Public Service Media in Europe

VALUE TEXTE

PUBLIC SERVICE MEDIA IN EUROPE

THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC SERVICE MEDIA IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

INDIVIDUAL VALUE TRUST SERVICE ENTERTAINMENT EDUCATION AND SCIENCE RESPONSIBILITY

QUALITY DIMENSIONS

SOCIAL VALUE

DIVERSITY ORIENTATION INTEGRATION RESPONSIVENESS CULTURE

INTERNATIONAL VALUE

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

NATION VALUE IDENTITY

ADDED VALUE FEDERALISM

CORPORATE VALUE INNOVATION TRANSPARENCY COMPETENCE

In order to define distinctive media quality Austrian Broadcasting Corporation has created a structure of five Quality Dimensions. Comprehensive media production in TV, radio and online is described along 18 categories to prove how ORF fulfills its Public Service Mission in the context of the current media environment and its challenges. More information, statements and documents you may find on http://zukunft.ORF.at .

PUBLISHED AND PRODUCED BY: Österreichischer Rundfunk, ORF Hugo-Portisch-Gasse 1, 1136 Wien

DESIGN: ORF Marketing & Creation GmbH & Co KG

RESPONSIBLE: ORF-Generaldirektion Public Value

PRINTED BY: ORF Druckerei

© ORF 2024 Send reviews and hints to: zukunft@ORF.at

THE WAY FORWARD.

There is much at stake in Europe these days: Alarming effects of climate change are threatening all countries, social unrest and tensions are supporting the segmentation and polarization of societies, increasing populism and illiberal democracy are affecting the political arena, the war in Ukraine has ended a period of security and peace in Europe. What most of us expected as given for granted is dramatically at stake. At the same time digital transformation creates new dimensions of insecurity. Artificial Intelligence enabling new and fascinating opportunities are revealing an unfriendly face of technological innovation. Filter bubbles and Hate Speech endanger the individual as well as the public discourse of citizens, uncontrolled algorithms owned and used by a handful of global acting companies are increasingly influencing the public sphere of European societies. What has been considered a transformation turns out to be a massive disruption of media economy and media perception. The visions of more freedom, more democracy and more social welfare have been replaced by fear and insecurity.

Since its first years after World War II Public Service Media has been a stable European institution in media, a backbone of trusted information and entertainment, a media infrastructure beyond state control and business interest, media for the common good creating Public Value instead of Shareholder Value, media supporting democracy and citizenship. Today however, PSM is challenged more than ever: Right wing parties are fiercely attacking its journalists, public funding is questioned, governments misuse their power threatening the independence of PSM, social media of global giants endanger its relevance.

How can PSM react? How can it resist? How can it face the enormous dynamics of digital transformation? How can PSM remain a trusted source of information and quality entertainment? And most important: How can it be useful for Europe, its citizens and democracy?

These questions are heavily discussed when the Public Value representatives of ARD, ZDF, SRG and ORF regularly meet, in close cooperation with the EBU. As a matter of fact, PSM are joining forces in many ways when it comes to define, to produce, evaluate, and communicate the distinctive quality of PSM.

Inspired by the elections to the EU Parliament in June 2024 we decided to have a look at the European dimension of PSM seen from external expertise. We invited scientists from all over Europe to reflect and

comment: What is the role of PSM amid all social and technological changes? How can it resist obvious challenges and support the public sphere of European democratic societies in the future?

The contributions published here do not represent the position of each national PSM, in fact they express a diverse and critical perspective of independent European media experts. Their comments might inspire the debate about the Future of PSM and its role for Europe.

Despite all challenges PSM is a powerful European infrastructure of media. Contrary to its national and international commercial competitors it is based on Public Mission, supported by Public Funding and most important guaranteeing Public Control. Its Public Value may become a substantial contribution to create a safe and trusted space in media and help to regain the power of democracy and citizenship in Europe.

KLAUS UNTERBERGER KONRAD MITSCHKA ORF GENERALDIREKTION PUBLIC VALUE

AUSTRIA GATEKEEPER DIVERSITY AND CONTENT MODERATION IN THE DIGITAL COMMUNICATION SPACE

BELGIUM

PRESERVING AND EXTENDING UNIVERSALITY IN THE PLATFORM

BULGARIA

PUBLIC SERVICE MEDIA SUPPORTING VITALITY OF BULGARIAN DEMOCRACY

STANDING UP FOR PUBLIC SERVICE MEDIA – THE PILLAR OF ACCOUNTABLE AND TRUSTWORTHY SERVICE OF INFORMATION AND KNOWLEDGE

IN CYPRUS: ADAPTING TO AFFORDANCES AND AUDIENCES

BUILDING AND EXPERIENCING MEDIA TRUST IN THE NORDICS: VIEWS OF PROFESSIONALS AND AUDIENCES

DR. IN MINNA HOROWITZ, UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI & MIKKO GRÖNLUND, MSC, UNIVERSITY OF TURKU & DR. IN

PUTTING THE SOVEREIGN AT THE CENTRE

GERMANY

EUROPEAN ELECTIONS. PUBLIC MEDIA‘S FINEST HOUR?

GREECE

HELLAS – TRUTH, COURAGE AND GOVERNANCE

UNIV.-PROF. IN DR. IN KATHARINE SARIKAKIS, UNIVERSITÄT WIEN ............................................................

HUNGARY

WHERE IS THE PUBLIC VALUE HERE?

PROF.DR. GÁBOR POLYÁK EÖTVÖS, LÓRÁND UNIVERSITY &

ASS.PROF. IN ÁGNES URBÁN, PHD, CORVINUS UNIVERSITY OF BUDAPEST ...............................................

IRELAND

THE ROLE OF PUBLIC SERVICE MEDIA IN EUROPE

DR. IN EILEEN CULLOTY, DUBLIN CITY UNIVERSITY ................................................................................

ITALY

A COHESIVE VOICE FOR EUROPE:

PUBLIC SERVICE MEDIA RESPONDING TO CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES

FLAVIA BARCA, MA, MEDIA CONSULTANT .........................................................................................

LATVIA

UNIFICATION OF LATVIAN PUBLIC MEDIA IN THE SHADOW OF STATE LANGUAGE DISCOURSE AND AGGRESSION

MG.SC.SOC. RAIVIS VILŪNS & MG.SC.SOC. MĀRTIŅŠ PRIČINS

LITHUANIA

FINDING DIALOGUE AMIDST DISAGREEMENTS:

PUBLIC SERVICE MEDIA INSIGHTS FROM THE BALTIC STATES

PROF. IN AUKSĖ BALČYTIENĖ PHD, VYTAUTAS MAGNUS UNIVERSITY

LUXEMBOURG

WHAT SHOULD THE PUBLIC SERVICE DO IN THE MEDIA SECTOR?

PHILIPPE DUMONG, CONSEIL DE PRESSE LUXEMBOURG

MALTA

WHAT IS THE ROLE OF PSM IN A DIGITAL FUTURE EUROPE?

DR. IN JOANNA SPITERI, PHD, MALTA BROADCASTING AUTHORITY

NETHERLANDS

CHALLENGING TIMES

ASS.PROF.DR. MAURICE VERGEER, RADBOUD UNIVERSITY

POLAND

PUBLIC SERVICE, NO DELIBERATION

PROF.DR. MICHAŁ GŁOWACKI, UNIVERSITY OF WARSAW ....................................................................

PORTUGAL

PUBLIC

AND MEDIA LITERACY

DR. JOÃO RICARDO PINTO, UNIVERSIDADE NOVA DE LISBOA

ROMANIA

YESTERDAY’S PROPAGANDA, TODAY’S DISINFORMATION: LEGACIES OF ROMANIAN PUBLIC BROADCASTING

ASS.PROF. IN DR. IN DANA

SLOWENIA

IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

SLOVAKIA

STRUGGLING TO NAVIGATE CHALLENGES AND PRESERVE INTEGRITY

SPAIN

SPECIFIC FEATURES OF A MEDIA MODEL IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT

SWEDEN

FAR RIGHT AND PUBLIC BROADCASTING: THE CASE OF SWEDEN JOSEF HIEN, PHD, MID SWEDEN UNIVERSITY AND INSTITUTE FOR FUTURE STUDIES

THE ROLE OF ITS PUBLIC SERVICE BROADCASTER –CURRENTLY A

–

FREEDOM AS A DEMOCRATIC KEYSTONE:

SUMMARY OF THE OSCE REPRESENTATIVE ON FREEDOM OF THE MEDIA’S WORK IN THE BROADER ELECTORAL CONTEXT TERESA RIBEIRO, FIFTH OSCE REPRESENTATIVE ON FREEDOM OF THE MEDIA

OCCUPY INTERNET: WHY WE NEED A PUBLIC SERVICE INTERNET

DR. KLAUS UNTERBERGER, ORF & UNIV.-PROF. DR. CHRISTIAN FUCHS,

GATEKEEPER DIVERSITY AND CONTENT MODERATION IN THE DIGITAL COMMUNICATION SPACE

DR. IN NATASCHA ZEITEL-BANK UNIVERSITY OF INNSBRUCK

„A lie has already circled the globe three times before the truth puts on its shoes.” This traditional quote from Mark Twain could not be more fitting for the challenges of finding, processing and communicating the truth in the digital communication space. The well-known saying „Many cooks spoil the broth” is also applicable. Both are a good way to describe the enormous speed of information transfer with a new complexity of senders and recipients in a fragmented media environment. The focus of interest and thus of the following explanations is therefore the question: What role does public service broadcasting (ORF) play with regard to gatekeeper diversity and content moderation in the digital communication space? The following aspects are analyzed:

1. the identification of ‚gatekeepers‘, 2. the nature and transparency of content moderation by ‚gatekeepers‘, also known as ‚content moderation‘, 3. the effects of ‚gatekeeper‘ diversity on public service broadcasting (ORF), 4. the accompanying EU legislation to curb the platform economy with a 5. concluding conclusion and outlook.

It is evident that the ‚gatekeeper‘ diversity in particular represents an opportunity for the ORF as a public broadcaster in a fragmented media environment to consolidate its position as a traditional ‚gatekeeper‘. However, the ORF will be able to assert its social orientation function in the future and emerge stronger in the competition for attention if it succeeds in mastering the organizational and digital adaptation processes that are still outstanding in order to win over the younger generation in particular. This development is being flanked by European legislation, particularly in view of the upcoming EU elections.

1. gatekeeper diversity in the digital communication space

The term ‚gatekeeper‘ stands for lock keeper who plays an important role in the decision selection process (White, 1950, 383-390). With the advent of the Internet and the new participatory possibilities in the form of user-generated content (OECD, 2009), the traditional (mass) media have lost their monopoly function; we thus find ourselves in a

new ‚gatekeeper‘ diversity. ‚Gatekeeping‘ and thus the limitation of the amount of information by selecting topics deemed worthy of communication is being expanded through collaborative forms of interaction at the individual level, but also at the meso level through platform economics focused on generating attention. In 2023 the European Commission also designate the operators of very large online platforms and large search engine providers (‚Very Large Online Platforms‘ - VLOPs and ‚Very Large Online Search Engines‘ - VLOSEs) as gatekeepers for the first time as part of the Digital Markets Act (Official Journal of the EU, 12.10.2022) and the Digital Services Act (Official Journal of the EU, 27.10.2022). At the individual level, there is also a constant change of perspective between sender and receiver in the digital communication space: Digital content is not only consumed, but also produced unfiltered. The individual thus becomes a ‚prosumer‘ and is the third ‚gatekeeper‘ after the traditional media and the very large platforms. The developments mentioned thus affect all levels of content production and forms of interaction in the digital communication space: the macro level in the form of socially binding control mechanisms within the framework of European legislation, the organizational meso level (traditional media and platforms) and the individual, actor-related level (micro level).

2. type and transparency of content moderation (‚content moderation‘)

The economically driven platforms as information providers and therefore broadcasters earn money by attracting attention. The aim is to keep the individual in the ‚system‘ on social media channels for as long as possible using individually tailored content. This is also known as the ‚rabbit hole effect‘ (Woolley & Sharif, 2021). It is, so to speak, about long-term ‚customer loyalty‘ with the help of algorithmic control. In the case of VLOPs and VLOSEs, content moderation does not focus on the quality of information, journalistic due diligence and transparency, but rather on algorithm-controlled, personality-based playouts. This in turn leads to various forms of influence and confusion on the recipient or individual level. There is an increased risk of reckless consumption of effect-generating disinformation or strategic manipulation on the recipient side, which will be further intensified in the future by the use of artificial intelligence (AI), e.g. ‚deep fake‘ (word combination of ‚deep learning‘ and ‚fake‘, saferinternet, n.d.).

‚Deepfakes‘ are photos, videos or audio files that are deliberately altered with the help of artificial intelligence. These developments and interactions between the individual and platform meso levels are parti-

cularly noteworthy in light of the fact that social media is the most important source of news for around two thirds (59%) of all young people in Europe aged between 15 and 24 (European Parliament, 2023). The state of multiple crises over several years has led to a further effect on media impact: More than a third of people (36%) avoid information. They have literally become tired of consuming news due to the variety and associated confusion in times of ‚bad news‘ or they avoid it altogether due to its depressing effect (‚news-avoiding‘) (Reuters Digital News Report 2023, 11, 22; ORF, 2020).

3. The impact on public service broadcasting (ORF)

While very large platform and search engine operators as ‚gatekeepers‘ were obliged by the European Commission for the first time at the end of 2023 to disclose the type of ‚content moderation‘ determined by algorithms in a generally accessible transparency database (European Commission, n.d.) and the ‚prosumer‘ as another ‚gatekeeper‘ is struggling with ‚information overload‘ and information fatigue, compliance with due diligence criteria in the generation of information for quality media remains a central component of journalistic self-image. For public broadcasters such as the ORF, this means the opportunity not only to be recognized as one of the central gatekeepers in a digital and fragmented communication space that has become confusing, but also to be recognized as such in society in the long term. This is certainly also a major challenge. According to the Reuters Digital News Report (Nielsen & Fletcher, 2023, 44), approval of public service media varies considerably in European countries: in Finland, two thirds of respondents (60%) see public service broadcasting as important for themselves and almost three quarters of all respondents (72%) as important for society as a whole. Austria, and therefore the ORF, on the other hand, came second to last, ahead of Spain, with only 16% in terms of personal importance and around a third (29%) in terms of importance for society as a whole. This may also be due to the fact that although many people recognize that the news selection based on algorithms in social media is not perfect, the selection by ‚editorial selection‘ is not considered better either (Reuters Digital News Report, 35). In addition, the young generation that has grown up with social media often prefers to be impressed by influencers rather than media professionals, even when it comes to news (Reuters Digital News Report, 10).

Consequently, Austria must create a visible and, above all, effective legal course towards de-politicization and new opportunities for the use of (cross-border) digitalization processes in the media sector. At the same time, it is necessary to face up to competition with private media

providers in the area of information quality. In Germany, the independent ‚Council for the Future Development of Public Broadcasting‘ presented a comprehensive report on 18.01.2024 with some revolutionary proposals. A positive aspect in the area of public perception is that public service broadcasting, and therefore also ORF, is seen as an indispensable anchor of democratic policy in the information landscape. There is concern about media threats from various sides both at the actor level and at the macro level of the European Union (European Commission, December 2023, 14): From a European perspective, 38 percent of European citizens see ‚false and / or misleading information‘ online and offline as a serious threat to democracy (‚most serious threats) and about one in five (22 percent) face ‚propaganda and false/misleading information‘ from a non-democratic foreign source. Especially in times of crisis and uncertainty, the reliability of public broadcasters with regard to careful ‚content moderation‘ becomes apparent.

However, the image at the actor level does not seem to be stable, but diffuse (see also Reuters Digital News Report, 33, 35) and fluctuates - as the above explanations have shown - at ORF between being unimportant for me and society and an important bulwark against forces destabilizing democracy at home and abroad. Especially ‚news avoiders‘ represent an important target group to be mobilized, because they are more interested in „solutions based journalism and less interested in the big stories of the day” (Reuters Digital News Report, 11).

4. accompanying EU legislation

The transparent selection of information, careful examination and responsible delivery of content to the recipient is of central importance for a democracy. This democratic policy insight has also been emphasized repeatedly by the European Union with corresponding legislation, especially in recent years, most recently in the aforementioned Digital Services Act (DSA), the Digital Markets Act (DMA), the Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act) (European Commission, 21. 04.2021, European Commission, 2023, the Media Freedom Act (European Parliament, 13.03.2024) and the Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising Act, which came into force on 01.04.2024 (Official Journal of the EU, 13.03.2024). The European Commission thus gives the impression of wanting to take decisive action against undesirable developments in the digital communication space: On March 4, 2024, for example, a fine of 1.8 billion euros was imposed on Apple for anti-competitive behavior (European Commission, March 4, 2024); in addition, the European Commission asked nine major technology platforms to explain how their practices in the field of generative artificial intelligence are com-

patible with the Digital Services Act (Bing, Google Search, Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat, TikTok, YouTube, X, LinkedIn) (European Commission, March 14, 2024).

These increased legislative activities in recent years alone testify to the need for legal flanking measures not only at national level, but above all at European level. These serve as a legal safeguard against disruptions and destroyers of fundamental democratic values at home and abroad, especially in view of important elections at all political levels. And they also support the public broadcasters in their general duty to provide truthful information.

5. Outlook

‚Gatekeeper‘ diversity combined with uncontrolled or unchecked moderation of content and new trends of news avoidance underline more than ever the necessity of ‚public service media‘ as an anchor of orientation in the ‚information jungle‘ (e.g. Reuters Digital News Report 2023, 26; European Parliament, 2023).

ORF can play to its strengths by consistently securing comprehensible content, as a seal of quality, so to speak, in times of gatekeeper diversity in a fragmented media environment. However, this unique selling point as the only public broadcaster in Austria must be accompanied by the fulfilment of corresponding (legal) adjustments (keyword: depoliticization, streamlining, digitalization).

Only then can sustainable understanding and recognition be maintained or created across the entire spectrum of society. Consequently, it must be possible to convince people, especially the young target group, that ‚public service media‘ are of central importance for democracy in times of gatekeeper diversity and manipulative efforts at all levels, even if this may not seem easy: „There are no simple solutions to what is a multifaceted story of disconnection and low engagement in a high-choice digital environment, but our data suggest that less sensationalist, less negative, and more explanatory approaches might help” (Reuters Digital News Report, 24).

List of sources

Official Journal of the EU (12.10.2022): Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of September 14, 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital Markets Act). Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/DE/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2022.265.01.0001.01.DEU

Official Journal of the EU (27.10.2022): Regulation of the European Parliament 2022/2065 and of the Council of October 19, 2022 on a single market for digital services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC

(Digital Services Act). Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/DE/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ .L_.2022.277.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AL%3A2022%3A277%3ATOC

Official Journal of the EU (13.03.2024): Regulation (EU) 2024/900 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2024 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising, 2024/900. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/DE/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L_202400900

European Commission (21.04.2021): Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down harmonized rules on Artificial Intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act) and amending certain Union acts, Com (2021) 206 final, Brussels. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource. html?uri=cellar:e0649735-a372-11eb-9585-01aa75ed71a1.0019.02/DOC_1&format=PDF

European Commission (n.d.): European Centre for Algorithmic Transparency (ECAT): https://algorithmic-transparency.ec.europa.eu/about_en sowie Transparenzdatenbank https://transparency.dsa.ec.europa.eu/statement

European Commission (December 2023): Flash Eurobarometer Report 522, Threats for Democracy. doi:10.2792/455273. Abrufbar unter: https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2966

European Commission (2023): Digital Strategy, AI Regulatory Framework. Available ater: https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/regulatory-framework-ai

European Commission (04.03.2024): Press Corner. Commission imposes fine of EUR 1.8 billion on Apple for anti-trust app store rules for music streaming providers, press release of March 04, 2024. Available at: https:// ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/de/ip_24_1161

European Commission (14.03.2024): Presscorner, Daily News 14/03/24, Brussels, Commission opens formal proceedings against AliExpress under the Digital Services Act, Commission sends request for information to LinkedIn on potentially targeted advertising based on sensitive data under Digital Services Act, Commission sends requests for information on generative AI risks to 6 Very Large Online Platforms and 2 Very Large Online Search Engines under the Digital Services Act. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/mex_24_1486

European Parliament (2023): Public Opinion Monitoring Unit, Media & News Survey, Most trusted Media Sources, DOI: 10.2861/146001. Available at: https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/3153

European Parliament (13.03.2024): Media Freedom Act: A new bill to protect EU journalists and press freedom, Press Release. Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20240308IPR19014/ media-freedom-act-a-new-bill-to-protect-eu-journalists-and-press-freedom Nielsen, R.K. and Fletcher, R. (2023): The Importance of Public Service Media for Individuals and for Society. In: Reuters Digital News Report, chapter 2.4. Difference between proportion that think that Public Service Media is important vs. unimportant, 44. Available at: https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/digital-newsreport/2023

OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) (12.04.2007): Participative Web: UserCreated Content, Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry), Committee for Information, Computer and Communication Policy, Working Party on the Information Economy, Unclassified DSTI/ICCP/IE(2006)7/ FINAL. Available at: https://web-archive.oecd.org/2012-06-15/135484-38393115.pdf

ORF (2020): Public Value Annual Study, Public Law Quality in Discourse, Information Deprivation and News-Avoiding, Public Value Directorate General. Available at: https://zukunft.orf.at/show_content. php?sid=147&pvi_id=2301&pvi_medientyp=t&oti_tag=Studie

Council for the Future Development of Public Service Broadcasting (18.01.2024): Report of the Council for the Future Development of Public Service Broadcasting. Available at: https://rundfunkkommission.rlp.de/fileadmin/rundfunkkommission/Dokumente/Zukunftsrat/ZR_Bericht_18.1.2024.pdf

Reuters Digital News Report (2023): Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism. DOI: 10.60625/risj-p6eshb13. Available at: https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/digital-news-report/2023 Saferinternet (n.d.): Deepfake. Available at: https://www.saferinternet.at/faq/informationskompetenz/wasist-ein-deepfake White, D.M. (1950): The Gate Keeper: A Case Study in the Selection of News. In: Journalism Quarterly 27, 950, p. 383–390. Woolley, K. and Sharif, Marissa A. (2021): Down a Rabbit Hole: How Prior Media Consumption Shapes Subsequent Media Consumption, in: Journal of Marketing Research, Volume 59, Issue 3 https://doi. org/10.1177/00222437211055403

PRESERVING AND EXTENDING UNIVERSALITY IN THE PLATFORM AGE

PROF. TIM RAATS, PHD VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT BRUSSEL

As Public Service Media (PSM) are repositioning themselves within the platform age (d’Arma et al., 2021), a clear shift to a ‚digital first‘ or ‚online first‘ approach for PSM is advocated as crucial for their survival. Central to this online-first strategy are the video-on-demand and news portals, which will serve as the main entry point for accessing PSM content. This strategy coincides with a rebranding of the existing portfolio, embracing user interface and functionalities, along with a shifted content commissioning strategy and reliance on recommender systems to personalize content and meet adjusted viewer expectations shaped by the popularity of global streaming services (Iordache & Raats, 2023). Recommender systems and algorithms, as PSM argue, would better guide audiences and increase diversity of consumption by recommending a broader range of news or program offerings in catalogs or news portals. The European Broadcasting Union has invested significant effort to align different experiments on these so-called ‚Public service algorithms‘ or ‚taste-broadening algorithms‘ (Sørensen, 2020). The findings of recent research within the PSM-AP project1, show how various public broadcasters tie the use of algorithms in their policy rhetoric to better fulfilling the public remit. Yet, they remain vague on what this actually implies (Martin & Johnson, 2024).

In that respect, the emphasis PSM put on curation and algorithms to safeguard or even improve the guidance that used to be achieved through clever programming strategies (Bruun, 2021) echoes the same kind of techno-optimism that was visible in PSM strategy in the 2000s. Back then, the shift from Public Service Broadcasting to Public Service Media, enabled by the rise of digital services, coincided with ideas and promises of far more ambitious audience interaction and new conceptions of ‘universality’. Additional online services were legitimized through arguments of being able to devote much more attention and space to specific target groups or specific core tasks as culture, inclusion and education. Initiatives such as thematic digital channels or websites for culture, debate, and education were often put forward by public media to defend a strong online presence and present an ideal of harnessing the full potential of the public service remit. Most scholars

1 See: https://psm-ap.com.

working on PSM have always defended an ‘all things to all people, on all platforms any time’ strategy (Looms, 2006). However, these scholars also stressed the importance of truly leveraging digital technology not only to continue what public broadcasters had been doing for so long but also to better fulfill audience needs and extend the reach and fulfillment of the public remit. Karol Jakubowicz, in his work (2007) – centered around a credo formulated as ‘keep the essence, change everything else’ – prescribed how the online and digital could truly innovate and improve. Likewise, the work of Graham Murdock, who envisioned a role for PSM as central nodes in a networked ‘digital commons’, remains crucial and as relevant today as it was then (Murdock, 2005). The problem lies in the fact that, for a large number of PSM, the promises of harnessing the full potential of online to expand their core tasks remained limited at best, or worse, served as an excuse to justify expansion of online activities. Many broadcasters in the 2000s never fully realized their ambitions due to limited funding on one hand and a lack of a true renewed understanding of ‘universality’ and its implications and true potential in an online age on the other hand.

Recent scholarly work devotes a lot of attention to processes of platformization and what a shift towards a digital-first and portal-central logic would mean for universality (e.g., Michalis, 2022). This increasing body of research convincingly shows how a portal strategy implies much more than just an add-on for public media. Scholars have demonstrated how online-first strategies have implications that affect the production, commissioning, branding, delivery of content, internal organization of departments, and how audience performance and engagement are measured. A lot of the discussions in academic work and PSM strategy revolve around the question of whether an online or digital-first logic can be reconciled with the idea of universality. This shift is mostly defended to meet changing audience expectations and to reach young audiences who have increasingly turned to global streamers and social media, which now dominate media and news repertoires. However, a true vision for PSM to reclaim universality needs to go further than - admittedly, still vague - mentions of recommender systems‘ ability to address audiences, and a portal strategy to capture the heart of younger audiences. It is, for one, important not to overlook that diverse content can only be consumed if audiences can navigate their way to the portal. Various factors, often linked to socio-economic status or social context, influence whether audiences will actually engage with particular content. Taste-broadening algorithms are in that sense crucial but not the panacea for achieving full universality.

This requires, firstly, a recognition that PSM have never truly been ‘universal’. Audience universality, for decades, has been pursued through a combination of genre diversity, brand segmentation, and specific niche content for target audiences. However, PSM have not been reaching all audiences and are increasingly losing particular segments of the audience. The COVID-19 pandemic has markedly shown how - despite an uptake in viewing ratings and temporary increases in trust in traditional television news - some audiences are never reached. These ‘hidden audiences’ go well beyond young people or audiences with different ethnic-cultural backgrounds. They include audiences struggling with various vulnerabilities, from lack of education to language and literacy problems, citizens in vulnerable socio-economic situations, or vulnerable psychological contexts. Realizing which audiences PSM fail to reach and engaging with them is a crucial first step. This is particularly pressing in times of increased polarization and societal complexity, in which political leaders often fail - willingly or not - to demonstrate that complexity. Delivering trustworthy and accessible news based on different audience demands implies a much stronger focus on groups with the lowest or non-existent media repertoire. The explosion of fake news and disinformation, coupled with eroding citizen trust in legacy media, has only emphasized this need. Important, yet often overlooked, alliances can be formed with various intermediaries and civil society organizations already working with vulnerable audiences and finding ways to lower barriers to reach them. As researchers, we often fail to capture them in data collection and research.

A second step requires abandoning some long-established conceptions of information provision. Information and the tools to participate in democratic societies might not necessarily reach vulnerable audiences by chopping news into palatable, ‘snackable’ Instagram feeds, but might, for example, be as valuable for particular audiences with lower media repertoires, when integrated across formats such as a drama series. Understanding the needs and expectations of those audiences, bottom-up and beyond existing market and audience research, with true efforts to reach the unreachable, is crucial. Identifying these needs and translating them into programming strategies requires a PSM strategy where the core tasks of informing, educating, and entertaining are not limited by genre but are entrenched across all genres and services. For media scholars, the ‘capabilities’ approach presented in the work of Amit Schejter could serve as an example and way forward to better conceptualize the viewing needs of the marginalized, as it clearly sets out from a bottom-up perspective of audience needs rather than how existing remits could work for particular audiences (Scheijter, 2023).

A third factor is the need for a diversified approach in the production and provision of content, tailored to the varying expectations of an increasingly complex and diversified audience. VRT in Flanders has traditionally aimed to make its evening news as broad and accessible as possible. However, conversations with civil society organizations reveal that many of their most vulnerable target groups struggle with the information density and language (Raats et al., 2020). Further simplifying the evening news to enhance accessibility might alienate other viewers. And, ideally, audiences with a higher media repertoire should also be engaged with content that has much more depth and detail than the evening news alone. Achieving this dual strategy requires making tough choices, especially amidst cutbacks and rationalization efforts, as it entails balancing an increased emphasis on particular groups while still reaching the masses. In the face of these challenges, algorithms and artificial intelligence could potentially play a crucial role in diversifying the public offering by providing adjusted and accessible content for different audience needs. This intersection of technological optimism and necessary transformation, as advocated by Karol Jakubowicz and many scholars, underscores the importance of public media fully embracing technological potential. This entails not only successfully migrating audiences from linear to online platforms but also achieving a new form of audience universality rooted in a deeper understanding of audience needs. This might eventually also necessitate redefining universality from “most-of-the-people most-ofthe-time” to a credo of “all-of-the-people, some-of-the-time”.”

All this also entails some key responsibilities from policymakers. One: a future-proof constellation for PSM only works through a public service mandate that gives room to experiment and divert for long standing audience ratings and that are not being held accountable on audience metrics which have worked in the past but might not be as relevant anymore tomorrow. Two: PSM’s online platforms might be as diverse and actively guiding audiences to different public media content, yet if these services are not visible, they are not universal. The next couple of years will require significant policy attention into the discoverability and prominence of PSM content. Some countries (UK, Australia, France, Germany, Italy) have already included due prominence measures to increase visibility of public service media. Regulation is likely to be required to ensure visibility of public media on smart-tv interfaces, smartphones, smart speakers. Three: PSM universality can only exist with a continued or increased investing in media literacy, digital literacy and data literacy programs that go beyond educating kids and youngsters, but also targeting the most vulnerable of audience groups.

Four: understanding the needs of particular vulnerable audiences might also imply – as some findings suggest – that linear tv and radio do continue to play an important role for reaching particular audiences, as BBC3’s shift from linear to online and back to linear has already showed many years ago. A switch to digital first needs to be encouraged, a switch to digital only requires much more carefulness. Lastly, and mos importantly, a renewed and more ambitious understanding of universality can only be achieved by policymakers that recognize the importance of experiment, of a diversified approach, of reaching everyone, but also engaging everyone. A strategy that is quintessential for PSM to truly fulfil their remit in complex democratic societies. But it is also a strategy that requires the financial leeway to do so. (Raats et al. 2022). A strategy imposing cutbacks, in essence, implies a strategy where universality in the next decade boils down to an erosion of its very foundations. In that scenario, redefining universality will result in reaching and engaging “some-of-the-people, some-of-the-time”.

Embracing universality to its fullest, as public media, as scholars and as democratic parties, has never been more important than today.

References

1. D’Arma, A., Raats, T. & J. Steemers (2021). Public Service Media in the Age of SVoDs: A Comparative Study of PSM Strategic Responses in Flanders, Italy and the UK. Media, Culture and Society, 43(4): 687-700.

2. Bruun, H. (2021). From scheduling to trans-programming. Media, Culture & Society, 43(4), 613-628. https://doi.org/10.1177/0163443720957556

3. Iordache, C. & Raats, T. (2023). The platformization of public service media: A comparative analysis of five BVOD services in Western and Northern Europe. In: International Journal of Media and Cultural Politics, 9(1): 3-22. doi.org/10.1386/macp_00070_1

4. Looms, P.O. (2006). Public service media: all things to all people – on all platform, anytime? In: Nissen, C.S. (ed.). Making a difference: public service broadcasting in the European landscape. Eistleigh: John Libbey Publishing, pp. 95-114.

5. Martin, D. & Johnson, C. (2023). Universality: A Battleground for UK Public Service Media in the Platform Age, 95(1): 25-34, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-923X.13342.

6. Michalis, M. (2022). Public service broadcasting in the online television environment: The case for PSB VoD players and the role of policy focusing on the BBC iPlayer. International Journal of Communication, 16, 525544.

7. Murdock, G. (2005). Building the Digital Commons. Public Broadcasting in the Age of the Internet. In Lowe, G.F. & Jauert, P. (eds.). Cultural Dilemmas in Public Service Broadcasting. Ripe@2005. Göteborg, Nordicom, pp. 213-230.

8. Raats, T.; Evens T., Appeltans, A.. & S. Tintel (2020). Stakeholderbevraging ter voorbereiding van de nieuwe beheersovereenkomst van de VRT met de Vlaamse Regering. Brussel, imec-SMIT, VUB i.s.m. imec-mict, UGent.

9. Schejter, A. M. (2022). ‘It is not good for the person to be alone’: The capabilities approach and the right to communicate. Convergence, 28(6), 1826-1840. https://doi.org/10.1177/13548565211022512

10. Sørensen, J. (2020). Personalised universalism in the age of algorithms; In: Savage, P., Mercedes M. & G.F. Lowe (eds). RIPE@2019 Universalism in Public Service Media, 191-205. Gothenborg: Nordicom

11. Raats, T., Ramsey, P. & K. Donders (2022). People, Platforms and Politics: The challenges for public service media in Ireland. In: Journal of Digital Media and Policy, 15(1): 101-121, https://doi.org/10.1386/jdmp_00109_1

| BULGARIA

| PUBLIC SERVICE MEDIA

SUPPORTING VITALITY OF BULGARIAN DEMOCRACY

PROF. IN DR. IN LILIA RAYCHEVA THE ST. KLIMENT OCHRIDSKY SOFIA UNIVERSITY

Following the contemporary intensive social, economic and technological transformations the very paradigm of the media inevitably changes as well, becoming a convergent phenomenon with regard to production and dissemination of content. Audiences also change. Contrary to the notions from the times of the hegemony of the traditional media, that the audience relatively passively and consolidatedly absorbs the messages imposed on it vertically by the editorial structures, modern audiences are dispersed horizontally - they participate in the communication process as prosumers, i.e. they not only accept, but also produce content by creating new patterns of identification. To the specificity of individual media is added the discourse of the platforms on which their messages are transmitted, i.e. the informal social network can exist in parallel with the formal media hierarchy. Despite promising opportunities to stimulate horizontal connections, however, the vertical structure of communication is still predominant. That is, interaction does not coincide with interactivity.

A number of issues are becoming increasingly important, including: freedom of expression and access to information; pluralism of opinions and variety of contents; professional standards and journalistic ethics; transparency of ownership and accountability to the audience; protection of underage and vulnerable social groups; cooperation between regulation, self-regulation and co-regulation; and expansion of the social media.

In this sense public service media nowadays plays a multifaceted role in digital geopolitics, serving as a significant tool for information sovereignty, national identification, cultural preservation, regulatory governance, and counterbalance to commercial media for the sake of the public interest. Its importance is connected with the ability to shape narratives, to influence perceptions, and to uphold democratic values in an increasingly interconnected and contested digital landscape. 48% of the EU citizens select public TV and radio stations (incl. their online presence) as a news source they trust most. For Bulgaria this percentage is 49%, although the country and Greece holds the highest proportion (57%) of news avoiders (European Commission, 2023).

In Bulgaria critical junctures in media developments follow three strands: political, economic, and technological. Politically, the country had to face: firstly, the transition from totalitarian (with limited sovereignty) to democratic type of political system (1989-2006), and secondly, since its EU accession in 2007, it had to cope with the empowerment of a supranational union to directly exercise some of the powers and functions otherwise reserved to member states (i.e. again, with limited state sovereignty). Economically, the country had to meet also with two challenges. Firstly, it had to deal with the transition from centralized, planned, predominantly state owned economy of the Eastern Bloc to market-place type of the economic system of the European Union. Secondly, along with the positive vibes of the EU accession came a ‘rude awakening’ with a number of unfamiliar hurdles. Indeed, the country rejected the monopolization of the state and gained encouraging developments as a result of technological and economic globalization. However, the free movement of capital from western multinational investors (mainly dominated by Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Ireland, the Scandinavian countries, the USA, etc.) brought about the media commercialization. This enhanced the concentration trends in the vulnerable Bulgarian media and advertisement market with emerging media and competition legal framework, which subsequently resulted in the opacity of media ownership. Technologically, the transition from analogue to digital media services after the quick progress of mobile communications, challenged the status quo of the media industry. The fast pace of ICT developments outstripped the timely catching up with the legal and regulatory framework, the modernization of business models, the realignment of professional activities, the psychological and technological adjustment of the audiences for perception and creation of content in the variety of sources and outlets.

Data provided by the National Statistical Institute present the trends for the media developments in the country with a current population of 6.5 mln. The decrease in titles and circulation in print media is notable: in 2022 there were 191 newspapers (dailies – 25) with annual circulation of 102, 819 mln copies. In comparison, prior to the EU accession in 2007 there were 423 newspapers with annual circulation of 310, 023 million copies. The number of radio stations and TV channels marks decline versus the increase in hours broadcasted. While in 2007 there were 222 national television channels with 599 135 hours of programming and 150 radio stations with 591 836 hours of programming, in 2022 they were reduced to 112 TV channels (778 163 hrs.) and 73 radio stations (603 201 hrs.). On the contrary, Internet penetration for households has increased more than four times for the same period: 17 % (2007) to 88.5% (2022) (National, 2022).

Despite the rapid development of ICT and online services, television continues to be the most preferred source of information and entertainment for most Bulgarian households. In addition to traditional media and online-only news sites, using of other social media platforms, as well as networking and microblogging services is becoming more and more popular. The use of online social networks every day or almost every day is 57 % (The EU average is 47% and it ranges from 34% in Germany to 72% in Sweden) (European Commission, 2023). More than 77% of the Bulgarians access Facebook for any purpose and 64% for news; 64%/31% - YouTube; 60%/21% - Viber; 56%/18% - Facebook Messenger; 35%/13% - Instagram; and 30%/12% - TikTok. (Reuters, 2023). https://reutersinstitute.politics. ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2023-06/Digital_News_Report_2023.pdf

In the contemporary complicated geopolitical situation of a country with limited sovereignty within the framework of the EU and NATO and internal political instability (1 regular and 4 early Parliamentary elections have been held 2021/2023, and forthcoming early Parliamentary elections will be scheduled with the European Parliamentary elections in 2024), the sustenance of media environment is essential in order to outline the risks in its developments and to envisage opportunities for their overcoming.

The critical rise of two interrelated processes - politicization and commercionalization of media and corporatism of politics threatens freedom of expression and independence of information sources. The seemingly existing external (structural) pluralism cannot sufficiently provide the necessary internal pluralism (diversity of content and viewpoints available to different social and demographic groups). The Bulgarian legislation imposes a requirement for internal pluralism only to the public service media and not to commercial broadcasters. Private media ownership remains opaque. This provokes rise in self-censorship as an attempt by media owners to secure the favor of government to access public financial resources. The money from the state and municipal budgets, as well as from participation in the communication campaigns of the various European Union funding programs is distributed directly by the state institutions without public transparent procurement. Indeed, the annual ranking for global freedom defines Bulgaria as a free country, with 79 points out of 100 possible. The report, however, notes: “While the media sector remains pluralistic, ownership concentration is a growing problem. The Constitution protects freedom of expression, including for the press, but journalists face threats and pressure from private owners or public media management” (Freedom House, 2023).

The independence of the public service media - the Bulgarian National Radio (BNR) and the Bulgarian National Television (BNT) lacks adequa-

te legal and economic guarantees. Nevertheless, they might play a major role in upholding democracy by fulfilling such key factors as providing accurate, impartial and comprehensive news coverage; promoting civic engagement by fostering more inclusive public discourse; providing a platform for dissenting voices and minority opinions; educating citizens about their rights and responsibilities; and offering tools for critical thinking to promote media literacy against fake news and filter bubbles. By fulfilling these functions, BNR and BNT can contribute significantly to the health and vitality of Bulgarian democracy, fostering an informed, engaged, and empowered citizenry. BNR and BNT might also play a vital role in promoting social cohesion, cultural and ethnic diversity, and countering populist fragmentation of society through various strategies, such as: producing inclusive content that reflects the diversity of Bulgarian society and the marginalized cultural, ethnic, and linguistic groups; upholding journalistic standards of integrity and objectivity to counter misinformation and disinformation, often used by populists to sow division and distrust; and avoiding the risks of trampling on internal media pluralism.

Struggling for financial sustainability PSM media in Bulgaria rely heavily on state budget subsidy and advertising revenue and face competition from digital platforms. To ensure the delivery of quality journalism, it is important to explore alternative revenue models, such as public funding, philanthropic support, and subscription-based channels. By implementing such strategy BNR and BNT can better navigate the challenges posed by global digital giants while fulfilling their mission to serve the public interest and to promote democracy, diversity, and cultural expression. Following the provisions of the European Media Freedom Act, BNR and BNT may utilize their infrastructure to support European integration and citizenship through various programs, projects, initiatives, strategies and European cooperation, such as: educational programs on EU Affairs; EU-funded Projects and Initiatives; coverage of EU events and summits; promotion of European cultural diversity and multilingual programs, thus fostering a sense of European community.

References

European Commission (2022). Flash Eurobarometer. Media and News Survey. https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/3153

European Commission, (2023). Standard Eurobarometer 98 – Winter 2022-2023. https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2872

Freedom House (2023). Freedom in the World. Bulgaria. https://freedomhouse.org/country/bulgaria/freedomworld/2023

National Statistical Institute. Culture, 2023). https://www.nsi.bg/bg/content/3552/%D0%BA%D1%83%D0 %BB%D1%82%D1%83%D1%80%D0%B0

Reuters Institute (2023). Digital News Report. https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/ files/2023-06/Digital_News_Report_2023.pdf

| CROATIA | STANDING UP FOR PUBLIC SERVICE MEDIA – THE PILLAR OF ACCOUNTABLE

AND TRUSTWORTHY SERVICE OF INFORMATION AND KNOWLEDGE

PROF. VIKTORIJA CAR, PHD UNIVERSITY OF SPLIT

The paradox is that at a time when information is more available to us than ever, we are living in an information crisis – or time of infodemic. An infodemic is a metaphor for virus-like spread of accurate but also false or misleading information. The term is originally coined by political analyst David Rothkopf (2003) in a commentary for the Washington Post. In Europe, it was ‘officially diagnosed’ in 2018 when the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) Commission on Trust and Technology published the report1 and stated that the information crisis the world had faced was systemic, and it called for a coordinated long-term institutional response. Since then, the European Union put a lot of effort in setting the policy framework to address multifaceted and ever evolving problem of disinformation. The European Commission‘s 2018 Communication introduced the “European approach to tackling online disinformation.” It was operationalised in the “Action Plan Against Disinformation”, and in the key policy instrument – the “Code of Practice on Disinformation” (2018, 2022). The Code contains 44 commitments and 128 specific measures, in the 8 main areas, however, none of them related to journalism.

