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WHY INDEPENDENCE MATTERS

PUBLIC SERVICE MEDIA IN EUROPE

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POLITICAL PRESSURE ON PSM IN EUROPE JEREMY DEAR, DEPUTY GENERAL SECRETARY, FEDERATION OF JOURNALISTS

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THE INDEPENDENCE OF BROADCASTING – A GUIDING PRINCIPLE OF ­EUROPEAN MEDIA REGULATION UNIV.-PROF. DR. BERND HOLZNAGEL, UNIVERSITY OF MUENSTER

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UNIVERSALISM IN HISTORY, MODERN STATEHOOD, AND PUBLIC SERVICE MEDIA UNIV.-PROF.IN DR.IN BARBARA THOMAß, HANS-BREDOW-INSTITUT

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HOW TO DE-ORBANIZE THE PUBLIC BROADCASTER KSENIJA HORVAT, JOURNALIST, RTV SLOVENIA

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BRUTALLY HONEST IGOR EVGEN BERGANT, JOURNALIST AND NEWS PROGRAMME HOST AT TV SLOVENIA

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WHOM DO WE WORK FOR? ALJAŽ BASTIČ, TELEVISION DIRECTOR, RTV SLOVENIA

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NINE DEMANDS AFTER FIVE YEARS ILINKA TODOROVSKI, FORMER OMBUDSWOMAN OF RTV SLOVENIA

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FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION DURING MILITARY CONFLICT DR.IN DARIIA OPRYSHKO, INSTITUTE FOR INFORMATION, TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND MEDIA LAW, MUENSTER, GERMANY

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TRANSFORM THE INTERNET: WHY WE NEED A PUBLIC SERVICE INTERNET UNIV.-PROF. DR. CHRISTIAN FUCHS, UNIVERSITY OF PADERBORN | DR. KLAUS UNTERBERGER, ORF

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IT IS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT…

QUALITY DIMENSIONS INDIVIDUAL VALUE

SOCIAL VALUE

NATION VALUE

TRUST SERVICE ENTERTAINMENT EDUCATION AND SCIENCE RESPONSIBILITY

DIVERSITY ORIENTATION INTEGRATION RESPONSIVENESS CULTURE

IDENTITY ADDED VALUE FEDERALISM

INTERNATIONAL VALUE

CORPORATE VALUE

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

INNOVATION TRANSPARENCY COMPETENCE

In order to define distinctive media quality Austrian Broadcasting Corporation has created a structure of five Quality Dimensions. Comprehensive media production in TV, radio and online is described along 18 categories to prove how ORF fulfills its Public Service Mission in the context of the current media environment and its challenges.

“TEXTE” publishes contributions from international and Austrian media experts focusing on Public Service Media quality.

More information, statements and documents you may find on http://zukunft.ORF.at.

PUBLISHED AND PRODUCED BY: Österreichischer Rundfunk, ORF Würzburggasse 30 1136 Wien

DESIGN: ORF Marketing & Creation GmbH & Co KG RESPONSIBLE: ORF Generaldirektion Public Value

PRINTED BY: ORF-Druckerei © ORF 2022 Send reviews and hints to: zukunft@ORF.at

... and at the same time most delicate challenges for Public Service Media: its independence from government, party politics and economic interests.

Undeniably important, since journalistic credibility directly depends on it. Obviously delicate, since there are few governments not trying to influence and infiltrate media. However, even if politicians, their spin doctors and PR advisers might think so, an "extended arm" into newsrooms is not "business as usual”. On the contrary, it is a significant abuse of political power. Journalists insist: Independence of media is an indispensable basis for its trustworthiness. For Public Service Media it is crucial for its public mission and funding. In this international issue of "PUBLIC VALUE TEXTE," we address independence of media from different perspectives: • Jeremy Dear, deputy general secretary of the "International Federation of Journalists" outlines a Europe-wide overview of the current areas of tension and challenges from a journalistic view.

• Bernd Holznagel, Muenster University, defines independence as a guiding principle of European media regulation.

• Barbara Thomaß, Hans-Bredow-Institut, analyzes the importance of equal accessibility and social communication for all citizens.

• Ksenija Horvat, Igor Evgen Bergant, Aljaž Bastič and Ilinka Todorovski, journalists working for the Slovenian Public Service Broadcaster, who in recent years have been involved in an intense struggle for its independence, deliver a dramatic inside perspective how to fight for editorial independence.

• Dariia Opryshko, Ph.D, Master of Laws from Vadym Hetman Kyiv National Economic University, Ukraine, at the moment Senior Fellow (of International and European Media Law) at the Institute for Information, Telecommunications and Media Law at Muenster University, focuses on her recent experience in Ukraine when analyzing freedom of expression during a military conflict.

• Finally, Christian Fuchs, University of Paderborn, and Klaus Unterberger, ORF Public Value, the initiators of a manifesto for the Public Service Internet, which has been supported by more than 1.200 scientists, among them Jürgen Habermas and Noam Chomsky, describe its motives and highlight the importance to protect and safeguard editorial independence in the world of digital communication.

You may find these contributions and more PUBLIC VALUE related information online: zukunft.orf.at.

KONRAD MITSCHKA

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KLAUS UNTERBERGER ORF PUBLIC VALUE

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POLITICAL PRESSURE ON PSM IN EUROPE JEREMY DEAR DEPUTY GENERAL SECRETARY, INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF JOURNALISTS

From political interference in the process of appointment of governing bodies to public accusations against individual journalists, from threats to cut funding to political pressure to toe the government line public service media across Europe are facing increasingly severe challenges. Threats to the independence of public service media in a range of European countries are highlighted in a recent study – covering countries, which are representative of the range of geopolitical situations across Europe: Turkey, Estonia, Belarus, Ukraine, Hungary, Poland, North Macedonia, Austria, Italy, Spain and the UK – published by the European Federation of Journalists and funded by the Open Society Foundations. But each had something in common.

Increasing political pressure on public media and funding challenges – in some cases crises. In each country interference in, and pressures on public service media, were identified as by far the most worrying threats reported by organisations taking part in the study. That situation has been exacerbated by the Covid-19 crisis which created a political and economic crisis, provoking some governments to cut funding to public media and an increasingly hostile environment for independent reporting.

Such interference or pressure ranged from public accusations against critical journalists or channels (Estonia) to refusing interviews (UK) and the questionable distribution of the state advertising budget (Austria) to politically-motivated criteria for nominating governing bodies (Italy, Poland). In Spain, one respondent to the study said: “public media, mainly national TV stations and autonomous radio stations, are governed more by political criteria than professional. Their configuration in the administration councils is based on the electoral political distribution…regional governments consider that they own public media.”

In Estonia, politicians were reported to have made public accusations against critical journalists, refusing interviews by public media and accusing them of being ‘untrustworthy outlets.’ Representatives of the political parties make up the supervisory body for the national broadcaster ERR: though this should have no direct influence on the content of reporting, it does influence the budget and selects the management board. In Austria, the so-called “Ibizagate” scandal of 2019 showed that politicians, particularly the then Vice-Chancellor Heinz-Christian Strache, had planned to privatise a channel of public broadcaster ORF.

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Strache’s populist party FPÖ is particularly threatening towards public service media in the country. The government itself has also been trying to interfere in ORF’s work: in September 2018 the Minister of the Interior suggested certain journalists should be investigated for their reporting on the activities of the Austrian intelligence services. In a subsequent email, the ministry’s spokesperson asked the police to “restrict communication with that media to the legal minimum”.

In Italy, public broadcaster RAI has been under pressure for decades. Despite the end of the lottizzazione, the system that officially distributed control of the channels according to political representation in the Parliament, RAI is still heavily subject to political interference. “Our autonomy is still put at risk,” according to Vittorio di Trapani, head of USIGRAI, the trade union of journalists at RAI. This is due to the fact that the members of the governing body are nominated jointly by the government and the Parliament, according to politically-motivated criteria. Another reason is the attribution of part of the income from the license fee – currently €350 million out of a total of around €2 billion – to commercial media, thus putting pressure on the public channels by putting them in direct competition with private corporations for their share of the license fee. The United Kingdom has often been considered as the heart of independent public broadcasting in the world but even the BBC is affected by recurrent threats to its independence. In 2019 Prime Minister Boris Johnson refused to be interviewed by journalist Andrew Neil on the BBC, declaring at the same time that he was “looking at scrapping the licence fee”. More recently, journalists and civil society organisations have been concerned by recurrent and co-ordinated limitations on Freedom of Information (FoI) requests by the government and the decision to privatise Channel 4 – a key part of the public media landscape. In Hungary, MÚOSZ (the National Association of Hungarian Journalists), claims “political pressure and control reached an unprecedented level in an EU member state.” The website Politico revealed instructions emailed to journalists in public media by senior editors, requiring them to request permission before writing about climate campaigner Greta Thunberg and to send draft reports for approval from “higher up” ahead of publication. Other “sensitive” topics included migration, EU politics, terrorism and church issues. The emails also include explicit orders not to mention reports from Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch.

In Turkey, public media are heavily politicised. Following a 2018 decree, public broadcaster TRT has been tied to the Directorate of Communications, under the direct control of the Presidency. A majority of the shares of the press agency Anadolu Agency (AA) belong to the

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Undersecretariat of the Treasury and to Şenol Kazancı, AA’s General Director, who was an adviser to President Erdoğan until December 2014. In Poland the power of the state media regulator (KRRiTV) to appoint heads of public broadcasters was removed by the Law and Justice Party after it took power in 2015. This right was transferred to a new “National Media Council”, controlled by the President and the Parliament, and there is now no provision forbidding the new council’s members from belonging to a political party. Despite the bleak outlook there is a resistance to the increasing pressure. “The fight against undue pressure and for editorial independence can be carried out in various ways, according to the situation in the country in question. Where the legal framework is guaranteed and where journalists are well organised, strong self-regulation is the most important thing to organise. But in more challenging places, journalists need to become activists and to reach out to other groups in society,” the report reads.

Examples of such activism are found in the UK, where the NUJ started the “Hands Off Our BBC” campaign, or in Spain, where the Plataforma en Defensa de la Libertad de Información, unites journalists, lawyers, publishers, social movements and consumer advocates, to campaign against political pressures on public media. Across each country journalists are demanding a depoliticisation of public service media management; more involvement of civil society; secure financing outside the “patronage” of a Ministry; and strong and clear procedures for nominating and removing members of the board to avoid cases of political intimidation, harassment or threats. In order to confront political pressures, knowledge exchange, solidarity and support are important for journalists’ organisations, although the specific needs differ from country to country.

There are also high expectations of European institutions and states: these must enforce the standards and values to which they are officially committed. The European Broadcasting Union (EBU) was also asked to react more firmly in cases of blatant violation of the independence of public service media, especially in EU member states such as Hungary and Poland. Journalists’ unions and organisations should campaign for the defence of public service media in collaboration with other stakeholder organisations and raise public awareness of the value of journalism.

Journalists and individual members of professional organisations should seek the support of their union or association when they become victims of political interference and should speak out about political pressure, harassment and censorship. Self-regulatory bodies need to be fully representative of the profession, have a clear and mandatory competence and be ruled by professional criteria only. Public media must be at the service of citizens not government or politicians. •

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THE INDEPENDENCE OF BROADCASTING – A GU ID IN G P R IN CIP L E O F EU RO P E A N ME D I A R EGU L AT I O N

THE INDEPENDENCE OF BROADCASTING – A GUIDING PRINCIPLE OF EUROPEAN MEDIA REGULATION UNIV.-PROF. DR. BERND HOLZNAGEL UNIVERSITY OF MUENSTER

I. Origin and Reasons Today, the independence of broadcasting is one of the common fundamental principles of European media law. This is not a matter of course. In the course of the Second World War, there was a far-reaching instrumentalization of the mass media by national governments. This was predominantly justified by the requirements of warfare and foreign policy necessities. The respective ruling political groups filled the positions of the leading personnel with henchmen. Programming activities were usually subject to strict state censorship.

In the postwar period, such state control of broadcasting could no longer be justified or politically enforced in the Western democracies.1 The tension between political influence and autonomous development of the media was gradually resolved in favor of free media. The national constitutional courts promoted this development. Media freedom, which is enshrined in all constitutions, is interpreted as a fundamental right directed against the state and, in particular, granting individuals a right of defense against excessive state intervention. The German Constitutional Court has expanded this subjective legal aspect of media freedom into a requirement of state freedom of broadcasting, which opposes any political instrumentalization – whether by the government or by the parties represented in parliament.

The Italian and Spanish courts, on the other hand, were more concerned with preventing the executive, not the parliament, from using broadcasting for its own purposes.

The objective-legal aspect of media freedom obliges the legislature to take appropriate measures to ensure diversity of opinion. In France, Italy and Spain, pluralism is considered a fundamental constitutional value that must be enforced in broadcasting by the legislature. Pluralism therefore carries particular weight when weighed against other legal interests worthy of protection. In Germany, on the other hand, a functional and purpose-oriented understanding of the freedom of broadcasting (Article 5 (1) 1

For an Overview of these developments Holznagel, Rundfunkrecht in Europa, 1996, 91 pp., 119 pp.

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sentence 2 GG) is predominant. The fundamental right is assigned the task of serving the free formation of public and individual opinion. The legislature must therefore ensure that this normative objective is achieved by means of a positive broadcasting order. With regard to private broadcasting, this means that there is an effective right of media concentration. The extent of advertising in programs is limited in order to protect broadcasters from excessive influence by the advertising industry.

1. Selection of personnel Political influence has often occurred when it comes to the selection of journalists or even management personnel. The Manole v. Moldova ruling of the European Court of Human Rights in 2009 has therefore attracted widespread attention. Former employees of the Moldovan radio station TRM (Teleradio-Moldova) filed the complaint. The station was currently Moldova's only nationwide broadcaster. After the parliamentary elections in 2001, there were extensive reorganizations of the station. The complainants alleged that numerous people who had held management positions were dismissed and replaced with party supporters loyal to the government. 2 In addition, there were requirements not to refer to certain historical topics, in particular not to criticize the former Soviet Union.

Unlike the press, television and radio are not completely surrendered to the market. This option was rejected in the 1960s and 1970s, with reference to the special situation of broadcasting, which was characterized by a shortage of frequencies and by high initial investments for programming.

Later, the counterweight function of public broadcasting to private broadcasters was emphasized. This is predominantly justified by the considerable concentration pressure in private-sector broadcasting and the associated risks of influencing the formation of public opinion. For the Federal Constitutional Court, it is also decisive that public broadcasting follows a decision-making logic other than that of economic incentives. In this way, it must contribute to a diversity of content that cannot be guaranteed by the free market alone.

The BBC predominated as a model for the organization of public broadcasting. The BBC was established as an independent organization as early as the 1920s. There, compliance with the programming mandate is traditionally monitored by an internal committee to which independent experts are appointed. The collection of a broadcasting fee from citizens ensures that the BBC's funding is not dependent on annual budget decisions in Parliament. As a result, after the end of World War II, public broadcasters were separated from the general administration of the state. They are organized, for example, as joint stock companies or public broadcasters, which limits possible state influence. Here, too, program control tasks are predominantly entrusted to internal bodies. Also typical are legally defined fiduciary obligations in the programming area, such as the obligation to report in a balanced, fair and impartial manner. In addition, there are provisions to push back political influence in the decision-making process for financial resources.

II. Securing Independence as a Permanent Challenge It is in the nature of the case that conflicts about the necessary degree of independence of public broadcasting arise repeatedly. The constitutional courts, in particular, have therefore repeatedly found it necessary to correct policy measures.

