The Bridge Magazine - Issue 16

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Editor' s note Greece’s accession in the European Community in the 1980s had a profound impact on the country’s political, societal and economic development. Hence, there is no doubt that economic prospects will increased significantly if a way is found to address uneasy relations with Turkey and enhance regional stability.

Only a few years after the end of the Cold War the new context offered for a redefinition of roles and identities in this relationship in an attempt to build a culture of cooperation, on the basis of mutual trust and interests. Greece’s decision to lift its veto and grant candidate status to Turkey at the ΕU Summit in Helsinki in December 1999 was the result of a paramount shift in Greece's foreign policy. Before that, the pain and sorrow from the lethal earthquakes that struck both countries in 1999 became fertile ground for the emergence of a strong feeling of solidarity among the Greek and Turkish peoples. In fact, it was a clear political message of peace and cooperation, dispelling the misunderstandings of the past that Greeks and Turks are “eternal enemies” unable to live together.

But what were the reasons for the major change in Greece’s foreign policy vis-ΰ-vis Turkey? Was this fundamental reorientation of Greece’s strategy the result of a rational recognition of Greece’s new strategic needs and priorities, of a more in-depth ideational change related to a collapse of the traditional – and reigning – orthodoxy about how to deal with the ‘threat from the east’ or of a combination of both? What were the particular goals the new strategy was aiming at achieving and, most importantly, to what extent had the new strategy managed through its implementation to affect Turkey’s behavior and/or its definition of national identity and interests? To what extent had the assumption of power by a conservative government, in March 2004, resulted in an alteration for the better – the so-called refinement – or for the worse – the so-called invalidation – of the strategy adopted by the socialists?

And perhaps, most importantly, what are the plans of the newly-elected socialist government in Greece?

All these issues, including the developments relating to the current economic crisis were discussed in the international conference “Greek-Turkish Relations” organized by the Center for Progressive Policy Research, under the Auspicies of the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Indeed, the Greek economic meltdown can be turned to the advantage of both Turkey and Greece, participants in the KEPP conference have said, stressing the benefits of a solidarity visit to Greece by Turkish high officials and leading businessmen to boost bilateral relations both politically and economically. This special issue includes some of the most interesting speeches delivered in the international conference, offering to the public an insight view of this complex relationship in times of hightened crisis. Last week visit of Prime Minister’s Erdogan and his team stress the importance of resetting relations to exit the crisis.

Dimitris Xenakis

Selim Egeli Challenges & prospects A quarterly review on European integration SE Europe & the SE Mediterranean

In cooperation with the Center for Progressive Policy Research

www.bridge-mag.com

The bridge is a publication of the “Agora Ideon” forum www.agoraideon.eu Project Manager: Metropolis Publications S.A. Contact: 12A Kyprou Street, Moschato, 18346 Athens, Greece tel: +30-210.482.3977 fax: +30-210.483.2447 e-mail: info@bridge-mag.com Publishing and Business Development Director: Kostas Tsaousis

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Yannos Papantoniou Working together

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Editor in Chief: Dimitris Xenakis Scientific Consultants: Kostas Lavdas Michael Tsinisizelis Panayiotis Tsakonas Kostas Yfantis Dimitris Chryssochoou Christos Paraskevopoulos Dimitris Bourantonis

Dimitris Droutsas Becoming pillars of stability

Editorial Consultants: Eleni Fotiou Thanos Triantafillou Editorial Team: Constantinos Angelopoulos Ali Osman Egilmez Maria Katechi Kostis Kapopoulos Alexandra Sarmas Simos Ververidis

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Pavlos Apostolidis Getting out of the dead lock

Project Director: Victor Dhimas Internet Edition Manager Vasilis Loukanidis Copy Editing: ICET Artwork team: Rubini Natsi Dimitris Stergiou Advertising Executive Manager: Emmanouela Cheirakaki Montage-Printing: Bibliosynergatiki S.A. ISSN 1791-2237

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© The bridge . All rights reserved. Neither this publication nor any part of it may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of The bridge .

Where opinion is expressed it is that of the authors and does not necessarily coincide with the editorial views of the publisher of The bridge . All information in this magazine is verified to the best of the authors’ and the publisher’s ability. However, The bridge does not accept responsibility for any loss arising from reliance on it.

Christos Makridis The democrating opening Constantinos Antonopoulos Political stability & economic growth

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Volkan Vural Cooperation & friendship

Evangelos Venizelos We could do the reverse

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Constantinos Zepos Opportunities come out of crises

Dimitris Avramopoulos The more we delay cover story 22 - 26

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contents

Working together

By Yannos Papantoniou

There is no doubt that in the last 50 years the Greek –Turkish relations have affected the policies not only of the two aforementioned countries, but also those that are third countries which try to capitalize or exploit, rather, if you like, the tension between the two countries to promote their own interest.

But we are not going to look only to the past. That is wrong. We all know, particularly those of us who have dealt with foreign policy issues, we all know that the foreign policy of Greece and Turkey is based on past experience, and I am talking about events that have taken place in the course of the centuries.

We must also take into account what is happening in the rest of the world but also what the aspirations of the two countries are.

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One main aim is on our mind how to further improve our relations, how to enhance cooperation even further and to be able to become true friends.

I would like to say that such efforts have been undertaken in the last few years, have happened in the past as well. At the end of the ’70s, for example. Later on we had the Meeting at Davos between Turgut Ozal and Andreas Papandreou, the Prime Ministers of the two countries. And again in the early ‘90s there was another such effort to bring the two countries closer together.

And I would like to say that for 10 years now there has been a systematic effort to further improve Turkish –Greek relations and Turkish –Greek cooperation.

This improvement in the relation of the two countries actually is proven in many ways. We have improved cooperation in many, many sectors, not just tourism, but also in the economy and other sectors as well.

And we also have high level visits, and I am talking about military officials who are going to the countries. And we also see that there were military officers who had come

to Greece but also the Greek head of the armed forces had also visited Turkey. So, I think this is good because it helped the two countries come closer together.

But we must be realists and we must be objective as can be. I would like to say that the Turkish-Greek relations are not ideal.

And this does not come to us as a surprise.

There is a long standing relationship between the two countries. It is centuries old. And it is very, very difficult to take away all the distrust that exist on either side, because this is something that cannot easily be forgotten or done away with.

And there are always forces on either side that do not think of the improvement in Greek –Turkish relationship in a positive way. They don’t want this to happen.

And actually they would like to stop it from happening.

I think that the greatest obstacle that we have ever encountered in this rapprochement is ignorance. And I am not talking about not knowing the sides, the views of either side. The diplomats of the Minister of Foreign Affairs know these views. But some times people don’t understand why a cer-

in a CREATIVE way tain opinion is expressed and why a certain behavior exists.

So, we have to have good understanding. We have to have a thorough understanding of why things are the way they are today. Otherwise it will be difficult to have a common understanding, and there is actually room for misunderstanding, for friction and sometimes some things are blown away out of proportion and they appear to be more significant than what they actually are.

The economic situation today actually can help promote greater understanding between the two countries.

People have not changed priorities in the world. The way things are is not what it used to be. My generation and the previous generation constantly believed in growth.

And we saw that living standards kept getting better and better. So, there was a good outlook.

But we see that now that the world has changed, we see that this progress can not be a given. We cannot considered it as something that will happen no matter what.

All countries now face financial problems. All countries need to find a way out of the crisis. No country in the world has re-

mained untouched by the global crisis. And this actually is something that we Greeks and Turks need to understand.

In the previous decades we were interested in acquiring more and more weapons.

And we see what happened, for example one side used to buy some armament system and then the other country were tried to catch up and try to purchase a similar system.

So, we were actually competing in a way. But this is something we should no longer do, we have to stop being competitive, we have to work together in a creative way, between security and economic development, because this is to the interest of both people.

This is what the times dictate. And this is a message conveyed to all of us, because we all are facing this crisis and we are actually feeling it very strongly.

Turkey has now become a strong peripheral power. It is a member of the G20. Its economy is very dynamic, quite surprisingly

so, it is remarkable. Its position is a strategic, if you like, from the geographical point of view.

We all can see that Turkey is becoming an energy hub. So we have natural gas, we have oil and the pipelines. We see that a lot of these pipelines will pass through Turkey, and there are a lot of energy giants, a lot of companies represented by Russia, the US, the European Union, and all these companies are fighting one other trying to secure these energy sources.

So, Turkey has expressed its will to become a member of the European Union. And I think that we Greeks should see this in a positive light.

Greeks and Turks have a common interest, and that is to belong to one family, the family of the European Union. Greece supports the accession of Turkey to the European Union. But of course there is a prerequisite that Turkey has to fully meet all the pre-accession criteria.

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We firmly believe that the accession of Turkey to the European Union will be positive, will be good for Turkey itself first and foremost, because it will modernize itself very quickly, it will be able to meet all modern challenges.

We had no land borders with other European Union member states. But the more countries around us become members of the European Union, the better of Greece, but also for its neighbors.

And I think that a lot of thorny issues would be also in result, for example the Aegean dispute and the Cyprus issue.

On the other hand Greece, as we know, is in the midst of a crisis. And I think it is battered more than many other countries in the eurozone.

But today Greece has a government it is being supported by its partners in the eurozone, and it fully believes in the recovery of the economy. And we believe that very soon will be able to go back to positive growth rates.

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The coming one or two years are going to be very difficult years, but we firmly believe that the government with the measures that it is willing to undertake will help Greece recover from its problems, and it will also push forward the great changes that Greece is in need of in order to become powerful once again.

Let us not forget that Greece actively participates in what is happening in Europe.

I would like to say that we are actively taking part in all discussions in Europe, and we are factor of stability in the Balkans.

Moreover trade relations have greatly improved between Greece and Turkey, and this actually promotes political relations.

Lets not forget that everything is part of a puzzle. We cannot establish economic relations without also promoting political relations. So, these two things are inter-related.

It is essential to congratulate the Greek and Turkish businessmen who have undertaken important initiatives in the last few years to further enhance this cooperation.

The Greek government attributes great importance to its relations with Turkey. To-

day we have in the Government Andreas Papandreou who is in favor of rapprochement and this actually is proof of the great interest we attached to improvement of Greek – Turkish relations.

We have with us today a lot of people from Greece and Turkey who have helped bring Greece and Turkey closer together. I know that there are a lot of things that we don’t share. But we also have a lot of things in common. We are different personalities, but we all believe that all problems will always remain unsolved.

We cannot always talk about the past, because that is like resigning ourselves to our fate. It is not good to be pessimists, we cannot just accept the situation as it is. We have to move forward.

We can break this vicious circle of tension and of crisis arising every time. This will be good for stability because there will be peace and prosperity in the region. It will be good for our peoples.

Yannos Papantoniou is the President of the Centre for Progressive Policy Research (KEPP), former Minister of Economy & Finance and of National Defense of the Hellenic Republic

becoming pillars

By Dimitris Droutsas

The historical course of the two countries has been punctuated by major encounters, alternating rapprochements and clashes. The significance of these encounters has been set down and interpreted, and is a collective frame of reference for our peoples.

It can’t be lost, it can’t be erased, and it can’t be glossed over. It is what it is. And to a significant extent – as one would expect – it impacts the relations between the two states in the modern era.

But the manner in which the historical past colours modern developments, impacting them positively or negatively, is – in my view – a matter of political choice.

And I would like to focus on this point.

Our choice – the choice of George Papandreou’s government – is clear: we choose to utilize historical experience to brighten, rather than darken, the prospects for Greek-Turkish relations. This, I remind you, is what we endeavoured to do from 1999-2004, when George Papandreou was again at the helm of Greek foreign policy.

And at that time – again, I must remind you – our efforts produced tangible results in many sectors, particularly in our economic relations.

In practical terms, this choice we have made means that we are once again exploring the potential for cooperation and understanding on a number of issues of mutual interest; issues on which cooperation and understanding are or can become feasible.

It means that we are identifying and exploiting opportunities and positive turns of events. We ourselves are creating these

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opportunities, taking the necessary initiatives and building relations of trust and good neighbourliness in the interest of the peoples of the two countries – first and foremost – and in the interest of the wider region. In short, through history and its lessons, we are pursuing the right to prospects, development and improvement in GreekTurkish relations, to the benefit of our states and their peoples.

And this brings us to the second point I want to develop: How the political choice we made in the past impacted developments in Greek-Turkish relations.

I hope you will agree with me when I say that at this time the sector in which there is the greatest activity is bilateral economic and trade cooperation. And we must admit that the impressive growth in our bilateral economic transactions is due in no small part to the political courage and vision shown by the Greek government at that time in concluding a broad spectrum of bilateral agreements with its neighbour. Fourteen agreements were signed between 1999 and 2004, and most of them concerned – more or less directly – the economic life of the two countries.

