Emory Journal of International Affairs, Spring 2013

VOLUME 1, JANUARY 2013

Emory Journal of International Affairs, Issue 1, January 2013

TABLE OF CONTENTS AN UNWELCOME HOST: PROLIFERATION, SOUTH KOREA, AND THE ROLE OF UNITED STATES ASSURANCES MARTIN SIGALOW 4 THE THREE YEAR COUNTDOWN MAJIA EHLINGER 7 ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION AND THE DURABILITY OF PEACE IN POST-CONFLICT SETTINGS SWETA MATURU 10 BRIDGING CONTINENTS: THE BATTLE OF ANATOLIA KATE CYR 15 REDIRECTING OUR ATTENTION: COULD OUR OBSESSION WITH IRAN BE MISGUIDED? CHRIS LINNAN 19 IRAN, ISRAEL, AND PERSIAN-JEWISH IDENTITY IN THE NUCLEAR AGE KATE MORAN 23 AFGHANISTAN AND THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN DEVELOPMENT LAUREN WEBB 26

Emory Journal of International Affairs, Issue 1, January 2013

Hello!

Welcome to the first issue of the Emory Journal of International Affairs (EJIA). EJIA is an undergraduate journal that publishes both opinion-editorial pieces and longer-form academic articles on important international issues. EJIA writers are undergraduate students at Emory University. EJIA publishes articles that address the histories and developments of foreign nations and the future impact of international policy worldwide. The goal of the EJIA is to foster dialogue and debate in the Emory community on the topic of international affairs.

We noticed that Emory lacked an avenue for original undergraduate publications related to international affairs and political science. After finding an enthusiasm for international politics on Emory’s campus, we decided to tap into that passion and began this journal. We assembled a team of editors and writers, and began publishing articles to a small online blog. What started out as a tiny website with an average of 10 views per week - the majority of which were ours - has expanded and blossomed into a dynamic and thought-provoking forum of ideas.

For our first year, we have seen the blog grow exponentially both in diversity of subjects and global readership. Over the last year, the op-ed pieces on the blog have been viewed almost 7000 times by readers across 97 countries. Topics have addressed territorial disputes in the South China Seas, global health issues in Africa, and foreign policy here in the United States. Staff writer Kate Cyr’s post on various international attitudes towards HIV/AIDS was featured on the front page of WordPress, the blog’s host.

For 2013, we are expanding beyond our blog into a journal structure. Inside you will find long-form, academic articles written by our staff writers and editors. The articles address topics ranging from politics in the Middle East to economic development in post-conflict states.

We would like to thank our wonderful staff writers for their extraordinary effort over the last year and for how they kept us on our toes with poignant analyses of the world around them. We would also like to extend our heartfelt appreciation to Matthew Muenzer, our graphic designer. Without you, this journal would never have looked this professional - or even existed in the first place. Thank you for all of your hard work.

With that, we present to you the first issue of the Emory Journal of International Affairs. Enjoy!

Sincerely, Sweta Maturu, Editor-in-Chief Daniel Feder, Managing Editor

Emory Journal of International Affairs, Issue 1, January 2013, 7-9

AN UNWELCOME HOST: PROLIFERATION, SOUTH KOREA, AND THE ROLE OF UNITED STATES ASSURANCES MARTIN SIGALOW To the chagrin of more dignified, reverent Southeast Asian countries, South Korea has a crazy uncle.

Without even mentioning the family-reunion-taboo subjects of his destitution, anger management issues and his self-imposed social isolation, North Korea constantly throws its bulk around at parties, blathering loudly about “sovereignty” or “supreme leaders” while generally making the South quite anxious to leave. But alas, despite the strong pressure of the wiser parts of the human clan, North Korea seems content on giving the world a nuclear hot case of embarrassment.

The focus of this piece need not be on the mad uncle himself, who has received far too many professional diagnoses for an amateur analyzer such as myself to combine, but rather ought to be on his nephew in the south. South Korea has been trying to distance itself as much as possible from that guy who lives in the basement. However, when North Korea takes up the pastime of clumsily juggling nuclear weapons, things get a little complicated. The goal of this paper is to investigate possible causes for South Korean nuclear proliferation, in light of and in spite of the presence of the North. The presence of North Korean and U.S. influences on South Korean leadership and the risk of proliferation is quite complex, and to attempt to find all the answers in this short paper would be an act of a well-rested god; at least one of those two things I am currently not. I will concern myself with the motivations for proliferation as well as the factors that the nations take into account.

The first factor is continued North Korean proliferation. A perceived North Korean nuclear threat is highly correlated with the success of nationalist and pro-nuclear expansion movements in South Korea and Japan. If North Korean proliferation, an issue which is always on Washington’s radar despite the minimal press coverage it gets, is not stopped through either internal or external means, South Korea has a major incentive to expand its nuclear program despite US security assurances.1 However, states are never motivated to acquire nuclear weapons based off of the mere existence of a dangerous rival in the region. Rather, the drive to acquire nuclear weapons is always intimately tied 1 Hayes, Peter and Hamel-Green, Michael, “Paths to Peace on the Peninsula: the Case for a Japan-Korea Nuclear Weapon Free Zone,” Security Challenges journal, Winter 2011, accessed November 2012.

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to the perception of the potential nuclear state, because the reaction of any military force to a threat can only be a response to the military planners’ interpretation of the threat to be. Perception matters; after all, as mere mortals not blessed with omniscience, military planners only have access to their own subjective interpretation of that threat through cognitive constructs.

In the particular case of South Korea, the perceived inadequacy of the United States’ security assurances directly impact South Korean calculations for proliferation. Through a combination of strategically increasing forward troop deployments in South Korea during times of particularly high tensions and strong diplomatic assurances, the U.S. has historically kept South Korea quite satisfied.2 In this regard, South Korean commitment to non-proliferation seems inextricably bound to the relations between the countries. Through sheer diplomatic force of will, the U.S. has managed to make its obvious military superiority sufficient to dissuade South Korea from a mindset of military deterrence.

The importance of the U.S. as an actor to influence South Korea decision-making when it comes to nuclear weapons policy cannot be underscored enough. Past efforts for South Korea to develop its own offensive weapons program were halted after intense resistance from the U.S.3 Clandestine efforts in the 1970s were even met with the threat of civilian nuclear energy cooperation and the threat of the renunciation of U.S. commitments to deterrence. South Korea responded to these threats not only by giving up these particular weapons ambitions, but also by structurally inhibiting their ability to pursue such policies in the future by signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It would seem that the U.S. is quite committed, at least in word, to South Korean security.

Nor is the States’ commitment to South Korea welfare merely a diplomatic matter. Indeed, U.S. claims to defend South Korea from aggression are inherently credible. The U.S. has an interest in preventing violence on the Korean peninsula, in fear both of the economic devastation wrought by the obliteration of one of the world’s largest economies (South Korea is 13th in the world) and of the possibility that any war on the peninsula would ignite a broader conflagration across Asia involving other world powers with nuclear weapons, such as Russia or China. Not to be overlooked is the sizable number of troops that the U.S. has stationed across South Korea whose lives would swiftly be lost in any sufficiently large Korean conflict.

As such, the U.S. “stake” in South Korea interests is sufficiently big enough to give U.S. intervention and wartime protection credibility.4 Another key issue to consider is nuclear power. South Korea possessed at least 20 distinct reactors by 2011, which together supply upwards of 45% of the nation’s power supply,5 a colossally large percentage compared to any other country but Japan. Though largely safe from proliferation due to an incredibly sophisticated set of export controls,6 South Korea considerations of nuclear reprocessing are making some

2 Keifer, Michael H., “Assuring South Korea and Japan as the Role and Number of U.S. Nuclear Weapons are Reduced,” January 2011, Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced Systems and Concepts Office (Department of Defense), January 2011, accessed November 2012.

3 Bergner, Jonathan, “Going Nuclear: Does the NPT Matter?” Georgetown University Master’s Thesis Program, April 15, 2011, accessed November 2012.

4 Ibid 2.

5 Ibid 3.

6 Snyder, Scott, “Counterproliferation and Global Korea,” Council on Foreign Relations, November 9, 2012, accessed November 2012.

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worry about possible proliferation concerns.7 Spent fuel reprocessing allows a nation to use spent fuel output from nuclear reactors as inputs in the generation of more nuclear energy. The ability to use output as input clearly increases the capacity of energy a nation can generate from its nuclear reactors, which makes it an attractive option for the South Korean government in a world where reliable energy is increasingly hard to come by, and in a world where international competition over nuclear energy components and supply is fierce.8 However, reprocessing as a technical process involves the enrichment of spent uranium, which can be built into a nuclear weapon or stolen in transit and made into one. This could become a significant proliferation concern, as potential reprocessing could generate thousands of nuclear bombs worth of weapons grade nuclear material that might be compromised in the inevitable logistical nightmare of transporting that fuel to a disposal site elsewhere.9 It is worth noting that the U.S. also is a key influence in this aspect of South Korean proliferation. Bilateral trade deals, as well as strategic partnerships, have made the U.S. the key broker of safe nuclear technology and materials.10 No doubt a weaker relationship would threaten this aspect of nuclear non-proliferation as well.

