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Table of Contents
Views from Abroad: The Shanghai Marriage Market
1
Here We Go Again: Thailand’s Return to Military Rule
6
By Nate Sawyer
By Stephen Jaber
A Rainbow Wave Across Latin America
10
Press Freedom Across the Globe
13
By Hobie Hunter
By Jessica Margolis
The Civilian Toll of Yemen’s Civil War By Deepa Mahadevan
14
Edited by Ben Perlmutter, Editor-in-Chief; Layout by Stephen Jaber, Digital Editor
Views From Abroad “No, I’m not interested in marrying your daughter”: Reconciling competing cultural forces at Shanghai’s Marriage Market
By Nate Sawyer
As much of a modern, cosmopolitan city as Shanghai may be, studying abroad in the “Paris of the East” is riddled with “culture shock” landmines. Even more amazing than how much sensory input you’re dealing with on a constant basis is how quickly you can get used to even the most shocking cultural differences. Give it a week, and the restaurant right next to your dorm that proudly displays its fine collection of snakes, frogs, and turtles for dinner will seem normal. (For the blood-lathered punching bag of a sheep carcass that you see hanging from the Xinjiang restaurant on the other side of the street, maybe give it two weeks). A mere month in, I thought I had mastered it all, from the fried silkworm cocoon stands outside the school’s front gate to the chaotic mess of any large number of Chinese trying to “line up.” But despite all of my adventurous encounters with foods and social norms on the streets of Shanghai, one particular experience still caught me off guard. Duck head and chicken heart with a side of fried rice for dinner? No problem. But to be confronted head-on by a horde of retirement-age Chinese strangers encouraging you to consider their daughter’s hand in marriage— that’s something else entirely. T’was indeed a warm welcome to the Marriage Quarter of Shanghai, circa 2015.
A scene from the Shaghai Marriage Market Now a crystallized cultural phenomenon, every weekend, dedicated parents of unmarried Chinese can be found in what’s locally known as the “Marriage Quarter,” all of them there to help their child find a potential suitor. As a Chinese friend of mine explained it to me, “it’s like the physical, real-life version of E-Harmony.” The comparison is an apt one, although adding the word “market” to describe the Marriage Quarter also seemed necessary to truly illuminate the transactions conducted within. As you peruse the organized chaos of the quarter situated in a little park off of People’s Square, you can see rows of fliers plastered across building walls advertising their respective individuals. It’s quite a motley mix, with advertisements for several 30-somethings sitting squarely next to an older male looking for someone also born in the year 1957. Umbrellas on either side of the walkway also lace the stone paths featuring a single individual. These colorful umbrellas, along with the featured child’s parents that stand guard over the parasols, beckon1
ing passersby like street vendors inviting someone to examine the quality of the good they are selling. Meanwhile, the “consumers”—other parents scoping out potential recruits for future daughter-in-law/ son-in-law—scrutinize the information displays, arguing with hopeful parents that they wanted to see a picture before information was exchanged because “the last time their son went on a date, she turned out to be uglier than a pig,” as one local put it. During my visit, my knee-jerk reaction to the scene was that of slight “moral disgust,” an unexplainable gut feeling that something was “off.” Each singular sheet of paper advertises an entire human being with as much word content as a PowerPoint slide— talk about reductionist. With only these few bullet points to go off of, romantic marriages are supposed to be struck up here? The die-hard Nicholas Sparks in me balked at this blatant instrumentalization of “romance.” The criteria used for advertisement and parental negotiation was first and foremost age, followed by hometown, educational/occupational background, and lastly one’s income, along with a few requirements for their future partner. For women, these requirements almost always included an older male who made above a certain wage and owned a house.