I would like to be more specific and point to some examples.

In 2000 and 2003, respectively, Greece and Turkey signed the Agreements on the Mutual Promotion and Protection of Investments and on the Avoidance of Double Taxation of Income. Today, these agreements are the basic pillars of the bilateral institutional framework. As we speak, total Greek investments in Turkey – in a broad range of sectors – have surpassed $6 billion.

But what is also important is the growth

that has been achieved in trade transactions between the two countries. Suffice it to say, the volume of our bilateral trade in 2008 surpassed €2.3 billion, whereas in 1999 it was at €669 million. Despite the difficult economic state of affairs on a global level, our bilateral trade transactions have the necessary momentum to return soon to a growth trend.

Renewed efforts to remove obstacles – tariff-related and otherwise – within the framework of the development of mutually beneficial cooperation between the two countries will contribute in this direction.

Moreover, particular emphasis should be put on cooperation between Greek and Turkish entrepreneurs on joint ventures in our countries and in third countries, in various sectors of common interest. We already have good examples of this in the energy and construction sectors.

Progress in bilateral tourism cooperation has also been noteworthy in recent years, though there is still much room for growth. For example, major opportunities can be created for entrepreneurs in the tourism sector through the creation of common package tours aimed at attracting tourists from third countries.

I left the most critical sector for last: energy, and specifically the Interconnector Turkey-Greece-Italy (ITGI), a project of major importance for energy supplies. But we mustn’t overlook the excellent opportunities for cooperation opening up in renewable energy sources, bearing in mind the significant dynamic both countries have in this sector.

We now come to Turkey’s European perspective.

Greece’s position on this matter is well known and crystal clear: We support Turkey’s European perspective. We want to

of stability see a Turkey that has implemented all of the reforms required for its accession to the European Union. If Turkey meets the prerequisites, it deserves full membership. Talk of a ‘special’ or ‘privileged’ relationship reduces Europe’s influence on Turkey and muddies the EU’s message. I reiterate our goal – a goal agreed upon unanimously by the 27 member states of the Union: a Turkey that will be a full member, provided it meets all of its obligations to the European Union and the member states.

Achieving the goal of accession has so far been a long and often arduous process for Turkey, just as it is for every candidate country, and just as it was for Greece. A process that needs to be worked through even as critical domestic realignment is under way. However gruelling and radical it is, this process is necessary if Turkey is to really change and become capable of joining the EU. I have said this before, and it is worth saying again. The Turkey that joins the EU will not be the Turkey of today or the Turkey of the past. It will be tomorrow’s Turkey; a European Turkey that will have adapted fully to the European acquis and carried out the necessary radical reforms.

Greece’s support for Turkey’s European perspective is sincere and is founded on principles and values. But that does not mean that the bar can be lowered – not even in the slightest – with regard to the obligation to meet all the criteria and prerequisites.

We support Turkey’s candidacy both politically and in deed. Just recently, we proposed to Turkey – anew – that we provide technical support on issues concerning the accession negotiations.

It is not easy to make progress on the road to accession. It presupposes two things in particular.

First, the normalization of Turkey’s relations with the Republic of Cyprus, which will do much to boost Turkey’s accession course.

We need to find a solution on the Cyprus issue. A just and viable solution. A European solution for a united Cyprus. We need to free Cyprus of all forms of dependency, from occupation forces. We need to free Cyprus of dividing walls that have no place in the European family. We all need to support the negotiation process in Cyprus. And the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Demetris Christofias, is aware of Greece’s – and the Greek government’s – belief in and support for in his efforts.

Second, the speedy and effective promotion of domestic reforms and respect for good neighbourly relations. And – of course – meeting all obligations to the Greek minority and the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Only in this way can Turkey send the right message to European public opinion: the message that Turkey is able and determined to join the great European family.

Ladies and Gentlemen, No effort has any chance of success if it isn’t backed by strategy, composure, consensus and a sense of responsibility.

On the shifting sands of international relations, it has been Greece’s longstanding pursuit for its relations with other countries to be founded on principles and values such as the promotion of good neighbourly relations; the peaceful coexistence and prosperity of peoples; respect for international law, legality and human rights; the pursuit of global and regional security and stability.

It is through this prism that we approach our relations with Turkey.

And for this reason, the effort we are making should not be undermined by species of conduct that are incompatible with international law and the European acquis.

This conduct needs to cease if we want to talk about real rapprochement with substantial content.

As I said, Turkey is going through a difficult time of domestic change. At the same time, we continue to see dangerous, provocative and rash practices, as in the recent entry of Turkish aircraft into the airspace of the Andros firing range. This has to stop.

Conduct such as this has no place in the relations of trust that we want to build.

But is this reason to abandon our efforts? Frankly, no. In fact, it is good reason to intensify our efforts. We want to invest in a future of peace. With cautious, measured steps. At the right pace. And always with the serious preparation that is necessary. If we succeed, we will create a huge “peace dividend” for our countries and peoples. A peace dividend that will be clear from defence spending in the difficult economic crisis we are experiencing.

For Greece, rapprochement between the two countries is a sincere choice. Greece aims to utilize the whole range of bilateral cooperation. But this is neither unconditional nor without rules. I stress the need for absolute respect for the territorial integrity and sovereign rights of Greece; the need for respect of international law and international treaties.

Dimitris Droutsas is the Alternate Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic Republic

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By Evangelos Venizelos

Dear colleagues, ladies and gentlemen.

I am really happy to be here. I really am pleased, because I am addressing such an illustrious audience. Let me warmly thank KEPP, the Center for Progressive Policy Research and Yannos Papantoniou, its President, in particular, my dear friend and colleague.

So thank you for giving us the opportunity to meet in an attempt to promote Greek-Turkish relations. I would like to say that the title of this Conference is very ambitious and it is very broad.

I know that a lot of interesting things have been mentioned this morning and I am really sorry that I was not able to attend the morning panel. Unfortunately, this was impossible; so I actually come in and I am doing so in a sort of violence manner.

I just came in all of the sudden, I just barged in. But I would like to express certain official views; and I hope that by doing so, I will contribute to a lively conversation, a lively dialogue after the end of the list of speakers.

Ladies and gentlemen, in the last few days we have witnessed – and this is the case in all international organizations and in all countries of the world – we are all carefully and anxiously monitoring what is happening in Turkey, in our neighboring country.

We are monitoring a clash between the political system and the army. I think that right now, what we see unfolding is something that will hope will quickly be diffused. There is a lot of tension; we hope

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that this will not escalate; we hope that this will be diffused.

Because what we want to have in Turkey is a government that has been democratically elected, a politically strong government, a government that can undertake strong radical reforms.

We want it to be able to help change things as regards Greece-Turkey relations.

So for us it is very important to avoid this export of internal tension. We don’t want an internal crisis to spill over to other countries.

Yesterday and the day before yesterday, I was able to talk to my counterpart, Mr. Gonul, in Majorca, in the margins of the informal defense ministers’ council in the EU, where my Turkish counterpart came to participate in the dialogue which was held between the EU and the candidate countries.

And I was really happy to see him once again, because I see that the current government in Turkey is really determined to act in a responsible, but also moderate manner.

I also see that people now understand why we do not want the internal institutional or political crisis to spill over to other countries. You understand that for us it is very important to have stability in the wider region.

It is very important for us to know that

in both countries we have governments that are capable of dealing with the problems that arise in a swift and moderate manner.

But we also want to transcend and we want to do things that are very important.

So at the same time, it is also very important to respect one another and to further strengthen the confidence building measures that we have established between our two countries.

I think it is very important to have these channels of communication and to use them in order to overcome problems and tensions that take place without the presence of governments. And I say “governments” and I use the plural, because I do not want to focus only on the Turkish government; I am talking about both governments.

It is very important to respect these confidence building measures and to implement them. It is also very important to make use of these direct communication channels at all levels and lately we have focused on this, because both sides have fully realized how fruitful such contacts can be.

Let us not forget that both countries experience the crisis. We both are feeling the crisis. You see that we have a big fiscal deficit and a fiscal debt. We know that military spending is an exorbitant amount of money; it is a very heavy burden for our two countries.

We have entered into a vicious circle; we have to find a way to break this vicious circle with the least possible damage.

I think that we all understand in Greece

A52 /=</@/< I think that we all understand in Greece that the economic crisis means that we lose our diplomatic strength, but the same applies for Turkey. And let us not forget that the Greek and Turkish economies are interrelated in many ways.

So when we have the real economy, we should also take this into account. There is a lot of interrelation between the two countries. This has been the case from the time of Andreas Syggros, up to the time of the acquisition of the Finance Bank by the National Bank of Greece.

So I think that we could learn our lesson and we should take this great opportunity to overcome our problems and we can have a more courageous, a more daring economic partnership between the two countries, at a regional but also at a wider level as well, not just on the regional level.

Of course, as you all understand, I am being very optimistic when I say all this and it is easier said than done. It is difficult to move from theory to practice. It is difficult to move from written text to actual implementation.

I think that the problem that we have with the Turkish growth model is quite clear.

I think that the Greek politicians see eye to eye on what our problems are with Turkey.

We clearly support Turkeyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s accession to the EU; we want Turkey to become a full member of the EU, because we very well understand that in the second decade of the 21st century now, all be it belatedly, we see

that the eastern issue is being dissolved, because we have had the western orientation of Turkey and the anti-western orientation.

This is something that has been discussed for two centuries. So there is no doubt that our answer to this dilemma is positive. We are in favor of the western orientation of Turkey.

This is something that has been accepted by the US, this is an answer that has not yet been given in a final, irrevocable and definite way by the member-states of the EU. There are many misgivings and many reservations by certain member-states of the EU, but Greece has put forward many arguments in favor of EU accession of Turkey; and we will mention it time and again.

Because we fully understand that regardless whether this objective is achieved, the fact that this objective has been set and that this objective is pursued is very important.

Because what we are actually supporting is the way in which this country is actually organized. So we are supporting the political decision expressed by Turkey to think in a European way and to agree with the community.

So, as I mentioned, we talk about EU law and we are talking about culture here as well.

This is not self-evident for any European society and for any member-state of the EU; and it is not easy nor self-evident for a society such as the Turkish society, for an economy such as the Turkish economy, for a country where there are many problems, regional inequali-

ties, minority issues, institutional issues, that are now unraveling, as I said in Turkey and in the beginning of my speech.

So we know what we want and we clearly express our opinions. And we sincerely hope that Turkey, as a nation, as a society, as a political system, will want this too and will confirm its determination to do so.

Because I think that this is a strategic choice made by Turkey. We want this strategic decision to be clearly, if you like, formulated.

So I think that we try to show our understanding, we try to be moderate in whatever we do and we know that Turkey is part of Europe and Asia, but it also is a country which is full of contradictions.

But sometimes, this is also useful. It helps further enrich the diversity of the EU. So Turkey is a country, which is mainly Muslim, but it is a secular state, it is a very strong regional power and we carefully monitor all Turkish initiatives in relation to Iran, Iraq, and the Kurdish issue.

We also see the bilateral relations between Turkey and Israel and the fluctuations therein, what is happening with the Russian Federation, the US and so on and so forth.

We see that there have been a lot of courageous initiatives between Turkey and Armenia. We do not ignore any of the features that Turkey has and we are certain that our Turkish friends actually watch us closely as well and they know what the strategic

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decisions are of Greece, of a country such as Greece, which is a member-state of the EU, a member of the eurozone and, together with Turkey, the oldest member of NATO in southeastern Europe.

So we coexist in the Alliance and this has been the case since 1952. But this coexistence did not help us solve any of our problems. On the contrary, I would say that problems linked to the structure and functioning of the Alliance may have been fuelling the tension between the two countries.

And I am talking about the Aegean and the control over the Aegean, the new management structure of NATO and other matters as well. For example, the distribution of positions. I am talking about who actually gets to sit in which commission in NATO and other things that are also very important should be mentioned.

We are talking about flags being put forward; we are talking about the correlation of powers as well. But sometimes, we have the impression that we have cold war structures still in place in NATO. Things that are outdated, that have nothing to do with the current relation of powers.

This has nothing to do with trying to find a new strategic doctrine for NATO; so maybe we should think of a different, more radical approach as regards to the strategic doctrine of NATO.

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But also, the truly new, not the new, but an even different structure of NATO, which could rid us of tensions that exist and which would allow us to resolve problems that have been troubling us for many years and which do not help us create a more positive climate in our relations.

I know that I am insinuating a lot, maybe more than I should be; but I am certain that those of you who know the problems in depth, those who deal with these problems at a military level, know very well what I am trying to get across.