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The Court first formulated general requirements for the organization and programming of public broadcasting stations: „A situation whereby a powerful economic or political group in a society is permitted to obtain a position of dominance over the audiovisual media and thereby exercise pressure on broadcasters and eventually curtail their editorial freedom undermines the fundamental role of freedom of expression in a democratic society as enshrined in Article 10 of the Convention, in particular where it serves to impart information and ideas of general interest, which the public is moreover entitled to receive (…). This is true also where the position of dominance is held by a State or public broadcaster.“ 3 “Where a State does decide to create a public broadcasting system, it follows from the principles outlined above that domestic law and practice must guarantee that the system provides a pluralistic service. Particularly where private stations are still too weak to offer a genuine alternative and the public or State organisation is therefore the sole or the dominant broadcaster within a country or region, it is indispensable for the proper functioning of democracy that it transmits impartial, independent and balanced news, information and comment and in addition provides a forum for public discussion in which as broad a spectrum as possible of views and opinions can be expressed. 4“ With regard to the selection of management personnel in particular, the Court requires that the national legislator follow guidelines established by

2

ECtHR, 17.09.2009, Nr. 13936/02, para. 18 – Manole v. Moldova.

3

ECtHR, 17.09.2009, Nr. 13936/02, para. 98 – Manole v. Moldova.

4

ECtHR, 17.09.2009, Nr. 13936/02, para. 101 – Manole v. Moldova.

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THE INDEPENDENCE OF BROADCASTING – A GU ID IN G P R IN CIP L E O F EU RO P E A N ME D I A R EGU L AT I O N

the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe for the organization of public broadcasting stations.5 These included the recommendation that

In its decision, the Federal Constitutional Court confirmed the legal opinion of the federal states and stated that the composition of the supervisory bodies violated the requirement of state neutrality in parts. The composition of the supervisory bodies of the public broadcaster must be consistent. Members of the government and other representatives of the executive branch should not have any decisive influence on the selection and appointment of members. Consequently, regulations on the composition of supervisory bodies in which the proportion of members with close ties to the state exceeds the constitutionally permissible limit of one-third are inadmissible.7 The bodies would therefore have to be made up predominantly of non-state members, in particular from civil society. 8 In addition, in order to take sufficient account of the requirement to be independent of the state, persons who are members of governments, parliamentarians, political officials or even elected officials would have to be excluded from appointment as members of the broadcasting institutions.9 Furthermore, all members must be free from instructions in the performance of their duties. In addition, a minimum level of transparency must be ensured in order to monitor the work of the supervisory bodies.10

“the legal framework governing public service broadcasting organisations should clearly stipulate their editorial independence and institutional autonomy”, with reference in particular to a number of key areas of activity, including the editing and presentation of news and current affairs programmes and the recruitment, employment and management of staff. The Guidelines also emphasised that the rules governing the status and appointment of the members of the boards of management and the supervisory bodies of public service broadcasters should be defined in a way which avoids any risk of political or other interference.“ (para. 102) In the Federal Republic of Germany, this obligation has been met for example through incompatibility rules found in the broadcasting laws. For example, anyone who, as a result of a judge's decision, lacks the capacity to hold public office, has limited or no legal capacity, or cannot be prosecuted without restriction, is excluded from the office of director. This is intended to safeguard the integrity of the management personnel.

2. Composition of the internal control bodies With regard to the composition of the control bodies, the Federal Constitutional Court had already set out specific requirements in its ZDF ruling in 2014. The decision was prompted by the ZDF State Treaty (ZDF-StV), which was put into effect by acts of consent of the federal states. As the central body of ZDF, the Intendant manages the affairs of the institution and bears specific responsibility for programming. In addition, the ZDF-StV establishes two internal supervisory bodies, the Television Council and the Administrative Board. The government of the Rhineland-Palatinate and the Senate of the Free Hanseatic City of Hamburg objected to what they considered to be excessive influence of the state in the Television Board and Administrative Board by means of an abstract application for a judicial review. They argued that the provisions violated the requirement that broadcasting be functionally independent of the state, which is based on the freedom of broadcasting under the second sentence of Article 5 (1) of the German Basic Law, according to which the state may not exert any decisive influence on the programming of a broadcaster. In this respect, the mere possibility of state dominance must be prevented.6

3. Determination of financial resources In addition to the composition of the internal control bodies, the determination of financial resources should also ensure the independence of broadcasting. Financing is essential if broadcasting is to be able to exist alongside private broadcasters and adequately fulfil its role in shaping opinion and will.11 Fees must finance public broadcasting in order to be able to perform its function free of economic constraints. At the same time, however, the determination of funding must not be left to the broadcasters themselves or to the legislature.12 Although the broadcasters declare their financing requirements on the basis of their programming decisions, it is the responsibility of the Commission for Determining the Financial Requirements of the Broadcasting Corporations (KEF), as an independent body not subject to directives, to present the financial situation of the broadcasting fee and to draw up proposals as to whether and at what level the broadcasting fee must be adjusted.

The fact that the procedure for setting the broadcasting fee is not free of complications was demonstrated by the proposed contribution increase 7

BVerfGE 136, 9 (39).

8

BVerfGE 136, 9 (43).

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BVerfGE 136, 9 (47).

10

BVerfGE 136, 9 (49).

5

ECtHR, 17.09.2009, Nr. 13936/02, para. 51-54 – Manole v. Moldova.

11

BVerfGE 90, 60 (90).

6

BVerfGE 136, 9 (14 f.).

12

BVerfGE 90, 60 (92).

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by KEF for the fee period 2021 to 2024. The state of Saxony-Anhalt refused to approve the state treaty and in this way blocked the increase in fees, because in the current system of broadcasting financing, it is only possible to deviate unanimously from the KEF's determination of requirements.

As a result, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that Saxony-Anhalt had violated its duty to cooperate under the second sentence of Article 5 (1) of the Basic Law, since it had refused to give its consent without a constitutionally viable justification. Each state must fulfill its duty to act within the federal community of responsibility in order to protect freedom of broadcasting. A failure to comply with the duty to cooperate can be challenged by way of a constitutional complaint.

4. Conclusions Even if the dispute over the assessment of broadcasting fees was ultimately settled, it nevertheless illustrates the dangers to freedom of broadcasting.

The current broadcasting system in Germany continues to be exposed to attempts to exert influence. Particularly in times of crisis, the importance of providing citizens with independent information becomes apparent.

Experiences during World War II and the war in Ukraine demonstrate the need for a strong and independent broadcasting system. Even if its foundations currently appear stable, it remains the task of the legislature to fulfill its mandate and to continue to defend broadcasting against external and internal attempts to exert influence.

U N I V E R S A L I S M I N H I S T O R Y, M O D E R N S T A T E H O O D , A N D P U B L I C S E R V I C E M E D I A

UNIVERSALISM IN HISTORY, MODERN STATEHOOD, AND PUBLIC SERVICE MEDIA 1

UNIV.-PROF.IN DR.IN BARBARA THOMAß HANS-BREDOW-INSTITUT

“One Policy, One System, Universal Service” was the claim made by AT&T (American Telephone and Telegraph) in 1907 (Lasar, 2011). In return for monopoly status, AT&T promised that every user of a telephone device would be able to reach anyone else with a telephone device. Universal access and service – for a price, of course. Use did not require membership in several networks. The rationale and approach has a background that points in two directions: to the past and to the future. To the past because the principle of universal service hearkens back to a complex philosophical realm about the concept of universalism. In its practical and broadly statutory implementation, the universal service obligation became the role model for many services the modern welfare state provides citizens.

The universal service obligation is both a challenge and an open question for today’s digital society. This contribution investigates the philosophical origins and dimensions of universalism and its historical development.

It reveals contradictory implications of the concept and shows how it became a significant influence in philosophy about the state. The concept is one of the grounds for welfare state policies. This establishes a background and framework for understanding the universal service obligation that remains fundamental to the legitimacy of public service media (PSM).

The step from universalism as a philosophical tradition of thought to the universal claim of citizens to certain state services of general interest is enormous. It is generally explained with reference to the construction of a welfare state. The principle of equality, which is so important for democratic states, has never been fully realised, as noted above. This is mainly due to prevailing ownership structures and discrepancies between rich and poor citizens. In an ongoing struggle over conflicting ideas on how to reconcile freedom and equality, modern democracies have increasingly set themselves the task of providing at least equal opportunities for all citizens to live in dignity and have an essential degree of social security. This is how the modern welfare state was created, with the essential task of subsidising 1

The whole contribution was published for the first time in: "Universalism in Public Service Media: RIPE@2019" / [ed] Savage, Philip, Mercedes Medina, & Gregory Ferrell Lowe, Gothenburg: Nordicom, University of Gothenburg

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U N I V E R S A L I S M I N H I S T O R Y, M O D E R N S T A T E H O O D , A N D P U B L I C S E R V I C E M E D I A

certain meritorious goods that the market does not or cannot provide due to the need for profitability. Perhaps some degree of supply is provided by the market, but not to a sufficient extent in relation to the need for these goods.

Such merit goods include education, security (including social security), public infrastructure, and culture. These are services that benefit everyone in a society, that is, the public at large. Hence, they must be provided as public services. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, mediated social communication was defined as a merit good. The principle that media are merit goods that can and should be made available to every citizen to the same extent and at the same quality is the core value of the universal service obligation. The obligation implies a universal human right and requires societies to provide an adequate infrastructure for their delivery and performance. Everyone should be reached by postal services, everyone should be supplied with electricity, everyone has a right to clean water and air, and all people need access to a telephone connection – and today, access to the Internet. People who are not able to access online media suffer a “digital deficit” that puts them, and their life chances, at risk, compared with people who have access. This is especially true for the citizen’s right to be informed.

Golding (2017) argues that despite the abundance of information available online, there is a growing inequality of access to quality information. This deficit of access to high quality online services can, when it comes to deficits of quality of information, translate into a citizen detriment (Thomass, 2019).

The debate about the implementation of universal services has always centred on the scope and quality of service. Today, for example, the question in modern industrial societies is not only whether Internet access exists, but also whether it meets the requirements of broadband connection. The invention of public service broadcasting (PSB) had its origins almost 100 years ago and was established in many countries that were structured by policy and practice to provide universal services as social welfare states. This orientation recognises a valid demand for universality of infrastructure, culture, and social communication via media as an institution whose central characteristic and obligation is the pursuit of universality of service. In 1986, the then Londonbased think tank Broadcasting Research Unit defined PSB with the following characteristics, in which the notion of universality has a central place (1986):

• Broadcasters should recognise their special relationship to the sense of national identity and community.

• Broadcasting should be distanced from all vested interests, and in particular from those of the government of the day.

• Broadcasting should be structured so as to encourage competition in good programming rather than competition for numbers.

• The public guidelines for broadcasting should be designed to liberate rather than restrict the programme makers.

• Universality (geographic) – broadcast programmes should be available to the whole population.

• Universality (of appeal) – broadcast programmes should cater to all interests and tastes.

• Universality (of payment) – one main instrument of broadcasting should be directly funded by the corpus of users.

• Minorities, especially disadvantaged minorities, should receive particular provision.

Universal availability plays a central role and has social, technical, and economic components. Universalism is fundamental to the provision of broadcasting as a merit good in the public interest. The other essential element is a broad spectrum of different programmes, formats, genres, and so forth on a channel –in short, diversity (Scannell, 1992). In this light, the principle of universalism has four dimensions in broadcasting: 1) access and reach; 2) genres and services; 3) relevance and impact; and 4) financing with attendant obligations. Providing universal service has been and remains a legal requirement for PSB and, more recently, PSM. This has crucial importance for the potential of media to cultivate enlightenment, encourage social cohesion, and provide a fair, full, and equitable range of media services. There is another line of important argumentation that still legitimates universalism in media that has significant implications today. This is the argument for media responsibility – the social responsibility of media – to strengthen democracy. Universalism is a prerequisite for realising that mandate as a project of addressing universal rights. From this perspective, citizens’ communication and information rights are the focus of discussion: “The logic is simple. Democracy needs citizens who are equally informed; thus, they must be guaranteed equal access to all relevant information” (Nieminen, 2019: 58). This makes the case for citizens’ communication and information rights explicit.

The basic elements are derived from, among others, international treaties and conventions such as the UN Declarations of Human Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Nieminen & Aslama Horowitz, 2016). Nieminen proposes five areas of communication and information rights, which all refer to the universalist claim of rights: rights to access, availability, critical competence, dialogue, and privacy (Nieminen, 2019: 58). Mandates for mediated social communication via PSM that is accessible to all citizens acquires its special significance and legitimacy as a subsequent effect of the principles of freedom and property. The freedom – by no means given to everyone – to express and disseminate one’s opinion through the media has led, in the absence of effective media concentration regulations, to enormous media conglomerates dominating the content and flow of information and entertainment. This threatens comprehensive, freely accessible information from a wide variety of sources. PSM is needed as a counterweight and to enforce

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HOW TO DE-ORBANIZE THE PUBLIC BROADCASTER

the principles of universalism in media supply. PSM is not conceivable without the encompassing idea of universalism. The history of the concept is an ongoing attempt to determine what is universal for all people and to embed that in norms. Since the Enlightenment, universalism has been fundamental to Western state constitutions, later adopted by many countries around the world. Universalist claims to validity, however, have always been criticised because of the presumption of comprehensive applicability, especially when the application has excluded so many who are also entitled to claim the right. As articulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, universalist ideas have become the model for the international order. An essential component of human rights, the freedom of communication has achieved decisive importance for the media order of pluralistic states. PSM are based on universalist ideas because they want to make the accessibility of information and social communication equally available to all citizens. However, as the promise of human rights freedom also refers to the right to property, and this right has enabled the emergence of media conglomerates in global media markets, PSM are also an attempt to preserve universal freedom of communication. • REFERENCES

References Benhabib, S. (1994). In defence of universalism – Yet again! A response to critics of situating the self. New German Critique, 62(Spring–Summer), 173–189. https://www.doi.org/10.2307/488515 Broadcasting Research Unit. (1986). The public service idea in British broadcasting: Main principles. London: British Film Institute Publication. Buonarroti, P. (1909). Babeuf und die Verschwörung für die Gleichheit.

[Babeuf and the conspiracy for equality].

Stuttgart: Verlag von J. H. W. Dietz. Retrieved December 7, 2019, from https:// archive.org/ stream/babeufunddievers00buon#page/ n5/mode/2up Donnelly, J. (2003). Universal human rights in theory and practice (2nd ed.). New York: Cornell University Press.

Eckel, J. (2019). Menschenrechte und die Gestaltung der internationalen Ordnung im 20. Jahrhundert [Human rights and the shaping of the international order in the 20th century]. In P. Geiss, D. Geppert, & J. Reuschenbach (Eds.), Eine Werteordnung für die Welt? Universalismus in Geschichte und Gegenwart [A set of values for the world?

Universalism in the past and present] (pp.

263–288). Baden-Baden: Nomos. Golding, P. (2017). Citizen detriment: Communications, inequality, and social order. International Journal of Communication, 11, 4305–4323. http://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/ viewFile/6673/2169 Habermas, J. (1997, February 4). Der interkulturelle Diskurs über Menschenrechte [The intercultural discourse on human rights]. Frankfurter Rundschau. Jensen, S. L. (2016). The making of international human rights: The 1960s, decolonization, and the reconstruction of global values. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi. org/10.1017/ CBO9781316282571 Kaiser, W., & Meyer, J. H. (Eds.) (2016). International organizations and environmental protection: Conservation and globalization in the twentieth century (vol. 11).

New York: Berghahn Books. Koehl, H. (2003, September 26). Moralischer Universalismus und der Begriff der moralischen Gemeinschaft: eine Gespenstervertreibung [Moral universalism and the concept of

moral community: An expulsion of ghosts].