The U.S. clearly has an important role determining the extent of South Korean proliferation. Although I will forgo another toothless proposal for six party talks (that horse has been decomposing for some time now, so there is little left to beat), I will offer the up the idea that a positive reaffirmation of the benefit of a U.S. role in Korean affairs could go a long way to ensure peace in a site normally reserved for hyperbolic forecasts of conflagration. To that end, the U.S. should take tangible diplomatic action through means such as, perhaps, deploying more troops, improving relations, or, as some suggest, reaffirming U.S. willingness to retaliate with nuclear or overwhelming conventional force should the north get any funny ideas. Doing these things could go a long way to giving wider range to the U.S. nuclear umbrella, or at least make it more dangerous to touch at the tip.

Lincoln once famously said “a house divided cannot stand,” no doubt in reference to the predicament I have just described. As familial domestic metaphors come, this one is hard to beat, although in this case the “divide” is an all-too-real place called the “demilitarized zone.” One can only hope that this particular defunct member of the global family will stop trying to sell bad things to the kids, or at least pay rent.

7 Kim, Duyeon, “South Korea’s commitment to nuclear non-proliferation” Center for Arms Control and NonProliferation, November 16, 2012, accessed November 2012.

8 Ibid 7.

9 Lovins, Amory, “’New’ nuclear reactors, same old story,” Rocky Mountain Institute, March 21, 2009, accessed August 2012.

10 Ibid 3.

Martin Sigalow is a sophomore at Emory University. He is pursuing a double major in Economics and Philosophy.

Martin is a college debater and high school debate coach. His international affairs interests include US relations with divergent countries, global nuclear proliferation, global women’s rights issues, and the structure of the global foreign policy arena.

Emory Journal of International Affairs, Issue 1, January 2013, 10-12

THE THREE YEAR COUNTDOWN MAJIA EHLINGER As another year comes to a close, we are reminded of the progress and the hardships of international affairs and development. In the year 2012 we saw the rise and fall of new regimes, changes in constitutions, and of course no lack of debate over the economic state. As we look to the future, we are reminded of the UN promise to promote a world free from domestic violence, HIV/AIDS and hunger. It is a promise where global camaraderie helps to sustain the environment and the economic opportunities of all. This promise has been recorded as the UN’s Millennium Development Goals, which provide an outline for how both individual governments as well as the international community should address problems. With these goals, the UN has already sketched out how to measure success in terms of new educational opportunities and infectious disease eradication that so plague current growth. But all targets of, from poverty reduction to sustained gender equality, are time-bound. And as another year comes to a close, that deadline is looming ever closer. With the year 2015 approaching more rapidly than any of us might be willing to accept, we must ask ourselves the difficult question; are we really on track to live up to our international pledge?

All eight of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are attempts to alleviate a specific problem found throughout the world; from lack of women empowerment to food insecurity. The tangible results from successful UN programs to decrease things like the numbers of new HIV/AIDS cases have been a source of great optimism for the international community. However, it is important to realize that combating HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases is a multifaceted pledge that goes beyond just epidemiological innovations, since increased survival rates requires access to and education about effective treatments. Clearly, Goal Six (combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and many other dangerous diseases) cannot be achieved without the full execution of goals that assure universal primary education, maternal health, as well as sufficient access to food and freedom from poverty.

As December 2015 draws closer, there will be a lot of questions about how to best assess the definitions of ‘equality,’ ‘opportunity,’ and even ‘health’ in light of UN promises throughout the world. The ways in which we will define success over the next three years will be different for each organizations and country. But as time passes, it becomes more apparent that the key to success for all will be reviewing the unified nature of the eight MDGs. For example, renewable energy sources have been tagged as an integral factor for achieving both environmental sustainability as well as world-wide economic growth.1 And of course, economic growth has been strongly associated with educational opportunities. Even though the character of all of the UN’s 1 Anthony Abdul Karim Kamara, “ ‘Energy Access is critical to meeting Millennium Development Goals,’ says UNIDO Representative to UN.” 11 December, 2012. http://www.sierraexpressmedia.com/archives/51150

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international promises are so linked together, it is important to realize that they are also viewed differently throughout regions of the world. For example, the promise for more educational opportunities regardless of gender has been extremely successful, leading to positive primary school graduation numbers for young girls throughout Africa. However disparities are still evident, and have deep cultural ramifications in certain regions around the world. The strongest discrepancy in education is still found in Western Asian and Middle Eastern countries, where boys attend primary school at twice the rate of girls,2 despite targeted attempts to increase the number of young girls in school in the majority world. While the call for women’s empowerment has led to exponential growth in primary educational opportunities, it has not led to increased secondary education in the bulk of developing countries.

Gender disparities are found in every statistical model evaluating the success of each of the eight MDGs. For example, a new trend suggests that most new HIV infections found in the developing world are disproportionally from young women.3 At the same time, we can see a strong correlation with increased girl’s education and household economic security. Similarly, improved global maternal health is directly tied to the poverty reduction goals the UN so adamantly wishes to achieve. As maternal health continues to be underrepresented in most parts of Africa and Asia,4 it has detrimental impacts on childhood mortality rates, both of which are MDGs. Countries that have the worst women-to-men in the workforce ratios – such as Ghana, Sierra Leone and Lesotho – have equally as unpardonable poverty figures. Ensuring equal gender representation is distinctly tied to all other seven MDGs, showing the interconnected nature of all the goals as well as all international development work.

Of course, the goals put forth by the UN are hopeful aspirations for a better future regardless of economic background or gender. The UN Statistics Division keeps close watch on the specific progress of each Goal and publishes reports broken down by country to establish which regions are on track to reach the 2015 deadline. This year, the UN’s overall report declared the need to make “rhetoric a reality,” poignantly drawing attention to the fact that the UN has been engaging in fruitful discussion about MDGs without an equal amount of tangible progress. Of course, most of the MDGs may seem like lofty and idealistic aims, but the UN has made the direct call that we can end poverty and all of the health problems caused by economic insecurity. In three years, we will be forced to will look back and appraise the success of each of the eight goals. Because these goal are all so interconnected, it is impossible to say that the international community can successfully solved just a few of these goals. Maternal health status, poverty levels and food security issues cannot be addressed adequately without continuing to challenge the status quo of women’s educational standards.

Exploring the interconnected nature of health, politics, opportunity and development highlights the difficult task of creating a global partnership for global change. The international community has a lot to take pride from the previous years; but the UN’s most recent reports show that not all regions of the world are on track to live up to their obligations. The success of the Millennium Development Goals will be 2 Julia Friesen, Joerg Baten and Valeria Prayon, Women Count: Gender (in)equalities in the human capital development in Asia, 1900-60. Universitat Tubingen. http://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/55451 3 How women and girls are faring: Charting progress on the Millennium Development Goals. 21 December, 2012.

UN’s Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment. http://www.unwomen.org/2012/12/how-women-and-girls-arefaring-charting-progress-on-the-millennium-development-goals/ 4 How women and girls are faring: Charting progress on the Millennium Development Goals. 21 December, 2012.

UN’s Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment. http://www.unwomen.org/2012/12/how-women-and-girls-arefaring-charting-progress-on-the-millennium-development-goals/

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determined by how seriously each country takes these commitments between now and the end of 2015. But most importantly, success of any part of the MDGs relies on the solid improvements in all other goals at the same time.

Maija Ehlinger is a rising junior working on a major in history and a minor in global health. Her main academic interests are in international health policy, and she hopes to pursue a career in the field of public health.

Emory Journal of International Affairs, Issue 1, January 2013, 13-17

ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION AND THE DURABILITY OF PEACE IN POST-CONFLICT SETTINGS SWETA MATURU Does economic liberalization, through the form of increased marketization, minimized government involvement in the economy and an increased capacity of private investors, producers and consumers to pursue their economic interests, assist or hurt post-conflict peacebuilding efforts? In other words, does economic globalization help post-conflict societies in establishing the durability of peace and prevent conflict from recurring? The literature that currently surrounds this topic is divided on the question.

Literature on Economic Globalization and Peacebuilding Neoclassical economic theory states that underdevelopment occurs because of poor resource allocation that are a result of wrong pricing policies and too much state intervention. State intervention in economic activity slows economic growth. Proponents of liberalization argue economic liberalization will result in promoting free trade and export growth, and eliminating government regulation in financial and factor markets. This will in turn promote both economic efficiency and economic growth.1 The second part of this argument is that economic development in turn reduces the likelihood of conflict. Collier et al find that the “key root cause of conflict is the failure of economic development.” Collier argues that countries with low and unequally distributed per capita incomes are usually dependent on primary commodities for their exports and thus face high risks of prolonged conflict. Without economic development or strong political institutions, other factors such as ethnic homogeneity or increased military spending will fail to reduce the risk of violence.2 Theoretically, economic growth (facilitated by market liberalization policies) serves as a necessary (but not completely sufficient) condition for economic development. Economic development then promotes the durability of peace. Thus, theoretically, economic liberalization should promote the durability of peace, 1 Todaro, Michael P., Stephen C. Smith. 2011. “Economic Development.” Prentice Hall.