In the light of the development of fact-checking as a new market within the media environment, which, among other things, is financed by lavish funds from the European Union, it remains logical to ask whether it is possible that in the 21st century media policy makers are giving up on encouraging the development of professional journalism and strengthening its internal capacities? What is the role of public service media (PSM) as the pillar of accountable and trustworthy information? If factchecking does not happen in the newsrooms, and if media policy makers agree that media publishes inaccurate information while newly established non-governmental organizations specialized in fact-checking are needed to debunk disinformation – a question arises: what has become

1 LSE (2018) Tackling the Information Crisis: A Policy Framework for Media System Resilience. The Report of the LSE Commission on Trust and Technology. London: LSE.

the definition of journalism in the 21st century? Who will be professionally responsible for the publication of accurate information in the future?

We should not give up on professional journalism and the need for a credible public service media, because only those media that are directly financed by citizens can be independent of both the financial and political interest. Since the American presidential elections in 2016, we have witnessed the most intensive exposure of the so-called fake news – what is an oxymoron, because news by its definition must bring accurate and verified information and cannot be fake or false in any case. The term fake news is used for inaccurate, invented, or distorted information that is published mainly on social media in journalistic forms and thus misleads the audience. The goal of the authors or those ordering such information is to deny the audience accurate information and lead them to false beliefs. Only media-literate audience will recognize that such announcements lack professional journalistic news features (authenticity of sources, representation of both pro and contra sides, balance, etc.). The average citizen, with his or her knowledge, level of critical evaluation of published content and free time at his or her disposal, is not able to check information from multiple sources every day to make sure of their accuracy and authenticity. It is very difficult to break through such a noise forest to the essential information that citizens need for quality decision-making on a daily level, thereby contributing to the development of a democratic society as individuals. PSM should take the leading role in becoming, or returning to be, the most reliable source of information, worth the monthly service fee that citizens pay.

To redefine the mission of “informing, educating and entertaining”

The mission of the PSM was visionary defined by the first director of the BBC, John Reith, who summed up the mission of the BBC in three tasks: to inform, educate and entertain. Although this definition is constantly repeated a century later as an unquestionable premise, the question is whether it really works at the end of the second decade of the 21st century.

From the beginning of the 20th century to today, the definitions or missions of informing and entertaining have changed significantly, as have methods and approaches to education. In the pre-internet era, information was not available to the public without a journalist as an intermediary. Information was hidden in institutions, in files, archives, in drawers or on shelves. The journalist‘s task was to obtain this information, make it available to the public, and thereby make the public informed. In today‘s internet, mobile, networked and platformed society, no one waits anymore for journalists to publish information first – information is published instantly by individuals (citizens), associations, public relations

agents, social network managers, politicians, political parties, but also bots and trolls, and AI. Today, sources no longer need an intermediary (journalist) to publish information – they do it themselves, „directly”, on the websites, in blogs, on social media, etc. And journalists in the media often or most often publish information that has already been published elsewhere, just in a different format. The result of all this is that citizens are oversaturated with information, and at the same time confused, since they do not know which of them are accurate, relevant, and useful at all.

A service is needed, a PSM, where educated and skilled journalists can compare the information, check its accuracy, and confirm it from at least two mutually independent sources, gather arguments for and against and explain the information within a wider context so that it makes sense and becomes understandable to a wider audience. And what is the most important, to explore what has remained hidden from the public. The difference between the information behind professional journalists and all other information available online should be that journalistic information is credible – prepared and published respecting professional journalistic and ethical standards. By this act, journalists contribute to informing citizens, and the totality of published information can be considered a public good because it is available to everyone under the same conditions and is not exhausted by multiple uses.

Arguments that with the development of the so-called citizen or participatory journalism, the need for professional journalism has disappeared, it is superficial and ill-conceived. Precisely because of the „flood” of information, disinformation and misinformation, the role of professional journalists has become extremely important. Citizen journalism as a kind of movement was criticized as early as the 1990s. The critics pointed out that journalists have left the daily political agenda setting to the citizens and accused them of compromising their profession and their ability to fulfil the role of the „fourth government” through critical reporting. This process of „flood of information” was paralleled by the explosion of the entertainment industry, which became one of the fastest growing industries in the world and used primarily the Internet and social media as a distribution platform. The former role of public service radio or television to bring the family together in the living room on the couch to listen or watch an entertaining show or movie together, has lost its function with the change in the habits of the audience, who in a digital, networked, and mobile society have turned to their smartphones and an individualized way of selection of media content. Considering all the above, losing the battle with online media in the speed of information, as well as with other media in general in offering entertainment content, the public service me -

dia is actually the only one left with its educational role. What remains is to focus on the role of educator and socio-political critic, placing known and accessible information in a wider context (social, political, historical, economic, technological, etc.) and at the same time providing the public with access to content kept in archives, encyclopaedias, film libraries, laboratories, etc. In addition, the main task of PSM should be to expose political and economic corruption activities, crime and similar socially harmful activities that are tried to be hidden from the public. In this sense, investing in the work of investigative journalists and their teams should be one of the most important investments within PSM.

The lost public and the newer reached fragmented audiences

Referring to the thought of Russell Neuman, who wrote three decades ago about the disappearance of the mass audience, we agree with Pippa Norris that the disappearance of the mass audience should not be interpreted as the disappearance of the audience at all. Its final number is constantly increasing, but its internal structure is extremely segmented. And somehow, this is the weakest point of PSM – incompetent and failure in reaching the audiences – not one audience, the massive one as it used to be, but many different, fragmented, and niche audiences.

Bearing in mind the previously described changes in the process of informing the public, which in the meantime has transformed into a series of fragmented audiences with highly individualized approaches to the selection of media content, and bearing in mind the development of the entertainment industry where the role of PSM as an entertainer has become minor, Reith‘s definition according to which is the task of PSM to inform, educate and entertain the public, it is necessary to adapt to audience practices and technological conditions in the second decade of the 21st century. Therefore, a new definition of PSM is proposed: The public service media is a publicly funded service intended for all citizens whose task is to produce and publish content whose goal is to provide reliable and complete information to citizens and to provide them with content and services that represent a source of knowledge in the lifelong learning process and are necessary for improving the quality of life. In its activities, PSM is guided by the criteria of content and production excellence and full independence from any political, financial, or other particular interests.

The main task of a public service media in a modern digital, networked, platformed and mobile society is to provide citizens with a platform where high-quality content is available, the task of which is to provide them with complete information that is necessary for a better quality of everyday life. And that is what, at least in some European countries PSM

really does, just the question remains – what is the reach of that quality programming? Does generation Z consume PSM programming and services? Does generation Z recognize PSM as friendly source of knowledge? Do citizens in general recognize PSM as a source of knowledge and a tool for developing critical thinking?

Public Campaign for Journalism and Strong PSM

The impression, at least in Croatia, is that PSM sleeps the dream of the hibernating bear, re-running some old black and white movies and documentaries taped long time ago.

The task of the PSM management team and editors is to ensure a high level of professionalism, the most professional and creative human capita and other resources necessary to produce high-quality journalistic and other media content and services. Also, its task is to provide additional sufficient resources for the development of investigative journalism because it is, along with general informative content, one of the two fundamental pillars of justification for the existence of PSM. Respect for professional journalistic standards and principles of journalistic ethics and professional deontology are a prerequisite for every published content and offered service. Part of the responsibility for understanding and creating needs for certain content within society lies with the media audiences, who, through their activity or passivity, can contribute to the (non)recognition of public service media as a resource of a public good in society. At the same time, promoting media and information literacy and its implementation at all levels of society takes time, but it guarantees long-term quality, trust in PSM content and employees, strengthening of existing ethical guidelines and legislation, and overall contribution to democratic society, both domestically and internationally.

In light of the information and journalistic crisis and the trend of „fake news” and false information, the need for a professional, credible, independent and economically stable PSM is greater than ever. The need for quality, or simply put – professional journalism, is greater than ever, and journalism as a profession is in perhaps the biggest crisis since its inception. We can only read and watch in movies with nostalgia about journalists who changed the course of history by exposing political and economic corruption and crime and other harmful and unjust processes in society and admire with disbelief the strength of these „watchdogs” of democracy. These are examples of investigative journalism that replaced governments and presidents, that influenced the making or changing of political decisions and thus contributed to important changes in the interests of citizens, sometimes at the local and sometimes at the international political level.

Media and journalists managed by either the government or the market can never act independently and freely. The very choice of topic and problem to be reported on is conditioned by a series of checks to see if such information will harm the interests of owners or advertisers or political power centres. In such a sieve, a whole series of topics, problems and phenomena are retained or stuck, which never even begin to be journalistically realized in a text or video story. This kind of pre-censorship is characteristic of all „trapped”, captured media whose financial survival on the feet of uncertainty depends either on advertisers or on the government‘s decision on how much money will be allocated to them from the state budget.

Citizens should support the PSM not only by agreeing to pay the fee, which should guarantee its financial independence, but also by intense public demands that PSM management should be elected exclusively according to meritocratic criteria. Their expertise and high level of ethics should be under intense scrutiny from the public and regulatory authorities. Corruption and nepotism at PSM should be professionally punished, publicly condemned, and finally eradicated. And the journalism and media profession should support PSM as the core and origin of professional journalism and media creation, where the door is firmly closed to amateurs, trivia, and sensationalism. A public campaign with this goal financially supported by the EU funds would be probably more efficient then “pumping money” into fact-checking organisations. Distinguishing journalism media from all other information or entertainment media would help creating media policy relying on the role of the profession, like any other public policy that relies on the profession (e.g. education, or health). EU media policy should provide a framework for trust in information society, and not platforms but journalism media with the PSM as the pillar should become the key partners in that framework.

PUBLIC SERVICE MEDIA IN CYPRUS: ADAPTING TO AFFORDANCES AND AUDIENCES

ASS.PROF. PASCHALIA LIA SPYRIDOU, PHD CYPRUS UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY

Across the world, public service media faces a multitude of simultaneous threats —to its funding, its appeal, its value and its independence. These threats come at a time when the fundamental purpose of PSM to provide accurate, impartial and useful news and information, is more urgent than ever (Moore, 2024). The platformisation of news production and distribution not only giving prominence to click-driven content but essentially altering the logic of news production (Smyrnaios & Rebillard, 2019), the wide spread of misinformation and the increasing use of AI-generated content (both text and videos) render PSM once again a stable and trustworthy channel of information. However, the digital transformation and more recently artificial intelligence (AI) have been conducive to PSM becoming marginalised in the new media ecosystem. As Peter Goodwin (2018) explains “PSM organisations are not well positioned for success in the network society context” (p. 36). They have no opportunity to take advantage of international con¬centration which greatly benefits large commercial media organisations. They face financial and personnel constraints when it comes to refreshing themselves technologically. They tend to be slower in adapting and innovating when it comes to story-telling techniques and agenda formation. They tend to emphasise quality and sobriety over dramatisation and profit-seeking.

The Republic of Cyprus is no exception to the rule. After an attempt to downsise the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation (CyBC) during the 20122018 financial crisis following the general austerity policies implemented in the country (Spyridou & Milioni, 2017), the Covid-19 crisis brought back its reputation as a trustworthy channel of news and information. CyBC saw its numbers grow as people looked for reliable data and guidance. However, CyBC is faced with significant challenges pertaining to its involvement with new technologies, its appeal on younger demographics and its perennial dependence on political parties.

Involvement in new technologies

The Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation (CyBC) founded in 1953, represents the PSM on the island. It comprises of four radio stations, three TV stations (two terrestrial and CyBC satellite), a website and has presence on

the major social media platforms. As a result of rapid developments in new communication technologies CyBC is forced to re-think, not only its programming policies, but also the way it operates, its technical set-up and its involvement in new digital media. Due to the downsising of CyBC during the financial crisis, the subsequent lack of resources and the general disappointment within CyBC, this shift was delayed. During the last couple of years though things are speeding up following the steady shift of news consumption online and the severe competition by on-demand platforms. As a result, CyBC is upgrading its production processes, they are making their programming available in additional platforms, and the news department is experimenting with AI-supported tools to offer personalised news, to ensure a constant flow of posts on social media and to engage with more innovative story-telling suitable for the digital age.

Looking for the under 30’s demographic

Within a general mistrust towards the media, PSM in Cyprus is by far the most trusted news and information channel; 45 percent claim that PSM (including their online presence) is their most trusted source of information while the number drops to 36 for commercial media (Eurobarometer, 2022). When asked which is their main source for getting news, television, news websites and social media are their top preferences with 63, 59 and 57 percent respectively. When looking at news preferences by age, it turns out that the younger demographics prefer television and social media. However, the commercial media tend to get the biggest part of the pie, as PSM tend to underperform within the younger demographics. Considering the importance of younger demographics in the formation of future media consumption habits, CybC is experimenting with short-form stories, a lighter agenda influenced by social media and more audiovisual content.

From permanent employees to contract schemes

A prominent tendency within CyBC is the turn to contract schemes instead of permanent employees. Currently the organization is faced with personnel shortage as a number of permanent employees is retiring and others have chosen to be posted in Ministries and other State organisations. Beyond the numerical shortage of personnel, there is a documented shortage of expertise on emerging media technologies, AI and new story-telling formats imposed by the platformisation logic (Stollfuß, 2022). To address this issue, the management is thinking to employ young professionals on a contract base in an attempt to modernise production and cater for the needs and preferences of younger audiences in a more effective manner.

Political dependencies

In terms of media systems Cyprus conforms to the basic tenets of Hallin

and Mancini’s (2004) polarised pluralism media model. Within a media environment of intense political parallelism and unholy alliances between media owners and political parties, the public broadcaster is strongly dependent on the government and the political parties. To a certain extent, this is the result of CyBC’s funding model. The public broadcaster is funded directly by the State budget and its resources are decided every year by the Parliament while there is a tacit agreement that time allocated on CyBC is associated with the power of the political parties in the Parliament. However, there have been some positive changes in the last years. Although CyBC’s Board president is directly appointed by the country’s President, therefore being a political choice, during the last years there is a preference for academics and people who are familiar with the media landscape.

Concluding remarks

Public service media (PSM) have been increasingly propagating their market importance in policy and public rhetoric to legitimate their relevance in times of cutbacks and increasing pressure (Raats, 2023). CyBC is taking serious steps to adapt to the digital demands and users’ preferences for the first time after a long period of cutbacks and introversion. However, cautious is needed not to lose its credibility and sobriety within a fiercely competitive landscape governed by click-baits and superficial content. It is important that CyBC takes the necessary steps to move forward while staying relevant and catering for the public interest.

References

Goodwin, P. (2018). An impossible challenge for Public Service Media? The intellectual context of the networked society. In G. Ferrell Lowe, H. Van den Bulck, K. Donders (eds.) Public Service Media in the Networked Society. Göteborg: Nordicom (pp. 29-41).

Hallin, D. and Mancini, P. (2004). Comparing media systems: Three models of media and politics. Cambridge university press.

Eurobarometer - Media & News Survey 2022, Country Factsheets Cyprus, https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/ surveys/detail/2832.

Moore, M. (2024). Keeping democracies alive: The Role of Public Service Media. The Political Quarterly, 95(1), 108-112.

Raats, T. (2023). Public service media caught between public and market objectives: The case of the “Flemish Netflix”. In M. Puppis, & C. Ali (Eds.), Public service media’s contribution to society: RIPE@2021 (pp. 111–130). Nordicom, University of Gothenburg. https://doi.org/10.48335/9789188855756-6 Smyrnaios, N. and Rebillard, F. (2019). How infomediation platforms took over the news: A longitudinal perspective. The Political Economy of Communication, 7(1), 30–50.

Spyridou, P. and Milioni, D. (2017). Financial crisis, austerity and Public Service Media in Cyprus. Reforming or downsizing? An analysis of discourses and critiques”. In V. Doudaki and N. Carpentier (eds). Cyprus and its Conflicts. Representations, Materialities and Cultures, Berghahn Books, pp. 99-120.

Stollfuß, S. (2022). Platformization as a structural dimension for Public Service Media in Germany: The funk content network and the new interstate media treaty. Television & New Media, 25(2), 185-203, https://doi. org/10.1177/15274764221138248.

| CZECH REPUBLIC |

PUBLIC SERVICE MEDIA IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND THEIR FUTURE

PROF. JAN JIRÁK, PHD METROPOLITAN UNIVERSITY PRAGUE

Public service media, or the principle of public service generally, became part of the Czech media system after 1989, after the collapse of the Soviet Union‘s sphere of influence in Europe. The decision to get rid of the state media as a remnant of the state propaganda system of the undemocratic regime led to the establishment of public service media. From the state-owned Czechoslovak Television, the Czech Television (CT) in the Czech Republic was created as a public service media, and analogously, state-run Czechoslovak Radio was redefined as the public Czech Radio (CRo). The Czech Press Agency (CTK) has got the status of a public service media in the Czech media system, too, but it differs from the two institutions mentioned above in that it is not financed by fees paid primarily by households (which is the case of the Czech Radio and the Czech Television) but is financed by selling its services to variety of clients. Due to its specific position, the Czech Press Agency will not be dealt with in this text and the umbrella term ‚public service media‘ will be understood as the relevant one for broadcast media.

The process of state media denationalization (deetatization) took place in the context of (a) the division of the former Czechoslovakia into two separate states, the Czech and Slovak Republics (the division has been officially declared on January 1st, 1993), and (b) the establishing of private, commercially oriented broadcast media as a new type of media, unknown in the Czech environment until then (the first nation-wide private television – TV Nova – began broadcasting in February 1993, for details on the transformation of the Czech media see Jirák, Köpplová 2008). The dual broadcast system of the British or German style, where private broadcasters and public service media exist in parallel, served as a model target state.

Especially in the area of television broadcasting, the commercial media demonstrated a noticeable vitality, attracted the interest of viewers, and for most of the 1990s gained a clear advantage in viewership, including a huge interest of viewers in all kinds of programs including news and journalistic ones. The fact that the transition from state media to public service broadcaster was incomprehensible to the general public also played a role, with viewers and listeners persisting in the idea that

it was still state media. This feeling was reinforced by the fact that the program offer remained very conservative in 1990s and did not differ much from that of the abolished state media (albeit, of course, with appropriate adjustments to the declared political positions and public issues discussed). To the success of private broadcaster contributed the fact that TV Nova as a commercial broadcaster came up with a tabloidoriented concept of news service with an emphasis on infotainment and contact with viewers, discussed taboo topics in journalism, offered proven commercially successful feature programs (one of the first was the American series Dallas) – and above all, it reached viewers with imaginative, consistently developed, aggressive marketing unprecedented until then.

Public Service Television has had to build the basis of its position in society only gradually, and over time it has become quite successful in this field. Its relative success rests on several pillars that have become the publicly accepted public service landscape in the country and have contributed to the public service medium becoming part of the societywide agenda. These pillars are mainly the following.

1. Public service media have become sources of fast, useful, reliable information, both domestic and foreign. This was mainly due to information-reliable news coverage in moments of crisis (for example, during the devastating floods of 1997 and 2022 in the Czech Republic), when a distinctive section of the public began to look for reliable, information-saturated news without excessive infotainment. At the same time, both Czech Television and Czech Radio managed to maintain a functional network of permanent and emergency foreign correspondents – mainly thanks to the stable revenue side of the budget based mainly on license fees – while other media outlets began to reduce their foreign news coverage and switch to internet sources and the use of external correspondents, in the case of local amateurs without the necessary training. Media discourse, in particular, has as a result repeatedly treated „public service media” as synonymous with „serious media”.

2. In parallel, public service television has profiled itself as a producer of current affairs journalism with a metropolitan liberal-conservative bent that appeals to viewers with middle and higher education, with average to slightly above-average incomes, and residents of medium and larger urban areas. While this has largely separated it from a substantial part of the population (especially for rural audiences, public service media has become the „voice of the city”, with a bit of

simplification „the voice of the Prague people”), it has strengthened position of the media as an opinion maker in the eyes of the public.

3. The attitude of the political elite towards these media, especially Czech Television, has inadvertently contributed to the stabilization of the position of public service television and radio in Czech society. The public service media are established by law, i.e. by the will and decision of the legislative bodies of the Czech Republic, namely the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic. In the current legal framework, the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate elect members of the Council of the Czech Television and the Council of the Czech Radio, i.e. the controlling bodies that supervise the activities and management of the public service media, approve key strategic decisions, hear complaints about the performance of these media and elect (or dismiss) the directors-general. At the same time, the Chamber of Deputies approves the public service media codes (“Kodex”) and the law setting the amount of the license fee. The legislature thus has an indirect but quite substantial influence on the content, staffing and, above all, the economic situation of the public service broadcast media. The possibility of interfering in the running of public service media is a temptation that parliamentary parties and movements cannot resist - politicians comment on the behavior of public service media, negotiate the level of fees, and ensure proportionality in the composition of supervisory boards (councils) through informal agreements.

One of the high points of these efforts was in the autumn and early winter of 2000, when a candidate with obvious ties to a major parliamentary party was elected to the post after the unusual dismissal of the current Director General of CT. The installation of the new director and his team provoked a tumultuous reaction within the institution itself, leading to a staff strike, interruptions in broadcasting, mass public protests in late December 2000 and early January 2001, and finally the resignation of the new director and the appointment of an interim director directly by the Chamber of Deputies and the adoption of an amendment to the Czech Television Act (for details on the „Christmas TV crisis” see Jirák - Köpplová 2001). However, the latter effectively strengthened the influence of the Chamber of Deputies by approving the Code (“Kodex”) (Section 8, paragraph 1 of the Czech Television Act states „The Council‘s competence includes: /.../ f) submitting to the Chamber of Deputies for approval the Code of the Czech Television, which sets out the principles for the fulfilment of the public service in

the field of television broadcasting” 1).

Irrespective of these facts, the ‚Christmas TV crisis‘ represented a clear increase in the visibility of public service media in Czech society, emphasized the need for their independence from the state or its legislative bodies and highlighted the integrative role of public service media at the societal level.

Against the integrative function of public service media, which leads to the promotion of the establishment and strengthening of the public sphere as a common space shared by citizens, there is a trend towards an increasingly clear fragmentation of the public, typical of private, commercially oriented media (their „user” is not the citizen, but the consumer). Both broadcast media are taking advantage of the possibilities of digitalization of broadcasting and are gradually expanding the offer of traditional, linear television and radio programs and towards selected groups of recipients or thematically defined content. For example, Czech Television offers not only two universal „full-format” programs (CT1 and CT2) and one news and current affairs program (CT24), but also a sports program (CT Sport), a program for children (CT :D) and a culturally oriented program (CT Art). In addition, both media are expanding intensively into the technological environment of the Internet, offering i-broadcast elements, podcasts, archives and similar services in various forms.

The future existence and development of the position and functioning of public service media in the Czech Republic will very likely be determined, among other things, by how media users, legislators and the media themselves cope with the tension between the integrating role of public service media and the fragmentation of the offer (and thus of the audience). As recalled above, a disjunctive feature of these media is precisely their ability to integrate viewers and listeners into a common social space of shared values, ideas and experiences. In contrast, the digitalized, online offer emphasizes the individualization of media content consumption, self-realization and interactive freedom in the choice of content consumed. In other words, the problem of the continued existence of public service media lies in the extent to which they can find the equivalent of their integrating social mission in a digitized environment. Specifically in the Czech environment, the question will be how public service media can resist the pressure of political elites

1 See ACT of the Czech National Council of 7 November 1991 on Czech Television, as amended (ZÁKON České národní rady ze dne 7. listopadu 1991 o České televizi v platném znění), https://www.ceskatelevize.cz/vse-o-ct/zakony/

while maintaining their integrating function - a pressure that is logical in a way, since public service media are one of the few institutions in a fragmenting and globalizing world that, like elected political elites, operate at the level of the state unit (the nation state).

Literature

JIRÁK, Jan a KÖPPLOVÁ, Barbara (2008): The reality show called democratization: transformation of the Czech media after 1989. Global Media Journal 4/1 (Spring), p. 7-23. ISSN 1550-7521.

JIRÁK, Jan a KÖPPLOVÁ, Barbara (2001): Der Prager TV-Streik und die Auseinandersetzung um das öffentlichrechtliche Fernsehen in der Tschechischen Republik. In: Tele visionen – historiografien des fernsehen. Vídeň: Turia+Kant, p.136-143, ISSN 1016-765 X

| DENMARK | DANISH PUBLIC SERVICE TELEVISION IN DIGITAL TRANSITION: A RANGE OF DILEMMAS

JULIE MÜNTER LASSEN, PHD AARHUS UNIVERSITY

Introduction

YouTube, TikTok, Instagram, Snapchat, and Messenger. Or, if you are older: Facebook, LinkedIn, and X. And then of course Netflix, Disney+, HBO Max, and Amazon Prime, not to mention gaming and browsing. There are so many things to do, so many services to choose when you are using a screen. And in a highly digital country as Denmark the screens take up a lot of the waking hours. More than seven hours per day, according to a recent study (DR Analyse, 2024, p. 5). The traditional competition between media companies about obtaining the highest share of viewing or listening has been replaced by the challenge of attracting and retaining users at all. In this fierce competition the legacy public service media (PSM) organisations are seeking ways to adapt to a more digital market dominated by global platforms and international subscription video on-demand (SVoD) services. And in an era of, among many other crises, misinformation, surveillance, and deepfakes, PSM continue to be of great importance to the general knowledge and public debate. But how does the digital transition of the PSM organisations take shape, and is it in accordance with the core public service value of diversity and the organisations’ role of facilitating a public conversation? I will reflect on these questions based on empirical data from two research projects: one Danish and one cross-country involving nine PSM organisations in six media markets.

The Danish media market and the digital development

Universality, or free access to a variety of content through a wide range of outlets, is essential for a solid reach in the population and thus an important first step in meeting the obligation of facilitating a national joint conversation. Therefore, it is necessary for the legacy PSM organisations to (be allowed to) develop their services in accordance with the population’s media usage. Denmark is, in general, a highly digital country. The fully developed digital infrastructure occasions that media consumption is characterised by internet-distributed services. Regarding the television market in 2023 the average daily viewing on streaming services was 98 minutes, while the average daily viewing of broadcast television was 123 minutes. Thus, it is evident that a significant part of the television consumption of the Danish population takes place online, and it increases year by year.

This usage pattern is reflected in the corporate strategies of Denmark’s two largest television organisations DR and TV 2, which both prioritise their streaming services in the digital transition despite significant differences in both business model and regulation: Whereas DR is a 100% publicly financed media organisation with public service obligations for both its television, radio, and internet outlets, TV 2 is financed through advertising and subscriptions, and only its main television channel is subject to public service regulation. The offerings of both organisations are popular: For the past couple of years, the streaming services DRTV and TV 2 Play together with Netflix have been the most used streaming services on the Danish market; and the combined share of viewing of the two Danish broadcasters’ linear channels amounts to 81%. Thus, the two PSM organisations are central players in the Danish media landscape, and their high-speed digital transition is in accordance with the population’s media usage.

Differences and similarities in the digital transition of PSM organisations

From recent literature on PSM organisations’ digital transition (Bruun, 2023; D’Arma et al., 2021; Donders, 2019; Iordache & Raats, 2023; Lassen, forthcoming) it appears that many factors influence the process, and that the outcome is complex and influences the organisations on several levels from production to distribution and organisational structure. The Danish research project Re-scheduling Public Service Television in the Digital Era has documented substantial changes in the production culture and adjustments of the production value of the programmes as a part of the digital transition (Bruun, 2023; Bruun and Lassen, in-press; Lassen, 2023; Lassen, forthcoming). Importantly, whereas some tendencies can be found across all cases in the research contributions, e.g. the rhetorical legitimization of the launch of streaming services and a focus on consolidation and quality, D’Arma and colleagues (2021, p. 695) emphasise how some strategies are contingent on national contexts. Preliminary findings in the cross-country project Public Service Media in the Age of Platforms support this conclusion. The project demonstrates how PSM organisations in Northern (Denmark), Southern (Italy), Eastern (Poland), and Western (Belgium and UK) Europe exercise many similarities when it comes to the structure of the streaming services (Bruun and Lassen, forthcoming). But regarding the content strategy, implied audience, and publishing practises different patterns appear. Comparative analyses of the two Danish PSM organisations show that regulation and business strategy, perhaps surprisingly, has less to say in the formation of the digital transition than cultural conditions, global competition, and the media usage of the population (Bruun 2023; Lassen, forthcoming).

The challenge of the broad versus the personalised offer

When DRTV and TV 2 Play were launched more than ten years ago, the intended audience was the younger target groups as these were considered first-movers and thus streamers. As the digitalisation has been rolled out in Denmark and also the older generations have embraced on-demand viewing, both Danish PSM organisations have re-structured their television offerings and verbalised their streaming services as front doors to the entire television offer for the entire population (DR 2018, p. 4; TV 2 2021, p. 9). Whereas this must be regarded as a reasonable strategy in offering a universal service in a digital society, it does entail a challenge for the organisations: Unlike the multi-channel portfolio there is one entrance to the online offer, and how to address a diverse group of users with a standardized landing page? As an SVoD service TV 2 Play has always demanded log-in and thus been able to personalise the offer. But providing a free VoD service DR has – until now – offered unrestricted access to DRTV and argued that this was important to the public service identity of the organisation. However, due to the intensified competition DR will, in the spring of 2024, introduce mandatory log-in if the users wish to access the on-demand content. Log-in, instead of unrestricted access, is somehow contradictory to the idea of universality and thus inexpedient to a PSM VoD service. However, the intention is that the improved knowledge about the users will enable segmentation and refined personalisation, and thus help DR in attracting and retaining the users, which have gotten used to a personalised offer on competing services. Even though DR promises that human curation continues to be pivotal in the prioritisation of the offering, personalisation of a PSM service is a dilemma. If the users abandon DRTV, the PSM organisation will lose its societal importance and legitimacy. But attracting and retaining users must not be at the sacrifice of a diverse offer and the joint national conversation. Thus, DR is facing a challenging task of personalising the service without contributing to a fragmented public.

A private national party?

An evaluation of the prime space (that is the most prominent positions at the top of the landing page) of DRTV and TV 2 Play shows that both services mimic the mixed range of programmes known from the single channel era by showcasing a genre-wise diverse offer (Bruun and Lassen, forthcoming). This practise is in accordance with the strategy of transforming the streaming services into front doors to the entire television offer, and it is in contrast to the practise of most of the other services in our cross-country study that exercise a more narrow focus on fiction and entertainment. However, diversity is more than variety

of genre. For instance, Hoffman-Riem (1987, p. 61) mentions diversity of formats and issues, person and group diversity, and geographical diversity. Regarding the latter, geographical diversity, there is a challenge in the current practise of the PSM organisations of study: In the findings of both the Danish and the cross-country research project there is a clear tendency of the PSM organisations to showcase national content in the prime space of their streaming services. This practise can be interpreted both as a way of standing out in the competition with SVoD services and other global media offers, and as a way of seeking (national) political support for the continued existence of the PSM organisations. Promoting the national culture, identity, and language has traditionally been a core obligation for PSM (Lassen, 2013; Van den Bulck, 2001), and being counterweights to the American and British dominance on SVoD services is, undoubtedly, an important role of the PSM organisations. However, a narrow focus on domestic productions is limiting the diversity of the offering. The EU’s Audiovisual Media Service directive obliges the Member States to ensure prominence of European works in on-demand services (Directive 2018/1808, Article 13.1). And while this, quite likely, will enhance the diversity of the offering, it causes some questions: When is a programme prominently displayed? How to implement the obligation without violating the editorial freedom of the PSM organisations? Will the visibility of more European content harm the reach of the national PSM streaming services? The answer to the last question is: Probably not. Within the past couple of years serials such as La casa de papel, Babylon Berlin, and several Swedish crime fiction series have attracted many viewers in Denmark. But what about factual content? What about documentaries, a genre characterised by Bruun and Bille (2022, p. 80) as core public service? Showcasing a variety of European documentaries is still relatively untrodden land, at least in the Danish case. So, there definitely is room for expanding the supply of European content, not just in the prime space but in the entire offering of DRTV and TV 2 Play, without compromising the national identity.

Conclusion

In many ways the current task of the PSM organisations is about striking a balance: A balance between outlets, a balance between programme types, a balance between a universal offer and a personalised service, and a balance between supporting the national culture, identity, and language and being self-centric. In these challenging dilemmas it is crucial that the organisations are given free rein (politically and economic) to develop in accordance with media usage of the population. But even in Denmark, a country with a general support for the PSM and high reach

of their services, the digital transition is not easy. To remain relevant the PSM must stay attractive and stand apart. As I have argued, this is currently being put into practise by a strong focus on domestic productions on the streaming services. However, showcasing a greater offer of European (as well as other non-Anglo-Saxon and non-US) content would strengthen the diversity and could, ideally, lead to better knowledge and understanding across borders.

Bibliography

Bruun, H. (2023). The changing role of a video-on-demand service in the strategies of public service media: A production study of Danish TV 2 Play and its impact on the production culture of the schedulers, 2016–2022. Nordicom Review, 44(2), 235–252. https://doi.org/10.2478/nor-2023-0013

Bruun, H. & Bille, B. K. (2022). Television documentaries as spearheads in public service television: Comparing scheduling practices on the linear channels and video-on-demand services of Danish TV 2 and DR. Nordicom Review, 43(1), 79–93. https://doi.org/10.2478/nor-2022-0005

Bruun, H. & Lassen, J.M. (in-press). Pushing Public Service Television Online: a quantitative study of the crosspromotional continuity announcements on DR and TV 2 Denmark. Norsk Medietidsskrift. Bruun, H. & Lassen J.M. (forthcoming). Publishing PSM on Demand: a comparative study of PSM companies’ editorial practices on their VoD-services in the age of Platformisation [Full paper]. RIPE PSM Conference 2024, Lisbon, Portugal. https://ripepsm.org/

D’Arma, A., Raats, T., & Steemers, J. (2021). Public service media in the age of SVoDs: A comparative study of PSM strategic responses in Flanders, Italy and the UK. Media, Culture & Society, 1–19. https://doi. org/10.1177/0163443720972909

Directive 2018/1808. Directive (EU) 2018/1808 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 on audiovisual media services. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2018/1808/oj Donders, K. (2019). Public service media beyond the digital hype: Distribution strategies in a platform era. Media, Culture & Society, 41(7), 1011–1028. https://doi.org/10.1177/0163443719857616

DR (2018). Det nye DR: Spare- og udviklingsplan [The new DR: Savings and development plan]. Copenhagen: DR. https://www.dr.dk/static/documents/2018/09/19/magasin_ekstern_22ad75d8_0be1f406.pdf

DR Analyse (2024). Medieudviklingen 2023 [The media development 2023]. Copenhagen: DR. https://www.dr.dk/static/documents/2024/03/08/medieudviklingen_2023_0128abcd.pdf

Hoffmann‐Riem, W. (1987). National identity and cultural values: Broadcasting safeguards. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 31(1), 57–72. https://doi.org/10.1080/08838158709386645

Iordache, C., & Raats, T. (2023). The platformization of public service media: A comparative analysis of five BVOD services in Western and Northern Europe. International Journal of Media & Cultural Politics, 19(1), 3–22. https://doi.org/10.1386/macp_00070_1

Lassen, J.M. (forthcoming). ”Television is about change”: The digital transition of the Danish public service media company DR and its implications for the production culture [Full paper]. RIPE PSM Conference 2024, Lisbon, Portugal. https://ripepsm.org/

Lassen, J.M. (2023). The reappropriation of time in television: How traditional qualities of broadcast media are being adopted by their video-on-demand services. Nordicom Review, 44(2), 217-234. https://sciendo.com/ article/10.2478/nor-2023-0012

Lassen, J. M. (2013). Nationalitetskonstruktion i dansk public service [The construction of nationality in Danish public service]. Nordisk Kulturpolitisk Tidskrift, 15(2), 235–252. //www.idunn.no/nkt/2012/02/ nationalitetskonstruktion_i_dansk_public_service TV 2 (2021). Årsrapport 2020 [Annual report 2020]. Odense: TV 2. https://omtv2.tv2.dk/media/hkln3l0m/tv2-aarsrapport-2020-interactive.pdf

Van den Bulck, H. (2001). Public service television and national identity as a project of modernity: The example of Flemish television. Media, Culture and Society, 23(1), 53–69. https://doi.org/10.1177/016344301023001003

Julie Münter Lassen’s work is funded by The Independent Research Fund Denmark, ID No. 1024-00001B and by Horizon 2020, ID No. 952156.

IT’S COLD OUTSIDE. PUBLIC MEDIA MUST PROTECT US FROM WINTER AND KEEP US WARM.

ASS.PROF. ANDRES JÕESAAR, PHD TALLINN UNIVERSITY

George R.R. Martin‘s prophetic warning in Game of Thrones that „winter is coming” has come true. Our civilised world is under the most brutal attack in Ukraine. The enemy has breached The Wall there. Elsewhere in the world, The Wall is holding. But the information war overcame The Wall much earlier. The poisonous ether of the information war is trying to invade our homes, to subjugate our minds to the service of evil. Russia does not choose the means of war. Its extraordinarily blatant lies know no bounds. That is why the role of the public-service media is particularly important in today‘s war situation. The public media must be exceptionally strong - the information it provides must be truthful, it must be a credible and trustworthy source of information that people turn to first. It must always be there. It must be available to everyone, everywhere, for free, on all platforms. In addition to news and current affairs, it must offer a wide enough range of content to appeal to everyone - from children to the elderly, from music, art, nature and sport lovers to those seeking quality entertainment.

The contribution of public service media to promoting social cohesion and creating a coherent information landscape is particularly important. Almost a quarter of the Estonian population is Russian-speaking. Due to the complicated history of the country, not all members of this community have learned the Estonian language. Their information space is in Russian. At the same time, there are not enough of them to ensure the profitability of creating information in Russian for the private media. The creation of Russian-language media on a commercial basis is too costly and does not pay off. It is a critical market failure. Public media have a responsible role to play in helping to heal the divisions in society caused by the language barrier. One of the causes of this division is decades of hostile propaganda from Russia. For a large part of the Russian-speaking community in Estonia, the TV channels and portals of the Russian Federation were the only source of information and shaped their worldview. Following EU sanctions, Russian TV channels are banned in Estonia, but various technological solutions make it possible to continue watching them. People living in radically different information spheres can never form a cohesive society. A common information space must be created to increase the coherence of society.

But unlike in Russia, in a democratic society people cannot be forced to participate in this information space. To change citizens‘ information consumption preferences in the Russian information space, they need to be offered something more valuable and unique. Public media are in a better position to do this than private media. Following the Russian occupation of Crimea, Estonian Public Broadcasting (ERR) launched the Russian-language TV channel ETV+ and its supporting online environment in 2015. This has significantly reduced the audience and importance of Russian propaganda channels as a source of information. While before Russian TV channels were the main sources of information for the Russian-speaking community, by 2020 their importance had already declined and the ERR’s TV channel ETV+ and the portal rus.err.ee had become the main sources of information. The daily work of creating a better-informed Russian-speaking population continues.

Today, in addition to everyday activities, we must also prepare for the worst-case scenario. In the countries bordering Russia, it is well known that it would take only a few minutes for Russian missiles to reach our cities. We must be prepared for such a situation. The ERR must also have a contingency plan in case of war. There must be shelters and studios in safe places. In the worst-case scenario, there must be guarantees that public media can continue to operate from abroad. And the duplication of all valuable digital archives into a secure national repository must be ensured.

All of this - from quality day-to-day work to preparing for war, with the approval and attention of the audience - is really a long-term, comprehensive plan. There is no point in building infrastructure and technical capacity if the audience has distanced itself from it or lost faith in it. Even the most secure technical solution is of no use if there is no quality content to engage audiences. The pandemic was a good lesson: in times of uncertainty, public media was the first source of information. ERR channels were and are more trusted than other media. People who kept faith and followed the advice given on these channels were mentally better able to cope with the difficulties. However, there were also many who could no longer find support from the many and often conflicting sources of information. Media research shows that these people became confused and, unable to find a solution, decided to significantly reduce their media consumption. In the worst cases, they encapsulated themselves in extremist groups and fell under the influence of conspiracy theories. It is human nature for difficult times to overwhelm the soul. Wars do this in a particularly harsh way. We need to find a way to bring these people back into the safe information space of the public media.

It is the role of public media to reach out and support the weaker groups in society. Public media in small countries also have a particularly important role to play now in protecting vulnerable, unique national cultures and languages. The war has made this task even more important. To fulfil such a responsible role, they need a solid legal framework to guarantee their independence and adequate funding.

Despite the weight of the arguments put forward, there are also voices in Estonia calling for restrictions on the activities of public service media. Criticism of the ERR from the private media accuses it of allegedly interfering in the free market, in particular by reducing the profitability of print media that have moved online. Finding a fair balance between these two arguments in a dual media system has been a challenge for media policy makers for several decades. Public good versus private economic performance? Research confirms the bias of national media policies towards the latter, with economic welfare being the dominant category of communication policy in the Western world. In the United States, we are familiar with a media system that is exclusively oriented towards commercial media. Instead of a balanced dual media, we have a politically charged, polarised media in the US, which has led to the division of society there. Balanced public service media, which allow dialogue between different parties, have been marginalised. This is a cautionary tale of what happens in society when the role of public media in society is not understood and its viability is not guaranteed at the national level.

In addition to the political threats to public service media, the media as a whole are under threat. The provision of media content that captures the public‘s attention is slipping from traditional media houses to the control of algorithms driven by social media platforms. At the same time, regulators have failed to protect national and local media in an unequal battle with global platforms. The big social media platforms take more than half of local advertising money from small markets. The negative result of this situation, especially in small markets, is the pressure for media concentration and the disappearance of local media. The paradox of the media economy is particularly acute in small countries - a plurality of media would be needed to ensure pluralism of opinion in the social information space, while small media companies are not particularly competitive. From the point of view of economic success, the number of competing companies should be as small as possible. A high concentration of media - a monopoly market position - would guarantee the highest profits for the owners. However, a monopoly in the field of information is extremely dangerous for the de -

velopment of democratic society as a whole. Russia is the most brutal example here.

In a tight environment, private media will try to remedy their plight not only by concentrating their business, but also by limiting the activities of public media. This is particularly the case online, where it is argued that online journalism should be the preserve of traditional print media and that public media should limit themselves to duplicating content produced for radio and television on the web. At the same time, people‘s media consumption has changed significantly over the past decade. Television and radio are no longer the main sources of information. Especially for younger people. As public service media are designed to be accessible to all free of charge, two traditional media platforms - radio and television - are no longer sufficient to fulfil this role. In order to provide an equal public good to all sections of society, public service media must also offer their content and services online. Younger age groups must not be discriminated against by technology. We must keep pace with changes in media consumption habits. We need to be innovative - experimenting with new formats and ways of delivering content, creating new technological solutions. For example, long radio talk shows are being replaced by podcasts, where extracts can be distributed on social media as well as traditional linear radio programmes. Bringing the news to young people means reaching out to places where young people congregate and being present at information hotspots with meaningful, attention-grabbing messages. Even better, if young people can be provided with a desirable, safe meeting place that keeps them away from the waves of the information ocean algorithms.

A century ago, the purpose of public service broadcasting was to inform, entertain and educate. All three were of more or less equal importance. Today, informing is certainly the most important of these three roles. Above all, public service media must be a reliable, balanced and factual source of information, accessible to all, free of charge, everywhere. Only well-informed people can make the right decisions to contribute to the development of society. But the journey to get there should be aided by some good entertainment.