[Conference presentation]. GAP.5: Fifth International Congress of the Society for Analytical Philosophy, University of Bielefeld, Germany. Retrieved May 8, 2020, from http://www.gap5.de/proceedings/ pdf/539-546_koehl Lasar, M. (2011, September 1). How AT&T conquered the 20th century. Ars Technica. Retrieved May 8, 2020, from https://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2011/09/how-att-conquered-the20thcentury/2/ Macekura, S. (2015). Of limits and growth: The rise of global sustainable development in the twentieth century.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Marko, J. (2012). Ethnopolitics: The challenge for human and minority rights protection. In C. Corradetti (Ed.), Philosophical dimensions of human rights (pp. 265–291). London: Springer. Namli, E. (2018). Critique of human rights universalism. In M. Stenmark, S. Fuller, & U. Zackariasson (Eds.), Relativism and post-truth in contemporary society (pp.

123–140). London: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-965598_8 Nieminen, H. (2019). Inequality, social trust and the media. In J. Trappel (Ed.), Digital media inequalities (pp.

43–66). Gothenburg: Nordicom, University of Gothenburg. Retrieved May 8, 2020, from https://www.nordicom.gu.se/sv/system/ tdf/kapitel-pdf/03_nieminen_0.pdf?file =1&type=node&id=40262&force= Nieminen, H., & Aslama Horowitz, M. (2016). European public service media and communication rights. In G. F. Lowe, & N. Yamamoto (Eds.), Crossing borders and boundaries in public service media (pp. 95–106). Gothenburg: Nordicom, University of Gothenburg.

Nkrumah, K. (1962). Towards colonial freedom: Africa in the struggle against world imperialism. London: Heinemann.

Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). (1986). Declaration on the right to development. https://www. ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/ RightToDevelopment.aspx Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).

(1993). World conference on human rights.

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http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ABOUTUS/Pages/ ViennaWC.aspx 36 BARBARA THOMASS Parsons, T. (1971). The system of modern societies. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall Sands, P. (2016). East-weststreet: On the origins of genocides and crimes against humanity. London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson. Scannell, P. (1992). Public service broadcasting and modern public life. In P. Scannell, P. Schlesinger, & C. Sparks (Eds.): Culture and power: A media, culture & society reader (pp. 317–348). London: Sage.

Schweppenhaeuser, G. (1998). Die Aporie des menschenrechtlichen Universalismus.

[The aporia of human rights universalism].

Kritische Justiz, 31(2), 260–265. https:// www.jstor.org/stable/24000636 Thomass, B. (2019). Economic inequality, appraisal of the EU and news media. In J. Trappel (Ed.), Digital media inequalities (pp.

95–112). Gothenburg: Nordicom, University of Gothenburg. Retrieved May 8, 2020, from https://www.nordicom.gu.se/sv/ system/tdf/kapitel-pdf/06_thomass_0. pdf?file=1&type=node&id=40265&fo rce= Toennies S. (1995 ) Der westliche Universalismus: Eine Verteidigung klassischer Positionen [The Western universalism: A defence of classical positions]. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. Toennies, S. (2001).

Der westliche Universalismus [The Western universalism]. 3rd, reworked edition.

Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag. United Nations (UN). (1994). The United Nations and apartheid, 1948–1994. New York: United Nations, Deptartment of Public Information. Westad, O. A. (2007). The global cold war: Third world interventions and the making of our times. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Weber, M. (1930). The protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism. New York: Scribner. Retrieved May 8, 2020, from https://ia802908.us.archive. org/29/items/protestantethics00webe/ protestantethics00webe.pdf Vattimo, G. (2007). A prayer for silence. In J. Caputo, & G. Vattimo (Eds.), After the death of God (pp.

89–113). New York: Columbia University Press.

HOW TO DE-ORBANIZE THE PUBLIC BROADCASTER KSENIJA HORVAT

JOURNALIST & PRESENTER RTV SLOVENIA

On April 21, 2022, at 8 p.m., the final debate before the general election featuring parliamentary parties took place in Studio 1 of Slovenian national public TV. Such a debate is typically one of the high points of a campaign, a debate against which the entire campaign is benchmarked, a debate that has a significant influence on voter choices before the election silence sets in.

Unfortunately, this debate will be remembered by the citizens of Slovenia primarily for the walkout of half of the participants: of the 11 politicians who came face-to-face in the studio (one was participating via video call due to Covid), six walked out before the end. Instead of being remembered for intense, critical and thoughtful debate, voters will remember campaign 2022 for the insults, for a powerless moderator who was not prepared and is seen by some as overly supportive of the government, for disorganised arguments, for endless verbal duels, and of course for the videos of participants leaving, in particular the clip showing the president of the National Party (SNS) marching towards the edge of the podium, missing the final step and spectacularly crashing to the ground.

The show had the highest ratings among all the debates hosted by public television, and it created immense chatter on social media and other platforms. Politicians, viewers and all staff at RTV Slovenija stood agape watching what has generally been described as a complete debacle of public television. In the end the moderator was even criticised by Prime Minister Janez Janša, the leader of the Slovenian Democrats (SDS), who is seen by many citizens as the person responsible for the Orbanisation of the public broadcaster and Slovenian media in general. In his closing statement he insinuated that the debacle was probably orchestrated. A subset of his supporters had no doubt that it really was. All others had every reason to doubt that insinuation, given that the Slovenian prime minister has taken control of all the levers of power at the public broadcaster, and of the editorial and reporting structures which produced the show.

After the end of the debate there was a meeting in the office of the director general of RTV Slovenija, a meeting symptomatic of a subjugated TV. The director general and the managing editor for news and current affairs, perceived by much of the public as supportive of Janez Janša,

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feted Janša, who is the president of the largest government party, and one his coalition allies. We don’t know how the meeting went, but we do know how it ended: with a press release in which the management of the public broadcaster expressed regret at some party presidents having left the debate early and at the author of the show having become the target of insulting comments. Journalists who are members of the in-house sections of the Slovenian Journalists’ Association and the Trade Union of Slovenian Journalists denounced the unprofessional project and demanded the resignation of the director general and the managing editor for news and current affairs at TV Slovenija.

trained journalists to commercial television stations and their replacement by young, inexperienced journalists or individuals recruited from pro-government media. Content critical of the government has started disappearing from news shows. We have recorded cases of censorship and the favouring of a planned new news programme on Channel 2 that is supposed to be on the lighter side. TV Slovenija, known for its ability to respond fast and comprehensively to major events, leveraging its network of correspondents at home and abroad, was unprepared for the Russian attack on Ukraine despite prior warnings by journalists. For the first time in its history, it responded to a new war more sluggishly than other media.

Backstory

Journalists had been warning for months before the election about editorial and production inertia in preparations for the election project.

Having been used to careful substantive and executive planning of preelection shows, this time we entered the campaign period without a serious substantive or staffing concept. With few exceptions, the trained and competent journalists and moderators who had long been the target of attacks by coalition politicians were side-lined from the project. Instead of being anchored by seasoned journalists capable of posing critical and substantive questions and creating a constructive atmosphere for debate with their authority, the majority of the campaign debates were moderated by journalists who do not primarily cover domestic policy, have no experience whatsoever as hosts, or had just started working for the public broadcaster; some, for example the hosts mentioned above, are even considered overt sympathisers of government parties. Our credibility was further eroded by disputes concerning which party can be considered parliamentary and which non-parliamentary. The management remained unresponsive to warning that the leadership of news and current affairs had started the election project too late, not comprehensively enough, unambitiously, and without a clear concept. Instead of displaying the maximum degree of professionality, guided by the fundamental principle of political impartiality, the election project quickly became ensnared in political bias and the favouring of some of the parties.

For the news staff at TV Slovenija, this was yet another protest in what has been a protracted slog of RTV Slovenija being transformed from a public broadcaster into a state broadcaster. Ever since the SDS took power a bit more than two years ago, it has tightened its grip on RTV Slovenija.

In both governing bodies, the Programming Council and the Supervisory Board, it has used objectionable moves to secure a majority, with the two bodies then voting trough staffing and programming decisions to the liking of the ruling coalition. It pushed through the appointment of the director general, who had clear support from the ruling coalition and who then gradually staffed key editorial positions with pliable individuals of dubious journalistic credibility. Indeed, the managing editor for news and current affairs at TV Slovenija, Jadranka Rebernik, was appointed without the support of the editorial staff after 80% of the news staff voted in favour of another candidate.

The members of the Programming Council have arbitrarily singled out for criticism individual journalists and editors who have done stories and shows critical of the government. One of the “government” councillors made it very clear in an interview for a pro-government outlet how the 21 councillors supportive of the government work “as one” and how they “agree everything” in advance of the public vote at the Programming Council, which for all intents and purposes acts as a well-oiled voting machine. The Programming Council has never seen such politicisation before.

Journalists have spent months warning about questionable programming solutions such as the discontinuation of shows critical of the government, the reassignment of competent and professional journalists and moderators to less visible posts, the departures of young, highly

Voters of the centre-right proclivity, identified as such in social media and in rightist, pro-government media outlets, mainly welcomed such a campaign on the public broadcaster as a long overdue break with the continuity of the proverbially left-leaning cadre from the Socialist era.

This allegation is not new and has been used by the Slovenian right for a long time even though the majority of staff working in news and current affairs at TV Slovenija were not even of working-age during Socialist times and many were born after Slovenia became an independent country.

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Centrist and leftist voters responded critically on social media. The now well-established rightist scepticism about the compulsory licence fee now started permeating into this camp as well. The pivotal TV debate merely reaffirmed the general dissatisfaction with how the public-service mission was being implemented, and it eroded trust in our work.

Even in its brightest moments, RTV Slovenia has been unable to fully deflect attacks by an incomparably stronger opponent – politics in all its shades, for which the public broadcaster was merely the lowest-hanging fruit. Neither the left nor the right ever changed the 2005 Law on RTV Slovenija, authored by SDS lawmaker Branko Grims, which left the broadcaster at the mercy of politics, nor has any government managed to sort out financing, even though financial independence is the only guarantee that the broadcaster and its news and current affairs programme, the segment most coveted by politics, will be managed independently. Many incisive journalists have left RTV Slovenija. Not only has the competition been able to lure them with much better pay and work conditions, but they have also given up because of the prevailing lethargy and recurring passing of RTV Slovenija like a baton into the hands of sometimes the left, other times the right political bloc. The result of such an attitude to RTV Slovenija is the present-day institution, politically subjugated and financially drained, without a clear vision for the future.

What next?

Representatives of centre-left parties, which won the general election in April, provided assurances during the campaign that changes to the Law on RTV Slovenija would be one of the first measures after they have formed a government. Multiple politicians have spoken candidly about the replacement of staff on management and supervisory bodies appointed by the rightist government, even though it is not entirely clear how they plan to do that in a lawful manner. In Eastern Europe we have seen numerous examples of political takeovers of public media, from Budapest to Warsaw and Vladivostok; sadly, there are not many good examples of de-Orbanization. The expert public have proposed multiple new models for the selection of the members of the Programming Council, the key oversight body that steers the broadcaster’s policy. We shall see what kind of decisions the new political structures take and to what extent they will be willing to listen to experts and staff.

RTV Slovenija’s problems go far beyond the unprofessional and politically biased execution of election project 2022. Throughout the entire period since Slovenia became independent, the public broadcaster, instead of establishing and affirming its newly won status as a politically independent media outlet, has been increasingly becoming a (sometimes wilful) victim of political subjugation. Periods of co-habitation with leftleaning governments have typically been calmer and yet torturous and full of mutual distrust. On the other hand, rightist government have more or less openly, and more or less graciously, endeavoured to take control of the public broadcaster. This has coincided with the broader rollout of a conservative socio-political agenda set on revaluing society’s values along the lines of those promulgated by the Eastern European right, with all that it entails: emphasis on the national, intolerance to refugees, retraditionalization of women’s roles, new views on Second World War history, increased role for the Catholic church in public life, scepticism about liberal European political elites, hatred of sexual diversity, and a very restrictive media policy in which public media are perceived as mere tools of state propaganda.

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In an era of high-tech progress, mobile devices and the dominance of social media, the future mission of public broadcasters is a perplexing intellectual challenge, even in strong democracies with a long history of public service media. One need not go far to see the examples: BBC, the proverbial mother of public broadcasting, faces financial limitations under the Conservative Boris Johnson government; Germany’s ARD and ZDF struggled to resolve a quagmire orchestrated by the far-right AfD in Lower Saxony concerning the licence fee; and ORF, in neighbouring Austria, experienced first-hand what grave political pressure on the institution and on key journalistic personalities feels like when the populist farright Freedom Party was in government. On the other hand, Denmark’s example shows that even concerted pressure by political parties and a 20% cut in the budget does not necessarily mean the end of public broadcasting.

What lies at the core of that? All these examples show that an outlet stands a much better chance of surviving as an independent public broadcaster if a key condition has been satisfied: having capable, trained, educated, erudite, resourceful, unyielding and credible journalists and editors. Ask the representatives of any of the above-mentioned media what happens if a person with a clear political profiled becomes the editor of news and current affairs, and their answer will be replete with amazement and misunderstanding, for in serious media, this is simply not possible. Key editorial posts are staffed by professional and credible people who are adept at managing their reporting teams and can maintain a healthy distance from all political blocs. This does not mean they are not constantly

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the targets of attacks by populist and extremist parties, but in societies with a political culture, established mainstream parties eschew attacks on the media, and what they refrain from most of all is attacking journalists personally. This is something that is simply not done in politically cultured societies. And it is why western capitals were amazed about the Slovenian prime minister’s Twitter attacks, some of which even targeted the journalist of an international outlet, the Brussels-based Politico.

dependent as they are. The sad fact is that many citizens have a poor understanding of the structure and mission of the public broadcaster and the numerous programmes dedicated to individual groups of users. Unfortunately, many citizens do not understand that the public broadcaster is their public good and public right. The reason they do not understand that is because nobody has ever made the effort to explain to them why it is that we really need a public broadcaster. Fortunately, awareness of the importance of the public service is nevertheless growing, due in no small part to the work of the Ombudsperson as a mechanism for editorial self-regulation and communication between various stakeholders and the creators of programming.

Vision of the future RTV Slovenija Every management of RTV Slovenija is constantly compelled to deflect political and other public attacks, with varying degrees of success, the effect of that being that the public broadcaster has lost the rankings game in the battle with commercial broadcasters, and it has lost its credibility in the battle with politics. So, what is even left for RTV Slovenija to do? What exactly should it do to perform its pivotal role in society – of trying to be the fundamental building block, a foundational glue for a society that is not only politically splintered but also socially, generationally, and educationally fragmented? If nothing brings people together in communication terms, if everyone lives in their own bubble, are we even a society anymore? We need a public broadcaster independent of politics and capital if we still define ourselves as a society with shared demands, needs and a shared vision of the future. The only way all these definitions are created, cultivated and propagated is in a common media outlet that is not constrained by political and capital noise.

So far none of the management teams at RTV Slovenija have even realised the need to open the institution to the broader public, explore how the public perceives the broadcaster’s role, or inform the public of all of its activities, let alone take action on that or transition to a phase where they would be capable of joining forces with the broader academic, cultural and civil spheres to articulate the arguments in favour of the existence of a public broadcaster. Because until RTV Slovenija starts to justify its existence and define what it is, it will always be in the position of others defining it – someone from the outside, acting without working with us and often completely oblivious to our internal structure and importance. One need not go far to find role models. The ORF has a Competence Centre that has done a great job developing everything that none of the leadership teams at RTV Slovenija have even detected as a possible lifesaver. The team of committed, educated and innovative people that RTV Slovenija still has in its ranks has the skills to bring the broadcaster closer to the people and vice versa, binding them closely together, inter-

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But even that is not enough. RTV Slovenija must first repair the damage done by Orbanisation. Just as importantly, it must immediately define its raison d’être together with the public. We urgently need a comprehensive and seriously devised strategy. It will not bear fruit immediately, but its existence and impact must promptly communicate to the public: we are here for you, we want you to understand our work and your satisfaction is our primary motivation. Perhaps it is not possible to convince all the citizens that a public broadcaster is essential for the existence of a democratic order, but surely it must be possible to have a creative discussion with a majority of them. And broad groups of citizens must be enlisted for this open and creative dialogue with all relevant partners, and not just in the capital city – it is of utmost importance to reach out to local environments and youths, who may have already completely lost contact with the public broadcaster. This is the only way to create a new social compact between the public and their media outlet. A compact that will by design prevent a new collapse of the system of the kind we witnessed in election campaign 2022. •

The translation from Slovenian to English was supported by the project “Defending watchdog role of civil society and journalists in Slovenia”, coordinated by the Peace Institute and the Slovene Association of Journalists and funded by the program Civitates of the Network of European Foundations.