2 Collier, Paul, V.L. Elliot, Havard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Querol, and Nicholas Sambanis. 2003.

Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy. Washington D.C.: World Bank and Oxford University Press.

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provided the growth is distributed widely. The empirical evidence on this theory, however, is very limited.

Much of the literature comes to the consensus that economic liberalization in fact hurts peacebuilding efforts and reduces the likelihood of sustained peace after conflict.

The benefits of trade are not always equally beneficial for all countries. Developing countries allocate substantially more of their natural resources and efforts towards promoting exports, and have not experienced noticeable gains in terms of global market shares. War-torn countries in the first place lack the ability to compete in the world market, especially in the immediate period after the conflict. Additionally, economic globalization makes post-conflict counties more vulnerable to the volatility of the international markets.

Since successful peacebuilding requires a stable and predictable economic and social environment, policies that connect conflict-torn economies to a more volatile global economy can undermine peacebuilding efforts directed towards building institutions and reducing violence.3 Some authors in the literature find that economic liberalization may not generate equal distributions of wealth, and may exacerbate inequality. In a post-conflict context, deeper income inequality can have a negative impact on the durability of peace. Chua (2003) finds that economic liberalization increases income inequality and increases the likelihood of conflict, particularly in societies that are dominated by an ethnic minority. Chua finds that most developing countries will have one or more ethnic minorities that have historically dominated the economy in a country and the indigenous minorities around them. These economically dominant minorities disproportionately control major sectors of the economy. If a market dominant minority is present in a developing country, then policies such as free trade and FDI will not be mutually reinforcing with democracy. In such a scenario, markets and globalization policies in general could tend to benefit the economically dominant minorities, while democracy increases the power of the larger, indigenous, and relatively poorer majority. Economic globalization then could instigate animosity by the ethnic majority by maintaining or even increasing the disproportionate wealth of the economically dominant minority. This animosity against the dominant minorities could lead to anti-market backlash and actions aimed at eliminating the market-dominant minority through armed conflict.4 Many economic liberalization policies are integrated into post-conflict peacebuilding agreements as conditions for obtaining international loans and assistance. These “structural adjustment policies” involve several requirements: cutbacks in public spending, privatization of public assets, government support for export industries, guarantees for international investors, and the reduction of domestic wage and price controls.5 There is a growing body of literature coming to the consensus that the positive impact of structural adjustment policies on economic growth remains yet to be seen. Milward (2000) and Easterly (2001) find that IMF and World Bank structural adjustment packages do not promote the amount of economic growth and development as initially projected by the institutions. If these policies do not promote economic growth or development in the first place, then the link towards the durability of peace (as discussed in the first section) is lost. Vreeland also finds that countries that select structural adjustment loans based on the IMF and World Bank policies see a significant increase in income inequality and end up growing at slower rates

3 Smith, Jackie. 2008. “Economic Globalization and Strategic Peacebuilding.” Centre for the Critical Study of Global Power and Politics working paper.

4 Chua, Amy. 2003. World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability. New York: Doubleday.

5 Robinson, William. A Theory of Global Capitalism. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004)

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(2003).6 Structural adjustment policies, as part of peace agreements, can limit the policy space available to governments to implement measures to build/rebuild democratic institutions and make commitments to citizens. Peterson finds that investment treaties are at times very ambiguous and can limit the actions of the state to expand governing institutions. Several investment treaty rules may make it more difficult to expand national policies (for example, health care) “if they would require existing foreign investors to relinquish a given business line (for example, health insurance).”7 The problems that come for developing countries from vague investment treaties are exacerbated in post-conflict settings where, in the face of an increased risk of conflict recurrence, the need for governments to provide basic public goods to their citizens is amplified. If the government cannot provide for their citizens adequately, it provides them a reason to rebel/engage in conflict to address their grievances.

Structural adjustment policies reduce or remove altogether the incentives for locals to engage in the peacebuilding process while promoting the needs of profit seekers. International peacebuilding operations in post-conflict settings can be structured to provide more control for locals, and therefore create incentives for locals to engage in the peacebuilding process. Conventional peacebuilding processes, however, encourage the pursuit of economic liberalization as a means towards economic development. Economic liberalization requires these countries in the peacebuilding process then to prioritize the needs of profit-seekers over other social aims by reducing the capacity of state institutions that are needed to prevent conflict recurrence/build peace in the first place.8 Overall, the economic liberalization policies that prioritize foreign investment and free trade prevent the ability of governments to strengthen domestic institutions to pursue policy programs that benefit the citizens. States need to win the loyalties of multiple factions and social groups, and therefore must be able to make sure that these groups have a stake and say in the decision making process in strengthening these institutions. At the same time, governments must be able to regulate private actors that could contribute to the exclusion of various social/economic groups. The reduction of state capacities that comes with economic liberalization negatively influences the ability of states to distribute resources equitably, which ultimately contributes to a narrow concentration of resources in the hands of a small group of people who most often remain beyond the control of the state. Neoliberalized states are unable to effectively govern the actions of international and transnational actors, even if their actions have an impact on the durability of peace.9 Roland Paris in “At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict” qualitatively details the influence that economic liberalization has on the durability of peace and the ultimate effectiveness of peacebuilding missions. Paris finds that peacebuilding operations that emphasize economic liberalization fail to take into account the serious hazards that are inherent in the transition from civil conflict to a well-developed market-based democracy. Democratization and marketization have the potential to encourage higher and 6 Easterly, William. “IMF and World Bank Structural Adjustment Programs and Poverty.” In Managing Currency Crises in Emerging Markets, edited by Michael P. Dooley and Jeffrey A. Frankel, 361-382. University of Chicago Press; Milward, Bob. 2000. “The Macro-Economic Impacts of Structural Adjustment,” In Giles Moha, Ed Brown, Bob Milward, and Alfred B. Zack-Wiliams, Structural Adjustment: Theory, Practice and Impacts. London: Routledge, pp.

24-38; Vreeland, James Raymond. 2003. The IMF and Economic Development. Cambridge University Press: New York.

7 Peterson, Luke E. “Bilateral Investment Treaties and Development Policy-Making.” (Winnipeg: International Institute for Sustainable Development & Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, 2004).

8 Collier et al., 2003 9 Collier et al., 2003

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volatile societal competition at a moment when states are the least equipped to contain such tensions. Paris puts forth three ways in which the process of marketization can be disruptive for countries emerging from conflict. Firstly, immediate post-conflict states start the liberalization process with intense societal conflicts already in place. Domestic peace tends to be more fragile in these states than in other developing countries, and marketization policies only stimulate further economic contestation, making a security situation more dangerous. Secondly, post-conflict states usually lack natural “conflict dampeners” that exist in other countries, which include traditions of non-violent dispute resolution. Third, countries that are just emerging from civil wars often lack the proper institutions that could otherwise help maintain the problems that arise from liberalization and the social insurance to buy off people dislocated by economic liberalization.10 Underlying the reasons as to why peacebuilding has been less than successful historically is the fact that policies of liberalization (both economic and political) foster social competition. Liberalization policies disregard the state of economic and political institutions to adequately adjust to the potential effects of liberal economic policies and impose social costs in the short term. Importantly, while marketization policies do not inevitably lead to undermining social cohesion and provoking violence, the record of these policies in conjunction with and part of peacebuilding activities in host states suggest that economic liberalization inherently deepens social tensions and creates the conditions in which conflict can recur. This happens because market liberalization policies inherently create competition between different groups. It creates winners and losers, which can fuel social unrest, particularly if those groups are divided on ethnic lines.

Policy Recommendations To make sure economic liberalization and peacebuilding efforts do not go to waste, there are several ways in which international institutions, national governments, civil society, and local actors can improve coordination in order to prevent conflict recurrence. The common denominator in all policy recommendations is the rebuilding of effective state institutions.

First, international institutions like the World Bank and IMF, and national governments should alter the way they implement economic liberalization policies. Ideally, economic liberalization should be put on hold, or at the very least gradually implemented, while government and legal frameworks are developed in post-conflict setting. This would allow for the development of institutions that have the capacity to successfully manage market-oriented reforms. Economic reforms then should be implemented in a gradual, phased way, rather than all at once (known as “shock therapy”), in order to make sure that economic reforms are not politically destabilizing. Requirements for fiscal budget balancing and low rates of inflation should be more lax in order to foster greater social spending on rehabilitation programs in the immediate post-conflict setting.