Nate at Jiuzhaigou National Park in Sichuan, China 2
Only if the above criteria are successfully matched will parents negotiate a date on their children’s behalf. If you’re young man and you don’t own a house, you can be as mouthwatering as Prince Charming or Ryan Gosling but end up walking away defeated. After watching a few deals pan out, the Shanghai Marriage Quarter more and more clearly revealed itself to be an intersection point of several Chinese cultural pressures. In part, the Marriage Quarter is the manifestation of traditional Chinese tendencies to prioritize concerns of the filial responsibility to get married. In other ways, the Marriage Quarter also showcases the immense social pressure that some unmarried individuals, particularly girls, face to get married to avoid losing face). Having grown up steeped in Eurocentric conceptions of marriage and romance, I would be remiss to not comment on the way that the Marriage Quarter seemed to exemplify a tradition of sidelining concerns of love and emotionality in favor of a more calculative practicality. Of the modern cities in China, it’s not much of an exaggeration to say Shanghai is the most modern city, complete with a wide array of not-so-traditional-Chinese cultural habits. There’s a Starbucks on every corner, and the movie “Minions” is a huge hit with the locals. (Minions here are called Xiao huáng rén, translating literally to “Little Yellow People,” a title that has caused more than one American on my program confusion when they burst out laughing after assuming that the Chinese were calling each other “Little Yellow People.”) Because Shanghai is situated so squarely within the reach of globalization’s pervasive influence on both consumer and social culture, I didn’t really expect to see social phenomenon like the Marriage Quarter while here. The mechanics of the marriage market rest on customs and traditions that I would have thought would be outdated to the younger Chinese generation. But my initial reading of the forces at work in the market were an incomplete and superficial characterization. I needed to delve a bit deeper into the interactions between several complemen-
tary, and contradictory, social forces that are continuing to impact both China’s younger and older generations alike. A healthy dose of perspective came to me in the form of an excellent book recommended to me by a sociology professor here called “The Individualization of Chinese Society” by UCLA anthropology professor Yunxiang Yan. The book focuses on the enormous amount of change that Chinese traditional cultural habits have faced in the last century by detailing some of the sociological trends affecting modern Chinese people and how these forces manifest in their lives. In the context of the Marriage Quarter, Yan focuses on the central (and distinctly Chinese) sociological force at play: that of filial piety and patriarchal power within family relations. The traditional Chinese family is built around Confucius’ articulation of filial piety: the virtue of respecting one’s parents, elders, and ancestors. This expectation seemingly still places a chokehold on much of China’s youth even in Shanghai as their parents negotiate out their marital futures—for the unmarried Chinese being “sold” at the market, the marriage question is not just about “love” but is also inseparable from filial piety-related concerns of financial security, the social implications of marrying a particular individual, and most of all parental approval. No wonder it’s the parents rather than the kids that populate the market every weekend. At the end of the day, part of the huge incentive for parents to utilize the marriage market to find a potential suitor is that they have the first say on whether or not they approve, even before their son or daughter has met their potential future spouse. The prioritization of these concerns at the market exemplifies the manifestation of Confucian conceptions of filial piety, as well as the importance of patrilineal identity as the arbiter of social status, which still seems to play a large role in the lives of young Chinese in Shanghai. As Yan discusses in his book, the individual has traditionally been seen as the “personification of their forebears” (and vice verse with the parent defined by their descendants), hence the urgency to get their child married in the first place as well as the selectivity in which they
choose suitors at the Marriage Quarter. But while this surface reading of the Marriage Market might seem the most obvious to Westerners, talking with some patrons at the market helped me realize that the Marriage Quarter often actually represents the triumph of individualism over patriarchal power, highlighting what Yan describes as a shift from the vertical power axis (parent-child) to a more horizontal one (husband-wife). I interviewed many of the Chinese teachers at my university regarding their opinions on the marriage market. Almost all said that they would refuse their parents recommendation to marry someone unless they were in love with their potential partner. Meanwhile, some of the parents I spoke with told me that the most important thing is that their child is happy, that the personality of their spouse is good-natured. One even said if his daughter would be happier in America instead of China (after I mentioned I was from America), he would gladly pack up and move to America to be with her. This willingness to integrate the child’s happiness, intentions, and tendency to value emotionality over practicality represents the huge shift in Chinese familial rela3
tions and power dynamics that Yan writes about. These examples from the Marriage Quarter, as well as the consistency of my teachers’ response to pursue love over their parents’ wishes (if the two came in conflict), demonstrate the victory of “emotionality” over more traditional values of filial piety which, Yan’s book explains, expected absolute “discipline,” the child’s “choices” to be “controlled” by the parents, and “emotions” to be “avoided for the sake of efficiency and order.” They are also indicative of the fact that the ideology of romantic love, and its prioritization in marriage, has certainly made its way to the younger Chinese generation even if it played very little importance in their parents’ marital decisions, which in turn mediates their parent’s expectations of their children on the subject of marriage and family. Consequently, I don’t see the Marriage Quarter as the inevitable harbinger of the resiliency of traditional Chinese patriarchal values, but instead quite the opposite: in some cases, the marriage market epitomizes where the two value systems are overlapping and beginning to learn to coexist, even when there is some tension.