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BRUTALLY HONEST IGOR EVGEN BERGANT

JOURNALIST AND NEWS PROGRAMME HOST AT TV SLOVENIA

RTV Slovenia (and the discussions about it) has always been a relatively accurate mirror of Slovenian society. Observing it from the outside as I have worked for it over the past almost four decades, I have the impression that RTV Slovenia is better than its current reputation. From the inside, however, I realise that it should definitely be much better than it is.

That is no reason to humiliate it, politically patronise it or even destroy it, as has happened in recent years. Or to privatise it, as the neoliberal agenda would have it.

But it is also important to be brutally honest: We are to blame for many problems. Even the first impression of our news programme on TV could be better. Our own colleagues at Radio Slovenia (formerly Radio Ljubljana) are to blame, at least a little. When the first television programmes were broadcast in the mid-1950s in Slovenia, which was then still part of socialist Yugoslavia (although the Slovenian-language media at that time enjoyed at least a certain autonomy), they were set up by radio journalists. Is that logical? Not really. Almost at the same time, on the other side of the Karavanke-Karawanken Mountains in Austria, the television part of ORF was created, where professionals from the film industry also had a much greater say in creating the basis for the news programmes. The Slovenian television pioneers deserve honour and glory, but in their TV coverage they took the illustrated radio approach, where the video part was of secondary importance and adapted to the spoken text. However, it was not about ideology, but about accessibility and the models of the Italian approach to television coverage. Slovenia's western neighbours liked to talk (they still do), so radio (text) was the basis for television (image). On TV Slovenia, we still occasionally recognise this approach in the design of our daily work (and sometimes even in our thinking).

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tantly lagging behind our commercial (and more visually exciting) rivals.

On TV Slovenia, we have even adopted some reporting approaches from the penetrating commercial competition without really thinking about it.

The problem is not in the formats, which are perfectly suited for certain commercial programmes, but less in the serious news on the national channels. Here, the original (also in this case) is usually better than the copy. But the problem is even older. In the 1990s, RTV Slovenia reacted rather passively to the emerging commercial competition, thus indirectly helping it to succeed and flourish. Imitation is just one example of this.

With the resounding transitions of the presenters and producers of TV from commercial to national (usually they ran in the opposite direction), in some periods we wanted to overcome the competition with even more sensationalism, banalisation of reporting and, so to speak, planned hysteria of public debate.

Public television has thus contributed (even if not decisively) to the "great irritation" of modern society in the digital age, which the German media expert Bernhard Pörksen aptly justified for Germany and Europe some years ago. These fluctuations have undermined our credibility and, in some cases, our professional self-confidence. Reporting in a rather populist manner on the two commercial mainstream channels with their news programmes (POP TV and also Kanal A) is in line with their commercial objectives and is completely professional in this framework. The fact that we have so often imitated them on TV Slovenia and followed them without a proper internal discussion, even less so.

The boundaries between the elements of "film" and "radio" – the traditional derision of our radio colleagues at the expense of television as the Slovenian version of Hollywood (with all its false stardom) is a paradox due to the historical debt of radio – have almost disappeared by now, but at TV Slovenia we never really managed to catch up with our historical backlog. This is shown by a comparison with the successful commercial programme POP TV, which provided a very good education in television reporting from its American owners at the time of its creation. They never looked back and were able to pick up the trend of colourful infographics and virtual animation in daily reporting long before we did. We are cons-

Despite its historical debt, Radio Slovenia has become a much more dynamic and exemplary part of the RTV Slovenia system. With its fresh approaches and additional offer, it is sensibly building for the future and expanding its reach through intelligent branding of its content. This also shows that the problem is not in the training of our staff, but in the systematic upgrading and use of knowledge (and the lack of it, considering the TV part of the company). We have quite a few excellent and exemplary examples of good practises, approaches and programmes on our television, including in the news programme. At the same time, it is understandable that it is here that the biggest problems can be observed.

The volume of work or the amount of information we have to process due to our (not always clear) public mandate and status is remarkable. So large and demanding that sometimes we are simply overwhelmed. We have a traditionally rigid organisation of work (which also has systemic and legal reasons). Interestingly, our slowness and seeming unresponsiveness are sometimes also the result of more urgent and above all higher

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standards in reviewing information. We are increasingly confronted with burnouts among our colleagues. Many departures from our editorial team to other media and professions have exactly this reason.

Of the 29 members of the Programme Council, five are appointed directly by the political parties in Parliament, three by direct vote of the RTV Slovenia staff, two by the President of the Republic (traditionally representatives of the two major religious communities – the Catholic and Protestant Churches), two by the representatives of the Hungarian and Italian minorities in Slovenia and one by the Slovenian Academy of Science and Arts. The rest (and the majority of the 16) are nominated by civil society and individuals, but in reality selected by a parliamentary commission (reflecting the political balance in parliament). However, the criteria for nomination and actual appointment are vague and therefore dependent on political interests. In fact, the most politicised members of the Programme Council traditionally come from this group.

The alleged chronic left-wing bias of journalists in our newsroom is a recurring myth, almost to the point of obsession. It is mostly supported by subjective "evidence" and questionable research data. Some of the criticisms are almost the same as those heard by our colleagues at ORF and ARD & ZDF from the right-wing populists parties of the FPÖ in Austria or the German AfD. The desire to present excessive content with limited resources also has other consequences: Due to financial, technical and personnel constraints, we have increased our coverage of organised media events by institutions or PR presentations (official press conferences, statements, visits) in recent years. We have partly given up editorial control and agenda-setting instead of improving our ability to research and provide background on important public issues.

This is also one of the reasons why our working and broadcasting agenda is too much dominated by politics in the broadest sense of the word.

There is something else to this: the pronounced dominance of reporting on events in Slovenia, especially on domestic politics, especially in comparison to the daily content from Europe and the world. The latter's share has been steadily decreasing for years. This is one of the most problematic imbalances in our news programmes. Unfortunately, there is no optimism for change. Frequent financial cuts usually hit reporting from abroad, including foreign correspondents. It is absurd that by 2022 the network of resident correspondents (usually just one journalist servicing Radio, TV and our news website) has shrunk to the point that we have no one in three of the four neighbouring countries (coverage from Croatia, Austria and Hungary comes from Slovenia), in the world's most populous countries (China and India) and in the Southern Hemisphere.

One of our biggest problems is undoubtedly the inadequate legal framework for our activities. The public mandate of our house is (too) extensive and vague. Due to the large number (29) of members of RTV Slovenia's Programme Council, as the main body of public scrutiny, its functioning is quite complex. An even bigger problem is that the Programme Council in its various formations has always been too concerned with matters that do not concern it (counting the seconds of guest appearances in our programmes or the number of members of ENG crews) and too little with those that should be of more interest to the Council members (such as the integrity and diversity of the programmes and strategic issues of RTV Slovenia's production).

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There are too many councillors who do not know much about how a big media company works. Many of them act (or are acting) as lobbyists for political blocs or (and) very narrow interests (or even just individual programmes or TV personalities) or as would-be super editors, often with a clear political agenda. In addition, there is a Supervisory Board of RTV Slovenia, which deals with financial matters and consists of 11 members – five are appointed by the Parliament, four by the government and two by the employees of RTV Slovenia. An important element is the licence fee for RTV Slovenia (which is a public corporation and in fact does not belong to the state), which is paid by about 700,000 households and businesses: It is set by the government and confirmed by parliament. The fee (EUR 12.75), which accounts for about 75 per cent of RTV Slovenia's annual financial expenditure, has not been changed since 2012, despite additional financial obligations for national film funding, rising operating costs and inflation. It is widely seen as a kind of political tool towards the country's largest media house.

The current national law regulating RTV Slovenia (and allowing too much political influence) was established by Slovenia's first right-wing government (2004-2008) but has survived several subsequent left-liberal governments. Despite open criticism (the law has always been controversial), the political will to change it has not been there: mostly due to the weakness of the ruling coalitions, other priorities, lack of interest, but also conformity. It simply suited party politics as such, regardless of the alignments. Who would give up the temptation of having a control mechanism at hand?!

Back to the Programme Council, on which I served as one of the workers' representatives from 2014 to 2018: the balance of (political) opinions is an important issue elsewhere in Europe as well, but it is usually addressed

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in a less technical or mechanical way than in our country, for example in Germany. This is probably due to the chronic mistrust of journalists in general by the political and politicising milieu represented in the Programme Council. There may even be a reason for this: immediately after the introduction of the long-awaited party democracy in Slovenia in the 1990s, we helped them along when some of the colleagues willingly took on the role of passive ball boys (and girls) in public TV debates.

several websites and a programme TV) previously owned by the Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) or its members and supporters. Economically, these Hungarian investments did not make much sense. In addition, Telekom Slovenije, in which the Slovenian state holds a large stake, sold its (unprofitable) programme TV Planet TV to the Hungarian media consortium TV2. All Hungarian-owned media maintained a strong pro-SDS position (and a pro-government stance after SDS president Janez Janša became prime minister again in 2020). Their influence remained limited (although the media's reach increased to about one-third of the Slovenian population in 2022, according to a Mediana Institute media survey).

However, the one-sided coverage of political issues (and occasional smear campaigns also directed against RTV Slovenia and POP TV) became a reference point for some members of RTV Slovenia's programme council, including when it comes to how RTV Slovenia should "objectively" balance its coverage.

At the same time, we have colleagues who even support such interference and involve programme councils in real time in our normal daily work as well as in editorial decisions.

Unfortunately, there are also journalists in our own ranks who succumb to their own political ambitions and activism. Such unprofessional blackouts are not good arguments to defend our professionalism. One of our problems is that we have not been consistent enough to crack down on it in our own ranks. At the same time, it happens that the supposed balance of opinions in our news programmes is sometimes celebrated by crossing the line of reason. But these are excesses, not the rule. We discuss this internally, but an open approach to self-reflection should be even more part of our professional routine, including sanctions for unprofessional work. Unfortunately, the false balance, as is well known elsewhere in the world, has been evident in the discussions in RTV Slovenia's Programme Council for years, with media experts dramatically underrepresented.

What about the wider aspect? The challenges for the quality press in Slovenia are part of the international trends but are even more specific due to the size of the market of 2 million inhabitants and the lack of fair, transparent and consistent support of the national media policy. The print media are rather weak economically, partly dependent on advertising from companies that are (fully or partly) state-owned, and therefore often subject to the political interests of the parties represented in the government. This system, which is anything but transparent and based on economic considerations, is less sophisticated than in Austria (where it led to the resignation of Chancellor Sebastian Kurz in 2021), but has also existed in Slovenia for years. The size of the Slovenian market is not exactly inviting for foreign investment in the media sector. In fact, there are two exceptions: In the market for TV advertising, the channels Pop TV and Kanal A, which belong to the Czech investment group PPF owned by the late billionaire Petr Kellner, have a monopoly-like market position. In the late 2010s, Hungarian-based businessmen with ties to Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's ruling party Fidesz began investing in rather small and marginal propaganda media (a weekly print magazine,

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The government led by SDS also launched an attack on the Slovenian state press agency STA in 2020 by cutting off its funding for several months. The aim behind this was to influence its independent reporting and bring it in line with the strategies of the government's information office PR (almost exactly 30 years after STA was established to provide independent information on Slovenia, when the then Yugoslav press agency TANJUG became a propaganda tool of the pro-Serb authoritarian forces in the former Yugoslavia). After a fierce public debate on STA, citizens' donations to prevent bankruptcy, and interventions by the European Commission and the European Parliament, STA prevailed, but with some serious scars. The fact that a national press agency is not able to survive financially says a lot about the limits of the media market in Slovenia. The German or Austrian model of an agency in the hands of a pool of media companies, which was originally also envisaged in Slovenia, is no longer viable due to the economic weakness of the media themselves.

For high-quality and diverse content, which as one of the most important sources in Slovenia should be provided by the financially independent RTV Slovenia, part of the problem is also Slovenian provincialism, which is even visibly growing stronger in the 21st century.

In part, this phenomenon is related to the information provided by the Slovenian media. The most successful newspaper project – by Slovenian standards – of recent decades, "Slovenske novice" (Slovenian News) daily from the Delo publishing house, was very narrow and almost provincial from the start, focusing mostly on crime or family tragedies on the front page. Because it was commercially successful, it remained so. The difference to the tabloid press in Western Europe and many other places is

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obvious, especially when it comes to the insight of the regular readers of "Slovenske novice" into relevant national and especially important international events. Of course, such content corresponds to a significant part of the Slovenian population, but the supply also creates standards and the demand itself with it. But of course, the existence of "Slovenske novice", which ensures the financial survival of "Delo" daily, still the most important Slovenian quality daily newspaper (despite its shrinking influence), should not be an obstacle for RTV Slovenia to insist on offering quality.

To recognise modern Slovenia, it is a matter of survival to observe the rest of the European Union and the world. Unfortunately, for some, including some decision makers at RTV Slovenia, it begins and ends in Croatia.

The populism of commercial television should be another reason for national television (especially given the importance of radio and the accessibility of multimedia content) to broadcast even more programmes based on diversity and openness. It is paradoxical that TV Slovenia has a certain reluctance to use internationally proven show formats of the public broadcasters (dance or baking shows) or domestic series (in both cases POP TV has adopted them almost completely), which would also make economic sense, but rather adopts populis elements in our news programmes.

An additional impetus for the (re)provincialisation of Slovenia is our integration into the European Union (and NATO) in 2004. After the country's independence in 1991, Slovenia surprisingly quickly became an integral part of the West, thus realising the common goal of achieving independence with a relatively coordinated efforts of the whole society and politics.

Of course, we too offer quality and connecting content, but we have not been consistent, creative, and courageous enough in the past decades.

A somewhat more diversified cooperation between our television, radio and a high-quality and extensive online offer is sometimes an impossible mission – but we are the only medium in the country that connects all three electronic media. We have some excellent domestic and foreign programmes, e.g., documentaries, which we do not promote enough and share in different ways within our media platforms.

At the same time, we are chronically doing too little to win back the population that we – and not only we – have lost. We still have not developed a system to systematically offer our content on the various social networks. We do have some individual examples of children's and science programmes on TV, as well as a smart radio service and a quite useful website, but this is not enough. At ORF, a selection of TV news content has recently found its way to TikTok. For us, this is science fiction and a systemic problem, because you can not tackle something like this individually and amateurishly. The Corona crisis, which disproportionately affected Slovenia in several ways, clearly showed us where this kind of dilettantism on the part of public and state institutions leads.

This was not a problem. The problem is that Slovenia mentally paused after joining the EU in 2004. We did not set new common ambitious goals for our society and the state in a rapidly changing world. We no longer knew what the former "EU model pupil", a common compliment during the accession negotiations, wanted to become. Slovenia turned inwards, not outwards. While experts in various fields focused on the new challenges in Europe, the political elites concentrated their ambitions on internal Slovenian affairs and unresolved disputes in history. The global financial crisis of 2008 did not help to refocus on the key issues of future sustainable development and the most important international challenges.

Perhaps it would be an exaggeration to expect RTV Slovenia to be able to defy this process on its own, to focus even more on the big questions and to help connect social systems that have begun to separate from each other due to influences from abroad (social media) and specific Slovenian factors. But we should be much wiser and more determined to swim against the tide.

