ISP-Myanmar Briefing Paper December 2018
Evolving Preference and Strategy of Tatmadaw Regarding Peace Process in Myanmar Min Zin Min Zin is a founding member and the Executive Director of ISP – Myanmar. He is also a Ph.D. candidate in the Travers Department of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley. Min Zin is a comparative political scientist, who studies civil-military relations, democratization, contentious politics, ethnic conflict and civil war with a focus on Myanmar and Southeast Asian countries.
Executive Summary What accounts for the Tatmadaw’s preference concerning the peace process in Myanmar? What does the Tatmadaw want out of the peace process? Why is the Tatmadaw not willing to make more accommodations at negotiating table in Union Peace Conference – 21st Century Panglong (UPC21CP)? These questions among many others are puzzling. No doubt that an understanding the evolving preferences of the Tatmadaw provide insights into understanding its engagement with the peace process and its current stalling. This paper argues that the ongoing evolution of the Tatmadaw’s preferences reflects its determination to keep the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) – originally conceived as a distinctively parallel institution with a mandate even to “repeal” the 2008 Constitution (See NCA Article 22 d) – within the broad parameters of the 2008 Constitution. Despite the Tatmadaw occasional tactical concessions to Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs), the Tatmadaw maintains strategic advantage as through its position as the guardian of the country with self-appointed roles not only to defend - but also to define -Myanmar as a nation. The Tatmadaw views its position as guardian as reflective of its twofold institutional interests, which are to secure the Tatmadaw’s unity at all cost and advance 1
Preference here is defined as value judgment about a ranking order over and the relative desirability of alternatives outcomes (Darity 2007).
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ISP Myanmar Briefing Paper December 2018
its modernization as “a standard army”. In turn, these fundamental institutional interests are an inseparable part of the Three Main National Causes – non-disintegration of the Union; non-disintegration of the National Solidarity; and perpetuation of the Union Sovereignty – which were prescribed by the Tatmadaw as its national interests (later known as its National Policy) in early 1992. The Tatmadaw clearly views that the 2008 Constitution enshrines its strategic position, institutional and political (national) interests. Thus, it is all-important for the Tatmadaw to bring the peace process back within the orbit of the 2008 Constitution. The need for the Tatmadaw to take action to maintain this imperative became more pressing after the NCA’s first-year anniversary on October 15th, 2016, when Aung San Suu Kyi declared her government’s roadmap for national reconciliation and union peace (later it was changed as NLD government’s seven-point policy of national reconciliation). In the Tatmadaw’s
This paper argues that the ongoing evolution of the Tatmadaw’s preferences reflects its determination to keep the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) – originally conceived as a distinctively parallel institution with a mandate even to “repeal” the 2008 Constitution (See NCA Article 22 d) – within the broad parameters of the 2008 Constitution.
interpretation, the NLD government’s roadmap or policy critically differed from the NCA-mandated roadmap because it omitted an important step for security reintegration that was embedded in the NCA’s Article 20 (d) and (g). Instead, The NLD’s plans emphasized the need for a constitutional amendment. This policy intent of NLD struck a raw nerve and led the Tatmadaw to conclude that it must be more assertive and even in-charge of the peace process. From the Tatmadaw’s perspective, it was for a long time rather reactive to initiative by the EAOs, which was intermediated through the previous the military-turned-civilian government of the President Thein Sein, in negotiating the NCA. Given persuasion by then Tatmadaw patron Thein Sein, Tatmadaw leaders reluctantly accepted concession to the NCA and other consequential political and security corollaries. Moreover, a fast-paced liberalization with its signature peace initiative undertaken by the Thein Sein administration left the Tatmadaw ill-prepared for comprehending the nature and the intended as well as unintended consequences of the process. Meanwhile, an unprecedented opportunity for broad and effective coordination by the EAOs through ethnic summits such as Laiza Summit in 2014 baffled the Tatmadaw. However, the Tatmadaw was troubled that all 2
ISP Myanmar Briefing Paper December 2018
other stakeholders in the peace process began sharing an interpretation of the NCA (Article 22 d) as a distinctively parallel institution from the 2008 Constitution with a mandate even to “repeal” the Constitution, which provides a constitutional basis for the Tatmadaw to hold principal responsibility for safeguarding the country (2008 Constitution, Article 20 f). The Tatmadaw tends to view that unguarded and unguided implementation of the NCA would run the risk of damaging its strategic, institutional, and political interests, which are the Tatmadaw’s guardianship of the country, autonomy from civilian interference, and the Three Main National Causes. The Tatmadaw’s shift to its default position, especially in the late 2016, has posed a critical challenge to other key stakeholders, such as the government and the EAOs, to find a common vision for the peace process. For the EAOs, their vision of the peace process as a step toward building a new democratic federal union differs radically from that of the Tatmadaw. The military
In the Tatmadaw’s interpretation, the NLD government’s roadmap or policy critically differed from the NCA-mandated roadmap because it omitted an important step for security reintegration that was embedded in the NCA’s Article 20 (d) and (g). Instead, The NLD’s plans emphasized the need for a constitutional amendment. This policy intent of NLD struck a raw nerve and led the Tatmadaw to conclude that it must be more assertive and even in-charge of the peace process.