Over the centuries, public service media have been cited to justify their essential role in the development of democracy, in ensuring pluralism, in giving all citizens an equal opportunity to think and speak on issues of importance to society. There are, of course, many other justifications, but the most succinct can be summarised as follows: public service media help people to understand and participate in the world, they help people to live. To help others, the helper must be healthy and in good shape.

BUILDING AND EXPERIENCING MEDIA TRUST IN THE NORDICS: VIEWS OF PROFESSIONALS

AND AUDIENCES

DR. IN MINNA HOROWITZ, UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI

MIKKO GRÖNLUND, MSC, UNIVERSITY OF TURKU

DR. IN KATJA LEHTISAARI, UNIVERSITY OF TAMPERE

During the current era of “polycrisis,” (e.g., Zeitlin et al. 2019), coupled with a diverse and complex media landscape, it is becoming increasingly challenging yet more crucial for citizens to find reliable content. Citizens‘ trust in information institutions such as the media is essential for democracy, but journalism must earn that trust.

The Nordic countries have been labeled as “Media Welfare States” (Syvertsen et al. 2014), characterized, among other things, by the legacy of strong national mixed media systems in which public service broadcasters (PSBs) play a crucial role. PSB organizations have also been at the forefront of digitalization and, early on, have become, de facto, public service media (PSM) that offer a variety of content and services in different formats and platforms, including on social media. They have also rapidly responded to challenges such as COVID-19 (e.g., Horowitz & Leino 2020) or disinformation (e.g., Horowitz & Nieminen 2024).

Still, in recent years, many Nordic PSM have faced strong opposition from their national commercial counterparts and populist right-wing politicians. Commercial media, worried about their future in the era of platformisation, argue that PSM have an undue advantage in the domestic news and entertainment market and that PSM offerings should be significantly reduced to “fill in the gap” by mostly providing genres that are not commercially viable. The rise of populist politics in the Nordics, as in many other countries, coupled with austerity policies, has additionally heightened the claims in the political debates that PSM are over-funded–and possibly politically biased. (E.g., Ala-Fossi et al. 2024 forthcoming.)

The case of the Nordics is especially interesting in that trust in PSM is extraordinarily high compared to many other countries in Europe and beyond (e.g., Horowitz et al. 2023; Nielsen and Newman 2023). In addition, Nordic policy-makers and media literacy experts see PSM as essential in combating communication disorders in today’s multi-crisis environment (Karell and Horowitz 2022). This can be partly understood in the natio -

nal media’s awareness of what they can and should do to maintain and strengthen trust in national legacy media (Grönlund et al. 2024). Drawing from audience analyses (Horowitz et al. 2023), interviews of PSM professionals and stakeholders (Karell and Horowitz, 2022), and other journalism professionals (Grönlund et al. 2024), this essay discusses the significant role and especially the success of trust building by PSM in the largest Nordic countries Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. First, it discussed the multidimensionality of trust as both a rational and affective experience for audiences (Horowitz et al. 2020). Second, it illustrates this multidimensionality with recent Nordic survey data focusing on PSM. Third, it reflects on these findings with several recent analyses of how Nordic media professionals see trust and their role in strengthening relationships with audiences. Finally, we discuss the implications of these findings for PSM strategies and practices in the Nordics and beyond.

Understanding media trust from multiple perspectives

In most social scientific studies, the experience of trust is understood both as cognitive and affective, that is, as born from rational reasoning and emotional experiences (Warren 1999). Trust in media can be conceptualized in multiple ways (Fisher et al. 2020) and recent research has begun to stress combining different understandings to capture the multidimensionality entailed in experiences of media trust. From audiences’ perspectives, no one factor determines their assessments of the veracity of a news item or the trustworthiness of a media outlet (e.g., Horowitz et al. 2021; Strömbäck et al. 2020).

In past years, various studies have documented declining trust in institutions, including media (e.g., Edelman Trust Reports and Digital New Reports). Parallel, research on media trust has increased, highlighting different dimensions of audiences’ experiences. For instance, while audiences’ feelings and experiences of trust may vary regarding individual media outlets, they often have a certain, relatively static opinion about the media and its power as an institution. This is often called generalized trust (Prochazka & Schweiger 2019).

Today, the relatively prominent role of social media as a source of news and other “media-like” content has raised questions about its impact on media trust. However, social media are viewed differently from legacy news media: Generalized trust does not extend to social media platforms and apps. One reason is that social media are used for various purposes, including entertainment. Audiences may seek sources they do not trust on social media for alternative views and trending debates (Ardèvol-Abreu & de Zúñiga 2017).

Another dimension of trust is how audience members view a specific outlet, such as a PSM organization. Similarly, their experiences of trust may vary depending on the content creator or journalist or even how the content is consumed (online, mobile) (Prochazka & Schweiger 2019).

The above dimensions of trust may be significantly impacted by individual audience members‘ and audience groups’ demographic and sociographic characteristics and personal experiences. The political views of an individual impact are a typical factor influencing what sources, topics, and views she or he finds trustworthy. For instance, research on populist attitudes and news consumption notes that populist attitudes also correlate with less news consumption (Stier et al. 2020). Another example is age: Young people’s news consumption is impacted by specific situations, individual interests, and particular apps for accessing news (Reuters 2019; FT/Knight Lab 2024).

Multidimensionality of trust in Nordic audiences’ experiences

How do the basic dimensions of trust manifest in recent studies of audiences in the Nordic countries, here represented by Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden? First and foremost, these countries embody trust in legacy media as mediators of information and arenas of debate– even in the global context of diminishing societal and media trust. For example, in Europe in 2022, trust in television ranged from over 80 percent in Iceland to just one-fourth of audiences in Greece. The global average of trust in news in all media, based on 44 media markets, was 42 percent in 2022. In contrast, the trust scores in the Nordic countries ranged from 50 percent in Sweden to 69 percent in Finland. Conversely, trust in social media and news via social media was remarkably low in the Nordic countries. There was also minimal variation between these countries, whereas, in Europe, trust in social media ranged from 42 percent in Poland to 7 percent in Sweden (Eurobarometer 2022).

A more recent survey of the aforementioned Nordic countries (Horowitz et al. 2023) also points to the robust and similar traditions of the national media systems in the Nordic countries. They are highly digitalized and showcase the importance of content consumption online and on mobile devices. The most important news sources are the same in all countries. The respondents were to choose the three most trusted sources, and their choices were clear: News media websites and apps are number one everywhere, and television is in second place. Radio and social media followed, and surprisingly, home-delivered printed newspapers still ranked 5th or 6th in importance.

PSM: The most trusted outlet

Overall, in the Nordic countries that were researched, trust in news media has remained relatively high, and it has even slightly increased in Norway and Sweden from the mid-2010s to 2023. Public service media are vital in these media systems and are each country‘s most trusted news brands. Trust equals reach: In these countries, PSM organizations are among the most popular news online and offline (Newman et al. 2023; Horowitz et al. 2023). Yet another dimension of PSM in Nordic countries is the high regard for the importance of PSM organizations in their respective societies. In a study of 19 countries around the world, Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden ranked the highest in terms of audiences’ trust and their perceptions of the personal and societal importance of PSM (Nielsen & Newman 2023). As argued elsewhere, this suggests these organizations support essential normative foundations of media welfare in the Nordics (Jakobsson et al. 2023).

Prominence of social media and awareness of challenges

Even if PSM and other national media outlets are a part of media consumption in the Nordics, global social media platforms also play a significant role for audiences. Meta’s Facebook was the most popular social media site in all countries, and there were only slight national differences: For instance, Facebook Messenger was popular in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, while in contrast, Finns preferred the WhatsApp messenger service (Nielsen et al. 2023).

Furthermore, these global platforms are relatively significant news sources, and the prominence of Facebook as a source is evident: In 2022, this social network was used to get news by approximately one-third of news consumers in each country. News is also shared on these platforms: 15% of people in Denmark, 27% in Sweden, 25% in Norway, and, remarkably, 29% in Finland shared the news via social media, messaging apps, and email (Eurobarometer 2022). These statistics speak to certain similarities between the Nordic countries regarding the relative stability of the national media landscape and the broad culture of media trust, even with the strong presence of global platforms in audiences‘ everyday lives.

Indeed, regarding generalized trust, the 2023 survey (Horowitz et al. 2023) showcases that Nordic audiences view the media as a significant societal force, influencing public opinion and political decision-making. While the study‘s respondents do not necessarily make a distinction between legacy and social media when assessing the media’s power in society, respondents refer specifically to legacy outlets when noting that reporting on current events, fact-checking, and analyzing and commenting on current issues are the most central tasks of the media.

The distinction between legacy and social media becomes evident in the 2023 study when the respondents are asked directly about their experiences and views on trust. While digitalization has meant that news consumption goes online and mobile, legacy media are the key news sources in each researched country. Notably, PSM organizations fare the highest in audiences’ trust, reflecting the tradition of public broadcasting in the Nordic media welfare state model and practice. Partly, this pronounced trust may result from the complex media environment and the audiences‘ experiences: They report, to a significant extent, that they worry about disinformation, foreign information interference, and information overload. This finding echoes earlier Eurobarometer (2022) results: Approximately 80 percent of respondents in these countries considered disinformation a problem for democracy.

Even with the high trust in legacy media, the individual aspects of trust experience come into play in the Nordic countries. The role of one’s family and friends is crucial in the respondents’ experience of media trust. Similarly, all researched countries indicate distrust in legacy media, particularly PSM, by respondents aligned with right-wing populist parties.

Multidimensionality: Trust and criticism

An interesting duality in the survey respondents’ views reflects the multidimensionality of trust: Legacy media are trusted yet critically viewed in terms of how different outside factors–such as media companies’ economic incentives or journalists’ political leanings–influence media content and other functions. One explanation might be the role of media literacy education, prominent in all Nordic countries, highlighting the importance of critically examining underlying motivations and contexts of media contents. This awareness may also be connected to the trusted role of legacy media itself, in that audiences set high expectations for the national legacy news and journalism sources.

Based on the 2023 survey (Horowitz et al. 2023), the audiences‘ experiences of media, trust, and disinformation in the four Nordic countries are almost identical. One explanation is the legacy Nordic Media Welfare State model and its principles of a mixed media system with consensus on media policies, editorial freedom, and universal access to media. As has been argued elsewhere (Ala-Fossi 2020), this model may no longer exist in its most ideal form. Challenges present in most countries due to digitalization and platformisation–such as a rapid increase in information disorders, diminishing trust in some knowledge institutions, political polarization, and fragmentation of news consumption habits–can also be detected from the survey results, even in those trends are modest.

Nordic stakeholders’ views on audiences, trust, and PSM

How are media trust and especially the role of PSM seen on the one hand by PSM professionals and on the other by other media decision-makers, policy experts, and media literacy stakeholders concerned about information disorders and the media landscape, including audiences’ trust in media, in the Nordic countries?

Mounting challenges due to social media

The interview and survey segments of the study on the role of PSM in combating information disorders in the Nordics (Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and Norway; Karell & Horowitz 2022) indicate that while trust in PSM and editorial media overall is high in the Nordics, many PSM experts are worried about social media as a distribution platform for news. In all programming, traditional PSM television and radio channels and the companies’ websites still fare well among audiences, but changes are happening fast within social media platforms. Social networks expose audiences to disinformation and other non-editorial content and pose problems for PSM in several ways: Social media and other platforms challenge news production processes, distribution strategies, and competitor relationships. Their prominence in people’s media consumption, as evident also in the audience surveys (see above section), forces the PSM organizations to upgrade their journalistic tools and skills while also raising concerns regarding journalists’ security and well-being due to increasing harassment of journalists (e.g., Hiltunen 2021).

The PSM experts’ commentary further points to the blurred distinctions and boundaries between legacy media and social media, resulting in PSM becoming a part of the information overflow. Increasing polarization and fragmentation can lead to some audience groups actively tuning out. Others may tune out more passively due to difficulty navigating an increasingly complex and crowded information landscape. Communicating the role of PSM to audiences, with emphasis on independence and reliability, becomes increasingly important to maintain high reach and trust. Another challenge relates to the lack of collaboration with commercial media. Many interviewees see a need for a common front between media organizations. Still, commercial competitors’ somewhat negative attitude towards PSM is an obstacle, and some Nordic countries also face challenges from political actors (see Ala-Fossi et al. forthcoming 2024).

Concerns about polarization

A few PSM interviewees mentioned the risk of polarization in the Nordic societies. While not dramatic, it can also be seen and noted in the audience survey One of the greatest challenges for PSM is to serve everyone

with the information they need and respect their views while remaining the most trusted and valued source. The risk of polarization was also a key concern expressed in the commentary by the journalism and policy experts outside of PSM organizations. They, too, stressed the importance of reaching all audience groups—different generations and minority groups, including minority language groups, and across the political spectrum—in all possible distribution channels. PSM organizations must reach out to audience groups that may not be commercially attractive to mainstream legacy media and who may otherwise navigate toward alternative, marginal information sources. Increasing viewership among young people should remain a priority for all PSM. Regarding reach, the importance of the tradition of strong local PSM news production was also mentioned, as well as strengthening trust and ensuring audience reach in crises (Horowitz et al. 2023).

Opportunities in the digital age

PSM interviewees note that a central factor supporting the role of Nordic PSM is the early adoption of digital channels. This has led to a good relationship with new generations of digital media consumers, even if reaching younger audiences is a continuing challenge to all legacy media. All PSM organizations in the researched countries invest in children’s programming, feature special news programs, and collaborate with schools. This robust reputation and digital-forward approach allow PSM to innovate with new tools and technologies.

It is evident from the PSM interviewees’ comments that they recognize a special trust relationship between audiences and PSM. However, according to PSM expert commentary, this elevated position also creates a responsibility to live up to the audiences’ expectations. A high level of media consumption and media literacy in the Nordic countries strengthens awareness of the importance of trusted quality content and ethical standards. This can be seen echoed in the 2023 survey: White legacy media, especially PSM, are considered trustworthy, and audiences are also very critical of potential news media biases: High levels of trust create high expectations by audiences.

Some support for PSM also comes from the commercial media. In a survey among editors-in-chiefs in Finland, most respondents considered Yle‘s, the public service media company’s, role in the Finnish news media to be important. According to a recent study (Lehtisaari et al. 2024), the majority of editors-in-chief in Finnish commercial media believe that Yle enhances the diversity of news media content and strengthens the Finnish news media ecosystem. However, half of the editors felt that the state aid received by Yle distorts competition in the news media. Conver-

sely, nearly one in three did not see the funding as distorting competition. Opinions were also split on whether Yle should focus its news operations solely on radio and television. About half (46%) of the respondents supported concentrating Yle’s news activities in traditional media, while a similar proportion (43%) disagreed (Lehtisaari et al. 2024).

In the 2022 study (Karell & Horowitz 2022), the stakeholders outside of PSM reiterated the two basic strategies available to PSM in the Nordic countries: First, continuous, high-quality, trust-evoking journalism and programming addressing specific phenomena of information disorder, whether in news journalism, educational programming, needs to be the primary content strategy. Second, collaborations are an underutilized opportunity to strengthen approaches against information disorders and build trust; and PSM should increase collaboration with academic institutions, researchers, think tanks, fact-checkers, and relevant authorities.

Discussion and conclusions: Implications for PSM

This analysis of the Nordic audiences and media professionals highlights the complexity of building trust in the challenging current media ecosystem with fragmenting audiences and various information disorders. These challenges are shared worldwide. To take the finding about the multidimensionality of media trust as a complex experience dependent on the content‘s proven veracity and the individual’s disposition (demographics, attitudes, values) seriously means for PSM that the strategies to strengthen media trust must also be multidimensional.

Undoubtedly, verified, truthful content is one key aspect of trust-building. The potential of PSM in supporting audiences‘ trust in shared knowledge can be seen in the EU’s European Media Freedom Act, which highlights the centrality and need for independent and adequately funded PSM in the Member States (EU 2024). Indeed, some studies indicate that PSM correlates with a nation’s democratic practices (EBU 2023a) and is a significant structural factor in national resilience against online disinformation (Humprecht et al. 2020).

Another element of PSM‘s trust-building potential, related to content veracity, is the independence of PSM organizations from commercial imperatives. Given the central role of PSM in the Nordic model, audiences‘ high trust in PSM and their understanding of it as a critical institution of one’s society (Nielsen & Newman 2023) are not surprising findings. Perhaps more unexpected survey result is the Nordic audiences’ highly critical awareness of the market-driven priorities of the rest of the nati-

onal media sectors. PSM can have an explicitly expressed competitive advantage in the eyes of audiences because it does not need to compete with the same strategies as its commercial counterparts.

However, perhaps the most remarkable insight from our analysis is that while commercial and political actors continue to challenge the remit and funding in many Nordic countries (e.g., Ala-Fossi et al. 2024), surprisingly many individual media professionals and other experts stress the importance of PSM. They position PSM as an industry leader, especially in tasks that pertain to addressing audiences as citizens, such as ethical and educational media innovations. Another study on the role of PSM in combating disinformation (Horowitz et al. 2022a) reports similar assessments from country experts in the Czech Republic, Spain, and the United Kingdom. This finding starkly contrasts the discourses that the opponents of PSM tend to disseminate: The bloated functions and resources of PSM that distort the market, as well as specific political leanings in PSM content. While these claims are often expressed without empirical evidence (e.g., Sehl et al. 2020), they may erode trust in PSM simply by being repeated in media publicity (Dragomir & Horowitz 2021).

While PSM need to remain a distinct, non-commercial, and independent, another, mainly untapped, opportunity for trust-building is selective and strategic collaborative projects between national media outlets and other knowledge institutions. PSM organizations tend to work with cultural institutions and, to some extent, universities, yet initiatives to build trust collaboratively with other national media are seldom. Still, for example, national resilience against online disinformation and other global information harms provides a shared cause for national legacy media. A great example of a well-functioning collaboration in verification and trust-building is the Norwegian Faktisk.no – an independent fact-checking organization that came together as a collaborative effort by PSM and numerous commercial outlets.

In increasingly complex and somewhat polarizing political climates in Europe, echoed in audiences’ media trust patterns even in the Nordics, the key takeaway is educating audiences about PSM‘s values and mission. PSM need to continuously communicate and stress their role as genuinely independent sources with values and principles that include, among other things, quality journalism and diversity of voices, as well as sustainability and ethical technological innovation (e.g., EBU 2023b). A prime example is the case of artificial intelligence: Its applications in journalism, and even more importantly, its increasing impact on people’s everyday lives, require careful and transparent actions from PSM (Horowitz et al. 2022b).

Finally, in the relatively homogenous Nordic countries, shared knowledge is still trusted – but PSM must be mindful of the need to represent a diversity of voices. For example, only half of the Nordic audiences believe that gender equality is a reality in today’s media output (Horowitz et al. 2023). As one of the Finnish PSM expert interviewees put it bluntly in 2022: Even in the Nordic countries, we live in a borrowed time of trust (Karell & Horowitz 2022). In the Nordic countries–and in all PSM contexts–PSM organizations have a central duty to strengthen trust by addressing and collaborating with various societal groups. As the scholars Maria Michalis and Alessandro D’Arma (2024, 116) eloquently remark, “PSM, as a fundamental epistemic institution, are critical to enabling citizenship and supporting democracy and can help remedy many of the injustices that today’s seemingly plural media environment exhibits and often amplifies.”

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Lehtisaari, K., Grönlund, M., Hellman, H., Ranti, T., & Suikkanen, R. (2024) Median keskittyminen ja mediasisältöjen moninaisuus Suomessa. [Media concentration and content diversity in Finland.] Valtioneuvoston selvitys- ja tutkimustoiminnan julkaisusarja 2024:6. https://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/165517/VNTEAS_2024_6.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Michalis, M., D’Arma, A. (2024). Public Service Media: From Epistemic Rights to Epistemic Justice. In: Aslama Horowitz, M., Nieminen, H., Lehtisaari, K., D‘Arma, A. (Eds). Epistemic Rights in the Era of Digital Disruption. Global Transformations in Media and Communication Research - A Palgrave and IAMCR Series. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45976-4_7

Newman, N., Fletcher, R., Eddy, K., Robertson, C. & Nielsen, R.K. (2023). Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2023. The Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism. https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/ default/files/2023-06/Digital_News_Report_2023.pdf

Nielsen, R.K. and Newman, N. (2023). The importance of public service media for individuals and for society. https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/digital-news-report/2023/importance-public-service-media-individuals Ojala, M. (2021). Is the Age of Impartial Journalism Over? The Neutrality Principle and Audience (Dis)trust in Mainstream News. Journalism Studies, 22(15): 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/1461670x.2021.1942150

Prochazka, F. & Schweiger, W. (2019). How to Measure Generalized Trust in News Media? An Adaptation and Test of Scales. Communication Methods and Measures 13 (1): 26-42. https://doi.org/10.1080/19312458.2018.1506021

Reuters (2019). How Young People Consume News and the Implications for Mainstream Media. Reuters Institue for the Study of Journalism. https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/our-research/how-young-peopleconsume-news-and-implications-mainstream-media

Sehl, A., Fletcher, R., & Picard, R. G. (2020). Crowding out: Is there evidence that public service media harm markets? A cross-national comparative analysis of commercial television and online news providers. European Journal of Communication, 35(4): 389-409. https://doi.org/10.1177/0267323120903688

Stier, S., Kirkizh, N., Froio, C. & Schroeder, R. (2020). Populist Attitudes and Selective Exposure to Online News: A Cross-Country Analysis Combining Web Tracking and Surveys. The International Journal of Press/Politics 25(3): 426–44. https://doi.org/10.1177/194016122090701

Strömbäck, J., Tsfati, Y. Boomgaarden, H., Damstra, A., Lindgren, E. Vliegenthart, R. & Lindholm, T. (2020). News media trust and its impact on media use: toward a framework for future research, Annals of the International Communication Association, 44:2: 139-156. https://doi.org/10.1080/23808985.2020.1755338

Syvertsen, T., Gunn Enli, Mjøs, O.J. and Moe, H. (2014). The Media Welfare State. Ann Arbour, MI: The University of Michigan Press. Warren, M. E. (ed.) 1999: Democracy & trust. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Zeitlin, J. Nicoli, F. & Laffan, B. (2019). Introduction: the European Union beyond the polycrisis? Integration and politicization in an age of shifting cleavages, Journal of European Public Policy, 26:7: 963-976. https://doi.org/1 0.1080/13501763.2019.1619803

FRANCE’S PUBLIC SERVICE MEDIA: THE NEED FOR A EUROPEAN VISION

PAULINE RENAUD, PHD UNIVERSITY OF LONDON CITY

What is the role of public service media (PSM) in France? This interrogation has become pressing due to mounting challenges faced by public TV and radio broadcasters, including pluralism, funding and their ability to remain reliable news providers in the current information disorder. At stake is their continued relevance and survival at a time when an increasing number of people in France, and the rest of Europe, are losing interest in the news.

According to Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism’s Digital News Report 2023, only 36% of respondents in France said they were very interested in the news, as opposed to 59% in 2015. Although public television channels and radio stations fare better than their private counterparts, in terms of trust scores and offline reach, social media remain “one of the main access points to online news while direct access to news apps and websites is declining” (Digital News Report, 2023).

The public broadcasters’ precarious resilience is further threatened by ongoing difficulties, including fresh accusations of bias coming from the far right. “Will the decision made by the Conseil d’État about CNews, in the name of ‚pluralism‘ and the independence of information, apply to public service media where political collusion and single worldview are the norm?” far right leader Jordan Bardella wrote on X in February. The tweet referred to a decision compelling the country’s broadcasting regulator, Arcom, to reexamine pluralism at CNews, a TV channel owned by conservative media magnate Vincent Bolloré (Dassonville, 2024).

Background

These accusations are not new but illustrate ongoing difficulties for the state-owned public service media to affirm its impartiality. Until the mid1970s, TV and radio were tightly controlled by the state, so much so that French president Georges Pompidou (1969-1974) once described the ORTF (the national agency tasked with providing public radio and television services between 1964 and 1975) as the “voice of France”. Under Charles de Gaulle’s presidency (1959-1969), the State’s stranglehold over broadcasting was even tighter. Chalaby (2005, p. 282) notes that, at the time, “French television was a cog in a vast ubiquitous state apparatus that dominated the life of the nation and that of all its citizens”.

However, the economic liberalisation resulting from the dissolution of the ORTF, and the end of the public broadcasting monopoly in 1981, contributed to pulling the French media away from journalistic considerations and towards commercial ones instead. The reshuffle of the broadcasting system saw the emergence and/or privatisation of four TV channels between 1984 and 1987. While this process introduced pluralism in broadcasting, Kuhn (2019, p. 71) also notes how, by the late 1980s, “the balance of the broadcasting system had tipped significantly in favour of private sector providers, led by TF1 [a TV channel] which consistently attracted the single largest market share in prime-time scheduling”.

Long-term funding in limbo

At present, the French public service media is split into four separate entities: France Télévisions (a mix of generalist and specialist TV channels for a national audience); Radio France (radio stations); France Médias Monde (TV and radio broadcast internationally); and the Institut National de l’Audiovisuel (INA, broadcasting archives). Until 2022, these entities were funded through a €138 annual licence fee per household. Revenues also come from commercial advertising on television although these have dropped sharply, following a 2009 ban between 8pm and 6am. To make up for these losses, part of VAT receipts go towards financing the public broadcast media.

However, there have been ongoing concerns that abolishing the TV licence fee could, over time, translate into reduced funding. In a July 2022 statement, Reporters Without Borders (RSF) highlighted that the levy on VAT can only be temporary because, from 2025, any tax allocation to a public service will have to be justified. At present, there is no such link between VAT and public broadcasting. Pointing to threats to independent and pluralist news coverage, RSF secretary-general Christophe Deloire said: “We urge the government to find a permanent funding solution that protects the public broadcast media from political pressure, and we ask parliamentarians to quickly enshrine it in legislation”. Echoing this, the European Media Freedom Act, adopted by the European Commission in September 2022, reaffirmed the importance of “adequate and stable” funding to ensure the editorial independence of public service media (European Media Freedom Act, 2022).

The bigger European picture

Inadequate funding not only poses a risk for the public broadcasters’ independence and pluralism of information. This also puts pressure on their resources at a time when disinformation continues spreading through increasingly sophisticated methods. Like several other French news organi-

sations, the public broadcaster has its own fact-checking and debunking platform, ‘Vrai ou Faux’ (True or False), which adheres to the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN)’s code of principles. Yet, as the 2024 EU parliamentary elections loom, there have been no plans for PSM to come together at the European level in order to share resources for the verification of information. The only such initiative emanates from the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN), whose members have joined forces to create a fact-checking database supported by Google.

That said, there have been plans to create a supra-national entity for European news media. In its 2022 European Media Freedom Act, the European Commission announced it would set up an independent board consisting of national media authorities to consistently apply “the EU media law framework, in particular by assisting the Commission in preparing guidelines on media regulatory matters”. The aim is also to establish a dialogue between online platforms and the media “to promote access to diverse media offers and to monitor platforms’ compliance with self-regulatory initiatives, such as the EU Code of Practice on Disinformation”. While this concerns all news organisations, and not just PSM, this initiative nonetheless constitutes a step in the right direction to ensure that media freedom, independence and pluralism are guaranteed across the EU.

However, public broadcasters, in particular, also have a responsibility towards the quality of the information they produce, including in terms of promoting diversity and identifying fabricated stories. Co-regulation with European instances is one way forward to ensure that media guidelines, including on fact-checking and pluralism, are applied at the national level. Joining forces with other European PSM, however, also requires a pooling of resources and expertise against the biggest threat faced by public broadcasters, i.e., the lack of funding. From this perspective, plans recently revived by France’s culture minister Rachida Dati to regroup all public broadcasting entities under one roof may augur a new era for PSM in France (Laemle and Dassonville, 2024), insofar as it does not imply a reduced budget. This may also contribute to greater European cooperation by facilitating coordination in terms of media literacy and the fight against disinformation. In an interview with newspaper Le Figaro in April, France Télévisions CEO Delphine Ernotte, also the president of the European Broadcasting Union, said merging France’s PSM entities – which most other European countries (Belgium, Italy, Spain) have already done – will mean “our power will be multiplied” (Sallé, 2024). Considering the bigger, European picture must, however, also become a priority for France’s public service media if it is to continue fulfilling its mission.

References

Chalaby, J. K. (2005) ‘French political communication in a comparative perspective: the media and the issue of freedom’, Modern and Contemporary France, 13(3), pp. 273-290. doi: 10.1080/09639480500177674.

Dassonville, A. (2024) ‘Après l’action de RSF auprès de l’Arcom, CNews est visée, mais c’est l’audiovisuel public qui est touché’. Available at : https://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2024/02/21/apres-l-action-dersf-aupres-de-l-arcom-cnews-est-visee-mais-c-est-l-audiovisuel-public-qui-est-touche_6217685_3234.html (Accessed: 8 April 2024).

European Commission (2022) ‘European Media Freedom Act’. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/ presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_5504 (Accessed: 9 April 2024).

Kuhn, R. (2019) ‘Public Service Media in France’, in Połońska, E. and Beckett, C. (eds.) Public Service Broadcasting and Media Systems in Troubled European Democracies. doi: 10.1007/978-3-030-02710-0_4.

Laemle, B. and Dassonville, A. (2024) ‘Ce qu’on sait du projet de regroupement de l’audiovisuel public porté par Rachida Dati’. Available at: https://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2024/04/15/audiovisuel-public-legrand-regroupement_6227936_3234.html (Accessed: 16 April 2024).

Reporters Without Borders (2022) ‘France must drop makeshift approach to public broadcast media funding’. Available at: https://rsf.org/en/france-must-drop-makeshift-approach-public-broadcast-media-funding (Accessed: 9 April 2024).

Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism (2023) ‘Digital News Report 2023’. Available at: https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2023-06/Digital_News_Report_2023.pdf (Accessed: 8 April 2024).

Sallé, C. (2024) ‘Delphine Ernotte au Figaro: «Le projet de fusion de l’audiovisuel public, c’est le choix de la responsabilité»’. Available at: https://www.lefigaro.fr/medias/delphine-ernotte-au-figaro-le-projet-de-fusionde-l-audiovisuel-public-c-est-le-choix-de-la-responsabilite-20240405 (Accessed: 16 April 2024).

| GERMANY | PUTTING THE SOVEREIGN AT THE CENTRE : PUBLIC SERVICE MEDIA IN THE ERA OF POSTMODERN DEMOCRACY

PASCAL ALBRECHTSKIRCHINGER

ZDF

European democracy and electoral processes

Elections and electoral processes – the embodiment of modern sovereignty - have recently moved to the centre of attention for EU policy makers. Bluntly put, it took the trolls of the disinformation age and the disruptive threats for regular electoral processes, for politicians and regulators to fully acknowledge the limitations of market forces and that ‘the’ Internet was not necessarily a self-regulating environment fostering freedom of expression and civilised discourse. It also became clear, consequently, that the very foundations of democracy were not a given and that they might have to be secured proactively.

But the fault lines and crevasses of the Internet are not the only challenge. Our societies and our democratic systems themselves are cracking, underneath the delicate coating of the democratic consensus built on the heritage of 18th Century Enlightenment rationality.

In Western parliamentary democracies, which were formed by the ideals of reason and progress in the Age the Enlightenment, the whole balance relies on one main factor: the acceptance of defeat. You loyally accept that the majority decision, for the period determined under the law, is binding on you even if you voted against it. In our increasingly polarised societies, that rule is more and more disregarded. Permanent suspicion regarding the electoral processes and contempt for the winner undermine the indispensable trust factor. If disruption, alternative facts and flagrant lies generate votes, why should one try complicated truths?

In 2018, the European Union first addressed the issue in an ‘electoral package’. This was followed in 2020 by a wider European Democracy Action Plan1 , to promote, inter alia, free and fair elections, to strengthen media freedom and to counter disinformation. On 26 March 2024, the Commission published, on the basis of the Digital Services Act (DSA), guidelines2 ‘to 1

mitigate systemic risks online that may impact the integrity of elections, with specific guidance for the upcoming European Parliament elections in June”, further pushing the measures more towards the hard law area.

In his 2018 State of the Union Address, President Jean-Claude Juncker stated: „We must protect our free and fair elections. This is why the Commission is today proposing new rules to better protect our democratic processes from manipulation by third countries or private interests.”

At the same time, First Vice-President Frans Timmermans established the firm link with the set of values the European Union feels committed too: „Together with the rule of law and fundamental rights, democracy is part of ‘who we are‘ and defines our Union. We must not be naive: there are those who want to disrupt European elections and their tools are sophisticated. And that is why we all must work together urgently to beef up our democratic resilience.”

Timmermans’ statement stressed the long way accomplished by the EU on its transformation from a Common Market to a values-based Union, following the inclusion of the Charter of Fundamental Rights into the Treaty of the European Union (Lisbon Treaty, 2009). The big qualitative step towards a kind of shared responsibility with regard to media freedom was the introduction in the TEU of Pluralism as a fundamental value of the Union (Article 2), as well as Cultural diversity as a goal (Article 3).

However, despite the focus put on exogenous dangers - which also led to the decision banning the retransmission of the Russia Today programmes, European democracies are also challenged from within. In the long term, this might prove far more worrisome.

Already by now, one cannot ignore that the strengthening of European values through Rule of Law policies and instruments is increasingly thwarted by the return of 19th century-style nationalistic narratives, autocratic tendencies and the muzzling of media.

The already apparent contradictions between ”core EU values” and the renaissance of “national values” and narratives are intriguing. How this will develop is uncertain, but a long-standing rift would hardly be sustainable. Europe is made of many concentric circles, but ultimately, it will not be able to function on the basis of different sets of values or even Weltanschauungen.

The European Commission has been widening the scope of the Rule of Law Report since it was first published in 2020. Recently, the state of Pu-

blic Service Media was added as a regular feature. The recent dangerous drifts of national political and judicial systems, or at least at the level of the political discourse – even in a long-stable country like Germany - show how judicious such a holistic approach has become. It is remarkable that during the negotiations of the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA)3 , adopted on 13 March 2024, the use of spyware to monitor media was not completely ruled out. France’s positioning was particularly intriguing.

The EMFA represents a remarkable move towards a kind of “shared responsibility” for the well-being of the democratic fabric in Europe. Regarding the question of competences and the difficult “subsidiarity” relationship between the European Commission and the Member States, as well as the governance issue, things are not clear-cut. However, there will be no stepping back. The very fact that a Media Freedom Act – aiming at repelling the interference of the State into media governance and editorial independence - was deemed necessary at all tells us everything about the present state of our societies and political systems.

The European Union and Public Service Media: a deepening relationship With respect to Public Service Broadcasting, the European Union had long remained either neutral or restrictive. In the early days of the Internal Market, competition was king. At the European level, media pluralism too would be ensured by the competition of media outlets, mainly by opening up an internal market for audiovisual services. In fact, this was - in parallel with the liberalisation of the telecommunications markets – the European Commission’s gateway into a regulatory field which was by then an exclusive domain of the Member States. Therefore, for many years, the main purpose of the Commission was the successful implementation of the “Television without frontiers Directive” and the fostering of a slowly emerging cross-border audiovisual production and distribution market.

In the direct aftermath of the fall of the Iron Curtain and the optimistic mood of the Delors years, the positive soft power exercised by audiovisual content was used positively to enter this new era. Just as Western current affairs programmes may have contributed to help bring down the Berlin Wall, Europeanised programming may also help bring people together. The presumed Jean Monnet quote that he would start with culture if he had to relaunch the Common Policies from scratch was repeated over and over again. There was also a growing consensus about what had to be de -

3 Media Freedom Act: a new bill to protect EU journalists and press freedom | News | European Parliament (europa.eu)

fended in common vis-à-vis foreign interference in the “Right to Regulate”. The EU was instrumental in establishing the principle of the exception culturelle in trade negotiations and in bringing together a majority of nations for the adoption of the UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity (2005)4 .

However, in those years, the Commission regarded any entry of Public Sector Broadcasting (PSB) into “new markets” with suspicion since public money was deemed to suffocate new competitors. Eagerly, the European Commission’s Directorate General for Competition (DG COMP) took on complaints filed by commercial broadcasters and publishers against PSB “new” offers.

That “market approach” led the Member States to react. With the 1997 Amsterdam Protocol5 on the system of public broadcasting in the Member States, the latter secured their primary competence with regard to its remit and funding.

Fundamentally, however, the question was about what PSB stood for and how it should develop. For the Member States and the Public Service broadcasters themselves, the answer was clear: Since PSB gets funded by all, it has to serve and reach the entire public wherever it is. In times of technological convergence, that also extends to all technological vectors. In 2004, the Council of Europe first officialised the transition6 from Public Service Broadcasting to Public Service Media (PSM). That status of technological neutrality was also recognised by DG COMP in the final ‘compromise’ of the state aid communication in 20097 , recognising the remit of PSM to serve the democratic, social and cultural needs of society.

Thus, PSM slowly blended with the system of core values to be safeguarded. When presenting her proposal for the EMFA, Vice-President Věra Jourová8 made this very clear: ‘…where public service exist, their funding provided should be adequate and stable, in order to ensure editorial independence. The head and the governing board of public service media will have to be appointed in a transparent, open, and non-discriminatory manner. Public service media providers shall provide a plurality of information and opinions, in an impartial manner, in accordance with their public service mission.’ Thus, one cannot exclude that one day, the EU will consider PSM to be a constitutive part of the regulatory landscape.

4 2005 Convention on Diversity of Cultural Expressions | Diversity of Cultural Expressions (unesco.org)

5 EUR-Lex - 11997D/PRO/09 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu)

6 1680a90831 (coe.int)

7 EUR-Lex - 52009XC1027(01) - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu)

8 IP_22_5504_EN.pdf (europa.eu)

Where do the societal and political divides leave Public Service Media?

The political and societal divides we are witnessing constitute a substantial challenge for Public Service Media. Liberty of thought and media freedom are not only enshrined in European and western democracies. They are their foundation. For the past 300 years at least, the competition of ideas has been at the heart of political and societal progress. Public Service Broadcasting ‘at its best’, as it was conceptualised in Britain 100 years ago, could be seen as an e-version of the overarching objectives of the Age of Enlightenment, promising universality and progress for all.

PSM are, per definition, inclusive. Funded by the public, they must serve the entire population without discrimination. In times in which all ‘institutions’ are suspected by many to be part of an ‘elitist’ plot, this is not an easy task. Being objective is no longer a guarantee for being seen as such. However, ultimately PSM legitimacy will depend on the support of a substantial part of citizens in all groups of society.

‘Ein ZDF für alle’ – the current leitmotiv of Germany’s national PSBepitomises that PSM remit. This is why, contrary to opinion papers, PSM find themselves in a very special situation: they must act as enablers for all. In times of Internet-driven and/or government-sponsored disinformation, PSM must foster opinion-forming based on unbiased, fact-based information.

However, PSM are facing multifold challenges, some of which are clearly beyond their direct control. Squaring the circle most probably describes it best. In the new multipolar order, PSM will have to adjust constantly, since their foundations now resemble more a moving sandbank. Political support is getting shaky and increasingly responsive to populist ideas. In parallel, PSM funding gets now more openly linked to political considerations - including in Germany, contrary to the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court. The citizen-user has become fully autonomous and uses third platforms, a fact that challenges PSM control over branding and findable content. As a result, taking nothing for granted, PSM will have to increase their lobby activities, communicate more efficiently with the public(s) and constantly monitor production and distribution lines. But foremost, PSM simply have no other choice than ‘to do their job best’ by reaching out to the entire public, using all means of distribution and by cementing their credibility with trustworthy content.

The German figures clearly show that the trust in PSM remains high. In our competitive times, one does not keep an overall 50% market share without merit. An even larger majority of citizens still recognise the es-

sential and indispensable role of PSM as an independent and credible source on which they can rely for their opinion forming9 .

European DNA

ZDF is and remains a national broadcaster, funded by the public residing in Germany. However, reporting and reflecting on the European integration process is an integral part of the remit of German Public Service Media. For a long time, European elections were widely perceived – both by politicians and the electorate – as “national test elections”. This might still be the case in a number of countries. However, as the understanding of interdependencies and the power of “exogenous factors” grows, the European perspective is gaining ground. The higher than usual participation in the 2019 elections in Germany was driven by that perspective, also based on intensive quality journalism.

The irony of our contradictory times is that anti-European – or anti-EUfeelings can also contribute to the sharpening of the European character of elections to the European Parliament: a strong participation does not necessarily mean support of the ‘European Set of values’ as defended by the European Commission and the (still) pro-European parliamentary majority.

Speaking about the coverage of the June 2024 elections, ZDF’s editor-in-chief Bettina Schausten10 elaborated on her approach to that key event in momentous times: ‘…in an interconnected and increasingly complex world, in times of crises and conflicts, Europe is challenged like never before. Russia‘s war in Ukraine, Hamas‘ attack on Israel, climate change and loss of prosperity, polarisation and protest raise big questions: How far does European solidarity go? Will Europe find a common response to autocratic regimes? And how defensible is democracy against its enemies, even within its own ranks? …Our correspondents explore these and other questions ahead of the European elections… and show the importance of the European promise of a life of freedom, prosperity and security…Above all, however, people in the different European countries will find their personal answers to the question of what Europe is worth to them. A lot, I think, as will become clear not only on the evening of the European elections on ZDF’.

9 Vertrauen in die Glaubwürdigkeit der Berichterstattung ARD/ZDF - ZDFmediathek

10 Pressemappe: Europawahl 2024 im ZDF: ZDF-Presseportal

| GERMANY | EUROPEAN ELECTIONS. PUBLIC MEDIA‘S FINEST HOUR?

CHRISTIAN FELD ARD

European politics is a complex process that needs to be well researched and explained by journalists. After all, they should enable people in the nation states to form an opinion on European issues. But in the run-up to the European elections, in nonetheless difficult economic times, it is above all the public service media that can provide more information than the results of major summits. They also keep an eye on the hardships on the ground, the important day-to-day business of the Brussels political machinery.

It‘s a question that is asked time and again by groups of visitors to ARD‘s Brussels studio: What are you as the media actually doing to present the EU in a more positive light? The answer is: hopefully nothing at all. It is not the job of journalists to promote the European Union. There is no reason to be particularly lenient when it comes to grievances, just because the „European idea” is a good thing. The institutions - Commission, Council and Parliament - have sufficient money and staff to provide information about their policies and positions. And it remains the task of journalism to classify, criticize or report positively where appropriate. This lays the foundation for independent decision-making and voting.

This is also stipulated in the German Interstate Media Treaty’s program mandate. „The public broadcasters must provide a comprehensive overview of international, European, national and regional events in all key areas of life.” In this way, they are to promote „European integration”, among other things. But this does not mean disseminating uncritical PR. Because, as the Interstate Media Treaty also states, public service media are „particularly obliged to comply with journalistic standards, in particular to guarantee independent, factual, truthful and comprehensive information and reporting”.

The European elections are approaching. What does this program mandate and the requirement to report with critical distance mean for reporting on EU policy? Knowledge, continuity and resources are needed in order to be able to adequately classify European legislation. This is the basis for being able to report on what is happening in the „engine room” of the EU.

„Is this the final decision?” - Planning editors in Berlin, Helsinki or Athens like to call their correspondents in Brussels because they need

guidance. In fact, it is not easy to maintain an overview from a distance. Has the Council of Ministers only agreed on one detailed issue or has a so-called general approach been reached? Is a vote in the lead specialist committee of the EU Parliament more important than the vote in the Strasbourg plenary? Are votes after the trilogue only a formality? Qualified majority. Comitology. Passerelle clause. Even those who have been around for a long time occasionally look things up in the EU treaties.