Unfortunately, during this period – or due to the poor management of the health and social dimensions of the pandemic – there was a kind of culmination of the undermining of RTV Slovenia as one of the most important cultural institutions in the country. The government of the right-wing populist Janez Janša in 2020-2022 tried, through the supportive majority of members of RTV Slovenia's Programme Council, to carry out a kind of political takeover of this media house as well. The approach was indirect and interestingly – at the time of writing – continued after the defeat of the right-wing political bloc in the April 2022 parliamentary elections.

Complex legislation makes this possible. The attempts at political subordination that have taken place (and are still going on), especially in the selection of key executives and editors, would not stand a chance if professional standards and professionalism were consistently applied in all areas in our media. But unfortunately, they have been corrupted by those who are supposed to protect it: The management of the RTV Slovenia has caused great discontent among the staff with far-reaching changes in the television programme, especially in the news, which were professionally nonsensical, poorly communicated and badly planned. Their aim was

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obviously to undermine the still existing relevance of RTV Slovenia's reporting and at the same time to create an "alternative" news programme, a kind of public service internal competition that would better meet the political expectations of the government of the day. As expected, and repeatedly urged by the vast majority of journalists and technical staff, most of the original plans did not materialise, despite financial investments in new programmes (with simultaneous austerity measures and cuts in widely respected and relevant existing programmes). The official goal of increasing the ratings and market shares of news programmes was clearly missed. The ratings and market shares actually declined. Due to mismanagement and editorial mischief, RTV Slovenia, especially its television section, was in chaos, which could also be seen on the screens, for example during the confusing pre-election broadcasts in 2022. The trend towards progressive provincialisation – following the Hungarian blueprint of Viktor Orbán's illiberal guidelines – was apparently one of the cornerstones of this approach. Quite symbolically – for alleged financial reasons – RTV Slovenia withdrew from the Eurovision News Exchange for South-East Europe (ERNO) in 2022, more than two decades after it initiated its creation, and also from the prestigious international media foundation CIVIS for the promotion of integration and cultural diversity in Europe (in which RTV Slovenia was the only member from South and Eastern Europe).

In May 2022, it is still difficult to predict the outcome of the efforts to free RTV Slovenia from the grip of politics, provincialisation, marginalisation and unprofessionalism. If the bad experiences of recent years and the tradition of mistakes lead to reflection and wise reforms, both in the legal framework of the entire media space (and of RTV Slovenia in particular), in better internal organisation, in innovative use of modern media, in comprehensive education and long-term career programmes for employees – but above all in much more consistent professionalism – the largest media house in the country can still prevail and become a better citizen service for the generations facing the greatest challenges of humanity. •

WHOM DO WE WORK FOR?

WHOM DO WE WORK FOR? ALJAŽ BASTIČ

TELEVISION DIRECTOR, RTV SLOVENIJA

The key question each audio-visual content creator should ask oneself is whom does they work for. Knowing the receiver is also one of the basic values of good communication. This question is demanding, multilayered and ever-changing for all mass media, but even more so for the public broadcasting media.

Even more so, as the public broadcasters, in contrast to commercial media, don't strictly follow the marketing principles but should rather engage, inform, educate, culturally fulfil and bring their audiences to higher intellectual and spiritual level. Alas, ideally, our viewer shouldn't be the same person after watching a public broadcaster's programme.

Should therefore a public broadcaster work and create content for the audience it already has or the audience it wants to have? Should it (exclusively) produce more complex programmes, providing the audience a chance to grow personally, become more knowledgeable, intelligent and with a wider view on the social affairs? However simply answered those questions might seem to be they significantly influence our view on the ratings system which are commonly a topic of discussions on either sides. But it would also be wrong to cancel out the ratings of a public broadcaster entirely – if it is the broadcaster's duty to serve the public, it does so successfully only as long as (a part of) the public shows interest in its programmes.

All the listed are, in my opinion, the fundamental questions of each public radio, television and online creator. They define the content we should make, how to make it and with how much resources. Whom should therefore a public broadcaster's programmes be addressed to?

The Public is (in Slovenian) defined as "a community, especially in a relationship to certain happenings or things" , in the Oxford dictionary as "ordinary people in general; the community" and "a section of the community having a particular interest or connection"2. Communication science defines the public in a relationship to a specific issue. It would therefore be wrong to define the public only in the narrow view as the scientific, the concerned, the academic or the political public. I myself am 1

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1

https://fran.si/iskanje?View=1&Query=javnost

2

Oxford Dictionary of English

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the public when visiting a classical concert. My friend with a passion for sports is also the public while watching a football game. The public is a neighbour who can hardly live on her pension. The public is a politician who influences a huge part of the society. The public is and old woman living at a distant farm, not being able to take part of the holy mass in person due to her mobility issues. The public is a scientist wanting to interdisciplinary discover other scientific branches in addition to her own.

quality, diverse and interesting programmes; but they unfortunately more and more often don't reach their audience. Rarely a week passes when a friend of mine doesn't mention a great programme they randomly saw or listened to produced by RTV SLO -- not knowing about it previously. This is telling about our lack of communicating about who we are and what we do to the public. It is telling about a bad presence on digital platforms and a non-existent digital strategy. The latter should at least include precise reflection on usage and presence on social media (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram), video-based social media (YouTube, Vimeo, TikTok), in-house VOD platform (RTV 365) and in-house online news platform (rtvslo.si with mobile apps).

Categories of the public are diverse and of different sizes, they intertwine with and build on one another, they make connections -- we define each one of us as being part of a public in a certain context and time. If it is a public broadcaster's duty to work in the public's interest it is therefore its job to try to holistically and comprehensively include as much social activities as possible.

But is it delusional to expect that? If a public broadcaster should widely address the whole social activity, that would also mean to include all existing natural, technical, social and humanistic sciences as well as looking out for the overlooked voices who cannot find their place in the current social structures. But how can a broadcast creator know which part of the public to create for? For which spectator?

As every single public broadcaster, RTV SLO has many challenges indeed, from falling numbers of active users to attacks by the politicians who see the media as their tool for gaining power; to attacks by professionals who are disappointed by broadcaster's work. Tale as old as time. A public broadcaster like RTV SLO has always been and always will be in between different opinions, susceptible to political influence and on the verge of precipice. And this is precisely the reason to clearly know who our viewers, listeners or readers are.

True, our programmes have been available online on custom-made VODplatforms since 2007 -- also adding live feeds in the late 2000s -- but unfortunately, this comprehensive digital library of audio and video archive (RTV 365), though available to everyone (that pays the RTV licence fee), is practically useless. There are two main reasons for YouTube being so successful – first, because of a brilliant search engine, second, because it incudes a strong platform of machine learning and artificial intelligence.

Being on YouTube, one starts with watching the wanted (and searchedfor) video -- but then continues watching all the other videos, suitable to our profile. The RTV SLO VOD platform is currently in ruins regarding both – and a few years already. We live in times of draining numbers of linear television viewership as well as new ways of watching television content -- on laptop and mobile screens. It is therefore even more important to reach the audience in the best way possible and vice versa – it is crucial the audience can easily reach us as well.

But let's return to the core question -- how to find out whom do we create our programmes for and what does the audience want?

It is vital to make changes inside RTV SLO. In my view, one of the main challenges is to get rid of the feeling of self-sufficiency. As every institution (state or private), RTV SLO isn't immune to the social "bubble". Even though the creators have many contacts with variety of people and outside coworkers in contrast to companies, which might mostly have their regular business partners, this still presents a narrow limit to subjective co-creators of our programmes. Just as the public needs us, we need the public as well. We need to want to communicate with our audience -- via a mediator (for e.g. Viewer's and Listener's Ombudsman) as well as directly.

All the creators should actively work towards getting their content widely available to the public through the media and channels of various kinds. Talking from experience, our broadcaster and its creators produce

One of the key deficiencies of RTV SLO is close to non-existing qualitative and partially even quantitative research of viewership, audience's wants and wishes. It is true some insight can be gained by analysing the ratings data (which is regular quantitative research), but it can only present a partial explanation not considering multiple other factors (weather, time of year, situation in the country, events, what the other media offer etc.)

-- but it definitely doesn't give the producers a comprehensive answer to low/high viewership numbers.

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Only after extensive quantitative and qualitative research, widely as well as narrowly specified (following target groups on one and the existing programmes on the other hand) could we create a comprehensive

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strategy of changes for RTV Slovenia and the Annual plan of Programmes and Production which would more realistically reflect the wishes and needs of the public.

conversations with people who think differently from us -- but discussions had probably mostly been constructive, full of content, lively and even inspiring. Watching media reporting on social and political affairs, one might often think we are on the brink of the civil war. It seems like this (artificially created) social divisions cannot be overcome by RTV SLO alone; but we could provide a new, alternative (political and apolitical) discourse in cooperation with other cultural, academic, artistic and media institutions that would reflect a more realistic image of the society.

In addition to qualitative research, I think it would be crucial for representatives of the public broadcaster to regularly, for eg. twice per month, visit all Slovenian regions and organise public platforms on which they would firstly introduce how the RTV SLO works, how it is organised, its units, channels and content. Secondly, they would listen to feedback and opinions of the present (and therefore concerned) public -- to complaints, suggestions, compliments, opinions and ideas. I claim that much of the negative feedback towards RTV SLO is based mainly on the lack of knowing the broadcaster and what it does -- but also not being familiar with professions and workflows. A live contact with the public would, I am sure, soften the often harsh online reactions and would have more positive influence on the programmes we make.

RTV Slovenia could also introduce a similar idea already present at the local government -- participatory budgeting. A few of the programmes could still be produced in-house, its form and rough content guided by the public.

An important question to which I have no answer is what attitude to take in all RTV-genres in relation to antagonism vs reconcilability or. cooperation. Opposition or conflict is the basis of each dramatic triangle, each dramaturgy: each and every good story. And it is stories that RTVcreators create. On the other hand, the conflict, namely antagonism, also spurs the social unrest and conflicts. If it is the RTV SLO's duty to work in the interest of the public, it is definitely the public's interest to solve (a certain) problem. This can only be done by cooperation, discussion, reasoning and making compromises. How can the RTV overcome this paradox?

To illustrate, the current-affairs talkshow "Tarča" gathers high viewership numbers; the programme's concept is based on antagonism, quick pace, confrontation of opinions and conflicts as well. If we wanted to hear more in-depth suggestions of solutions to social challenges, a longer, sat-down and calmed genre would work much better. But surely, it would not get even a half of the ratings of the existing programme ...

This dilemma is also the starting point of the challenge to overcome social divisions and to work on de-politicising the perception of society.

To put this in context -- each one of us had already had a number of

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All the public broadcasters constantly ask themselves the question how to reach a very special public indeed – the Young. The Public, commonly viewed as passive and non-active but nevertheless with many problems and challenges. I believe the first step should be a clear personnel strategy -- a regular inflow of new, younger colleagues (the average age of employees at RTV SLO was 48 in 2021) and an intergenerational cooperation and knowledge transmission as a must. Next step should be the foundation of an Experimental Unit or Laboratory (for content, form as well as new technologies) with a very clear vision on one and absolute freedom on the other hand. The Experimental Unit should not be bound to produce regular weekly programmes rather experimenting and researching everything edgy: new as well as established methods. However, to enable the flow of the staff it would be necessary to individually engage (more and more often) in the regular programmes and production (and therefore not be isolated in a parallel bubble).

We would also address younger audiences more successfully if we had the already mentioned coherent digital strategy. The creators should also distance from the idea of creating the programmes only for the television broadcast -- our audiovisual content must live (and survive) on variety of platforms -- and our main goal should become to reach the audience on whichever of them. To embrace our own VOD platform (RTV 365), some specialised content just for young viewers (and others) with the goal to promote and introduce RTV 365 and other content would be a must. We need not go far for a great example -- only towards Krajnčeva street .

3

After decades of a small and laid-back state, encouragement of private founding and decrease of public spending one feels that the societies all over the world finally recognise the importance of everything public -- health and educational system, culture, sports and, one might think, 3

Krajnčeva street is the HQ of PRO PLUS, the private broadcaster of the most popular (regarding the ratings) Slovenian television channel POP TV as well as Voyo, their subscription-based VOD platform with a lot of original content.

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media as well. Media, who should and will not be indulgent to the capital (neither small nor big), who will not be servile to (party) politics. A privately-owned media is responsible to the capital; a public broadcaster is responsible to the public alone. It is delusional to expect a public broadcaster not being on crossroads of many different interests; but its public status per se ensures it being in everybody's and nobody's ownership at the same time. It is an entity no one must appropriate, but it still is ours. An institution, while working for it I will always ask myself over and over again -- whom I am working for. •

NINE DEMANDS AF TER FIVE YEARS

NINE DEMANDS AFTER FIVE YEARS ILINKA TODOROVSKI

FORMER OMBUDSWOMAN OF RTV SLOVENIA

My retrospection after a five-year term as Ombudsperson, as I scan back to pinpoint when the cordon sanitaire of professionalism was breached, having heretofore fairly reliably shielded the public broadcaster from political incursion, lingers in March 2020. It is not that there had been no attempts at political subjugation and influence before; if nothing else, they took the form of neglect, the downplaying of problems, the exploitation of weak points, the deferral of systemic solutions, the revocation of financial support and other such methods. There have been widely publicised attempts to increase the licence fee, for example a solo action by the director general of the public broadcaster in the spring of 2019, which ended miserably. But I also remember how aghast my colleagues were when they returned that same year from a meeting at the Ministry of Culture, where they were told a Greek scenario was in the cards in lieu of a solution. The public broadcaster had to be demolished to be rebuilt.

It was a minister in a centre-left government who ventured that.

When I became the Ombudsperson in January 2017, I was taken aback by several realisations. One of them was that the public could be irked by everything, literally everything, that the public broadcaster produced.

And by how the public were craving to have the opportunity to be able to tell what they had to say to someone, and discuss that in a respectful way. And also by the realisation how arrogant and haughty people who should be concerned by some of the reactions could be, and how they absolutely refused to acknowledge having done anything wrong, let alone to apologise (“Why should be listen to the grumbling of some ordinary viewers(listeners/readers?”). It was as if the public broadcaster was relevant and credible by default, whereas the statement by an opposition politician that he is not paying the licence fee (and would not, because he is not satisfied with the content), was merely an excess unworthy of serious reaction and analysis. In three years, the tables have turned: political forebodings and attacks as the default, and relevance and credibility at breaking point.

What I was always concerned about from day one as the Ombudsperson reading and listening to audience reactions were the fallacies, misconceptions, myths and ignorance about the national public broadcaster. How is it possible that our audience know their public broadcaster so poorly?

When did RTV Slovenija forget that it had to tell its viewers/listeners/readers about that? To open up and enter into a dialogue with its audience?

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The public editor’s mantra, which angered the leadership, but not enough to embrace it as its own, was: Woe unto the media house that will fight for a higher financial contribution without having previously explained to the public the value of the media services on offer, once and a hundred times more if necessary, in regular programming, through its media channels, and even live, door to door, village to village. To explain the values of the public broadcaster. Its potentials. Why we need it and why it is worthwhile not only to preserve it but also to critically, analytically, professionally and earnestly improve it.

These are some of the misconceptions and myths that the broadcaster should address: – RTV Slovenija is (just) TV Slovenija – Nowhere in the world do people pay a licence fee.

– We have to pay a coercive subscription fee for the national public broadcaster – Why should we be paying something that we have not subscribed to (and do not watch)?

– In a democracy, you pay for what you buy and what you are satisfied with.

– You are getting paid salaries from our licence fee instead of giving us what we want to watch/listen/read.

– If we are paying you, why do you have ads and teleshopping?

– Why are commercial programmes “for free”, we are not paying anything for them?

– We pay you double, first the cable subscription fee and then the licence fee on top.

What can we infer from the reactions of our audience if we desire to do that?

First and foremost, that the viewers, listeners, readers and users want to be reassured that there is a partnership between them and the broadcaster, that in exchange for payment of the licence fee they have the right not only to a respectful consideration of new opinions, criticism, questions and proposals, but also to good programming and the kind of service that will truly inform, educate, culturally enrich and also entertain them at a high level of quality.

The reactions reveal extraordinarily high expectations about RTV Slovenija as a guardian of media values such as accuracy, impartiality, integrity, diversity, credibility, cultural excellence and linguistic erudition, but most of all the expectation that it will be a kind of mini-BBC (only with the minimum of money and staff) preserving everything good that it creates and adding that which is modern in media, what people want and commercial broadcasters already have – only at a higher level. Yes, this is what I mean by the concept of public service media being the default, a notion that should be implemented substantively, organisationally and structurally.

At the same time, the reactions are full of resentment, anger and aversion by those who do not find in the programming what they think they are entitled to, even if they know nothing about the tasks and mission of a public broadcaster. And the broadcaster itself does not communicate these tasks and mission because it does not even notice them, even though in this arrogant and negative position the average viewer/listener/reader is no different than an average politician. Or vice versa: if the average decision-maker knows so little about RTV Slovenija, why should the average consumer of its content know more?

Since that turning point in the spring of 2020, this fertile soil of ignorance and grumbling has been the ideal breeding ground for the political seed of deception, exaggeration and lies. These are tweets by the prime minister, the president of the Democratic Party (SDS), posted on 20 and 21 March 2020: “Don’t spread lies @InfoTVSLO We’re paying you to inform in these times, not to mislead the public. It’s clear there are too many of you and you’re paid too much. @RTV_Slovenija.”1 “Get serious. Did you inform #Slovenia on time about the danger of #coronavirus? About the restrictions adopted in #Taiwan, #Japan, #SouthKorea? What have your correspondents been doing? 2300 employees, almost more that there are soldiers in the @Slovenskavojska?”2 1

Tweet,20March2020:https://twitter.com/JJansaSDS/status/1241089868492681218?ref_ src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1241089868492681218 %7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.24ur.com%2Fnovic e%2Fslovenija%2Fnapadi-na-medije-in-napovedi-kadrovskih-cistk-gotovo-ne-pripomorejo-k-izboljsanju-situacije.html

2

Tweet, 21 March 2020: https://twitter.com/JJansaSDS/status/1241440991783129094?ref_ src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E124144099864080 3840%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es2_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.dnevnik. si%2F1042925332

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“Look around you. Name countries with 2 mil population and a national broadcaster with 2300 employees?? Find one in which the national broadcaster conducts such vile politicking as a some of the @RTV_Slovenija editorial staff engage in.”3

ledge that...), the calling out of individual journalists for allegedly antigovernment and unpatriotic views, political, value-based judgements of content, the convocation of emergency sessions or demands for emergency debates about “violations of the law,” the sanctioning of the disobedient (for example, after a particularly polemical and critical currentaffairs show, but also after the airing of protest music on the radio or an impromptu by the host of the morning show on TV about spring festival and government tweets) – all this political interference narrowed the space of professional debate to a minimum. The boundary of the political was overstepped with attempts at encroaching on editorial and journalistic independence, attempts super-charged by so-called analyses of the Government Communications Office, which published spreadsheets of one-word comments on shows, holding these up as the ultimate proof of the violations of standards and bias in radio and TV news programming.

Such posts (which RTV Slovenija, media organisations and the civil society at first responded to consistently), fired up an explosion of reactions at a time when a political turnaround and the change of government coincided with the outbreak of the Covid pandemic and the imposition of a series of restrictions. It was becoming increasingly difficult to make out from these reactions what the subject of the responses was or what objection was being levelled at a piece of content or a service, what these reactions revealed most of all were the political and partisan views of those who wrote them. Gratitude by a large portion of the audience at the public broadcaster being the first to provide consistent, accurate and indepth information about the pandemic, becoming an irreplaceable adviser and companion in pandemic life, was drowned out by assertions by critics that RTV Slovenija is a part of the political and pandemic problem because it failed to realise that the country was at war with the virus and was instead critical and insufficiently patriotic.

Two years later, at the outset of 2022, a member of the Programming Council who represents the largest religious community in Slovenia publicly stated that the broadcaster was culpable and shared the blame for how the pandemic unfolded, and also for the Covid deaths. Asked to provide a single argument for such a radical, unfair, inaccurate, spiteful and manipulative claim, he retorted that such damage was being done by reports about anti-government bicycle protests that too place on Fridays.

The changed composition of the RTV Slovenija Programming Council (the appointment of seven new members dates to the spring of 2020) also changed the tone and manner of debate about the public service, about the content and content creators, but also about the reactions of the public and the role of the Ombudsperson.

Obfuscated debates (you can see it from an airplane..., it is general know3

Tweet, 21 March 2021: https://twitter.com/JJansaSDS/ status/1241440998640803840?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweete mbed%7Ctwterm%5E1241445496201318400%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es2_& ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.24ur.com%2Fnovice%2Fslovenija%2Fnapadi-namedije-in-napovedi-kadrovskih-cistk-gotovo-ne-pripomorejo-k-izboljsanju-situacije. html

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Two more novel claims made their way among the collection of delusions about the public broadcaster: • Public media = state media (they are accountable to the government, the guardian of taxpayer money) • Because this is “our” media outlet, “we” (individuals, pressure groups, government, deputy groups) can take over from journalists, editors and moderators (on behalf of the public) and decide what gets published and what does not get published.

The consequences thereof translated into staffing and programming decisions, including into attempts at unauthorised changes to journalists’ reports and into censorship.

As I pointed out on the occasion of the publication of the Ombudsperson Annual Report for 2021, my last report in that role, the main takeaway of this year would be that it should not be permitted to engage in debate about programmes, journalists and the media outlet as such from a position of political power, and that in public service media a clear divide between professional and political debate must be preserved.

How to achieve that? How, after the plunge into culture war, to pivot the attitude towards the public broadcaster, and the broadcaster itself, in a direction such that it will serve the public interest in the most virtuous sense of the word? How to establish an honest and open partnership between the public broadcaster and the public, how to return RTV Slovenija to the public and position it as a building block of community and a pillar of (restored) credibility and relevance in society?

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1. RTV Slovenija needs a good, modern and concise law that will guarantee its steadfastness and managerial, financial and supervisory independence.

2. Programming oversight should be defined such that the risk of politicisation and obfuscation is reduced to a minimum.

3. In exchange for the licence fee (or another form of financing) viewers/listeners/readers deserve a partnership agreement under which they are provided with high-quality and modern programming, transparent operations, and open communication focused on nurturing knowledge about the public broadcaster and the understanding of what public interest is.

4. The public must have access to simple communication with the public editor and to the values espoused by the public broadcaster, which in turn must leverage professional confidence and experience to explain and help people understand and distinguish between the right and the wrong in media.

5. The public also needs an effective complaint model that leads to the resolution of dilemmas and the rectification of mistakes and weaknesses, and prevents bad practices from recurring.

6. The creators of programming must be provided with the conditions to perform their job freely and deliver high-quality content.

7. Journalists and editors also need a modern, transparent code of professional ethics, useful and actionable guidelines, the best professional interpreters of these standards, and permanent education, starting with an onboarding model for newcomers. In public service media, there should be no room for creators who are not familiar with, and dedicated to, the values of public service.

8. The Ombudsperson as guardian of the rights of the audience and the values of public media should act as an assistant to the management, supervisory and self-management bodies, and creators in interpreting reactions from the public, resolving professional and ethical dilemmas, and in self-reflection.

9. The position and power of the Ombudsperson as an important stakeholder in efforts to strengthen public trust and striking a balance between expectations and capabilities should not hinge on the personal authority and integrity of the individual performing this job, the role of this autonomous body for self-regulation should be enshrined in the law. •

F REEDOM OF E X PRE SSION DURING MILITA RY CONF LIC T

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION DURING MILITARY CONFLICT * DARIIA OPRYSHKO

INSTITUTE FOR INFORMATION, TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND MEDIA LAW, MUENSTER, GERMANY

Freedom of expression is a natural and inherent right that is given to every human being from the birth. Without this right no real democracy could be imagined. The right to freedom of expression is enshrined in a number of international acts, in particular in Article 19 of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights1 and in Article 10 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter – Convention or European Convention)2.

For Ukrainian people freedom of expression is one of the most essential rights. It is enshrined on the highest level – in the Constitution of Ukraine. Article 34 of the Constitution of Ukraine states that: • Everyone is guaranteed the right to freedom of thought and speech, and to the free expression of his or her views and beliefs.

• Everyone has the right to freely collect, store, use and disseminate information by oral, written or other means of his or her choice3.

Censorship is forbidden in Ukraine4.

However, this right is not absolute, it is connected with duties and responsibilities and may be limited subject to a number of requirements that are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society. The right to freedom of expression may be limited in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary5.

1

https://treaties.un.org/doc/treaties/1976/03/19760323%2006-17%20am/ch_iv_04.pdf

2

https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf

3

Parts 1, 2 of the Article 34 of the Constitution of Ukraine of 28.06.1996 No. 254к/96-ВР / https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/254%D0%BA/96-%D0%B2%D1%80#n4269

4

Article 15 of the Constitution of Ukraine, Article 24 of the Law of Ukraine “On Information”, par. 2 Article 2 of the Law of Ukraine “On Printed Mass Media (Press) in Ukraine”, Article 5 of the Law of Ukraine “On Television and Radio Broadcasting”, par. 2 Article 2 of the Law of Ukraine “On Informational Agencies”

5

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Part 3 of Article 34 of the Constituion of Ukraine

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In Ukraine the right to freedom of expression may be restricted through martial law. According to the Law of Ukraine “On the Legal Regime of Martial Law,” martial law is a special legal regime imposed in Ukraine or certain territories in case of armed aggression or threat of attack, a threat to state independence of Ukraine, its territorial integrity, and provides for granting to the relevant state authorities, military command, military administrations and local governments the powers necessary to deter the threat, repel armed aggression and ensure national security, eliminate the threat to Ukraine’s state independence, and its territorial integrity, as well as sets forth temporary threat-induced limitation of constitutional rights and freedoms of man and the citizen and the rights and legitimate interests of legal entities, indicating the term of these restrictions6. On the 24th of February 2022 Russia Federation launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In connection with this, the regime of martial law was announced on the whole territory of Ukraine7 and the right to freedom of expression was limited.

It was not the first case, connected with the dissemination of information that helped the enemy to aim weapons more accurately and repeat shelling.

The problem lies in the fact that collection of information from open and public sources, especially from the internet, constitutes the part of OSINT (open-source intelligence). OSINT is used by journalists-investigators in the process of their professional activity, however it is widely used by the intelligence services as well9.

Balancing the right to freedom of expression and the interests of national security With the beginning of the war Ukraine faced new problems. On one hand, the State is interested in the broadest coverage of the events that took place and bringing this information to the international community. On the other hand, disclosure of particular data may help the enemy.

It may be illustrated by the following example.

On the 24th of February 2022 a TikTok user made a video of allegedly the military equipment of the Armed Forces of Ukraine that could make a stop that day under the roof of one big shopping mall in Kyiv. He posted this content on TikTok after three weeks, on 20 March, and on the same day Russia destroyed this shopping center via high-precision missile strike. However, as of March 20, there was no military equipment on the territory of the mall. According to the information from the open sources, minimum 8 civil people died because of this attack8.

The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine highlighted that photos, videos and data on place of shelling or falling of the projectile; addresses, coordinates of battles; numbers of cars and armored vehicles; victims or dead (except official data); flying or hitting missiles; street names, transport stops, shops, factories; movement of Ukrainian troops, military facilities; work of air defense shall be kept in secret10.

In some days after the attack on the shopping mall an Article 114-2 was introduced to the Criminal Code of Ukraine. It foresees criminal liability for unauthorized dissemination of information on the: • direction, displacement of weapons, armament and ammunition to Ukraine; • movement, displacement or deployment of the Armed Forces of Ukraine or other military formations formed in accordance with the laws of Ukraine, committed under martial law or state of emergency. Such actions may lead to imprisonment from 3 to 12 years, depending on the severity of the crime.

This means that during martial law it is allowed to disseminate abovementioned information (in press, on TV, radio, internet etc.) only after it was disseminated by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine or the Security Service of Ukraine or 9

6 7

Col Shane P. Hamilton, USAF; Lt Col Michael P. Kreuzer, USAF, PhD “The Big Data

Article 1 of the Law of Ukraine “On the Legal Regime of Martial Law”, https://zakon.

Imperative. Air Force Intelligence for the Information Age” / Air & Space Power Jour-

rada.gov.ua/laws/show/389-19/conv#Text

nal, 2018/2/11 / https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ASPJ_Spanish/Journals/

Law of Ukraine “On Approval of the Decree of the President of Ukraine “On the Intro-

Volume-30_Issue-2/2018_2_11_hamilton_s_eng.pdf ; What is open-source intelligence

duction of Martial Law in Ukraine” of 24.02.2022 No. 2102-IX / https://zakon.rada.gov.

– and how is it helping to map the Ukraine war? / The Week of 10 March 2022 / https://

ua/laws/show/2102-IX#Text ; Decree of the President of Ukraine “On the Introduction

www.theweek.co.uk/news/technology/956029/what-is-open-source-intelligence-

of Martial Law in Ukraine” of 24.02.2022 No. 64/2022 / https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/

ukraine-war ; Perrigo Billy “How Open Source Intelligence Became the World's Win-

show/64/2022#n2

dow Into the Ukraine Invasion” / Time of 24 February 2022 / https://time.com/6150884/ ukraine-russia-attack-open-source-intelligence/

8

https://focus.ua/uk/voennye-novosti/510023-minoborony-rf-pokazalo-kak-okkupan-

10

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/278381417808277

ty-udarili-raketoy-po-trc-retrovil-v-kieve-video

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by official sources of partner countries.

Such changes greatly complicated the work of journalists, even for those, who was accredited by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Except that ordinary citizens were very frightened when they saw that somebody is making photos or videos of shelling, bombing etc. as they thought that these people may be artillery spotters, so in the beginning of the war some of them extremely resisted journalists’ professional activity.

Thus, we come to a question as to how to distinguish information or ideas that offend, shock or disturb, but are protected by the law, from those that constitute an abuse to the right to freedom of expression, especially in cases when there is a large-scale war of one state against another, conducted with violation of all international treaties.

A number of journalists made a joint statement calling for an end to the harassment of journalists in connection with the coverage of the Russian shelling11. As a result, the Government and journalists’ community reached an agreement and concluded a memorandum. In particular, they agreed that journalists can gather information on the ground immediately after the shelling. However, it is allowed to publish photos and videos of the events at the scene of hostilities after 12 hours for military facilities, and three hours later – for civilian facilities12.

Usage of offensive language in mass media For many timesthe European Court of Human Rights reiterated that freedom of expression include the right of a person to receive and impart not only information or ideas that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also those that offend, shock or disturb13.

However one should remember that it is prohibited to abuse the rights, foreseen by the European Convention14. It means, in particular, that not all expressions fall within the right to freedom of expression and are protected by the Article 10 of the Convention (for instance, this protection does not cover “hate-speech”).

The European Court has developed a number of standards and principles when dealing with cases on Article 10 that concern expressions made in regards armed or military conflict15. Analysis of Court’s case-law gives an opportunity to conclude that Conventional protection is not provided to expressions that: • unequivocally intended to justify war crimes such as torture or summary executions16; • calls for the violent destruction of the State and for the banishment and killing of its inhabitants as well as propaganda of such aims17 ; • justify the racist insult18 etc.

However, the Court always reiterated that in the context of Article 10 of the Convention, offending expressions should be examined in the light of the circumstances and the whole context19. Further case may be taken as an example to illustrate this standard.