conceded to this new power structure of the family unit, it more so seems that the understanding of filial piety has shifted to be more inclusive of the values of the younger generation. “If I didn’t really love her, I wouldn’t try things out just because my parents told me to,” said my teacher. “And that’s not disrespecting my parents—on the contrary, I know that my duty is to be as happy as I can be in order to respect my parents’ sacrifices for me.” My teacher’s answer is strikingly similar to that of a villager that Yan interviewed. The example verbatim from his book: “filial piety is to make your parents happy. What makes my parents happy? Their son having a happy life makes them happy. So, my happiness is the best way to be a filial son to my parents.” While Confucius might not agree, it seems that the younger generation of Chinese are not necessarily abandoning the principles of respect to parents and elders, but they are certainly cultivating alternative conceptions of the way filial piety materializes in the modern family unit.
The Marriage Quarter mechanics seem to be itself a compromise between two competing locus points of familial power—that of the parent over the child and that of the child’s individual pursuit of happiness. Pursuant to this new focus on individual desires and following the 1980’s and 1990’s development of many young people choosing one’s spouse for romantic love, the Marriage Market actually seemed to illustrate patriarchal power giving way to the individualization of the family unit, a spreading trend even in rural parts of China, as documented in Yan’s book. I think that perhaps part of the secret to this careful balance struck between these two forces lies in a more nuanced understanding of “filial piety,” an argument pointed out to me by my teachers and supported by Yan’s article. While the instances I bring up (like the father willing to move to America for his daughter because her feelings mattered more) might make it seem like the parents have absolutely 4
A busy day at the Marriage Market
This new version of “filial piety,”—one that is dynamic and constantly subject to the shifting winds of different cultural pressures and ideologies—and the Marriage Quarter that accompanies it, demonstrate an important lesson about modern China. China’s rise to modernity has not forced it to walk down a narrow path of Westernization. Instead, as China becomes a “modern” nation, the people of China are not forsaking their cultural heritage while they modernize. In any case, the Shanghai Marriage Quarter serves as an interesting window into a rapidly changing Chinese culture that has to learn to reconcile the sociological forces of the modern globalized world and the strength of its own traditional past, regardless of the extent of Western influence. And this is perhaps one of the most valuable benefits of studying abroad as a Westerner in Shanghai—it affords an incredible opportunity to watch this reconciliation process taking place at every street corner and with every individual you interact with.