Secondly, there should be increased coordination between UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO) and international financial and development institutions. Increased coordination between the IMF, World Bank, and the UN DPKO with national governments could improve government bureaucracy. This in turn could foster more effective economic reform. The three actors, by working together, can make sure the system of rules that market system requires to function smoothly and foster economic growth are upheld and enforced. This includes making sure contracts are enforced and that disputes related 10 Paris, Roland. 2004. At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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to economic matters are resolved peacefully and not through violence. Increased coordination between these actors should focus on developing a legal framework that is capable of regulating a market economy and a redistributive mechanism to protect the welfare of vulnerable populations and distribute the gains of liberalization equitably. With institutions like these in place, liberalization will be more effective in contributing the durability of peace and not serve as a contributing factor to conflict recurrence.

Third, there should be increased coordination between development NGOs, local civil society, and the UNDPKO to address income inequalities and access to institutions. Institutional peacebuilding as a topdown approach, particular peacebuilding in the form of economic liberalization, runs the risk of not engaging with local populations and ignoring their needs. Thus, peacebuilding efforts should make concerted efforts to address the economic concerns of local populations by working in conjunction with NGOs and local civil society actors.

One such example of intense coordination between civil society and NGO groups and the World Bank is the World Bank Justice for the Poor program. Despite the end of conflict in Sierra Leone, the country faces low levels of development and high levels of poverty. The Justice for the Poor program in Sierra Leone works on rebuilding and reforming justice and governance in order to reduce poverty and prevent conflict recurrence. While the national government is a major partner in the program efforts, the World Bank works extensively with various NGOs and local civil society groups to carry out their activities, such as Timap for Justice, Namati, and the Centre for Accountability and Rule of Law-Sierra Leone. Programs like the J4P in Sierra Leone should be replicated as a best practice for making sure economic liberalization helps vulnerable groups and reduces the risk of conflict.

While economic liberalization can foster economic growth, it does not serve as a sufficient condition for making sure conflict does not recur. Strategic peacebuilding must take into account the impact of economic liberalization in the context of a post-conflict setting in order to fully prevent conflict recurrence. Economic liberalization that is pursued before making sure political and economic institutions are fully developed can have negative consequences on the durability of peace. Thus, international actors and civil society must work together on developing the capacity of institutions to foster economic growth and development in a post-conflict setting. By doing this, international peacebuilding efforts can mitigate the destabilizing negative effects of economic liberalization and equitably distribute the wealth benefits of economic growth to maximize the positive effects of economic liberalization.

Sweta Maturu is a senior at Emory University majoring in International Studies with a minor in Economics. Her academic interests include international conflict resolution, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and the rule of law in post-conflict states.

Emory Journal of International Affairs, Issue 1, January 2013, 18-20

BRIDGING CONTINENTS: THE BATTLE OF ANATOLIA KATE CYR In modern Turkey, one the most heated flash-point issue is Kurdish nationalism. It has kept Turkey from joining the European Union (EU) and causes political and physical strife. Turkey is not the only country facing this problem. Calls for a formation of Kurdistan from Kurdish regions in Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria have been largely debated and ignored by larger nations.

But who are the Kurds, and why are they important? Where did they come from, and why, if they are so adamant for a united Kurdistan, do they not have one?

The Kurds are an ethnic group mostly in southeastern Turkey, northern Iraq, northwestern Iran, and parts of northern Syria. They are an indigenous group to the mountainous region they inhabit and have their own language and culture, separate of any country they may live in. They are Sunni Muslims who, during the time of the Ottoman Empire, were mostly nomadic sheep and goat herders.

The struggles of the Kurdish people began after World War I, when the Ottoman Empire was divided into a collection of new states. The Treaty of Sevres, which officially formed Iraq, Syria, and Kuwait, originally included room for “Kurdistan,” though the rise of Kemal Ataturk, the founder of Turkey, prevented this dream. The land of the Kurds was too valuable to each country, and another player in the region would have been another economic and power struggle for the newly divided Middle East. Ataturk, along with the current leaders of Iran and Iraq, all agreed to prevent the formation of an independent Kurdistan.

Ever since, Kurds have had to adapt to harsh and degrading treatment at the hands of “their” governments. Turkey is less strict about banning the Kurdish language and denying the Kurdish culture, but it still refuses to acknowledge the Kurds as a minority group. Iraqis retaliated against Kurdish uprisings with chemical weapons and by razing entire villages. Iran and Syria have been equally as unkind in their treatment of the Kurds.

Turkey, however, is the main issue. It has the strongest power over its Kurdish population, and a concession by Turkey would probably lead to the other countries allowing a small amount of territory to the Kurds. If nothing else, an area donated by the Turks would allow Kurds a safe haven in Asia Minor.

Despite the fact that Kurds have lived under the rules of other governments for centuries, nationalism and a strong desire for an independent Kurdistan didn’t begin until the 1920’s. Why? Before the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, the Kurds were one of many non-Turkish ethnic groups within the Empire. They could remain nomadic herders with their own distinct ethnic identity. When they were denied their own state, however, they had to conform to the new states’ laws and cultural identities, none of which wanted a rather sizable minority population forced upon them. The Kurds transitioned from the Ottoman system, where a common religion determined identity, to the new Turkish idea of civic identity, a system to which

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the Kurds had trouble conforming.

Sheik Said was the first Kurdish nationalist who rebelled against the newly formed Turkish Republic.

The Republic abolished the Caliphate in 1924, and with it, the Kurds lost the tolerant and unifying attitude the Caliphate created. Said mobilized Islamic networks and with their help managed to control a fair bit of territory. Eventually the Turks hanged him. Forever after, Turkey would be suspicious of any Kurdish activity.

More Kurdish groups tried and failed to gain rights or independence. Revolts were quashed and leaders fled or were killed. In retaliation, Kurds were deported and forced to assimilate. The Kurds settled for an identity based on Sunni Islam instead.

Kurdish nationalism was revived in the 1960’s and 70’s with an increase in young, intellectual Kurds.

Education reform and a shift towards urban centers pushed highly educated Kurds to the forefront of the push for Kurdish nationalism, replacing the old tribal and religious leaders. Again, Turkey responded with violence. The 1980 coup by the army not only toppled the government, but also Kurdish leaders.

What came next is the current state of affairs in Turkey: The Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK). The PKK is currently at the forefront of the Turkey-Kurdish conflict. Some call it a terrorist group, other a voice for freedom.

Depending on the time period, the PKK has called for both total independence of the Kurdish people and for lesser things, such as the right to speak Kurdish in public and name their children Kurdish names.

They have been violent and non-violent, political and brutal. In response to the oppression by the Turkish government, the PKK has started wars, carried out terrorist attacks, and, equally as important, negotiated.

As a result of the strife between the PKK and the Turkish government, almost an entire generation of Kurds was wipe out, villages bear the scars of war, and tensions with neighboring countries have risen.

Weapons from Syria and other rebel groups like Hezbollah made their way to PKK hands, and the Turkish government was having none of it. Although the leader of the PKK, Ocalan, was caught in 1999, the “Kurdish problem” was far from over.

The 1999 EU’s Helsinki summit, which momentously declared Turkey a candidate for EU membership, brings us to present day. Turkey is still not a part of the EU and Kurds are still an oppressed minority. Turkey is bound to its historical and political tradition, and the Kurds are bound by their desire for freedom.

While Iraqi Kurds have accepted a semi-autonomous zone within Iraq, the PKK believes this is too compromising of a solution. They want only an independent Kurdistan and nothing else. They validate their violence and destruction by saying that Turkey would never have taken notice of them or the struggle for Kurdish rights without the PKK and its drastic actions.

Today, many Kurds are peaceful. Many try to lead normal, non-violent lives. They attend university, speak Turkish, and hold successful jobs. Their only true complaint is that they are treated as second-class citizens and are denied their native culture. They are denied their language, their own broadcasts, and equal treatment socially and economically. Most have adapted to these harsh truths with only mild protest.

On the other hand, Turkey still views Kurds as a troublesome elephant in the room. They have never recognized them as an official minority group and still deny the Kurds their basic rights. Many Turks are bitter about the role of Kurds in the state, as the violence gives Turkey a bad name.

Kurds run for office, though to get enough votes to gain seats in parliament they must run as independents. Their representation is not large, but it exists. Turkey needs to reform voting laws that prevent minority groups from attaining enough votes to get representation in parliament. Without representation, nationalist groups turn to violence, which starts the vicious fighting cycle between Turks and Kurds.

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In order for all sides to be happy, a compromise has to be reached—and soon. Attempts at reform have left the Turkish government no better than it was before it tried to reconcile with the Kurds, and the EU has stalled any official membership until Turkey has dealt with the Kurds in a peaceful manner. The two groups are at a standstill. It really comes down to Turkey’s stubbornness: will it join the EU or continue to hold out against the Kurds?