15

Burmagin O., Opryshko L., Opryshko D. Freedom of speech during armed conflict (overview of case-law of the European Court of Human Rights), p. 102-107, https://www.ppl.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Draft_Chapter_on_ECHR_preview.pdf

16

Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 15.01.2009 in the case of “Orban and Others v. France”, application no. 20985/05, § 35, https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ eng?i=001-90662

11

https://zmina.ua/statements/mediaruh-zaklykaye-prypynyty-czkuvannya-zhurnalis-

17

tiv-u-zvyazku-iz-vysvitlennyam-rosijskyh-obstriliv/?fbclid=IwAR16FeHtvxOaj2ykT6Gi

rir and Others v. Germany”, application no. 31098/08, §§ 73, 74, https://hudoc.echr.

Idqr35R5FS27UKxZVzZozQ0JnmDr7Fz8nmZlxXU 12

13

14

https://zmina.info/news/vlada-ta-zhurnalisty-domovylysya-pro-pravyla-roboty-

Decision of the European Court of Human Rights of 12.06.2012 in the case “Hizb ut Tahcoe.int/fre?i=001-111532

18

Decision of the European Court of Human Rights of 20.10.2015 in the case “M’Bala

media-v-umovah-vijny-mediaruh/?fbclid=IwAR0__s0gxiuZTs5JmyAiuvNBQma7aho-

M’Bala v. France”, application no. 25239/13, §§ 34-42, https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/

Tuq5IJmfBP7zRVb91DtQX1CZnRBA

eng?i=001-158752

Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 07.121976 in the case of “Handy-

19

Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 08.07.1986 in the case “Lingens

side v. The United Kingdom”, application no. 5493/72, § 49, https://hudoc.echr.coe.

v. Austria”, application no. 9815/82, § 40, https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57523

int/eng?i=001-57499 ; Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 26.11.1991 in

; Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 23.04.2015 in the case “Morice

the case of “Observer and Guardian v. the United Kingdom”, application no. 13585/88,

v. France” [GC], application no. 29369/10, § 162, https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-

§ 59, https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57705 https://www.facebook.com/Gene-

154265 ; Decision of the European Court of Human Rights of 20.10.2015 in the case

ralStaff.ua/posts/278381417808277

“M’Bala M’Bala v. France”, application no. 25239/13, § 37, https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/

Article 17 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental

eng?i=001-158752

Freedoms, https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf

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On March 1, 2022, the Commission on Journalistic Ethics received a complaint about a news story aired that day on Channel 520. The story was dedicated to the subject “130 works by Maria Pryimachenko destroyed: occupiers burn a local art museum near Kyiv” and was accompanied by a red text box on the screen which said: “Russian soldier, go f*ck yourself”.

Commission on Journalistic Ethics considered this claim, taking into account the best practices in the field of editorial standards, in particular BBC Editorial Guidelines. It stressed that, naturally, journalists shall refrain from usage of offensive language and profanity, however, in this particular case the use of profanity acquires a completely different meaning than the usual violation of language norms. Taking into consideration the context, as well as the broad coverage of the situation that happened between Russian warship and Ukrainian border guards by national and international media that have chosen this issue as the main topic of their stories and programming, the Commission on Journalistic Ethics did not find a violation of ethical standards in this case24. It concluded that Channel 5 acted within the framework of freedom of expression.

However, the Commission called the media to (1) refrain from the use of offensive language, profanity, unless justified by the context; (2) in any case, refrain from the use of offensive and obscene expressions in programming or websites aimed at children; (3) be especially vigilant about adhering to the standards of journalism and journalistic ethics during martial law in Ukraine.

The background The disputable statement is a rephrase of words of Ukrainian border guard. On 24 February 2022, the first day of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, several Russian naval warships, among which there was a guided missile cruiser “Moskva”, attacked Zmeinyy island21. Russian military told the following: “I am a Russian warship. I propose to lay down our arms and surrender in order to avoid bloodshed and unjustified casualties. Otherwise, you will be bombed”. Ukrainian border guard responded: “Russian warship, go fuck yourself”. This response became a symbol of Ukrainian resistance, a meme itself and gained a worldwide attention.

The applicant complained that the TV channel violated ethical and moral standards accepted in Ukrainian society as in his view “...the use of dirty, obscene curse words and expressions...is unacceptable”22. It is necessary to mention that Article 15 of the Code of Ethics for the Ukrainian Journalist foresees that: “...no one shall be discriminated against on the grounds of sex, language, race, religion, national, regional or social origin or political opinion. Relevant features of a person (group of people) should be indicated only in cases where this information is an essential part of the material. It is necessary to refrain from hints or comments concerning physical defects or diseases of the person, to avoid the use of offensive expressions, profanity”23.

20

“Channel 5” is a private, national-wide television channel that belongs to TOV Channel 5 (ТОВ “П’ятий канал”) https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/

Attention! Sensitive Content The war has raised before journalists new challenges, including those that are connected with ethical aspects of sensitive issues’ coverage. How to inform society about massacres, tortures and rapes so not to go beyond ethical standards? And what actually the boundaries that cannot be crossed? What is the role of journalists in the coverage of these events?

And what should the responsible journalism look like in regards coverage of mentioned issues?

In this article it is proposed to consider one of the aspects of sensitive content’s coverage, namely photography and video recording of scenes that include showing of killed people. One could see a lot of different photos and videos of the results of massacres that happened in Kyiv oblast (in particular, Bucha, Irpin, Gostomil, Borodyanka and many other cities)25. A lot of them contained pictures of killed people. Some of the

posts/278381417808277 21 22

Острів Зміїний був атакований з російських кораблів / https://www.ukrinform.ua/

Decision of Commission on Journalistic Ethics in regards complaint against TOV Channel 5 (Piatyi kanal) due to the use of the response of Ukrainian soldiers from Snake

Decision of Commission on Journalistic Ethics in regards complaint against TOV Chan-

Island / https://cje.org.ua/news/the-complaint-against-tov-channel-5-piatyi-kanal-

nel 5 (Piatyi kanal) due to the use of the response of Ukrainian soldiers from Snake

due-to-the-use-of-the-response-of-ukrainian-soldiers-from-snake-island/

Island / https://cje.org.ua/news/the-complaint-against-tov-channel-5-piatyi-kanal23

24

rubric-ato/3411679-ostriv-zmiinij-atakuvali-z-rosijskih-korabliv.html

25

See, for example, an overview of newspapers that covered Russia’s atrocities in Bucha,

due-to-the-use-of-the-response-of-ukrainian-soldiers-from-snake-island/

prepared by the Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/04/mas-

Code of Ethics for the Ukrainian Journalist / https://cje.org.ua/ethics-codex/

sacre-of-innocents-how-the-papers-covered-russias-atrocities-in-bucha

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latter were seen from the distance without much details, others – very closely. From one side, such content definitely brings shock and disturbs. However, from the other side, it brings a horrifying truth.

dicate why this happened, how it is possible to punish the perpetrators, what is already being done in this direction, what can be done to help, and so on). Commission stressed that journalists shall respect feelings of family members of the killed person. For instance, it is unethical to report a person's death before his or her relatives find out about it. If journalists are not sure about whether family members are aware of the death of their relative, they shall not give close-up images of the dead person and shall not name him/her until the official notification to relatives. In addition it is unacceptable to use photos and videos from social networks without any verification. Journalists shall ask authorities for the verification of this information or to state in the material that it is impossible to verify information in the circumstances of the war.

If to speak about this issue from the perspective of standards in the field of freedom of speech, one should always remember two things valuable for the assessment of the case: importance of the context and ability to contribute to the public discussion.

In the case “Von Hannover v. Germany (No. 2)” the European Court highlighted that the contribution made by photos or articles in the press to a debate of general interest is an initial essential criterion [for the case’s assessment]. It pointed out that the definition of what constitutes a subject of general interest depends on the circumstances of the case26.

Taking this into consideration, there shall be no violation of the right to freedom of expression, if photos and videos that contain images of killed people, contribute to a public debate or/and help to inform about crimes.

However, they shall not be taken to make a “shock-content” aimed to increase a number of views and one’s income.

In the light of sensitive issues’ coverage it is important to mention recently published recommendations of Commission on Journalistic Ethics on the coverage of deaths during the war27. These recommendations were prepared as a reply to the discussion in the journalists’ community and their inquires as to how journalists should cover people’s deaths during the war. This document takes into account the practice of certain Ukrainian media, editorial codes of well-known world media, as well as guidelines of international journalistic and expert organizations.

Commission on Journalistic Ethics stressed that before covering facts of people’s killings, journalists shall formulate the aim of the material (to inform audience/help or to click on emotions/shock). Except that journalists shall not simply state the fact, but what is more important, they shall provide their audience with a broader context (for example, to in26

As to the usage of photos and videos of killed people, the Commission on Journalistic Ethics recommends not to abuse the illustrations and videos, which show a close-up of the consequences of violence: the blood, the bodies of the victims, their last minutes of life. It is of the opinion that in many cases, it is advisable to hide photos of murder scenes in online media so that users can make their own choices by clicking on the link to view.

Conclusions The right to freedom of expression is one of the basic human rights, however it is connected with duties and responsibilities and may be limited subject to a number of requirements that are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, including in the circumstances of war.

When covering issues, connected with military actions or events that took place during the war and include sensitive content, it is essential to balance the right to freedom of expression with interests of national security as well as with the rights of other people.

It is very important that journalists act in line not only with the current legislation, but also with ethical rules. Their aim shall be objective informing society, but not dissemination of shock-content itself. •

Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights [GC] of 07.02.2012 in the case of “Von Hannover v. Germany”, applications nos. 40660/08 and 60641/08, § 109, https:// hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-109029

27

Decision of Commission on Journalistic Ethics in regards complaint against TOV Channel 5 (Piatyi kanal) due to the use of the response of Ukrainian soldiers from Snake Island / https://cje.org.ua/news/the-complaint-against-tov-channel-5-piatyi-kanaldue-to-the-use-of-the-response-of-ukrainian-soldiers-from-snake-island/

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* This contribution was first published in: Ad Legendum 3/2022, AD LEGENDUM e.V./ University of Muenster

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TRANSFORM THE INTERNET: WHY WE NEED A PUBLIC SERVICE INTERNET UNIV.-PROF. DR. CHRISTIAN FUCHS UNIVERSITY OF PADERBORN

DR. KLAUS UNTERBERGER ORF

Why do we need an independent Public Service Internet? What’s wrong with the existing one? Are there any alternatives to Google&Co? Digital transformation has caused severe disruptions in media economy and media perception. Despite plenty of enthusiastic expectations the internet has created an alarming dominance of data companies controlling the market as well as their consumers. Hidden algorithms exploit and manipulate its users, filterbubbles support fragmentation and polarisation.

The contemporary Internet does not support and empower but endanger the public space of democratic societies. Are there any alternatives? How can we create quality media producing independent and accountable quality journalism supporting democracy and citizenship? Is there a specific role Public Service Media can play, in order to create a public digital sphere delivering a Public Network Value?

T R A N S F O R M T H E I N T E R N E T: W H Y W E N E E D A P U B L I C S E R V I C E I N T E R N E T

interest in alternatives to YouTube, Facebook, Twitter and Google. Public Service Media are excellently equipped to provide not-for-profit alternatives to the likes of YouTube, Amazon Prime, Spotify and Netflix.

The fact that Internet users are critical of the corporate practices of online platforms is not new. Already in 2009, when Facebook and YouTube started to become popular, a case study of social media’s political economy (Fuchs 2009) led to a larger research project (http://www.sns3.uti.at). The case study and subsequent project showed that users highly value the services such platforms provide and are at the same time highly critical of their business practices.

Today’s Internet and social media users face ten problems (Fuchs 2021, chapters 14 & 15):

In the research project netCommons (http://www.netcommons.eu), a team of researchers led by Christian Fuchs found that 82.4% of surveyed Internet users expressed concerns about YouTube’s and Facebook’s use of personal data for profit (netCommons 2018). 78.7% said there are too many advertisements on the Internet. 82% were somewhat concerned, concerned or very concerned about targeted online advertisements, the digital giants’ main business model. 72.8% were concerned about large Internet corporations’ tax avoidance practices. 87.6% of the respondents expressed

1. Digital capitalism/digital class relations: Digital capital exploits digital labour. It results in capitalist digital monopolies and contributes to the precarization of life.

2. Digital individualism: Digital individualism consists of users accumulating attention with and approval of individual profiles and postings on social media. Its logic treats people as mere competitors, undermining interpersonal solidarity.

3. Digital surveillance: State institutions and capitalist companies carry out the digital surveillance of people within the digital-industrial and surveillance-industrial complex.

4. Anti-social social media: Social media are anti-social social media. Edward Snowden’s revelations and the Cambridge Analytica scandal have shown that capitalist social media are a danger to democracy. Right-wing ideologues and demagogues spread digital authoritarianism on social media and attack Public Service Media, independently acting media and quality media as “metropolitan elite media”.

5. Algorithmic politics: Social media are characterized by automated, algorithmic politics.

Automated computer programs (“bots”) replace human activity, post information and generate “likes”. This has made it more difficult to distinguish which information and approval comes from a human or a machine.

6. Filter bubbles: Fragmented online public audiences are organized as filter bubbles in which opinions are homogeneous and disagreements either do not exist or are avoided.

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1. The public sphere in the digital age The public sphere forms an important aspect of any political and social system. Habermas understands “public” to mean spaces and resources that are “open to all” (Habermas 1991, 1). That is why we speak of, for example, Public Service Media, public opinion, public education, public parks, etc. The concept of the public sphere has to do with the common good, with the idea that institutions exist that are not just used and owned by a privileged few but which benefit everyone. An ideal-typical public sphere is a sphere that organizes “critical publicity” (Habermas 1991, 237) and “critical public debate” (Habermas 1991, 52).

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7. D igital tabloids: The digital culture industry has organized social media as digital tabloids, which are controlled by digital corporations. Online advertising and tabloid entertainment dominate the Internet, displacing audience engagement with political and educational content.

8. Influencer-capitalism: On social media, so-called “influencers” shape public opinion, creating power asymmetries in terms of online attention and visibility, and live a commodified online culture that presents the world as an endless shopping mile and a huge shopping mall.

9. Digital acceleration: Superficial information, which hits us at very high speed due to digital acceleration, strains our attention spans. There is too little time and too little space for conversations and debates on social media.

10. Fake news: Post-truth politics and fake news are spreading globally through social media. In the age of new nationalisms and new authoritarianism, a culture has emerged in which false online news is spread, many people distrust facts and experts, and there is an emotionalization of politics through which audiences do not rationally examine what is real and what is fiction but assume something is true if it suits their state of mind and ideology.

2. From the crisis of Public Service Media towards a Public Service Internet The initial idea behind European broadcasting was simple: public media as a public service –accessible to all, publicly funded, and independent from government and business interests – an accountable, trusted source of information, reflecting the diversity of society. Introduced first in Great Britain, with the launch of the BBC in the 1920s, Public Service Broadcasting was adopted and adapted around the world. In continental Europe, it was developed not by chance but in response to dictatorship and the defeat of democracy: after the devastating effects of the Second World War, Public Service Broadcasting re-emerged in Germany, where it helped to restore social cohesion, addressing people who were no longer obedient subordinates but citizens of a new-born democracy.