They understand why we are determined to actually resolve these issues. We have to safeguard integrity; we have to safeguard our dignity and our sovereignty. But we have to find solutions that are acceptable within the framework of the Alliance, but which will also help us diffuse the tension which has been there for 35 years.

Problems such as what is happening in Cyprus, the existence of occupying forces, the fragmentation of the island of Cyprus, the fact that the two communities and the heads of the two communities have not been able to find a solution to their problems, so that Cyprus can enter not just the EU and the Eurozone as one united island.

But let us not forget that if the problem were resolved in Cyprus, Turkey would be given a boost to enter the EU as well.

So I would like to say, and this was mentioned by the Ambassador, Mr. Zepos, we can talk about the continental shelf issue first, because this is a very important issue, but we could approach it in many different ways.

What is not important though is to start from the most difficult aspect of this issue.

I think we could do the reverse. Maybe we could try to resolve certain issues pertaining to basic principles, meaning we should agree on certain principles first and foremost, i.e. that the islands have a continental shelf and that they have all the other zones provided for by the international law of the sea.

So we can then accept what was accepted in the agreement between Albania and Greece and Italy and Greece; and I am talking about the delimitation of marine zones and the continental shelf.

We can talk about the middle line, we can talk about the baselines; and after having reached an agreement on all these things, we can then see how easy it is to talk about the breadth of the territorial waters and the breadth of the airspace.

Because then there will be confidence, there will be a will to go beyond the problem and to try and find a solution to a series of problems. These problems are like the links in a chain and one affects the other.

But what is very important is the way in which you discuss the problem, the way in which you describe the problem. Because I think that this is half the solution.

So what is very important is for us to change what we do in the Aegean. I am talking about something that happens on

a daily basis. We actually monitor what is happening with Turkey and we actually show strategically cool mindedness in what is happening in the Aegean and in the Mediterranean.

But unfortunately, every single day, many times a week to be exact, definitely every working day, we have a violation of our airspace so we have violation of air traffic rules.

This leads to a problem pertaining to security of flights. So we have the violation of our airspace between six to ten miles; but sometimes even up to six miles, up to six nautical miles.

We very often – and this is more the case now than in the past – have over flights of fully armed Turkish aircrafts over Farmakonisi and Agathonisi.

We fully are in favor of free shipping.

Ships are supposed to have safe passage; that is very important. But sometimes there are some borderline cases.

We do not want to say that certain areas must be saved for exercises in the Aegean. But our NOTAMs should be respected by both sides.

And if we start thinking about areas where there can be no misunderstanding and no insult pertaining to our dignity and the dignity of the two countries, I am sure that we can find solutions to our problems.

If we want to go ahead and see all this in a positive light, I am sure that then we will be able to generally improve GreekTurkish relations.

But in order for this to happen, what we need, as I mentioned before, is our ability to create a climate of confidence. I think we should avoid unnecessary provocations. This is something we do. We do not react nervously when things are up to tactical maneuvers.

We do not attribute to any Turkish behavior something that is not what it is. So we must not exaggerate and we must not blow things out of proportions.

I understand very well that there are different opinions in Turkey and that there is a relation of powers. But on the other hand, one must understand that we are wasting time. We must make big, radical, courageous decisions.

If we do not do this now, then we will limit ourselves to things that are small and insignificant. So time is not infinite. Time is not working in our favor and it is not working in the favor of Turkey, as well. Time is against us.

I think that we must grasp all the opportunities. We have to talk to our Turkish interlocutors on all levels. It is not a coincidence that our Prime Minister, right after his inauguration, visited Istanbul and letters were exchanged between the two prime ministers.

We also know that the Turkish foreign minister talked to the Greek alternate foreign minister, Mr. Droutsas, and I know the content of their meetings and discussions.

I have actually exchanged views four times informally with my Turkish counterpart. I am optimistic, but I am not naïve from historical or geopolitical point of view.

Here we are talking about a very fine distinction between naiveté and optimism.

So I think that we have to see where the difference lies between the two; meaning, we have to try not to create over optimism, because this may lead to tension.

I think we have the determination to find a way out and we are expecting the Turkish side to show the same determination and the same capacity.

I would like to express the wish once again that Turkey becomes a modern, democratic state, where there is rule of law and where the government is in charge of the armed forces and which plays an important role as well.

And I would like to say that foreign policy must only be exercised by the legitimate government of a country. Thank you.

Evangelos Venizelos is the Minister of National Defense of the Hellenic Republic

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By Selim Egeli

During the last 22 years, the efforts I have made for a Turkish- Greek rapprochement occupied an important part of my life, and also taught me an important lesson.

When I first started as a member of the Council in 1988, I believed that the economy, economic relations, investments and trade provided the secret and miraculous formulas that could bring countries together.

If we as businessmen would try harder and increase our business relations with our counterparts in Greece, I thought, then the bilateral volume of trade between our countries would break records and we will start to solve even some of our political problems.

I was wrong.

With the political problems or differences between our countries remaining unresolved, we could only achieve a limited and temporary success in economic relations.

Without the resolution of the outstanding political issues remaining between our two countries, it is almost impossible to establish strong, solid and advancing economic relations.

For most of the 20th century, our common relations were defined by the politics of hard power with national security priorities, dominating the agenda of our foreign policies.

Since the beginning of the 1970s the priorities in our relations were focused only on the divisive issues.

The borders of the continental shelf and the territorial waters in the Aegean, the control of the airspace and the militarization of the Greek islands, the minorities in Greece and Turkey and, at the top of the list, the Cyprus disputeâ&#x20AC;Ś

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Greece recognizes the dispute over the continental shelf and claims that the disagreement should be resolved at the international court.

Turkey does not accept the ten-mile airspace claimed by Greece, and declares that Greece is only entitled to a six-mile airspace, and therefore sends its fighter jets as close as six miles to the Greek coast.

This practice results in aircraft confrontations between the two states that has become something of a routine.

In order to compete in this race, to keep their militaries alert, both countries at one point had to spend between 3.5 and 5 percent of their GDPs on military expenditures. More dramatically, the episode over the Aegean islets Immia/Kardak brought us to the verge of war. Those years of antagonism, suspicion and historical enmity induced Greeks and Turks to share a mutual distrust.

Some corporations who tried to establish some bilateral business activity were obliged to practice their trade over a third country such as Switzerland or Lichtenstein.

The very few Greek companies who have invested in Turkey, and those that did so, assumed the guise of Swiss establishments.

Businessmen were afraid to be exposed as traders buying from Turkey, or vice versa.

Until 1987, like most of the business community, our political leaders and diplomats also avoided meetings and dialogue. In 1987, Turkish and Greek leaders decided to meet at an international Forum to try to find a way to break this vicious circle.

Some of you in this room today, who have been witnesses to the Forum of Davos, would remember that the most important outcome of that meeting has been the joint decision to choose Greek and Turkish businessmen as the

new driving force to initiate a rapprochement by improving economic relations between our two countries.

At the behest of the two governments, we organized ourselves into a corporate structure and named it the Turkish- Greek and GreekTurkish Business Councils.

The establishment of the Councils in both countries has been a significant step towards to improvement of our relations.

Against the background of old political and historical disagreements, a positive climate of cooperation in economic relations and in the business, trade, sports, cultural and civil society sectors has started to develop very positively.

Since 1988 both councils tried to promote trade, joint investments, technological cooperation, joint projects in third countries and brought together Greek and Turkish companies in banking, construction, tourism, energy, communication, insurance, textiles, agriculture and shipping.

Many years of hard work, lots of sacrifices, hundreds of flights between Athens and Istanbul, countless hours spent with the members of the media, unfortunately, did not solve any political problem, but did cause a positive awareness in both of our societies.

As a result of all these efforts, our bilateral trade volume increased to 400 Million Dollars in 1990 and almost froze around this figure for the next 10 years.

But despite the static nature of economic activity after 1990, economic considerations and public diplomacy began to affect the choices of respected political elites who had already started to try to avoid polarization, even when â&#x20AC;&#x153;hot incidentsâ&#x20AC;? occurred in the Aegean.

In both countries two opposing tenden-

1SPTQFDUT cies started to face each other: At one end, a skeptical political class, a negative press, a negatively predisposed public opinion which perceived the bilateral relationship only from a security perspective, a business community which mistrusted the other side…

At the other end, flexible and practical political and economic decision makers and civil society groups and constructive media groups who saw this relationship as a positive and promising challenge with win-win perspectives…

I think this was a very healthy development. At the very least, after decades of silence, groups and individuals in both of our societies started to discuss Turkish and Greek relations in an open and a constructive context.

The large Turkish market of almost 72 Million, started to attract the service sectors in Greece, and the per capita income of Greece and its membership in the EU, started to move the Turkish industry to explore the opportunities in the Greek market.

At the end of 1999 the two governments decided to start a new era, which became the second milestone to affect our bilateral economic relations after the Davos World Economic Forum in 1987.

Our Governments have stipulated a number of high-level agreements regarding tourism, transport, environmental protection, cultural cooperation, trade, double taxation, shipping, refugees, narcotics, and terrorism, in total 19 agreements.

We should not forget, that compared to just 3 agreements in 53 years, 19 agreements were finalized in just a few years after 2000.

As a result of this policy change, more correctly starting a low policy cooperation which resulted in all these agreements, both societ-

ies, but primarily the businessmen started to enjoy this new environment, which afforded new opportunities and challenges.

The volume of bilateral trade between the two neighbors has been on an upward trajectory since 2000.

Greek exports of goods to Turkey have recorded an impressive annual growth rate of around 18 percent, reaching 5.4 percent of total Greek exports.

Turkey’s exports to Greece exceeded 1,5 billion Dollars in 2008, but this figure is only a small share of total Turkish exports. The volume of bilateral trade reached 3.6 billion Dollars in 2008 and despite the world wide economic crisis, 3 Billion Dollars in 2009. Turkey’s exports are enjoying a notably consistent surplus in value from 40- 50 percent over Greek exports during this period. I believe there are structural reasons for Turkey exporting more to Greece.

The contribution of manufacturing to GDP is significantly higher in case of Turkey than in the case of Greece. Greek exports consist of commodities with low value-added component. By contrast, Turkish exports are much more diversified manufactured goods with higher value-added component such cars and automotive products, televisions, whitegoods. On the other hand Greece’s economy is highly service oriented. The Greek market reforms during the 1990s, together with the country’s entry into the European Monetary Union have modernized the service economy and helped Greece’s economy to grow.

In banking for example, your macroeconomic stability has enabled your country’s financial institutions to grow and to develop an excellent level of know-how in many bank-

ing activities, whereas, perhaps due to high inflation and long lasting economic crises in Turkey, we were not able to demonstrate such a capability.

Greece’s reforms and macroeconomic stabilization have driven Greek companies to achieve the best corporate governance in Southeastern Europe.

Greece became the leading foreign direct investor in the Balkans.

Greece became the 8th largest investor in Turkey with 5.2 Billion Dollars between 2002 and 2007, with a further 799 Million Dollars in 2008. First, the National Bank of Greece, the country’s biggest financial group, please correct me if I am wrong, bought the controlling stake in Finansbank and paid almost 2.9 billion Dollars. Euro-Bank then became the second Greek bank to make an acquisition in Turkey by buying 70 percent of Tekfenbank. Alongside the Turkish restaurants in Athens, Turkish textile and ready-wear products started to be sold in Turkish boutiques located at Greek shopping malls. Turkey’s largest bank, Ziraat opened two branches in Greece. Turkish and Greek contractors are working in partnership on big construction projects in the Gulf, the Balkans and Central Asia.

Our governments have still not come to an agreement yet regarding major, difficult and sensitive issues such as the continental shelf, airspace, Cyprus and minority rights. Almost all of the major problems are still pending.

Then, what was the reason for this rapid development in our economic relations?I believe there have been four major reasons.

First, what has actually changed the economic climate has been a simple assurance given by the two governments to their publics

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that they are determined to be good allies, good neighbors, good partners and that they intend to solve their problems through peaceful means.

This guarantee has been received as a blessing by the two publics, and has influenced the business communities on a much larger scale, compared to 1987, namely not only corporations with global experience but also many small and medium size companies have started to enter each other’s market.

This joint message has started to build up the trust between our two nations. Second, upon analyzing the characteristics of both economies at the time this rapprochement had begun, I noted that they were more complimentary than competitive, which is still the case, and the most encouraging factor for the future of our economic relations. Third, Greece helped to open the way for Turkey’s EU accession. That paved a completely new path in our diplomatic relations; the two nations became partners in cooperating in the context of subregional groupings in South East Europe, the Black Sea and the Middle East. Fourth, Turkish and Greek businessmen since 1987 laid an excellent foundation on which diplomacies could advance with their bilateral agendas.