Particularly before the European elections, but also in “everyday life”, there is a need for knowledgeable reporting on the decisions that arise in the interaction between the EU institutions. The media system should monitor and criticize those in power. This starts with reporting on what they do and why. As a service provider for citizens and voters, the task is to explain, translate and classify. The wondrous world of directives and regulations must be translated into understandable language, and references must be made to the reality of life beyond the European Quarter. What exactly does a regulation regulate? Has the original claim been fulfilled, or has it been lost on its way through the compromise machine?

One recent example is the EU Supply Chain Act, which is intended to ensure that companies throughout the EU pay attention to decent working conditions and environmental protection at their suppliers. Although the Council, EU Parliament and Commission had reached an agreement in the so-called trilogue, weeks of negotiations between the member states ensued, which ended in a change to the text. Critics believe that the original intention of the law has been watered down. Continuously following the legislation is an exhausting and resource-intensive mission. This is precisely why public service media have a fundamental and responsible role to play.

In the battle for users‘ attention, reporting on European Union policy hardly seems like a cash cow. A permanent presence in the European capital is a major investment in economically strained times. Who is prepared to spend significant resources on content that is relevant but sometimes unwieldy and may not guarantee enough attention beyond major events?

The German Permanent Representation to the EU maintains a list of German-language media and services that are permanently represented in Brussels. As of April 2024, there are no private broadcasting companies on this list. It is primarily the public media that can and should provide a large part of the service here. ZDF, Deutschlandfunk and Deutsche Welle operate their own offices. In ARD‘s Brussels studio, eleven corres-

pondents work with an experienced team for radio, television and digital channels. The Europamagazin on German First Television “Das Erste” provides in-depth reports on EU politics every Sunday. The podcast punktEU is also produced here.

The European Councils - usually referred to as EU summits in the news - attract a great deal of media attention. The heads of state and government of the 27 member states arrive and discuss the big issues at the summit table. In the Justus Lipsius building next door, hundreds of media representatives sit in a tightly packed room. Some of them travel from the EU member states especially for the two-day event. However, they often lack contacts beyond their own home country - even though these would be important in order to convey the full picture.

After all, reporting before and after - the day-to-day business - is at least as important. Between the summits lies the toil of the plain, the normal operation of the Brussels compromise machine. What happens in the engine room may seem tedious and less spectacular, but it is important to be able to understand: Why was a draft changed? Which aspects of which groups were given greater consideration? Which nation state played which card? This is the only way for citizens to ultimately get an idea of the quality of legislation at EU level for the people.

The demands on correspondents have grown in many respects. The demand for topics from Brussels is certainly subject to changing cycles of attention.

However, the past few years have clearly brought the EU back into the spotlight. First it was the pandemic, followed by the Russian war against Ukraine. This has massively increased the extent of reporting in Brussels - including on NATO. In addition, populist forces are gaining ground in many EU countries. Particularly regarding Europe, this means that parties are increasingly providing seemingly simple answers and, in the worst case, even disinformation. In such an environment, it becomes even more difficult for the media to penetrate the complex EU decisionmaking process.

The consequence of these conditions: Any media outlet that is not represented at all or is represented by a single person quickly finds itself having to set priorities. There is a risk of topics „falling by the wayside”. Dependence on a few news agencies increases, the diversity of reporting decreases, even if many lone correspondents continue to report excellently from Brussels.

In such a situation, the public service media have a special role and responsibility. They can still use their resources to significantly support the formation of public opinion with regard to the Brussels cosmos. The focus here is not just on the showdown on the big summit stage and the highly personalized politics in this context. The aim is to provide informed and differentiated reporting that illuminates the valleys between the summits, which represent the intermediate stages of EU legislation: the 50 shades of the search for compromise.

Meanwhile, the conditions for the journalistic trade are getting tougher. In the European elections, attempts to influence the discourse through disinformation and propaganda are likely to become even more massive. Added to this is the rapid development in the field of artificial intelligence. The possibility to generate realistic video sequences with fake political appearances ties up resources in media companies for verification measures, so that they do not fall prey to manipulation.

The bottom line is that reporting on the EU from Brussels is a complex and difficult undertaking. How the European Union makes laws, what it decides, must not be a secret science for citizens - if only because the legislative process often seems unfamiliar and non-transparent to laypeople. This is precisely why the media need to have the knowledge and experience to report in a factual and balanced manner in this confusing situation. They must critically follow the people, institutions and processes and try to give people a clear picture of the EU‘s legislative processes. They can offer citizens a basis on which to form their own opinions: When do good intentions turn into over-regulation? What influence do lobby groups have? Do we need more or less EU?

It is important to create transparency and comprehensibility. Only in this way can an association of states that transfer competencies to a higher level ward off mistrust in the long term. Or to put it positively: Citizens should be able to form their own opinion on the value of the European Union. Public media systems still have the resources to take on these extremely important tasks. With their independence - both from governments and from economic constraints - they are equipped to fulfil an important social mission. This is all the more true shortly before the elections to the European Parliament.

| GREECE | HELLAS – TRUTH, COURAGE AND GOVERNANCE

UNIV.-PROF.

IN DR. IN KATHARINE SARIKAKIS UNIVERSITÄT WIEN

At the time of writing, elections for the tenth term of the European Parliament are under way. This term coincides with the 10th anniversary of the reinstatement of the Hellenic Public Broadcaster, ERT, after its illegal and abrupt closure, which lasted two years, by the then Conservative Government of the Hellenic Republic. By the completion of its term in 2029, the EP would be achieving a 50-year anniversary, as the only global institution of supranational governance elected through universal suffrage, and ERT will be a centenarian.

Since the late 1970s and with the arrival of neoliberal policies and freeto-air private broadcasting, there hasn’t been a single decade without an identified crisis to the Public Service Media (PSM): time and again, we are called to and call for more study, more thinking, more analysis, better arguments, more activism, broader recommendations all in favour of the development and legitimacy of public service broadcasters. With the European Single Market of 1992, the path to which was paved by the first Audiovisual Services Directive, the legitimacy of PSM has become an unavoidable thorn, stuck to every public debate, every policy initiative and every study commissioned or free focusing on the ‘role’ and the ‘future’ of PSM. Already in the mid 1990s, questions about what ’public service’ means, what roles public (non-commercial) media should play, what forms of legitimacy public media should have, do have or can have, set a strain of enquiry that feel like a constant reinvention of the wheel: the questions we thought had been fully answered, at least in principle, are posed repeatedly from (and by the) left and right, by the defenders, believers, unconvinced and also the enemies of public media. Undoubtedly, PSM paradigms as organisations and as institutions have been suffering from exogenous pressors: funding threats and contraction, political interference and control, commercial demands. To those, an army of various coalitions has been at the forefront of defence: from citizens in the streets (as strange as this might sound perhaps) to politicians, academics, journalists and cultural creators. Endogenous ‘pest control’ over biases, paternalism, nepotism, elitism and righteousness has been attempted through systems of transparency such as reports, councils, involvement of parliaments and citizens with only limited success. “For 30 years we are being told we failed” comes the lament from a colleague and friend, who has worked for democratic public media in Germany.

There is no need to reinvent any wheel, as really, the answer to the question what should we expect from the public broadcasters in this new term – and indeed any legislative term – has been given in its simplicity: we expect them to be of the public and for the public. The debates as to what exactly this means are also decades old and ongoing, some versions of operationalising and defining these principles are available across European broadcasters and are being adhered to, to various degrees, all being reasonable and context related. What seems to be escaping these conversations often, is an intangible truth. The fragility of public institutions and that of democracy cannot be overstated; it has been demonstrated in Europe’s recent history, in a spectacularly concerning manner, starting from the financial crisis. To name a few examples, the lack of accountability of governing institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund or the European Central Bank, leading to human rights violations and the impoverishment of millions, the rise of authoritarian politics and governments giving the name to the 21st century as the “authoritarian century”, the polarisation of society enabled by political and media elites, the oligarchical dominance of global platforms, the rollback of civil rights especially of women, imposed austerity measures across Europe and the exacerbation of the wealth gap, anti-constitutional and contested public policies of recent years severely compromising fundamental rights, all having the limiting of basic freedoms as their common denominator. And within this context, the renewed and sustained assault against the institution of PSM, the control of PSM organisations through political and financial strangleholds all the way to the close of branches, channels (see Portugal, Spain etc.) and to Greece’s ‘To mavro’ (The black screen). In other words, the foundation on which the democratic characteristics of PSM, indeed their publicness, is built, has been also assaulted, leaving PSM exposed and unarmed against micro-or large-scale assaults to their core essence. To be of the public is quickly replaced with by the state; to be for the public transformed to controlling the public. Here, I make the case of PSM being by the public too. Elsewhere, in this TEXTE series, I have gone at length to describe possible directions for the development of PSM as Democracy Labs; the call included the development of journalistic values of ‘newsworthiness’ to better connect to a rapidly changing world and the heightened needs of humanity for honest knowledge and information support through the lenses of care.

Critique to do better (but which direction), to be valuable (for whom), to be worth public spending (in what form and measure) is necessary, wherever it comes from. Indeed, without critique institutions turn to weapons and ideas to dogmas. However, critique is only part of the story, one piece of the mosaic of truth. Another important part is self-reflection; another is

vision; another is honesty, all qualities hard to operationalise and institutionalise. Still, it has been done to some extent. Finally, importantly, noble acts are important, translated today into ethics for professional but also morals for protecting individuals’ rights and the well-being of communities. Noble acts, as Aristotle demanded from citizens, are based on virtue and ability to care for the common good, because the utmost participation in the polity was for Aristotle the golden standard of a democracy. “We still state our claims but the executive still ignores them” says a veteran and good friend who literally fought for democratic PSM during the years ERT was ‘closed’ in Greece.

The degree of fragility of democracy comes as strong reminder during this period of voters’ renewed engagement. The European Parliament, an institution mocked for decades by various elites and citizens alike, was a pioneering indeed radical idea. Starting life as a consultative organ as Assembly, with no powers at all, it has reached a co-legislative status in the EU. Arguably, its radical pro-democracy character has been perhaps compromised; perhaps it is the influx of authoritarian aligned politics finding their way through democratic processes that has blurred its vision at times. Still, it remains one of the great public spaces, the only one perhaps where national boundaries, biases, power and, even, short-sightedness, take a second place behind efforts for the publics. PSM require an overhaul of a nature that might cause ridicule or shock, similar to that the establishment of the EP caused: PSM business of governance, and hence its input and output, requires an overhaul. When the ERT closure was announced by the government, in 2013, the global outcry (counted in thousands of documents, tweets, press, announcements and so on) reflected the shock and disbelief not only about the act itself, but also about how easy it can be to lock and chain a democratic institution, not only illegally within the national legal context, but also against European and global treaties and instruments on public service media and culture, freedom of expression and fundamental rights. Were these political ‘monsters’ of the governing party? Was that a another ‘Greek drama’? Was ERT ‘dodgy’ enough to ‘make you wonder’ as a German scholar told me? Or is it because “the (Greek) political culture will never learn to be democratic”, as an American but UK based scholar told me in the presence of another Greek scholar. Was it just one of the austerity measures imposed by the Troika among other documented human rights violations across the countries of crisis? To the thousands of citizens protesting this closure, all this was beside the point: the only other such times was the closures by the Nazi German occupation of Greece and later by the military junta. What mattered was not the organisation with all its ills, but the institution of ERT. “As a citizen, it is my institution to exercise critique on, and not for any government to exterminate” I summed up at a keynote that year.

Throughout the two years between closure and reinstatement, a small number of employees and a massive number of citizens defied the unlawful decision and continued operating ERT through a combination of noble acts: guerrilla tactics (defending the broadcasting Antennas and guarding the buildings), rotating shifts and multiskilling (working as camera and sound engineers, directors, editors and journalists), making decisions collectively (friction and disagreements included), managing content and programme and relation with audiences through multiplatforms. Above all, the lesson learned – and taught the world – was one of civic disobedience of defying bad rulers and rules and one of what is possible. Worker led governance took place for two years without wages, funding, legality, sources and at times even expertise was. The history of self-governance of ERT OPEN (as it was renamed) is still being written, but the lessons we took have marked the lives of not only those who continued the public service of information and their families, but for many around Europe who visited and witnessed the work. Ultimately, it was this civic disobedience, at great personal cost, that rendered ERT reinstated in 2015. We have had several experiments of PSM or community media staying close to the experiences of the masses, either through involving meaningful and substantial participation of citizens in their decisions, such as the Nordic countries, or by running channels or radio stations, partially or fully through and by citizens, citizen journalists and professionals accountable to their communities, such as media histories of Latin America or pirate or alternative forms of media throughout the world have shown. But never before has a Public broadcaster been run in this way.

This was one of the worst times in Greece’s modern history and its impact is still strong affecting the elections: national sovereignty and human rights were brought to the ground, resulting in Greece occupying currently the place of the second poorest country in Europe. Amidst the continuous humiliation of people, human values, institutions and processes that guarantee a minimum of human dignity, civic disobedience led to living proof of what is possible democratic practice. The difference to dominant PSM paradigms, apart from the obvious issues of hierarchy, rigidity, exclusion and news values, was that fluid and participatory governance supported and was supported by practices of news generation and coverage with, by and for the various publics. Information expanded to long conversations and cont3extuaisations next to conventional news programmes was deemed anything and everything that had public significance, experts were not only academics and analysts or few political representatives, but also citizens, creators, workers, activists, children. Coverage was sustained clearly engaged for the public good, critical and transparent towards audiences as far as priorities were

concerned, standing of journalists and presenters and was universal in terms of geography, class , gender, age, topics.

The dominant paradigms of PSM lead mathematically to further disconnection from their democratic mission. Political and market pressures will not cease. Algorithmic, machine “regulators” are in charge of prioritising and silencing content and making decisions as to which content reaches millions of users. PSM use data driven personalisations and content creation. Citizens characterised as ‘problems’ when critical of PSM lack of comprehensiveness and investigative motivations reject license fees and distrust the system of celebrities. The long-held acceptance of ’impartiality’ or ‘objectivity’ of news media overall and of PSM is no more. Information fragmentation, communication silos, socioeconomic polarisation, frustration and humiliation in various combinations across the continent have culminated to conflicting politics of articulations of dismay: pro-democratic engagement turned to the physical spaces of squares and streets through fluid, issue-driven movements in the multicrises of the past quarter century, such as Occupy and Indignados, Nuit Debut, No Pay and antiausterity movements, Women’s marches and the Women’s Strike, the me too movement, Extinction Rebellion, Gilet jaune, Farmers’ Movement, anti-war movements, are taking aim at national governments and European leadership to return to and reinvest in the politics of hope. While critique against European and national elites continues uninterrupted and with no signs of receding, pro-European citizenship mobilisation is on the rise, in view of the experience of the UK exiting the EU. It is time to commit to true public service, to pursue and enable the utmost participation of citizens, to cultivate and act from a place of enlarged thought as Hanah Arendt envisioned. Democracy means fragility. Humility. Care.

Disclaimers of transparency: I am writing this piece from a critical standpoint, which entails the fundamental driving question of how can the pubic be served at best by its own media. I am writing with the experience of scholarship as an academic, public intellectual and in service of the public, of being raised and having grown up in the country as a native Greek and an acquired dual citizen, as a European citizen-at-large with work and living experience in four countries and as former holder of the honorary (unpaid) position of President of Administrative Board of the Hellenic Public Broadcaster 3 (Elliniki Radiofonia Tileorasi 3). I am writing, therefore, not from a theoretical and abstract point of view, but from a place where I have seen first-hand and in practice what is possible and the reasons why the possible is so vehemently opposed.

WHERE IS THE PUBLIC VALUE HERE?

PROF.DR. GÁBOR POLYÁK EÖTVÖS, LÓRÁND UNIVERSITY

ASS.PROF. ÁGNES URBÁN, PHD, CORVINUS UNIVERSITY OF BUDAPEST

The Hungarian public service media is internationally seen as a negative example, and this is completely understandable. The first step in media capture was the restructuring of the public service media and the creation of an editorial line loyal to the government. The aim was already obvious in 2010: the election winner Viktor Orbán wanted to build a media background that would keep public opinion under full control, and the public service media played a major role in this. Fourteen years have passed since then and we can say that the experiment has been successful from their point of view: they have succeeded in creating public control in a European Union member state and the public service media have played their part in this.

Blurred responsibilities, lack of transparency

Hungary has never had a truly independent, highly prestigious public service media (PSM). Even before 2010, the public media were biased towards the political forces in power, but it never turned to uncritical propaganda. A major step forward was taken in 2010, with organisational change creating full dependency (Mertek, 2021).

The Media Act merged the previously distinct public service media providers into the Media Service Support and Asset Management Fund (hereinafter Fund). The law states that this Fund exercises the ownership rights and responsibilities of PSM assets, and – among other things – it is also in charge of producing or supporting the production of public service broadcasting items. At the head of the Fund is a CEO who can be appointed and recalled by the president of the Media Council without providing reasons for the dismissal, and whose work is not subject to review by any public body. At that time PSM were provided by four closely held corporations, but public media service providers had no production capacities of their own, so their latitude is limited to ordering shows from the Fund. These four private limited companies were Magyar Televízió Zrt. (Hungarian Television), Duna Televízió Zrt. (Duna Television), Magyar Rádió Zrt. (Hungarian Radio), and the Magyar Távirati Iroda Zrt. (Hungarian News Agency).

Another organisational change took place in 2015. As a result of amendment of the media law, Duna Media Service Nonprofit Ltd. (hereinafter Duna) was established as the legal successor of the prior companies.

Duna became the provider of all public service television, radio and online content services, as well as public service news agent’s activities.

Based on the media law Duna is subject to the outside review of several public bodies (Board of Public Service Foundation, Public Service Fiscal Council, Public Service Council) but the Fund is subject to the review of a single organisation: the Media Council. Media Council members were delegated by the ruling party, so there is no independent control over the Fund.

So, according to the media law de jure public service media provider is Duna and it is more or less appropriately subject to external control mechanisms, but in reality, the oversight is merely a façade since it has no resources for the actual performance of these functions. De facto the Fund produces and buys the programmes, so the Fund disposes taxpayer funds without being subject to any meaningful outside control.

The spending of the Fund is not transparent, although since 2019 at least an annual report has been published on the website. In any case, it is unclear how much the Fund has spent on certain public service purposes. In addition, the Fund publishes contracts over 5 million HUF, but it should be added that this is a poor quality scanned pdf in a non-searchable format.

The function and financial system of the national news agency (MTI) was also changed in 2011, it became integrated to the public service media system. This occurred in parallel with the centralization process of the public service media. MTI‘s responsibilities were expanded to produce news programs for other public media service providers. MTI’s fees were abolished, it offers its news services free to all media providers. It destroyed the news agency market in Hungary. There was no one in the market who could compete with free services and, one by one, MTI’s commercial competitors went out of business leaving the state-owned provider as a monopolist in the market.

PSM as propaganda machine

The propagandistic editorial practice of the Hungarian public media is well documented. There are a lot of examples for propaganda and lies. Even OSCE criticized the biased editorial practice during the 2018 and 2022 election campaigns.

The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Parliamentary Elections report also analysed the news shows of the M1 public

television channel and found strong bias during the election campaign. “In its editorial coverage, M1 showed bias in favour of the ruling coalition and the government, which received around 61 percent of the news coverage. On average, 96 percent of it was positive in tone, while 82 percent of the coverage devoted to the opposition was negative. This is at odds with OSCE commitments and international standards on fair access to the public broadcaster’s programmes and undermined the public’s corresponding right to receive media output. (OSCE, 2018).

Findings in the 2022 election campaign were similar. The M1 public television channel was biased in favour of the government and the governing party. There was no clear distinction between the coverage of the government and the ruling party Fidesz and the vast majority of these news were positive towards them. The opposition coalition received 43% of the total coverage, and this coverage was overwhelmingly negative. Reports were often laced with comments and unsubstantiated allegations attacking the opposition candidate (OSCE, 2022).

Mertek Media Monitor also analyzed the major television news programs in the 2022 election campaign. In the public television news, the opposition candidate was barely given any airtime to present his positions and views himself. He was barely quoted in the coverage about him; for the most part, a still image of him was featured while his personal comments were single sentences or fragments taken out of context, completely unsuitable for presenting his actual opinions. The government politicians had a total of 161 minutes of speaking time in the public television news shows, while their opposition counterparts had 37 minutes. (Mertek, 2022) It is also important to note that the opposition candidate was not invited to appear in the public service television at all, except for the five minutes which was obligatory quota in the campaign for all candidates.

In addition to the lack of balance in news coverage during the campaigns, it is also clear that the PSM aligned itself with the Hungarian government‘s foreign policy line and increasingly promoted the Russian narrative.

Already in 2014, at the time when Crimea was annexed by Russia, the presence of the Russian narrative was identifiable in the coverage of the state-owned news agency, which had been integrated into the PSM system in 2011. As Rácz (2016) found in his content analysis, MTI news agency clearly favoured the Russian narrative.

Bódi et al. (2022), concluded that in 2020 presentation of fake news prob-

lem was changed: instead identifying false information, the accusation of fake news emerged as a communication instrument against the domestic independent media, the opposition, and the international liberal elite.

A recent study found that the anti-EU narrative has emerged as the most dominant narrative in public communication about the war in Ukraine. This narrative is an extension of the “Brussels” antipathy, which has been a mainstay of government and PSM communication for years before the war broke out. At the same time, it is an important element in the efforts to absolve Russia and the Russian political leadership of responsibility for the current problems. Instead of Russia and Putin, “Brussels” is presented as the source of the problems that Hungary is facing because of the war and the government’s policies (Urbán et al., 2023).

Conclusion

In well-developed democracies, the public media are an important part of the media system. They serve as guarantees of reliability and credibility, and they have a definite role in the fight against disinformation. The situation is completely different in Hungary, where public media are part of the problem rather than the solution. Public service news programmes constantly spread propaganda and disinformation.

The organisational framework established in 2010 and partially amended in 2015 is not at all suitable for ensuring unbiased and diverse information and programming. Under the current organisational, financing and staffing conditions, there is no chance of restoring a genuine public service media service in Hungary. Therefore, any future media policy proposal must start from the premise that a completely new public service institutional framework must be created, providing a stable framework for the realisation of the public service ethos.

The current organisational and funding frameworks do not comply to the European regulation because of the use of unlawful state aid. The European Commission attaches strict conditions to public service media funding in order to forestall the market-distorting use of public funds. The blurred responsibilities, the lack of transparency in funding and the doubled organisation structure (one pseudo PSM with real control mechanisms and another institution with huge budget and without any control) is the hacking of the European rules.

The authors of this paper – together with other complainants – submitted a complaint to the European Commission. The Commission has been reviewing the complaint since 2016 and it seems that it will close the pro -

cedure without any formal investigation. It means that the Commission which investigated the state aid rules of several European PSM in the last years, is not willing to investigate the unlawful state aid of the Hungarian propaganda machine.

References

Bódi, J., Polyák, G., & Urbán, Á. (2022). Az álhír fogalmának átalakulása a közszolgálati híradóban. A Hirado. hu álhírekkel kapcsolatos tartalmainak elemzése, 2010–2020 [The changing concept of fake news in public service news. An analysis of Hirado.hu’s content on fake news, 2010–2020] Médiakutató, 23(1), 7–26. https:// www.mediakutato.hu/cikk/2022_01_tavasz/01_az_alhir_fogalmanak_atalakulasa.pdf

Mertek (2021). Four Shades of Censorship. Illusion of Public Service Media in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia. Mertek Media Monitor, Budapest. p.64. https://mertek.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/ Mertek-fuzetek_22.pdf

Mertek (2022). Election Campaign 2022. Analysis of the news shows of the three most-watched television channels. Mertek Media Monitor, Budapest. p.30. https://mertek.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Mertek_ fuzetek_27.pdf

OSCE (Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights) (2018). Hungary: Parliamentary elections 8 April 2018. https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/0/9/385959.pdf

OSCE (Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights) (2022). Hungary: Parliamentary elections and referendum 3 April 2022. https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/2/6/523568.pdf

Rácz, A. (2016). Hungary: Where the government-controlled media was the main entry point for Russian metanarratives. In K. Pynnöniemi & A. Rácz (Eds.), Fog of falsehood: Russian strategy of deception and the conflict in Ukraine (pp. 211-243). Finnish Institute of International Affairs.

Urbán, Á. – Polyák, G. – Horváth, K. (2023). How Public Service Media Disinformation Shapes Hungarian Public Discourse. Media and Communication 11(4), 62-72. https://www.cogitatiopress.com/mediaandcommunication/article/view/7148

| IRELAND | THE ROLE OF PUBLIC SERVICE MEDIA IN EUROPE

DR. IN EILEEN CULLOTY DUBLIN CITY UNIVERSITY

A sense of crisis now pervades discussions of media and democracy. More than a century ago, the philosopher John Dewey cautioned that “democracy has to be born anew every generation”1 . In other words, arguments for democracy have to be made and tested in the specific context of each era. Moreover, it is a mistake to assume that old arguments are meaningful for, or even known to, younger generations. Dewey’s point has clear applications for public service media (PSM). An idea born of early 20th-century technology must now be redefined to meet the challenges of the digital age. And those of us who believe in the enduring value of PSM must make our cases in public. Afterall, if the argument is fundamentally about the public good then it must be readily comprehensible to the public.

Unfortunately, if recent events in Ireland are anything to go by, there is no reason to assume that the public, politicians, or even media practitioners have a sound understanding of why PSM matters.

Ireland’s superficial debate

PSM have been the subject of intense, but superficial, debate in Ireland. In June 2023, the Irish public broadcaster, RTÉ, became embroiled in a scandal about secret payments to a high-profile presenter. This scandal was surrounded by others involving generous payouts to executives and the misclassification of employees as freelancers. The controversary became a national drama. Record numbers of people watched meetings of the parliamentary media committee; journalists invited academics to explain media funding; and politicians from across the spectrum were quick to reiterate their support for PSM. However, the latter was often undercut by an insistence that almost all media are public service and, therefore, deserving of public funds.

Over and over, politicians, journalists, and commentators demonstrated major knowledge gaps. They made spurious claims about different funding models and advanced the reductive idea that public-service is primarily about news and current affairs. Such ignorance was all the more dispiriting because Ireland had just completed a “once-in-a-generation’ review of the media system.

1 Dewey, J. (1916). Democracy and Education. Macmillan Publishing.

The government-appointed Future of Media Commission2 was originally envisaged as an investigation into the future of PSM. Many hoped it would bring an end to decades of uncertainty surrounding RTÉ’s dual-funding model (licence-fee and advertising). Among European PSM, RTÉ is unusual in drawing 43 per cent of its revenue from commercial income; the European Broadcasting Union average is just 18 per cent3. Critics have long argued that this creates a conflict between public service and commercial interests, with the latter winning out. Meanwhile, RTÉ executives have repeatedly argued that the licence-fee (currently €160) has failed to increase with inflation and that evasion rates are high4.

Nevertheless, the scope of the Future of Media Commission expanded significantly to include the whole media system. In particular, it became focussed on news media as a sector in crisis and on issues of diversity and inclusion given the profound social change that has occurred in Ireland. In 2022, the Future of Media Commission published its final report with 50 recommendations. The government accepted 49 of them, rejecting the one about replacing the PSM license-fee with direct exchequer funding. As of April 2024, the government has not yet indicated how it intends to fund PSM.

As an institution, RTÉ remains in disarray. Licence-fee revenue dropped by almost €22 million since the current scandal began5. In February 2024, a dispute between the chair of the RTÉ Board and the relevant government minister led the former to resign and brought the latter in front of another parliamentary committee. The saga promises to go on and on, but what is almost entirely absent is any serious discussion about what PSM is or could be.

Back to basics

The rationale for PSM is relatively simple to understand. Perhaps, considering Dewey, this very simplicity is why many of us neglected to consider it important enough to teach or preach. When for-profit companies dominate the media system, the public are typically treated as consumers rather than citizens. As a result, the public interest may be sacrificed for profit. Clearly, some commercial media do serve the public-interest, but it is also true that most have an obligation to maximise profit for their owners or

2 https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/ccae8-report-of-the-future-of-media-commission/

3 https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/2023/07/13/rte-is-struggling-to-square-its-commercial-andpublic-interests-heres-why-it-should-be-fully-state-funded/

4 https://www.irishexaminer.com/news/arid-20352976.html

5 https://www.irishtimes.com/media/2024/03/07/tv-licence-sales-drop-by-almost-22m-since-start-ofrte-controversies-last-summer/

shareholders. PSM are supposed to mitigate this influence by prioritising citizens.

When radio broadcasting began more a 100 years ago, there was a clear recognition that this new technology could serve the public good. The ethos of PSM initiated by the BBC famously promised to inform, educate, and entertain the public. To be sure, there was also a paternalistic and controlling impetuous to many early arguments for PSM. Nevertheless, the overall of vision of employing technology in the public interest remains a noble one. In contrast, policymakers failed to regulate the Web in the 1990s despite its even greater potential. Policymakers wanted business to flourish online and it did. It’s notable that among the world’s most popular websites, Wikipedia is the only non-commercial entity. The tech giants that have colonised digital media (Google, Meta, etc.) are advertising companies.

The consequences are stark when you consider something like children’s media. PSM established a model of educational and creative programming for children. The BBC created Blue Peter in the 1950s followed by Sesame Street in the US a decade later. These were media spaces where children were not being sold products and where teachers and educational specialists informed the programming. In common with other PSM during Covid-19, RTÉ developed collaborations with the education sector to deliver novel programming in response to school closures6 . In Ireland’s case, this was a bittersweet validation of purpose for a children’s department that had suffered dramatic cuts.

Compare PSM to the tech giants. The latter have platforms designed for “engagement” and data harvesting. The burden is on children and parents to protect themselves by engaging in ‘trust and safety’ initiatives. There are no standards. There is no commitment to the education and well-being of children. As Wired report, “get-rich-quick hustlers say it’s a great time to push AI-generated kids videos on YouTube”7 . With children exposed to increasing amounts of AI-generated nonsense – what neuroscientist Eric Hoel memorably called “synthetic dream slop” 8 – there is an obvious case for PSM to provide reliable and enriching media experiences for children.

Looking to the future

Many question whether PSM are still relevant. Often this question is narrowly about technology: “why do we need television, when we have the internet?” But PSM was never primary about technology; it’s about the pu-

6 https://www.ebu.ch/resources/covid-19-report

7 https://www.wired.com/story/your-kid-may-be-watching-ai-generated-videos-on-youtube/

8 https://twitter.com/erikphoel/status/1762506064308613239

blic good. That’s why in TEXTE 25, Christian Fuchs and Klaus Unterberger argued for transforming PSM into a Public Service Internet9 . There is merit in this long-term vision, but here are some suggestions for European PSM to redefine themselves in the meantime.

Take public ownership seriously. PSM needs to find meaningful ways to involve the public. Meaningful participation happens when people can influence decisions and outcomes. It is not what happens when people are invited to “tell us what you think?” on social media or in public consultations. In The Return of the Public10 , Dan Hind forcefully argued that new technologies have removed the need for highly-centralised media institutions and top-down decision-making. There is an opportunity and a need to rethink PSM as an institution. At a recent seminar in Dublin, Prof. Des Freedman observed that most PSM were not borne out of popular demand comparable to, for example, public demand for a national health service. Consequently, when PSM are under threat, the public do not readily perceive the loss.

Help communities and, especially, young people, create their own media. It is often noted that young people ‘don’t engage’ with traditional media, but why should they if all it offers is content consumption? PSM can play a crucial role in empowering young people to create media and develop critical awareness about media. That might be mean working with schools and youth theatres or creating workshops to demonstrate how to make content.

Provide a digital platform to promote national and regional cultures. Globalised media create a culture of sameness. That’s why so many countries have their own versions of ‘Dancing with the Stars’ in primetime slots. Globalised media also create unprecedented opportunities for local dramas to break-through internationally. However, our national cultures cannot rely on international conglomerates and commercial markets. PSM are needed to tell stories that are publicly valuable regardless of economic value. Moreover, there is often a dearth of opportunities to see the short-films, documentaries, music videos, and animations that constitute the bulk of cultural production. PSM has a key role to play in promoting access to this cultural life.

Interestingly, Ireland’s Irish-language PSM, TG4, is an exception to Freedman’s observation about public demand. It grew out of frustra-

9 https://zukunft.orf.at/rte/upload/2021_aktuelles/public_service_media_and_public_service_internet_manifesto.pdf

10 https://www.versobooks.com/products/2186-the-return-of-the-public

tion with English-language media and a fundamental commitment to cultural identity. The resulting publisher-broadcaster has been a major success: it recently took an Irish-language film to the Oscars, it championed coverage of women’s sports, and recently launched a children’s channel and online platform. There is a sense that this PSM understands who it serves and why –that may be the most fundamental requirement for all PSM.

A COHESIVE VOICE FOR EUROPE: PUBLIC SERVICE MEDIA RESPONDING TO CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES

FLAVIA BARCA, MA MEDIA CONSULTANT

Introduction: public service media as a backbone for Europe

The main challenges Europe is facing at the moment are the climate crisis and the geopolitical conflicts. Both are strongly connected to capabilities and social dialogue. The digital transformation, understood as a tool that intervenes in a disruptive manner on products and on economic, social, and organisational processes, which has been underway since the second half of the 20th century but is now in a particularly accelerated phase, is at the same time, within this framework, both an opportunity and a threat.

The public service media, a network of organisations with a long history behind them and a future mission to be clarified, can play an important role in this context. One of the main strategies identified by the European Union to promote economic development is, especially in the last ten years, to stimulate the creation of networks and open dialogue to foster the exchange of knowledge, develop creativity, promote innovation. An increasing number of networks - of organisations and citizens – are crossing Europe connecting different territories and communities in the service of social wellbeing and cohesion and addressing climate change. The public service media network could thus get a privileged position, due to its capillarity, solidity (despite the repeated and multiple attacks by many governments on the very idea of public service) and inclusiveness and become the “backbone of Europe”, the voice of a ‚just‘ change, of a vision of digital and ecological transition that looks to individual and collective wellbeing. We will examine, in the following paragraphs, how this role can be exercised, focusing in particular on PSM „cohesive” role (par.1) and on its possible function of „domesticating” the digital to the objectives of the common good (par.2). Finally, some possible areas of action for a new European public service media network will be suggested (par.3).

1. The cohesive role of public service media

In the face of the pressures of globalisation processes and the erosion of traditional communities, the new inequalities produced by the penetration of the digital ecosystem into public and private spaces, and the growing mistrust of institutions, the issue of social cohesion appears absolutely central to the resilience of the social system.

The concept of social cohesion has a long and complex history1 but as far as media are concerned2 a first step to be considered is Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights on the right to expression3 where the Council of Europe attributes considerable importance to the role of the Public Service Media precisely in the perspective of promoting values such as democracy, diversity, social cohesion4 . In its 2008 Report, implementing a specific Resolution5 , the Council of Europe subjected the measures taken by different European public services to promote social cohesion to careful analysis. The Report also pointed out the centrality given to the issues of diversity and inclusion in the BBC‘s lines of endeavour6 which, it should be recalled, has embraced the concept of social cohesion since its foundation, linking it to the idea of nation building7.

More articulated is the concept in the analysis of the Bertelsmann Foundation, which, in its approach to social cohesion, within three frames of reference - social relations, degree of connectedness, interest in the common good - reflects on the theme of perception, trust and acceptance of diversity8 . The theme of diversity is also central in the thought of Andrew Jakubowicz 9 who, recalling Habermas and Anderson, identifies the public sphere as the main place of negotiation and construction of social cohesion10 : here two opposing dynamics develop, one ai-

1 See Antonia Carparelli, “Di cosa parliamo quando parliamo di coesione sociale”, in Ufficio Studi Rai (a cura di), Coesione sociale, la sfida del servizio pubblico radiotelevisivo e multimediale, Rai Libri, 2020.

2 See Barca F. (2023), “La sfida del digitale alla missione dei media di servizio pubblico” in Bruno F., Lobianco V., Perrucci A., Preta A. (eds), La televisione del futuro, Le prospettive del mercato televisivo nella transizione digitale, Il Mulino

3 Council of Europe, European Court of Human Rights, European Convention of Human Rights, 67075 Strasbourg, France https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf

4 Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe No. R (97) 21, and Contribution of public service media in promoting social cohesion and integrating all communities and generations, Implementation of Committee of Ministers‘ Recommendation Rec (97) 21 on media and the promotion of a culture of tolerance (MC-S-PSM), November 2008.

5 Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe No. R (97) 21, adopted on 30 October 1997.

6 BBC, Diversity and Inclusion Strategy 2016-20 Diversity includes everyone http://downloads.bbc. co.uk/diversity/pdf/diversity-and-inclusion-strategy-2016.pdf.

7 Ofcom, Public service broadcasting in the digital age. Supporting PSB for the next decade and beyond, 8 March 2018; see also Paddy Scannell, ‚Public service broadcasting: the history of a concept‘, in Andrew Goodwin - Garry Whannel (Eds.), Understanding television, London, New York: Routledge, p. 23; and Hon. James Spigelman AC QC ‚Defining Public Value in the Age of Information Abundance‘, in Gregory Ferrell Lowe - Fiona Martin (eds.), The value of Public Service Media, Nordicom, 2013.

8 Bertelsmann Stiftung, Social Cohesion Radar. Measuring Common Ground, 2013, https://www. bertelsmann-stiftung.de/fileadmin/files/Projekte/Gesellschaftlicher_Zusammenhalt/englische_site/ further-downloads/data-and-methods/Introduction_Methods_SCR_International_en.pdf.

9 Andrew Jakubowicz, The media and social cohesion, in James Jupp, John Nieuwenhuysen and Emma Dawson, Social Cohesion in Australia, 2007, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511481574.015.

10 Andrew Jakubowicz, cit., p. 158.

med at fuelling conflict, fragmentation, mistrust and another, instead, promoting citizens‘ empowerment, identity, trust, sense of belonging, and the construction of social capital11 . In relation to the latter we can place the public service‘s ‚cohesive‘ mandate.

Following Jacubovicz‘s analysis, this cohesive PSM mission could be summarised in four lines of action: to facilitate the expression of different worldviews; to counter stereotypes by portraying contradictory and complex realities; to support the expression of different cultures and opinions from a variety of audiences; to support participation and interaction between groups. In this vision, identity and diversity coexist, and the concept is well expressed in the words of Antonia Carparelli: „A society is all the more cohesive the more the individuals and communities in it trust that the values and culture, institutions and norms, as well as the concrete mechanisms of functioning and shaping economic and political power, are conducive to the pursuit of their personal and social development goals”12 . At the centre is the theme of trust (already present in the reasoning of the Bertelsmann Foundation) linked to that of human development and individual fulfilment developed by Amartya Sen.

In light of the above, how do we achieve the goal of connecting and holding the country together? By addressing all and sundry, young and old, the people of the big cities and the countryside; by promoting social and cultural inclusion at all levels; by representing the plurality and diversity of the components of society; by giving voice to the richness and disparities present in the territory at both regional and provincial levels; by providing the public with an account of reality and at the same time with adequate tools for understanding the contemporary world; adequately addressing socially relevant issues (from gender or children‘s issues, to the problems of people with disabilities); urging active and informed participation in the life of national, European and international institutions; and finally enhancing the country‘s digital skills (particularly in difficult contexts), in the light of new forms of citizenship.

And what media can place these issues at the centre of its action, beyond the logic of profit and sometimes even audience maximisation, if not a public service media that bases its own mandate on these very objectives?

11 The latter, a useful theme for reasoning on the definition of social cohesion in television, contains two elements: the construction of ties within social groups and the construction of ties between social groups.

12 Antonia Carparelli, What we talk about when we talk about social cohesion, cit., p. 44.

2. Digital transformation and the common good

The public service media‘s mission will be confronted in the coming years with the digital transformation and the emergence of the Internet as a privileged broadcasting and communication space. The Internet is increasingly imposing itself as the preferred medium for many categories of users. The media companies operating on the network have long been providing content in a non-linear form, i.e. unconstrained by schedules. This is a rapid and probably irreversible process, with pervasive effects with respect to the overall structure of the media system, in particular the public service13 .

The problem is that the new digital environment has been influenced by the large private media groups economic model. The transition to digital, in addition, it is not the end of intermediation because the recommendation system14 actually directs the user towards one content rather than another and consequently becomes the hand of the publisher exercising its editorial responsibility. And it is not true freedom because, as Amartya Sen reminds us, freedom would presuppose full awareness and capacitation15 .

Global digital platforms today jeopardise the personal data of users, their very identity. Surveillance capitalism16 operates on a double track: on the one hand, consumers are profiled in order to direct a tailor-made commercial offer, on the other hand, they are made transparent, traceable, measurable and controllable. The volume of information, collected privately and without public control (despite certain boundaries set by the European Data Protection Regulation - GDPR and the Digital Service Act), has given rise to a data-driven economy that has established that the actual needs of users are less profitable than predictions about their behaviour. At the same time global media groups contribute - willingly or unwillingly - to feeding the spirals of social hatred and the chain of disinformation17 .

13 Alessandro D‘Arma, Tim Raats and Jeanette Steemers, “Public service media in the age of SVoDs: a comparative study of PSM strategic responses in Flanders, Italy and the UK”, in Media, Culture & Society, 2021, Vol. 43(4) 682-700.

14 For an in-depth study of recommendation systems see Francesco Ricci, “I sistemi di raccomandazione: inquadramento e modelli”, in Ufficio Studi Rai (ed.), Algoritmi di Servizio Pubblico, Rai Libri, 2022. See also Rai Crits, Artificial intelligence and the broadcasting world, in „Elettronica e Comunicazioni”, no.1/2020.

15 Amartya Sen, Development is Freedom. Why there is no growth without democracy, Milan, Mondadori, 2000.

16 Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism, PublicAffairs, 2019.

17 Jose van Dijck, Thomas Poell and Martjin de Waal, The Platform Society: Public Values in a Connective World, New York, Oxford University Press, 2018.

It appears increasingly urgent and necessary to focus on a subject that will act as a curb to these phenomena by defining a new public space. We are talking about a digital space18 in which new values and rules, fully consistent with the mission of a public service, can be defined - and experimented with. Which brings us back to the public service mission: how can it promote competences? How can it increase the diversity of products and ideas to which people are exposed? And how can this “suggestion”, or “good mediation”19 , be generated in the new digital environment?

To this end, a large international community of experts and practitioners in the field has promoted a two-year-long work on the problematic interaction between the Internet and democracy, fake news and hate speech, algorithmic policies, and the impact of commercial Internet platforms on citizens, users, and society. The path took shape in an important and articulate document, The Public Service Media and Public Service Internet Manifesto20 , a call to save and advance democratic communications by renewing Public Service Media and creating a Public Service Internet, with elements of analysis and concrete proposals. The challenge has also been attempted by large public media organisations internationally21 . As it is evident, there is still no perfect model or univocal direction because, as D‘Arma, Raats and Steemers22 recall, in the transition to public service platforms many broadcasters have in fact replicated the models of commercial platforms, but the debate is ongoing and the two areas on which experimentation is mainly taking place are the possibility of providing users with the tools to understand, if not select, recommender systems and that of showing them the wide range of choice they could access, in short, the world “beyond the garden”. The public service media can stand as guarantors, in front of the public, of ‚accountability‘, of transparency, of proper handling

18 A broadcasting space for a few more years, for those European countries that are not ready for the leap. In Italy, for example, audiences are not yet fully digitised, and national PSM economic model is not ready for the new digital environment - Bruno F., Lobianco V., Perrucci A., Preta A. (eds), La televisione del futuro, Le prospettive del mercato televisivo nella transizione digitale, Il Mulino

19 Flavia Barca, Public Service Media and the Common Good, in ‚Digicult, Scientific Journal on Digital Cultures‘, Special Issue, vol. 1, no. 1, 2016 https://digitcult.lim.di.unimi.it/index.php/dc/issue/ view/1.