These ten tendencies have led to a digital public sphere colonized and feudalized by business interest, state power and ideology, characterized by economic, political and cultural asymmetries of power. The Internet certainly has the potential to socialize human activities in the form of communication, cooperative work, community building and the creation of digital commons. Today, the digital public sphere has taken the form of a colonized and feudalized public sphere through the logic of accumulation, advertising, monopolization, commercialization, commodification, acceleration, individualism, fragmentation, the automation of human activity, surveillance and ideologization. Public Service Media operate on the basis of a different logic. They are manifestations and cornerstones of the democratic public sphere. The communication studies scholar Slavko Splichal gives a precise definition of Public Service Media: “In normative terms, public service media must be a service of the public, by the public, and for the public. It is a service of the public because it is financed by it and should be owned by it. It ought to be a service by the public – not only financed and controlled but also produced by it. It must be a service for the public – but also for the government and other powers acting in the public sphere. In sum, public service media ought to become ‘a cornerstone of democracy.’” (Splichal 2007, 255)

In 2022 the world faces yet another severe, manifold crisis: the war in Ukraine, an alarming energy crisis, a global pandemic, accelerating climate change, persistent and deep social inequalities, increasing political polarization and an alarming infodemic, with lots of misinformation and hate speech. Despite all the great opportunities digital technologies have offered society and individuals, the hopes and expectations of a free and democratic Internet are broken. Digital giants, led by Apple, Alphabet/ Google, Microsoft, Amazon, Alibaba, Facebook and Tencent, have acquired unparalleled economic, political and cultural power. They undermine the indispensable resources of trusted information, in-depth analysis, rational debate and diversity of representation that allow us to fully understand the challenges we face. They have created a communication landscape dominated by surveillance, advertising, fake news, hate speech, conspiracy theories, and the algorithmic allocation of users to commercial and political content tailored to their expressed tastes and opinions. As currently organized, the Internet separates and divides instead of creating common spaces for negotiating difference and disagreement. In fact, the dominant forms and uses of digital technologies and the Internet endanger democracy.

Given the enormous economic power that global acting data companies generate from billions of revenues, it seems impossible to challenge, even to keep pace with GAFAM (Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon, Microsoft) and FAANG (Facebook, Amazon, Apple, Netflix, and Alphabet). However, the path of digital technology is not a one-way street. In Europe there is a strong and effective infrastructure of non-commercial media funded and controlled by the public, based on a clear public remit, committed to universality, diversity and independence. Wherever it is operating, it provides distinctive quality from commercial media, balances the negative effects of tabloid media – whether online or print – and counteracts the effects of

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filter bubbles created by so called “social media”. Following the BBC’s core remit, Public Service Media “informs, educates and entertains”, reflecting the social, regional, economic, political, cultural and religious diversity and complexities of everyday life, creating public value as a universal service, equally available to everyone, supporting societal awareness, responsibility and citizenship. Even if operating Public Service Media organisations are facing severe challenges, its role in society, its experience and competence qualifies for a most needed alternative to an alarmingly increasing new version of digital capitalism (Fuchs 2021). It would be a mistake not to use the existing infrastructure of Public Service Media for the creation of a Public Service Internet.

spread and already supported by more than 1.200 academics, scientists and media experts worldwide, amongst those Jürgen Habermas and Noam Chomsky. Its vision defines specific quality criteria:

However, transforming traditional Public Service Broadcasting into a globally acting Public Service Internet is definitely not business as usual. On the contrary, it requires a clear vision and substantial and collaborative work from institutions and the commons, from existing Public Service Broadcasters and civil society. The suggestion that Public Service Media content should simply move to commercial platforms operated and controlled by the digital giants is not a sufficient option. Establishing a public service channel on YouTube or Facebook would support the major digital service providers’ cultural centrality and offer no alternative to their operating procedures and business models.

Public Service Internet platforms will be provided by Public Service Media organizations with a not-for-profit imperative and the digital remit to advance information, news, debate, democracy, education, entertainment, participation and creativity with the help of the Internet. Public Service Media should redefine their remit as the digital service to advance information, entertainment, education and democracy by utilizing digital platforms.

We need a new Internet, serving citizenship and democracy. While the contemporary Internet is dominated by monopolies and business interest, the Public Service Internet would focus on public purpose. While the contemporary Internet is under surveillance, the Public Service Internet would be privacy-friendly and transparent. While the contemporary Internet misinforms and separates the public, the Public Service Internet would engage, inform and support citizenship. While the contemporary Internet is driven by the profit principle, the Public Service Internet would put societal needs first. This is why we need to rebuild the Internet.

3. The Public Service Media and Public Service Internet Manifesto On our initiative, an international group of scientists and media experts published a Manifesto for a Public Service Internet. It is globally

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he Public Service Internet is based on existing networks, infrastrucT ture and logistics, as well as competence and experience of Public Service Media. It takes the societal consensus of the public service remit and applies it to the digital age. It creates strong cooperation with civil society, individual media users, citizens, and creative, cultural and educational sectors.

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ublic Service Internet platforms are ideally operated as internatioP nal networks curated by Public Service Media organizations. Public Service Internet platforms cooperate with public organizations (universities, museums, libraries, etc.), civil society, civic and community media, artists, digital commons projects, platform cooperatives and a wide range of quality media. In fact, it creates a public-civic-partnership using societal resources. Public Service Media organizations, together with public interest organizations, create open, public online spaces, which form the Public Service Internet.

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ublic Service Internet platforms provide workspace for high-end jourP nalists. At a safe distance from corporate and political power, they can produce critical investigative journalism and high-quality programs that educate, inform and entertain in ways that reflect the affordances of the digital age and the diversity of society. They engage citizens in new forms of communication that build on the experiences, structures and content of the Public Service Broadcast model and use the creative potential of digital content-production through user participation.

Public Service Internet’s remit will therefore be to create a new Digital Public Service.

• - The Public Service Internet will have to defend its independence to ensure that editorial and creative decisions are separate from governmental and business interest. Safeguarding Public Service Internet’s role as a trusted and independent source of information and analysis as well as a responsible mediator, curator and moderator of independently produced and user-generated content requires transparent procedures of accountability. Such procedures need to be based on clear ethical principles of governance, editorial guidelines and quality control.

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• - The Public Service Internet promotes diversity. Ensuring that the full range of experiences and voices are seen and heard requires renewed commitment to widening the social bases of recruitment. Creative and institutional positions have to be open to minorities underrepresented in mainstream commercial media.

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he Public Service Internet will include, transform and expand the T cultural and educational mission and remit of existing Public Service Broadcasting. Public Service Media emerged alongside an array of other publicly funded cultural institutions such as museums, libraries, art galleries, universities, archives and performance spaces. Public Service Internet will offer an accessible platform for all of these collaborative ventures.

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eflecting the needs of the public and supporting citizenship, Public R Service Media provides the ideal foundation to create and house a new Public Service Search Engine and Platform, directing users to the full range of freely available relevant material produced and curated by public educational and cultural institutions.

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onsequently, data privacy is a core aspect of the Public Service InC ternet. It provides role model practices of data processing. Public Service Internet software are a common good that can be reused for noncommercial purposes. On Public Service Internet platforms, users can manage their data, and download and re-use their self-curated data on other platforms. The digital giants store every click and every online move in order to monitor and monetize behaviour. Public Service Internet platforms minimize and decentralize data storage and have no need to monetize and monitor Internet use. Public Service Internet platforms experiment with new forms of content licencing that advance the cultural and digital commons for not-for-profit and non-commercial purposes.

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he Public Service Internet’s algorithms are publicly controlled. Such T algorithms are open source and transparent. They are programmed in ways that advance the Digital Public Service remit. Public service algorithms are produced by the public and for the public. They help organize the platforms, formats and content of the Public Service Internet by making recommendations and suggestions based on transparent procedures, without advertising, commerce and surveillance. Public service algorithms reflect the diversity of the public and advance accessibility, fairness and inclusivity.

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he Public Service Internet will be driver of change. Its news and enT tertainment provision will pay particular attention to developing innovative styles of media production that highlight, explain and contextualize issues with far-reaching social implications and their possible consequences. Public Service Internet will build on its proven strengths to produce innovative programs and online content that supports children’s educational development, speaks to the full range of young people’s interests and concerns, and provides comprehensive resources for life-long adult learning. In the digital future, as in the past, entertainment, drama and sport will remain central aspects of public cultural expression and social solidarity. Public Service Internet will play a central role in maximizing the social value of public cultural resources.

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he Public Service Internet must provide new opportunities for partiT cipation to safeguard inclusion and democracy. Civil society supports a rich variety of self-organized, collaborative, activity-producing, collective resources, from community choirs to groups protecting wildlife habitats or those campaigning for disadvantaged groups using new forms of digital action, from creating opensource software to contributing to citizen science projects. Public Service Internet will utilize the full range of voluntary engagement and develop new forms of popular participation in key areas such as the production of programs and the creation of Public Service Internet resources.

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ll of this requires a continuous commitment to guaranteed public A funding to ensure that Internet access and Public Service Internet are available to all. Public Service Media and their Public Service Internet Platforms need sustainable funding. The licence fee that sustains Public Service Media is not a mechanism of the past but one for the digital future. The digital licence fee will extend and transform Public Service Media’s licence fee into the digital age.

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J ust as the Internet and public sphere are global, so too should the Public Service Internet and its platforms besides being regional and local also be global. Such platforms can be accessed by anyone, at any time, from anywhere. The Public Service Internet requires a global communications infrastructure. Such a global infrastructure will be independent from commercial and governmental interests, serving citizens and democracy. However, there is no reason why the Public Service Internet should not be created, established, initiated or empowered on both a national and European level. On the contrary, an alternative to the purely commercial-driven Internet needs the power of states, their regulatory framework and access to sustainable funding.

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The existing international infrastructure of Public Service Media has all the potential required to become a key force that advances democratic communications in the digital age. As in the past, the current COVID-19 crisis has demonstrated the indispensability of Public Service Media. Locked down at home to avoid infection, audiences have massively turned to Public Service Media for trusted sources of objective and impartial information, high-quality educational material for home schooling, and diverse entertainment and drama. Public Service Media has used this momentum to prove its competence as an important reference point in times of crisis. Again, the experience that crisis threatens all of us, that democracy and its fundamental resources can easily be endangered, might cause an unexpected, positive turn: the renaissance of the common good in society, in the public sphere, and, consequently, in public communications and media.

Conclusion: Tranform the Internet!

Although it will be an extraordinary challenge to “occupy” the existing Internet with public interest in order to create a new public sphere, an Internet, serving the public, there are good reason to make it happen: global crisis, whether the current “pan- or infodemic”, have clearly shown the urgent need for independent, accountable media serving citizens and democracy. Fighting the pandemic, it became obvious that nations, their governments and societies still have the power to act, intervene, regulate and change course. As trillions of working hours and billions of dollars and euros have been moved and invested in the fight against the virus’s globally spread, there’s no reason why it should be impossible to invest in the quality of the public sphere, serving citizens and safeguarding democracy.

A different media world is possible. Now is the time for a Public Service Internet and revitalized Public Service Media. We call on all media users and experts inside and outside of Public Service Media, in fact all citizens who care for the future of democracy in our countries, to participate in the quest for strengthening Public Service Media and creating a Public Service Internet.

The means of production of Public Service Media are publicly owned.

The production and circulation of content is based on a non-profit logic. Access is universal, as all citizens are given easy access to the content and technologies of Public Service Media. In political terms, Public Service Media offer diverse and inclusive content that promotes political understanding and discourse. In cultural terms, they offer educational content that contributes to the cultural development of individuals and society.

A public and commons-based Internet is possible – an Internet on which people share, communicate, decide, discuss, play, create, criticize, network, collaborate, find, maintain and build friendships, fall in love, entertain themselves and each other, and educate themselves as common activity without corporate mediation.

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The Manifesto, described here, is a vision, a wake-up call. Public communication is more than business, it is a public purpose. More than ever, democratic societies need media and a public sphere reflecting the needs of their citizens. At the same time, the Manifesto is a call for action. It’s a call to save and advance democratic communication by renewing Public Service Media and creating a Public Service Internet: an Internet of the public, by the public and for the public; an Internet that advances instead of threatens democracy and the public sphere, that provides a new and dynamic shared space for connection, exchange and collaboration; an Internet enhancing the public sphere, supporting active citizenship and young creatives, who will build the cultural industries of tomorrow and foster social cohesion.

The full Manifesto is available here: http://bit.ly/psmmanifesto You can sign the Manifesto here: http://bit.ly/signPSManifesto

BIBLIOGRAPHY Fuchs, Christian (2009): Social Networking Sites and the Surveillance Society. A Critical Case Study of the Usage of studiVZ, Facebook, and MySpace by Students in Salzburg in the Context of Electronic Surveillance. Salzburg/Vienna: Research Group UTI. http://fuchs.uti.at/wp-content/ uploads/SNS_Surveillance_Fuchs.pdf [accessed on 26 July 2021] Fuchs, Christian (2021): Social Media: A Critical Introduction. London: Sage. Third edition.

Habermas, Jürgen (1991): The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. netCommons (2018): Survey on Internet Attitudes: Dataset. https://zenodo.org/record/1294040#.YNL0BpMzb8E [accessed on 26 July 2021] Splichal, Slavko (2007): Does History Matter? Grasping the Idea of Public Service at its Roots. In: From Public Service Broadcasting to Public Service Media. RIPE@2007, ed.s Gregory Ferrell Lowe and Jo Bardoel, pp. 237–256. Göteborg: Nordicom.

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A L R E A D Y P U B L I S H E D I N “ T E X T E ”:

An evaluation of public broadcasting in the international context

Public service media in Europe at times of crises: Some reflections

Anthony Mills, Texte 4

Alessandra D’Arma, Texte 13

A search for quality – Journalism from the vantage point of the user*

Recharging public service media discourse: Diversity focus

Irene Costera Meijer, Texte 13

Kristina Juraitè, Texte 13

A state of emergency

Snatch the public service!

Rubina Möhring, Texte 9

Sandra Bašic Hrvatin, Texte 13

Channelling diversity

The challenge of digitalization to the Bulgarian public service media*

Gunilla Hultén, Texte 13

Creating public value in a digital media landscape

Lilia Raycheva, Texte 13

Inta Brikše, Texte 13

The challenge of maintaining community in the face of the market

Crisis or dismantlement?

Zrinjka Peruško, Texte 13

Isabel Fernández-Alonso and Marc Espin, Texte 13

The diversity of musical expression

Eurovision and the “new” Europe

Harald Huber, Texte 14

Karen Fricker, Texte 14

The four horsemen of the post-broadcast era

Evolving PSB core values: The maltese experience

Marko Ala-Fossi, Texte 13

Joseph Borg, Texte 13

Greek public media in Turmoil Marc Gruber, Texte 9

How important shall public service media be in the European digital media age?

Roderich Flynn, Texte 13

Le face à face public-privé: la regulation, entre les règlements et la concurrence Francis Balle, Texte 13

Majorities and minorities Vasilis Vasilopoulos, Texte 9

>>MyBBC<<, in the digital media age Lizzie Jackson, Texte 13

Necessary for a liberal democracy

The international value of public broadcasting Alison Bethel McKenzie, Texte I

The plea for history and the return to Europe Dana Mustata, Texte 13

The present and future of PSM und austerity: The case of CYBY Lia-Paschalia Spyridou and Dimitra L. Milioni, Texte 13

The price to pay Ernst Gelegs, Texte 9

The <<SuccERT>> story Annita Paschalinou, Texte 9

The unity of plurality Werner Jauk, Texte 14

Three challenges and a fine kept balance

Andrej Školkay, Texte 13

Anker Brink Lund and Christian S. Nissen, Texte 13

No signal

Tolerant creativity and innovative art

Hans Laroes, Texte 9

Ludovit Garzik, Texte 14

Pluralism and public service media

Transnational television

Petros Iosifidis, Texte 13

Kati Förster and M. Bjørn von Rimscha, Texte 14

Public media is the pillar of europeanism that unifies all states and nations

We are all Greeks

Maarja Lõhmus, Texte 13

When the self-evident is endangered

Public service broadcasting in Hungary: A mission impossible?

Kostas Argyros, Texte 9

Katharine Sarikakis, Texte 9

Péter Bajomi-Lázàr, Texte 13

Whiter public service entertainment – or how it helped to save the future of PSM

Public service media: A means to an end

Mikko Sihvonen, Texte 13

Caroline Pauwels and Karen Donders, Texte 13

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