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Here We Go Again: Thailand’s Return to Military Rule By Stephen Jaber Thai soldiers enforcing military rule in Bangkok
More than a year after the Royal Thai Armed Forces overthrew Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra’s Pheu Tai Party (PTP) backed government, hopes for a democratic revival have been dashed in Thailand. The military junta, called The National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) (irony unintended), seized power following widespread protests that hoped to oust Shinawatra from power due to the corruption of her cabinet. Moreover, protesters were fed up with the sizable influence exerted by former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, Yingluck’s brother, who had ruled Thailand from 2001 to 2006. Thaksin’s government was similarly removed via military coup. Nonetheless, the Shinawatras have seen their influence diminished by this most recent military coup. On April 1st 2015, Prime Minister General Prayuth Chan-Ocha lifted martial law and has opted to rule via the interim constitution that the junta imposed upon seizing power. As this is Thailand’s 19th constitution in less than 80 years, Thailand’s future as a liberal-democracy is increasingly under threat. A situation in which an unaccountable and unmuzzled military is able to paralyze democratic development is no environment fit for the democratic renaissance Thailand was close to achieving. Yingluck Shinawatra’s government was not an angelic liberal democracy. The government was a function of a constitutional regime that was severely ineffective and largely watered down from its predecessor enabled by the comparatively progressive 1997 Constitution. The 1997 Constitution, nostalgi6
cally referred to as “The People’s Constitution,” was a relatively populist document that enshrined respect for human rights, religious freedom and stipulated increased democratic decision making in the form of a directly elected senate and house of representatives. Contrasted with the 2007 Constitution that served as the institutional framework for Yingluck Shinawatra’s government, the 1997 Constitution was exceedingly more liberal and promising for Thailand’s democratic future. A bit of history on Thailand’s two-decade long democratic backsliding is necessary for understanding the current situation. Following the implementation of the 1997 constitution, the first Shinawatra administration was able to largely maintain unconstrained rule and control major policy organizations of the government. In some ways this violated the spirit of the constitution, while also offending the conservative establishment that resented the first Shinawatra administration. An unexpected byproduct of the constitution’s wide-reaching liberalism was a large power brokerage to the executive. Nonetheless, the military, bureaucratic civil servants, and the monarchy all voiced displeasure towards the administration’s deployment of ministerial power. Shinawatra loyalists were appointed to key military positions, and civil servants disdained the party’s use of the bureaucracy as a political instrument. Most importantly, the monarchy, headed by the world’s longest reigning king, King Bhumibol Adulyadej, was worried that monarchical influence would dissipate
in the face of a popular Shinawatra administration and a centralized, and effective Thai Rak Thai Party (TRTP). After Thaksin Shinawatra was removed in a bloodless coup d’état in September 2006, The People’s Constitution was superseded in 2007 by a military imposed constitution that severely weakened the populist oriented rhetoric of its predecessor. The 2007 constitution limited the Prime Minister’s power vis-à-vis the parliament, restricted the office to a two-term limit, lowered the opposition seat requirement to launch a vote of no confidence, and prompted a weak legislative system that answered the aspirations of Thailand’s conservative elite. The elite, who had been “victims” of the first Shinawatra’s unexpected power consolidation, welcomed the return to normalcy in the face of a neutered executive and an fractured legislature. In essence, the 2007 constitution was doomed to fail as it encouraged a political environment that resembled the troubled and ineffective eras prior to The People’s Constitution. With a weak institutional arrangement in the form of a dangerously insolvent and conservative con-
stitution, crippling protests galvanized by the opposition Democratic Party (led by former Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva and Suthep Thaugsuban) became an issue that prompted military confrontation. Thailand has particularly susceptible to coups and has experienced somewhere around 20 coups since 1912. As the military repeatedly cited The Military Law Act of 1914, which gives the army “superior power” over government and national security as recurring justifications for direct intervention, coupled with quiet acceptance by King Adulyadej, it was all but expected that military would intervene in May 2014. Furthermore, in May 2014, the military’s casus belli was to restore order and enact political reforms, an expected yet empty promise that has yet to be delivered over a year later. Until this year, Thai coups more-or-less followed a formula: civilian government is deposed in a bloodless military coup, the King legitimizes the endeavor, a new constitution is written and civilian government is restored. Rinse and repeat. General-Prime-Minister Prayut’s recent declaration that Article 44 of the interim constitution “will be invoked with an aim to deploy military officers in tasks related to maintenance of national order,” indi-
General Prayut Chan-ocha at a news conference just after the coup in 2014 7