20 On the details of this work and the path to the Manifesto, see Christian Fuchs and Klaus Unterberger, eds. The Public Service Media and Public Service Internet Manifesto, London, University of Westminster Press, 2021, http://doi.org/10.16997/book60.

21 For an in-depth overview of the challenges posed by recommendation systems to the mission of a public service media and the responses of the main European public media see the study carried out by the RAI Research Office on algorithms and, in particular, Eleonora Mazzoli Ricognizione dei servizi di raccomandazione dei media di servizio pubblico Europei, cit.

22 Alessandro D‘Arma, Tim Raats and Jeanette Steemers, Public service media in the age of SVoDs: A comparative study of PSM strategic responses in Flanders, Italy and the UK, cit.

of personal data (“data trust”) but, above all, of awareness of the forms that technological capitalism has taken.

Central, it is evident, is the creation of competences. It is a formula, composed of process transparency (awareness of how the system works) 23, truthfulness of information, diverse and empowering content, participation. Technology allows the role of users to be enhanced by making the platform open and inclusive. An agonistic space 24 where different social and cultural values dialogue, a space for negotiation: this is the real challenge that PSM face today: to engage citizens in a new form of negotiation and leave room for change25 . A public space in which to host proposals, re-elaboration of content, relaunching and sharing of products, co-creation, possibly collective visions.

In a certain sense, this would be the natural transposition of the public service mission into the new century, which has decreed the end of the passive enjoyment of the television screen, promoting new audiences and new systems of use and engagement. In fact, no one better than the public media can imagine a new digital space in which users can feel welcome and involved, can enter into relations with other users, or can even be stimulated to become creators themselves of new languages and a new offer. Let us also not forget the huge rights archive in the hands of public services, an archive that could be put, at least in part, at the service of new creation and co-creation works, thus bringing closer those youth targets that in many countries are abandoning public media.

3. Towards a public service media network as the voice of a new Europe, some recommendations

As Roberto Suárez Candel et alii remind us, PSM are intensifying their efforts in building bridges between territories by bringing the voices of

23 The European Commission has also expressed itself on this issue by referring to „technological solutions instrumental in boosting engagement, including transparent algorithms used to improve content recommendations and adapt paywalls” (Commission Recommendation of 16.09.2022 on internal safeguards for editorial independence and ownership transparency in the media sector, C(2022) 6536 final).

24 On the concept of the ‚agonistic‘ algorithm see Kate Crawford, Can an Algorithm be Agonistic? Ten Scenes from Life in Calculated Publics, in „Science, Technology & Human Values”, 2016, 41(1), 77-92 and on its application to public service media, Tiziano Bonini and Eleonora Maria Mazzoli, A convivialagonistic framework to theorise public service media platforms and their governing systems, in „New media & society”, Sade Ed. 1-20,2022.

25 Flavia Barca, Public Service Media and the Common Good, in ‚Digicult, Scientific Journal on Digital Cultures‘, Special Issue, vol. 1, no. 1, 2016 https://digitcult.lim.di.unimi.it/index.php/dc/issue/ view/1. On the concept of negotiation see also Andrew Jakubowicz, The media and social cohesion, in James Jupp , John Nieuwenhuysen and Emma Dawson, Social Cohesion in Australia, 2007, https://doi. org/10.1017/CBO9780511481574.015.

those territories to the national stage to foster the debate and celebrate diversity26 . Likewise, the public service media network can become a new cohesive voice of the European regions, enabling people to enter the decision-making processes through a heated, frank, informed and reasonable public discussion. As Fucks already argued in 201727 it is time to realise that the European media landscape is different from US capitalism and that public service media is one of its strengths.

In light of what has been discussed in the previous paragraphs, it is clear that the public service media can cope with the digital transformation not only by stemming its most deteriorating aspects and preserving a democratic space for debate, but even by playing a significant role in the quality of the future that awaits us. In the sharp bifurcation that the technological transformation is accelerating, between the retreat of democracy into authoritarian configurations and progress towards more advanced models of democracy capable of realising new forms of popular sovereignty adapted to the widespread knowledge of the people, the public media can and must play a decisive role.

Let us examine how in three possible areas of action:

A. PUBLIC SERVICE ALGORITHMS AND DATA MANAGEMENT:

Public service media can implement recommendation systems that are relevant to users but, at the same time, provide access to impartial and plural information and promote cultural diversity and cohesion.

A public service media network could also, as Michele Mezza suggests28 , create European oases on three aspects:

• Transparent collection and storage of data with a certified traceability (a real certificate of collection) documenting that the platform has collected users’ data exclusively to be able to provide citizens with the most dedicated ancillary services;

• The public service media, in a transversal manner in the various European countries adhering to the big data big society agreement, could make its data available to communities, territories or individual citizens (everyone can collect their own data as if in a bank);

• The PSM network could create incubator channels for activities and

26 Roberto Suárez Candel, David Fernández Quijada and Andrea Valencia Bermúdez, “Public Service Media and Territorial Cohesion in Europe”, in Ufficio Studi RAI, The Public Service Media as Drivers Of Territorial Cohesion, I Quaderni series, 2021.

27 Fuchs C. (2017), “Towards the Public Service Internet as Alternative to the Commercial Internet” in ORF, Public Value

28 See Mezza M. (2017), Algoritmi di libertà, Donzelli e Mezza M. (2020), Il contagio dell‘algoritmo, Donzelli

professions (music, storytelling, cultural heritage, smart cities) to support the development of local talent or projects, also re-using PSM archives and cultural heritage. i.e.: it could organise a specific European channel on museums to foster the training of professional profiles relevant to the sector.

B. SLOW MEDIA

What does it mean for the public media to confront the green transition? Brevini argues that the acceleration of the impact of human interventions on the Earth’s ecosystems identified by climate research coincides with significant rushing and development of communication and computational systems29 .

Moei et alii30 identify three ways in which the media impact on the environmental crisis, contributing to the destruction of natural resources:

• Trough the production of luxury goods as part of a capitalist overconsumption economy;

• promoting and contributing to planned obsolescence;

• through the enormous amounts of energy needed for data production, distribution, and storage31 .

Public media could instead launch a major slow media campaign to combat the highly accelerated production, transmission, storing, and consumption of media content and digital devices (p.244). PSM could also promote the creativity of re-use, as a concept of common good and as an innovative strategy of editorial offerings. And could “open the black-box”, adopting a transparent account of the carbon footprint of AI-powered devices in the form of a “Tech Carbon Footprint Label” to raise awareness and inform regulators and the public about the implications of each AI-powered action.

C. CAPACITY-BUILDING

The third area of action, naturally transversal to the first two, is competence building. As noted above, the new digital universe constantly activates a multitude of stimuli, choices, processes, which require, in order not to reproduce new inequalities and exacerbate conflicts and social fragmentation, a high degree of skills. A European public network can ‚leave no one behind‘ and promote critical thinking in order

29 Brevini B. (2020), “Black boxes, not green: Mythologizing artificial intelligence and omitting the environment”, Big Data & Society, July–December: 1–5, Sage

30 Moei H., Enli G. & Syvertsenii T. (2024), “The dark side of the media welfare state”, in Jakobsson P., Lindell J. & Stiernstedt F. (ed.), The Future of the Nordic Media Model: A Digital Media Welfare State? Nordicom, 2024, 1, p. 241-260

31 Brevini B. (2020), “Black boxes, not green: Mythologizing artificial intelligence and omitting the environment”, Big Data & Society, July–December: 1–5, Sage

to combat fake news but also to acquire a capacity to distancing oneself from the content proposed by platforms, allowing audiences to maintain a lucid vision of the difference between reality and the imaginary.

Building skills also means generating the confidence and the tools to produce social change, individually and collectively, and thus enable the continent‘s inhabitants to face the great challenges of the new century.

It is precisely here, where the future is taking shape, that public media platforms can play a key role, offering reliable, diverse and capacitating products and information, in an increasingly generative, co-creative and cohesive dialogue with their audiences.

UNIFICATION OF LATVIAN PUBLIC MEDIA IN THE SHADOW OF STATE LANGUAGE DISCOURSE AND

AGGRESSION

MG.SC.SOC. RAIVIS VILŪNS & MG.SC.SOC.

MĀRTIŅŠ PRIČINS UNIVERSITY OF LATVIA

Latvia‘s public service media, after the restoration of independence, maintained a system of separate public service television (LTV) and radio (LR), which enjoyed full editorial and institutional independence. The idea of a merger, following the example of the BBC and other European public service media, has been discussed at various levels for more than a decade, but only started to be implemented in 2024. The presence of Russian language in the public media has become a central issue in the public debate. In parallel, issues of remuneration, content and format are being addressed, while professionals and industry watchdogs warn of risks to freedom of expression.

Since the collapse of the USSR and the restoration of independence in 1991, Latvia‘s public service media have been key players in shaping the information environment. Latvian Radio (LR) and Latvian Television (LTV), although supported by the same funds and subject to the same supervisory and regulatory mechanisms, have operated as two completely separate organisations, with their own boards, budgets, editorial offices and departments. At the same time, the potential merger of the two media has been discussed for many years at both expert and policy level. It is important to note, however, that the two public service media are already a single entity for online news readers, as the public service media portal LSM has been in operation since 2013. Although on paper it is a division of LTV, the site features content in three languages produced by LR, LTV and LSM‘s own editorial team. It can thus be said that, at least in the presentation of content on the internet, the media merger is already partly complete. At the same time, it should be noted that all three media maintain their own separate social media accounts, which are managed independently of each other.

In 2023, however, the formal process of merging the public service media was finally launched. This year, the Latvian Parliament approved a law requiring the necessary steps to be taken by 31 December 2024 to make them a single entity from 2025. This has raised concerns about political influence and the loss of successful Russian-language content in the digital space.

Russian language presence

According to Article 3(3) of the Latvian Law on Public Electronic Media and its Management, media „shall produce their programmes and services in accordance with high ethical and quality standards, ensuring journalistic excellence and observing the highest international professional and quality standards”. Paragraph 4 of the same Article provides that the media shall ensure diversity of opinion and shall respect objectivity, due accuracy and neutrality in their activities. Article 3(7) provides that public service media shall produce content in minority languages in order to promote national belonging and integration.

An issue that has long been discussed in the context of public service media is the presence of the Russian language in them.1 Latvia has a significant Russian-speaking population - according to the Central Statistical Office of Latvia, in 2023 there are 24% (445,000) Russians and 3% (55,000) Belarusians in Latvia – which is why, since independence, both public and commercial media have had sections, programmes, channels or broadcasts with content in Russian. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 raised the issue of the presence of Russian language and culture in Latvia, both in society and in the media. Questions are being asked: is it necessary to create content in the language of the aggressor‘s country with taxpayers‘ money and does this not contribute to maintaining a bilingual society and hinder the integration of the Russian ethnic group into the Latvian language space.

In autumn 2023, Latvia approved a new national security concept, which foresees that by 2026, public media content in Russian will be phased out in favour of content in Latvian and languages belonging to the European cultural sphere. The public media disagree, arguing that this will not contribute to strengthening the information environment and security. European Broadcasting Union director General Noel Curran in an open letter said: „Latvia is a member of the UN, EU and Council of Europe and is legally bound to act within the scope of the international, EU and European human rights law. Governments should serve the interests and needs of the whole population, including minorities, „ to access the media and impart and receive information, including in their own language” in accordance with the „principles of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness”. 2

1 CSB (2023). Population by ethnicity at the beginning of the year - Ethnicity and Time period, Retrieved from: https://data.stat.gov.lv/pxweb/lv/OSP_PUB/START__POP__IR__IRE/IRE010/table/tableViewLayout1/

2 ENG.lsm.lv. (2023). EBU warns against shutdown of Russian-language public media in Latvia. Retrieved from eng.lsm.lv/article/features/media/05.10.2023-ebu-warns-against-shutdown-of-russianlanguage-public-media-in-latvia.a526622/

The importance of this issue on the Latvian political agenda is also evidenced by the fact that on 8 April 2024, media representatives and policy makers met at a discussion organised by the President of Latvia, Edgars Rinkēvičs, where media representatives drew attention to a number of issues of concern to them, including the presence of the Russian language.

„We cannot address all minority people through Russian. There are things that time requires us to change, but in a way that does not destroy what we have achieved, but broadens our understanding of what minorities are,” said the President of Latvia, listening to the media and experts.3

Several public media representatives pointed out that the interruption of Russian-language content would mean that a part of the population could be exposed to Russian propaganda. Media representatives listed the positive achievements of Russian-language content creators in the public media (this will be expanded below).

Concerns about threats to freedom

Public service media have exited the advertising market from the start of 2021. However, funding planning problems and political dependency remain, as the budget of the public service media is approved each year by the national parliament. From time to time, officials of all ranks - ministers, MPs, extra-parliamentary activists or ordinary citizens - wave these levers, pointing to a review of media funding or lecturing on how public service media should work. This problem was most pronounced during Covid-19, but has been exacerbated after the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

The Latvian media environment, as in many other parts of the world, is experiencing a decline in audience trust. According to a 2022 Eurostat survey, the trust of Latvian citizens in the public media was slightly higher than the European average: 51% of Latvians named the public media as one of their three most trusted news sources, compared to 49% of the European average. By comparison, two other Baltic countries have higher levels of trust in the public media - 56% in Lithuania and 67% in Estonia. At the same time, given that this content is supported by taxpayers‘ money, Latvia‘s figure is considered low. This may also go some way to explaining the rise in negative attitudes, aggression and political pressure towards the media expressed by public media journalists.

3 Office of the President (2024). PHOTO/VIDEO: discussion at the Riga Castle on the future development of public service media. Retrieved from: https://www.president.lv/lv/jaunums/fotovideo-diskusija-rigas-pili-par-sabiedrisko-mediju-turpmako-attistibu

In a letter published in April 2024, representatives of Latvian Radio expressed their concern about the decline of freedom of expression and efforts to restrict public service media, including by politicians and regulators.

„Journalists have been subjected to hate attacks on social networking platforms for years, which have unfortunately silenced some of them. Their voices are no longer heard on social networks. (...) Russia‘s fullscale invasion of Ukraine has further narrowed the boundaries of freedom of expression - media, especially public service media, are only expected to provide „patriotic” content, while voicing a view contrary to the „mainstream” is seen as an anti-government act by the media,” reads the letter, which lists the risks and editorial concerns of Latvian Radio.4

Similar concerns have been expressed by the Media Ombudsman Andra Rožukalne, who warned of the risks of political pressure and verbal violence against journalists and the negative effect of these events on freedom of expression and pluralism of opinion.5

Digital content and its future

As already mentioned, public service media in Latvia are currently two independent companies. LTV and LSM have a budget of 31.3 million for 2024, almost entirely financed by the state, while LR has 15.5 million for 2024. The merger, although the underlying debate is content based, as media watchdogs hope, would in the long term reduce administrative costs, savings of which could then be channelled into content creation. In parallel, there is also duplication of content published on social media. LTV and LR use their Instagram accounts to promote their content, while LSM tries to offer more informative content, the duplication of breaking news content from other platforms can occur. This phenomenon is more pronounced on platform X. A merger would probably allow for a harmonisation of the strategies of the different social media content creators and thus possibly provide a more rational use of resources.

However, when it comes to content and the use of digital opportunities, the strategy pursued by LR is an interesting example. LR consists of six radio stations.

4 Radio Latvia (2024). Statement by the Editorial Board of Latvijas Radio. Retrieved from: https:// www.latvijasradio.lsm.lv/lv/par-mums/informacija-presei/?id=994

5 Rožukalne A., (2024). Anda Rožukalne: On the threat to values, freedom, independent media. Delfi. lv. Retrieved from: https://www.delfi.lv/898102/versijas/120009998/anda-rozukalne-par-draudiemvertibam-brivibai-neatkarigiem-medijiem?utm_term=Autofeed&utm_medium=Social&utm_source=Tw itter#Echobox=1712525904

• LR1 - news, discussion and current affairs coverage;

• LR2 - Latvian music and entertainment channel;

• LR3 - academic music and high culture radio station;

• LR4 - news, discussion and current affairs coverage in Russian language;

• LR5 – channel for youth with a focus on current music and entertainment;

• LR6 - free format programmes.

Each of these stations fills a specific niche and offers unique content, most of which is not found on other commercial stations. Particularly important in this context is LR4, which produces content in Russian, is in fact the only audio medium that produces news and analytical programmes in Russian. Each of the radio stations also has a digital presence on online platforms such as Youtube, Facebook, Instagram, TikTok and X, etc.

LTV focus on:

• LTV1 focuses on social current affairs and news, but also entertainment content, domestic and foreign films and TV series;

• LTV7, during major sporting events, the spotlight is on sport, while the rest of the content is made up of entertainment programmes and repeats of LTV1 content;

• LSM is an online medium that aggregates content from all public media and also produces its own content.

It should be mentioned that it is the Russian-language LSM (rus.lsm.lv), and more specifically the digital platform content created by this editorial office, that has gained high popularity on social media. According to SEPLP (Council for Public Service Electronic Media) data, last year the Russian-language Youtube account received more than 15 million views (it is important to note that only 1.8 million people live in Latvia), about half of them from Latvia and half from abroad. The big increase was observed in 2022, when the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine began.

This shows the importance of content produced outside Russia in a free media system, both locally and internationally. Thus demonstrating the potential to reach Russian-speaking audiences in other countries and potentially export content produced in Latvia. The Russian version of LSM also shows consistently good statistics and in 2023 attracted an average of 130,000 readers per week, a third of the 330,000 attracted by the Latvian version of LSM.

It should be mentioned that LSM also produces content in English. This mainly appears in the contributor section and attracts a relatively very small audience (16 000 readers per week on average in 2023). There is no

significant debate about the presence of this content and it is unlikely to be affected by the changes.

The future?

The public discourse, shaped by experts, industry representatives and politicians, suggests that the central issue in public service media mergers will be language. But the quality of content, the adaptation of content to hybrid formats, information resilience in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war and other key issues should not be forgotten. It is also clear from the public debate that the merger will not actually affect the Latvian-language editorial offices, at least in the short term. Given that there will be no physical merger of the media in the coming years, these editorial offices will remain „de facto” independent of each other, both administratively and in purely practical terms. However, the future of the Russian-language editorial and content production is much more uncertain. The politically and socio-culturally charged issue of the presence of Russian language in the Latvian environment exacerbates this, and discussions on this topic in social media, as industry representatives mention, provoke aggression against the expression of different opinions. In parallel, however, it is often said that the discontinuation of the successful production of Russian-language content will create a vacuum in the information environment and that the more than one-fifth of the Latvian population that consumes content in Russian may find themselves in an ideologically opaque bubble of private Russian-language media or Kremlin-produced content.

| LITHUANIA |

FINDING DIALOGUE AMIDST

DISAGREEMENTS: PUBLIC SERVICE MEDIA INSIGHTS FROM THE BALTIC STATES

PROF. IN AUKSĖ BALČYTIENĖ PHD VYTAUTAS MAGNUS UNIVERSITY

Rationale

This essay provides only a brief outline of ideas on how the ideal of epistemic commons and civic empowerment through media can address the challenges and risks of today to serve the public good. It leans only on a few insights from the Baltic countries, yet having these countries’ situations in mind assists in setting the course of thinking about the role of PSM and its solutions to integration and citizenship in Europe.

Background

The Baltic states have made remarkable progress in democratization compared to other young democracies in Europe. After joining the EU in 2004, the three countries have successfully implemented liberalization reforms in their small, competitive markets. In the two decades following EU accession, the media played a crucial role in exposing the shortcomings in the reform process while also transforming the media institution from the inside. Today, people in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia enjoy a high standard of living and are highly optimistic about the future of the European Union.

Still, in spite of the successes of media reforms, certain risks are associated with technological and social transformations that affect the information climates and citizenship conditions in the Baltic states.

Though the Baltic news markets are small and viable, and it seems that transparency on media ownership and related demands of accountability is implemented there, media analysts have repeatedly raised concerns about the national media landscape’s lack of diversity and representation, predominantly for local, regional, and ethnic communities (Verza et al., 2024). Paradoxically enough, digital communication has expanded the number of ways people can communicate and form interest groups, and many of them have found social media highly appealing for such purposes as group solidarity and (social or political) expressionism. However, the rapid expansion of global platforms-sustained content has also made the spreading of cyberattacks, bullying, and hate speech extremely easy.

As a result, enduring socio-economic and regional inequalities and socie -

tal “splits” continue to cause concern about individuals and vulnerable groups deprived of quality services and news content.

The past few years have seen yet another wave of disruptive changes causing detrimental effects on the socio-emotional stability of the whole society. First, it was social and health risks and emotional triggers of uncertainties that came together with the global COVID-19 pandemic; then followed the Russian aggression and war in Ukraine, bringing about socio-psychological challenges instigated by geopolitical and economic risks in the region and across Europe as well as globally. Due to the swift changes in people’s everyday lives and the news media’s failure to bring accounts of rapidly evolving events, the Internet became flooded with dubious information. This has further aggravated already existing social conflicts and heated disagreements. As a result, many of the controversies have been seized as populist narratives by some of the domestic politicians or have become the main targets of manipulative and disinformation attacks by malicious actors.

Indeed, in all European democracies, both old and young, there is evidence of populist rhetoric, divisions of opinion, disagreements and conflicts, and a general radicalization of public discourse. The Baltic states are no exception.

Societies’ ongoing polarization will undoubtedly continue to affect how news media organizations function. Therefore, in an enduring and growing information disorder, accountable communication and informed deliberation – both of which are aligned with the mandate of PSM – appear more pressing than ever. However, to deliberate successfully on important matters, one needs accessibility to relevant news and quality content. Hence, individuals require digital literacy, data awareness, and knowledge of media systems to navigate their opinions. In addition to accessibility, a set of additional characteristics, such as awareness of moral and caring principles of attentive and respectful communication, must be emphasized, including the ability to listen attentively and care (Kavada, 2024; Michalis & D’Arma, 2024). Undeniably, individuals acquire knowledge through news sources and advance their communication by observing exemplary cases. The more personally relatable media is, the more people engage and care for their own and others’ well-being. Likewise, the more someone feels cared for and cared about, the more resilient they become.

Deliberation and resilience

It seems that all European democracies are facing the task of developing their own systems of national resilience (Dragormir & Horowitz, 2021).

Sustaining reliable information infrastructure and assuring that the public maintains epistemic rights to quality news appears to be the biggest challenge during the period of peak social changes.

In the three Baltic countries, the public service media organizations have specific strengths in each country, making them important actors in the national resilience system. The Estonian ETV is a highly trusted news organization, with over two-thirds of the population trusting the institution. ETV reaches out to diverse groups of people and provides highly professional content. Lithuania’s LRT has gradually installed a system to secure its professionalism and political independence through independent financing. This enables LRT to fulfill public service obligations as required by law. The Latvian LTV is implementing significant structural reforms to address the needs of young people and ethnic minorities.

An idealized (normative) view of PSM in democracy asserts that inclusive and deliberative processes require an inherent participatory and educational approach that is implemented in its functions. The media and journalists set the agenda and frame issues that are important to people. The media mediate, i.e. create a public arena for citizens to engage and discourses to evolve. Following the ideals of democratic and deliberative communication, journalists are the only actors in any communications setting who act in accordance with professional principles of scientific questioning and ethical exploration. Professional journalism adheres to an implicit structure in its reporting practice: it determines the framing aspects of news and includes voices that matter to the story. By carefully following the scheme of the 5Ws (who, what, when, where, why) and the H (how), it sustains a narrative structure and provides a reliable sense of attachment and belonging by delivering the knowns. Mainly, journalistic news is crucial for social cohesion because of its coherent narrative structure and facticity that create a sense of continuity and belongingness (Peter & Boersma, 2012). All of these latter features are at the core of resilient citizenship.

The abundance of information will continue to increase, and society’s fragmentation will be inevitable, resulting in new vulnerabilities. Against this background, the pressing question remains: How can individuals develop a sense of social cohesiveness when their information sources are diverse and scattered across a wide horizon? Do they have the necessary skills, information, and perception of coherence to feel secure as individuals and maintain collective integrity? What is the function of public service media in this regard?

The diagram presented here (see Figure 1) illustrates the essential characteristics required to build a resilient and inclusive society. These attribu-

tes involve promoting individual and collective resilience by cultivating individual skills and utilizing public service media as an information platform that reflects the interests and cares of all its members.

Figure 1. PSM as a significant component of the resilience system.

Restructurings in news organizations due to platformization and generative AI-infused shifts are challenging the news media’s position and significance in setting public agendas. In a changing digital media ecosystem, journalists are finding it increasingly difficult to ensure the application of traditional journalistic principles in their coverage of topics that expose conflicting values. In this context, it is essential to note that any use of engaged and ethical questioning and listening can become useful in developing a caring dialogue.

Synthesis

Against this background, a number of critical issues must be highlighted that require a specific change in contemporary media affairs. Among these are the impact of digital infrastructure on the news ecosystem, the increase in disruptive and dysfunctional communication, and the emergence of new attention-seeking players in the digital information domain. How can society’s resilience be assured in such a context? How can PSMs contribute to ensuring that society receives the necessary assistance?

In the Baltic countries, PSMs have been perceived as a tool for delivering news around shared issues, such as vaccine skepticism or contested issues linked to memory politics. Their strengths have always been the flexibility to respond to exceptional situations. However, in the newer times, de-

fined as conflict and disagreement-prone, the concept of “synthesizing” and “caring” journalism must be promoted to increase social cohesion and the public sense of belonging to a wider and better-integrated society.

“Synthesizing” stance in reporting involves reporting on polarizing conflicts and addressing the underlying tensions that cause them. The “caring” attitude involves actively listening and responding to public concerns.

In situations of persistent social divergence and polarization, it is crucial to establish a safe environment for all parties involved in disputes. The goal of the media is to maintain an epistemic authority and nurture dialogic communication practice. Under this function, the role of the journalist is perceived as that of a caring mentor and moderator, and the media is seen as a socially responsible and caring organization. Hence, to become truly attentive institutions, the PSMs require updates and revisions of their classical public service mandate to better outline responsibilities towards their changing audiences. Likewise, citizens must also be reminded of their democratic duty of staying curious and seeking information. For it to happen, other epistemic institutions, such as schools, must assist individuals in developing epistemic capacities and ethical frameworks by promoting news literacy and public communication ethics.

References

Dragormir, M. & Horowitz, M. (2021). Media Capture and Its Contexts: Developing a Comparative Framework for Public Service Media. In Túñez-López, M. et al (eds.). The Values of Public Service Media in the Internet Society. 217-246. Palgrave MacMillan. Kavada, A. (2024). The Caring Public Sphere: Reframing the Concept in an Era of Care Crises. Javnost - The Public, 31(1), 158–175. https://doi.org/10.1080/13183222.2024.2314841 Michalis, M. & D’Arma, A. (2024). Public Service Media: From Epistemic Rights to Epistemic Justice. In Horowitz, M., Nieminen, H., Lehtisaari, K. & D’Arma, A. (2024 eds.). Epistemic Rights in the Era of Digital Disruption. Palgrave. 97-109. Peters, C. & Boersma, M. (2012). Rethinking Journalism: Trust and Participation in a Transformed News Landscape. Routledge: London. Verza, S. et al. (2024). Uncovering news deserts in Europe: Risks and opportunities for local and community media in the EU. https://cmpf.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/CMPF_Uncovering-news-deserts-in-Europe_LM4D-final-report.pdf.

| LUXEMBOURG |

WHAT SHOULD THE PUBLIC SERVICE DO IN THE MEDIA SECTOR?

PHILIPPE DUMONG

CONSEIL DE PRESSE LUXEMBOURG

Among our neighbors, the answer is clear to the question of what public radio and public television is. For Luxembourg it is more complicated. The station, originally founded as a socio-cultural radio station, now Radio 100,7, has played the role of a public radio since it was founded in 1993. In addition, the private broadcaster RTL also fulfills a “public service”. In the television sector, the company occupies a monopoly position on behalf of the state.

What should the public service do in the media sector? How should it be defined and financed? The Luxembourgish Parliament dealt with this during a consultation debate requested by the government two years ago. The government was striving for legal regulation of the public media.

For a better understanding: 29,340 million in state subsidies have been earmarked for Luxembourg‘s public television for 2021 to 2023. According to a multi-year convention agreed with the state, Radio 100,7 received 6,85 million euros in 2023. RTL is the biggest broadcaster and has a “public service mission” but is not a “public service medium”. There are about seven private radio stations with national coverage and only one radio broadcaster (Radio 100,7) that is officially recognized as a public service medium (PSM).

However, differences of opinion emerged on the question of a public television channel independent of RTL. For some politicians, the creation of a new infrastructure would hardly be justifiable. They referred to the high costs involved. They mentioned that it is also uncertain how the medium of TV will develop in the future. Other politicians were in favor of creating a state alternative rather than setting up an independent television broadcaster. They mentioned a public service medium on the internet, a web-TV.

Other alternatives were brought into the discussion. Should CLT-UFA (RTL) not be prepared to fulfil state requirements in the future, alternatives would have to be available. In this regard, partnerships with public broadcasters abroad were mentioned in addition to a web-TV and an own channel. All politicians were against the introduction of a fee to finance 100,7 and the television program. Public service media should remain generally accessible. State support should also not be limited to 100,7 and RTL.

The access to public service media

The question of how access to public service media could be guaranteed for all citizens thanks to multilingualism is not fully clarified. Both 100,7 and RTL remain largely in Luxembourgish. On the other hand, the Luxembourgish reality that half of the population does not speak Luxembourgish must be considered. Programs in different languages could be made available as podcasts or video on demand, for example.

As far as the television channel is concerned, RTL must broadcast a daily „journal” of at least 30 minutes. However, cultural and sports programs as well as a knowledge program are also required. Among other things, the radio station must offer a certain minimum „basic service”, for example practical information on the traffic situation or the weather report in addition to news programs. Because the income from advertising on the local market would not be enough to make this model profitable, the state cofinanced the RTL programs now with between 11 and 15 million euros per year until 2030. Of course, without the state or the government being able to intervene in the day-to-day business of the various RTL editorial teams.

For the socialist party, just to take this example, it is clear that Luxembourg must have his Luxembourgish television. But that wouldn’t mean that there is no alternative to RTL. CLT-UFA is a company under private law that operates for profit. That is why the socialist party has long been in favor of the creation of a separate Luxembourg public broadcaster. The radio station „100,7” is now a permanent fixture in the Luxembourgish landscape. An expansion of „100,7” into the television sector is conceivable for some politicians, but not a must. Cooperation with a public broadcaster from the greater region would be also a possibility.

Danger of lurid tabloid and cheap journalism

Private broadcasters are dependent on advertising customers - the danger of lurid tabloid and cheap journalism is obvious. That is why the term of the RTL-convention must be used to prepare for the time after 2030 and to set up a Luxembourgish public broadcaster. Incidentally, the new convention stipulates that the state can buy the television material from RTL at the end of the term.

The politicians have the opportunity to prepare the future of the Luxembourgish media center in a prudent manner. The central question that those in favor of a public service television must answer concerns the objective of such a project. The supposed need for a national elite or quality program based on the example of the Franco-German cultural channel “Arte” with very high costs will hardly be convincing. But another argu-

ment is stronger: television is considered as the medium of social integration par excellence. If Luxembourg society does not want to fall apart completely in the coming decades, places must be created where social cohesion can be developed.

However, if Luxembourg engages in this consideration, it is not aim at an „internal Luxembourgish” national television offering, but at a program that resolutely integrates the Greater Region and the 47,5% of foreigners working and living in Luxembourg. This public broadcaster must offer programs and opportunities that bring people together. He has to be there for everyone who permanently lives in Luxembourg and who could be considered as future voters. The program mandate must also consider the opportunities for digital participation of the society and its stakeholders.

In view of their function of serving democracy, public broadcasters must make their contribution to maintaining and promoting the social and cultural prerequisites of our democracy. And this doesn’t just apply to Luxembourg, but to all of Europe. Democracy needs good journalism, and good journalism can only thrive in a democracy. Both are dependent on each other. This applies both inside and outside the public service broadcasters.

The mission of public broadcasters is not limited to (political) journalism. In addition to information, education and culture, fiction, entertainment and sport are essential because they are the only way to reach a broad audience. They are also part of the public broadcasters‘ remit. Fiction, entertainment and sport can form a bracket around large sections of society and bind the audience. Only the interaction of all areas can make an important contribution to the self-understanding of this society.

| MALTA |

WHAT IS THE ROLE OF PSM IN A DIGITAL FUTURE EUROPE?

DR JOANNA SPITERI, PHD MALTA BROADCASTING AUTHORITY

Malta’s historical development, its political structures, the socio-cultural and religious changes, the legal and economic system as well as the developing media technology affect the Maltese mediascape, leaving also an impact on the message if we stick to McLuhan’s phrase “the medium is the message”.(McLuhan, 1967)

The mission of the public service broadcasting is in a nutshell to “inform, educate and entertain”1 and this has remained until this day. These three elements satisfy the purpose of education and the promotion of citizenship. Since technological developments gave rise to a wider spectrum of content, be it in the number of channels but also in the amount of audiovisual content in different types of platform and the tsunami of content on social media platform where everyone is becoming a journalist and a content creator, the public service broadcaster role in the promotion of good quality programming, programming that reaches the wider population and the restriction of social detriment and harmful content within the broadcasting content is becoming a more important characteristic for the public service broadcaster. Also, trustworthy and impartial news is a must for the public broadcaster to provide to its viewers.

Amidst the fake news and disinformation and the hidden agenda of the news media, the concept to provide accurate and trustworthy information becomes much more necessary. The obligations of impartiality by public service broadcaster are generally a controversial theme in the Maltese political sphere. The Maltese public broadcaster is caught between two other television stations which are owned by the two major political parties in Malta. This puts further onus and expectations on the public broadcaster to act as the role model of impartiality. However, the public broadcaster is always seen as the arm of the governing party and accused to be a tool which is manipulated by the Government to the extent that the party in Opposition very often calls the public broadcaster as the State broadcaster and recently goes on further in calling it as the second station of the Labour Party2 (i.e. the Party in Government).

1 First BBC Director General, John Reith in the 1920s.

2 Owns a TV station together with the Nationalist Party (the party in Opposition)

Its financing might also give rise to such controversy since the public broadcaster in Malta is not funded by the licence fees but it is funded directly by the Government. Furthermore, it also has a commercial model and competes for advertising as the rest of the commercial stations. Public funds are allocated to PBS through a system of PSO (Public Service Obligation) and in theory PBS funds TV and radio programmes which are not commercially viable. These are set in the National Broadcasting Policy which date back to 2004.

When the public broadcaster in Malta was a monopoly and there were very few choices for televiewers, this made it easy for the public broadcaster to force viewers to watch the programmes it thought they should, however, in this age with several television channels and much more audiovisual media services the alternative now is to switch to other media services. Hence this competition reduced the public service control over televiewers and is now competing with a much greater number of channels and services be it linear and non linear, analogue or digital. Notwithstanding this harsh competition from national stations and foreign stations, it is very difficult to state that the public service broadcasting in Malta will die out.

The growing use of broadband and video streaming blurs the distinction between the television set and other devices. The digital age meant that viewers as media consumers are paying and choosing a television package for their needs and likes and hence they become more accustomed to their choice and pay per view. However, two public service stations, together with other 5 nationwide TV stations in Malta can still be reached from a digital platform on a free to air basis.

Convergent technology through the use of internet and broadband deliver broadcast and other content which are specific to the customer’s interests and such content can be viewed and followed through different devices at a time and place which the citizens choose. The on-demand services have drastically increased, and the public service broadcaster invested in such technology as it is aware that it is competing with podcasts or vodcasts and other audio-visual content which is accessible at any time.

Notwithstanding that traditional broadcasting is believed to be on the decline, audience survey commissioned by the Broadcasting Authority3 still shows a very good percentage of viewers who follow the traditional broadcasting be it public service or other channels. An example of this

3 The Broadcasting Authority commissions an audience survey every quarter.

is the traditional news bulletin on TVM4 which registers a very high percentage of audience even though technology would have made consumers switch to new mobile devices and platforms. While the news portal of the public broadcaster is being given its deserved attention this has not yet took place the traditional news bulletin on linear television.

User generated content and citizen journalism is on the increase and might perhaps be competing with the news by the public broadcaster and perhaps other commercial stations, however trust and professionality would still tip the balance and consumers would still opt for professional journalism event though consumer generated news content is easily accessible and perhaps more timely. But elements of editing selection, placing the event into context, sourced news reports, researched investigative journalism, are all techniques which would define the work of the professional journalists which in return gain trust among viewers.

The number of ‘hits’ might have become one of the criteria which can affect editorial decision nowadays and helps keep the news content tied to what actually interest the public rather than being led by traditional notions of what makes an important news report. So journalists might be tempted and actually would choose to address the likes of the citizens and focus on those particular stories. Having said that, the public broadcaster is still bound with criteria which address the due impartiality and balance and so to a certain extent it is more difficult to move away from the public service obligations and criteria. One of the main differences between the traditional news bulletin and online news is that the first is regulated under Chapter 350 of the Laws of Malta and hence journalists need to adhere to the broadcasting legislation and the subsidiary legislations which specifically regulates news and current affairs programmes.

However, it is a question of adaptation, evolving and change rather than the death of TV. Different mediums evolve and yet survive because mediums adapt to change and while the public broadcaster consisted only of an analogue television and radio services, now television and radio channels under the remit of the public service broadcaster increased but also in recent years there was the birth of an online site, a news portal and an on demand online service, all mediums complement each other.

While keeping the three main characteristics mentioned above5 , in this digital age with the inclusion of global platforms and streaming services,

4 One of the public stations in Malta

5 Inform, educate and entertain.

the environment of the public service broadcaster must be transformed and the public service media has to now compete with global streaming services such as Neflix, Youtube, online news portals for audiences. The public service media had to develop new on-demand services and online content to make up for all the information and entertainment presented on these online platforms. This is the adaptation of the new platform age and the values of the public service media have to be revisited while at the same time responding to the public interest.

As is the situation across Europe, the public service broadcaster is facing challenges to operate in a digital environment with their funding heavily scrutinized and ongoing calls for independence and transparency while keeping the element of public value and enhancing the criteria of the contribution to society.

The duties and obligations which pertain to the public service broadcaster include mainly the duty of impartiality, objective news in news bulletins and current affairs programmes, cultural and educational obligations in programming and hence the public broadcaster is responsible for the Core and Extended Service Obligations, the General Interest Objective. All this is governed by the National Broadcasting Policy (2004), albeit needs a revisit and an update, mainly deals on a commitment by the government to make PBS Ltd the company of the public service broadcaster in line with the Prague Declaration (1994). In fact, the public service obligations were set out according to this Declaration which mainly speaks about the multiple choice of programming, high educational and cultural element within programmes, balanced programming and co-ordination and exchange with other European broadcasting productions.

Even though social media is dominating the audiovisual media services, broadcasting still has its impact on citizens to receive information and form opinions and to receive educational and cultural content and entertaining content and these are essentially the role of the public service broadcaster, hence its significance remains till this day and age. The core duties of the public service broadcaster generally include information, education, culture, pluralism of voices, promotion of minority, accessibility, and impartiality amongst others.

Internet and the new media do offer challenges to the public service broadcaster but perhaps the biggest challenge is that broadcasters are becoming more faced with political interference and so broadcasting needs to adopt a new form of commitment with the state. The indepen-

dence of the public broadcaster needs to be considered as a fundamental pillar of democracy itself.

The digital transformation did not only mean that traditional TV stations are being carried out through digital transmission or through interactive stations, but it also meant new players in the media market such as new platforms, new content creators and new ‘journalists’.

Conclusion

Notwithstanding the multitude of devices, media services and information, the need for the public service broadcaster is imperative. The need to safeguard democracy and have a trustworthy media service which its main aim is the public interest remain relevant.

| NETHERLANDS | CHALLENGING TIMES

ASS.PROF.DR. MAURICE VERGEER RADBOUD UNIVERSITY

The Netherlands was praised for its unique public broadcasting system. Originally, it consisted of many independent broadcasting organizations representing social, cultural, or political groups in society, along the lines of societal pillars. Over the years, this system has changed to a more centralized organization where the or (Ministerie van Algemene Zaken, 2024).

Where PSB radio channels are losing the battle against commercial radio channels, PSB TV channels still have sizable market shares. In 2023, the NPO had the largest market share (34.4%), with the commercial broadcasters following at a distance (RTL: 25.1%; Talpa: 17.1) (Stichting Kijkrapport, 2024).

Threats and opportunities – Fragmentation and social cohesion

The Netherlands was one of the last countries in Europe to introduce commercial TV. At first RTL-Véronique broadcasted from Luxembourg via cable taking advantage from a legal loophole to enter the dutch TVsystem. In 1992, commercial TV legally entered the Netherlands. The emergence of the dual - public service and commercial - system, lead to a sharp increase in TV-channels.

Nowadays, close to a thousand TV licenses (local, regional, (inter)national) targeting Dutch audiences are issued (European Audiovisual Observatory, 2024). As a consequence TV audiences are diluted across all these channels. Still, the main channels (NPO1, RTL4, SBS6) of the three major broadcasters (NPO, RTL, Talpa) have a total market share of 76.6%. These statistics do not take into account the time spent on watching streaming platforms (e.g., Netflix, Amazon prime).

The sheer number of channels fragments the audience, even though people gravitate to the main channels of the three large broadcasters (NPO, RTL, Talpa). Although each broadcast organization targets different groups in society, they share the same NPO channels. Moreover, although the organizations may still be less diverse internally, externally they are. Furthermore, as the societal pillars are far less important nowadays, people consume media from all different sources, resulting in higher levels of diverse media use.

Still, the Media Law stipulates that main events (e.g., Olympic Games, EC and WC football, King’s Day) should always be available on an open

channel, so all viewer can share the same experience. Moreover, a diverse set of programs produced by different broadcasting organizations show people the diversity of opinions in the Netherlands and possibly create mutual understanding, resulting in more social cohesion.

For a number of years, streaming platforms form a serious threat to the national broadcasters. Especially during the COVID-19 pandemic these platforms increased their subscriber-base considerably. Combined with the popularity of these platforms and the unpopularity of the PSB among younger generations, the future of the PSB faces a challenge to keep younger generations tied to their channels. Still, larger streaming platforms now are expected to invest at least 5% of their Dutch turnover in Dutch productions, ensuring the Dutch media production industry is sustainable in the current streaming media era and media content from Dutch origin is still being produced.