appears to view it as a way to convince all or most EAOs to engage in the NCA process and not related to state- or nation-building. The Tatmadaw appears willing to accommodate reasonable demands by the EAOs that could help stabilize the country by agreeing to let ethnic leaders who signed any type of ceasefire deal establish political parties and contest multiparty elections, if these groups agree to submit to a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration program within some (three to five) years. But – and this is a fundamental point for the Tatmadaw – any concession would require negotiation within the major terms of the existing military-drafted Constitution (2008). At the actual negotiation tables of the UPC21CP, the deadlock involves issues concerning non-secession, self-determination, and a unified army in the future union. Since the second session of the UPC21CP in May-June 2017, the Tatmadaw has imposed a so-called package deal that demands the EAOs explicitly accept non-secession and one army in exchange for the right of self-determination that allows for states to draft state constitutions. Although the third session of the UPC21CP and a summit between the signatory EAOs, the Tatmadaw and government leaders were held in October 2018 with the aim of breaking the deadlock, an agreement has not yet been 3
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reached. On December 21, the Tatmadaw announced a limited, unilateral ceasefire (from December 21, 2018 to April 30, 2019) in five of its fourteen Regional Military Commands that are adjacent to Myanmar’s entire border with China and part of its border with Thailand in the apparent hopes of furthering negotiations with EAOs operating in these regions. Even if ceasefire agreements - either bilateral or multilateral (via the NCA) - with some of the non-NCA signatory EAOs are achieved, it is unlikely to end the current deadlock in the UPC21CP process. Aung San Suu Kyi, who appeared to share the EAOs’ vision of nationbuilding in the beginning, has also shifted from her lofty nation-building rhetoric to a minimalistic goal of constitutional reform and partial peace in the aftermath of the second session of the UPC21CP. She has even begun to blame non-signatory EAOs for their reluctance to take “calculated risk” to sign the NCA. For many EAOs, the NLD victory in 2015, and its ascendancy to
a fast-paced liberalization with its signature peace initiative undertaken by the Thein Sein administration left the Tatmadaw ill-prepared for comprehending the nature and the intended as well as unintended consequences of the process. Meanwhile, an unprecedented opportunity for broad and effective coordination by the EAOs through ethnic summits such as Laiza Summit in 2014 baffled the Tatmadaw.
power represent their first opportunity to negotiate with a civilian government. The expectation that Aung San Suu Kyi’s civilian-led government would offer new opportunities have not materialized. In November, the Karen National Union (KNU), an NCA signatory, decided to suspend its participation in the formal talks, and the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) announced that it was reevaluating its participation in the Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee. The decisions by these two EAOs, which are the strongest among the NCA signatory groups, seem to signal that the current cycle of peace process that revolves around the UPC21CP initiative is winding down. This paper examines the following five factors that explain the ongoing evolution of Tatmadaw’s preference, which is its determination to incorporate the NCA back into the confine of the 2008 Constitution. (1) A sudden absence of the military-turned-civilian government’s patronage in the aftermath of the 2015 elections that saw a defeat of Thein Seinled USDP; (2) Lack of concerted leadership from the incoming National League for Democracy government regarding the peace process; 4
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(3) Increasing disorientation and even splits between and among EAOs of both the NCA signatories and non-signatories; (4) Increased geopolitical supports from the regional actors, especially China and Japan; and (5) Uncertainty posed by the general elections scheduled for 2020. In addition to these five factors, other critical contextual conditions including mounting international pressures against the Tatmadaw leadership over the Rohingya crisis in Rakhine State have helped shaped the Tatmadaw’s preferences for more securitization. This paper makes the following five recommendations that specifically concern factors influencing the Tatmadaw’s peace preference. (1) Stakeholders in the peace process should maintain the NCA because it is
The Tatmadaw tends to view that unguarded and unguided implementation of the NCA would run the risk of damaging its strategic, institutional, and political interests, which are the Tatmadaw’s guardianship of the country, autonomy from civilian interference, and the Three Main National Causes.
the only (though weakly) binding institution to constrain all armed groups including the Tatmadaw, while seeking additional means and agreements to complement the NCA. In this regard, the Article 30 of the NCA, which hold that “decisions contained in the agreed meeting minutes taken during negotiations” shall be referred to implementation of the NCA, is a useful entry point for brainstorming any add-ons. (2) Bilateral ceasefire agreements between the Tatmadaw and EAOs that are not signatories to the NCA should be either commenced or reinforced (if there are existing but inert ones). Bilateral agreements could help both sides address urgent humanitarian issues such as the resettlement of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in conflict zones, and eventually serve as a stopgap to the NCA. (3) The Tatmadaw’s nominal acceptance of federalism that was once a political taboo in Myanmar represents a significant progress. The contention among the stakeholders now is how to interpret federalism. The Tatmadaw has been advancing its interpretation of federalism since the first session of 21st Century Panglong Conference in 2016. It is important for other stakeholders and also the international community to have more dialogues with the Tatmadaw with regard to their notion of federalism before it entrenches its version in stone. 5
ISP Myanmar Briefing Paper December 2018
(4) The NCA is unlikely to settle Myanmar’s conflicts once and for all, but it can provide an acceptable mechanism for mitigating armed conflicts and must be further brought to bear for more progress gradually. Thus, the idea of “progressive realization” should be maintained. (5) The NLD government should activate and convene the National Defense and Security Council (NDSC) because it is the only platform that the government can cultivate better civil-military relations, which is indispensable for the peace process. The government should pay attention to the Tatmadaw’s functional veto rather than its overemphasis on constraining the Tatmadaw’s constitutional veto. The paper investigates all relevant documents including records of single text negotiations between Tatmadaw and EAOs over the NCA and conducts at least two dozen of leaders from both the government and EAOs. n
The Institute for Strategy and Policy – Myanmar (ISP – Myanmar) is an independent, non-partisan and nongovernmental think tank. The goals of ISP – Myanmar are to promote democratic leadership and strengthening civic participation by conducting policy-oriented research, analysis, public outreach, training and through leadership-level dialogue.
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Relationship between the Tatmadaw's Interests and Ways/Means to Achieve Them
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Seven Cycles of Peace-Making in Myanmar
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