cates that the military is over the martial law stage. The vagueness and hazy wording of the interim constitution, paired with some bellicose rhetoric from Prayut, — he said in November, “Don’t ask me to give you democracy and elections. This is not the right time” — marks troubling developments for Thailand. There is certainly a break with tradition here, given that Prayut can be expected to rule with impunity given the wide-reaching authority of the interim constitution, there are worries that a return to civilian rule will become a distant pipe dream. In any case, as is typical of military juntas, rule under the NCPO has not been fractionally friendly to human rights. The junta has indicated plans to combine the Thai National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) and the Office of the Ombudsman (the office responsible for investigating complains against maladministration of public authorities) in a selection process closed to the public and without deliberation with civil society organizations. This move, according to the Human Rights Watch, would gut the agency while also exposing the military’s disregard towards human rights. The military has brought forth 14 cases of “lese majeste” (insulting the monarchy), reiterating the military’s disdain for political speech, or criticism of the ruling elite. Indeed between 2005 and 2011, there were 400 cases of “lese majeste” brought forth. The military and police have routinely arrested those deemed as threads to the establishment. By the end of March of 2015 the military had enacted “14 articles … under Article 44” that give the military the authority to make arrests, conduct searches, censor the media and crack down on any threats against the monarchy or towards national security. There should be no expectations that the military would moderate its image after its umteenth coup. The military-government control of Thailand’s political future has not yet reached its climax. Developments are shifting towards a continuance in the manner that it is currently projected: a strong military dictatorship. Nonetheless, Chan-ocha remains stalwart towards his regime’s worrying democratic subversion: “Article 44 will be exercised constructively,” he said, “don’t worry, if you’re not doing 8
anything wrong, there’s no need to be afraid.” On September 6th 2015, a vote was taken on a drafted constitution written by a committee handpicked by the military Junta. The constitution was rejected 135 to 105. The stunt will keep the military in power well into the next year, a move that Sangsit Phiriyarangsan, a member of the drafting committee, said was intended to delay elections. The military has continued to trumpet its maxim: “reforms before elections” in light of the vote but has yet to specify what reforms are needed. Nonetheless, the military moved forward anyway with a brand new 21 person constitutional committee on October 6th 2015. Regardless of the outcome, many commentators have insisted that the military intends to retain power through 2016, a troubling sign that the military does not intend on leaving the halls of power. A succession crisis is also underway as the 87 year old King Adulyadej is reportedly terminally ill. His heir, Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn is not nearly as well respected as his father. Having pledged loyalty to Thaksin in the past, Vajiralongkorn is now trying to align himself with the Bangkok elite, i.e. the Junta and its sympathizers. The Crown Prince’s reputation as a “hothead, womanizer, and poor decision-maker” has placed him firmly in contention with his father, who not only has been a sober and moderating force in Thailand but also maintains a cult of personality throughout the country. Vajiralongkorn overall inspires no such loyalty. While association with the deeply loved King Adulyadej has legitimized the military in the public’s eyes, a King Vajiralongkorn will not be able to induce comparable levels of support for the military relative to his father. Thailand’s economy is showing signs of slow-down as the World Bank’s 2015 projections place the economy as the slowest growing in the region. Thailand’s household debt levels are rising fast, and the country’s growth rates since 2010 have paled in comparison to its regional neighbors such as the Philippines and Malaysias. Thailand was once hurtling towards being a regional economic leader, but frequently military putsches have dissuaded investors and tem-
The Thai Royal Family: King Bhumibol Adulyadej, Queen Sirikrit and Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn (L to R) at the King’s 80th birthday party
pered growth rates. Slow growth rates and a potential currency depreciation will make the junta’s task even more demanding if they are to seemingly fix political corruption as well. As the country moves forward with a military junta once again at the helm, many have cautioned moderation and restraint from the military especially in situations involving the opposition, free assembly and political expression. These suggestions, however, are likely to be ignored by the hot-tempered General who has taken a one-dimensional attitude towards power in Thailand. On March 23rd 2015, Prayut declared in a speech, “”In the past, our society experienced many problems because we were too democratic.” Thailand remains “99 percent” free, he continued, because if it wasn’t “we’d jail [our opponents] and put them before the firing squad. Then it would all be over and I wouldn’t have to lie awake at night.”
in Russia, Egypt, and Turkey before getting complacent with Prayut. Unfortunately, due to recent moves by the military and its emphasis on “reform before elections” it might be a while before a definitive solution to Thailand’s multitude of problems arises.