An option to battle further fragmentation of audiences is to reduce the number of channels. The third NPO channel (NPO3) has a market share of 4% in 2023 (Stichting Kijkonderzoek, 2023). Although it sounds contradicting for an open media system, limiting the number of channels would bring larger audiences back together on fewer channels, and more likely to share watching the same programs. At the same time, in order to keep the same level of program diversity, minority programs should not be discontinued due to the reduction of channels. Therefore, it should be important for PSM to decide whether they should follow the principle of reflective diversity or open diversity (Van der Wurff, 2005). Furthermore, removing a PSB channel will direct its advertising revenue to the commercial broadcasters, reducing the tax income from advertising on NPO3. To keep the budget the same, the government should compensate for the loss of advertising revenue. As it is, the Dutch PSB a budget for 2024 of 963.8 million, making it one of the most cost-effective (per capita) public broadcasters in Europe (Nordicity for, 2020).

Population aging and diversity

As in many countries, the Dutch population is aging. For the NPO, the audience consists for 81% of viewers older than 50 (Stichting Kijkonderzoek, 2023) (RTL: 71.1%; Talpa: 74.6%). To keep their audiences, the NPO should focus more on programs that bind younger generations to public service channels. It requires a two-tier policy. First, the NPO should keep broadcasting quality programs for existing older generations. Second, the NPO should increase quality programs to capture younger audiences, even though these are somewhat smaller. If the NPO doesn’t invest in programs for younger generations, in order to

have them as audience when they grow older. Alternatively, the NPO should consider using or building platforms specifically intended for use by younger generations.

Three layers of public broadcasting

Even though the Netherlands is a relatively small country, it has three types of public service broadcasters: National, regional (province), and local (municipality). Even though all are state-financed, the local PSBs mostly have volunteer producers. Generally, volunteers are increasingly harder to find, and those who work for local PSBs want to move up to regional or national PSBs.Recently, the national PSB intensified its collaboration with the regional, reserving a daily time slot for the regional PSBs to broadcast their latest offerings to the national audience. Such collaboration could be extended across all levels. One question is whether three layers of broadcasting are one too many. Instead, a layered broadcasting system could merge regional and local broadcasting into a single level, where the local media productions could be integrated into local editions. These media productions could benefit from higher levels of technical and journalistic professionalism and, at the same time, be more cost-effective.

News and trust

Generally, trust in news provided by the PSB is relatively high (Dutch Media Authority, 2022). During the pandemic, viewership of PSB news programs increased drastically, much less so for news by commercial broadcasters.

While the Dutch people trust news producers, it is brittle. Recent events damaged people’s trust in the broadcasting system because of unsafe working conditions. After some candidates in the audition show The Voice of Holland (Talpa) were harassed, it was disclosed that employees were harassed for many years (NOS: Studio Sport, WNL). As such, a public image of the PSB emerged as a broadcasting system with unsafe working conditions. During the pandemic, a minority accused the NOS (NPO news program) of being complicit in spreading the government’s false information about the pandemic, even resulting in harassing TV journalists working on the beat.

Given the political right-turn in the 2023 general elections, with Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom emerging as the winner and in the process of forming a right-wing government coalition, sentiments toward the Public Broadcasting Service turned negative. It is yet unclear whether there will be a right-wing government, but it is clear that liberal parties wish to reorganize the PSB drastically, for instance, even more centralization and fewer broadcasting organizations, financial cutbacks by closing down

the third channel NPO3. Providing news becomes a challenge in an era when digitally manufactured fake news increases due to advancements in Artificial Intelligence software. Furthermore, acceptance of societal institutions seems to decrease. The PSB should be aware of these developments and prepared to counteract them, preferably at a European scale. Although the open nature of the TV system seems advantageous diversity, it can also have adverse effects. For instance, Ongehoord Nederland (Unheard Netherlands), to date still a candidate broadcasting organization with a conservative, nationalistic ideology (Missie - Ongehoord Nederland, 2022), was fined twice for unethical journalistic practices (spreading fake news) (NPO, 2023). Stressing the diversity (politically, culturally, ethnically, and gender) of the news production teams could counteract people’s distrust of the news.

Digital strategies – Embrace digitization and collaborate

The main PSB, commercial and regional PSB broadcasters of linear TV also entered the streaming market. Collaboratively, they operate NLZIET, showing the same programs as on linear TV, but with the option to watch episodes ahead of time or delayed. Separately, each main broadcaster has its own streaming service. The NPO has NPO Start (for free, with ads) and NPO Plus (subscription, no ads). The introduction of NPO Plus was controversial for its subscription fee (€2.95) (Kamervragen over NPO Plus, 2013), limiting access for lower income households. RTL offers Videoland (€4.99-€11.99) and Talpa has Kijk (for free, with ads). These initiatives keep big tech (mainly from the US) at bay. That is, NPO employs Amazon’s AWS-service (Wokke, 2023). Yet the EU GDPR mandates that data-centers to be located in the EU. Further digitization is the way forward for PSM. However, relying on social media platforms such as YouTube and X (formerly Twitter) creates vulnerabilities in terms of continuity of broadcasting operations. Musk’s acquisition of Twitter turned X into a less open, more biased and negative platform. As a result, the NOS (NPO news program) considered to not use X as a news channel anymore (Villamedia, 2024). While Nosop3 posted its last tweet on 2024/01/13, the NOS-account still continues to use X for their news. In case the NOS - or any other PSB organization - would leave BigTech social media platforms, they might consider switching to to a fediverse architecture for online social communication, such as Mastodon, allowing much more control over how the platform is used.

Conclusion

The political wiggle room of the Dutch PSB is quite limited. Because the PSB is financed through taxes, its financial model is susceptible to financial cutbacks by political parties. Because election outcomes in the past few decades always resulted in political coalitions, including moderate politi-

cal parties, the consequences for the PSB were limited. However, with the right-wing parties currently negotiating a coalition, the future state of the PSB is unclear. A more centralized system would make the PSB financially more efficient. Still, provisions should be made for retaining diversity of programs in terms of political ideologies, cultural and ethnic identities, reflecting the presence of those groups in the Dutch society.

While the European Commission follows its mission on battling disinformation, European PSM ought to coordinate efforts aimed at detecting audio-visual misinformation by developing a system to deploy technology for distinguishing between videos from credible news sources and those that are altered or fabricated.

Furthermore, in order to decrease the dependency on BigTech companies, European PSM could consider to collaborate on creating a European streaming software. In combination with the European cloud service Gaia-X, this could be a way to ensure that European PSM can operate independently and continuously. Aforementioned initiatives would also help to ensure public’s trust in news provided by PSM. The use of a federated system for social media (cf. Mastodom) further could ensure continuity and control over its own media resources.

References

Dutch Media Authority. (2022). Digital news report. Nederland 2022.

European Audiovisual Observatory. (2024). Mavise - Database on audiovisual services and their jurisdiction in Europe. http://mavise.obs.coe.int/advanced-search?country=144

Kamervragen over NPO Plus. (2013). https://www.marketingtribune.nl/media/nieuws/2013/11/kamervragenover-npo-plus/index.xml

Ministerie van Algemene Zaken. (2024). Welke omroepen zijn er? - Rijksoverheid.nl. https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/media-en-publieke-omroep/vraag-en-antwoord/onderwerpen/media-en-publieke-omroep/vraag-en-antwoord/welke-omroepen

Missie - Ongehoord Nederland. (2022). https://ongehoordnederland.tv/missie/ Nordicity for. (2020). International comparison of public funding for public service broadcasting, 2018. https:// site-cbc.radio-canada.ca/documents/vision/strategy/latest-studies/Nordicity-analysis-of-government-support-for-public-service-broadcasting-april-2020.pdf

NPO. (2023). Besluit op bezwaar ON! https://pers.npo.nl/persberichten/npo-handhaaft-tweede-sanctie-ongehoord-nederland-in-bezwaar/download/138

Stichting Kijkonderzoek. (2023). SKO jaarrapport 2022. https://kijkonderzoek.nl/images/Jaarrapporten/ SKO_Jaarrapport_2022.pdf

Stichting Kijkrapport. (2024). SKO jaarrapport 2023.

Van der Wurff, R. (2005). Competition, concentration and diversity in european television markets. Journal of Cultural Economics, 29, 249–275. Villamedia. (2024). NOS spreekt intern over mogelijk stoppen met socialmediaplatform X. https://www.villamedia.nl/artikel/ook-nos-overweegt-te-stoppen-met-x Wokke, A. (2023). Achter het scherm - Ontwikkelaars over het nieuwe NPO Start. https://tweakers.net/reviews/11598/achter-het-scherm-ontwikkelaars-over-het-nieuwe-npo-start.html

| POLAND | PUBLIC SERVICE, NO DELIBERATION

PROF.DR. MICHAŁ GŁOWACKI UNIVERSITY OF WARSAW

As before the 2024 European Union Parliament’s elections, Poland’s media are prone to mis– and disinformation and fake news to challenge social cohesion. Especially in times of war, reliable and deliberative public service media (PSM) is to unite people and provide a space for listening, sharing and arguing with respect. On the surface, recent political shifts as the outcome of the October 15, 2023, national parliamentary elections have resulted in the ongoing crisis regarding the legal state of the PSM and multiple answers on which government representatives are (or should be) in radio and television power(s)? The critical questions on Poland’s future shape of public service media organisations and mental collaborative adaptation in the era of Generative AI and platforms remain shallow, with no civic deliberations impacting and engaging with young creative startups, SMEs and future media makers generations in search for universal, diverse, inclusive and intergenerational PSM.

Two Democratic U-Turns: 1989 and 2023

Recent shifts towards Poland’s public service media go back to December 13, 2023, and (the legacies and current) politics. Among the keywords before the October 15, 2023 elections were restoring democracy and democratic institutions, including pluralism, accountability, transparency and no politics in the judiciary, state-controlled enterprises and public service media. Eight years of conservative-right driven United Right alliance formed by the Law and Justice party (2015–2023) received criticism about the decline of the rule of law, media freedom and multilayered media capture in terms of regulation, use of state financing as a control tool, private ownership takeover and taking control over the PSM. The conservative propaganda from TVP (Telewizja Polska) and PR (Polskie Radio) did not help Law and Justice to form the government despite getting the most significant number of votes in the parliament elections.

What will be remembered is the highest election turnout of 74,4 per cent, with people standing in line to cast their votes by 3 a.m. in the Jagodno neighbourhood in Wrocław. The turnout results beat the record of the historic first semi-democratic elections in 1989. Moreover, the 2023 election turnout analyses also identified the so-called ‘youthquake’, with turnout for the age group of 18–29 reaching 68,8 per cent, compared to 46,4 per cent in the 2019 elections. With each political party claiming victory, democracy was the biggest winner.

The news about the Polish people’s enthusiasm and becoming a prototype to reinvent and restructure the semi-authoritarian regimes. The liberal turn of 2023 aimed (as opposed to the illiberal turns traditions) was there to celebrate diversity as the broad centre-left coalition of the Civic (Platform) Coalition, the Third Wave (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe + Polska 2050) and the New Left formed a government under the leadership of Donald Tusk (the government was formally appointed on December 13, 2023 – the date that conservative Law and Justice opposition refer to the early morning announcement of martial law of December 13, 1981, and related legacies of non-democratic regimes). The troubled multiple democracy continues with two political and media tribes polarising society to the extent that some families avoid political topics during Christmas and other social gatherings. What followed, however, was to look at Poland as one of the case studies of today’s democratic drivers, with Timothy Garton Ash‘s quote: “It looks like a big win for the democratic opposition in Poland, which will be a major positive turn for Europe as a whole… Bravo Poland Jeszcze Europa nie zginela!” (“X”, October 15, 2023, original quote/spelling). Poland’s 2023 elections were regarded during political campaigning as the most significant since the previous democratic turn, referencing the Spring of 1989 and the so-called Central and East European domino effects with the related collapse of the Berlin War in the Fall of 1989 (and everything after).

All I Want for Christmas is Public Service Media

On December 20, 2023, a day after the Polish parliament passed a resolution demanding the restoration of public service media, TVP Info went off the air at 11:18:31 CET. TVP Info was replaced by TVP 1 programming (terrestrial and digital), and no evening news programme was broadcast. The news on that day was replaced by a 1:35-minute-long statement by Marek Czyż, announcing no more political propaganda and the offer to broadcast “the world’s photography instead of the paintings”; from December 21, 2023, onwards. Marek Czyż also said that “every Polish citizen who finances the Polish public service media has a right to demand from it [public service media – MG] reliable, professional and honest information” (quotes from broadcast on December 20, 2023, TVP1: 19:30).

‘The Polish PSM restoration’ was followed by protests from previous government supporters and conservative-right activists in Warsaw’s headquarters of TVP and TVP Info, alongside regional TVP centres across major cities in Poland. The Law and Justice and conservative-right circles claim that Tusk’s government broke the constitution, media law and the Constitutional Tribunal procedures, further putting the TVP ‘in a state of liquidation’ and terminating staff contracts to employ new peo -

ple. On December 29, 2023, the International Federation of Journalists statement to “(…) urge Polish policymakers to establish clear and robust safeguards shielding public service media from any form of political or economic pressure” (IFJ, 2023) and related the European Federation of Journalists statement condemning “continued political interference in public broadcasting” (EFJ, 2023) – from an online statement issued on December 24, 2023. Returning to potentially relevant timing alongside a previous reference to the political challenge in family gatherings and deliberations, one might ask why the Christmas holidays have recently marked the governance change of Poland’s public service media. From the historical perspective, the regulatory media capture and the parliament debates around the Law and Justice’s PSM governance regulatory proposals were discussed during Christmas, more precisely, the days (and nights) before New Year‘s Eve 2015/2016. From a more current public service media governance change 2023 experience, we–the media and communications researchers must address our knowledge and experiences living in two polarised (tribes or) communities to fight for their services and interests. Will all the citizens get the actual balance of what’s in politics and the current Polish PSM?

What one could have experienced again was two borderline paintings (instead of photographs); a political power battle over the PSM, with more or less active groups and people protesting or observing what comes next with the principle of freedom of the press and the media defence perspectives. So, are we going back to times when the core foundation of deliberation was who had the better Christmas gift? How far do you go to restore democracy, and what does it mean to two individuals (and groups) in a constant conflict? What does this mean to social cohesion, human rights, and deliberative communications? Besides, no one knows the potentially relevant factors for public service media’s déjà vu Christmas holiday experience.

A Little Respect

In the search for ‘reliable, professional and honest information,’ the socially driven public services media communities in Poland, such as citizen activists, NGOs, creative and high-tech communities, and neighbourhood spaces alongside communications and democracy researchers, have all aimed to make significant public service (and pride)-driven strides in advocating for fundamental change in public service media’s production, delivery, and thinking (emotions). Still, our individual and group contributions are prone to experience socio-political revenge and calculation alongside all-time normative media and democracy theories and usually end up with the West telling a never-ending story of living the public ser-

vice media ideals without even getting closer to the social and individual layers (just your personal experience of expectations and imaginations) of one’s overall understanding and assessment of systemic policy and decision-making via the lens of unique socio-cultural plasticity.

A recent study by Mediadelcom researchers from 14 EU Countries has added to the media deliberations from cross-country experience considering PSM values and working conditions among essential monitoring capabilities of democratic societies. The project findings taught us to look critically at deliberation processes addressing questions about people and their engagement and participation alongside access to public service media’s debates, conversation loops, civic arenas, meetups, labs and hubs, and so on. What also matters is that deliberation is about trust, reasoning, and hope to be driven by the culture of meritocracy, diversity and inclusion (D&I), and not primarily by conflicts, polarisation and political games over the PSM.

This is now one of the most critical challenges for Poland’s public service reinvention: to deliberate. There needs to be a little respect for people organising and engaging in civic debates, not to mention multigenerational enthusiasm for the fundamental change of politics as voiced during the last parliamentary elections. While the social capital of new generations is likely to address more experimentation and change in how critical social deliberations on public service organisations could be invented, there is still no clear solution to make people sit and deliberate at the same table. Considering Polish pride and context, the PSM deliberations table could be round to offer a fully diverse perspective. With relevant public service media solutions for the organisational, technological, and social future, the cultural lens of anthropology and ethnography calls for the group and individual experience of spaces, rituals, and D&I-driven deliberations.

References (and further reading):

Dragomir, M. (2024). The Capture Effect: How Media Capture Affects Journalists, Markets and Audiences. Central European Journal of Communication, Volume 17, no 1 (35): forthcoming. European Federation of Journalists (EFJ) (2023). Poland: EFJ and IFJ condemn continued political interference in public broadcasting, https://europeanjournalists.org/blog/2023/12/24/poland-efj-and-ifj-condemn-continued-political-interference-in-public-broadcasting/ (December 24, 2023).

International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) (2023). Poland: The Government put Public Service Media in a State of Liquidation. https://www.ifj.org/media-centre/news/detail/category/press-releases/article/polandthe-government-put-public-service-media-in-a-state-of-liquidation (December 29, 2023). Reporters Without Borders (2023). The World Press Freedom Index: Poland, https://rsf.org/en/country/poland World Justice Project (2023). Rule of Law Index, https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/global/2023/Poland/

| PORTUGAL

|

PUBLIC SERVICE MEDIA AND MEDIA LITERACY EDUCATION IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

DR. JOÃO RICARDO PINTO UNIVERSIDADE NOVA DE LISBOA

Today, media is the most important vehicle for the dissemination of ideas and values. However, more than a century after the emergence of some of these media, there is still a long way to go in terms of research. This is observed both throughout the 20th century and in its role in the present.

In Portugal, radio and television played a crucial role in the transition from a dictatorial political system to democracy in 1974. The most obvious and visible evidence of this is the songs which were played on the radio and acted as a code for the military to start the revolution that would become known as the 25 de Abril or Carnation Revolution. However, as we know, revolutions don‘t come out of the blue. We can say that, from the end of the 1950s, the various media showed signs of change, especially Portuguese television, which began broadcasting in 1956. It should be noted that the technical equipment initially used by Radiotelevisão Portuguesa (RTP) was largely due to the support of other European counterparts. This was in a country geographically located on the Iberian Peninsula, the only European territory still under dictatorial political rule, which sought to isolate itself from the European democracies. Nevertheless, television in Portugal seems to have been an exception. Besides technical dependence, we can also observe the presence of foreign programmes on Portuguese TV screens.

These and many other examples reveal the importance of the media in history, which is inseparable from different social and ideological movements. Nothing happens without a social context. The construction of the European Community (EU) is itself an ideological statement based on pillars such as solidarity, democracy and human rights.

Although not exclusive to Europe, populism is now a reality, manifested in the growth of social and political movements with extremist ideals that challenge the main pillars of the EU: respect for diversity and tolerance. These are ideologies that offer simplistic answers to current problems. One of the most common is the insecurity that these movements associate with immigration, based on social sensitivities rather than concrete facts. This gives rise to fake news and half-truths.

In this sense, Public Service Media (PSM) have a leading role in defending social cohesion and integration. The creation of media content that promotes the social integration of minority and marginalised groups, who are often the target of misinformation, has been an important commitment of the different PSMs to facilitate intercultural dialogue. An important effort in the fight against discrimination and intolerance.

Democracy and pluralism are two other pillars of today‘s EU. Only through quality, impartial information, covering a wide range of opinions and accessible to all, can diversity be transformed into cohesion. In this sense, culture plays a fundamental role as an element of identity. The production of content that reflects Europe‘s cultural richness and diversity, as elements that bring together a sense of belonging and identity, is fundamental to dispelling racist and xenophobic ideals.

Together with education and innovation, pillars I will focus on later, these are the foundations that any PSM should base its work on. However, the advent of the Internet has clearly changed the media landscape. If it has democratised access to information, it has also dispersed the ways in which it is disseminated. But the most important change, and the one that raises the most questions, has been the creation of new sites of emergent information. The field of communication is no longer the exclusive preserve of professionals bound by professional ethics.

This means that PSM services need to rethink their strategies to continue to implement the pillars of the EU. It‘s no longer enough to be present in the various media spaces. We need to go even further. Today, these spaces are dominated by platforms such as HBO, Netflix or Amazon Prime. If we want the different generations, especially the younger ones, to be aware of recent history so that they are more aware of social and political achievements, something must change.

If blocking other ways of thinking is not a democratic attitude, even if they are based on lies, and that preventing fake news is a somewhat inglorious attitude, what needs to change at SMP to keep the pillars of the EU standing?

I believe that education and innovation are the answer to this question. Although PSMs all over Europe are striving to create quality educational content, they don‘t seem to be achieving their goals because they often end up not reaching the youngest. As far as innovation is concerned, I think it is important to continue to focus on more attractive content without losing quality. However, the existence of new venues for emerging information and their capacity for dissemination leads us to think that the

efforts currently being developed in the PSM are no longer sufficient. It is essential to break down barriers.

We all learn to read and write as a foundation of knowledge when we go to school. But shouldn‘t we be learning to ‚read‘ images as well? It‘s important to be aware that a lot of the information that reaches us today is in the form of images, whether static or in motion. It is in this sense arise questions like:

• How many schools teach young people to be critical citizens, aware of the vast amount of information that comes at them, for example through the mobile phone?

• How many teachers and educators are using the work developed by the PSM in the formal education?

• Isn‘t it possible, for example, to teach using documentaries, educational games or films?

These and many other questions are not new, but they don‘t seem to be answered by the PSM or by formal education. There is an urgent need to improve media literacy in schools.

In the Portuguese context, there are two important moments in the rapprochement between the PSM and the school. The first was in 1964, when RTP launched Telescola, during a period of dictatorship and in a social context characterised by a lack of schooling. The second moment was in 2012 with the creation of the RTP Ensina portal, whose main objective is still to provide free educational resources. In a completely different social context, both in terms of education and politics, it was an essential tool for the success of the #estudoemcasa project during COVID-19. Due to the pandemic, there has been a significant increase in the production of educational content through a partnership between the Ministry of Education and RTP in 2020.

Although they were about half a century apart and took place in very different contexts, they reveal the PSM‘s concern to supplement the school. In both cases, the aim was not to create new proposals for school content. Instead, the focus was exclusively on existing school content. Two opportunities that don‘t seem to have been enough to break down the walls between PSM and formal education that limit the introduction of media literacy into formal education.

If we want to show what Europe looked like before it united and achieved such a long period of peace, it is important to edit and reflect on the harsh reality of living under a dictatorial political regime. There is an urgent need to show the importance of freedoms that seem to be taken for

granted, and to remember that today‘s difficulties are incomparably less than those of previous generations. But it is also important to highlight the responsibilities that freedom brings as a social pillar.

Past achievements need to be revalidated if they are to remain a social pillar. This can only be done through a greater focus on the social sciences and humanities throughout schooling, which today is more oriented towards the exact sciences. In this sense, PSMs can and should play a leading role in media literacy, not only in terms of creating content, but also in defining school programmes. Greater Europeanisation of the various European SMPs is essential in the sense that greater institutional cooperation is needed to create European programmes linked to knowledge. This does not negate the importance of entertainment programmes such as the Eurovision Song Contest, which, although not exclusively European, has a European vision that is so important for the social dimension.

The commitment to education and innovation must be accompanied by media literacy developed outside the media field. Providing quality educational content for different age groups as a complement to formal education no longer seems sufficient. In addition to remaining on the various social distribution platforms, PSM must be introduced into formal education. In other words, it needs to become a reality in schools. Teachers and educators need to be trained to become media literate actors. They must take responsibility for using media to transmit knowledge and values. A fundamental role in formation of critical and informed citizens with strong media literacy skills.

In conclusion, there is an urgent need for PSMs to fulfil their role beyond their walls. Without this attitude, it will be difficult to achieve the goal of preparing citizens for an increasingly digital future, so that we can live in a modern Europe while maintaining respect for diversity and tolerance as the main social pillars of the EU.

|

ROMANIA

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YESTERDAY’S PROPAGANDA, TODAY’S DISINFORMATION: LEGACIES OF ROMANIAN PUBLIC BROADCASTING

ASS.PROF. IN DR. IN DANA MUSTATA UNIVERSITY OF GRONINGEN

On the eve of Romania’s and Bulgaria’s joining of Schengen’s air and maritime borders, a Romanian traveler at Bucharest Henri Coada is interviewed on prime-time news for the private television channel Antena 3 CNN. The man – presumably in his mid 30s-early 40s – commented on the event: “I think this would be helpful for us, but until we see things working at European standards here in Romania as well, I think we still need to wait. It is impossible for things to run smoothly. I think something is bound to happen and problems are bound to appear. It would be too beautiful to be true and for us to be able to travel so freely.” 1 The man’s sense of foreboding joy (“too beautiful to be true”), his sentiments of mistrust and disbelief (“impossible for things to run smoothly …something is bound to happen and problems are bound to appear”), and his discourse of inferiority (“until we see things working at European standards here in Romania as well, I think we still need to wait.”) make up an orientation to the world that is all too common and recognizable for Romanians across generations. I am interested in understanding what shapes such attitudes, sentiments, discourses and (dis)beliefs, how they position Romanians in the world and why they have been pervasive in Romanian society during and after communism.

Archives documenting the history of media in communist Romania offer countless illustrations of similar sentiments and attitudes that ran rampant in Romanian society at the time. A letter sent to Radio Free Europe in 1983, for instance, and signed under the pen name ‘a soldier of common sense’ read:

…Although I am aware of the circumstances in which we are forced to live, I do not have the strength to go out into the street or stand up at a work meeting to speak my mind, even though everyone else has the same convictions as I do. […] We live […] in a state of intimidation and this intimidation has become, I believe, the most repressive mechanism of Ceausescu’s regime… When for instance, one is taken from their work place to the airport to applaud [Ceausescu’s] departures and arrivals, one goes there for fear of losing their job.2

1 “Today: Romania washes away Austria’s humiliation regarding Schengen: changes at airports”, Antena 3 CNN, 30 March 2024.

2 Radio Television Files D135, Vol. 81, CNSAS, Bucharest, 11 August 1983, p.144.

As late into Ceausescu’s communist regime as December 1989, sentiments of powerlessness, mistrust and disbelief among Romanians prevailed. Teo Cepraga, a former programme maker working within Romanian television at the time remembered his reactions to the first news of the anti-regime rebellion happening in the west of the country:

“November had passed and on December 16th, I hear on Radio Free Europe what happened in Timisoara. It cannot be possible, I told to myself, they must be lying. […] They were talking about shootings and deaths and I wondered: could it be true; how did they know about shootings and dead people? On the 17th, when I arrived at the television station, I saw every one looking strange. No one was talking anymore, no one was making jokes anymore. I started laughing and thought to myself: they must all be listening to Radio Free Europe. I couldn’t wait then to go home and turn on my radio set. Jjjjjj, the jamming sounds that were on the radio those days, like never before. I asked my wife then: ‘do you think this is the end?’ ‘I don’t know, I don’t think so, Ceausescu won’t ever give up until he sees us all dead’, she said. 3

What these different examples – old and new - have in common is that they offer a close rendition of an orientation to the world that is part of the legacy left behind by Romania’s communist past. These examples describe attitudes, sentiments, (dis)beliefs and internalized disciplinary discourses, in Foucault’s (1972) understanding of this phenomenon, that have emerged historically in Romania against the backdrop of a repressive apparatus of control and propaganda. They describe a psychosocial experience specific to the political and social organization of the communist period. This legacy of past, albeit immaterial and embodied within lived experiences, can give us a long-term perspective on propaganda and political repression. It shows us that far from being contained within a specific time, political regime and apparatus of repression, propaganda and political repression produce effects that are dispersed and persistent in time, and reach deep within an individual to form a rather specific psychosocial experience that carries with it long into the future the very asymmetries of power that have produced it.

On the 22nd of December 2022, the public television channel TVR 1 broadcast a special edition talk show called Decembrie Rosu (transl. “Red December”). On their own website, the broadcaster introduced the programme as follows: “After 33 years since the fall of the communist dictatorship, the bloody events in December 1989 remain an open wound for

3 Interview with Teo Cepraga, Bucharest, 26 August 2009.

democratic Romania. 1000 people died then and over 3000 people were wounded, but nobody was found responsible […] Until a legal verdict is passed – for which who knows how much longer we need to wait – on the 22nd of December, Romanian Television presents a televised debate based on up to date, substantiated information, which allows viewers to form their own opinions about the 1989 Revolution.”4 On TVR’s YouTube channel, users commented on the programme:5

“[The truth] won’t come to light even after 50 years” said @danirumano3019. “And yet, the question ‘Who shot us after 22 [December 1989]?’ remains unanswered” commented @Gigelul2. “We live a total lie…”, warned @sorinalexandra9126. “The simple ignoring of historians and researchers who have been documenting […] the revolution very professionally, and who reached conclusions different than those of the Securitate (who were present, whether directly or by proxy, in the studio) says everything about their good faith.” added @sobchak1, directly critiquing the programme makers and their invited guests, among whom also historians.

A slogan that has become emblematic for post-89 Romania is: “Ati mintit poporul cu televizorul” (transl. “Through television, you lied to the people”), which has become a hymn about Romanians distrust in the public broadcaster. Other cultural expressions post-89 allude to a similar sentiment of mistrust and a sense of an unresolved past. Corneliu Porumboiu’s 2006 film “12:08 East of Bucharest (in Romanian: “A fost sau n-a fost?”, literally translated as “Was it or was it not?”) is illustrative of that. The film centers on three protagonists who – to a humourous effect - debate on local television the truthfulness of what may or may not have happened in their town during the 1989 revolution.

Such cultural expressions in post-communist Romania form today a living cultural archive, a phenomenon that refers to “‘the presence of the past into the present’, a way of acting that people have been socialized into, that becomes natural, escaping consciousness.” (Wekker, 2016, p.20).

Deconstructing this living cultural archive requires us to understand the legacy of a repressive, propaganda-ridden past as well as to ponder on the nature of that legacy. The public broadcaster in Romania offers the best vantage point for mapping out that legacy and this is not because of its former proximity to the propaganda machines of the communist regime. In fact, it is dangerously reductionist to equate the history of the

4 http://tvr1.tvr.ro/dezvaluiri-in-premiera-din-culisele-anchetei-cunoscute-ca-dosarul-revolutiei_38829.html , Retrieved: 25 April 2024.

5 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a9nbAyHbSsk&t=3000s, Retrieved: 25 April 2024.

public broadcaster with the history of a political regime. It is primarily because of its status as a legacy public broadcaster that has been documenting Romanian society in the long-term that the institution finds itself in a unique position in a media landscape, where social media, online platforms and commercial incentives have become the trend, while fake news, deep fake technologies and echo chambers are wreaking havoc. As a legacy public media institution, the Romanian broadcaster has been documenting, preserving and archiving the heritage of the past. This heritage of the past is to be found in their archives, as well as in their current productions and equally important, in the attitudes the broadcaster generates among its publics, which speak of deep-seated sentiments in Romanian society. This heritage forms the unique resources of the public broadcaster in the current society.

TVR’s multimedia archives mark the broadcasters’ most tangible form of heritage. This heritage fuels the production of new programmes and has been the foundation for the recently founded channel TVR Folclor, which promotes the visibility of Romanian folklore, traditions and crafts for older and younger media generations. Adding to this in-house heritage of Romanian television, there are other archives, which shape the legacy of the institution. Examples of this are the ‘Radiotelevision Files’ at the Council for the Study of the Securitate Archives or the documents left behind by the Propaganda and Agitation Section of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, to be found at the National Archives of Romania.

This material archival heritage of Romanian television comes with a twist. While this heritage is important, it also marks an incomplete and hardly a satisfactory representation of what constitutes the legacy of the Romanian public broadcaster today. As Katherine Verdery argued, by approaching archives originating from a political regime that functioned by obliterating the distinction between fact and fiction as “a site of truth about the past, post-communism simply prolonged its logic into the present” (Verdery, 2014, pp. 72-73).

If one were to account for the compromised or at best, severely challenged truth-value of discursive acts produced inside a propaganda-ridden totalitarian regime, the very nature of archival documents originating from that context comes under scrutiny.

“Initially, the visas were strictly political, they only prevented from political mistakes”, remembered former TVR professional Stefan Dimitriu. “Censors only interfered in political programmes. But we abided by self-

censorship, we knew what was allowed and what not. Our worst censors were some of our superiors in the department […]. There was Manase Radnev, the adjuct editor-in-chief, […] who didn’t accept anything that wasn’t standard, he cut out what was most attractive in a programme. He didn’t like any hints that could be interpreted as subversive, not even innocent comments. He said that’s what drew attention. He took no chances with humour in the programmes. Everyone was scared in case the Comrades [n.a. Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu] were watching. If someone had the bad luck for Ceausescu to watch his programme and say he didn’t like it, he would lose his/her job.”6

Before looking to conceive of rigorous methods that may help us sift through the questionable nature of documents produced by the communist regime, a different question looms large: are we not omitting to see that the very act of questioning truth without a resolve – a practice that can take a myriad of forms, from skepticism, to cynicism, to mistrust and disbelief – may in fact be part of the legacy of a media system and society that lived through a political regime, where propaganda obliterated truth concomitantly to obliterating people’s sense of trust, where individuals’ autonomy in making reliable judgements about who, what and when to trust was severely put to the test and where one’s orientation to the world was marked by the instilled belief of what Hannah Arendt described in 1951 as “everything was possible and nothing was true”?

The act of questioning truth without a resolve is different than the act of asking critical questions. Its lack of resolve comes primarily from a deeply engrained sense of powerlessness, mistrust and hopelessness, the same sentiments that described the lived communist experience for the majority of Romanians in Ceausescu’s Romania. It is the repository of sentiments rooted within the psychosocial experience of a propagandaridden and repressive regime - which the public broadcaster, through its positioning as a mediator between the political sphere of the regime and the domestic spaces of civilian viewers, documented - that marks an intangible, immaterial heritage of the public broadcaster, a heritage that is even more important as it has remained ignored so far.

Opening up this immaterial heritage for exploration brings us to the people’s embodied experiences of Ceausescu’s propaganda and control. This shows us how propaganda worked even though people were able to distinguish fact from fiction and did not believe the regime’s lies.

6 Interview with Stefan Dimitriu, Bucharest, 17 January 2008.

Stop showing us these goddamn liars!”7 , raged a television viewer on 15 March 1988 as she phoned the public broadcaster. “The result of a consistent and total substitution of lies for factual truth is not that the lie will now be accepted as truth and truth be defamed as a lie, but that the sense by which we take our bearings in the real world—and the category of truth versus falsehood is among the mental means to this end—is being destroyed.” argued Hannah Arendt. What can be learnt from the immaterial heritage of Romania’s communist past as documented through the lens of the public broadcaster is that it is a very specific psychosocial experience that makes propaganda effective. This experience is not driven by persuasion, but by a specific social organization where people’s ability to distinguish fact from fiction no longer provides them with a resolve, nor a respite from the pervasiveness and consistency of lies. In the absence of such a resolve and respite, sentiments of powerlessness, mistrust, and disbelief in the rule of facts over fiction, as well as an internalized sense of disciplining oneself as a way of adjusting to an incongruent outer social organization, emerge.

The spread of disinformation today brings urgency to the historical heritage of public media in Europe’s former totalitarian regimes, such as Romania. Far from new, what is currently called a ‘post-truth’ era points to phenomena that were already widespread before the rise of the Internet, so much so that “there has never been a ‘truth era’” ( Dutilh Novaes & de Ridder, 2021, p.156-157). If anything is novel about these phenomena today is how they have adapted to the technological and commercial affordances of online media, gaining in amplitude across the world (Ibid). What Romania’s communist past can teach us is that propaganda and disinformation do not thrive by means of persuading the masses of lies, nor does it thrive on the assumption that people cannot distinguish fact from fiction. They thrive under specific psychosocial conditions that can be characterized by a generalized and unresolved sense of mistrust, powerlessness, and a lack of belief in a world in which the rule of fact over fiction would bring a respite from undesirable conditions. Such psychosocial conditions are intertwined with and can be engineered, manipulated or exploited through asymmetries of power.

This comes both as a lesson and as a warning, a warning that Hannah Arendt already formulated in 1951: “Totalitarian solutions may well survive the fall of totalitarian regimes in the form of strong temptations which will come up whenever it seems impossible to alleviate political, social, or economic misery in a manner worthy of man.” Bringing back

7 D/00328291, Radiotelevision File D 135, Vol. 83, CNSAS, Bucharest, 15 March 1988, p.90

the discussion to the public media heritage of Europe’s former totalitarian regimes, it is precisely the intangible, immaterial heritage of sentiments, attitudes and discourses of self that have their origins within the propaganda-ridden regimes of the past and which form a living cultural archive in the present, that gives insights into the human condition to be guarded in today’s disinformation warfare. While data, technologies for fact-checking, media literary and actively combating falsehoods are important, caring to protect against a psychosocial climate where the vulnerability of human nature to the perils of disinformation is left to fester, is of utmost importance. This is even more the case as – when looking at the media history of communist propaganda in Romania – it is primarily the condition of human nature within a specific psychosocial climate engineered by a propagandistic regime, which has been overlooked. Acknowledging that condition would mean to recognize, explore, ask critical questions and take responsibility for the legacy that the communist past has left behind, a legacy that has been passed on from communism to post-communism until today and still lives on. That legacy informs a present-day orientation to the world, to self, to Europe, to the present and the future, and equally the past that belongs equally to post-communist Romania as much as it belongs to post -Cold-War Europe.

References:

Michel Foucault, The archaeology of knowledge and the discourse on language, Pantheon Books, 1972

Gloria Wekker, White Innocence, Duke University Press, 2016

Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, Penguin Classics, 2017 (originally published in 1951)

Catarina Dutilh Novaes, Jeroen de Ridder, “Is fake news old news?” in: S. Bernecker, A. K. Flowerree, & T. Grundmann (eds.), The Epistemology of Fake News, Oxford University Press, 2021, p.156-179.

Katherine Verdery: Secrets and Truths: Ethnography in the Archive of Romania’s Secret Police, Central European University Press, 2014.

A MULTITUDE OF COUNTLESS BUBBLES

KSENIJA HORVAT

RTV SLOWENIA

The Slovenian public media, RTV Slovenija, is a prime example of how easily public media can succumb to undemocratic tendencies. In recent history, it has become clear that just a few people in key positions can redirect the programming policy of a major media service in a direction favorable to the ruling political agenda and turn it into its propaganda machine.

In Slovenia, independent journalists within the public RTV, in the years 2022/23, through a journalistic strike and participation in a referendum, which clearly expressed the public‘s expectation that the public broadcaster should operate independently of politics, fought for an important space for autonomous work. Now we are faced with an extremely difficult task of how to use this acquired freedom for broadcasting that will support democratic social development.

The environment is unfriendly. Among young viewers, we are not a popular medium, as their way of consuming media content has moved far away from linear television, and RTV has not aggressively enough entered the modern digital media market over the past decade.

We are losing ground in rural areas, where the public broadcaster is viewed as detached from social reality, aloof, and less viewer-friendly compared to the lighter content of commercial competitors. Can we reach them with quality content packaged in relatable formats? How to develop them? How to be popular without populism?

In Slovenia, there traditionally exists a strong populist right that labels the public broadcaster as a stronghold of the extreme left, which is far from the truth, but vocal opponents of public broadcasting maintain the suspicion of bias in public debates, keeping it alive and influential. The wider environment is also problematic, as the strength of public media has often been challanged even in Austria, Italy, Croatia, let alone in Hungary.

With the departure of the politically motivated previous leadership and with a strong referendum victory, in which journalists supported the amendment to the law that brought about the depoliticization of super-

visory bodies, journalists knew that they had won a very important victory. However, we discovered that the financial situation of the house was much different from the picture painted by the previous management. Financial reserves were depleted, and the consequences of the fact that the RTV contribution in Slovenia has not been raised since 2012, nor has it been adjusted for inflation during this time, became very clear.

The current government of Robert Golob promised long-term stable financing during the referendum campaign, which has not happened so far, and the public broadcaster has been on the brink of insolvency for several months now. We know that simply adjusting for inflation could bring us millions in annual revenue, which would be fresh money for innovation and finding shortcuts to the audience we have lost or have not yet gained.

In such conditions it is extremely difficult to be successful in developing new television formats, creating a viewer-friendly television service, successfully tackling the challenges of attracting young viewers, conquering rural areas, and solidifying professional standards. Except for the period when the former, right-leaning government-friendly leadership brought its people from party media satellites onto TV, there has been a ban on hiring at RTV for many years. The average age of our employees is almost 50 years, and we lack young, ambitious, and enthusiastic staff in all areas. This also reflects in the program itself, and consequently, the predominant audience of public television is over 60 years old. The fact that in Slovenia we are employed at RTV in the public sector and we are thus public servants means that we also have all the ailments of the public sector.

In many areas, public television still successfully fulfills the tasks prescribed by law, such as programs for cultural and ethnic minorities. On special frequencies, we have exceptionally rich and diverse programs aimed at the Hungarian and Italian autochthonous minorities, prepared by Hungarian and Italian-speaking journalists and production workers. No neighboring country devotes as much daily program to television production for minorities as in Slovenia. In neighboring countries, there is considerably less such programming than here. Alternatively, we can also ask whether such quantity is disproportionate to quality. And, in general, do these programs have viewers, as there is no data suggesting that they have higher viewership among minorities than in the general population.

We also prepare a significantly modest show for members of minorities from the former Yugoslavia. Most of the shows on our television are

equipped with modern systems that allow deaf, hard of hearing, and visually impaired viewers to follow public television. Recently, we have committed to striving for equal participation of women and men in our talk shows wherever possible. What else? During election campaigns, public television must follow special strict rules for the electoral campaign. The essence of the rules is the equal participation of all candidates in pre-election television shows. The consequence is a fair, but often not the most exciting pre-election media activity on our TV, as we are obliged by law to provide media coverage also to parties and movements that have no chance of crossing the parliamentary threshold. Public television pays special attention to religious communities, especially the Catholic one. We are beginning to open up. This year we broadcasted the Eid al-Fitr prayer live for the first time. So far, the Muslim community in Slovenia had to watch it on Croatian public television. This broadcast is an important step in recognizing the previously unrecognized needs of the relatively numerous Muslim community in Slovenia.

Again: these steps are steps towards plurality and democracy, but not necessarily towards higher viewership, and thus towards greater reach and influence in society.

We are beginning an important program of restructuring public broadcasting, after which RTV will no longer be the same as before, but all units, radio, television, and digital, will be significantly more closely connected. We are connecting editorial offices, which will improve our offer. Within a few months, we will adopt new professional standards, as the previous ones date back to 2000 and no longer reflect the reality of social life. The plan is for all RTV employees to be familiar with the importance and implementation of the code in reality. We attach great importance to this, as it will reduce mistakes and slips in the whole programming, not only in the news program and contribute to improving our reputation in the field of impartial and professional reporting. We have strengthened local news, which are among the most watched TV program slots. We plan a new prime time show that will deal with local issues. We are reforming the network of local correspondents, connecting with radio, and at the same time fighting the possibility of reducing the network of correspondents abroad. We will be forced to reduce this if the RTV contribution remains at the level of 2012 in the future.

We are aware that television programming must thrive not only as linear television but also in its digital forms. With continuous improve -

ments to our RTV 365 player, the visibility of television content in the digital world is also improving. Registered users can now use the „My 365” feature to subscribe to and save RTV content and access it via the web, mobile phone, smart TV, or multimedia player. Additionally, users can resume playback of interrupted content from the point of interruption. Within the application, users also have access to the „Filmoteka”an online store of Slovenian fiction, documentary, and animated films. While we may not be able to directly compete with digital giants, we can strengthen our offering in the Slovenian language (which large corporations like Netflix do not prioritize). There is still plenty of room for improvement, for example, preparing TV content exclusively for digital media for a digital audience, and we are impatient, finding the entire process to be too slow. With additional financial resources and new knowledge, we could be much faster.