Bibliography Gunter, Michael M. “Kurdish Nationalism in the Aftermath of the Arab Spring.” Foreign Policy. November 8, 2011. Accessed January 2, 2013. http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/11/08/kurdish_nationalism_ in_the_aftermath_of_the_arab_spring.

Tezcür, Güneş Murat. “Kurdish Nationalism and Identity in Turkey: A Conceptual Reinterpretation.”

European Journal of Turkish Studies. October 2009. Accessed January 03, 2013. http://ejts.revues.org/ index4008.html.

“Who Are The Kurds?” The Washington Post. Accessed January 2, 2013.http://www.washingtonpost.com/ wp-srv/inatl/daily/feb99/kurdprofile.htm.

Yavuz, M. Hakun. “Five Stages of the Construction of Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey.” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 3rd ser., 7 (2001): 1-24. doi:10.1080/13537110108428635.

Kate Cyr is a sophomore at Emory University and hails from the small town of Washington, D.C. She loves all things international, especially Model UN, and she is the Secretary-General of MUNE I this year. She is extremely interested in the Middle East and the economy, as well as the secret recipe for Wild Berry Pop Tarts and The Social Network.

Emory Journal of International Affairs, Issue 1, January 2013, 21-24

REDIRECTING OUR ATTENTION: COULD OUR OBSESSION WITH IRAN BE MISGUIDED? CHRISTOPHER LINNAN Anyone who paid even the slightest attention to our American presidential race will acknowledge that the economy was the primary issue this past election cycle, but US foreign policy was not very far behind.

One of the most contentious foreign policy issues was how we should deal with Iran’s attempt to acquire nuclear arms. Politicians from both parties have tried to outdo each other on who is harsher on Iran, which has started to stray into the absurd. Unfortunately, neither candidate offered a compelling argument as to why American foreign policy focuses so much attention on Iran and more importantly, neither explained the potential implications of a hard-line stance on Iran.

The primary reason given for our aggressive stance towards Iran is that we need to protect our closest friend in the region, Israel. While I fully support our friendship with Israel, it strikes me as disconcerting that we have started to treat Israel as America’s fifty-first state. Israel is clearly one of our strongest allies and it is important that we support it, but there must be limits. The current Israeli ruling coalition, led by Prime Minister Netanyahu, has done almost everything in its power to try to force us to align our stance towards Iran with their ultra-aggressive position. Carlo Strenger argues that “Netanyahu has proven beyond a doubt that he is not willing to move towards a viable Palestinian state. His primary achievement this term has been to put the Palestinian issue on the backburner by making Iran the central theme of his foreign and security policy.”1 This is obviously at odds with the American commitment to create a two-state solution, yet we appear unwilling to force Netanyahu to make any sort of compromise.

One of the common refrains heard about the Middle East is that “Candidate X or Y will help solve the ‘Palestinian Question.’” For the purpose of this paper, I will not delve into roots of the Arab-Israel conflict or attempt to place proportional blame. However, I believe one can safely say that both sides are at least partially responsible and that it is in everyone’s best interest to strive for peace. The Palestinians need to recognize that Israel will exist no matter how loudly or violently they protest. Conversely, Israelis need to realize that they need a permanent solution to the “Palestinian Question.”

1 Strenger, Carlo, “Israel’s upcoming elections: No hope we can believe in,” Haaretz 17 October 2012, http:// www.haaretz.com/blogs/strenger-than-fiction/israel-s-upcoming- elections-no-hope-we- can-believe-in. premium-1.470581, accessed 1 November 2012.

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A recent survey in Israel found that 69 percent of Israeli Jews object to granting Palestinians the right to vote in Israel even if the West Bank were annexed.2 Yehuda Ben Meir points out that this opinion is not necessarily a problem, as the majority of Israeli Jews are against annexing the territories. Rather, it is indicative of the Israeli Jewish desire to live in a Jewish state, which was the reason for Israel’s original foundation. Well, as the saying goes - you can’t have your cake and eat it too. I don’t believe that there are many people outside of the Israeli far-right that believe it is acceptable to permanently occupy the West Bank territories and make its inhabitants sub-citizens who are forced to rely on Israel for their basic living needs, yet have no political rights. Israel needs to recognize that it has the responsibility to create an alternative state for Palestinians, especially given the long and harsh history of intolerance against the Jewish people, which culminated in history’s greatest tragedy, the Holocaust. It is unlikely that any Netanyahu coalition will manage to create this alternative state unless America exerts real pressure on it.

Unfortunately, Americans often don’t fully understand why anti-Americanism is so prevalent in much of the Islamic Middle East. Our loud and unwavering support of Israel has not brought peace, and we bear responsibility as Israel’s primary material and vocal supporter.3 One needs look further than some of our presidential candidates, who - with the notable exception of Ron Paul - competed to prove they were the most pro-Israeli. This culminated in Newt Gingrich’s proclamation that Palestinians are an invented people.

Steven Weiss, his interviewer, described the comments as something he had only heard from the far-right pro-Israeli community and completely unexpected for a mainstream presidential candidate.4 One should remember that “unlike its reputation in the West and in Israel in particular, Iran is a rational country with rational leadership, which seeks to enhance its regional and global power. Iran is not suicidal.”5 Westerners have a tendency to create caricatures of foreign leaders whom we don’t like which are more appropriate for James Bond films than international diplomacy. We tend to think of men such as Kim Jong-Il, Saddam Hussein, and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as unhinged madmen itching to blow up the world. Asher Kaufman highlights the habit of many American and Israeli leaders to compare the Iranian leadership to National Socialist Germany. This is an appalling analogy, demeaning the true evilness of the Nazis and setting a bad precedent by equating anyone who questions the state of Israel with the Third Reich.

While certain Iranian leaders such as President Ahmadinejad have made extremely offensive anti-Semitic remarks, such as denying the Holocaust, this does not make them Nazis. If we actually hope to reach any type of lasting peace in the Middle East we would do better not to demonize the other side and instead find some common ground.

It is also important to consider the potential consequences of either invading or condoning an Israeli invasion of Iran. We should note that Iran took part in one of the most brutal conflicts of the twentieth

2 Ben Meir, Yehuda, “Most of us don’t want apartheid,” Haaretz 28 October 2012, http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/ most-of-us-don-t-want-apartheid.premium-1.472660, accessed 31 October 2012.

3 Seale, Patrick, “Why Do Arabs and Muslims Hate America?,” Washington Report on Middle Eastern Affairs 31 (2012), 8.

4 Montopoli, Brian, “Newt Gingrich: Palestinians are ‘invented’ people,” CBS News 9 December 2011, http://www. cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-57340513-503544/newt-gingrich-palestinians-are-invented-people/, accessed 31 October 2012.

5 Kaufman, Asher, “Stop beating the drums of war against Iran,” CNN Opinion 9 March 2012, http://edition.cnn. com/2012/03/09/opinion/kaufman-israel-iran/index.html?iid=article_sidebar, accessed 31 October 2012.

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century, the Iran-Iraq War during the 1980s, yet remains very aggressive.6 The limited protests that have occurred throughout Iran are less significant than many neighboring Arab Spring countries. We must not fool ourselves into thinking that the Iranian people are waiting to be liberated by the United States. Our last nation-building exercises in Iraq and Afghanistan have cost us between 3.7 and 5.2 trillion dollars, as well as thousands of American servicemen killed in combat.7 Unfortunately, the only return on our investment has been sectarian violence and political instability in Iraq. Without noticeable support from the Iranian people, we would be wise to avoid a military engagement with Iran at all costs. A war with Iran could also potentially cripple our global economic system as oil prices will skyrocket - perhaps even to $300 a barrel - and our own tepid economic growth may be retarded.8 I am not attempting to argue that America should simply ignore the growing tensions between Israel and Iran, but it seems foolhardy to suggest the greatest threat to our national security resides in Tehran.

Pakistan, for instance, may present a greater threat, due to the fact that Osama bin Laden and quite a few other prominent terrorists have taken refuge there, and due to the blatant anti-Americanism that exists there.9 During the final presidential debate, Mitt Romney was asked whether he believed we should dump Pakistan as an ally, and responded that we should continue to try to work with Pakistan because “Pakistan has 100 nuclear warheads. It has a strong military, and there are a lot of terrorists there. It’s in an important part of the world.”10 Who controls this geopolitical and nuclear hotspot? Well, according to Robert Kaplan it is none other than “a military obsessed with -- and, for decades, invested in -- the conflict with India, and by a civilian elite that steals all it can and pays almost no taxes.”11 It seems absurd that Iran poses a greater threat to American and global safety than Pakistan, which has undergone so much political and cultural turmoil over the past several years, yet controls one hundred nuclear warheads.12 One need only look South towards Mexico to discover another potential threat to our national security as the Mexican drug war enters its sixth year having claimed anywhere from sixty to a hundred thousand lives, with no discernible end in sight.13 The world is fraught with other geopolitical hotspots such as North Korea’s continued intransigence, the worrying rise of far-right parties throughout Europe and the Middle East, and the South China Sea dispute between China and Japan, which despite catastrophic global implications was largely ignored by our leading politicians.