Thailand’s leaders need to get serious about reform and stability. In a country fraught with violence, and uncertainty, the military must return to the barracks and civilian politicians need to remain in parliament. Paranoid dictatorships are never the solution to a country’s troubles. Thailand’s politicians and leaders would be wise to look to souring situations
9
A Rainbow Wave Across Latin America By Hobie Hunter
Coverage of LGBT rights internationally usually comes in two varieties. Recent headlines that come to mind include “SCOTUS rules in favor of marriage equality” and “Net tightening on gay and lesbian west Africans.” While the United States and Western Europe have made strong progress on LGBT rights, stagnation or regression is seen in Africa, the Middle East, the former Soviet Union, and South Asia. However, there is another, underreported story: that of Latin America. While the region may conjure images of machismo and Catholic conservatism, many countries of the region have actually shown remarkable progress on LGBT rights. In recent years same-sex marriage has swept across much of Latin America. In 2010, Argentina became the first Latin American country to nationally legalize same-sex marriage. Uruguay and Brazil, which had previously only had marriage equality in some states, followed in 2013. In Mexico, Mexico City, Quintana Roo, and Colima all grant marriages to same-sex couples. More importantly, each Mexican state is required to recognize same-sex marriages performed in other states. Although marriage equality technically is not the law of the land in Colombia, judges are able to use a 2011 ruling to marry same-sex couples. While some other Latin America states have yet to adopt same-sex marriage, they have nonetheless made other forms of progress for LGBT rights. Bolivia’s constitution bans all forms of anti-gay 10
Pride on a Brazilian Beach discrimination, Ecuador grants civil unions to samesex couples, and sex reassignment surgery is covered by public health insurance in Cuba, Peru allows gays to openly serve in the military, and Venezuela has laws protecting against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity/expression, among other victories. Much of this progress for LGBT rights is due to strong action by the judicial branch, as has been the case in the United States. High courts were responsible for marriage equality in Mexico, Colombia, and Brazil. Judiciaries across the region have been so able to support LGBT rights because many constitutions of the region are so young, and have progressive aspects that empower the judiciary to protect human rights. Whereas the United States’ constitution has held fast for over two hundred years, Argentina’s, for example, last underwent a major overhaul in 1994. In Argentina’s new constitution, all international treaties that Argentina has ratified, including those that pertain to human rights, are held as equal to the rest of the constitution as supreme law. Ironically enough, many Latin America counties now have such progressive constitutions because of the conservative authoritarian regimes that used to span the region. Wanting to ensure that human rights are not systematically violated, as they were
Same-Sex Union Rights in South America
with progressive constitutions, Latin America courts have been able to act as the vanguard of LGBT rights. Strong social movements have backed up the progressive judicial decisions across Latin America. In a region that has suffered decades of repression, demands for human rights resonate. LGBT movements first emerged during the 1980s, as HIV began to spread. In Brazil, STD groups (AIDS groups in particular) helped achieve a constitutional right to health care in 1988. A wide variety of NGOs and international organizations have supported the civil society efforts. During the 1990s, World Bank loans helped to fuel the LGBT movements. By 2007, 1,500 non-governmental organizations were working with LGBT populations, some with funding from the national STD and AIDS program.
