted with accusations of human rights violations, especially in its treatment of asylum seekers who attempt to enter the EU. The creation of a new Operational Office in Piraeus and the strengthening of Frontex in general needs, thus, to be accompanied by a number of other political efforts, both on the national and the European level that would enable the Agency to acquire the enhanced role it seeks. Firstly, the European Commission should work closely with national policymakers towards the creation of standardised data-

bases on migration across the continent, in the hope of generating more reliable estimates. A more accurate numerical portrayal of irregular migration in Europe would also aid in the visibility of Frontex's efforts and, in the long term, in increased social awareness across the EU member states. Lastly, the positive effects that bilateral readmission agreements between EU member states and neighbouring countries have had on curbing migration waves suggest that such agreements should continue being forged between countries of origin (such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, Somalia, etc.) and EU countries of transit.

All things considered, the new Operational Office should, indeed, be considered a significant step in enhancing Frontex's role in South-Eastern Europe and dealing a significant blow to irregular migration in the Mediterranean. At the same time, however, it should serve to remind us of the political and administrative gaps that remain to be bridged, before we can truly talk of an efficient, proactive, pan-European immigration strategy.'' Stavros Kourtalis and Gerasimos Tsourapas are researchers at the Hellenic Centre for European Studies (EKEM)

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(SFFO 1 * ( 4 By Thanos Triantafyllou

In these times of economic imbalance and financial insecurity the energy matter becomes more and more important in particular for the weak economies of the planet. Especially for the â&#x20AC;&#x153;countries of crisisâ&#x20AC;? (Portugal Italy Greece Spain) the energy sector is crucial in enabling their economies to overcome the current difficulties and return to high growth rates through the assurance of continuous and sustainable energy supply. Despite the important steps towards the synchronization of the electricity sector of the past years, the electricity supply gap is widening as major planned power sector capacity additions are delayed. In parallel, competition for private investment required for new energy infrastructure is fierce. Continuing concerns over energy security and high import dependence have highlighted the importance of efficiency improvement and supply diversification. The role of green energy technologies (i.e. renewables and energy efficiency) to address these problems is crucial. They provide unique development opportunities and under the right conditions and safeguards they are main vehicles for achieving environmental targets while they contribute to the security of supply. Renewable energy sector attracts investments in short time period that, under the appropri-

ate support framework, offer secured capital returns for long time, and create significant job opportunities. The acceleration of green investments in the region is an urgent need, especially taking into account that the EU has established an overall target of 20% share of RES in energy consumption by 2020, as well as specific national ones for each EU member state, as part of the Climate Action Package 20-20-20 by 2020. Developments are needed in the energy sector, particularly in the oil industry - where skyrocketing prices are having a drastic effect on the economies of most countries - and the continually growing threat of climate change has now made it obvious that a transition to new energy sources, which are less polluting and more secure, is vital. The most promising proposal for this transition is the use of renewable energy sources (RES), which can reduce greenhouse gas emissions and pollution using local and decentralized sources. At the same time, we now realize that we cannot keep increasing energy production to cover our needs, but that we

must manage energy in a rational way and improve our energy efficiency. Investments in these sectors contribute to the protection of the environment, the security of energy supply and long-term development while functioning simultaneously as a magnet for innovation, providing export opportunities. Status and perspectives of RES Renewable energies such as wind power, solar energy, hydropower and biomass can play a major role in tackling the twin challenge of energy security and global warming because they are not depletable and produce less greenhouse-gas emissions than fossil fuels. Since the energy crises of the 1970s, several industrial nations have launched programmes to develop renewable energy solutions, but the return of low oil prices prevented renewable energies from picking up on a large commercial scale. Despite the significant utilization of hydro power plants only limited portion of the total potential is not utilized. In the recent years there has been extensive modernization of existing large and small plants

through funds provided by international institutions. In almost all of these countries an extensive program for further development of the sector and in particular of small hydro power plants has already started with sometimes significant results. Wind energy has significant potential in several countries of the region; however there is currently no significant capacity. However, there is already great interest from investors in investigating the potential and developing projects that is supported by recent legislative reforms to promote wind energy in some countries. Another important renewable source of energy in the region is biomass, but the current utilization is almost entirely restricted to the traditional uses for cooking and space heating. Significant support will be needed to promote modern utilization of biomass for space heating, electricity generation and combined heat and power production. Solar energy is abundant in the region and can be used most cost-effectively for water heating. Solar photovoltaic (PV) in-

stallations, whether at the household level or for centralized applications require significant support measures given the high capital cost of the systems. Finally, there is important potential for low-temperature geothermal resources that can be used for heating as well as electricity production in some of the countries. We do face two energy challenges: on the one hand, to ensure secure and sufficient energy and, on the other, the sustainable management of the environmental impacts of the production, conversion and use of energy. These challenges are not insurmountable. If we all take greater responsibility for our actions, basing our energy decisions on best practice, we can ensure a clean, intelligent and competitive energy future.

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EU-Western Balkans High Level Meeting in Serajevo The EU-Western Balkans High Level Meeting, organized on the 2nd of June, in Sarajevo by the Spanish Presidency, marks the 10th anniversary of the Zagreb Summit of 25 November 2000, where EU launched the Stabilization and Association Process and the European perspective for Western Balkans. The EU and the west Balkan countries, but also participants from US, Russia, Turkey, OSCE, Council of Europe and NATO, welcomed the progress of the last decade that brought the Balkans from war-torn times on the road to prosperity. The High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and VicePresident of the Commission, Catherine Ashton, and the Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy, Štefan Füle, welcomed the outcomes of the meeting, stressing that the EU will support and reaffirm the Balkans’ place in Europe and the European perspective for the region. The Director of OSCE's Conflict Prevention Centre, Ambassador Herbert Salber, stressed that “Making more use of the tools that the OSCE provides would benefit the countries of the Western Balkans”, inviting in this way the participant countries to make use of the OSCE tools to achieve more stability on the basis of cooperative security.