6 Banafsheh Keynoush, “Opinion: No more hedging, time to defuse Iranian nuclear issue,” CNN Opinion 18 September 2012, http://edition.cnn.com/2012/09/18/opinion/keynoush-iran-nuclear-strategy/index.html?iref=allsearch, accessed 31 October 2012.

7 Johnson, Robert, “What the money spent in Iraq and Afghanistan could have bought at home in America,” Bussiness Insider 16 August 2011, http://articles.businessinsider.com/2011-08-16/news/30078831_1_iraq-andafghanistan-air-conditioning-defense-budget, accessed 10 November 2012.

8 Forbes, Steve, “War With Iran is Coming,” Forbes 2 February 2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/ steveforbes/2012/02/22/war-with-iran-is-coming/, accessed 10 November 2012.

9 Linnan, Christopher, “The Pakistan Problem,” Emory Journal of International Affairs, 13 November 20012, http:// emoryjia.org/2012/11/13/the-problem-with-pakistan/, accessed 12 November 2012.

10 The Editors, “The Least Enlightening Debate,” Bloomberg 23 October 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/ news/2012-10-23/the-least-enlightening-debate.html, accessed 29 October 2012.

11 Kaplan, Robert, “What’s Wrong with Pakistan?” Foreign Policy July/August 2012, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/ articles/2012/06/18/whats_wrong_with_pakistan?page=0,0, accessed 29 October 2012.

12 Linnan, “The Pakistan Problem.”

13 Seijas, Susana, “Are Obama, Romney ignoring Mexico’s drug war?” CNN Opinion 1 November 2012, http:// edition.cnn.com/2012/11/01/opinion/mexico-city-postcard/index.html?hpt=hp_c2, accessed 1 November 2012.

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We have been focusing far too much energy on foreign policy issues that are priorities of other nations and cause us more harm than good. As someone who has been to Europe, Asia, and Oceania, I can personally attest to the goodwill most of the world’s citizens harbor towards America. This includes places such as France and Indonesia, which the media often portrays as hotbeds of anti-Americanism. The most common critique that one hears is that foreign citizens do not understand why our leaders engage in ill-advised actions in other parts of the world. Often, they bring up the invasion of Iraq, Guantanamo Bay, and aggressive American rhetoric towards perceived enemies, including Iran. The last century was indisputably an American century during which we managed to build up global good-will through our victories over the Third Reich and Imperial Japan, the Marshall Plan, and our staunch opposition to the Soviet Union. Did we always do the morally right thing? Of course not, no country ever does, our actions in places such as Vietnam and Central America have stained our world-reputation immensely. Yet despite this, our president remains the leader of the free world and America is still a nation that stands for good. However, if we enter another Middle Eastern conflict we will be hurting ourselves domestically, as well as further damaging our global image. American foreign policy needs to place American priorities first and it is imperative that our leaders begin to recognize this. Otherwise, we risk causing irreparable damage at home and abroad.

Christopher Linnan is a rising senior majoring in history. His chief interests are contemporary European and American politics. He is currently studying abroad in Dortmund, Germany.

Emory Journal of International Affairs, Issue 1, January 2013, 25-27

IRAN, ISRAEL, AND PERSIAN-JEWISH IDENTITY IN THE NUCLEAR AGE KATE MORAN It’s Friday night, just before sunset, and across Isfahan, an Iranian city in the center of the country, Jews are gathering for Shabbat services. A city of flowering gardens, intricately tiled mosques, ancient caravanserais, and winding bazaars, Isfahan is also home to more than 1,500 Jews. If this scene strikes you as odd, it is important to remember that Jews have a history in Iran stretching back 3,000 years. Today, the country is home to the largest population of Jews in the Middle East outside of Israel—a little over 25,000.1 Yet current events tell a different story. Ever since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, relations between Jews in the Middle East and their Arab neighbors have been tenuous at best. Certainly, there have been instances of attempted reconciliation, such as the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty. By and large, however, the relationship between Israel and the Arab world has been characterized by conflict.

What, then, of the Persian-Jewish community? What has their relationship with Israel historically looked like? This article will be an exploration of the origin and nature of Persian-Jewish national identity.

Further, it will be an attempt to understand how this identity plays into their political opinions and ideological beliefs about Israel. To do so, I will examine current standards of living as well as nationalist sentiments, both past and present. Finally, I will ask the questions: what does the future of the Iranian Jewish community look like, and what will be the implications of current tensions in the region?

The Jewish community of Persia—modern-day Iran—is one of the oldest in the Diaspora, with its historical roots dating back to the 6th century B.C.E.2 Ancient texts, such as the Biblical books of Esther, Daniel, and Nehemiah give the most accurate picture of life for the Jewish population in Persia as a minority community in what would have then been pagan, pre-Islamic societies. Particularly during the Sassanid period, the Jewish community flourished, despite intermittent periods of oppression and persecution.3 Perhaps this early success was due to Persia’s long and vibrant history of religious and cultural 1 Harrison, Frances. “Iran’s Proud But Discreet Jews.” BBC News. September 26, 2006. Accessed December 6, 2012. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5367892.stm 2 Jewish Virtual Library. “Jews of Iran.” American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise. Accessed October 13, 2012. http:// www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/anti-semitism/iranjews.html 3 AICE, “Jews of Iran.”

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diversity. In many ways, the period of Sassanid rule established a cultural and political precedent of tolerance; Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians all played a vital role in contributing to and sustaining the Empire.

But with the Arab conquest of the region in 642 C.E. came a new religion: Islam. As a result, the sociopolitical status of the Persian Jews underwent drastic changes. As ahl al-dhimma, or “People of the Pact,” Jews were subverted to an inferior social status. Nonetheless, they remained an important economic and political force, and oftentimes the rules set forth in the pact4 governing non-Muslims were overlooked or altogether ignored.

With the appearance of the Zionist movement in the late 1880s, many European Jews began looking eastward, toward Jerusalem, as a national homeland. The Holocaust from 1939-1945 prompted thousands of Jews in Europe to flee in mass numbers to Palestine and other countries. As opposition to the Zionist movement and anti-Jewish sentiments gathered steam in the Arab world, Jews from Morocco to Iraq followed in the footsteps of their European coreligionists. Following the formation of the State of Israel in 1948, Jews from Arab lands sought refuge in the new country in even greater numbers, while the Iranian Jews, by and large, remained. Although some certainly opted for migration for either ideological or political reasons, the secularization of Iran by the Pahlevi dynasty in the 1920s greatly benefitted the Jewish community, and this orientation toward the West resulted in their emancipation, as well as an increased role in the economic and cultural life of the country.5 It was not until 1979, with the Islamic Revolution, that the Persian-Jewish community saw its first major exodus to Israel. Yet those Jews who did not immigrate to the United States or Israel experienced a sort of communal “reinvigoration.” Synagogue attendance increased and there appeared to be a resurgence of interest in both cultural and religious aspects of Persian-Judaism.

Despite this resurgence, however, the position of minorities in Iran (particularly the Jews) has become increasingly precarious since the Revolution, especially following the rise to power of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005. Jews have faced increased violence, anti-Semitism, and marginalization. Because of Ahmadinejad’s virulently anti-Semitic regime, and his opposition to the State of Israel, the remaining community of Jews in Iran is being threatened.

It is important to understand that the root of Ahmadinejad’s opposition to the existence of Israel is supposedly not on the basis of its “Jewishness”; rather, he claims it is a rejection of what he understands to be the expansion of “Zionism,” a force that he believes to be both hostile and incompatible with the idea of a national homeland. He has even gone so far as to refer to Israel as a “tumor,” echoing the words of the former Iranian Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and insisting that the country be “wiped off” the map.6 Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric, most notably his convening of an international conference in Tehran in 2006 to assess the “validity” of the Holocaust, calls into question the truth of his claim.7 More recently, the Iranian government’s pursuit of a nuclear program, allegedly for “peaceful purposes only,” has put Israel and many of its Western allies, including the United States and Great Britain, on the defensive. A nuclear Iran 4 The Pact of ‘Umar, the fourth and final of the al-Rashidun, or “Rightly Guided Caliphs” 5 AICE, “Jews of Iran.”

6 Charbonneau, Louis. “In New York, defiant Ahmadinejad says Israel will be ‘eliminated.’” Reuters. September 24, 2012. Accessed October 17, 2012. http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/24/us-un-assembly-ahmadinejadidUSBRE88N0HF20120924 7 “Iran Hosts Holocaust Conference.” Al-Jazeera. December 11, 2011. Accessed October 17, 2012. http://www. aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2006/12/200852513053660495.html

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would, it is believed, be catastrophic for both Israel and all with whom it is aligned. While some argue that Iran would never dare attack Israel due to the risk of mutually assured retaliation and destruction, others refuse to believe that this alone is enough to defuse the current regime’s hostility.