Marriage Other type of partnership Unrecognied or unknown Same-sex marriage banned Same-sex sexual activity illegal (not enforced) under the old authoritarian system, the new legal systems are more responsive to human rights violations. Furthermore, Latin American courts are more willing to be influenced by foreign judicial rulings. When SCOTUS Justice Anthony Kennedy referenced foreign precedent in Lawrence v. Texas, he came under fire from conservatives. Meanwhile, in a 2012 ruling striking down the Mexican state of Oaxaca’s ban on same-sex marriage, the Mexican Supreme Court cited Loving v. Virginia, the landmark U.S. case striking down bans on interracial marriage. Courts have been able to take more decisive action because they are farther removed from the will of the people than the executive or legislative branches. With insulation from majoritarianism, compounded
LGBT movements have prospered when they have built strong partnerships with political parties, such as in Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay. Meanwhile, strong social movements in Bolivia, Colombia, and Costa Rica have had trouble because they have failed to build strong connections with national political parties. LGBT activists have traditionally partnered with the left, but this is not always the case. In Chile, they worked with the center-right party to push through the nation’s first hate crime law. The progress of LGBT rights in Latin America has not been without opposition. Religious organizations, including both the Catholic Church and the Protestant right, have voiced their opposition. Even within high-income countries that have seen marked progress, divisions can be drawn. Argentina and Uruguay, which have seen the strongest progress on LGBT rights, are noticeably more secular. They have a stronger tradition of separation of church and state and a less religious population. On the other hand, Mexico, Brazil, and Chile all have a major political party with strong ties to the Catholic Church. This is not the case in Argentina or in Uruguay. Pope Francis, from Argentina, garnered significant press attention when he said in a speech, “Who am I to judge?” in reference to homosexuality. 11
While this marks a shift in tone from his predecessors, it is not a change in Church policy. The Vatican’s official Catechism still holds that homosexuality is “objectively disordered,” but that homosexuals must be received with “compassion and sensitivity.” This position, essentially stating, “Hate the sin but love the sinner,” is not new. Despite the Pope’s softening of tone, religious organizations have not budged on policy. Change in Latin America will ultimately come from secular authorities, rather than religious organizations. Countries that have made the strongest progress on gay rights—Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay—collectively compose about two-thirds of the total population of Latin America and the Caribbean. However, other parts of Latin America have not made commensurate progress. Central America in particular lags behind. Not a single Central American country allows same-sex couples to marry or adopt. None ban discrimination on the basis of gender identity or expression. Only Costa Rica recognizes same-sex unions for some purposes, and only El Salvador permits gays to serve in the military.
The Anglophone Caribbean lags even farther behind Central America. Consensual same-sex sexual acts are criminalized in Jamaica, Guyana, Belize, St. Kitts and Nevis, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, St. Lucia, Grenada, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago. Needless to say, as same-sex intercourse are illegal in these countries, same-sex adoption and marriage are illegal as well. Jamaica was dubbed by TIME in 2006 as “The Most Homophobic Place on Earth.” Lynch mobs have murdered homosexuals and popular musicians write songs laden with homophobic lyrics. Latin America is diverse yet underreported regarding LGBT rights. The region is home to some countries that have made among the strongest progress on LGBT rights. While we may view social rights in the world as divided between the progressive developed world and the conservative developing world, Latin America has forged its own unique path as progressive and developing. This is something that should be lauded, and serve as an exemplar for the rest of the developing world. There is still significant progress to be made in Latin America, but with foreign assistance and more importantly grassroots efforts, greater freedom and tolerance for LGBT people will result.
A LGBT rights demonstration in Buenos Aires, Argentina 12
Press Freedom Across the Globe By Jessica Margolis
This map represents data from the World Press Freedom Index, created and maintained by the organization Reporters Without Borders. The index ranks “the performance of 180 countries according to a range of criteria that include media pluralism and independence, respect for the safety and freedom of journalists, and the legislative, institutional and infrastructural environment in which the media operate.� All countries are color-coded based on their relative Press Freedoms score from 2014, with darker colors indicating countries with fewer freedoms and a more restricted press. The overlay indicates countries whose 2014 score was worse than their 2013 score, by a value greater than 1. It is interesting to note that the scores for some democratic European countries, including Ireland, worsened in 2014. Despite this fact, these countries are still ranked as being some of the freest in the world. The majority of countries whose scores have decreased are those that still have a comparatively free press. Unsurprisingly, countries with the lowest press freedoms scores have more authoritarian regimes, notably China, Saudi Arabia and Iran. For countries with a more restricted press to have a significant change in press freedoms, a change of regimes is likely necessary.