First; Turkey will continue to export to Greece an ever-rising amount of goods and Greece will continue to export to Turkey, as an investor, an ever-rising amount of capital. Second; a durable EU accession process, following today’s successful economic policies, will continue to entrench low inflation in Turkey. This will continue to give Turkish industry a much more stable planning outlook and provide the cheaper funding that the country needs for its capital expenditures. As a result Turkey’s solid

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manufacturing base will be upgraded and its exporting capabilities greatly enhanced. This situation will also mean a more effective privatization process and will result in the greater attraction of Turkey to foreign direct investors.

Third: Greek investors, in turn, who I still are well prepared because of their solid capitalization, their experience with in the Balkans and their affinity for the Turkish environment will take a greater advantage of the opportunities that will made available for them in Turkey.

More specifically, Greek companies in the services sector have the capital that probably is less available in Turkey and the know-how that Greece’s higher per capita income and a stable economy for most of the beginning of 2000s have brought into being.

I think, the economic crisis which effects Greek’s economy maybe in a very negative direction today, will not last forever. I believe, this situation can be a new opportunity for both of our countries to increase our bilateral volume of trade. For more Greek companies, Turkey, of course in the context of EU accession will be seen as one of their major strategic opportunities. Due to the remaining effects of the world wide economic crisis, delays may well occur but nothing will change in the long term.

Fourth; Due to competitive advantages, such as more convenient prices, shorter distances and superior quality Greece will increase its share of Turkish imports at least by five percent during the coming years.

In other words, our bilateral trade volume annually will exceed 8 Billion Dollars. Fifth; the majority of the Turkish and Greek investors in tourism will cooperate more closely and they will combine their marketing efforts. The Aegean Sea will get a much higher portion of the international tourism traffic and income.

Sixth; more Turkish and Greek join-ventures will initiate construction projects around our geography.

I believe the future of Turkish- Greek economic corporation has an enormous opportunity from which both publics will benefit.

But these predictions can only come true if the political stability between our countries continues.

This rapprochement must be sustainable.

There is only one solution. We must bring all these pending disputes to a solution.

I am fully aware that the discussion of security questions, such as the continental shelf or airspace could be a highly charged process on both sides. True, those issues were once very sensitive issues and could have entailed high political costs. Once, it was even worse, any compromise would have required a systematic and repeated preparations of the respective public opinions.

But time has changed, the world has changed, Europe has changed, Greece has changed, and Turkey has changed. I believe that we should all feel relieved, both can afford sacrifices in this respect, we should only trust them more. Recently, our two Prime Ministers exchanged letters with each other and the Turkish Prime Minister will pay a visit to his Greek counterpart during spring months in Athens. I hope this meeting will be the third corner stone and will open the way for a radical solution.

Selim Egeli is the Chairman of the TurkishGreek Business Council, Board-Member of the Foreign Economic Relations Board of Turkey, Chairman of SHENCO Consulting Inc and Board - Member of Balikesir Electromechanical Industries

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By Constantinos Zepos

Greece and Turkey are going through a transitional phase, they are undergoing a crisis. But it is a different crisis; there is one thing in common though. We can assume and hope that these crises in the two countries are the herald of recovery.

In Greece, because we have an economy that is in crisis and in Turkey we have a crisis when it comes to the political system. I am talking about the role of the army and other reactionary forces.

I want people to understand that the bilateral relation between Greece and Turkey to a large extent is influenced by the relation between Turkey and the EU. I think we can even read the progress report, which was drawn up by the European Commission last October on how Turkey has progressed on the road to EU membership,

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so we can there understand that all the problems mentioned in the progress report are of direct interest to Greece.

We are talking about human rights, for example. This is not a theoretical problem that we look at from a distance. I think it has ramifications on minority rights and minority issues. Also, territorial rights, sovereignty, the law of the sea; all these have an impact on the economy as well.

In 1999 at the Helsinki European Council, the bilateral problems were integrated into the process and Turkey had to show its will to progress on that front.

I would also like to mention that in these progress reports there is a mention, of the fact that we have an intervention on the part of the army and what is happening in Turkey.

But we also know that despite the fact that the government in Turkey has all the good will in the world, but it has not been able to change the constitution; because constitutional reform is necessary for Turkey to come closer to the EU.

We have to think of different periods in diplomacy. We have the previous period in diplomacy, where bilateral and multilateral relations were two distinct, if you like, segments. This is no longer the case today.

Let me underscore the fact that Greece is undergoing a serious economic crisis; there is no doubt about it. But this is a shortterm crisis, whereas the problem facing the Turkish government is of a different nature and the duration of that crisis is different.

I think it is time for us to get rid of stereotypes and inhibitions of our past. I think that we can give fresh impetus to certain priorities that need to be taken, in order for us to overcome longstanding problems.

I am trying to be optimistic. I know that a lot has happened in the last few years. But let me say that as regards Turkey sometimes it is difficult for us Greeks to express ourselves fully in front of Turks, because sometimes there are some highly sensitive issues,

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if you like. Sometimes it has to do with how people perceive things. I am not trying to say something negative here, at all. But let me also talk about the progress reports drawn up by the European Commission. For example, in the case of Turkey, the latest progress report was written in a very strict way. And sometimes things are provided in a moderate way, if you like, the way they are expressed is not very strong. Sometimes the facts are downright negative. Turkey really is finding it difficult to get rid of the legacy it actually inherited after the drawing up of the latest constitution, after what had happened back in 1980 in Turkey.

However, we are still going through a phase where there are many factors inhibiting the resolution of bilateral issues.

Despite all this, there have been some positive moves; and this is recent.

We see that the Prime Minister of Turkey, Mr. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, on the occasion of former Prime Minister Karamanlisâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;

visit to Ankara in the beginning of 2008, there was a press conference on the occasion of that visit.

Prime Minister Erdogan said something that was very important, about the Patriarchate. He said that in fact the ecumenicity of the Patriarchate is something that is important to the Orthodox world, the orthodox Christians. So what the Prime Minister said was easy to understand, but it was the first time that this came out of official lips.

I am saying this, because the Patriarchate encountered many problems, just by using the adjective â&#x20AC;&#x153;ecumenicalâ&#x20AC;?, which is clearly of a religious nature. The Prime Minister of Turkey also added one more thing during this very important, historic, press conference. He also said that the elections of the Patriarch were also important.

I do not want to preempt anything, but the Prime Minister talked about a real problem. I am talking about the way in which the Patriarch is elected and the way in which the members of the Synod are elected, meaning they have to be Turkish citizens.

This is not the case of the orthodox patriarchates in other countries. For example in Albania, the Archbishop of Albania is elected as a Greek citizen; but he has the obligation, when assuming his duties to assume Albanian citizenship.

So this is a very realistic, a very flexible procedure. If it were implemented in the case of the Patriarchate, it would greatly help things. Prime Minister Erdogan also talked about the fact that the Seminary of Halki closed down. He mentioned the exact date when this happened; and we also have another historic meeting, which took place on Halki, or Prigipos, between the Patriarch and the Turkish Prime Minister, because that was also a very important event.

So Turkey is going through an important time. There are certain conditions it has to meet, but it has shown that it fully understands why Greek are so sensitive about the issue and I am sure that they will be able to make some positive steps forward.

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Before moving on to the Aegean, I would quickly like to talk about the Greeks living in Turkey. And I am talking about their property rights to be exact.

You know very well that the Court of Human Rights has actually tried a lot of cases where Greeks living in Turkey have actually gone to court, trying to protect property rights, because they feel that they were wronged in Turkey.

Actually, I would like to say that there is a bad track record in our bilateral relations when it comes to this issue. And of course, we have a decree of 1964, according to which the Turkish government took away the right from Greeks to freely manage their property they had in Turkey.

This is a ban, a prohibition, which actually caused many problems in Greek-Turkish relations. We also decided to mention this,

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not only to Turkey but to our EU partners, an ambassador had certain doubts and he kept saying: “Why do you keep scratching these wounds? That would be bad.”

This is something of course that happened back in the 1980s. And I said in that case that it is very simple. For example, that in Istanbul there are three people, a Dutch guy, a Turkish guy and a Greek guy, a person of Greek decent of course, who live in Constantinople.

Let me repeat that the main perception behind my analysis is that this crisis, be they long-term or transient, we should actually see it as an opportunity for the countries to shed light on their longstanding problems and try to find solutions to these problems.

So I dare say that we can sight certain positive examples. And this, of course, is not based on what happens in the public sector, but in civil society.

Let me quickly say a few words, before concluding my presentation, on the Aegean issues. These issues were examined by an informal working group, comprising Greek and Turkish officials and this working group managed to draft a text.

A text about the problems between the two countries and on how to find a solution to the Aegean issues; and of course we are talking about the delineation of the continental shelf as well.

So this was a group of people who had an in-depth knowledge of the subject; Yes, we are talking about civil society, but we are talking about informed civil society.

This document was drafted by this working group and in this text we had certain basic principles, but also certain proposals on how to resolve the issue of the continental shelf.

First of all, let me say that we start from scratch. That is important. So what is very important is for both sides – and I repeat, I am talking about an initiative undertaken by private individuals, this has nothing to do with the governments of the two countries, this was then put to the governments, but first it was a private initiative.

So our basic stand is that both sides need to determine the vital interest that they have in the area. This cooperation for the protection of the marine environment in particular is something that should be promoted further.

We should also have free shipping; we should promote tourism. So there were certain things that were mentioned in this

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text. There are a lot of details in this text; it is a very detailed text. So we see that in this endeavor undertaken, the main will of the working group is to try to be as objective as can be and to try to inform the public opinion in an unbiased way.

We are not living at a time of secret diplomacy. Our democracies depend on a large extent on how well we are informed and on how the public opinion perceives things. They should really understand the nature of the problem.

I think we all sometimes are frustrated, because we do not receive all the information. We sometimes believe that the mass media are not giving us the facts.

So I think that we have to have good information, timely information and as objective as can be information, because then we will be able to look into a complex problem in a good way.

We said that we should proceed in the following fashion. First of all, the two coun-

tries should agree that for a certain period of time that will be strictly predetermined – for example, it could be six months, one year or so, two years maximum – so there will be a timetable set and we must within this timetable resolve all problems pertaining to the continental shelf.

That was the first phase. Let me talk about the second part of this process, if you like. I am talking not just about the delineation, the limitation if you like, of the continental shelf.

We said that whatever was pending would then be referred to the International Court of Justice in The Hague and then, for legal reasons, the Court would first look into the issues pertaining to the airspace and territorial waters.

Anyway we are not talking about one issue; it is not just the continental shelf, it is three things. It is the continental shelf, it is the territorial waters – because the Court will ask the two parties, “Tell me, how are you going to measure the continental shelf?” – and of course, we also have the airspace, because according to the law of the

sea, the airspace is directly linked to what was mentioned before.

I do not want to ramble, but this was the proposal. The proposal concluded that sensitive issues, such as the demilitarization of the Aegean islands, according to what has been mentioned in the Treaty of Paris and the Treaty of Lausanne, will be left for settlement at a later stage.

First we have to deal with the continental shelf issue and we can make use of the International Court of Justice in the Hague.

I think that it is very important to understand that all these things are interlinked. So if we want to go to the Hague, we have to discuss everything. We cannot just discuss the continental shelf and nothing else.

I do not think that the fate of Greece was decided by the breadth of the nautical miles. I think that this is a politically sensitive issue. It has been charged with a lot of emotion.

But we have got to have a cool head, we have to think without emotion; and I think that this is the right time. We have many opportunities to do so now, because we see that both countries are undergoing a crisis and opportunities come out of crises.

Constantinos Zepos is an Ambassador a.h.

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HFUUJOH PVU PG UIF EFBE MPDL So, just imagine how many years have gone by since then. We are talking about 23 years. No other country has ever had to wait so long in order for it to join the European Union. And if we are to go even back further in time, and I am talking about the association agreement between Turkey and the European Union, this entity was into force in 1964, 2 years after the Greek agreement.

The thing is that we might not be able to realize this, because now Greece is undergoing this economic crisis, it doesn’t actually see what is happening elsewhere.

But I think that negotiations are not going that well. And why I am saying that? I think we have a combination of things.

On the one hand we have countries, such as France, Germany, but also Austria, expressing their reservations. And we also have the Cyprus issue and the Greek –Turkish issues in general, the NG and dispute and so and so forth.

So, if we look at all these together, we see that the development of negotiations and the opening of chapters for Turkey is very slow, out to 35 chapters they have only opened 11 chapters, if I am not mistaken.

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And it is not just that. We have capital being blocked from Cyprus. And I am talking about the recognition of Cyprus by Turkey.

But also something else which is also very important. I am talking about the ratification on the part of Turkey of the extension of customs union to Cyprus and direct trade between Cyprus and Turkey, and Greek and Cypriot ships entering Turkish ports.

So, the question that comes to mind is how we will be able to get out of the dead lock. How we will be we will be able to surpass the problems. Well, that is up to Turkey and the European Union of course.

The solution of the Cyprus issue would be great. I don’t know if it is realistic to think that the issue can be resolved now. I think that talks are about to end in a month’s time.

And I think that it would be overly optimistic to believe that we will have positive results in a month from now.

I don’t know what will happen in Northern Cyprus. What we here, actually, materializes, well that is not a good omen for the continuation of negotiations of these talks.

So, I don’t think we should consider the solution of the Cyprus issue in the coming years.

What remains is to try to come up with solutions to other issues. I am talking about capital, for example, that has been marked and that can not leave Cyprus.

By Pavlos Apostolidis

Of course it is difficult to find a solution, because this is linked to firm positions held

by Turkey and Cyprus. This goes way back in time, it is not something new, so people have to show great will, great courage in order to move forward.

So, I would like to say that it is not that Cyprus doesn’t want Turkey to become a European Union member, far from it. It is important is to look at the process in place.

So we must try to come up with solutions.

Now, there are many objections. I have talked about the three countries, the three European Union member states that are against Turkey’s accession.

These objections are directly related to the public opinion in Germany, France and Austria. The public is negatively predisposed, it thinks of the consequences of the European Union enlargement.

We see that the unemployment rate has gone up, because we have the Polish plumbers, for example, finding work in Paris.

We also have to think of the matter of religion, because a lot of people in these countries believe that Muslims will not fully integrate and will not fully become a mem-

ber of French society, German society, Austrian society.

Now, of course in order for these reservations and objections to be justified, we hear all sorts of arguments being put on the table. Some people say that Turkey is not truly a part of Europe, geographically speaking, and so on and so forth.

Some people also express concerns about the population of Turkey, because it has a very big population, and will happen to the rest of the European Union once Turkey joins the European Union.

Let us not forget what is happening in Turkey as regards the institutions, political institutions and the Turkish economy as well.

And there is a paradox here, because some people say that the European Union rushed to help countries in Eastern Europe become members of the European Union and that some have regretted that move and that it was a rushed decision.

On the one hand this is something that is not in favor of Turkish membership, because some people may say: well, look, if those countries joined, why cannot Turkey join?

But on the other hand some people seem to be saying: that is enough, we did what we did and lets stop now, and lets not have any more waves of enlargement.

But you see what is happening with Croatia. Negotiations with Croatia are continuing, they are moving forward quickly and I am sure

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that the same will happen in the case of the other Balkan countries as well.

Of course the Helsinki European Council was a great milestone. Greece then expressed that it is in favor of Turkey joining the European Union. However, effort was made to try to maximize the benefits of Turkey’s joining the European Union.

And here we are talking about the negotiation process, but also the actual accession of Turkey into the European Union as well. I believe that these arguments are still valid, they still apply. So, we must continue to actively support Turkey in the negotiations.

In Greece, of course, people are really concerned as to whether our policy was successful. Well, what I have to say in answer to that, is that the opposite policy wasn’t successful either.

We shouldn’t even think about the idea of supporting the privileged, if you like, relationship between European Union and Turkey. I believe that we should continue to strive for full membership of Turkey.

We must help so that negotiations can move forward. We must do our best to lift all the existing obstacles.

Pavlos Apostolidis is the Ambassador a.h. and former Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic Republic

0OLITICAL 3TABILITY %CONOMIC GROWTH

By Constantinos Antonopoulos

Since 1995 our company tried to enter the Turkish market. We managed to do so in 2001. In 2001, we won a tender and we actually carried out a major investment. And I would like to say that before NBG had invested, we were the biggest investment. We are talking about 100 million euro.

This investment of ours was together with a business group, TURKCELL, one of the biggest mobile operators in Turkey and one of the greatest players in the region.

I must admit that this experience is one of the most positive experiences we have had so far internationally. And I would like to say that we are present in five continents and I would like to say that this business cooperation between TURKCELL and INTRALOT in Turkey is one of our greatest examples of cooperation in all five continents.

The reason why this was the case is because Turkish business groups have been structured in an excellent way. We are talking about corporate governance and best practices. This is what makes them stand out.

We are talking about large business, well organized business groups, better than the same Greek companies. This greatly helped us, because we had the knowhow and the technology and we wanted to work with a good partner in the Turkish market.

What we managed to get out of this cooperation is that we actually have football pools now in Turkey. I think that the word “ida” is what we call “betting” in Greece.

In five years we have been able to have 1.5 billion dollars given to the Turkish public sector. And a lot of money went to football clubs in Turkey.

So we are talking about a lot of money; substantial amounts. Even if you were to think of it with a Greek analogy, Olympiakos and Panathinaikos never gets that amount of money. There is nothing similar to that in Greece.

Now you understand that Turkish football is very important worldwide. I think that despite the fact that the Greek football teams have done very well lately, the Turkish teams are even better than ours.

To conclude on our experience in Turkey and our business cooperation with this business group, this was a hub and we were able to expand our business activities in the region.

We were also able to sign an agreement for the football bet in Azerbaijan. There is a joint venture; we have a 45%. Now there is a ten year agreement in Azerbaijan.

It is obvious to see that now there are practical ways to promote our cooperation.

Business cooperation between Greece and Turkey is thriving, not just in Turkey, but in the area around Turkey as well.

Turkey has developed rapidly. Demographically, the figures change very quickly and you have to have high growth rates, because otherwise you have unemployment.

Because we see that the birth rate is also very high in Turkey.

The growth rates in Turkey are very good, very good. We see that they were able to weather the economic crisis very well, the currency is stabilizing. There were some troubles, but they were able to overcome these problems.

What is most important is that Turkey combines a big domestic market, but also access to areas which Greece cannot access easily. And I am talking about whatever is on the eastern side of Turkey.

In order to put it simply, one of the best hubs for you to go to Asia, except Dubai which everybody likes for shopping too, is Istanbul. Istanbul is a great hub.

You can go to Beijing. There are daily flights to Beijing. So we believe that one of the best transport hubs is Turkey and this actually shows that Turkey is really interested in developing in transportation.

This means that there are good relations with the neighbors and this is one of the main features of modern Turkey.

I would like to say that geopolitically, Turkey has developed many initiatives for the Muslin world. It is not just a matter of politics. Turkey influences the Muslin world.

We work in Malaysia and I would like to say that Turkey has a special weight in Indonesia, in Malaysia and in the rest of the Muslin world. So we are talking about millions of people.

And I would like to say that it is not easy for small companies and for small business groups from Greece to access these countries. We cannot be international players.

I represent a leading Greek company that is present in five continents. But I would like to say that the Greek businesses cannot be leaders in the world market.

We can be good regional players. So we have invested in the Balkans, in Eastern Europe, in Turkey, around the Mediterranean basin.

But it is difficult for us to move further away. We can only do so by cooperating with other countries and I think that Turkey is such an excellent partner.

Constantinos Antonopoulos is the Chief Executive Officer of INTRALOT

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7KH PRUH ZH GHOD\

By Dimitris Avramopoulos

I would like to say that the two people of the Turkish and the Greek peoples embraced this initiative and gave the opportunity to the governments, to come closer to one another.

I remember that George Papandreou, who was then Foreign Minister, and now Prime Minister of the country, called me and we spoke on the phone on how to further enhance this initiative.

And I would like to say that this is what led to a friendly relationship with Tayyip Erdogan, when we first elected Mayors. We have a common vision in a new era for Greek â&#x20AC;&#x201C;Turkish relations. I would like to say that the peoples, the Greek and Turkish people broke down the walls. Greece traditionally follows a policy based on values and principals. We believe in rule of law in respecting international law. We believe in territorial sovereignty. We want to avoid the use of force, all threats of force, and respect for human rights.

All these are the cornerstones of our foreign policy. This is how we exercise our diplomacy in the world.

Greece is an honest supporter of Turkish European Union membership.

We firmly believe that Turkey can become the best possible neighbor for Greece provided and carries out all the necessary changes in order for accession to be carried out. I am talking about geo-strategic court decisions, changes in the interior of the country and so on and so forth.

I would like to say that Tayyip Erdoganâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s government meets with difficulties, it has difficulties with the military regime, the military establishment, which of course actually puts a lot of resistance.

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But we know that as days go by, democracy becomes stronger in Turkey. The government of new democracy made an important number of steps in the last five years in Greek-Turkish relations. This has also been the case in the past.

Kostas Karamanlis was the first Greek Prime Minister who after 49 whole years in 2008 carried out an official visit to Ankara.

But at the same time the Turkish planes entered the airspace. They harassed Greek pilots, and they were flying over Greek islands.

This caused concern to the Greeks living in the Aegean, and the Greeks actually didnâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t know how to interpret Turkeyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s will.

I personally believe that Turkey wants to find a viable settlement, a fair and viable settlement in the area. Now the question is when we will be finally know who makes decisions in Turkey. For Europe and for all of us the answer is clear: the legally elected government of the country decides on what happens.

First of all the UN Chart on the law of the see is the document which we should go by. Greece would be in favor of a decision taken by Turkey to ratify the convention on the law of the see. This would be a symbolic move by Turkish diplomacy.

And then the dialogue on the continental shelf would be placed on a legal basis.

I sincerely would like to hope that our countries would sit down soon and talk honestly to one another. I think they have to move away from problems of the past, to be realists, to take into account the facts that I have resulted.

I am certain that both governments will safeguard their national interests, and they will be able to give to Europe and to our neighborhood a new era for Greek Turkish relations. This is good for our peoples, for the people in the area, for Europe and the entire world for that matter.

But the key to all this, and I have to say it once again, clearly has to do with the Cyprus issue, contrary to people who say otherwise.

Cyprus, whether we like it or not, is a full member of the European Union. And I think that the two communities have to find a solution which will lead to the automatic integration of the Turkish â&#x20AC;&#x201C;Cypriot side to the European Union without any problems, just like what happened in Germany.

So, the road to the settlement of the Cyprus issue is still a long one, it has many obstacles, many difficulties. Greece is in favor of a fair comprehensive and viable settlement on the basis of UN resolutions and on the basis of the institutional framework of the European Union and of course in line with the community.

This is a solution that will lead to a really unification of the island. The Turkish-Cypriots will automatically be integrated and Turkey will very quickly join the European Union.

I firmly believe that the two communities must act independently without irresponsible guarantors, without pressure, without any outside intervention. They must decide on their common future, our common future.

All these deadlines, all these time limits, the risk of the island being divided for ever, well I donâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t think that is good. That is not a solution.

One is certain, that the situation in Cyprus cannot continue for ever. It is not possible for Famagusta, which was a prosperous city to have become a ghost city. Nicosia, can not be a divided capital.

All this is unthinkable in our modern world. We can not have foreign occupying forces on an island, on a country that is part of Europe.

WKH JUHDWHU ZH ZLOO KDYH WR SD\ Let us not forget that the soil and the sovereignty of Cyprus is part of the European Union. So, according to the international law, Turkish forces are actually on European Union soil.

Lets resolve the issue as quickly as possible. The more we delay, the greater the price we will have to pay diplomatically, economically and otherwise.

Let Cyprus no longer be a problem.

Let it be an example that many others will follow, a prosperous and peaceful place. There will be a domino effect, and then Greece and Turkey will greatly enhance their relations.

We spend a lot of money on defense, we spend a lot of money on armaments, and this is to the detriment of our economy, of our peoples. And we know that we both are members of NATO and of course there is a problem in the cohesion of NATO because of this tension between the two countries.

So, instead of the military trying to invent all these technical difficulties and problems, it is time for them to try to come up with viable solutions to any problems that are still outstanding.

At the same time at the Greek-Turkish borders millions of people, women, children, men have tried to enter the European Union via Greece. They are in search of a better life.

Some were arrested, others were extradited, some lost their lives.

The time has come for countries in southeastern Europe to leave all the problems behind them. These are long standing problems, they have been divisive. I am talking about differences in religion and other issues as well.

So, we have to leave the past behind us.

We have to move forward. You see, I donâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t use the term Balkans. We must look ahead.

We must look towards the future. We have to strengthen our good neighborly relations.

We have to protect legality, and we have protect institutions.

The time has come for Turkey to official recognize the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, and I am talking about the reopening of the Orthodox Seminary in Chalki.

I know that the current government in Turkey wants to reopen the Seminary, but it doesnâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t dare to do so yet, as was mentioned by the journalist Ali Birrand in an article. The time has come for us to change our relations, and to actually be able to find solutions to our problems.

There was an exchange of letters between the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey. This shows that the dialogue has been re-initiated. Both sides have recapitulated long know positions, firm positions.

The Greek Prime Minister says that there should be a dead line, a timetable for the talks to take place. Otherwise we have to the Hague to settle the issue of the continental shelf. Many compatriots of mine may say that the relations of powers between the two countries, it is no longer favorable for Greece. Greece has many problems. There is a lack of creditability in the political system of Greece. And Greece is in the throws of a severe economic crisis.

And let us not forget that we know that destabilization of international relations at such a difficult juncture may lead to terrible consequences. This is the reality. We have to face it.

It is true that the balances that have been struck now depend more than ever before on the economic competitiveness, social cohesion, and the strategic effectiveness of both countries.

What I mean is that what is happening internally in Greece and Turkey may be yet another geo-strategic parameter. But this makes it even more important than ever before for the two governments and the politicians to act responsibly.

I am certain that the current government of Turkey will never attempt to take advantage of the fact that Greece is suffering an economic crisis now. I also know that Turkey of course wants to become a member of the European Union.

Let us not forget that Turkey has its own financial problems, and its own social issues to deal with.

Greece and Turkey have missed many opportunities in the past. But this time we have to move forward. We cannot start from scratch though. We cannot start talking about matters like economic and so on and so forth.

From Davos up until now, all governments have tried to talk about low policy issues like tourism, investment, trade, cooperation and so on and so forth.

But we can do a lot more. We can bring the Greeks and Turks closer to one another.

We can show them the way and then they can actually help us, provided of course the national systems want it to happen.

The time has come for us to plunge into deep water, to swim, because we all know how to swim.

Thank you.

Dimitris Avramopoulos is a Member of the Hellenic Parliament, former Minister and Head of the Foreign Policy

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4HEæ#OURSEæOFæ'REEK æææ

By Ali Tuygan

I would like to make some observations on the international scene from a Turkish perspective, and the challenges we face.

9:11 was the day when people made the observation that the world will no longer be what it used to be. I think they were right.

Nine years ago we had the Middle East problem, now we have the Middle EastAfghanistan-Iraq triangle. I say “triangle” because the three are linked in many ways and share a certain background.

My last assignment abroad was UNESCO. The Constitution of UNESCO starts by the following : “ …since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defenses of peace must be constructed… a peace based exclusively upon the political and economic arrangements of governments would not be a peace which could secure the unanimous, lasting and sincere support of the peoples of the world and that if it is not to fail, it must be founded upon the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind…”

Do we see much of this when we look at this Middle East-Afghanistan-Iraq triangle?

I regret to say “no”. On the contrary, we see a vicious circle where internal and external problems feed on one another, creating rocky terrain in the minds of men where the defenses of peace need to be constructed.

The conflicts in this triangle have created a profound sense of disappointment among the peoples of the region. They have the feeling that they are not treated with justice. The West has not been able to address regional expectations. So much so that even the Western discourse on democracy is

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viewed with suspicion and is attributed to ulterior motives.

The sentiment in the West is not any better. 9:11 followed by other acts of terror in Europe, involvement of local individuals in these acts have not only underlined the urgency of internal/external security but has also created suspicions towards Muslim communities in the West. And now there is the question of growing resistance to what some call “a changing way of life”.

Walls on both sides are rising.

The question then is “are we heading for a clash of civilizations?” Hopefully not, but nations must collectively do their best to avoid what I would call “border incidents of growing numbers and intensity”. How? First try to resolve these conflicts and secondly encourage intercultural dialogue. The latter will help but will not constitute a remedy by itself.

Since we generally agree that the spread of democracy will help overcome these political questions and problems of culture, identity then we also have to take into account the fact that democracy as it is defined and practiced in the West has also faced some challenges in recent years. This is essentially a by-product of the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Here, I am referring to the discussion regarding how much information was provided to or withheld from the public during the lead in to the Iraq war, and the alleged violations of human rights and international conventions in those two countries which have eventually become the subject of investigations.

Moreover, we now have the global economic crisis which is giving rise to strong criticism of certain aspects of the existing economic order on both sides of the Atlantic and beyond. Let us not forget that long before, but especially since the collapse of communism, the “free market” economy had become the twin sister of democracy.

The two had become inseparable. Therefore, one should not overlook the impact of the shortcomings of the free market on the perception of democracy.

I am sure that our friends and allies will deal with these problems, because their democracy is based on strong institutions and aberrations here and there will be corrected, perhaps at a price, but in a definitive way. In the meantime, however, these challenges will likely slow down the overall effort to promote democracy elsewhere. As a matter of fact, there are those who advocate different understandings of democracy based on differences of culture, tradition and experience of history. There are places where people, in view of their most fundamental needs, may give priority to economic stability over the broad mechanics of democracy.

The West, therefore, and we are part of it, must rise up to these challenges.

I know that I have moved away from our immediate agenda for today but I find it worthwhile because this is the broad international setting and it may encourage us to look at our problems in a different light.

The challenges that the world faces in the “triangle” dwarf, if I may say so, whatever differences we may have. This the way I feel

æ4URKISHæ2ELATIONS

as a Turk because we are a neighbor to the “triangle”. You are also close by but you have Turkey in between. Having a bilateral agenda with fewer thorns is fine but it also puts on our shoulders the responsibility to resolve our differences in good time and perhaps set an example for others to follow. I should say a very valuable example considering: firstly, that the Greek identity and the Turkish identity are similar in certain ways and different in other ways , and secondly, the international reputation these questions have earned: “the endless Turkish- Greek quarrels”.

I will conclude this deviation from our agenda with a final note : most of us believe that democracy is the remedy to many of those challenges within and around the Middle East-Afghanistan-Iraq triangle. But it is extremely difficult to externally impose it and unrealistic to expect it to flourish rapidly. It can, however, be encouraged.

This is where Turkey can play a role. When the West, the European Union advocate democracy in this wide area they are not heard loud and clear because of the cultural background I referred to. But for them Turkey is a “local”. The ultimate success of our democracy will set an example. So, as my colleagues from Turkey underlined earlier this morning, Turkey’s remaining on track with the EU is of paramount importance. Greece is in a better position, given your experience in the wider region to see the relevance of this. I hope that your support to Turkey’s accession process would be based on its own merits and on Turkey’s success with its reforms.

If I am to look back, however, just for a minute, I would say that Greek-Turkish relations are like a long, very long road. We have travelled on this road together for a thousand years. We have crossed rough terrain, different seasons. When I look at the signs on this road I read, “war “ and “peace”, “confrontation” and “reconciliation”, rivalry” and “friendship”, “competition” and “cooperation”, “adversity” and “alliance”. So I am tempted the call this road “the road of antonyms”. I believe that on this long road we have finally reached, over the last decade, wide fertile plains and a good climate. So, we have to start thinking of a new name, one that emphasizes only the positive. By saying this now, rather than at the end of my presentation, I am already displaying a high level of confidence on our common future. At least, I am saying that there is no going back to the past. If I were to be criticized someday for lack of judgment or foresight, or for being an optimist, I would respond by saying that “it was not my lack of foresight but the lack of foresight of those who failed to seize the opportunity.”

Does this mean that we have overcome all our differences. No, but it means that we have covered good distance in understanding that our interests are served better when we cooperate.

I am of the opinion that we have made remarkable progress since 1999 which was the second year of my stay here. A process of dialogue and cooperation has been in place for a decade now. More than 30 agreements, protocols and memoranda of understanding have been signed. Numerous CBMs have been adopted.

Steady improvement in our economic and trade relations is promising. Energy, tourism and transport stand out as strategic sectors, offering new opportunities. Statistical data of our economic and trade relations is an important indication of the spillover effects of dialogue between our two countries. For example in the year 2000, the bilateral trade volume was about 870 million US dollars. It amounted to over 2,7 billion US dollars in 2009. Similarly, foreign direct investment inflow from Greece to Turkey was merely 55 million US dollars between 1980 and 2000. It has reached a spectacular 6 billion US dollar level in 2009. This is a solid indication of how positively our business communities perceive the new climate of our relationship.

To put it in a nutshell, we now have certain mechanisms in place which provide a legal and practical framework for our relations, better political understanding between us and substantial economic cooperation. All of this has given our perceptions a certain maturity. And, we also have the unresolved issues.

So the question is, “where do we go from here to keep up the momentum and to cover additional ground?”

I believe that a decade is a good period to allow us to sit down and take stock of what has been accomplished. The existing bilateral framework and mechanisms which have functioned well so far. But, in spite of

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high level visits from time to time they are essentially at the level of senior officials.

We have the exploratory talks, we have the political consultations, a steering committee and its working groups. Over time these have been expanded in accordance with our growing cooperation. The Joint Economic Commission, the Mixed Commission on Land Transport, the Joint Standby Disaster Response Unit, the Joint Agricultural Committee and the Tourism Forum have been added. We can see if these arrangements need to be improved, taken to higher level and if we can inject renewed political will into the process.

I think this is doable. Prime Minister Papandreou was Foreign Minister when we turned a new page. He and Minister İsmail Cem contributed a great deal to the process of rapproachment. Prime Minister Erdoğan has also expressed readiness for more and I know that there is an invitation extended to him to visit Greece.

Within an energized new framework we can undertake a fresh effort to resolve our differences.

Earlier, I made a reference to the Constitution of UNESCO to underline the importance of popular support in achieving lasting peace. Understandably, the public, with the help of the media, can form its own opinion on a wide range of issues. But governments can exert a certain influence. This is not say that we should mislead our peoples or keep them in the dark. This is possible neither for you nor for us. But, we can put

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the emphasis on the positive and refrain, where we can within the limits of reason, from highlighting what may lead to negative perceptions which our current relationship does not deserve. I can tell you that Turks, in general have a positive perception of Greece and are ready to move forward. We do not put our bilateral issues on top of our list of challenges. We have other worries. This does not mean that Turks are indifferent to our bilateral agenda, but they are very favorably disposed towards further cooperation and the settlement of the questions which divide us. We want this to happen on the merits of our own relationship and our converging interests.

If we can together create an enhanced framework for our relations and start moving forward then we can start calling the road on which we travelled for a thousand years, the ”Road of Partnership”. We both face economic and other challenges some of which are beyond our control and this may create some distraction. But I still believe that nothing should prevent us from taking charge of our problems in a result-oriented way.

Our bilateral issues may not be on top of world’s agenda but they are complex enough or have become more complex over time.

Though some may not fall directly under the scope of our bilateral relations, several, such as Cyprus, Aegean issues, minority issues, illegal migration require our close attention.

When I look at these problems, some of them at least, appear to be some sort of a structure,

not a perfect wall, but some sort of a wall.

Blocks of stone have been placed on top of one another without a master plan or architectural design. I tend to call these blocks, “blocks of action/reaction or retaliation”, reflecting a “if you put a block there, I will put a block here” sort of approach.

The first thing to do could be, therefore, to look closely at these blocks and see if if they are actually the same material, shaped or polished differently and whether all of them or only some of them are relevant to a new and better designed structure. In other words, we need to see with a cool mind, without emotion if our positions are indeed so far apart? Can we find common ground?

I am not going to go into further detail of our problems because I know that our intention is not to solve them here but address the broad framework, at least for a start.

Resolving our differences in a timely fashion will expand our opportunities for further cooperation, both bilaterally and internationally. It will give us an edge in a wider area. It will serve our economic and political interests. It will help raise our image internationally.

If we want to continue with the present course and allow the relationship to mature even more, hopefully not forever, that is also a choice.

Ali Tuygan is the former Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and former Ambassador of the Republic of Turkey to Greece

PUBLI

THE POWER OF ENERGY

P

ublic Power Corporation was founded in 1950 with a view to formulating and implementing a national energy policy, which achieved electrification of Greece through the intensive exploitation of domestic resources.

As of 1.1.2001 it has been operating as a société anonyme, and it has been listed οn the Athens and London Stock Exchanges since 12.12.2001.

Today PPC is operating in a liberalized market environment and is a fully vertically integrated company, covering the whole spectrum of activities in the electrical power field. With €5.8 B turnover and total assets amounting to €13.9 Β, PPC holds a leading position not only in the Greek market – one of the most rapidly growing European markets – but also in the wider market of Southeast Europe.

It owns about 93% of the installed power capacity in Greece (12,843 MW), generated from lignite, hydroelectric and oil stations, natural gas stations, as well as wind and solar energy parks. Approximately 58% of the total electricity is generated from lignite, turning PPC into the 2nd largest lignite-generated electricity producer in the E.U. It owns the national power transmission system of 12.000 km, as well as the power distribution network of 215,000 km and is the only power distribution company delivering electricity to 7.6 million customers.

The Business Plan of the Group includes investments for the total modernization of its power plants and dynamic growth in the RES field.

Operating across boundaries with a special emphasis on the energy markets of Southeastern Europe and the Mediterranean, PPC aims at the creation of a significant energy portfolio.

By fully mobilizing its capacities, PPC S.A. proves to be a pioneer and state-of-the-art power corporation with social responsibility and environmental awareness, which creates new values for its Shareholders, Personnel and stakeholders.

'SSTIVEXMSR

By Volkan Vural

It is very difficult at times like this, both in Turkey and Greece that we both suffer from the global financial crisis, to talk about futures. But perhaps precisely for this reason, it is imperative that we have to look forward and seek alternative ways to ensure the prosperity and wellbeing of our peoples.

Admittedly, I am not a businessman; but having retired from the government public sector. We have a Black Sea region in Turkey, where we have a Greek heritage as well and these people on that region have a very particular sense of humor. And one day, one gentleman on that region, on a rainy day, he climbs up his roof of his house, but it is very slippery and he falls down.

His wife, his neighbors, everyone is gathered around him and one is calling for an ambulance, another for a nearby doctor and the man, in pain, suddenly lifts his head and says: “I don’t need a doctor. I don’t need an ambulance. Just find me someone who has fallen off a roof before.”

For an ordinary Turkish citizen, the economic crisis is not a novelty. My adult life has passed through economic crisis. More recently, in 1994, when we had the major economic crisis, I happened to be the chief advisor to the Prime Minister.

When I accepted that job – I remember that now more vividly than before – she told me that I could advise her on any subject, except economy. I was very glad that I was not responsible for the economic crisis of 1994.

But this was hardly a consolation, because in one night I lost 40% of my wealth, whatever it is. So economic crisis, we know.

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In 2001, I was the Secretary General for European affairs in Turkey. I was entrusted by our government to prepare our national program for the adoption of the (…).

But suddenly, we had a financial and economic crisis in Turkey and while I was preparing our national program for EU reforms, my colleague and friend Kemal Dervis, who was recruited from the World Bank, came and prepared the economic stabilization program.

These two programs, which were adopted in 2001 under a coalition government, even today serve as the main pillars of Turkish economy and political reform.

Through these reforms what we have done is that we addressed our structural weaknesses. We did not have any independent central bank; we did not have regulatory independent bodies; we had government control on everything, on statistics, on everything.

And we did not have a real knowledge of what was happening in Turkey, because of the absence of transparency.

So these reforms were addressed to recover the institutional deficiencies in the Turkish economy. And when in 2002 Mr. Erdogan and his party came to power, they continued these two programs, even with greater vigor and with greater fiscal discipline.

So within 2002 and 2007, Turkey registered an impressive growth rate around 7% per annum. During that period, we increased our exports, we cut our budget deficits, we had of course changed our industrial basis and Turkey became one of the modern economies of the world.

In 2007, our economy started to contract a little. But in 2008, when the global financial crisis started in the United States, it hit us also.

Last year, our growth rate – nowadays it will be announced – should be around we have contracted about 6%; and for this year, we expect a growth rate of about 5%.

But any growth rate in Turkey below 7% does not help us. Because high unemployment, and especially unemployment of the youth, requires a growth rate in the region of 7%.

We are confident that we will manage to accelerate our growth in the coming years and we are confident that the Turkish economy, in addition to traditional markets, will penetrate into new markets.

The crisis in Turkey, the economic crisis in Turkey, demonstrated how vulnerable the world is and especially the capital system.

So we need new regulations, new fiscal instruments; we need a new approach.

However, we all live in Europe, but the world is not Europe. There is a new world.

It is not fashionable anymore to have flashbacks. What is fashionable today is flash forward; we have to look forward. There is Asia, China and India, there are the Latin American countries; there is an Asian-Pacific region where we have to concentrate.

Therefore, we cannot be local; we cannot remain national while we are competing in a globalized economy. We have to increase our competitiveness, we have to increase our creativity, and that means freeing people, freeing ideas, freeing human ingenuity.

*VMIRHWLMT That brings us to the strong part of Europe; that is, the freedom of expression, freedom of ingenuity. And that is why Turkey wants to become a member of the European Union.

In trying to realize the political reform process in Turkey, in the year 2000, we benefited greatly from the EU accession process.

When Turkey was recognized as a candidate country, it gave us a moral boost to initiate reforms and to directly address certain issues which were taboos in Turkey; like the Kurdish issue, the Armenian issue, the Patriarch issue that was mentioned before, like many other issues. The minority rights.

So in Turkey that discussion is going on.

We do have weaknesses, we have certain mentality problems, but the Turks and the Turkish society is changing and changing for the better.

Almost all the economic crises of Turkey, except the current one, were homemade. It was our fault. We could not manage our finances, we could not bring our budget into realistic terms and we had to borrow both domestic and externally in a heavy way.

That meant high inflation, low productivity, and huge budget deficits. These were the trademarks of the Turkish economy.

After the reform process of 2001, we met this current crisis in a more prepared manner.

There were no bank defaults in Turkey; no subsidies to companies, no major deficiencies have appeared.

Of course, we still have problems. We have the problems of credits, of the small and medium sized enterprises, we have the problems of unemployment; but due to the

structural reforms, we have initiated in 2001 especially, we are now prepared and we are dealing with the current crisis in a muchmuch better way. In fact, better than many other European countries.

I understand that Greece is now going through similar challenges at the moment.

In two sectors, in which Europe is highly vulnerable. That is, shipping and tourism.

You also invested heavily. That is one of the structural problems of Greece; and I hope Greece will overcome these difficulties in the coming years.

But this will require – please, let us not fool ourselves – this will require sacrifice. No country can manage such challenges without sacrifices.

In the last decade, certainly TurkishGreek relations have undergone dramatic, important changes, a positive turn. I will not deal with the economic relations and investments which have improved.

Political problems, yes there are some problems, but please, let us not look at these problems from the 19th or 20th century concepts. We have to look at them from a different angle.

These are not only a matter of national pride or sovereignty rights, which are becoming de passé in many terms. I think we have to look from a different perspective and I will tell you how I would like to see them.

Turkish-Greek challenges, problems ahead, cannot be solved, cannot be addressed in isolation and in an environment of

competition. There is no necessity for Turkey and Greece to compete.

We have to cooperate. We have to pool our resources, we have to bring our expertise together and we have to think about how we can deal with this international environment, which has become increasingly competitive and how we can live in that environment.

For instance, the Greek islands and the Turkish mainland can they be separated economically in an infrastructural way? In addressing climate change problems, in addressing water resource problems, electricity problems or intraregional trade, we have to pool those areas, we have to treat them as a zone, which are close to each other and which could bring out a synergy of our resources and efficiency.

Therefore, we have to look at the TurkishGreek relations – economic relations especially – from a different perspective of cooperation.

I am not referring only to regional cooperation in the Balkans or in the Middle East, but in a more global scale. I think there is an opportunity there; we have to use that opportunity and together we can be better off.

And this should include Cyprus as well.

Volkan Vural is a Board-member of the Turkish Industrialists & Businessmen Association, ret. Ambassador, former Undersecretary regarding EU at the Ministry and Board-Member at DOGAN Group

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A quarterly review on European intergration S.E. Europe & the the S.E. Mediterranean

A quarterly review on European intergration S.E. Europe & the the S.E. Mediterranean

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RSHQLQJ I started working on Turkey three and a half years ago. Turkey of 2006 was a very different country to that at the beginning of this century. This came about after a wave of reforms that allowed the opening of accession negotiations in 2005.

In the same vein, Turkey of today is very different to the country of four years ago. The Turkish society has started to address openly a number of issues considered sometime ago as highly sensitive and, indeed, taboos.

Be it on the "deep state", civil-military relations, the Kurdish issue, Turkish-Armenian relations, freedom of expression, cultural diversity, views unthinkable not so long ago, are exchanged in the public sphere and rank high on the political agenda.

This is demonstrated for instance by the "democratic opening" initiative, which the government launched over last summer. We have also witnessed recently one of the most significant diplomatic breakthroughs of the past decades in Southern Caucasus, namely the signature between Turkey and Armenia of protocols by which both countries commit to normalise their relations. This is an important step, which the EU welcomes as a contribution to stability and peace in the region.

We are now looking forward to a swift ratification of these texts. Disagreements will have to be discussed and settled through dialogue. In any case, this development is another sign that Turkey is becoming more assertive, confirming its strong potential as a pole of stability in one of the most unstable regions of the world.

Another spectacular development, which nobody would have imagined a few years ago, is the so-called Ergenekon case, followed by the also so-called Cage and Sledgehammer cases. For the first time in modern Turkish history, suspects who have been, or are working for the state, including military officers, have to respond to charges as serious as attempting to overthrow the government and instigate armed riots.

These cases are a unique opportunity for Turkey to strengthen confidence in the proper functioning of its democratic institutions and the rule of law. But precisely because they are so important for the rule of law and the proper functioning of the state, it is crucial that the trial be conducted in an exemplary manner, with the sole aim of disclosing the truth, and in full respect of the rights of the defendants.

More recently, the EMASYA protocol was cancelled. This protocol allowed the Army to intervene without authorisation in case of security threats. This is a landmark achievement in civil-military relations.

Turkish society has become over the years more confident and more aware of its rights. In many ways, it has demonstrated a democratic maturity and has gained own-

By Christos Makridis

ership of a number of EU related reforms, which it sees largely as assets rather than constraints to improve the rights and living standards of the Turkish people.

Yet, a lot remains to be done. I will not list here all the areas which require improvements.

The latest progress report of the Commission, adopted in October last year, provides a comprehensive overview of what was achieved but, also, what remains to be done to meet fully all accession criteria.

The issues at stake are serious, as they concern, still and again, fundamental rights.

For instance, while there have been far fewer prosecutions under the revised article 301 of the Turkish criminal code than a few years ago, intellectuals still continue to be scrutinised and sometimes prosecuted for peacefully expressed opinions. A number of other provisions of the criminal code, or of the anti-terror law, are used to restrict freedom of expression in practice. Legal uncertainties and pressures affect equally freedom of the

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press in practice, as shown by the tax fine against the Doğan group.

In a similar vein, perpetrators of torture and ill-treatment still benefit from impunity, despite the ambitious "zero tolerance policy" launched by the government several years ago. This gives the unpleasant impression of 'déjà-vu' from year to year.

At the same time, however, we see the willingness of the government to reinvigorate reforms in a difficult political environment.

The broad consultation which started over last summer, known as "democratic opening", gives rise to hope. As such, the method used and the debate it triggered are encouraging and the EU can only invite the Turkish authorities to continue this discussion and translate it into concrete acts. Recently, the submission to parliament of a draft law setting up an independent human rights institution and the adoption of the much-awaited anti-corruption strategy are also promising.

As regards accession negotiations, the opening of the important Environment chapter last December is an encouraging development, bringing the number of open chapters

to twelve. We are hopeful that we will open more chapters this year. These include the chapters on public procurement, competition, food safety and social policy. However, this will require additional efforts from Turkey in order to be able to fulfil the demanding benchmarks.

In the medium term, however, if things do not change, we face the risk of not being able to continue opening negotiating chapters.

Based on our experience with all candidate countries, we continue to believe strongly that the EU perspective is a powerful stimulus for change, provided, however, that this perspective remains clear and credible.

At the same time, the core principle of any accession negotiation is that progress in reforms determines progress in negotiations.

The slowdown of reforms in Turkey since 2005 has been a serious handicap in the negotiations. A serious re-launch of reforms, addressing all critical areas, will become a powerful asset in the process that will convince people in the EU that Turkey is serious about human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Constitutional reform remains a priority for further democratisation of Turkey, including the reform of the judiciary, the civilian oversight of the military, the establishment of the Ombudsman, the functioning of political parties and the extension of trade union rights.

If the encouraging efforts we have witnessed in the last year continue to develop, Turkey will re-create a virtuous circle of the same magnitude as the one which led to the start of accession negotiations in 2005. This is an issue of political will. It is about grasping the opportunities when they present

themselves and focusing on what is really at stake: Turkey's integration into the European Union as a full member.

Speaking of opportunities, there is one which, definitely, no one can afford to miss: a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus issue. It is time to turn to the future and to look for a pragmatic solution, within the UN framework, in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and in line with the principles on which the Union is founded. The settlement of the Cyprus issue will also give an enormous boost to accession negotiations. In the same vein, and as the Council has stated, Turkey needs to commit unequivocally to good neighbourly relations and to the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the UN Charter, having recourse, if necessary, to the International Court of Justice.

Since the beginning of this century we have had the privilege to witness the deep changes the Turkish people are prepared to engage in when a clear European roadmap is provided. We also saw the same people taking ownership of those reforms, not necessarily to meet benchmarks and criteria, but simply because these reforms are needed anyway to take on the challenges of this century, for the good of their country. These two processes of reforms and EU accession are destined to proceed together. They may move on at times in parallel, they may not follow always the same speed, but they will inevitably intertwine and - inch’ Allah - eventually anchor Turkey firmly into the European Union and, thus, consolidate its democracy.

Christos Makridis is the Deputy Head of Unit of the Turkey Team in DG Enlargement, European Commission

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By Gerlinde Niehus

A new strategy – why and how?

2010 will be a decisive year for the Alliance as it will not only mark a further NATO Summit but, equally important - if not more so, the shaping of NATO’s future strategic orientation.

Allied leaders are expected to agree on NATO’s new Strategic Concept, a new mission statement for the Alliance, on the occasion of the next NATO Summit in Portugal in November 2010. First indications as to where the journey could be going are awaited in early May 2010.

This is when the NATO-appointed group of experts will present their analysis and recommendations to the Secretary General.

The process leading towards a new Strategic Concept formally kicked off at NATO’s 60th anniversary Summit in Strasbourg / Kehl 2009. On that occasion, NATO leaders decided that it was time to work on a new strategy.

The current Strategic Concept dates back to 1999. As such it does not take into account many of the new threats and challenges characterizing the 21st century. Likewise, the 1999 Concept describes the Alliance as „Eurocentric“ - but today’s NATO is dealing with security issues well beyond Europe’s borders. Last but not least, in 1999 NATO had 16 members; now there are 28 Allies.

To facilitate the process leading to the new Strategic Concept, NATO’s Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen appointed a group of external experts led by former US Secretary of State, Dr Madeleine Albright, composed of representatives from public and private sectors and coming from a good mix of small and large NATO members. Following an initial reflection

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phase, centred around four key international seminars, the group is now in the consultation phase, visiting Allied capitals to discuss their findings and proposals with governments and, where possible, parliamentary committees.

A key feature of the process is its intended openness and inclusiveness, explicitly aiming to foster public participation and discussion.

To that end, NATO has also, for the first time it its history, set up a dedicated Strategic Concept website and discussion forum serving as a key tool for sharing views and opinions. Raising public awareness, understanding and eventually support is more important today than ever: NATO is an Alliance of democratic nations, and many of them regularly experience the heavy burden of a “NATO in action” especially in Afghanistan. Engaging the public in a frank dialogue and, where necessary, controversial debate is key and must be part and parcel of the democratic security culture of an organization “founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law”.

Defining the new strategic environment NATO was initially invented to deal with 20th century challenges, mainly the risk of conventional war between predictable, organized, military alliances with states as the key actors – where the response was also essentially military. However, in the 21st century conflicts within states have largely replaced conflicts between them. In addition, many

threats these days come from non-state actors and are often per se unpredictable. As such, NATO is confronted with a host of new threats – terrorism, cyber warfare, energy insecurity, etc. – as well as old, latent threats that are urgent again, such as the proliferation of nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction.

In an age of globalization, we face globalised insecurity. Addressing these issues requires a mix of policy instruments that go well beyond military capabilities, and frequently beyond NATO itself. Deciding which challenges fit most readily into NATO’s frame of reference and where the Alliance can add value to international efforts is fundamental.

Updating the meaning of the Washington Treaty’s Article 5 In light of the new security environment, how should Article 5, the bedrock of the Alliance, be interpreted and implemented today?

There is no doubt that NATO’s core task was, is and will remain the defence of its territory and populations. For the Alliance to endure, all members must feel that they are safe and secure. That is a fundamental raison d’être for a security alliance. But in a changed and changing world, the meaning of Article 5 is changing too. When NATO invoked Article 5 for the first time in its history in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 11 September, this was not an attack in the traditional sense or in the sense Article 5 was initially thought of.

IRU 1$72 In the 21st century, terrorism has mutated into a global franchise. Cyber attacks or energy cut-offs can seriously destabilize a country.

Iran and North Korea highlight the risk of nuclear proliferation. Piracy poses, once again, a major threat to international shipping. Climate change is likely to intensify conflicts over arable land, competition for natural resources and migration. Addressing these threats does not necessarily require military responses, but it does require collective responses by all Allies.

However, the approaches of a bygone era simply no longer work. Static, heavy metal armies are not going to impress terrorists, pirates or computer hackers. Burying our heads in the sand and hoping that these threats will fade away will only increase our insecurity and exposure. Security today is about active engagement, possibly far away from the borders of allied nations. As geographic distance will not protect us, territorial defence means to engage, to cooperate with partners and to deal with the problems when and where they emerge, before they end up on our doorstep.

This implies that any debate about Article 5 versus non-Article 5 missions seems distorted and artificial: it is distorted as the discussion mainly focuses on the purely military dimension of the Alliance, thereby neglecting the much more fundamental political dimensions of Alliance solidarity and credibility. And it is artificial as it seeks to reinstate the already obsolete dichotomy between security at home and from abroad as a yardstick for prioritization.

Boosting NATO’s role as a joint political forum We cannot meet today’s and tomorrow’s security challenges effectively without engaging much more actively and systematically with other important players on the international scene, nor without broadening the scope of political dialogue, opinion shaping and decision-making amongst Allies and partners. This cannot be done ad hoc or on a case-by-case basis. It has to be an ongoing systematic process and very much the way NATO does business.

The foundations for doing this are in place. In many ways they only need to be reinvigorated: one is enshrined in Article 4 of the NATO Treaty, whereby “the Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened”. Another one is the rediscovery of Alliance core values founded on the principles of the UN Charter. And, last but not least, the rediscovery of the transatlantic link, based on solidarity and partnership between America and Europe.

In vigorously drawing on these assets, NATO should or could become the hub of a network of security partnerships and a centre for consultation on international security issues – even on issues on which the Alliance might never take action. As NATO’s Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen recently flagged: “NATO can be the place where views, concerns and best practices on security are shared by NATO’s global partners. And where, if it makes sense – if we decide that NATO

should have a role – we might work out how to tackle global challenges together.” This development also implies that NATO needs to strengthen its global networking capabilities, be this by strengthening the various partnership arrangements, or by reaching out to a broader range of actors such as India, China or Japan and organizations like the World Bank, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the G20 – to name but a few. And it will imply that NATO will have to move from a largely geographical understanding of partnerships to a much more functional approach.

Incorporating the notion of a “Comprehensive Approach” Today’s security challenges cannot be dealt with by NATO nor by military means alone - but equally, no other institution can do everything on its own. Today, the effectiveness of NATO, and security for us all, depends on how well and efficiently the Alliance cooperates with other organizations and nations. This is not a question of hierarchy, but of synergy.

Security in Afghanistan, and elsewhere, demands a comprehensive application of economic, political and military measures that go far beyond NATO’s capabilities. A new Strategic Concept has to lay out the role NATO can play within a comprehensive approach and how the necessary civilian and military means are to be applied coherently, effectively and in a coordinated manner.

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NATO has made good progress these last few years in building closer ties with other international actors such as the UN and the African Union. The adoption of the EU’s Lisbon Treaty should encourage greater EU – NATO cooperation and a more strategic partnership.

Notwithstanding, there are a number of key issues which need to be addressed collectively: one is about strategic alignment. By reinforcing joint analysis and political dialogue among major international organizations, it should be possible to better identify together key priority areas, helping to concentrate resources and thereby maximizing our chances of success.

A second issue is about planning, especially on the strategic level. And a third issue concerns the relationship between security and development. It is certainly true that there is no development without security, and no security without development. But beyond the theory, the practice is challenging: strengthening cooperation between civilian and military actors implies inter alia to achieve better mutual understanding, strengthening information sharing and timely coordination.

Fostering military transformation NATO has been engaged in a process of continuous and systematic transformation for many years to ensure that it has the capabilities, policies and structures required in the changing security environment. But this does not imply that the Alliance can rest on

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its laurels – there are many challenges ahead, which require innovative thinking and candid discussion among the Allies and also its partners: How do we ensure that we do not spend tomorrow’s money on yesterday’s conflicts?

How can we narrow the capability gap between the US and its European Allies?

NATO’s fundamental value resides in particular in the ability to translate political decisions into military action. This is a precious asset. But to preserve its value, NATO needs to focus on capabilities that are relevant for the new security environment. This means capabilities and forces that are mobile, flexible and employable in a variety of contingencies – in distinction to the largely static armed forces of previous times. In the current economic crisis it is more important than ever that we get our priorities right.

This implies that NATO needs to keep reviewing and innovating the way in which we plan, man and pay for operations. We need to continue focusing on capabilities that we all know are relevant in the new security environment, such as strategic lift, helicopters, and modern command and control systems. And we need to promote more multinational solutions for acquiring and operating these vital assets, such as joint funding and pooling arrangements. Having multiple national projects running at the same time is simply a waste of scarce resources. In addition, it implies continuing to foster the modernization and training of armed forces: having technical capabilities and devices to do a job is certainly important, but

equally, if not more important, is the “human factor” – the man or woman using them. And their profession has not only become extremely demanding, it also requires an increasingly broad range of skills and competences that can only be met by embracing an approach of lifelong learning.

Pursuing the consolidation of Europe Amidst all these challenges, there is clearly still unfinished business in Europe. NATO’s open door policy and related enlargement process have contributed significantly over recent decades to consolidating Europe as a whole, free and democratic security zone. The process has minimized the risk of a large-scale war in Europe. It has enhanced stability and security in the entire Euro-Atlantic area, not just for NATO nations but also for NATO neighbors.

The process needs to be continued. The prospect of Euro-Atlantic integration remains the most effective way to bring lasting peace and stability to the strategically important Western Balkans. The perspective for NATO membership for both Ukraine and Georgia has been confirmed at recent NATO Summits and Ministerials. Keeping NATO’s door open to other European states is anchored in the NATO Treaty’s article 10. However, application and implementation of this policy depends upon key two factors: the performance of the applicants themselves, underscoring that they are willing and capable to contribute to the

security of the North Atlantic area; and the consensus among NATO nations to offer membership or the preparatory membership action plan (MAP) to a candidate, although the latter does not include any automaticity towards membership.

Key events over the past two years have, if anything, demonstrated that attaching timetables or fixed scenarios to any of these questions is unproductive. The crisis in Georgia in 2008, the subsequent deterioration (and now progressive resurrection) of NATO–Russia relations or the recent elections in Ukraine have intensified discussions on enlargement, yet so far without any major definitive decision “for” or “against”. With a view to avoiding a too short-term perspective, it seems therefore likely that the new Strategic Concept could underscore the principles of enlargement, similar to the provisions of the 1999 Strategic Concept, and go for the “long haul”. In that respect it could also help to get back to some of the fundamentals of this policy, as initially outlined in NATO’s 1995 Study on Enlargement, putting particular emphasis on the readiness of candidates to fulfill membership requirements. That way, the current mainly political and often (mis)perception-based process could be reanchored on more objective and performancebased principles.

Forging a productive partnership with Russia NATO cannot talk seriously about an undivided Europe if the organization is unable or unwilling to engage Russia. Clearly, among the 28 Allies, there are different views on Russia.

History cannot be erased. But neither should the Alliance become a prisoner of the past.

The international security environment will not wait for NATO and Russia to sort their act out. The partnership has the potential to contribute strategically to security in the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond. As such, NATORussia cooperation is not a matter of choice but of necessity. The goal must be a relationship that allows NATO and Russia to pursue common interests even when disagreements and differences remain in other areas.

There are many de facto zones of common interest providing opportunities to intensify practical cooperation with Russia. These range from the fight against terrorism and measures to enhance maritime security, to steps countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and building a more effective missile defence system. Some take this scenario even further by calling for (or at least not excluding) future NATO membership for Russia. Amidst these bold and so far controversial proposals, two foundations of the Alliance should not be sacrificed as they constitute the lifeblood of the Alliance: living up to its common core values as enshrined in the Washington Treaty, and constantly striving towards Allied unity and solidarity. The recently launched joint review of

NATO’s and Russia’s common threats and challenges could serve as a facilitator to these ends.

To conclude, since its founding in 1949, the transatlantic Alliance’s strategic flexibility, embedded in its original Treaty, has allowed it to suit the different requirements of different times. In the 1950s, the Alliance was mainly a defensive organization. Since the 1960s, NATO also became a political instrument for détente.

In the 1990s, the Alliance became a tool for the stabilization of Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Now NATO has a new mission: extending peace though the strategic projection of security.

This is not a mission of choice, but of necessity. And it is what the new Strategic Concept should reflect.

Gerlinde Niehus is Head of the Corporate Communication Section, NATO Public Diplomacy Division

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