The most interesting factor in all of this is, of course, the Persian Jews themselves. How do those Jews of Persian origin living in Israel feel about the prospect of a nuclear Iran? More importantly, how do Jews in Iran feel about it? The answer is indeed complicated; however, it is clear that most Iranian Jews in both Israel and Iran are conflicted. They are torn between pride in their national heritage and religious devotion. With certain issues, such as the Palestinian struggle for national recognition and statehood, Iranian Jews tend to side with what could traditionally be considered the “opposition.” In other instances, religious affiliation trumps national identity. It is difficult to separate the two, as religious and national identities are inextricably intertwined in the case of the Iranian Jews. While anti-Israel demonstrations and shouts of “Death to Israel” are commonplace in Iran, so too are scenes of peaceful coexistence and worship. At sacred sites like the tomb of Abrahamic prophets like Daniel, Muslims and Jews worship side by side. In moments like this, it becomes clear that to be “Iranian” is much more than mere religious affiliation. It is a pride in their history and a shared tradition of a distinctly Persian cultural prominence.

What then, does the future of the Jewish community in Iran look like in light of current tensions? To be sure, one day Iran will be a nuclear-capable state, regardless of whether or not Israel and the West desire it to be so. International sanctions have proven to be futile. The question then becomes: what measures will be taken to ensure the continuation of a national Jewish presence in the Middle East, and simultaneously, prevent an Iranian attack? Certainly, without increased dialogue between the two countries, there will be no resolution anytime soon.

As for the Jewish community in Iran, it has proven its resilience as well as its ability to adapt. It is my prediction that there will continue to exist a Jewish presence in the country, as there has been for more than 3,000 years. The Persian Jews have witnessed the rise and fall of empires; they have braved revolutions and uprisings, and survived the ousting of kings and the installation of dictators. They have, above all, endured.

Ahmadinejad’s hostile rhetoric concerning Israel cannot, and should not, be taken lightly, however, if there is to remain a Jewish presence in the Middle East. A willingness to understand the issues, to confront them in a diplomatic, respectful manner, and to be open-minded is of the utmost necessity. It is my hope that the respective governments of Israel and Iran, as well as all those in the international community, will seek to resolve the current conflict not on the basis of international alliances or personal benefit, but so that all of humanity, regardless of religion or national creed, may flourish, as all Persians—both Jewish and Muslim— once did together.

Kate Moran is a sophomore at Emory University, majoring in Middle Eastern Studies and Arabic. Her academic interests include human rights issues, religious traditions in the Middle East, and international development policy.

She hopes to one day pursue a career with UNICEF or the UN Refugee Agency.

Emory Journal of International Affairs, Issue 1, January 2013, 27-33

AFGHANISTAN AND THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN DEVELOPMENT LAUREN WEBB It is now widely acknowledged in the academic and development communities that development programs for women result in major gains across all sectors of a community. However, for all the good intentions of NGOs and multinational organizations, development programs often fail to adequately incorporate women into the planning of such programs. In Afghanistan, the international community’s focus on armed conflict and counterterrorism has kept women’s development from being a priority outside of rhetoric.1 Meanwhile, the unique security and social challenges of Afghanistan have limited the involvement of women in decision-making. These same social challenges have made it difficult for Afghanistan’s central government to extend its control throughout most of the country, particularly in regards to enforcing laws protecting women’s rights. Due to the unique political, social, and security structures of Afghanistan, it is necessary that NGOs and governments place a greater emphasis on local-level, inclusive implementation with the input, cooperation, and assistance of the community to ensure lasting progress on women’s development.

Critical to Development Since the Beijing Declaration on Women in 1995, literature and international declarations (including the Millennium Declaration and the 2012 Tokyo Declaration) have acknowledged the importance of women’s development to development and conflict resolution. Studies have shown that improving the education, health, and economic prospects of women and girls often creates greater gains for society than those same investments in men. For example, increases in female income are estimated to improve child survival rates as much as 20 times more than the same increases in male income.2 This is likely due to traditional roles that create a stronger association between women and the home. Similarly, greater participation by women in government results in increased investment in “infrastructure that is directly relevant to women’s needs,” helping to address resource inequality.3 In post-conflict and conflict societies like Afghanistan, this 1 “We Have the Promises of the World”: Women’s Rights in Afghanistan (Human Rights Watch, December 2009), 2.

2 Isobel Coleman, “The Payoff From Women’s Rights,” Foreign Affairs (June 2004).

3 Ibid.

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investment is necessary, as the needs of women increase during and after conflict. Often the infrastructure necessary for daily life—hospitals, grocery stores, roads—has been greatly damaged and women must take on increased responsibility, including caring for the sick and assisting local volunteer groups.4 Recent studies have also acknowledged the importance of women in peace building—and the glaring lack of opportunities for their participation.5 Despite the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 in 2000, women continue to be marginalized and underrepresented in formal peace negotiations.6,7 This is indicative of the recurring disconnect between high level proclamations, which nominally mandate or reaffirm women’s rights, and the substantive changes that require a strong local element. Moreover, progress in women’s rights also requires the use of resources that national and third-party actors would rather put towards more immediate, short-term needs.

The Challenge of Afghanistan Afghanistan is arguably one of the worst places in the world to be a woman. It is estimated that 87% of Afghan women and girls have experienced at least one form of sexual, physical, economic or psychological abuse.8 Nearly one Afghan woman dies every two hours due to complications in pregnancy.9 Women daring enough to enter the public life as politicians, teachers, or activists face threats and attempted murder.10 Most marriages—between 70 and 80 percent—are forced marriages and over half are child marriages.11 And opportunities for an independent life are severely limited—only 6% of the female population over age 25 has a secondary education and the current generation’s education is limited by insecurity and lack of access.12 But the challenges of women in Afghanistan are only part of the issues plaguing the Afghan people.

Decades of conflict and outside intervention have left a country plagued by fragmentation and poverty, and a corrupt central government that is unable to exert control throughout most of the country. In a research project examining local peace building in Afghanistan, the majority of respondents did not feel that the central government and other national groups contributed to local-level peace, inevitably the peace that would most affect individuals’ daily lives.13 4 Ivan Cardona et al., From the Ground up: Women’s Roles in Local Peacebuilding in Afghanistan, Liberia, Nepal, Pakistan and Sierra Leone (ActionAid; Institute of Development Studies; and WomanKind, September 2012), 16.

5 “Women’s Participation in Peace Negotiations: Connections between Presence and Influence” in Women, Peace, and Security (UN Development Fund for Women, 2010); Judy El-Bushra, Gender in Peacebuilding: Taking Stock (London: International Alert, June 2012).

6 UN Security Council Resolution 1325 codified the importance that women have “equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security.”

7 Cardona et al., From the Ground up: Women’s Roles in Local Peacebuilding in Afghanistan, Liberia, Nepal, Pakistan and Sierra Leone, 10.

8 Ibid., 19.

9 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Slip-Sliding on a Yellow Brick Road: Stabilization Efforts in Afghanistan,” Stability: International Journal of Security & Development 1, no. 1 (November 1, 2012): 11.

10 “We Have the Promises of the World”: Women’s Rights in Afghanistan, 4.

11 UNIFEM Afghanistan, The Situation of Women in Afghanistan, UNIFEM Afghanistan Fact Sheet (UNIFEM Afghanistan, 2008).

12 Cardona et al., From the Ground up: Women’s Roles in Local Peacebuilding in Afghanistan, Liberia, Nepal, Pakistan and Sierra Leone, 17.

13 Ibid., 7.

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Internally, Afghanistan is a deeply fragmented country with stark differences between urban and rural areas, the north and south, and divisions along tribal and ethnic lines. Understanding these local differences is absolutely vital to successful development programs, particularly in the traditional and highly paternalistic Pashtun region bordering Pakistan.14 Promoting work with Afghan NGOs, who often have “access to areas which international, and some mainstream national, NGOs are unable to enter” will also open new opportunities to address these difficulties.15 Moreover, the withdrawal of forces in 2014 will inevitably be accompanied by a decrease in foreign aid, which accounts for a disproportionate amount of the Afghan economy. Dependence on foreign aid poses the risk of distorting the development agenda based on donor interests and threatens the long-term stability of development goals and projects. This timeline makes it particularly important that organizations learn to work closely with community members.