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The Civilian Toll of Yemen’s Civil War By Deepa Mahadevan The aftermath of a Saudi airstrike in Saana, Yemen
Civilians in Yemen are bearing the burden of the ongoing conflict that is raging between opposing militant groups. In September 2014, Ansar Allah, more commonly known as “Houthis,” a militant group originating in northern Yemen, seized control of the capital and large parts of the country with the help of army units loyal to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Since then, anti-Houthi armed groups and other army units supported by a Saudi Arabia-led military coalition have been caught in a raging conflict to regain the lost territory. All parties involved in the conflict have demonstrated an overt disregard for civilian lives and the fundamental principles of international law. They have killed and injured hundreds of Yemeni citizens not involved in the conflict, many of them women and children, in disproportionate and indiscriminate airstrikes and ground attacks. The conflict has raged in 20 out of the country’s 22 governorates and has killed close to 4,000 people–half of them civilians. Over one million civilians have been displaced since March 2015. In the southern region of Yemen, Houthi and anti-Houthi armed groups battling for control in the cities of Aden and Ta’iz have routinely launched offensives in densely populated residential areas, using weapons lacking the technology to aim at specific targets, and putting civilian lives at high risk. In addition to the large number of civilian casualties resulting from indiscriminate violence, many innocent people returning home after the fighting in the Aden region had died down have been killed and injured 14
from landmines laid by the parties in conflict. The Saudi Arabia-led coalition forces have also killed and wounded civilians in unlawful airstrikes that have similarly failed to distinguish between military targets and civilian occupied targets in Houthi-controlled territories. Hundreds of cases have been reported in which women and children were killed or injured while asleep or carrying out daily activities in the places where they had sought refuge after being displaced by the conflict. Entire neighborhoods have become virtually deserted as residents flee their homes fearing attacks. Airstrikes render residential areas without water, electricity, and other services. Additionally, the sick and wounded have run into many challenges accessing proper medical care due to the difficulty of acquiring safe passage through military checkpoints. Houthi loyalists and anti-Houthi armed groups involved in ground fighting in Aden and Ta’iz have characteristically harmed and endangered civilians residing in the area as they battled for the control of the two cities. Attacks by both sides failed to make the distinction between military and civilian residents. Residents of the locale reported instances when fighters launched attacks in their neighborhoods, despite the presence of civilians nearby, thus exposing them to the risk of retaliatory attacks. The warring parties have greatly hindered the delivery of humanitarian aid to areas controlled by
their opponents, causing a sharp deterioration in the humanitarian situation. Prior to the conflict, 60 percent of Yemen’s population was in need of some sort of basic assistance in areas such as food; water; healthcare; or shelter. That demand has risen to 80 percent — 4 out of 5 Yemenis— which prompted UN agencies to declare a Level 3 emergency response (the most severe) in Yemen until January, 2016. The crisis has severely disrupted the delivery of essential services in cities and rural areas alike. Schools have been closed since March 2015 and are currently being used as shelters for internally displaced peoples (IDPs) instead of education facilities. Ministry of Education officials in Sana’a report that 600,000 students have been unable to take their high school final exams because schools due to the government’s reappropriation of the buildings. Damage to power stations has left Aden and Ta’iz without electricity for prolonged periods of time and has disrupted vital services such as food supply. Access to water has been hindered as well due to lack of fuel needed to operate the water pumps and by damage caused to water sanitation infrastructure.
A paramedic working in a health center in the Aden region said, “What is electricity? It’s been so long that we have forgotten what it is. We had some water until 10 days ago but since then we have none, and there is no telephone network coverage here. It is very difficult to run a hospital in these conditions. The lack of electricity and water was making life unbearable, especially with the high temperatures.” Under international humanitarian law, civilian humanitarian relief personnel must be granted freedom of movement by all parties to the conflict and must be protected from attack, harassment, intimidation, and arbitrary detention. Therefore, the parties involved in the conflict must, in the future, allow for the facilitation and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief for civilians in need. All states involved in the conflict must comply with these provisions of humanitarian law and take measurable precautions to minimize harm to civilians by giving warnings of impending attacks to populations in areas at risk. It is necessary for the international community to condemn the violations and war crimes being committed in Yemen, as they pose a challenge to the universal application of international law.
Houthi rebels in the Yemeni capitol, Saana
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