THE JEWISH February 6, 2015 • 17 Shevat 5775
STAR Vol 14, No. 6 • TheJewishStar.com
Yisro • Published weekly since 2002 • 516-622-7461
THE NEWSPAPER OF LONG ISLAND’S ORTHODOX COMMUNITIES
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5Towners urged: Attend AIPAC confab Rabbi Hershel Billet of the Young Israel of Woodmere is encouraging Five Towners to participate at AIPACâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Policy Conference in Washington on March 1â&#x20AC;&#x201C;3. â&#x20AC;&#x153;With the events in the recent weeks â&#x20AC;Ś itâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s nev-
er been more important for our community to stand with Israel and show President Obama and the U.S. Congress how strong American support is for Israel,â&#x20AC;? Rabbi Billet said in a e-mail to YIW members.
PRST STD US POSTAGE PAID GARDEN CITY, NY 11530 PERMIT NO 301
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Commentary by Rafael Medoff The supposedly unprecedented step taken by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in his plan to speak directly before Congress about the Iranian nuclear threat, rather than working exclusively with the White House o, has an interesting precedentâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;established in 1975 by none other than Yitzhak Rabin and Americaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Democratic Party. That spring, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger undertook a round of shuttle diplomacy aimed at reaching a peace agreement between Israel and Egypt. The negotiations quickly ran into trouble, when Egypt refused to offer anything more than a brief a period of â&#x20AC;&#x153;non-belligerencyâ&#x20AC;? in exchange for an Israeli retreat from strategic mountain passes and oil ďŹ elds in the Sinai desert. In an attempt to force Israelâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s hand, Kissinger arranged for President Gerald Ford to send Rabin a message expressing â&#x20AC;&#x153;profound disappointmentâ&#x20AC;? that Israel had not agreed to Egyptâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s terms, and threatening a â&#x20AC;&#x153;reassessmentâ&#x20AC;? of U.S.-Israel relations unless Jerusalem gave in. Rabin confronted Kissinger directly. Kissinger responded by storming out of the meeting, claiming that â&#x20AC;&#x153;never, never had he been spoken to in a diplomatic meeting in such insulting terms,â&#x20AC;? according to Matti Golan, chief diplomatic correspondent for the Israeli newspaper Haaretz. The claim to have been insultedâ&#x20AC;&#x201D; featured prominently in recent Obama administration criticism of Netanyahuâ&#x20AC;&#x201D; became one of the themes in Kissingerâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s arsenal as the crisis gathered steam, according to Prof. Arlene Lazarowitz of California State University-Long Beach, who recently examined Fordâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s papers on this topic and wrote about the subject in the scholarly journal American Jewish History. When Rabin and his cabinet declined to give in to Fordâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s threat, Kissinger told the president, â&#x20AC;&#x153;To have received a letter from you and not to change one iota is an indignity to the United States.â&#x20AC;? U.S. arms transfers to Israel were halted, negotiations over future weapons purchases were suspended, and visits to the U.S. by Israeli diplomats were canceled. Rabin had recently spent ďŹ ve years in Washington as Israelâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s ambassador. He knew the American political system well enough to understand that those who found themselves at odds with the White House sometimes turned to Congressâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;espe-
cially if the presidentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s opponents enjoyed a majority there. In 1975, the Democrats held 61 of the Senateâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s 100 seats. Rabin took his case to them. In just three weeks, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) persuaded 76 senators to sign a letter urging Ford to â&#x20AC;&#x153;stand ďŹ rmly with Israelâ&#x20AC;? and to be â&#x20AC;&#x153;responsive to Israelâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s urgent military and economic needs.â&#x20AC;? Taking direct aim at the administrationâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s â&#x20AC;&#x153;reassessment,â&#x20AC;? the senators emphasized that â&#x20AC;&#x153;withholding military equipment from Israel would be dangerous, discouraging accommodation by Israelâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s neighbors and encouraging a resort to force.â&#x20AC;? The letter also asserted that the U.S. should not seek any Israeli withdrawals without â&#x20AC;&#x153;meaningful steps toward peace by its Arab neighbors.â&#x20AC;? Among the 76 signatories to the letter, 51 were Democrats and 25 were Republicans. It sent a strong message to the White House about the breadth of support for Israel on Capitol Hill. Naturally, Ford and Kissinger were furious. The president complained directly to Rabin that the letter was â&#x20AC;&#x153;very bad.â&#x20AC;? Ford assured Egyptâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s leaders that â&#x20AC;&#x153;half of [the senators who signed] didnâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t read it and a quarter didnâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t understand the letter.â&#x20AC;? The senatorsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; letters would have strengthened Rabinâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s position, had he chosen to stand his ground. But Rabin, prime minister for barely nine months, was not well prepared for the crisis and by midsummer, â&#x20AC;&#x153;simply caved in,â&#x20AC;? as Matti Golan of Haaretz put it. Israel accepted the Egyptian demands that it previously resisted. There are similarities between Netanyahuâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s situation today and what Rabin faced in 1975, most notably the depth of Congressional support for Israel. But there are also differences, the most important of which has to do with the two men themselves. Rabin, who was then a rookie in the prime ministerâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s ofďŹ ce; Netanyahu, now serving his third term, was raised in America and has a keen understanding of how American political culture and the media help shape U.S. foreign policy. The current crisis is not likely to end the way Rabinâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s did.