Ownership Development projects openly promoted by NGOs and multinational groups in Afghanistan often face the risk of being perceived as part of a Western agenda imposed on Afghanis. This appearance is exacerbated by the top-down approach to women’s rights. For example the National Action Plan for the Women of Afghanistan (NAPWA), a 10-year plan approved in May 2008, and the 2008 Afghanistan National Development Strategy Cross-Cutting Gender Equity Strategy (ANDS-GES) seek to make gender concerns mainstream issues in Afghan policy documents. This is an important goal and one that should be incorporated into both national and provincial documents. However, the theory-based policies of NAPWA and ANDS-GES offer little in the way of a pragmatic guide to bring Afghanistan up to par with international standards.16 Working with local groups and communities offers the best opportunity to bring Afghanistan up to international standards, step-by-step. A representative from the Afghan Ministry of Women’s Affairs was quoted as saying, “All the people at the national peace council are not related to the community…We also have a lot of expert people—religious people, etc. But if members of councils are chosen from the community then this process will be better.”17 Top-down approaches risk resulting in “‘template’ solutions that fail to adequately take account of the local social and cultural context” in the gender sections of international agencies.18 Involving community members gives them the opportunity to shape and create programs that within their context.

A similar, decentralized approach is already employed by the Afghan government through Community Development Councils (CDCs) to provide services to communities in the absence of strong government.

These elected councils are already empowered to use grants for reconstruction and development projects.

14 Knowledge on Fire: Attacks on Education in Afghanistan: Risks and Measures for Successful Mitigation (London: CARE International, September 2009), 50.

15 Women and Transition in Afghanistan CARE International Policy Brief (London: CARE International UK, 2012), 4.

16 “We Have the Promises of the World”: Women’s Rights in Afghanistan, 86.

17 Cardona et al., From the Ground up: Women’s Roles in Local Peacebuilding in Afghanistan, Liberia, Nepal, Pakistan and Sierra Leone, 48.

18 Sultan Barakat and Gareth Wardell, “Exploited by Whom? An Alternative Perspective on Humanitarian Assistance to Afghan Women,” Third World Quarterly 23, no. 5 (October 2002): 910.

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These CDCs, and other local-based development programs, such as the Midwifery Education Program, provide a pre-existing framework for local-level women’s development.

Local ownership also promotes the long-term growth and preservation of these programs. While many high-level projects change as jurisdictions or administration’s political priorities change, or security issues worsen, focusing on the local-level offers development programs the opportunity to make those most affected true stakeholders, capable of shaping and continuing the programs.

Increasing Participation A focus on community-level development also offers greater opportunities for women to lead and assist in the formation of these programs. Though education and security concerns restrict a woman’s ability to participate in decision-making and politics at the provincial or national level, their participation can certainly be recruited at the community level. Such community development programs are already in place and are supported by CARE International, the National Solidarity Programme, and other civil society groups.

These programs give women at the local level a voice in how project funds are spent and have proven to be a successful way to involve women in decision-making and effectively address community needs.19 Particularly, outside of urban areas, male family members and cultural norms often place limits on an Afghan woman’s ability to participate in many activities outside the home. Women in Afghanistan have stated that their participation is more likely to be accepted at local centers, where the men in their family recognize the members—who are ideally all women—and trust that they will not damage the family’s honor.20 For example, in a community near Kabul, Womankind Worldwide has helped the community build The Afghan Women’s Resource Centre, providing literacy classes, computer courses, and skill-building workshops and courses, such as gardening and tailoring. By incorporating local women into committees,” which decide on the focus of future projects,” Womankind has helped make the community a stakeholder in the project. Membership has increased, families feel secure sending girls, and, according to the Head of the Centre, they have “never had any security problems.”21 One particularly successful program conducted with local interaction has been the National Midwifery Education Program. A research team, led by Dr. Linda Bartlett of Johns Hopkins, studied maternal mortality in Afghanistan in 2002, just a few months after the Taliban fell. The results were discouraging: only five percent of births were attended by a doctor or midwife; only five percent of mothers used antenatal care; and Badkhshan province had the highest maternal mortality rate ever recorded.22 USAID, the European Commission, and the World Bank then provided money for NGOs and Afghan communities to run midwifery schools. There are now midwifery schools in 32 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, with two schools serving two provinces to cover every province and it is estimated that the national need for midwives will be reached by 2018. But beyond the numerical successes, interviews with participants—including trained midwives 19 Women and Transition in Afghanistan, 7.

20 Cardona et al., From the Ground up: Women’s Roles in Local Peacebuilding in Afghanistan, Liberia, Nepal, Pakistan and Sierra Leone, 32.

21 Ibid., 40.

22 Linda Bartlett, “The National Midwifery Education Program in Afghanistan: Training Women and Saving Lives” interview by Isobel Coleman, June 8, 2011, http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/national-midwifery-education-programafghanistan-training-women-saving-lives/p25260.

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and community members—show how important community involvement can be in these programs. One woman discussed how—rather than dictated by international organizations—the residential midwife schools had been designed by Afghans, “so they’re very culturally appropriate, they’re safe, they’re comfortable, and private and all the appropriate things that they need to be.”23 Community involvement reduces any perceived threat to the social order and makes it easier for women to participate in these programs.

It is important to realize that the leaders of remote villages should not be viewed solely as an obstacle for their cultural differences. When approached to discuss the benefits of skill development and education, provincial leaders often give their support and are able to facilitate input that can be vital for these programs.

For example, after attending a USAID meeting in Gardez City, a woman from Shagai Village, in a rural region of Paktya Province, consulted with community leaders and village elders. The Women’s Organization of Shagai worked with these groups and women throughout the community to design a tailoring training and literacy program that would suit the needs of the community, through a small grant from USAID.24 Education at the Local Level Improving education opportunities for women and girls in Afghanistan is necessary to create a pool of qualified women for roles in Afghanistan’s civil service and other sectors. One female official stated, “We can’t hire women in civil service cadres if they don’t receive higher education. […] Until girls are educated, we can’t help women advance.”25 Education for girls in Afghanistan, however, remains under threat by both security and budgetary concerns. In just the first five months of 2009, 102 schools were attacked and 200 students were poisoned (198 of whom were female). Moreover, the shortage of schools in rural areas disproportionately impacts girls’ attendance because parents are not willing to send their daughters to walk alone.26 To best address these problems, it is vital that governments and NGOs emphasize work at the local level.

With the goal of preparing Afghanistan for self-sufficiency as foreign militaries begin to withdraw— and likely take much of the world’s attention and donations with them—donors have pushed to transition education funding into the control of the Afghan Ministry of Education. Although the intent is understandable, the current security situation of Afghanistan means that this transition, without close community cooperation, places education at risk. For example, in 2011, funding for a community-based education program led by CARE International was cut dramatically. Of the over 600 classes given to the Afghan government, one-third were closed and one-third were relocated.27 Girls’ education is particularly vulnerable to relocation—parents are more likely to keep daughters home when schools are far due to security concerns.

Afghan schools also face direct threats and attacks, particularly on all-girls schools. Despite the dramatically lower number of all-girls schools in Afghanistan, of those schools attacked between 2006

23 Ibid.

24 USAID | Afghanistan, “Case Study: Out of the Home, Into the Economy,” United States Agency for International Development, n.d.

25 “We Have the Promises of the World”: Women’s Rights in Afghanistan, 77.

26 Ibid., 9.

27 Women and Transition in Afghanistan, 3.

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and 2008, 40% were all-girls schools and 32% were mixed population schools.28 In addition to this disappointing—though not altogether surprising—news, a study on the attacks offered some insight into a few helpful trends. First, NGO-supported schools and schools requested by or developed in cooperation with the community were less frequently attacked than schools sponsored by the central government. In fact, in interviews among attacked schools, “the single most important reason cited for attacks is the fact that schools are (or are perceived to be) government entities.”29 The attack trends and funding problems call into question the wisdom of taking education programs—particularly those targeted towards girls—out of the hands of local institutions. For their part, most local communities appear to view themselves as the primary stakeholders in education. In the CARE International study, “most respondents indicated the community as the entity they see as holding the primary responsibility,” even for providing additional security in the form of volunteers and patrollers.30 Local participation also provides community support in preventing attacks. Many communities have created “security shuras” as small, unarmed groups to “engage with elements that are opposing education in their areas” in the interest of promoting the security and acceptance of schools.31 Different parts of Afghanistan have also employed traditional defense structures when they feel invested in education, such as the Arbikai Shura in Khost.32 These community security systems are likely to be more effective than outside security forces. By demonstrating support for education, these local groups play a role that goes beyond short-term physical security and promotes the long-term acceptance and security of girls’ education in Afghanistan.

It remains true that national policies and international standards are vital for setting the agenda of women’s issues and are certainly necessary for long-term women’s development and rights. But to fully achieve these goals, we must emphasize work at the local level that is inspired by, not dictated by, these agendas. It is only through local ownership and cooperation that development programs can truly surmount the difficulties of Afghanistan.

28 Knowledge on Fire: Attacks on Education in Afghanistan: Risks and Measures for Successful Mitigation.

29 Ibid., 36.

30 Ibid., 43.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid., 44.

Lauren Webb is a junior at Emory University majoring in Political Science and History, with an unofficial minor in Economics. Her research and academic interests focus on India, China, and Japan, with a particular interest in development, human rights, and diplomacy. Having just returned from study abroad in Japan, she is excited to serve as Vice President of Emory Model United Nations.