While maintaining the formal separation of radio, television, and digital editorial offices, we are collaborating like never before. In recent months, we have successfully completed the „Prvič” project, a television-radio-web project aimed at a young audience. We will closely collaborate on covering the European Parliament elections to reach the widest possible audience together. Interestingly, the former director of TV Slovenia decided not to compete for funds allocated by the European Parliament to cover these elections, claiming that „we do not need European propaganda.” Despite all the delays, the current management has managed to negotiate a special editorial grant for covering the European elections, which means that we will be able to allocate more resources to this topic, prepare a more diverse, more ambitious program, and make important comparisons with pre-election events in other European countries. We see comprehensive, in-depth, and inviting coverage of the European Parliament elections as our fundamental mission at a time when strong forces of disintegration are at work in the European Union and when especially young voters are losing their relationship with European (and other) political structures. However, it must also be noted that so-called European topics do not attract high ratings, to put it mildly. Therefore, we need to find the right ways to convey European issues in a user-friendly manner.

With content specifically aimed at young people, we aim to engage them in both television and digital formats, wherever they may be –even on social media and elsewhere online if necessary. It is important for young people and others to understand that the content provided by public television is independent of politics and capital, and that we creators are worthy of their trust.

This represents a crucial aspect of media literacy, where Slovenia generally lags behind established European practices. Here, we will explore new approaches to addressing issues such as conspiracy theories, misinformation, filter bubbles, source reliability, and fact-checking. Particularly, we‘ll focus on artificial intelligence, which is also entering the Slovenian space, and for the questions it raises, we currently lack answers. We will closely monitor the initial experiences of other European media in this regard.

For a media outlet experiencing very tough financial times, all of these tasks are extremely demanding, yet exciting. The public broadcaster has an important mission: it must be a transcendent multitude of countless bubbles in which we individually live our media lives. In other words, we must be builders of community, we must provide a platform that the public uses to communicate ideas for a democratic future.

| SLOVAKIA |

STRUGGLING TO NAVIGATE CHALLENGES AND PRESERVE INTEGRITY

DR. IN LUCIA VIROSTKOVA COMENIUS UNIVERSITY BRATISLAVA

Recent legislative proposals aimed at restructuring Slovakia´s public service broadcasters have raised concerns about potential political interference and its implications for media freedom. These developments highlight broader European concerns over media independence and citizens‘ right to information. Additionally, societal divisions exacerbated by events like the pandemic and the war in Ukraine have intensified scrutiny of traditional media outlets. Consequently, some citizens are increasingly turning to online platforms as their preferred sources of information, posing a new challenge for public media broadcasters in convincing audiences of their unbiased news reporting and ability to moderate public debates.

Public service media‘s most potent contribution to democracy lies in adhering to the fundamental functions defined in national legal frameworks, which encapsulate values essential to the public interest. In Slovakia, the public radio and television (RTVS) is legally designated as „the national, independent, informative, cultural, and educational institution providing radio and television services to the public” (Zákon o RTVS 532/2010 Z.z.).

1 The legislation underscores democratic principles as fundamental to the content of news and programs, requiring adherence to essential standards of impartiality, verification, accuracy, balance, and pluralism. This mandate aims to guarantee the public´s ability to form opinions without bias. However, assessments of RTVS‘s compliance with these criteria differ widely across various viewpoints. To address concerns, both internal and external expert-led bodies have been appointed to evaluate specific contentious cases raised by the public, academics, or other professionals.

Research on Slovakia‘s public service media (PSM) highlights various challenges encountered during the country‘s transition towards establishing credible democratic institutions following the Velvet Revolution in 1989, initially as part of Czechoslovakia and as an independent state since 1993. Several scholars point to the mid-1990s, under the govern-

1 The forthcoming legislation concerning Slovak Television and Radio, referenced later in the text, employs the identical definition.

ment of Vladimír Mečiar, as particularly difficult to maintain the integrity and professionalism of public broadcasters and their staff, who operated as separate entities—Slovak Television and Slovak Radio (Sámelová, 2018). Following the establishment of RTVS in 2011, concerns have persisted among stakeholders in the media and public sphere regarding potential entanglements between management and state power, as well as compromises affecting editorial independence.

The recent decision by Slovakia‘s Ministry of Culture to overhaul the leadership of RTVS has sparked renewed concerns about the future direction and core values of the public broadcaster. The new legislation has established a quasi-new entity, rebranded as Slovak Television and Radio (STVR), featuring revamped management structures aimed at bolstering the Ministry of Culture‘s influence. Unlike the previous framework governing RTVS, where the ministry lacked direct appointees in the management hierarchy, the new setup provides for the ministry to handpick four members of the governing board, with the remaining five chosen by the national parliament. This board will wield the power to select the general director of STVR. Another significant change is the establishment of an advisory body for the board, as the nine-member ethical commission, tasked with monitoring compliance with the statutes governing STVR employees and collaborators, along with other ethical principles. However, some reporters within the public broadcaster have expressed their concerns that this institution could potentially be used to target critical journalists, reminiscent of past instances where ethical norms were cited as a pretext for punitive action.

The contentious legislative initiative has evolved into a compelling case study illustrating broader European influence on national regulators, particularly concerning foundational principles such as media freedom and citizens‘ right to information. Initially introduced on the eve of the European Parliament‘s plenary debate on the European Media Freedom Act in Strasbourg on 12 March, the draft law prompted a cautionary response from European Commissioner Vera Jourova. She warned against any infringement on the editorial independence of journalists in Slovakia, stressing the importance of robust public service media that serve as impartial platforms rather than mouthpieces for political interests (TASR, 2024). Jourova‘s critique found resonance among various experts and journalist organisations quoted in Slovak media reports and was prominently featured in live debates involving representatives from the Ministry and the Slovak National Party, which oversees the culture portfolio within the ruling coalition led by Prime Minister Robert Fico.

The proposed measures encountered internal resistance, with over RTVS 1200 employees and external collaborators signing a petition outlining objections and public demonstrations organised to protest the initiative. As a result, the draft proposal underwent a rapid public consultation process, attracting hundreds of comments, including critical responses from university departments of journalism. In response to mounting pressure, the Ministry proposed a revised institutional setup and also confirmed the removal of one of the most criticised early provisions –the board´s authority to dismiss the STVR director without cause - as it violated the EU´s Media Act.

However, several critics argue that any legislative changes aimed at removing the current management of the public broadcaster are contrary to EU legislation, pressing EU institutions to voice their criticism to the Slovak government or potentially take measures against it.

More challenging questions

Beyond the internal political turmoil in Slovakia, deeper and more challenging issues are at play, resonating not only within the nation but also across other European countries and their PSM. The aftermath of the pandemic and Russia‘s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has intensified societal divisions across the continent, leading a significant segment of the population to question the credibility and relevance of traditional media outlets, particularly in their news reporting.

In Slovakia, a significant driver of this scepticism stems from the onslaught of verbal and online assaults against the media perpetuated by the very politicians advocating for controversial reforms concerning the public broadcaster. However, these attacks are not limited to the present administration but are partly or otherwise associated with previous governments or opposition parties, in condemning the overarching approach of journalists in reporting on contentious topics such as COVID-19 measures, vaccination, and Russia. Certain members of the media audience contend that legacy media have demonstrated bias and partiality, amplifying arguments from a limited pool of experts and opinion factions. Conversely, these critics praise diverse online platforms, labelled by media theorists as „disinformation platforms” or „alternative media,” hailing them as impartial sources of information (Hacek, Virostkova, 2022).

The need for sufficient diversity of viewpoints and impartiality stands as a cornerstone expectation of PSM, alongside their pivotal role in combatting misinformation and fake news. Drawing from the initial findings of our research at the Department of Journalism, Comenius University in Bratisla-

va, it is evident that significant disparities exist among Slovak politicians, journalists, and the wider public regarding the interpretation of „objective reporting” and the optimal approach for PSM to achieve it. Particularly in contentious topics like the pandemic and the conflict in Ukraine, PSM has faced critique for both amplifying certain voices -including those denying the efficacy of vaccination or the reality of the virus, as well as pro-Russia arguments - and for omitting them entirely: While some journalists and analysts have dubbed this approach as „false balance,” critics on the other side of the spectrum have lamented the apparent lack of more assertive perspectives in RTVS programs. They argue that this undermines the principles of impartiality, balance, and objectivity (Virostkova, 2022).

The growing dissatisfaction among certain segments of the public and politicians with the current performance of PSM is significantly shaped by the online sphere and social media networks. The proliferation of more extreme or radical voices online fosters an expectation for their inclusion in mainstream or traditional media outlets. The failure to incorporate these voices is perceived by some as evidence of media bias, particularly if this narrative is echoed and endorsed by political figures. A notable incident in Slovakia exemplifies this trend, where prominent members of the Smer-SD party participated in online TV debates alongside a neoNazi conspiracy theorist wanted by Slovak police on extremism charges. Interior Minister Matúš Šutaj Eštok defended his participation, citing the need to engage with the „alternative space” to reach those embracing conspiracy theories, stating, „I don‘t discriminate between people” (The Slovak Spectator, 2024). The notion that refusing a platform to a far-right extremist during a current affairs debate could be construed as discrimination underscores the complexity of the issue. Furthermore, despite the minister‘s purported willingness to engage with diverse societal groups, coalition parties recently abstained from invitations to mainstream commercial TV political talk shows due to negative sentiments toward specific moderators and their interviewing style (Osvaldová, Mikušovič, 2024). In this context, the role of PSM in facilitating political debates becomes crucial. However, given amendments at RTVS and past rhetoric from certain politicians, there is a risk of measures being taken to silence critical journalists and moderators there as well.

Based on my experience in public radio and TV, ongoing pursuits in journalism, and academic research, I argue that PSM in Slovakia faces two pivotal challenges:

1. Navigating open-minded yet critical discussions with political leaders amidst the rise of social media, which provides alternative avenues for engaging with voters, bypassing traditional journalistic oversight.

2. Sustaining public trust despite persistent attacks from politicians by embracing a genuinely pluralistic approach to reporting and programming, prioritizing fact-based journalism, democratic principles, and the rule of law.

Success in this endeavour relies not only on journalists and media outlets but also on fostering a mindset shift among Slovak politicians to recognize and uphold editorial independence as a cornerstone of journalistic integrity, in line with expectations across the European Union. Equally vital is enhancing media literacy among the Slovak public, empowering them to navigate the digital landscape effectively and distinguish between verified news and misinformation, including combatting hate speech on social media platforms.

Bibliography

Hacek, J. Virostková, L.: Lies Are Everywhere but Who Are the Liars. Addressing Online Disinformation Platforms in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/365615848_Lies_are_all_around_but_who_are_the_liars_Addressing_online_disinformation_ platforms_in_the_Czech_Republic_and_Slovakia Osvaldová, L. Mikušovič, D. (Denník N, 12.4.2024) Ficova koalícia bojkotuje reláciu Na telo v Markíze.

Available at: https://dennikn.sk/3937352/koalicni-lidri-sa-dohodli-ze-ich-ministri-budu-bojkotovat-na-telopodobny-model-pouzili-pred-koncom-na-hrane-na-joj/?ref=tit1

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The Slovak Spectator (20.3.2024): Slovak Interior Minister on Show with Wanted Neo-Nazi Conspiracy

Theorist. Available at: https://spectator.sme.sk/c/23298897/slovak-interior-minister-on-show-with-wanted-neo-nazi-conspiracy-theorist.html

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SPECIFIC FEATURES OF A MEDIA MODEL IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT

PROF. IN DR. IN AURORA LABIO-BERNAL UNIVERSITY OF SEVILLE

Spain’s entry into the European Union in 1986 constituted a step towards the country’s internationalisation in the context of its transition to democracy. The Franco dictatorship (1939-1975) had defined Spain’s economic and political development, as well as the evolution of its media sector. The old authoritarian structures collapsed once and for all when the country held its first democratic elections in over four decades in 1977 and its new constitution was ratified the following year. This article considers the importance of establishing and regulating public media organisations, especially television broadcasters, to guarantee pluralism and uphold democracy, although it also offers a critical analysis of the problems associated with such initiatives. For the development of its own media sector, it is clear that Spain looked to other European nations that already had important public media groups and broadcasting services, such as the BBC in the United Kingdom.

In the early 1980s, the democratisation of Spain and its integration into the community of European nations required the implementation of new structures in all sectors, including news media. The old press system tied to the dictatorship thus gave way to new initiatives that looked to other European countries for models. An example is Spain’s daily newspaper El País, founded in 1976, the first enterprise of the PRISA group, which would later become a shareholder in the French newspaper Le Monde.

A new public television broadcaster for a new country

Spain sought to define its public broadcaster as an instrument of the new democratic era and the future development of the country’s audiovisual sector. Although its origins can be traced back to 1946, when Spain’s first public radio station took to the airwaves, and to the foundation of its first public television channel in 1957, in reality public broadcasting in Spain had previously always been conceived of as an instrument of the Franco regime. Thus, in 1980, a few years after the dictator’s death, Spain’s democratic government enacted the RTVE Statute, which defined the public broadcaster according to the principles of objectivity, veracity, impartiality, and respect for political, religious, social, cultural, and linguistic pluralism. Even in the Statute’s preamble the influence of other European public broadcasting services is evident, with references to ideas such as the need for the organisation’s independence from poli-

tical power. This has of course been a principle upheld by the BBC since its foundation, for example; similarly, Italy’s public broadcaster, RAI, underwent a significant change in 1975 when control over the network passed from government to parliament with the aim of giving it greater independence and plurality (Cipriani, 1995); and ARD was established with the foundation of the German Federal Republic with the firm objective of contributing to a decentralized and independent media system.

Thus, at least in theory, the points of reference for the new Spanish public broadcaster were creating essential public radio and television services operated by the State. However, since its founding, RTVE has been the subject of scrutiny due to two basic issues: one economic, and the other reputational (Zallo, 2011). On the one hand, RTVE began spending huge amounts of money in the early 1990s in an effort to compete with the new private networks, resulting in a massive debt that ultimately had to be covered by the State in 2006 as part of a rescue package for the broadcaster. On the other, RTVE’s reputation has been marred for many years by public scepticism about its independence. Of course, other public broadcasters have also had problems of this kind, such as the BBC in the Tony Blair era during the Iraq War (Lundberg, 2008), and RAI under the Berlusconi governments (Pavli, 2010). Indeed, the Council of Europe added to such criticisms in 2004 by pointing to “the political pressure suffered by public media outlets in Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain” (La Voz de Galicia). A few years later, Belgian MEP Ivo Belet called for solutions to be found to ensure the independence of public TV, suggesting that management board appointments should be based on criteria of “competence and acquaintance with the media sector” (European Parliament, 2010). At the same time, he also called for stable long-term financing to prevent political interference through annual budgeting decisions.

Reforms and adaptation to European guidelines

The clientelism affecting RTVE’s operations led to the proposal of a reform (Law 7/2006) to reverse the situation. As a result, from 2006 to 2012 the public corporation would experience a period marked by its “greatest independence since the restoration of democracy” (Fernández Alonso et. al., 2017: 103). However, a new reform implemented by Spain’s conservative government in 2012 reintroduced governmental bias in public broadcasting, giving rise to a period of constant allegations of government censorship and manipulation.

An important development occurring in this period was the digital television transition in Spain in 2010, two years ahead of the date planned

for the rest of Europe. That same year, two other important events took place: the end of advertising on RTVE and the approval of Spain’s General Audiovisual Act (Ley General Audiovisual). The first of these two events has a long history behind it, as for years private television networks had been protesting against the public broadcaster’s ability to tap two financing sources, even taking their complaint to the European Commission on the grounds that it was incompatible with EU regulations related to fair competition (Linde Paniagua, 2005: 41). However, under legislation such as the Treaty of Amsterdam, the EU appeared to have authorised the financing of public broadcasting services through both advertising and state funding. This same EU authorisation, however, was called into question in the wake of the analogue shutdown and the proliferation of digital channels after the DTT. Private operators, knowing that shares in the advertising pie were limited in the new digital context, had repeatedly called for the public broadcaster to be adfree. The measure was announced by Socialist Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero as a new step forward in the consolidation of RTVE to ensure “more public service and fewer commercial interests” (RTVE, 2009). In practice, RTVE’s expenses continued to be covered under the agreements between the government and the public broadcaster while private networks benefited from the 600 million euros in advertising spending that was freed up as a result (Martin Meden, 2009).

Moreover, in 2010 the Spanish government enacted the Ley General Audiovisual, which implemented the provisions of European Parliament and Council Directive 2007/65/CE of 11 December 2007 on television broadcasting services. This new law set forth the principles that were expected to underpin the activity of public radio, television, and interactive service providers in the audiovisual sector. As stipulated in the preamble, these principles had to be “inspired by EU regulations and recommendations on public funding compatible with the Treaty Establishing the European Community, independent control through regulatory bodies, and the guarantee and protection of rights” (BOE, 2010). The government made use of this act to update the definition of the role of a public service as:

an essential service of general economic interest with the mission to disseminate content that promotes the principles and values of the constitution, contribute to the formation of a plurality of public opinions, raise awareness of Spain’s cultural and linguistic diversity, and disseminate knowledge and the arts, with a special focus on the cultivation of an audiovisual culture. Moreover, public audiovisual media service providers shall serve citizens and social groups that are not served by mainstream programming. (BOE, 2010)

This last point, which ties in with the idea of cultural pluralism included in the Independent Study on Indicators for Media Pluralism in the Member States (European Commission, 2009), is of special concern for all public broadcasting services. A study conducted a few years ago (Labio-Bernal & García-Prieto, 2022) analysed the under-representation of minority groups, including people with disabilities, and the conditions of access to audiovisual content on the BBC and RTVE. The findings revealed clear similarities between the two networks in relation to the incorporation of sign language into their news programming, as both used simulcasts to provide signing on daily reports on their news channel. There were clear parallels between the two public broadcasters in relation to the approaches adopted for the integration of sign language, similar shortcomings and a similar amount of room for improvement to ensure universal accessibility in line with the principles of pluralism and cultural diversity.

Rethinking the idea of public service

In the summer of 2022, the changes to the audiovisual sector ultimately led to the Spanish Congress of Deputies passing an amendment to the existing Ley General Audiovisual in order to transpose the EU’s Audiovisual Media Services Directive of 2018 to Spanish law. The amendment maintained the quota of 51% broadcast programming of European productions for traditional television broadcasters, including RTVE. However, for the first time a quota was also established for streaming platforms, which would now have to dedicate at least 30% of their catalogue to European productions. The amended act also established an obligation upon the public television broadcaster to allocate 6% of eligible revenues to advance funding for European audiovisual productions (eldiario.es). The amendment places special emphasis on using this budget for productions in the official languages of Spain or its autonomous communities, as well as for productions made by women or independent producers. It also makes special reference to the protection of children and the accessibility of content for all audiences.

In a certain sense, this legislation reinforces an idea of public service that should be reviewed to ensure its practical application. As Ramón Zallo (2011) argues, the idea of public service needs to be redefined in accordance with a number of different questions, such as the articulation of a space for culture and communication, the construction of a collective cultural memory, and the promotion of linguistic standardisation. A public television broadcaster should also act as a force for societal cohesion and a vehicle for the construction of a diverse and pluralistic community, prioritising information and promoting quality

productions. It also seems clear that a genuine political will is needed to prevent the manipulation of public broadcasting, as well as internal regulations beyond its framework agreement in order to reinforce its independence. Also important is the journalistic commitment of the public broadcaster’s employees and their contribution to the provision of accurate information. Moreover, the role of public television in Spain needs to be redefined in light of younger audiences and new OTT platforms that are drawing a large proportion of viewers away from conventional television. Despite the good viewing figures enjoyed by some European public broadcasters such as the Danish and German networks, which increased their market share in the period from 2015 to 2019, the growth of online platforms is clearly unstoppable. For the same period, the audience sizes of public broadcasters in Portugal and Spain dropped as a result of the new on-demand viewing habits (Servimedia, 2022).

All of these issues raise questions about the future of public television in Spain and in Europe as a whole. While the essential nature of national public television as a democratising tool is beyond dispute, the challenges posed by the current technological developments and increasing political polarisation are equally undeniable. The proposal of a European News Initiative, a collaborative news service aimed at providing audiences with reliable content, may represent a good direction for the future. The initiative, which includes the participation of EU state broadcasters in Germany (BR/ARD), Belgium (RTBF), Spain (RTVE), Finland (YLE), France (France Télévisions), Ireland (RTÉ), Italy (RAI), Portugal (RTP), and Switzerland (SWI swissinfo.ch), as well as the European public service channel ARTE, is a good starting point for ongoing exploration of the digital environment and European identity under the leadership of public broadcasting services.

References

BOE (2010). Ley 7/2010, de 31 de marzo, General de la Comunicación Audiovisual. https://www.boe.es/buscar/ pdf/2010/BOE-A-2010-5292-consolidado.pdf

Cipriani, I. (1995). La radio Audizioni Italiane. Videazumit. La lucha por el derecho de comunicar. Eldiario.es. (2022). Lo que la nueva Ley Audiovisual va a cambiar en nuestra televisión. https://www.eldiario.es/ vertele/noticias/nueva-ley-audiovisual-cambios-television_1_9112713.html

European Commission (2009). Independent Study on Indicators for Media Pluralism in the Member States. European Parliament (2010). „Political, economic independence of public TV must be ensured.”

Fernández Alonso, I.; Fernández Viso, A. & Blasco Gil J.J. (2017). “Crisis de credibilidad y debilidad financiera de RTVE.” In Fernández Alonso, I.: Austeridad y clientelismo. Política audiovisual en España en el contexto mediterráneo y de la crisis financiera. Gedisa. Barcelona. pp. 97-120

La Voz de Galicia (2004). “El Consejo de Europa acusa a TVE de «manipulacióninformativa».” https://www.lavozdegalicia.es/noticia/espana/2004/01/30/consejo-europa-acusa-tve-manipulacion-informativa/0003_2376715.htm

Labio-Bernal, A. & García-Prieto, V. (2022). Cultural pluralism and diversity on public television: An analysis of the use of sign language on the BBC and TVE. Critical Studies in Television. 17 (2). https://doi. org/10.1177/17496020211072460

Linde Paniagua, E. (2005). La televisión, un servicio público esencial. (Del servicio público esencial al servicio público integral). In García Casanova, J. F. & Casado Salinas, J. M. (Eds.): El Servicio Público de la Televisión. Lundberg, K. (2008). “Reputation to Lose: BBC versus the Blair Government.” The Journalism School Knight Case Studies Initiative.

Martin Meden, J. M. (2009). “Al quitar la publicidad de TVE se ‘liberan’ 600 millones para las privadas.” Rebelión. https://rebelion.org/al-quitar-la-publicidad-de-tve-se-liberan-600-millones-para-las-privadas/ Pavli, D. (2010). “Berlusconi’s Chilling Effect on Italian Media.” Open Society Foundations. RTVE (2009). Zapatero: „La reducción de publicidad en TVE se traducirá en más servicio público.” https://www. rtve.es/noticias/20090605/zapatero-reduccion-publicidad-tve-se-traducira-mas-servicio-publico/279785. shtml

Servimedia (2022). “Las televisiones públicas europeas buscan afianzar la audiencia joven, según un estudio realizado por Forta.” https://www.servimedia.es/noticias/televisiones-publicas-europeas-buscan-afianzaraudiencia-joven-estudio-realizado-forta/3183330

Zallo, R. (2011). Estructuras de la comunicación y de la cultura. Políticas para leer en la era digital.

| SWEDEN |

THE FAR RIGHT AND PUBLIC BROADCASTING: THE CASE OF SWEDEN

JOSEF HIEN, PHD, MID SWEDEN UNIVERSITY AND INSTITUTE FOR FUTURE STUDIES ASS.PROF. DR. LUDVIG NORMAN, STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY

European public broadcasting organizations have in many cases been established as a way to strengthen democratic institutions and ensure a well-informed citizenry. However, public broadcasters across Europe increasingly face challenges related to the increasing contestation from far-right parties, sometimes perceived as challenging institutionalized democratic norms.

This presents these organizations with a difficult dilemma of, on the one hand, upholding expectations of norms of pluralism and impartiality while on the other, protecting democratic norms related to human dignity against efforts, often by actors on the far-right, to undermine such norms.

Swedish public broadcasting is no exception. The emergence and increasing electoral support for the Sweden Democrats, a party emerging from the Swedish Neo-Nazi political environment in the 1980s, have placed these dilemmas front and center.

Similar to public broadcasting organizations in many other European countries, Swedish public media is bound by expectations of upholding and reproducing democratic values. However, as this brief analysis highlights, the application of rules and guidelines related to safeguarding these values have been far from straight-forward.

The response by Swedish public broadcasters have dithered between an at times assertive stance against statements of far-right representatives, and at times a cautionary approach especially after having received considerable criticism after electoral debates before the parliamentary election in 2018. The Swedish case highlights challenges and dilemmas that face many public broadcasting organizations today.

The democratic dilemma in public broadcasting European public broadcasting organizations today find themselves dealing with a general dilemma related to the limits at which liberal democracy may accommodate views that challenge norms that underpin its institutions.

Perhaps partly as a consequence of their important democratic role, public broadcasters constitute an important target for anti-system parties, especially on the far right. Public broadcasters are regularly accused by far-right groups and parties of forming political correct cartels that silence oppositional voices or acting in the interests of social and political elites as the “enemy of the people”.

At the same time the function of public broadcasting as a bulwark for democracy has been complicated by the evolution of the far-right- Contemporary parties on the far-right are often able to communicate their political messages within the limits of what is legally allowed. This is a key reason of why public broadcasting organizations, similar to social media platforms and other venues of public sphere institutions, have often found it difficult to deal with dilemmas that arise as these actors become more prominent (Hien and Norman 2023; Norman and Beckman 2024). Like in many other liberal democracies this has also been the case for Swedish public service broadcasters.

The Swedish case

The democratic role of Swedish public broadcasting was established in a 1966 law stating that “The program activities as a whole shall be characterized by the basic ideas of the democratic state and the principle of the equal value of all human beings and the freedom and dignity of the individual”. This “democracy clause” has since figured as a standard formulation in legislation regulating public broadcasting. It has also been extended and specified, especially as concerns gender equality. It is also a provision highlighted in the guidelines for public service companies (Public service handbook, 2014). The explicit role assigned to Swedish public broadcasting as democracy’s defender, has, however, rarely been the object of public debates. This clearly changed with the ascendance of the Sweden Democrats party in the 2010s. The ascendance of the party and its relation to Swedish public broadcasting highlights the difficulties in implementing this role in practice.

The Sweden Democrats and Public Broadcasting’s Dilemma

Sweden was a late-comer in a European context for lacking a far-right party with any significant voter support. In the 2010s, however, SD gained increasing support in each consecutive election, finally receiving 20,5% of the votes in the 2022 parliamentary elections and becoming a key supporting partner for the center-right government coalition.

While the SD communicated in 2012 that it would no longer tolerate “racism and extremism” among its members (Swedish Radio 2012) its re -

presentatives have often been found to make racist statements, often online, and have, once these statements have been made public, often been forced to leave their positions in the party.1 Officially, the party has instead retained what it refers to as socially conservative, nationalist and anti-immigration position (Sweden Democrats 2019).

Since its entry on the political scene SD has with the Swedish public service media and its representatives have often argued that public broadcasting is highly biased. Tensions ran high in the run-up to the parliamentary elections of 2010 when SD was excluded from the final televised party leader debate. In 2022 a prominent party representative demanded “fundamental reform” of public service after a guest in the main news program had referred to public information about the party’s extremist roots (Söder 2022). Demands that public service media needs to be reshaped due to its lack of impartiality has been a recurring line of the party (Emilsson 2021; SVT 2020). SD has focused on what it considers to be biased and unfair characterization of the party by public broadcasters as well as biased reporting on political issues.

Things came to a head during the final party leader debate hosted by SVT two days before the 2018 parliamentary election involving all party leaders in Parliament. Here the SD party leader, Jimmy Åkesson, referring to immigrants, said “why is it so difficult for these people to get a job? It is because they are not Swedish. Because they do not fit in in Sweden” (SBC 2019: 1). After this segment of the debate the host stated that the Åkesson’s statement was “severely generalizing” and that “SVT takes exception” to such statements (Ibid. p. 2).

SVT’s intervention gave rise to an intense discussion on whether or not the announcement could be justified with reference to the ‘democracy clause’ or if SVT had indeed breached its obligation to remain impartial. The Swedish Broadcasting Commission (SBC), tasked with processing complaints against the public broadcasting organization, received around 200 separate complaints regarding the debate. Some argued that Åkesson’s hade made himself guilt of hate speech while many others saw that Swedish Television had taken a political position against SD and had thus breached the impartiality requirement. The Commission concluded that SVT had indeed compromised its obligation to impartiality by intervening in this particular way in the debate (SBC 2019). SVT’s counter arguments centered on the notion that Åkesson’s statements were dero -

1 An overview published by the left-leaning news site Dagens Arena identified around 100 party members having been excluded since 2010.

gatory, bringing into question the equal worth of individuals since the statement could be perceived as arguing that immigrated Swedes could be defined as non-Swedes (Ibid: 4-5). The Commission, however, motivated its decision by emphasizing that the SD leader’s statement was made in the context of a debate with other party leaders and that the statements also triggered responses from other party leaders. Furthermore, it referred to the proximity to the election and the form of the denouncement risked the appearance of SVT taking a political position (Ibid. p. 6). Faced with the debate, SVT further on stated that it would refrain from making this type of explicit denouncements of problematic statements, and would seek to integrate the “democracy clause,” in its journalistic practice and reporting (SVT 2018).

Conclusion

What does this short episode tell us about the dilemmas faced by contemporary public broadcasting organizations in Europe?

First, we believe it highlights how challenging it is for public broadcasters to navigate an increasingly polarized political landscape. Public broadcasters’ democratic roles are often enshrined in legislation and in some countries in their constitutions. Nevertheless, when meeting concrete instances where these issues come to the fore, things are often far from clear cut. This does not mean that these rules or inconsequential. However, open and continued debate on well-institutionalized tenets of journalistic ethics are perhaps equally important.

Second, the fraught relation between the far-right and public broadcasters further complicates discussion, and makes organizations vulnerable if and when far-right parties gain more electoral power. Often cast as a mouthpiece for leftist or liberal elites, public broadcasters should highlight their long tradition of transcending political divides even during prior periods of intense polarization.

References

Dagens Arena, „Så många har uteslutits ur partierna – ett parti sticker ut” [„So many have been excluded from the parties - One party sticks out”] Januari 13, 2021. Available at https://www.dagensarena.se/innehall/sa-manga-har-uteslutits-ur-partierna-ett-parti-sticker-ut/ (accessed 2023-05-31).

Emilsson, Aron (2021) ‘Public Service-Frågor‘, Swedish Parliament, Motion 2021/22:2472. Hien, J. and Norman, L. (2023) ‘Public Broadcasting and Democracy’s Defense: Responses to Far-Right parties in Germany and Sweden’ Democratization 30(6): 1160-1181.

Norman, L and Beckman, L. (2024) ‘Democratic Self-Defense and Public Sphere Institutions’, Constellations: An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8675.12737 Public service handbok, 2014 (Sveriges Radio).

SBC (2019) Decision of 2019-02-18, doc. No 18/03103.

Sveriges Television (2018) ’SVT:s programdirektör efter avståndstagandet mot Åkessons uttalande: ”Vi måste jobba på tydligheten”’, SVT Nyheter, Available at https://www.svt.se/nyheter/inrikes/jan-helin-efteravstandstagandet-fran-akessons-uttalande-svt-ska-avskaffa-denna-typ-av-markeringar (Accessed 202109-08).

Sveriges Televison (2020) ” SD vill kalla in SVT-chefer till riksdagen: Public service är partiska,” 21 February 2020. Available at https://www.svt.se/kultur/sd-s-forslag-fraga-ut-public-service-cheferna-om-opartiskhet-i-kulturutskottet (Accessed 2021-09-30).

Sweden Democrats (2019) ‘Sverigedemokraternas principprogram’ Available at https://ratatosk.sd.se/ sd/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/16092141/Sverigedemokraternas-principprogram-2019.pdf (Accessed 2022-06-28).

Swedish Radio (2012) ‘Jimmy Åkesson städar up i SD’ 12 October, 2012, Available at https://sverigesradio. se/artikel/5307626 (accessed 28 September 2022).

Söder, Björn (2022) https://twitter.com/bjornsoder/status/1569768478692851714 (Accessed 30 September 2022).

REFLECTIONS FROM SWITZERLAND ON THE ROLE OF ITS PUBLIC SERVICE BROADCASTER – CURRENTLY A HOT TOPIC OF PUBLIC DEBATE.

PHILIPP CUENI EDITO

Proactive dialogue.

Raising the question of the role of public broadcasting leads to another question: where and by whom should this be discussed and answered? My answer: facilitating the debate about its own function within society is one of the main tasks of a public broadcaster.

We notice that throughout Europe the population is becoming alienated from public institutions, including the media. The challenge now for public broadcasters lies in reviewing their relationship with their „customers” – licence fee payers, in intensifying the dialogue with them and in legitimising its social benefits, mission and funding. For too long, the major radio and television broadcasters took their mission for granted and as a given, thus becoming idle and neglecting to reflect on their selfimage, including in dialogue with their users.

The media has a special role to play in the functioning of society and democracy. For this reason alone, it should be a matter of course for them – and even more so for publicly funded broadcasting – to review and legitimise their own performance. However, legitimisation must not be a declaration. What is expected now from broadcasting companies is to lead proactive dialogue campaigns with their stakeholders: audiences. Their own role should be defined in dialogue with the latter. Public value is achieved when audiences can contribute to relevant aspects of the mission and feel represented as part of the broadcasting system. For the acceptance of public service media, it is crucial for audience loyalty to be achieved through this dialogue. Public broadcasters should organise this exchange proactively and find suitable structures for it.

In Switzerland, the traditions of direct democracy and public participation are considered important, and SRG SSR, the largest public media company in Switzerland, is based itself on a participatory model. The operational side of the company is structured like a commercial media company, but the funding body of the broadcasting corporation has been established as an association since its foundation. It is made up of

14 regional companies. Its 22,000 members broadly represent civil society and stay away from political influences (parties). They can participate through a variety of elected association bodies, working groups, ad-hoc discussion groups, public councils, etc. In this way, dialogue structures are established that are suitable for the members as well as for the company and programme makers. These structures can be used to debate the role of broadcasting or programming.

Unlike commercial media, public broadcasting is not beholden to shareholders, but to licence fee payers, the wider society and audiences. This is why a dialogue with the wide-ranging association is an interesting approach. In addition, public broadcasting in Switzerland must also find further channels and ways to engage in a broad dialogue with civil society.

Referendum as an opportunity.

In Switzerland, a popular initiative is also forcing SRG SSR to define its role. The popular initiative from the right-wing populist milieu wants to cut the licence fee in two and thus the SRG SSR budget. Six years ago, a popular initiative was already held on abolishing licence fee financing for public broadcasting and thus the SRG SSR altogether. But 71.6% of voters rejected the initiative. This lent public broadcasting a legitimacy that was probably unique in Europe and strengthened SRG SSR‘s position. At least this is how it was perceived in 2018. However, the same political circles have now launched a second popular initiative.

Ironically, the attack on SRG SSR is rekindling the debate on its role. Recently, the committees responsible in the Swiss parliament decided that a discussion should be held on the scope and content of public service in the broadcasting sector. Its service mandate could then be reviewed and only then could a decision be made on its financing. Previously, the Federal Council (executive) had already wanted to reduce the licence fee by a fifth – supposedly as a moderate alternative to the popular initiative. The media minister submitted this proposal for „consultation”, a direct democracy tool through which stakeholders give their views and opinions on policy. This in turn mobilised not only political parties and cantons to issue a statement, but also a large number of organisations from civil society (culture, sport, tourism, the church, etc.). Many of these submissions explained in detail why SRG SSR was important and what tasks it had to fulfil.

For SRG SSR, this uncertainty about its future is a heavy burden. Its services, its role in society and ultimately its existence are constantly up for debate. At the same time, it is a great opportunity for public broadcasting

to secure a high level of legitimacy with the public through this political debate and ultimately the referendum. If it succeeds in doing so, it turns its audience into allies and thus protects itself from political influence.

Benefits for the media system.

The future role of public broadcasting must be considered in the context of the overall media landscape. The business model of commercial media has collapsed, resulting in massive budget cuts, a reduction in services, and concentration of titles and ownership structures. In Switzerland, the very small market, which, on top of that, is divided into four language regions, further accentuates the situation. Competition is becoming stiffer, including between private and public media. Commercial media criticise the public brodcaster for what they perceive to be market distortion and demand that its remit and activities be restricted. Conversely, civil society is calling on SRG SSR to compensate for the shortcomings of commercial media with its programming. However, the resources of SRG SSR itself are under pressure, both in terms of advertising revenue and (politically) in terms of licence fees.

In addition to the economic crisis in the media, there is also a crisis in journalistic offerings: not all areas that are relevant to democracy are being covered by journalists anymore, while parajournalistic offerings and fake news are increasingly jeopardising the credibility of all media. In this situation, the list of criteria for the public value claim of public broadcasting must be expanded to include a new question: what benefits does public broadcasting bring to the entire media system? Public service media, which suffer market pressure only to a limited extent, should play a role in stabilising the media landscape as a whole. A few years ago, the former Director General of SRG SSR, Roger de Weck, spoke of „coo-petition” - i.e. competition and cooperation between public and commercial media.

Integration services.

Increasingly, the public debate threatens to fragment into filter bubbles - even in Switzerland. However, the social challenges call for joint solutions, which in turn require dialogue and integration.

Traditionally, local and regional aspects, federalism and diversity are very important to small Switzerland. It is important for SRG SSR to serve the needs of minorities in its programmes, while promoting community and cohesion and to involve minorities in a joint dialogue. SRG SSR has been creative in implementing this „contradiction” for decades and invests a great deal in this integration effort. In this country, it has always

been a challenge to bring together the four language regions and corresponding cultures into one society, into a common Switzerland. SRG SSR therefore produces a full programme for each of the three major language regions via various channels, as well as a programme service for the Romansh-speaking group (60,000 people) at a cost of CHF 25 million.

Broadcasting can contribute to the integration of a society, a region or a country if it depicts the diversity of civil society life, culture, politics, etc. in an area and helps these areas engage with one another. It can help to create shared experiences, bonds and points of reference. This can lead to social cohesion and a shared identity. It is nearly impossible for these costly services to be financed by the market. Public broadcasting must provide this public benefit and continue to utilise its diverse opportunities to create communities through the media.

Entertainment.

Creating identity and integration as a public benefit of broadcasting. Which programmes should be used to achieve this? The current debate in Switzerland is interesting in this regard. In the discussions about the allocation of fees to SRG SSR, it is often argued that with a massively reduced budget, broadcasting could do without entertainment programming. However, it is well known among experts that entertainment in particular can be relevant for social cohesion.

Entertainment programmes have this function if audiences can connect with and relate to them. SRG SSR has now almost completely renounced using international licence formats, which, on the flip side, means more (expensive!) in-house productions. SRG SSR is currently developing quality criteria that entertainment programmes must fulfil in order to generate public value. This involves criteria such as making sense of the world, breaking down prejudice, strengthening empathy, creating links to Swiss society, promoting ethical standards, encouraging social understanding and supporting community building.

WHY WE NEED REGIONAL MEDIA

FERNANDO R. OJEA CIRCOM REGIONAL

Everything seems to be changing fast in the world of digital information and communications technologies. The media and the users‘ habits are in permanent evolution as long as there are more and more sources of information and entertainment, new systems of content distribution from social networks to OTT platforms, more and better end devices and an increasing number of content advisors in the public and private sphere.

Media is no longer a one-direction supplier of content and needs to listen to its audience all the way, as well as to interact with it. The communication sphere became global and hyperactive but the need for proximity, keeping bonds, identity and own culture is at the same time stronger than ever. We still need to know what happens in our community, in our town. And this is where regional media come in.

Regional public service media (PSM) operates in the interest of regional and local communities. It plays an active role in the democratic process, contributes to the economy, supports the diversity of cultures, which is a core European value, and helps preserve identity of regions. Regional media also connects regional societies that form the countries of Europe.

As an international association of professionals working in the field of public service regional audiovisual media across 29 European countries with more than 25,000 journalists, CIRCOM Regional has an important role in enabling members to work together to preserve and strengthen regional public service television across the continent. The organization stands for independent strong regional journalism, which is vital for working democracy. Communities and individuals – both benefit from this. By serving communities with information about regions, about the work of local authorities, regional media encourages participation in public life. It fosters citizen’s activism, urges dialogue between communities and authorities and allows for effective involvement of people in governance at the respective levels. It has a positive effect on taking part in elections, as it was reported on one of the CR forums.

Regional PSM exists in the wider framework of local and regional economy, it is a decisive factor for development. It supports creative industries, and is a source of journalistic talent and skills. It creates jobs and opportunities in the regions, develops talent and fosters community activity. We work with colleges and universities to develop skills and media

literacy, and foster intellectual debate by creating the environment for everyone to participate, learn and develop.

Regional public service media supports all types of cultural activities, and has a commitment to portrayal and diversity. Also, it delivers independent local and regional news and information that connects with the cultural differences in European regions. It can support second and minority languages. Also, it fosters local and regional identity, and contributes to political stability and understanding for the benefits of minorities as well as communities as a whole.

Regional media is a meaningful part of media pluralism in society. In its being as such, it serves to protect the very backbone of regional communities.

THE EBU IN – AND FOR - EUROPE

DR. IN FLORENCE HARTMANN EUROPEAN BROADCASTING UNION

The European Broadcasting Union (EBU) is the leading alliance of public service media (PSM) worldwide, representing 113 media organizations across 56 countries in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, with 31 additional Associates globally. With nearly 2,000 television and radio channels and a vast online presence, our Members collectively reach over a billion people, broadcasting in more than 150 languages.

But what does this mean for Europe? The EBU stands for unity, culture, and connectivity, shaping the continent‘s media landscape while advocating for media freedom and pluralism.

In the EU

The EU has the power to change the behaviour of governments and regulate global tech giants. At a time when media freedom and the very existence of public service media is threatened, we need them to hear our voices now more than ever.

Over the last five years, the EU has legislated areas we could never have imagined before. The EBU has been active on the EU files that matter for media, from the Digital Services Act to the AI Act and, most of all, the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA). The EBU has worked for the best possible rules and regulations for public service media to thrive.

In the 2024 EU elections, the EBU is calling on EU decision makers to ‘Do the next right thing for media and democracy’ because ‘Public service media are bringing their best for Europe’.

The campaign urges policymakers to take a stand in support of a diverse and pluralistic media sector in Europe with guidance on the policies that are needed to support people’s ability to stay informed with reliable news and enjoy quality media. The EBU is ready and willing to be a key partner for the solution. Discover our campaign: https://www.ebu.ch/ eu-elections

Europe beyond the EU

The EBU advocates for journalist safety within the Council of Europe’s Journalist Safety Platform and contributes to their work in the areas of media freedom and AI as an observer to the Steering Committee on Media and Information Society (CDMSI).

The EBU also features sector-leading research through its Media Intelligence Service. The team identifies issues that impact public service media and provides EBU Members with reliable data, trustworthy analysis, and relevant arguments to build their case. Recent reports have included the European Commissioning Landscape; Funding of Public Service Media, and Artificial Intelligence – Public Service Media Leveraging AI.