The Annual Regional Meeting of OSCE On the 21st of June, was held the annual regional meeting, hosted by Vienna-based OSCE Secretariat's Conflict Prevention Centre. In cooperation with the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the meeting brought together Heads of OSCE Field Operations from South-Eastern Europe, the Director of the Conflict Prevention Centre, Ambassador Herbert Salber. The participants discussed present and future work of OSCE Missions in the region and the importance of cooperation and partnership between the OSCE and EU in South-Eastern Europe. “Both organizations value democracy and fundamental freedoms, values that are shared by each of the countries we work in,” said Ambassador Gary D. Robbins, Head of the OSCE Mission to BiH. “The OSCE, with its inclusive membership and its comprehensive security concept, is the natural place for dialogue and cooperation of all.” All participants agreed that cooperation between the two organizations is crucial for stability in South-Eastern Europe.

Montenegro: the role of women in the security sector The Third OSCE Regional Meeting of Women Parliamentarians was held in Cetinje of Montenegro, on the 22nd of June, in order to strengthen the role and participation of women in the security sector. Ambassador Paraschiva Badescu, the Head of the OSCE Mission to Montenegro, argued that "Although enormous strides have been made over the last decades, the continued under-representation of women in governance structures requires specific effective measures to promote gender balance in all legislative, judicial and executive bodies, especially at the political and decision-making levels". Meeting participants agreed that enhancing gender equality was an important tool for conflict prevention and the creation of sustainable peace. They also noted that women played an important stabilizing role in South-Eastern Europe during the conflict and post-conflict period of the last decade. The meeting was held as part of the 10th Cetinje Parliamentary Forum, organized by the Parliament of Montenegro, the OSCE Mission to Montenegro and the United Nations Development Programme in Montenegro on the occasion of the 10th Anniversary of the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women and peace and security.

OSCE Presence supports parliamentary oversight of security services The OSCE Presence in Albania announced on the 14th of July, in Tirana, that it is providing assistance with the drafting of a bill on parliamentary oversight of the intelligence and security services. A former expert member of the Intelligence and Security Committee of the U.K. parliament, together with OSCE staff were authorized to provide recommendations that would be submitted to the Chair and the Committee members of all political parties, members of institutions and civil society, before the bill is drafted. The objective is to help produce a first draft to strengthen parliamentary procedure, regulating the oversight of the parliament over the work of the Intelligence and Security Services. The support followed a request from the Chairman of the National Security Committee of the National Assembly of Albania and is part of the Presence's Parliamentary Support Project, funded by the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

Anniversary of the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement On the 12th of August a joint statement was issued in Skopje, by EU, NATO, OSCE and UN, in order to mark the 9th anniversary of the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. According to the statement, the EU Special Representative and Head of Delegation of the EU, Erwan FouĂŠrĂŠ, the NATO HQ Skopje Commander and Senior Military Representative David Humar, the Head of the OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje Ambassador Jose-Luis Herrero and the United States Ambassador Philip T. Reeker, on behalf of the four organizations, recognized and welcomed the positive progress the country has made in improving interethnic relations since the signature of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. They also recognized, that the Agreement and relevant constitutional provisions remain indispensible to building a peaceful, and cohesive multiethnic society, verifying in this way their commitment to the Ohrid Framework Agreement. They also stressed the particular importance of adopting further measures in the fields of equitable representation, decentralization and education, noting, that further efforts are needed in order to establish an education system able to foster integration and interethnic relations at all levels.

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Roadmap to EU EU-Albania relations By Alexandros Arvanitakis

Albania formally applied for EU membership in April 2009, but if its accession bid is to move forward it must tackle a number of issues: particularly political stability, economic reform and corruption. Milestones • 1992: EU and Albania sign Trade and Cooperation Agreement. Albania becomes eligible for funding under the EU's preaccession PHARE programme. • 1993: Opening of first EU delegation in Tirana. • 1999: EU proposes new Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) for five countries in South Eastern Europe, including Albania. • June 2000: Feira European Council states that all SAP countries are 'potential candidates' for EU membership. • Nov. 2000: Zagreb summit starts SAP for Albania. • Jan. 2003: Negotiations on Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) between EU and Albania officially launched. • June 2003: Thessaloniki Summit confirms that SAP countries may join EU once they are ready for membership. • June 2004: Council adopts first European Partnership for Albania. • June 2006: Signature of the SAA. • Jan. 2008: EU visa facilitation agreement with Albania enters into force.

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• • • •

Jun. 2008: Commission presents roadmap identifying specific requirements for visa liberalisation. 1 Apr. 2009: SAA enters into force. 1 Apr. 2009: Albania becomes official member of NATO. 28 Apr. 2009: Albania submits application for EU membership. 14 Apr. 2010: Albania returns Commission questionnaire on EU accession preparations.

Policy Summary After World War Two, Albania became a communist state allied with the Soviet Union and then China, before pursuing its own form of autarchic socialism under the dictatorship of Enver Hoxha. Under Hoxha, Albania became one of the most economically underdeveloped countries in the world. In the early 1990s, a multiparty democracy was established – replacing decades of isolationist communist rule. Albania is bordered by Montenegro and Kosovo to the north, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to the east and Greece to the south. It has a coastline on the Adriatic Sea.

Ethnically, Albania is largely homogenous – over 95% of its 3.6 million inhabitants are ethnic Albanians. According to estimates, roughly 70% of the population is Muslim, 20% Albanian Orthodox and 10% Roman Catholic. The average age in Albania is just 29. Despite undergoing a radical transformation since the communist era, Albania remains a very poor country. A recent Eurostat survey places it at the very bottom of Europe in terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). EU relations since 1990 In 1992, Albania became eligible for funding through PHARE, the EU's main financial instrument to assist Central and Eastern European countries in the run-up to the 2004 enlargement. In 2001, CARDS replaced PHARE for the Western Balkan countries. Since 2007, Albania has been receiving EU financial aid under the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) for transition assistance, institution building and crossborder cooperation. IPA aid for 2008-2010 totals €245.1 million.

Albania's Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) entered into force on 1 April 2009. Albania officially joined NATO on the same day. In December 2009, the EU excluded Albania from the first stage of its visa liberalisation scheme for Western Balkan citizens. On 27 May 2010, the European Commission adopted proposals to lift the requirements for Albanian citizens once the country satisfies the remaining criteria – meaning that visas could be lifted by autumn this year. Issues Albania became a potential candidate country for EU accession at the Thessaloniki EU summit in June 2003 and officially submitted its application for membership in April 2009. Once it has evaluated the responses to a questionnaire aimed at determining Albania's readiness to join the EU, the European Commission will issue an 'opinion'. If it is positive and then endorsed by the EU Council of Ministers, the country will acquire official candidate status.

After Albania had officially requested to join the European Union, EU foreign ministers stated that they would return to the country's application once national elections had been completed in June 2009. However, since the poll was held on 28 June 2009, the ruling Democratic Party of Prime Minister Sali Berisha and the Socialist party of opposition leader Edi Rama have kept accusing each other of fraud Berisha's party prevailed in a very close vote. Olli Rehn, the EU's enlargement commissioner at the time, said the country must do better when staging elections in future, citing campaign violence and procedural violations. In its observation report on the elections, the OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights stated that the elections marked tangible progress for Albania but the improvements were overshadowed by the ''politicisation of technical aspects''. While the elections met most OSCE [Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe] commitments, they did not adhere to the highest standards for democratic elections and all the political parties must work harder to respect the letter and purpose of the law, the report concluded.

The Socialist Party, which controls nearly half the seats in parliament, proceeded to boycott the assembly for several months and thus block the passage of laws – many of which are needed to align the country with EU legislation. Though the Socialists returned to the legislature in February, they are refusing to take part in parliamentary activities as their demand that the votes be recounted was rejected by the assembly, which is dominated by Berisha's coalition. EU Enlargement Commissioner Stefan Füle has expressed concern about the lack of political dialogue and recently warned Tirana that such instability has no place in the democratic politics of the EU. Yet the Socialist Party is showing no signs of letting up, calling for anti-government demonstrations to ''accelerate the end'' of Berisha’s government. In May, 200 protestors from the socialist camp – including 22 members of parliament – even started a hunger strike.

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In response, Martin Schulz of the European Parliament’s Socialist group and Joseph Daul of the European People's Party have urged Prime Minister Berisha and opposition leader Rama to end the political deadlock and avoid a suspension of Albania’s EU accession process . On 8 July 2010, the European Parliament adopted a resolution urging the Albanian government and the opposition to end the ongoing political crisis. MEPs called on the two factions "to take over responsibility and to enter into a constructive dialogue" and reiterated their "comprehensive support" for Albania's EU membership bid. Economic prospects Albania, which was a closed, centrallyplanned state for almost fifty years, has been making the difficult transition to a modern, free-market economy since the early 1990s. Between 2004 and 2008, macroeconomic growth in Albania averaged around 6% and despite the global economic crisis, it still recorded 3% growth in 2009. A fiscal reform package was recently adopted with the aim of reducing the grey economy and attracting foreign investment. Agriculture accounts for over half of employment in Albania but modern equipment is seriously lacking, while energy shortages and poor infrastructure mean that business

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development and outside investment is scarce. The EU is Albania's main trading partner but the gap between imports and exports has produced a large trade deficit. EU funds are being used to improve the national road and rail networks, the poor state of which is hampering economic growth. Corruption and organised crime In its most recent report on Albania, the European Commission raised concerns about the impartiality of the judiciary and said a comprehensive reform strategy was needed. The Commission criticised attempts by the national executive to limit the independence of the judiciary and raised concerns about its impartiality, following the postponement of certain high-level cases on procedural grounds. The government has implemented an anti-corruption strategy and action plan in line with the EU's European Partnership initiative and efforts have been made to increase transparency. However, the Commission still stated that corruption remains a problem in many areas and has called for greater political will, stronger institutional arrangements and better inter-agency coordination to fight a ''culture of impunity''.

On a visit to Brussels on 14 April, Prime Minister Sali Berisha declared that a number of tough measures had been put in place to crack down on corruption and organised crime. He claimed that corruption had been eradicated and that foreign investors now enjoyed simple procedures for starting businesses at an attractive flat tax rate of 10%. Speaking to EurActiv in an exclusive interview, Berisha also that the Albanian mafia is now a thing of the past, as arrests have been conducted across Western European countries and more than 1,000 criminals have been sent to jail. Positions In an April 2010 statement following a meeting with Albanian Prime Minister Sali Berisha, Permanent President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy said: ''Prime Minister Berisha represents a country that has made its political vision and ambition very clear. I would like to use this opportunity as well to reiterate my strong commitment to the EU integration perspective of the entire region of the Western Balkans.'' On a visit to Albania in March, EU Enlargement Commissioner Štefan Füle used unusually tough language, warning Tirana that a prolonged political stalemate would harm the country's EU accession prospects.

''A fully functioning parliament is essential to a fully functioning democracy. If the current political stalemate were to persist, it could well prevent Albania from reaching the political standards expected from a country that has applied for EU membership,'' he said. Speaking to EurActiv in March, Füle expressed concern about the ''stability of democratic institutions and the lack of political dialogue in the parliament''. Recognising that considerable progress had been made in recent years, he urged Albania to overcome the impasse, adding that ''responsibility lies with both political parties – both the ruling group and the opposition'.' On a visit to Brussels on 14 April, Albanian Prime Minister Sali Berisha pleaded the case for his country's EU accession and provided numerous examples of tough measures imposed to crack down on organised crime and corruption. In an exclusive interview with EurActiv, the prime minister said that his country was now one of the safest in Europe following a ''zero tolerance'' crackdown on the Albanian mafia, and economic growth had remained steady despite the global crisis.

On 5 April, Socialist opposition leader Edi Rama called on Albanians to instigate demonstrations against the ''bad governing'' of Prime Minister Berisha's ruling Democratic Party. ''The time has come for a big popular movement in order to accelerate the end of this government, responsible for electoral fraud, but also for other social and economic injustices,'' he said. Rama, who is also mayor of Tirana, urged citizens to protest against ''stolen votes'' and the ''ruining of the country's and each family's economy''. Albanian Foreign Minister Ilir Meta conceded that the political stalemate was not ''contributing'' to speeding up the country's EU integration. In an interview with RFE/ RL, he accused Socialist leader Edi Rama of making demands that run counter to the country's constitution. He declared that an inquiry commission, which was only set up by votes from the ruling party, had the legal stature to rule on the controversy and accused the Socialists of ''damaging the country's image for the sake

of the personal agenda of their own party chairman'.' Speaking to EurActiv in March, Albanian Ambassador to France Ylljet Aliçka claimed that Albania is making steady progress on adopting European standards and has a lot to offer the EU. ''Corruption and organised crime remain a problem in Albania, but there is a strong desire to tackle these issues and the results are encouraging […] But we have to speed up the pace of reform in economics, infrastructure and tourism,'' he said, adding that the country's administrative capacity is ''more mature'' than its political class. Aliçka believes that Albania suffers from an image problem in Europe and would in fact bring many positive things to the EU: ''Religious tolerance, secularism, cultural diversity, tourism, young people, skilled workers... Albania's energy resources are also very important – only 20% are currently exploited,'' he said.

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Speaking on 8 July in the European Parliament, German MEP Doris Pack (European People's Party) lamented the socialist opposition's boycott of the parliament and wants the EU to use visa liberalisation as an incentive for reform. "A continuation of the boycott is bad for Albania and immobilises the approach towards the European Union, because without a functioning Parliament, the upcoming reform laws cannot be adopted. The opposition must stop poisoning the political climate of the country with its irresponsible acting. The citizens of Albania are fed up with these political games. All they want is a functioning parliament, which can build up a new - European - future for the country,'' she stated. ''The European Parliament supports a European perspective for Albania. If Albania fulfills the criteria, Albanian citizens should then be allowed to enter into the European Union also without a visa. This would be an important incentive for the necessary reforms," added Pack. After its observation mission for last year's national elections, the OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights stated: ''The 28 June 2009 parliamentary elections marked tangible progress with regard to the voter registration and

identification process, the legal framework, adopted in a consensual manner by the two main parties, the voting, counting and the adjudication of election disputes." "These substantial improvements were overshadowed by the politicisation of technical aspects of the process, including during the vote count and tabulation, which temporarily blocked the counting process in some areas, as well as by violations observed during the election campaign. These actions of political parties undermined public confidence in the election process," the statement continued. In its April 2010 report on the state of democracy in the country, the Madrid-based European think-tank FRIDE concluded that ''Albania's democratic status still falls short of European standards'' and that ''important democratic deficits remain in the areas of the rule of law, judicial independence, elections, media independence, and control over corruption''. The HYPERLINK "http://www.fride.org/ download/IP_Albania_ENG_ap10.pdf" report calls for the strengthening of democratic institutions, promoting the respect of the rule of law and the fight against corrup-

tion, dismantling the unlawful interconnections between business, media and politics, closer monitoring by the international community of the developments in Albania and further concerted action on the country's democratic flaws. ''Our report uncovers some major challenges that both sides of the political divide in Albania need to take seriously if the country is to deepen its democratic reforms and move closer towards the EU,'' said FRIDE director-general Richard Youngs. Alexandros Arvanitakis is a political scientist

EU official documents

European Commission: Albania 2009 Progress Report (14 Oct. 2009) European Commission: Conclusions on Albania - Enlargement Strategy & Main Challenges 2009-10 (14 Oct. 2009) European Commission: Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2009-2010 (14 Oct. 2009) European Council: Decision on the European Partnership with Albania (18 Feb. 2008) European Council: EU-Albania visa facilitation agreement (19 Dec. 2007)

A quarterly review on European intergration S.E. Europe & the the S.E. Mediterranean

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5IF EPNFTUJD by Bledar Feta & Apostolis Karabairis, EKEM/CSIS

The curtain rose on the latest act of Balkan diplomacy: the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the legality of Kosovo’s proclamation of independence in 2008 was announced at 15:00 CET on Thursday, July 22. Contrary to what had many expected, the Court did not come up with a Solomon’s judgment that might prove equally (un)satisfactory for both sides; rather, it produced a clear winner and a loser. In its ruling the ICJ stated that the February 2008 declaration of independence by the Kosovo Assembly violated neither the international legal order nor the United Nation Security Council Resolution 1244. In September 2008 the Court was asked by the United Nations General Assembly to give its advice on a question put forth by Serbia, which inquired “whether the declaration of independence by the provisional self-ruling institutions of Kosovo was in line with international law.” Resorting to the ICJ was a shrewd diplomatic stroke by Belgrade, through which it bought time and slowed international momentum toward recognition of Kosovo for over two years. Pristina and Belgrade are engaged in a battle on the world stage to draw countries into their respective camps. Ultimately, Serbia’s attempt to outmaneuver Kosovo through the ICJ laid in ruins, leading to one of the most important victories of Kosovar Albanians in the international arena.

The President of ICJ Hisashi Owada read the decision according to which Kosovo’s declaration of independence does not violate international law in principle, since the latter contains no prohibition of such kind. In this light, he pointed to around 100 similar declarations throughout world history, whose legality has not been questioned. Further, the Court’s decision read that the UN Charter principle of territorial integrity applies to inter-state relations, not secessions. With regard to UN Security Council Resolution 1244, the Court argued that it did not preclude any sort of final status outcome, including independence. The judgment did not mention whether Kosovo’s secession was legal, or whether other states could legally recognize its independence. Rather, all it did was to rule that international law does not prohibit the declaration of independence. The ICJ opinion can be summarized in three main points: 1. Kosovo’s Declaration of independence does not violate international law 2. Kosovo’s declaration of independence does not violate UN Security Council Resolution 1244 3. Independence does not violate the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government Although not binding, the ICJ’s advisory opinion bears significant political weight and forms a turning point in the long-debat-

ed Kosovo issue, as it can be seen from the reactions that it provoked both throughout the region, as well as globally. Reactions of the two parties concerned are indicative of their attitudes and their future intentions. Additionally, since each side is not made up of one single subject, it is crucial to examine all basic actors that exercise a larger or smaller influence within each side. Reactions from Serbia The advisory opinion of the ICJ came as a slap in the face to the Serbian side. Optimist statements of their leaders in the previous days notwithstanding, Serbs were very disappointed to see that their own initiative backfired, although it had initially been experienced as a victory, when pro-Albanian countries at the UN General Assembly in September 2008 failed to block the Serbian proposal from proceeding to the ICJ. Serbian president Boris Tadić described the decision as harsh, but nevertheless tried to downplay its impact by pointing out to the rather vague distinction that ICJ itself had made between the unilateral declaration of independence and the right to secede, claiming that the Court concentrated on the technical nature of the former, while it avoided to take positions on the latter,

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SFHJPOBM EJNFOTJPO which is of most substance. This distinction, as well as the Courtâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s omission to rule on the legal implication of the independence declaration (as, for example, on whether it produces statehood), has appeared in the statements of other Serb officials, too, and generated a debate about whether the question to the ICJ was properly formulated by the legal expert team. The government, on its part, reaffirmed its resolution never to recognize an independent Kosovar state and reiterated its commitment to continue fighting by political means. Furthermore, it announced an extraordinary session to examine its next steps, above all seeking the adoption of a favorable resolution at the UN General Assembly. Government parties came up with calls for unity and renewed efforts but were also supportive of the government and the President, despite the debacle. On the contrary, opposition parties were highly critical: DSS president KoĹĄtunica called for resignations, while NikoliÄ&#x2021;â&#x20AC;&#x2122;s SNS and Ĺ eĹĄeljâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s SRS demanded a harder line in the Kosovo issue, since the current policy of concessions and partnership with the West proved, as they claimed, to be detrimental to Serbian national interests. On the other side, JovanoviÄ&#x2021; and DraĹĄkoviÄ&#x2021;, leaders of LDP and SPO respectively who had previously endorsed the idea of Serbiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s recognizing Kosovo as a sovereign state, each applying their own ra-

tionale, found new grounds to support their stance and invited more political parties in the country to join them. All the same, such revisionist approaches remained marginal in the political spectrum, while gaining only little support among the circles of domestic liberal thinkers. The prevailing mainstream opinion reads that the official state policy vis-Ă -vis Kosovo should remain generally the same. This is, after all, what the Kosovo Serb local leadership had asked for immediately after the announcement of the ICJ opinion. The head of the Kosovska Mitrovica periphery Radenko NedeljkoviÄ&#x2021; called Belgrade not to give up fighting against the recognition of the Kosovar state and his fellow Serbs in Kosovo to continue their boycott of Kosovar institutions and retain their own parallel ones. Non-party actorsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; reactions were less visible in Serbia. No massive demonstrations were observed either in Serbia proper or in Kosovo. Even in Kosovska Mitrovica the crowd remained quiet, unlike previous times. High security measures taken by KFOR were thus rendered needless. Obviously the prevailing feeling was disappointment rather than indignation, hence no one burst out in dynamic actions. The reaction of the usually talkative Serb Patriarch Irinej was in the same wavelength. He called the flock to join a special service and pray for Kosovo. Carefully chosen words made up a statement, which, although partial, did not convey intolerance or xenophobia.

In conclusion, initial Serb reactions to ICJâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s decision show that no major shift is expected to take place on Serbian policy as far as the Kosovo issue is concerned. And this is due to the salience attributed to it by the right-wing parties and because advocating a revised approach has become a taboo for almost every Serb politician. Therefore, albeit with a weakened arsenal, Serbia seems intent to remain on the same track. What is most likely to change is the people that occupy some key positions. There has been increasing pressure that Serb Minister of Foreign Affairs Vuk JeremiÄ&#x2021; is removed from office, because he has been the champion of, and directly responsible for the ICJ venture, but also because he most objects to any policy update. In a broader aspect, the whole government, along with the President of the Republic, has been held responsible for the heavy defeat. Fortunately for them, the governmental coalition has remained united, which is not given in such cases, but still their image has been suffered and opposition has got a chance to morally discredit them in front of the electorate on this allimportant issue. As a consequence, many are those who fear that Serbia again risks turning isolationist and putting its European integration perspective at stake, not only because this perceived national debacle is attributed to the pro-Western block, but also because Serbian citizens largely got disillusioned by the inter-

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national community, and especially Western nations, most of which stood against their country with no serious reservation. Reactions from Kosovo The advisory opinion of the ICJ drew immediate reactions from Kosovo and Albanian-inhabited countries. Scattered across Kosovo, Serbia, FYR of Macedonia and Montenegro, Albanians followed intently what was happening miles away in The Hague. The decision has been interpreted as a historical victory for the Albanian nation, and also an argument that will add many more recognizing states to the current list of 69. Kosovars celebrated the verdict on the streets of Pristina by hugging each other, blowing the horns of their cars and waving Kosovo’s flag, considering the decision a resounding reaffirmation of the legitimacy of their cause. Kosovo officials described the longawaited opinion as a great victory in their country’s struggle to be recognized as a full and legitimate state, as the Court stated clearly and explicitly in favor of Kosovo, an unexpected outcome for the majority of the Albanian population. Kosovo Prime Minister Hashim Thaci reaffirmed his government’s willingness for talks with Serbia over technical issues. According to him the “decision on the declaration of independence has been reconfirmed, legalized, and re-legitimized by the ICJ’s opinion, offering an opportunity to all countries that hesitated to recognize Kosovo, to do so, as all the dilemmas have been resolved”. The Minister of Foreign Affairs Skender Hyseni made clear that any discussion with Serbia on practical matters of mutual interest must be on an equal footing and on a state-to-state basis. Kosovo leaders desire engaging in negotiations that aim

to leave Kosovo an independent state with its Serb-populated northern region part of it. Diplomatic sources claim that discussion between the two countries on decentralization, cultural heritage and the northern part of Kosovo can start later this year. July 22 was another blessed day for the Republic of Kosovo and all her people, stated the country’s President Fatmir Sejdiu. The Kosovo President called for more international recognitions, as the ruling eventually removes all the doubts that countries that have not recognized Kosovo yet may have had. There is now more optimism in Pristina that the nonbinding verdict, which comes two years after the UN General Assembly requested the opinion, will set the stage for a renewed Kosovo push for more international recognitions. The government in Pristina desires to expand the current total of 69 recognitions to more than 100, thus demonstrating the country’s legitimacy through the majority of United Nation members. This could provide a new impetus to Kosovo’s regional cooperation and integration into international organizations. It should, however, be noted that the increased number of recognitions does not necessarily open the way for Kosovo’s UN membership given the opposition by China and Russia, two vetowielding members in the United Nation Security Council. Kosovo is expected to apply for United Nations’ membership in 2011. Kosovo Assembly has adopted a declaration in support of the advisory opinion, stating that the historical decision will contribute to peace and stability not only of the Republic of Kosovo, but the whole region. Considering the Court’s decision to be professional and impartial, respecting at the same time Kosovo citizen’s willingness for independence the declaration call the European Union to find a modus vivendi on Kosovo issue while demands from the reluctant countries to recognize the

new state. In clear contrast to Serbian views, Kosovo officials believe that Kosovo does not constitute a precedent in any other case in the world. The Court’s opinion was closely tailored to the unique circumstances of Kosovo; it was not about other regions or states. Furthermore, as far as the statements of Kosovo officials are concerned, it has been clear that nothing in the opinion given by the Court casts any doubt on the statehood of the Republic of Kosovo, which is an established fact. The reaction from the political parties was in the same wavelength. The IJC opinion was considered from both government and opposition parties as the best answer that has been given thus far on the Kosovo’s right as a legitimate, legal, consolidated and functional state. Generally, there was a consensus between them that the decision is righteous international historical response to historical injustice that has been made to Kosovo. In contrast to Kosovo’s officials, the Vetevendosje (self-determination) movement, a popular nationalist civil society group, does not share the same views. They accuse Kosovo government and politicians of attributing more importance to the formal attributes of Kosovo independence and less to its territorial integrity and genuine sovereignty. Vetevendosje thinks that the government’s celebratory tones are not justified by the ICJ decision since the latter did not rule on the substance of Kosovo’s independence but rather on the fact that the declaration is not illegal. More have to be done for consolidating Kosovo independence. The movement’s leader Albin Kurti protests against the implementation of the Ahtisaari plan as it does not provide sovereignty to Kosovo but a ‘deepening partition’ giving Belgrade actually the opportunity through decentralization to control every Serbian populated territory.

Reactions from Banja Luka, Tirana, Tetovo and the Presevo Valley Every development in the Kosovo issue unavoidably has an impact on Bosnian Serbs, since it is often linked to the future of Republika Srpska. With regards to ICJ’s advisory opinion, Bosnian Serb leaders once more aligned themselves with official Belgrade. They accused the court of bias and politically driven decision-making and reassured that Bosnia and Herzegovina will continue its policy of non-recognition with regard to Kosovo. To the question of whether the ICJ ruling will affect Republika Srpska’s status vis-à-vis the Bosnian state similar, Prime Minister Dodik made it clear that Republika Srpska remains an entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina according to the Dayton Agreement. However, Dodik did not dismiss the possibility of its selfdetermination in the long run. Apart from his intentions in the domestic scene, this statement indicated support to the Serbian cause but also served as a warning that insistence on Kosovo’s independence may have farreaching spillover effects. Swift was the reaction from Albania, which is seen as the “mother country”. Immediately after the decision the Albanian Prime Minister, Sali Berisha, welcomed the “historical” opinion. Berisha believes that the Hague verdict makes a major contribution toward fresh relations between the Serbs and the Albanians between, Tirana and Belgrade as well as to help in the relations between Pristina and Belgrade. There is no doubt that after the unilateral declaration of Kosovo’s independence Albania has increased its efforts to cooperate with region countries, especially with the Albanian inhabited ones. Furthermore,

Albanians and Kosovars are against every attempt of bargaining with territories. According to him, The Hague definitely puts an end to this chapter and through Kosovo’s independence the fluidity of the Albanians in the Balkans comes to an end; it turns into a settled issue and, thus, gets consolidated. The Albanian Minister of Foreign Affairs described the decision as a reconfirmation of the unchangeable right of the citizens of Kosovo for self-determination, contributing to stability in Kosovo, the region and further. Albania expresses its full support for the further affirmation of Kosovo across the international arena. Opposition leader, Edi Rama expressed great satisfaction with the decision, stressing that Albanians are not divided when it comes to Kosovo issue. All political parties and institutions in Albania also welcomed the Court’s decision. For more than two decades, Kosovo and the Kosovo issue have been in the center of attention of the political and scientific circles of the Albanian inhabited countries in the area. The Albanian political parties in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia have an unchanged position towards the Kosovo issue, which is: “Kosovo a sovereign and independent state and an important precondition for the stability of the region”. They do not see nor treat the resolution of the issue as a national problem of Albanians, but as something that surpasses the national boundaries and affects regional stability and progress. Thus, the Democratic Union for Integration, the largest Albanian political party in the country, considers the Court’s decision as a clear confirmation of the legality of the creation of the new state; in addition, it views its decision as endorsing the correctness of the FYROM government’s earlier decision to recognize Kosovo and to establish diplomatic relations. For the leader of the

opposition Democratic Party of Albanians, Menduh Thaci, the ICJ’s opinion constitutes a fundamental act of the new historical era that begins in the region. For Thaci the decision is proof of the honorable Albanian struggles for freedom and independence, while at the same time constituting an extraordinary contribution to peace and stability in the region. Generally, Albanians in FYROM view the decision as serving the common good of the region and downplay the Albanian nationalist element in it. The political elite of Presevo Valley, which is home to the largest Albanian community in Serbia, notice the great importance of the decision not only for Kosovo but also for its eastern side: Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja, “three municipalities that never given up the struggle for freedom and independence.” Radical and moderate political parties in the Valley published press releases on ICJ’s decision, congratulating the Kosovo authorities and the Albanian nation. Additionally, the Albanian diasporas around the world celebrated their personal contributions to this historical achievement. In all Albanian-inhabited territories, community leaders, activists, politicians, and intellectuals viewed the decision as a historical victory that belongs to the whole Albanian nation. Although Albanian political elites in the Balkans have a long history of mutual animosity as far as their own distinct problems and agendas is concerned, it should not be difficult to find common ground when it comes to the Kosovo issue. Bledar Feta is a Junior Researcher at the Hellenic Centre for European Studies. Apostolis Karabairis is an expert on Balkan affairs.

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World powers facing a fateful deadline in the Middle East peace process will invite Israelis and Palestinians to open direct talks on 2 September in Washington. Envoys from the so-called Quartet of Powers - the United States, the European Union, Russia and the United Nations - have been discussing a draft statement inviting the two sides to talks intended to conclude a treaty in one year, diplomatic sources said.The Israelis and Palestinians were expected to agree to attend, and US President Barack Obama would be present at the talks. The Quartet said in June that peace talks would be expected to conclude in 24 months, but the new draft says 12 months. The Palestinian Authority government intends to have established all the attributes of statehood by mid-2011. Diplomats say the idea that a unilateral declaration of statehood could win support if talks do not start or collapse in the next 12 months is gaining interest. The peace process resumed in May after a hiatus of 19 months but is stalled over the terms of an upgrade from indirect talks mediated by US envoy George Mitchell to direct negotia-

tions. Israel insists it is ready for direct talks provided there are no preconditions. The Palestinians are ready provided there is a clear agenda. Israel says an agenda means preconditions. Resolving the snag over terms is crucial, diplomats say. The "invitation to talks" statement by the Quartet has been awaited since Monday. Face to face Obama wants face-to-face talks started well before 26 September, when Israel's 10-month moratorium on Jewish settlement building in the occupied West Bank is due to end. Full-scale return to settlement construction could sink the talks for good. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton spoke by telephone with the Quartet representative, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, as well as Jordanian Foreign Minister Nasser Judeh as Washington kept up pres-

sure for talks to resume. State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley said: "We believe we are getting very close to an agreement to enter into direct negotiations. We think we're well positioned to get there. But we continue to work on the details of this process. "Clinton also spoke to Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak about the peace process. The Quartet draft reaffirms a "full commitment to its previous statements". Quartet statements from Moscow, Trieste and New York this year called for a halt to settlement building. The draft, however, does not explicitly repeat that demand, which would be rejected by right-wingers in Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's centre-right coalition. It simply says that direct, bilateral negotiations that resolve all final status issues should "lead to a settlement, negotiated between the parties, that ends the occupation and results in a state at peace with Israel". It says negotiations "can be completed within one year". Success will require the sustained support of Arab states, it adds. Netanyahu may benefit from a move to direct talks, countering the notion abroad that he is not a genuine peace-seeker. Pal-

estinian President Mahmoud Abbas, by contrast, has a lot to lose politically. He could be destroyed if he emerged from the process after months of talking as a failed appeaser. If accepted by Netanyahu as the basis for talks, the Quartet invitation could give Abbas the backing he needs. Few Palestinians or Israelis believe direct talks would lead to a peace treaty soon, or that one would be quickly implemented if it were ever agreed. In Israel's coalition, attention is focused on the 26 September settlement moratorium deadline, with a majority of Netanyahu's inner cabinet opposed to extending the settlement freeze, but a minority seeking some compromise that Abbas could swallow. One idea is to allow building in big established settlements that Israel expects to keep in a peace deal but not in those it would hand over in a land swap with the Palestinians.

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book reviews The Incomplete Breakthrough in Greek-Turkish Relations. Grasping Greece’s Socialization Strategy Greece’s decision to lift its veto and grant candidate status to Turkey at the ΕU Summit in Helsinki in December 1999 was the result of a paramount shift in Greece's foreign policy that most analysts attributed to Greece's entry into the European Community in January 1981. The paramount shift in Greece’s policy toward Turkey has been the instigator of a process that managed to bring a substantive change, actually a breakthrough, on Greek-Turkish relations. What were the reasons for this Uturn in Greece’s foreign policy vis-à-vis Turkey, the neighboring state which was considered to be Greece’s major security threat over the course of the last thirty years, as well as of the reasons behind Greece’s major foreign policy initiatives? Was this fundamental reorientation of Greece’s strategy the result of a rational recognition of Greece’s new strategic needs and priorities, of a more in-depth ideational change related to a collapse of the traditional – and reigning – orthodoxy about how to deal with the ‘threat from the east’ or of a combination of both? When did Greece’s new strategy to transform the three decades dispute with its NATO-ally and ‘arch-enemy’ into a less confrontational and more stable relationship reach its climax? What were the particular goals the new strategy was aiming at achieving and, most importantly, to what extent had the new strategy managed through its implementation to affect the behavior

of Turkey and/or its definition of national identity and interests? To what extent had the assumption of power by a conservative government, in March 2004, resulted in an alteration for the better – the so-called refinement – or for the worse – the so-called invalidation – of the strategy adopted by the socialists? Panayotis Tsakonas’ new book offers insightful answers to the above central questions which --although related to the most important chapter of Greece’s foreign policy in the post-WWII era— remained unanswered in the relevant literature. Moreover, based on unique primary sources (given that the author is an academic who served as an advisor to the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, George Papandreou from June 1999 to January 2004) and extensive research on secondary sources, the book presents the first theoretical treatise of the most significant shift ever made in Greece’s strategy vis-à-vis Turkey. Indeed, by advancing the 'strategic culture' literature the book illustrates that culture is a basic determinant in understanding change in a state’s strategy. It also highlights the causal linkage between culture and strategic behavior by demonstrating the role particular realms of Greece’s strategic culture – agentic culture and national culture – play in explaining outcomes and in accounting for change. Moreover, by proposing how states employ international socialization in

their strategic approaches to transform the behavior of other states, the book presents the most comprehensive explanation to date of what defines a state's socialization strategy, when it is likely to emerge in relations between adversaries, what forms it can take and with what consequences. The book thus shows how the paramount change in the traditional strategy Greece followed towards Turkey from the mid-70s and the adoption and implementation of a new strategy in the late-90s provides a unique empirical case to approach the concept of international socialization as a state strategy, pursued and implemented by a threatened Greece vis-à-vis a threatening Turkey. By developing a particular type of socialization strategy, namely active socialization strategy, Greece managed –Tsakonas argues— to transform over a certain period of time the EU factor into a catalytic instrument able not only to strengthen its balancing efforts but also to lead to the resolution of the Greek-Turkish dispute. The book does not only offer a fascinating new theory on foreign policy behavior, as T.V. Paul, James McGill Professor of International Relations, notes in his endorsement. More important, taking stock of the book’s findings Greek and Turkish decision makers now do know what it would take for a breakthrough in Greek-Turkish relations to happen.

Panayotis J. Tsakonas, The Incomplete Breakthrough in Greek-Turkish Relations. Grasping Greece’s Socialization Strategy (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke and New York, 2010), pp. 304.

Dimitris Xenakis

Upcoming The State of Europe: Tough questions for the EU On October 14 Friends of Europe will host its seventh annual State of Europe highlevel brainstorming roundtable for Friends of Europe’s Trustees, business leaders, top policymakers and opinion-formers at the Palais d’Egmont. Organised by Friends of Europe with the support of Belgium’s EU Presidency and the Financial Times in partnership with Veolia Environnement, NYSE Euronext and Vodafone, it will consist of three sessions and a TV debate. The roundtable will welcome a select group of some 70 senior discussants, including ministers, senior policymakers, business leaders and international press. A maximum of 2 introductory discussants will give remarks at the start of each session before the senior discussants will engage in an interactive debate. The roundtable will also be attended by a few hundred observers. Entitled “Tough Questions for the EU”, State of Europe will be co-chaired by Friends of Europe’s President Viscount Etienne Davignon and Former European Commissioner for Competition and President of Università Bocconi Mario Monti. Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council, Michel Barnier, EU Commissioner for Internal Market and Services, Jerzy Buzek, President of the European Parliament, Dominique Cerutti, President, Deputy Chief Executive Officer and Global Head of Technology of NYSE Euronext, Vittorio Colao, Chief Executive of Vodafone Group and Josette Sheeran, Executive Director of the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), have confirmed their participation. http://www.friendsofeurope.org/Home/tabid/454/Default.aspx

The Future of the Integrated Border Management Strategy On September 06, Centre For European Policy Studies, will organize In cooperation with the Law, Science, Technology and Society (LSTS) research centre of the Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB). Speakers: Jean-Louis De Brouwer, Deputy Director-General, DG Home Affairs, European Commission; Simon Busuttil, MEP and Member of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs; Sergio Carrera, Research Fellow, CEPS; Henrik Nielsen, Head of Unit for Border Management and Return Policy, DG Home Affairs, European Commission; Anneliese Baldaccini, Executive Officer for Asylum and Immigration, Amnesty International EU Office; María Duro Mansilla, Advocacy Officer, European Council on Refugees and Exiles; Katarzyna CuadratGrzybowska, Legal Advisor, European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) http://www.ceps.eu

Events International Conference EuroMed 2010 on Digital Cultural Heritage The EuroMed 2010 joint event will focus on interdisciplinary and multi-disciplinary research concerning both cutting edge Cultural Heritage Informatics and use of technology for the representation, documentation, preservation, archiving and communication of CH knowledge. The scope includes every phase of CH information technology: initial data capture/digitization, information/data processing, reconstruction, visualization, preservation and documentation as well as dissemination of results to the scientific and Cultural Heritage communities and to the general public (Multilingual, Multimedia Digital Library). This event will be supported by a scientific committee which consists of almost 100 renowned professionals in the area of CH for a blind peer review of all submitted papers. The main goal of the event is not only to illustrate the programs underway but also excellent work wherever it is located and however it is supported, in order to promote a common approach to the tasks of e-documentation of World Cultural Heritage. Furthermore, regional capacities in the area of Cultural Heritage and IT will be facilitated in advancing their know-how through the exchange of information and generation of new ideas and cooperation’s, where the world meets the finger prints of several ancient civilizations on earth.

European Innovation Summit (EIS On October 11, Knowledge for Innovation, organize the 2nd European Innovation Summit (EIS) in the European Parliamen. The role of innovation in tackling the grand challenges will be at the centre of discussion with stakeholders and policy makers from all over Europe and beyond. A debate will take place on how to achieve Europe’s goal to become a global leader in innovation and how we can make innovation partnerships successful. The Summit includes a three-day exhibition in the European Parliament, breakfasts, lunches and dinners, as well as the session “Europe’s Future Nobel Prize Winner”, aiming to raise students’ interest in science and technology careers. http://www.knowledge4innovation.eu

http://www.cs.ucy.ac.cy

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39 Kremasti bridge, Lesbos, Greece