In an age of rapid technological change, including the impact of artificial intelligence, and shifting media habits, the EBU upholds journalistic standards, delivers reliable, trusted news, holds power to account, fosters debate, and promotes quality programming that informs, educates, and entertains. We facilitate collaboration among all PSM, sharing stories that contribute to a common European culture and showcasing Europe‘s diversity through flagship events like the Eurovision Song Contest.

Ultimately, by protecting public media values and traditions, we aim to empower all European citizens, strengthening Europe as a whole.

MEDIA FREEDOM AS A DEMOCRATIC KEYSTONE: A SUMMARY OF THE OSCE

REPRESENTATIVE ON FREEDOM

OF THE MEDIA’S WORK IN THE BROADER ELECTORAL CONTEXT

TERESA RIBEIRO

FIFTH OSCE REPRESENTATIVE ON FREEDOM OF THE MEDIA

Introduction: the continuing relevance of freedom of the media in the face of populism and autocracy

We find ourselves in the midst of a “super election year”, with the forthcoming elections to the European Parliament among many elections in 2024. There are legitimate fears that populists and autocrats will (attempt to) undermine the integrity of the electoral process and, more broadly, undermine the trust of electorates in democracy itself. For their purposes, they exploit the latest information technologies and use the shortcomings of media regulation.

It is a stark reminder of the need to uphold and strengthen media freedom within the political space of the region of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (with 57 participating States “from Vancouver to Vladivostok”). Without access to reliable information and without free debate, the electoral process threatens to be swamped with mis- and disinformation, leaving the citizenry confused, ill-informed and most likely cynical about the concept of elections altogether. In a “posttruth” environment, where trust in any information is scarce, the electoral process will be continuously undermined. The role of the media as a democratic watchdog gains even more significance against the backdrop of the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI) 2024, which reports concerning declines in the quality of democracy, economic development, and governance performance across 137 countries.

It comes as no surprise that populists and autocrats directly attack media freedom and quality media. Free and independent media are a hindrance to them, as they play a crucial role in challenging misinformation, distortions, and the oversimplification of complex issues. The strategy of these political actors frequently involves undermining public trust in facts, while discrediting journalists and aiming to silence them through methods like slander, defamation, and, in extreme cases, deten-

tion, often under the pretext of terrorism-related or other grave charges without proper legal process. Professional journalists and legacy media are portrayed as liars and traitors betraying national interests. Regrettably, this takes place not only in autocratic regimes, but also in established democracies, where some politicians and public figures use targeted and systemic smear campaigns against free media to promote their own political agendas at the expense of public interest. Public Service Media often also become targets of such attacks. Their abolishment is a typical populist demand. The abolishment or weakening of Public Service Media frequently accompanies the decline of democracies in various countries. These assaults on free media are made even more effective by the unregulated business models of large digital platforms that create informational bubbles, amplify the spread of disinformation and misinformation, and undermine the financial viability of legacy media.

In my role as the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media (RFoM), I have consistently highlighted the importance of free media for democracy and, in particular, for elections. By outlining the measures that would strengthen the media in its enabling and watchdog role in a democratic society, I have contributed to two key political declarations. The Joint Declaration on Freedom of the Media and Democracy, issued with my esteemed colleagues who hold the other three mandates on freedom of expression in the multilateral system (https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/542676), along with my Communiqué „On Media Freedom during Elections”, represent a comprehensive understanding of the challenges and opportunities that lie at the intersection of media freedom and democratic governance.(https://www.osce.org/ files/f/documents/9/b/554107_0.pdf)

On many occasions, I have mentioned and elaborated on these positions through various platforms, including declarations, public statements, speeches, and publications. This spectrum of communication serves to refine the critical ideas from the statements and weave them into a coherent narrative. In doing so, it not only explores the broader implications for democratic elections and highlights the need for media regulation appropriate to the age of digital transformation. It is my firm belief that to withstand the attacks of populists and autocrats on freedom and democracy, the Internet must become a place where public interest media and quality journalism can flourish.

OSCE Media freedom commitments and the mandate of the RFoM

The OSCE has since long recognized the vital role of free media in upholding democratic values, a commitment that dates back to the Helsinki

Final Act of 1975. This commitment was further reinforced with the establishment of the RFoM role in 1997. The foundational principles guiding the RFoM‘s mandate are deeply rooted in the early ideals and agreements of the OSCE’s participating States.

Serving as the fifth Representative on Freedom of the Media (RFoM), I continue the legacy of advocating for freedom of expression and freedom of the media. From my office in Vienna, Austria, I am committed to diligently observing relevant media developments in all participating States, advocating for and promoting full compliance with OSCE principles and commitments regarding freedom of expression and free media. My role is crucial in addressing serious challenges, including obstruction of media activities and unfavorable working conditions for journalists. It is a core belief of mine that free and independent media are pillars of any democratic society.

These commitments continue to be as important these days, if not more important, as they were in 1975. The current rise of populism presents significant challenges to media freedom.

Protecting media freedom

The fulfillment of these obligations by the States involves actively fostering a strong pluralistic media ecosystem. The Joint Declaration of the four international freedom of expression mandate holders in particular asserts that

“By producing and providing reliable information and diverse perspectives, explanations, and analyses, the media can enable public debate and help build an informed and active citizenry. This in turn can facilitate free and fair elections and other forms of public participation, community engagement, and inclusive decision-making processes, strengthening democratic governance and institutions.”

This means that the States have a positive obligation to create an enabling environment for media freedom, in accordance with the international human rights framework.

In particular, the design of such a media landscape must ensure pluralism and diversity. Measures include preventing mergers and acquisitions that could adversely affect media pluralism or political control; ensuring transparency of media ownership; and transparent and efficient use of subsidies and state advertisement to support quality media financially. Diversity also means that minorities’ voices are represented in

the media, and more attention needs to be paid to this issue. Lack of diversity fosters polarization and may lead to the surge of extremist views among some citizens and self-exclusion from politics among others.

Quality journalism has a hugely important role in all of this. Unfortunately, as mentioned above, journalists face attacks, not in the least from populists and autocrats. They are exposed to digital, physical, psychological and legal threats. It has become almost a habit of certain politicians to call journalists ‘liars’, ‘traitors of the state’ or ‘foreign agents’ if they ask critical questions or write critical assessments on their policies and programs. It is a disturbing development that undermines the credibility of journalists and diminishes trust in the media by the public.

States have the obligation to ensure the safety of all journalists. The adoption of the OSCE Ministerial Council Decision 3/18 on the Safety of Journalists in 2018 marked a pivotal moment, with participating States committing to align their laws, policies, and practices with international obligations and OSCE commitments. This commitment underscores the importance of fostering an environment where journalists can operate independently and without undue interference. In response to the existing challenges in this area, my Office launched in 2022 a project on the Safety of Journalists, providing essential guidance to enhance journalists‘ safety across the OSCE region. This initiative reflects a multifaceted approach, joining the efforts of other institutions, such as the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly.

In my capacity as the RFoM, I pay special attention to the silencing of critical reporting by politicians, businesspeople, and public authorities and entities through legal action. I have often observed that the mere threat of such potential lawsuits – often also referred to as Strategic Lawsuits against Public Participation (SLAPPs) – causes journalists to selfcensor and abstain from publishing critical stories. States must discourage such practices and take steps to alleviate its harmful effects. Equally, politicians must be discouraged from attacking journalists for their critical reporting and acknowledge the positive role independent journalists play in a democracy.

Digital Transformation: Impact on Global Media Freedom

Compliance with human rights standards is also valid for online content moderation and curation, which has to be transparent and protective of privacy and personal data. Internet throttling and shutdowns are prime examples of actions that are not compatible with the obligations to defend freedom of the media. In all cases of the violation of freedom of the media,

effective judicial remedies must be available. By minimizing intervention and encouraging free debate with online content moderation, the state and the political leadership ensure that elections to be truly democratic.

The digital transformation of media, especially social media and increasingly artificial intelligence (AI) have all become instruments in the hands of those who want to discredit free media and undermine their very existence. Especially during election campaigns, we observe technology being used against the public interest, notably in the rapid spread of misinformation and propaganda. This can potentially distort electoral outcomes and erode trust in democratic institutions, fuel polarization, and incite violence, even in consolidated democracies. Digitally enhanced dis- and misinformation and propaganda endanger every aspect of human rights, democracy, peace and security.

In my role as the RFoM, together with other freedom of expression mandate holders, I advocate for the regulation and self-regulation of key actors in the digital space – specifically, the social media platforms that have grown so large and powerful that they dominate the information and media ecosystem and shape political debate. Their business model relies on profit-oriented use of algorithms that control user access to information and attract advertising revenue that previously funded professional journalism. In my Communique, I pointed out, “The business model of digital platforms is built on a system of clicks, likes, and shares—not on promoting content of public interest.”

These algorithms and their governance processes are untransparent and can promote misinformation and disinformation on a large scale. They lead to self-reinforcing ‘information bubbles’ and diminish the diversity of information and opinion. In this environment, the business models of many legacy media outlets become unsustainable. Especially smaller and local media outlets go out of business, and media capture by businesses and politicians is noted in numerous election reports across the OSCE region. All this negatively impacts media pluralism and diversity and eventually undermines democracy.

Internet platforms may also decrease the pluralism of the media and information space by blocking or deprioritizing content that is of public interest. The lack of accountability for such actions and the absence of remedial mechanisms further deteriorates the situation.

At the same time, digital media technologies hold potential to bolster democratic processes through enhanced public awareness and fostering

informed debates. Technologies are empowering citizens worldwide. In particular, digital tools are being used in Ukraine to document human rights abuses and make sure the world knows about them. As I highlight in my Communique, for these benefits to be sustainable, a collaborative effort of the key stakeholders is necessary:

“With the right framework to promote content of public interest, social media platforms could be part of creating and promoting an active and well-informed citizenry. For this, a joint effort is needed that includes lawmakers, big tech companies, civil society and international organizations to define the parameters of such a framework, based on international human rights standards.”

The regulation and self-regulation of internet platforms should be an integral part of this effort and follow the UN Protect, Respect and Remedy framework that calls on businesses – including digital platforms – to respect human rights, which also includes freedom of the media. Obviously, States have the larger responsibility to protect and respect human rights, while in case of violations, they must ensure effective remedy. In our Joint Declaration, as multilateral freedom of expression mandate holders, we call on digital platforms to make transparent the algorithms they use for content moderation and curation and for labeling accounts or information as trustworthy, untrustworthy, state-funded and so on. The platforms are further encouraged to assume responsibility for fostering pluralism and independence of media. This includes the monetization of quality content and support for fact-checking initiatives. The recently adopted EU Digital Services Act is a historical step in the right direction. It provides a mechanism to ensure that the platforms are liable to remove illegal content and enhance the algorithmic transparency concerning labeling and targeted advertisement.

Conclusion

The weaponizing of the internet against media freedom poses a significant threat to the core elements of our democratic societies, particularly in the context of elections. At the same time, it’s encouraging to note that the regulatory tools for mitigating the effects of this information disorder have already been designed.

In this context, I call on all the stakeholders in this process, both State and non-State actors, to join efforts to protect media freedom in a holistic manner. This includes prioritizing public interest media, including appropriate funding of genuinely independent Public Service Media, and media regulation that is effective against disinformation, misinformation

and manipulation and supportive of media pluralism and diversity. My guiding principle is clear: “There is no security without media freedom”. In this pivotal election year, this message holds more significance than ever.

References

Joint Declaration on Media Freedom and Democracy

https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/542676

Communiqué by the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media On Media Freedom during Elections https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/9/b/554107_0.pdf

RFoM Speeches:

1. Speech for the 3rd Committee of the PA

(General Committee on Democracy, Human Rights and Humanitarian Questions)

22nd February 2024

2. Speech on Plattforms

Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights. 2011.

Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights : Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework. United Nations: New York and Geneva

OCCUPY INTERNET: WHY WE NEED A PUBLIC SERVICE INTERNET

DR. KLAUS UNTERBERGER, ORF

UNIV.-PROF. DR. CHRISTIAN FUCHS, UNIVERSITY OF PADERBORN

1. From the Crisis of Public Service Media Towards a Public Service Internet

The idea was simple and initiated the history of European broadcasting: Public Media as a Public Service. Accessible for everybody, publicly funded, independent from government as well as from business interest, an accountable, trusted source of information, reflecting the diversity of society. Introduced first in Great Britain, with the launch of the BBC in the 1920s, Public Service Broadcasting was adopted and adapted around the world. In continental Europe it was established not by chance but following a tragic experience with dictatorship and the defeat of democracy: After the devastations caused by the Second World War, it re-emerged in Germany where it helped to restore democracy addressing people, who were no longer obedient subordinates but citizens of a newborn democracy.

In 2024, again, the world faces severe crisis: accelerating climate change, a war in Ukraine, persistent and deep social inequalities, increasing political polarisation and an infodemic crisis, where lots of misinformation is spread online. Despite all the great opportunities digital technologies have offered to society and individuals, the hopes and expectations of a free and democratic internet are broken. Digital giants led by Apple, Alphabet/Google, Microsoft, Amazon, Alibaba, Facebook, and Tencent have acquired unparalleled economic, political and cultural power. They undermine the indispensable resources of trusted information, in-depth analysis, rational debate and diversity of representation that allow us to fully understand the challenges we face. They have created a communication landscape dominated by surveillance, advertising, fake news, hate speech, conspiracy theories, and algorithmic allocation of users to commercial and political content tailored to their expressed tastes and opinions. As currently organised, the Internet separates and divides instead of creating common spaces for negotiating difference and disagreement. In fact, the dominant forms and uses of digital technologies and the Internet endanger democracy.

This is why there is an urgent need for an alternative. We need a new Internet, serving citizenship and democracy. While the contemporary Internet is dominated by monopolies and commerce, the Public Service Internet is dominated by public purpose. While the contemporary Internet is dominated by surveillance, the Public Service Internet is privacy-

friendly and transparent. While the contemporary Internet misinforms and separates the public, the Public Service Internet engages, informs and supports citizenship. While the contemporary Internet is driven by and drives the profit principle, the Public Service Internet puts societal needs first. This is why we need to rebuild the Internet.

Facing the enormous economic power, the billions of revenues, that global acting data companies generate, it seems impossible to challenge, even to keep pace with the power of GAFAM (Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon, Microsoft) and FAANG (Facebook, Amazon, Apple, Netflix, and Alphabet. However, the path of digital technology is not a one-way street. In Europe, there is a strong and effective infrastructure of non-commercial, public media, funded and controlled by the public, based on a clear public remit, committed to universality, diversity, and independence. Wherever it is operating, it provides distinctive quality from commercial media, balances the negative effects of tabloid media, whether online or print, and counteracts the effects of filter bubbles, created by so called “social media”.

Following BBC’s core remit Public Service Media “informs, educates and entertains”, reflecting the social, regional, economic, political, cultural, and religious diversity and complexity of everyday life, creating Public Value as an universal service, equally available to everyone, supporting societal awareness, responsibility and citizenship. All of this qualifies for a most needed alternative to an alarmingly increasing new version of digital capitalism (see Fuchs 2021). It would be a mistake not to use the existing competence, infrastructure and experience of Public Service Media for the creation of a Public Service Internet.

However: Transforming traditional Public Service Broadcasting into a global acting Public Service Internet is definitely not business as usual, to the contrary: It requires a clear vision and substantial and collaborative work from institutions and the commons, from existing Public Service Broadcasters and civil society. The suggestions Public Service Media content should simply move to commercial platforms operated and controlled by the digital giants is not a sufficient option. Establishing a public service channel on YouTube or Facebook supports the digital major’s cultural centrality and offers no alternative to their operating procedures and business models.

2. The Public Service Media and Public Service Internet Manifesto

This is why an international group of scientists and media experts have published a Manifesto for a Public Service Internet, defining specific quality criteria:

• The Public Service Internet is based on the existing net-

work, infrastructure, logistics as well as competence and experience of Public Service Media. It takes the societal consensus of the public service remit into the digital age and creates a vivid cooperation with civil society, individual media users, citizens, and the creative, cultural and educational sector.

• Public Service Internet platforms are ideally operated as international networks curated by Public Service Media organisations. Public Service Internet platforms will co-operate with others, including public organisations (universities, museums, libraries, and so on), with civil society, civic and community media, artists, digital commons projects, platform co-operatives, and a wide range of quality media. In fact, it creates a public-civic-partnership, using the resources of society. As a result, Public Service Media organisations together with public interest organisations create public open spaces that are mediated by Internet communication forming the Public Service Internet.

• Public Service Internet platforms provide works space for quality journalists. They are distant from corporate and political power, producing critical, investigative journalism, and high-quality programmes that educate, inform, and entertain in ways that reflect the affordances of the digital age as well as the diversity of society. They engage citizens in new forms that build on the experiences, structures and content of the public service broadcast model and use the creative potentials of digital content-production by including user participation. Public Service Internet’s remit will thereby be transformed into a new digital public service remit.

• The Public Service Internet will have to defend its independence and ensure that editorial and creative decisions are independent from governmental and business interests. Safeguarding Public Service Internet’s role as a trusted and independent source of information and analysis and well as a responsible mediator, curator and moderator of independently produced and user-generated content requires transparent procedures of accountability. Such procedures need to be based on clear ethical principles.

• The Public Service Internet promotes diversity. Ensuring that the full range of experiences and voices are seen and heard requires a renewed commitment to widening the social bases of recruitment to creative and institutional positions opening opportunities to minorities underrepresented in the mainstream commercial media.

• The Public Service Internet will include, transform and expand the cultu-

ral and educational mission and remit of existing Public Service Broadcasting. Public Service Media emerged alongside an array of other publicly funded cultural institutions, like museums, libraries, art galleries, universities, archives, and performance spaces. Public Service Internet will offer an accessible platform for all of these collaborative ventures.

• Reflecting the needs of the public and supporting citizenship Public Service Media are ideally placed to create and house a new public service search engine and platform, directing users to the full range of freely available relevant materials produced and curated by public educational and cultural institutions.

• Consequently, data privacy is a core aspect of the Public Service Internet. It provides role model practices of data processing. Public Service Internet software are a common good that can be reused for non-commercial purposes. On Public Service Internet platforms, users can manage their data, download and re-use their self-curated data for reuse on other platforms. The digital giants store every click and every online move we make in order to monitor and monetise our behaviour. Public Service Internet platforms minimise and decentralise data storage and have no need to monetise and monitor Internet use. Public Service Internet platforms experiment with new forms of content licencing that advance the cultural and digital commons for not-for-profit and non-commercial purposes.

• The Public Service Internet’s algorithms are publicly controlled algorithms. Such algorithms are open source and transparent. They are programmed in ways that advance the digital public service remit. Public service algorithms are algorithms by the public and for the public. They help organising the platforms, formats, and contents of the Public Service Internet by making recommendations and suggestions based on transparent procedures, without advertising, commerce, and surveillance. Public service algorithms are committed to reflect the diversity of the public and advance accessibility, fairness, and inclusivity.

• The Public Service Internet will be a driver of change. Public Service Internet news and entertainment production will pay particular attention to developing innovative styles of media production that highlight, explain and contextualise issues with far-reaching social implications and their possible consequences. Public Service Internet will build on its proven strengths to produce innovative programmes and online content that supports children’s educational development, speak to the full range of young people’s interests and

concerns and provides comprehensive resources for life-long adult learning. In the digital future, as in the past, entertainment, drama and sport events will remain central aspects of public cultural expression and social solidarity. Public Service Internet will play a central role in maximising the social value of public cultural resources.

• The Public Service Internet must provide new opportunities for participation to safeguard inclusion and democracy. Civil society supports a rich variety of self-organised, collaborative, activity-producing shared collective resources, from community choirs to groups protecting wildlife habitats and campaigning for disadvantaged groups together with new forms of digital action, from creating open source software to contributing to citizen science projects. Public Service Internet will utilise the full range of voluntary engagement and develop new forms of popular participation in the key areas such as the production of programmes and the creation of public Internet resources.

• All of this requires a continuing commitment to guaranteed public funding to ensure that Internet access and Public Service Internet are available to all. Public Service Media and their Public Service Internet platforms need sustainable funding. The licence fee that sustains Public Service Media is not a mechanism of the past but one for the digital future. The digital licence fee will extend and transform Public Service Media’s licence fee in the digital age.

• As the Internet and the public sphere are global, also the Public Service Internet and its platforms should be global, regional, and local. Such platforms can be accessed by anyone at any time and from anywhere. The Public Service Internet requires a global communications infrastructure. Such a global infrastructure is independent from commercial and governmental interest and will serve citizens and democracy. However, there is no reason why the Public Service Internet should not be created, established, initiated or empowered on national, on European level. To the contrary: Establishing an alternative to the purely commercial driven Internet need the power of states, their regulatory framework and access to sustainable funding.

The existing international infrastructure of Public Service Media has all the potentials it takes for becoming a key force that advances democratic communications in the digital age. Comparable to severe crisis in the past the current COVID-19 crisis has demonstrated the indispensability of Public Service Media. Locked down at home and faced with the constant danger of infection, audiences have massively turned to Public Service

Media for trusted sources of objective and impartial information; high quality educational materials for home schooling; diverse entertainment and drama. Public Service Media used this momentum as a chance to prove its competence as an important reference point in times of crisis. Again, the experience that crisis threatens the social life of all of us, that democracy and its fundamental resources easily can be endangered, might cause an unexpected as well as an positive turn: The renaissance of the common good in society, in the public sphere and consequently in public communications and media.

Even it will be an extraordinary challenge, to “occupy” the existing Internet with public interest in order to create a new public sphere, an Internet, serving the public, there are good reason to make it happen: Global crisis, whether the current info- or pandemic have clearly shown the urgent need for accountable media serving citizens and democracy. Fighting the pandemic, it became obvious, that nations, their governments and societies still have the power to act, to intervene, to regulate and to change course. As trillions of working hours and billions of Dollars and Euros have been moved and invested in the fight against the globally spread virus, there is no reason why it should be impossible to invest into the quality of the public sphere, serving citizens and safeguarding democracy.

3. The Public Sphere in the Digital Age

The public sphere forms an important aspect of any political and social system. Habermas understands “public” to mean spaces and resources that are “open to all” (Habermas 1991, 1). That is why we speak, for example, of public service media, public opinion, public education, public parks, etc. The concept of the public sphere has to do with the common good, with the idea that there are institutions that are not only used and owned by a privileged few, but from which everyone benefits. An ideal-typical public sphere is a sphere that organises “critical publicity“(Habermas 1991, 237) and “critical public debate“ (Habermas 1991, 52).

Users of today‘s internet and social media face ten problems (see Fuchs 2021, chapters 14 & 15):

1. Digital capitalism/digital class relations: Digital capital exploits digital labour. It results in capitalist digital monopolies and contributes to the precarisation of life.

2. Digital individualism: Digital individualism consists of users accumulating attention with and approval of individual profiles and postings on social media. Its logic treats people as mere competitors, undermining interpersonal solidarity.

3. Digital surveillance: State institutions and capitalist companies carry

out digital surveillance of people as part of the digital-industrial and surveillance-industrial complex.

4. Anti-social social media: Social media are anti-social social media. Edward Snowden‘s revelations and the Cambridge Analytica scandal have shown that capitalist social media are a danger to democracy. Right-wing ideologues and demagogues spread digital authoritarianism on social media and attack the public service media, independently acting media and quality media as “metropolitan elite media”.

5. Algorithmic politics: Social media are characterised by automated, algorithmic politics. Automated computer programmes (“bots”) replace human activity, post information and generate “likes”. This has made it more difficult to distinguish which information and which approval comes from a human or a machine.

6. Filter bubbles: Fragmentated online publics are organised as filter bubbles in which opinions are homogeneous and disagreements either do not exist or are avoided.

7. Digital tabloids: The digital culture industry has organised social media as digital tabloids controlled by digital corporations. Online advertising and tabloid entertainment dominate the internet, displacing engagement with political and educational content.

8. Influencer-capitalism: On social media, so-called „influencers” shape public opinion, creating power asymmetries in terms of online attention and visibility, and living a commodified online culture that presents the world as an endless shopping mile and a huge shopping mall.

9. Digital acceleration: Due to digital acceleration, our attention capacity is strained by superficial information that hits us at very high speed. There is too little time and too little space for conversations and debates on social media.

10. Fake news: Post-truth politics and fake news are spreading globally through social media. In the age of new nationalisms and new authoritarianism, a culture has emerged in which false online news is spread, many people distrust facts and experts, and there is an emotionalisation of politics through which people do not rationally examine what is real and what is fiction, but assume something is true if it suits their state of mind and ideology.

These ten tendencies have led to a digital public sphere colonised and feudalised by capital, state power and ideology, characterised by economic, political and cultural asymmetries of power. The internet certainly has potentials to socialise human activities in the form of communication, cooperative work, community building and the creation of digital commons. Today, The digital public sphere has the form of the colonised

and feudalised public sphere through the logic of accumulation, advertising, monopolisation, commercialisation, commodification, acceleration, individualism, fragmentation, the automation of human activity, surveillance, and ideologisation. Public service media operate on the basis of a different logic. They are manifestations and cornerstones of the democratic public sphere.

The communication studies scholar Slavko Splichal (2007, 255) gives a precise definition of public service media:

“In normative terms, public service media must be a service of the public, by the public, and for the public. It is a service of the public because it is financed by it and should be owned by it. It ought to be a service by the public – not only financed and controlled, but also produced by it. It must be a service for the public – but also for the government and other powers acting in the public sphere. In sum, public service media ought to become ‘a cornerstone of democracy’” (Splichal 2007, 255) .

The means of production of public service media are publicly owned. The production and circulation of content is based on a non-profit logic. Access is universal, as all citizens are given easy access to the content and technologies of public service media. In political terms, public service media offer diverse and inclusive content that promotes political understanding and discourse. In cultural terms, they offer educational content that contributes to the cultural development of individuals and society.

A public and commons-based Internet is possible – an Internet on which people share, communicate, decide, discuss, play, create, criticise, network, collaborate, find, maintain and build friendships, fall in love, entertain themselves and each other, educate themselves as common activity without corporate mediation.

Public Service Internet platforms are provided by Public Service Media organisations with a not-for-profit imperative and the digital remit to advance information, news, debate, democracy, education, entertainment, participation, and creativity with the help of the Internet. PSM should redefine their remit as the digital remit to advance information, entertainment, education and democracy by utilising digital platforms.

In the research project netCommons (http://www.netcommons.eu), a team of researchers led by one of us found out that 82.4 percentage of the surveyed Internet users expressed concerns about YouTube and

Facebook’s use of personal data for profit-making (netCommons 2018).

78.7 percent said there are too many advertisements on the Internet. 82.0 percent were somewhat concerned, concerned or very concerned about targeted online advertisements, the digital giants’ main business model. 72.8 percent were concerned about large Internet corporations’ tax avoidance practices. 87.6 percent of the respondents expressed interest in alternatives to YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, and Google. Public Service Media are excellently equipped to provide not-for-profit alternatives to the likes of YouTube, Amazon Prime, Spotify, and Netflix.

That Internet users are critical of the corporate practices of online platforms is not news. Already in 2009, when Facebook and YouTube started to become popular, one of us conducted a case study of social media’s political economy (Fuchs 2009) that led to a larger research project (http:// www.sns3.uti.at). The case study and the subsequent project showed that users highly value the services such platforms provide and are at the same time highly critical of their business practices.

4. Conclusion: Occupy the Internet!

The Manifesto, described here, is a vision, a wake-up call: Public communications is more than business. It is a public purpose. More than ever democratic societies need media and a public sphere reflecting the needs of their citizens. At the same time the Manifesto is a call for action. A call to save and advance democratic communications by renewing Public Service Media and creating a Public Service Internet. An Internet of the public, by the public and for the public; an Internet that advances instead of threatens democracy and the public sphere, that provides a new and dynamic shared space for connection, exchange and collaboration. An Internet enhancing the public sphere, supporting active citizenship and young creatives who will build the cultural industries of tomorrow and foster social cohesion.

A different media world is possible. Now is the time for a Public Service Internet and revitalised Public Service Media. We call on all audience members, citizens, users, readers, experts and non-experts, inside and outside of Public Service Media, in fact all citizens who care for the future of democracy in our countries to participate in the quest for strengthening Public Service Media and creating a Public Service Internet.

The full Manifesto is available here: http://bit.ly/psmmanifesto You can sign the Manifesto here: http://bit.ly/signPSManifesto

References

Fuchs, Christian. 2021. Social Media: A Critical Introduction. London: Sage. Third edition. Fuchs, Christian. 2009. Social Networking Sites and the Surveillance Society. A Critical Case Study of the Usage of studiVZ, Facebook, and MySpace by Students in Salzburg in the Context of Electronic Surveillance. Salzburg/Vienna: Research Group UTI. http://fuchs.uti.at/wp-content/uploads/SNS_Surveillance_Fuchs.pdf Habermas, Jürgen. 1991. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. netCommons. 2018. Survey on Interne Attitutdes: Dataset. https://zenodo.org/record/1294040#.YNL0BpMzb8E Splichal, Slavko. 2007. Does History Matter? Grasping the Idea of Public Service at its Roots. In From Public Service Broadcasting to Public Service Media. RIPE@2007, ed. Gregory Ferrell Lowe and Jo Bardoel, 237-256. Göteborg: Nordicom.

2022, total individuals.

AUSTRIA

NAME: ÖSTERREICHISCHER RUNDFUNK

WEBSITE: HTTPS://ORF.AT/

NUMBER OF TV-CHANNELS: 4 + 9 WINDOWS

E.G: ORF1, ORF2

NUMBER OF RADIO STATIONS: 12

E.G: Ö1, HITRADIO Ö3

BELGIUM

NAME: VLAAMSE RADIO EN TELEVISIEOMROEP

WEBSITE: HTTPS://WWW.VRT.BE

NUMBER OF TV-CHANNELS: 3

E.G: VRT ÉÉN, CANVAS, KETNET

NUMBER OF RADIO STATIONS: 9 + 5 WINDOWS

E.G: RADIO 1, RADIO 2

NAME: RADIO-TÉLÉVISION BELGE DE LA COMMUNAUTÉ FRANÇAISE

WEBSITE: HTTPS://WWW.RTBF.BE/

NUMBER OF TV-CHANNELS: 4

E.G: LA UNE, TIPIK

NUMBER OF RADIO STATIONS: 9 + 7 WINDOWS

E.G: LA PREM1ÈRE, VIVACITÉ

BULGARIA

NAME: BALGARSKA NATIONALNA TELEVIZIJA

WEBSITE: HTTPS://BNTNEWS.BG/ NUMBER OF TV-CHANNELS: 4

E.G: BNT 1, BNT 2

NAME: BÂLGARSKO NACIONALNO RADIO

WEBSITE: HTTPS://BNR.BG/ NUMBER OF RADIO STATIONS: 12

E.G: RADIO BULGARIA, HORIZONT CHANNEL

CROATIA

NAME: HRVATSKA RADIOTELEVIZIJA

WEBSITE: HTTPS://HRTI.HRT.HR

NUMBER OF TV-CHANNELS: 5

E.G: HTV1, HTV2

NUMBER OF RADIO STATIONS: 11

E.G: HR-1, HR-2

CYPRUS

NAME: CYPRUS BROADCASTING CORPORATION

WEBSITE: HTTP://CYBC.COM.CY/

NUMBER OF TV-CHANNELS: 4

E.G: RIK1 (CYBC1), RIK2 (CYBC2)

NUMBER OF RADIO STATIONS: 4

E.G: FIRST PROGRAMME, SECOND PROGRAMME

CZECHIA

NAME: CESKÁ TELEVIZE

WEBSITE: HTTP://WWW.CESKATELEVIZE.CZ/

NUMBER OF TV-CHANNELS: 7 + 2 WINDOWS

E.G: ČT1 , ČT1 (JMO)

NAME: ČESKÝ ROZHLAS

WEBSITE: HTTPS://WWW.IROZHLAS.CZ/ NUMBER OF RADIO STATIONS: 26

E.G: ČRO RADIOŽURNÁL, RADIOŽURNÁL SPORT

DANMARK

NAME: DR

WEBSITE: HTTPS://WWW.DR.DK/ NUMBER OF TV-CHANNELS: 5

E.G: DR1, DR2

NUMBER OF RADIO STATIONS: 8 + 20 WINDOWS

E.G: P5, P6 BEAT

NAME: TV2/DANMARK

NUMBER OF TV-CHANNELS: 7 + 8 WINDOWS

E.G: TV 2 ZULU, TV 2 CHARLIE

ESTONIA

NAME: EESTI RAHVUSRINGHÄÄLING

WEBSITE: HTTP://WWW.ERR.EE/

NUMBER OF TV-CHANNELS: 3

E.G: ETV, ETV2

NUMBER OF RADIO STATIONS: 5

E.G: VIKERRAADIO, RAADIO 2

FINLAND

NAME: OY YLEISRADIO AB

WEBSITE: HTTP://WWW.YLE.FI/

NUMBER OF TV-CHANNELS: 3 + 10 WINDOWS

E.G: YLE TV 1, YLE TV 2

NUMBER OF RADIO STATIONS: 6 + 25 WINDOWS

E.G: YLE PUHE, YLE MONDO

FRANCE

NAME: FRANCE TÉLÉVISIONS

WEBSITE: HTTPS://WWW.FRANCETVINFO.FR/

NUMBER OF TV-CHANNELS: 18 + 24 WINDOWS

E.G: FRANCEINFO, FRANCE 2

NUMBER OF RADIO STATIONS: 9

E.G: GUADELOUPE 1ÈRE RADIO, GUYANE 1ÈRE RADIO

NAME: FRANCE MÉDIAS MONDE

WEBSITE: HTTPS://WWW.RFI.FR/FR/ NUMBER OF TV-CHANNELS: 4

E.G: FRANCE 24 (ENGLISH), FRANCE 24 (ARABIC)

NUMBER OF RADIO STATIONS: 4

E.G: RFI MONDE, RFI AFRIQUE

NAME: RADIO FRANCE

WEBSITE: HTTPS://WWW.MOUV.FR/ NUMBER OF RADIO STATIONS: 50

E.G: FRANCE CULTURE, FRANCEINFO

GERMANY

NAME: ARBEITSGEMEINSCHAFT DER ÖFFENTLICH-RECHTLICHEN RUNDFUNKANSTALTEN DER BUNDES-REPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND

WEBSITE: WWW.ARDKULTUR.DE

NUMBER OF TV-CHANNELS: 16 + 24 WINDOWS

E.G: DAS ERSTE, ONE

NUMBER OF RADIO STATIONS: 77 + 63 WINDOWS

NAME: DEUTSCHE WELLE

WEBSITE: HTTPS://WWW.DW.COM/ NUMBER OF TV-CHANNELS: 5

E.G: DW, DW (DEUTSCH+)

NAME: ZWEITES DEUTSCHES FERNSEHEN WEBSITE: HTTPS://WWW.ZDF.DE/ NUMBER OF TV-CHANNELS: 6 E.G: ZDF, ZDFINFO

GREECE

NAME: ELLINIKI RADIOPHONIA-TILEORASSI SA

WEBSITE: HTTPS://WWW.ERTNEWS.GR/ NUMBER OF TV-CHANNELS: 5

E.G: ERT 1, ERT WORLD

NUMBER OF RADIO STATIONS: 30

E.G: KOSMOS RADIO, ZEPPELIN

HUNGARY

NAME: MEDIA SUPPORT AND ASSET MANAGEMENT FUND MEDIASZOL- GALTATAS-TAMOGATO ES WEBSITE: HTTPS://WWW.MEDIAKLIKK.HU/ NUMBER OF TV-CHANNELS: 6

E.G: M1, M2

NUMBER OF RADIO STATIONS: 5

E.G: KOSSUTH RÁDIÓ, PETŐFI RÁDIÓ

IRELAND

NAME: TG4

WEBSITE: HTTPS://WWW.TG4.IE/EN/ NUMBER OF TV-CHANNELS: 2 E.G: TG4, CÚLA4

NAME: RAIDIÓ TEILIFÍS ÉIREANN

WEBSITE: HTTPS://WWW.RTE.IE/

NUMBER OF TV-CHANNELS: 4

E.G: RTÉ ONE, RTÉ2

NUMBER OF RADIO STATIONS: 4

E.G: RTÉ RADIO 1, RTÉ 2FM

ITALY

NAME: RADIOTELEVISIONE ITALIANA

WEBSITE: HTTP://WWW.RAINEWS.IT/

NUMBER OF TV-CHANNELS: 21 + 25 WINDOWS

E.G: RAI 1, RAI 2

NUMBER OF RADIO STATIONS: 15 + 20 WINDOWS

E.G: RAI RADIO INDIE, RAI RADIO 3

LATVIA

NAME: LATVIJAS TELEVIZIJA

WEBSITE: HTTP://WWW.LSM.LV/

NUMBER OF TV-CHANNELS: 2

E.G: LTV1, LTV7

NAME: LATVIJAS RADIO

WEBSITE: HTTPS://LATVIJASRADIO.LSM.LV/

NUMBER OF RADIO STATIONS: 6

E.G: LR1 - LATVIJAS RADIO 1, LR2 - LATVIJAS RADIO 2

LITHUANIA

NAME: LIETUVOS RADIJAS IR TELEVIZIJA

WEBSITE: HTTPS://WWW.LRT.LT/ NUMBER OF TV-CHANNELS: 3

E.G: LRT TELEVIZIJA, LRT PLIUS

NUMBER OF RADIO STATIONS: 3

E.G: LRT RADIJAS, LRT KLASIKA

LUXEMBOURG

NAME: CLT MULTI MEDIA

NUMBER OF TV-CHANNELS: 19

E.G: RTL Z, SOROZAT

NUMBER OF RADIO STATIONS: 3

E.G: RTL RADIO LËTZEBUERG, RTL RADIO 93,3

MALTA

NAME: PUBLIC BROADCASTING SERVICES LTD

WEBSITE: HTTPS://TVMNEWS.MT/EN/

NUMBER OF TV-CHANNELS: 2

E.G: TVM, TVMNEWS+

NUMBER OF RADIO STATIONS: 3

E.G: RADJU MALTA, RADJU MALTA 2

NETHERLANDS

NAME: NEDERLANDSE PUBLIEKE OMROEP

WEBSITE: HTTP://WWW.NOS.NL/

NUMBER OF TV-CHANNELS: 8

E.G: NPO 1, NPO 1

NUMBER OF RADIO STATIONS: 9 + 4 WINDOWS

E.G: NPO RADIO 1, NPO RADIO 2

POLAND

NAME: TELEWIZJA POLSKA SA

WEBSITE: HTTPS://WWW.TVP.INFO/

NUMBER OF TV-CHANNELS: 22 + 16 WINDOWS

E.G: TVP1, TVP2

NAME: POLSKIE RADIO SA

WEBSITE: HTTPS://WWW.POLSKIERADIO.PL/

NUMBER OF RADIO STATIONS: 12

E.G: JEDYNKA - PROGRAM 1 POLSKIEGO RADIA, DWÓJKA - PROGRAM 2 POLSKIEGO RADIA

PORTUGAL

NAME: RÁDIO E TELEVISÃO DE PORTUGAL

WEBSITE: HTTP://WWW.RTP.PT/

NUMBER OF TV-CHANNELS: 14

E.G: RTP1, RTP2

NUMBER OF RADIO STATIONS: 8

E.G: RDP ÁFRICA, ANTENA 2

ROMANIA

NAME: SOCIETATEA ROMÂNĂ DE TELEVIZIUNE

WEBSITE: HTTP://STIRI.TVR.RO/ NUMBER OF TV-CHANNELS: 12

E.G: TVR 1, TVR 2

NAME: SOCIETATEA ROMÂNĂ DE RADIODIFUZIUNE

WEBSITE: HTTP://WWW.RADIOTIMISOARA.RO/ NUMBER OF RADIO STATIONS: 22

E.G: RADIO VACANȚA, RADIO ARAD FM

SLOVENIA

NAME: RADIOTELEVIZIJA SLOVENIJA

WEBSITE: HTTPS://WWW.RTVSLO.SI/ NUMBER OF TV-CHANNELS: 5

E.G: TV SLOVENIJA 1, TV SLOVENIJA 2

NUMBER OF RADIO STATIONS: 8

E.G: RADIO KOPER, RADIO MARIBOR

SLOVAKIA

NAME: ROZHLAS A TELEVÍZIA SLOVENSKA

WEBSITE: HTTPS://WWW.RTVS.SK/ NUMBER OF TV-CHANNELS: 4

E.G: JEDNOTKA, DVOJKA

NUMBER OF RADIO STATIONS: 11

E.G: RÁDIO DEVÍN, RÁDIO_FM

SPAIN

NAME: RADIOTELEVISIÓN ESPAÑOLA

WEBSITE: HTTPS://WWW.RTVE.ES/ NUMBER OF TV-CHANNELS: 8 + 19 WINDOWS

E.G: LA1, 24H

NUMBER OF RADIO STATIONS: 5 + 19 WINDOWS

E.G: RADIO EXTERIOR, RADIO NACIONAL

SWEDEN

NAME: SVERIGES TELEVISION AB WEBSITE: HTTPS://SVERIGESRADIO.SE/

NUMBER OF TV-CHANNELS: 5 + 21 WINDOWS

E.G: SVT1, SVT2

NAME: SVERIGES RADIO AB WEBSITE: HTTPS://SVT.SE/ NUMBER OF RADIO STATIONS: 35

E.G: P1, P2

SWITZERLAND

NAME: SRG SSR

NUMBER OF RADIO STATIONS: 3

E.G: RADIO SWISS CLASSIC, RADIO SWISS JAZZ

NAME: FRENCH: SRG SSR / RTS

WEBSITE: HTTPS://WWW.RTS.CH/ NUMBER OF TV-CHANNELS: 2

E.G: RTS UN, RTS DEUX

NUMBER OF RADIO STATIONS: 4

E.G: LA PREMIÈRE, ESPACE 2

NAME: GERMAN: SRG SSR / SRF

WEBSITE: HTTP://WWW.SRF.CH/ NUMBER OF TV-CHANNELS: 3

E.G: SRF 1, SRF ZWEI

NUMBER OF RADIO STATIONS: 6 + 7 WINDOWS

E.G: RADIO SRF 1, RADIO SRF 3

NAME: ITALIAN: SRG-SSR / RSI

WEBSITE: HTTP://WWW.RSI.CH/ NUMBER OF TV-CHANNELS: 2

E.G: LA1, LA2

NUMBER OF RADIO STATIONS: 3

E.G: RETE UNO, RETE DUE

NAME: ROMANISCH SRG-SSR/ RTR

NUMBER OF RADIO STATIONS: 1

E.G: RADIO RTR

BORDERS DO NOT EXIST ...

… neither for the frightening consequences of the climate change or a spreading infectious virus, nor for the global internet dominated by a handful of digital giants. This is why Public Service Media has to invest into its transnational European perspective. In this collection of articles various scientists and media experts from all European countries reflect and comment on crucial challenges for Public Service:

How can they keep pace with the dynamics of digital transformation?

Will they be capable to protect their independence and resist fierce attacks from populistic parties?

Will they remain a relevant as well as trusted source of information and quality entertainment?

Independent expertise inspires the debate about media freedom and the future of Public Service Media and its contributions for European democracy and citizenship.

The ORF series „Public Value TEXTE“ present more than 300 articles from international media experts focusing on the distinctive quality of Public Service Media, available at: