Democracy by The Paris Globalist

DEMOCRACY

The Paris Globalist | Vol. 6 Issue 1

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Cover art by Edda Mac p. 12 Photoreportage: Les cent jours

Sommaire 6

Au Liban, pas de révolution mais un souffle de contestation

China’s non-interventionism and democracy in the world order

Are we free at last? Démocratie et médias dans la Tunisie post-révolutionnaire

2011: A watershed for the Singaporean regime? Manuela Suarez

Photoreportage: Les cent jours Emma Ghariani, Moujahed Jarboui

Jón Gnarr, comedian turned mayor of Reykjavík

Occupy Wall Street: A Microcosm for Democracy

Varia

How NYU students found their voice in the Occupy movement

La vitesse, syndrome du déclin de la puissance

Voting in America

Libya and the future of R2P

Forced to be Free: The challenges of creating a legitimate democracy in Afghanistan

L’Iran, une menace pour la stabilité du Golfe? L’exemple du Bahreïn

Olivia Blanchez

Emma Ghariani

Tara Zivkovic

Julien Gathelier

Stephen Hartka

Stacia Koster

Furui Ren

Kamma Thordarson

Guillaume Levrier

Marina Tondo

Raphaëlle Sardier

The Paris Globalist | Vol. 6 Issue 1

Illustration credit: Andrea Castelletti via Flickr CC

Edito

President

Toppling authoritarian leaders left and right, outraged civilians in the Arab world demanded for it. In other parts of the world, people claiming to represent the 99% came together and camped around financial centres to demand for it. If there is anything the past year has shown us, it is that democracy is still in demand. Whether this is the same democracy as we here in Paris think of when we hear the age-old Greek word remains to be seen. Whether the global sense of democracy is even worth aspiring to, let alone killing in the name of, remains to be seen. Some protesters got what they wanted: a new political regime. Others have since packed their tents and gone home. Although these movements across the globe call for many changes, plenty of which are going unaddressed by leaders, these people set a movement into motion which will have consequences for a long time to come. Blood, sweat, tears, colourful posters, bandanas, and the heat of protesters chanting – these are the images with which this issue of The Paris Globalist begins. In the Arab world, where protesters demanded democracy, we take a look at what they got. In the age-old democracies, we examine whether it is what the people wanted. And in those countries that have chosen different paths, we wonder whether democracy is really any better. In these pages, our writers cover challenges to democracy, new democracies, the downfalls of democracy, and, especially, what is being done in the name of democracy. We have attempted to put together a global narrative, covering as many diverse experiences of democracy as possible. The topics range from Tunisia, the United States, China, to Singapore – a new democracy, an old democracy, a pseudo-democracy, a “hybrid” democracy. A little bit of everything. Now, more than ever, is the appropriate time for leaders to take a good hard look at what exactly “democracy” is and consider how the times, they are a-changin’. In a world where social media and the internet give people free reign to express their ideas, debate them, and group together, it is time for leaders to prepare for feedback from the masses. We wish them the best of luck adapting, and look forward to witnessing how democracy will adapt to its new surroundings.

Côme J. Dechery

Editor-in-Chief

Kamma Thordarson

Layout Artist Krystle Wong

English Editors Guillaume Auffret Stephen Hartka Emma Knight Austin Tyler Krystle Wong

French Editors

Martina Bail Côme J. Dechery Raphaëlle Sardier

Web Editor

Catherine Hart

Webmaster

Etienne Lepers

Contributors

Olivia Blanchez Julien Gathelier Emma Ghariani Stephen Hartka Moujahed Jarboui Stacia Koster Guillaume Levrier Furui Ren Raphaëlle Sardier Manuela Suarez Kamma Thordarson Marina Tondo Tara Zivkovic

Treasurer

Guilaume Auffret

Kamma Thordarson

The Paris Globalist | Vol. 6 Issue 1

DOSSIER: DEMOCRACY

Au Liban, pas de révolution mais un souffle de contestation Olivia Blanchez

Petite bande de terre coincée entre la Syrie et Israël, le Liban a toujours été au cœur d’une situation géopolitique complexe. Et même si la démocratie y est établie depuis les années 1920, le pays du Cèdre ressent aussi le vent des révolutions arabes, qui remet en cause un équilibre fragile. « Faire chuter le système » : c’était l’une des revendications des manifestants à Beyrouth, au printemps dernier. Pourtant, à l’heure où ses voisins s’enflamment, le vent des révolutions arabes peine à atteindre le Liban. Car au pays du Cèdre, il n’y a pas de dictateur à faire tomber. Le Liban peut même se vanter d’être l’une des seules démocraties de la région, avec Israël. Etabli depuis 1927, le régime a pourtant été mis à mal par quinze années de guerre civile. Et aujourd’hui, comme ailleurs dans la région, les Libanais expriment leur rasle-bol de la corruption, de la cherté de la vie, et du non-respect de certains droits fondamentaux.

Le confessionalisme, source de tous les maux ?

Photo credit: Rikard Lagerberg (rlager) via Flickr CC

C’est une forme de démocratie bien particulière qui a été mise en place au Liban sous le mandat français, après la chute de l’Empire Ottoman. Pour satisfaire les velléités des dix-huit communautés reconnues officiellement, un partage de l’Etat selon le poids démographique de chaque religion est instauré. Au sommet de l’Etat, les trois confessions majoritaires se répartissent les postes clés: la présidence du Conseil est dévolue au sunnites, celle de la République aux chrétiens maronites et celle du Parlement aux chiites. Jusqu’au plus bas niveau de l’administration, c’est la même logique qui domine, dans tous les secteurs de la vie publique. Mais le système a du mal à s’adapter aux évolutions démographiques : aujourd’hui, les chiites

sont en passe de devenir majoritaires alors que le poids de chrétiens décroît . « L’espace public est accaparé par les leaders d’opinion, qui sont souvent directement issus de la guerre », explique Bachir Hilal, fondateur de l’association française du Rassemblement pour la démocratie au Liban. Selon lui, « il est nécessaire de garantir la neutralité de l’Etat envers les différentes communautés, de l’émanciper de toute influence ». Ziad Majed, politologue et enseignant à l’université américaine de Paris, souligne quant à lui « l’incapacité du système, basé sur le consociativisme , à gérer les crises ». Fréquentes, ces crises paralysent la vie politique : en mai 2008, de violents affrontements entre chiites et sunnites avaient ainsi eu lieu à Beyrouth et le Hezbollah s’était emparé de certains quartiers de la capitale. Pour Ziad Majed comme pour Bachir Hilal, la faiblesse intrinsèque à l’Etat est d’ailleurs accrue parce que le Hezbollah est un parti puissant et armé. Pour lutter contre le manque de démocratie effective, la première réforme qui s’impose est celle de la loi électorale. En effet, « le système majoritaire simple a pour conséquence une monopolisation de la représentation au sein de chaque communauté, dès lors qu’un groupe émerge avec une toute petite majorité », explique Ziad Majed, qui ajoute que ce phénomène est accentué par la division uniquement verticale des élites au sein de chaque groupe communautaire. « Une loi proportionnelle permettrait l’émergence de nouvelles forces politiques, minoritaires, voire de forces dépassant les communautés », propose-t-il. Au-delà de la loi électorale, c’est tout le système qu’il faut repenser. Mais pour le politologue, la déconfessionnalisation doit être progressive. Elle passe aussi, selon lui, par la lutte conThe Paris Globalist | Vol. 6 Issue 1

DOSSIER: DEMOCRACY

« Censure de films, annulation d’un festival rock par crainte de satanisme… On en avait assez. »

tre le clientélisme en accordant plus de pouvoirs aux régions, ou par la création d’un Sénat qu’on ouvrirait progressivement à un quota non communautaire. Cependant, comme le souligne Bachir Hilal, « il n’y a pas seulement des blocages au niveau communautaire mais aussi au niveau organisationnel. La société libanaise est bloquée par les peurs et les haines ». Cela a pour conséquence immédiate l’accaparement de la vie politique par les communautés : « comment voulez-vous développer une action politique–au sens moderne–à partir de communautés qui se haïssent et s’entretuent? », s’interroge-t-il. Ancien militant au sein du Parti communiste libanais, il exprime sa désillusion : « Aujourd’hui, plus un seul parti ne peut prétendre être démocratique au Liban. Le Parti Communiste s’aligne aussi sur la position du Hezbollah et de la Syrie, ce qui a été d’ailleurs critiqué par le PCF. La gauche libanaise a contribué à déclencher la guerre en 1975, et elle en paie aujourd’hui le prix, celui d’un grave échec ».

Des droits civils mis à mal par le poids de la religion

Si le système confessionnel montre ses limites en politique, il a aussi des conséquences directes sur la vie quotidienne des Libanais, du fait de l’absence d’un statut civil de droit commun. Concrètement, cela signifie que les Libanais naissent, se marient et meurent selon leur communauté. L’absence de mariage civil oblige ainsi les couples de confession différente à aller se marier à Chypre. « On ne peut pas être égaux en n’ayant pas un statut civil commun et un droit commun à tous les Libanais », explique Saïd Chaitou, l’un des initiateurs de la « Laïque Pride » dont la première édition a eu lieu à Beyrouth en 2010 et a rassemblé 5000 personnes. « Cela va à l’encontre du principe d’égalité, affirmé à l’article 7 de notre Constitution et à l’article 1er de la Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme, dont le Liban est signataire ». C’est à partir de Facebook que le mouvement pour la laïcité est né : des jeunes libanais de Beyrouth, mais aussi de Paris, puis de Washington ou de 8

The Paris Globalist | Vol. 6 Issue 1

Montréal voulaient protester contre « l’implication de la religion dans notre vie de tous les jours », explique Saïd Chaitou. «Censure de films, annulation d’un festival rock par crainte de satanisme… On en avait assez. Nous avons eu l’idée de faire une marche pour montrer qu’on existe, nous, ces Libanais qui refusent de rentrer dans un moule confessionnel ». Saïd est fier d’expliquer que la « marche des laïcs vers la citoyenneté » a été la première manifestation libanaise depuis la fin de la guerre civile où il n’y avait que des drapeaux libanais, et aucun drapeau de parti. Sans imposer de solutions, le but de la marche est de susciter un « éveil citoyen », et en particulier de « faire appel aux médias et aux intellectuels pour réfléchir ensemble à comment l’on pourrait arriver à un système libanais, qui ne serait ni une copie de la France, ni des Etats-Unis ou de la Turquie mais un système qui assurerait la diversité libanaise et la justice sociale, seul moyen pour arriver à la paix civile », raconte Saïd Chaitou.

Quel printemps arabe pour le Liban ?

Face à cette démocratie « inachevée », comme la qualifie Bachir Hilal, quelles ont été les échos du printemps arabe sur la scène politique libanaise ? Certes, une « Révolution du Cèdre » avait déjà eu lieu en 2005, à la suite de l’assassinat de Rafic Hariri, et avait abouti au départ des troupes syriennes, présentes dans le pays depuis la fin de la guerre civile. Mais pour Ziad Majed, ce processus est très différent de celui du printemps arabe : « malheureusement, rien ne change pour les Libanais : il y a ceux qui prétendent que le printemps arabe a commencé à Beyrouth en 2005 – je pense que c’est faux – et ceux qui ont tellement peur de tout changement qu’ils préfèrent le statu quo ». Saïd Chaitou, de la Laïque Pride, emploie des mots forts : « la classe politique est corrompue, sectaire, et profite des failles du système confessionnel pour conserver le pouvoir ». Néanmoins, les événements dans le monde arabe ont des effets sur la politique intérieure libanaise.

DOSSIER: DEMOCRACY Comme l’explique Ziad Majed, « les clivages libano-libanais se projettent sur le printemps arabe ». Ainsi, au printemps dernier, la répression qui a eu lieu au Bahreïn, essentiellement tournée vers les opposants chiites, a entraîné un durcissement des relations entre le Liban - où les chiites représentent au moins 30% de la population - et cette monarchie. Plus grave encore, la situation en Syrie accentue les tensions entre les différents groupes politiques libanais. Le Liban est là encore divisé par les évènements qui secouent ce grand voisin : l’Histoire a établi des liens compliqués entre ces deux pays, du fait de la longue tutelle militaire syrienne (jusqu’en 2005) et des liens privilégiés du régime syrien avec le Hezbollah chiite. Ziad Majed explique que « les événements ont également nourri les craintes des chrétiens libanais de voir se mettre en place un scénario d’islamisation de la région : ils se comparent aux Coptes d’Egypte, préfèrent voir une minorité qui gouverne en Syrie plutôt qu’une majorité qui fait peur ». Pour Bachir Hilal, « une démocratisation de la Syrie influencerait le mode et les aspects de la politique au Liban. Le pays sera plus apte à réformer ». Mais selon Saïd Chaitou, les révolutions arabes ont un impact plus profond sur le Liban. Leur enseignement le plus important s’adresse directement aux citoyens : « les gens se sont rendu compte qu’en tant que citoyen, on peut faire beaucoup de choses », explique-t-il. Dans une région en ébullition, c’est donc aux Libanais eux-mêmes qu’il revient de se mobiliser, en dépassant leurs divisions, pour réformer une démocratie confessionnelle dans l’impasse. Olivia Blanchez est étudiante en 4e année (Master Affaires Publiques) à Sciences Po et en licence d’arabe à l’INALCO. Elle a passé sa troisième année au Liban.

Aller plus loin: Georges Corm. Le Liban contemporain. Histoire et Société. Editions La Découverte. Paris, 2005.

Manifestation contre le sectarisme au Liban. Plus de 10.000 manifestants sont descendus dans les rues pour appeler à la sécularisation du système politique. Beyrouth, Mars 2011. Photo credit: mozzoom via Flickr CC

The Paris Globalist | Vol. 6 Issue 1

DOSSIER: DEMOCRACY

Are we free at last?

Démocratie et médias dans la Tunisie post-révolutionnaire Emma Ghariani L’automne fut chaud en Tunisie. Sous les feux des projecteurs, condamnées à réussir pour l’avenir du printemps arabe, les élections de l’Assemblée nationale constituante ont été placées sur sous haute surveillance. Le résultat est à la hauteur des espérances avec 89% de taux de participation. Les images des élections qui passeront à la postérité sont celles de bureaux de vote pris d’assaut par les queues interminables de citoyens de tous bords. Des citoyens parfois enveloppés dans le drapeau tunisien ou chantant en chœur l’hymne national. Salué par des réactions internationales globalement positives, le processus électoral a prouvé que le printemps arabe pouvait éviter l’impasse d’une révolution sans lendemain. La Tunisie est aujourd’hui un État avec une Assemblée élue en charge d’élaborer la nouvelle constitution. S’est-elle pour autant libérée de ses chaines ? Plus que dans l’analyse des taux de participation ou des résultats, la réponse tient dans celle du renouvellement du système de production et de circulation de l’information post-révolution (garant de la qualité du débat public, luimême condition de l’épanouissement démocratique). La révolution politique depuis janvier a certes délié les langues et les plumes en Tunisie mais peut-on aller jusqu’à parler de révolution médiatique ?

Anciens acteurs, nouveaux discours?

Dans la Tunisie en transition, l’ombre des partisans du régime plane toujours sur la vie publique tunisienne. Alors que le Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique (RCD), parti du président déchu, a été dissout et ses anciens membres théoriquement interdits de concourir aux élections, les regards se sont portés vers les représentants de l’alternative politique, apparemment florissante. La multiplication des 10

listes indépendantes est cependant trompeuse. Symptomatique de la crise de confiance envers les partis historiques dans un paysage politique en recomposition, elle a de plus déçu, portant au pouvoir d’anciens RCDistes tels l’ancien ministre de la Défense Kamel Morjane, et laissant nombre d’autres listes sur le bord de la route faute de moyens de financement. Les principaux leaders de l’opposition sont en outre restés les mêmes qu’en 1987, les cheveux gris en plus. Difficile pour les partis tunisiens de faire du neuf avec des vieux: la sacralisation de la révolution dans les discours et la rhétorique démocratique, adoptée dans les médias par les nouveaux pontes du paysage politique, peinent à faire oublier les compromissions passées. Le niveau de confiance des Tunisiens dans les discours diffusés par leur classe politique est par conséquent resté faible. Les mots de Mouna, diplômée de master et au chômage, sont parlants: « J’ai cherché à voter pour quelqu’un qui soit propre ». Sous-entendu : pas pour un programme. Or dans la Tunisie postrévolutionnaire, trouver quelqu’un qui soit parfaitement «propre» relève d’une gageure après des années de petits arrangements troubles avec la loi. Litotes consensuelles, langue de bois et mauvaise foi grevaient quotidiennement tant le discours des responsables politiques que médiatiques. Comme le souligne Leyla Bakhti, la révolution politique s’est accompagnée partout d’une révolution linguistique. Les lignes rouges qui délimitaient l’étroit périmètre où était

The Paris Globalist | Vol. 6 Issue 1

confinée la liberté d’expression ont volé en éclats. Mais les vieux réflexes ont la vie dure, notamment chez les journalistes. Pour Taoufik Ben Brik, le jugement est sans appel: « En Algérie ils ont tué des journalistes. En Tunisie, ils sont allés encore plus loin: ils ont tué la profession de journaliste ». Plus optimiste, Lotfi Hidouri, rédacteur en chef du journal Al Farj, pointe la culture de l’autocensure et le manque de respect des standards éthiques de la profession comme une conséquence de l’oppression de la presse: « les anciens comme les jeunes journalistes ont besoin de formation ». Si le contenu du discours change progressivement avec les efforts faits pour instaurer des pratiques nouvelles, les canaux de diffusion de l’information se sont peu renouvelés. Pour la rédaction de Radio Kalima, « de solides résistances concourent à entraver la métamorphose de l’audiovisuel ». L’encadrement juridique des activités liées aux médias est assuré depuis mars 2011 par l’Instance nationale pour la réforme de l’Information et de la Communication (INRIC), mais il reste lacunaire. En effet, ses pouvoirs parcel-

« En Algérie ils ont tué des journalistes. En Tunisie, ils sont allés encore plus loin: ils ont tué la profession de journaliste. »

DOSSIER: DEMOCRACY

laires et son budget, contrôlé par le gouvernement, ne laissent que peu de marge de manœuvre aux tentatives d’assainissement du paysage médiatique. Ainsi quand la Mission d’Observation Électorale de l’UE constate que la « couverture de la campagne par les médias privés a été globalement équilibrée et relativement neutre », elle tend à oublier que les grandes chaînes de télévision privées sont toujours entre les mêmes mains. Chez Hannibal TV, le patron reste Larbi Nasra, proche de Leïla Trabelsi. Nessma TV a conservé son conseiller spécial, Fehti Houidi, ministre de la Communication sous Ben Ali . Au sein des médias, propriété de l’État, les cadres dirigeants ne se renouvellent qu’au compte-gouttes et dans la plus totale opacité. Dans ce paysage médiatique encore sclérosé, les radios apparaissent comme le moteur du changement. Alors qu’aucun nouveau quotidien n’a su s’imposer et que la création de cinq nouvelles chaînes de télévision n’a été autorisée que fin octobre, c’est dès le mois de juin que l’équipe de Radio Kalima s’est mobilisée pour être diffusée officiellement. Fondée par la journaliste Sihem Bensedrine, Radio Kalima incarne la difficulté qu’a le système médiatique tunisien à réintégrer dans le jeu les médias d’opposition alternatifs. Il a ainsi fallu six mois et une grève de la faim de

son directeur Omar Mestiri pour obtenir une licence de diffusion officielle, néanmoins limitée à la région du grand Tunis.

Les réseaux sociaux: un canal à risque

Les Tunisiens entendent peu parler de ces batailles en coulisses. Depuis longtemps déjà, Internet est devenu leur source d’information privilégiée. A l’image de Mariem qui avoue ne pas lire les journaux mais s’informer via les contenus postés par ses amis, les bloggeurs ont vécu la révolution au son du slogan : « la jeunesse n’a pas besoin de pseudojournalistes, elle est le média ». Pourtant, les réseaux sociaux sont un outil à double tranchant. Aux heures les plus incertaines de la révolution, les tuyaux virtuels servaient autant à faire passer les messages de mobilisation qu’à démentir ou créer des rumeurs. Or la culture du net-bricolage, faite de montages vidéo et photo ou de tribunes d’opinion qui circulent sur Facebook, pâtit du manque de recul critique sur l’image. L’information fausse est ainsi relayée jusque dans la rue, via les discussions en famille et entre amis, véritables antichambres du débat public. La campagne contre la diffusion par Nessma TV du film

Persépolis, menée sur les réseaux sociaux puis relayée dans les médias traditionnels, est emblématique des risques que comporte la montée de ces nouvelles sources d’information dans le débat public. La rumeur du web peut vite se muer en opération de désinformation d’une opinion publique « naissante, versatile, sensible aux rumeurs, facilement manipulable ». Aux professionnels de l’information de cadrer ce flux. Aux politiques de garantir les conditions nécessaires pour rendre ce travail possible. La boucle est bouclée. Reste à entretenir le cercle vertueux. Malgré les chausse-trappes et les détours, les modalités du débat public se renouvellent peu à peu en Tunisie. Mais l’arbre pourri du régime a beau avoir été abattu, ses racines ont creusé profond et la société tunisienne, qui vient d’entamer son périple sur le chemin escarpé de la démocratie, pourrait bien s’y prendre les pieds. Un responsable contrôle les rapports d’infractions envoyés par des observateurs locaux via SMS, Twitter et Facebook. Tunis, 2011. Photo credit: Freedom at Issue via Flickr CC.

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Photoreportage: Les cen

La Tunisie du début de la campagne élector

Cents jours de la Tunisie. Cent jours où la question religieuse s’est invitée dans les débats de la démocratie tunisienne en devenir. Les élections ont stabilisé la situation un moment: période pré-électorale, la Tunisie et le monde avec elle retenaient leur souffle. Le 23 octobre 2011 un vent de liberté balaie les rues. Le processus électoral a été mené à son terme sans soubresauts. Les tunisiens respirent. Puis le souffle est devenu soupir: attaques de sit-in devant la Constituante siégeant au Bardo, attaques de professeurs dans les universités, attaque du recteur de l’université de Tunis Manouba, parce qu’il a refusé de revenir sur le port du niqab dans l’université. Menaces sur la liberté d’expression. La Tunisie, à la croisée des chemins. Chemins retracés en dans ce reportage. 12

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20 octobre: Sfax

[1] Marches Aatakni, « libère-moi », pour la liberté d’expression organisées dans toute la Tunisie après les attaques consécutives à la projection de Persépolis. Une contre-manifestation a été organisée en même temps pour dénoncer la laïcité et réaffirmer l’identité arabo-musulmane.

23 octobre: Bureau de vote à Sfax

[2] Le jour du vote, à l’école Al Abassia dans le quatier populaire de la Médina de Sfax une heure avant sa fermeture. La queue est encore longue. Plusieurs dizaines de citoyens ne pourront finalement pas voter du fait de la fermeture du bureau.

23 octobre: Sfax

[3] Manifestation pour la protection du Code du Statut Personnel promulgué par Bourguiba et qui protège les droits des tunisiennes. Sur la pancarte: « Constitutionnalisez le Code du Statut Personnel »

[1]

nt jours

rale

Photos

Moujahed Jarboui Graphiste et photo-reporter tunisien. De Sfax à Tunis en passant par Sidi Bouzid il pointe un objectif sans concession sur les rêves et les ratés de la révolution. Texte

Emma Ghariani Etudiante franco-tunisienne en année de césure à l’Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris. Elle travaille pour l’ambassade de Franceen Tunisie dans le Sud de la Tunisie et comme journaliste free lance.

[2] [3]

24 octobre: Centre de dépouillement à Sfax Le soir du 24, la Tunisie dans l’attente des résultats des élections.

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Les résultats du dépouillement sont consignés dans les feuilles répertoriant le décompte des voix pour chaque parti, au niveau local.

Le décompte des voix continue tard dans la nuit, les volontaires et les observateurs épuisés dorment dans le Théâtre qui sert de centre de dépouillement.

11 novembre: Sfax

Reflets de l’actualité mondiale en Tunisie: prémices du mouvement Occupy Bardo. Les 99% manifestent contre le capitalisme à l’appel du POCT (Parti Communiste tunisien).

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23 novembre: Les victimes de la révolution

Funérailles du Sfaxien Yosri Truigui, parti combattre en Irak et condamné à la pendaison pour le meurtre d’Atwar Bahjat, correspondante de la chaine arabe Al-Arabiya et l’attentat perpétré le mausolée chiite de Samara (Irak). Cette condamnation est contestée en Tunisie, notamment par le parti islamiste Ennahdha. Le corps rapatrié à Sfax est enterré en grande pompe. 3000 personnes, en majorité des hommes se sont rassemblés sur une place du centre-ville pour une prière. Des drapeaux salafistes tâchent la foule. But de la manœuvre : faire de Yosri Trigui un martyr. Rassembler autour du sentiment religieux.

3 Décembre: Tunis Bardo

A Occupy Bardo. Des jeunes vivant en majorité dans le sud ont planté depuis le 30 novembre une vingtaine de tentes devant le bâtiment de l’Assemblée Constituante au Bardo à Tunis. Ils réclament que le gouvernement s’active pour satisfaire leurs demandes de travail et se mobilisent pour exercer un droit de regard sur les travaux de la Constituante. Ils sont rejoints par des milliers de manifestants. Contre sit-in au Bardo où les manifestations continuent depuis le 22 novembre. Les jeunes trouble-fêtes qui proviendraient des quartiers populaires de Tunis et auraient été rémunérés pour troubler le sit-in sortent les drapeaux salafistes et d’Al Qaeda. Suite à leurs provocations, la manifestation dégénère et entraine l’intervention au gaz lacrymogène des forces de police qui séparent les deux camps en présence. 16

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Cent jours après: Gare de Sfax

Foire aux livres envahie par les livres religieux

Consultat de Libye à Sfax

Protestation des blessés de guerre libyens en Tunisie devant le consulat de Libye à Sfax

Inside/Out

La Tunisie à la croisée des chemins

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A Microcosm for Democracy Tara Zivkovic some manner the country has now come full circle, just as Adams predicted it would. For two months, protesters occupied “Liberty Square,” formally known as Zuccotti Park, in New York City’s financial district, before the police cleared them out on the 15th of November. While the evacuation put an end to the visible surface of the movement, its energy and ambitions are ongoing, and the questions it broached have been integrated into America’s political dialogue. Beyond the media’s sensationalised accounts, it is interesting to analyze what really went on at Liberty Square, and what it says about the At 7p.m. on a November evening, state of democracy in America. just before dusk begins to settle It is no secret that the United on the famous Manhattan skyline, States’ political system has been the General Assembly of Occupy suffering. Christian Harrington, a Wall Street is called to order. At first professor of American politics at glance, this daily meeting might New York University, affirms that seem odd to an observer who is una- America’s democracy is in “considware of what Occupy Wall Street is erable disarray in that we do not really up to, for it is not a typical pro- have a healthy two party system; the test. The issue at stake is the system political liberals are in bed with the itself, and Republicans, Democrats, political conservatives.” Harrington veterans, anarchists, students and continues that it is this very “crisis union workers are coming together of liberalism that has led to what we to discuss – and in some ways, to [saw] at Occupy Wall Street.” demonstrate – what there is to be Speaking from Liberty Square, done. Greg Horwitch, an American artist, During the day, protesters take explains how he found himself occupart in small working groups that are pying Wall Street. “At first I didn’t assigned to deal with certain issues, know what the hell it was,” he admits, such as sanitation, education, and “but I think that’s part of it, I think the handling of funds. In meetings, we are coming to understand what they employ democratic princi- exactly it is while it’s happening.” pals that seem archaic in an age of It is exactly this nebulous quality lobby groups and partisan politics: that the media have lampooned from decisions are reached through con- the outset, depicting the protesters sensus, approval is expressed by as a group of liberal hooligans withintricate hand signals (wiggling fin- out a real plan. “Part of our dismal gers mean yes; a single hand in the democracy has to do with the media shape of a C signals that clarifica- being out of touch,” affirms Hartion is needed) and microphones are rington. “Days after the initial Occupy strictly prohibited. Wall Street started in New York, the The scene brings to mind colo- media lambasted the movement for nial Boston circa 1776, where the lacking a neatly-packaged set of likes of John Adams and company goals. But isn’t one of the primary huddled in candle-lit rooms, map- values of democracy openness? ping out what the future of America And furthermore, doesn’t this open would look like. And so it appears in quality demand time to coalesce?” Horwitch also emphasises how Poster. Image credit: Rob Sheridan via Flickr CC

“It is in vain to say that democracy is less vain, less proud, less selfish, less ambitious, or less avaricious than aristocracy or monarchy. Remember, democracy never lasts long. It soon wastes, exhausts, and murders itself. There never was a democracy yet that did not commit suicide.” John Adams

misleading the media portrayals have been. “No one is angry,” he laughs, “it is a thoroughly enjoyable experience where restrictions have only led us to further innovation.” The absence of microphones, for example, inspired the creation of the human microphone. When a speaker talks, different sections of the audience immediately repeat what the speaker has said, so that those seated in the back will not miss out on the message. In the process of repeating what others are saying, Horwitch explains, one takes part in a goosepimple-raising experience in that “you really come to understand what is being said.” This is the end of talking-heads, and political jargon swirling out of reach to the average citizen; what was taking place at Occupy Wall Street is what participative democracy is all about: whole-hearted, spoken-aloud participation. “The beauty of this movement,” continues Horwitch, “is how it has radically transformed the way we protest in this country. The real innovation is that Occupy Wall Street is not a traditional protest, but rather a microcosm of democracy. In its procedure it’s a laboratory experiment of a possible democratic system.” What is most striking, perhaps due to the misrepresentation by the mass media, is the introspective nature of Occupy Wall Street. While it began as a movement against the disproportionate power of the financial sector, for the first two months much of its energy was aimed inwardly, toward building solutions. It was an incubator of ideas. “Come and feel what true democracy feels like,” should have been the movement’s slogan, Horwitch jokes. As one might guess, it feels pretty incredible. Many people quit their jobs to join the experiment. Professor Harrington describes the general euphoria experienced at Liberty Square: “In my life time, I’ve never seen something like this, expect during Vietnam.” She also The Paris Globalist | Vol. 6 Issue 1

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How NYU students found their voice in the Occupy movement Julien Gathelier Day 10 of Occupy Wall Street. New York. 2011. Photo credit: Paul Stein via Flickr CC

“Come and feel what true democracy feels like,” [...] should have been the movement’s slogan. stresses the considerable expertise of those taking part in the working groups and how open they were to further education. Zuccotti Park gave physical space for dissent, which, certain people behind the movement argue, had been drastically missing beforehand. New York has always been a magnet for progressive initiatives, yes, but to find a place where these movements could meet was virtually impossible or immediately dismantled. Take, for example, the attempted protests during the Bush Administration, which the City of New York banned on the Great Lawn of Central Park, citing potential “grass damage” as their justification. The fact that Zuccotti Park is private property and open to the public 24/7 proved a strategic blessing for frustrated dissenters. The deep irony, however, cannot be ignored: the battle of Occupy Wall Street – demanding public change and accountability from the government – is being fought on private property. “Tourists now 22

have two major stops in downtown Manhattan,” Horwitch says with an ironic laugh, “Ground Zero and Liberty Square.” Both of which give a crucial peak inside into the turmoil plaguing present America. With elections lurking around the corner, Democratic candidates see a potential electorate to seduce in aligning themselves with this movement that drew the support of nearly 40% of the American population. But unlike their “Tea Party” counterparts, the occupiers of Wall Street warned politicians to stay far away from their movement. After two months of intense discussion, which is gradually coalescing into ideas, they are not prepared to be “co-opted by a political agenda,” Professor Harrington explains. In considering this historical movement, one might wonder if we are not witnessing what Adams predicted almost 200 years ago: the “suicide of democracy,” followed by its rebirth. The answer to this remains to be seen. With the Occupy Wall Street protesters still very much engaged in constructing mini-democracies, the ideas behind which could be carried up to Washington, politicians will have to, at some point, be trusted with relaying the message. Tara Zivkovic is a graduate student in International Public Management at Sciences Po Paris. She obtained her bachelors degree from New York University.

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“

...There is a structural problem with capitalism.

”

Julien Gathelier is in his final year of undergraduate studies at Sciences Po’s Franco-German campus in Nancy. He is currently on exchange at New York University.

Students in solidarity with Occupy Wall Street. New York, 2011. Photo credit: Kelly Schott via Flickr CC Zucotti Park, the birthplace of the Occupy Wall Street movement, has become a somewhat pitiful sight nowadays. The few protesters that still rally everyday at 7 p.m. to hold the general assembly under the newly installed Christmas decorations offer a stark contrast to the bustling heap of activity the park was just a few weeks ago. The tents have been cleared, the media have shifted their focus to other topics, but Occupy Wall Street has evolved. Paul Funkhouser, an art history major at New York University involved in NYU4OWS (New York University for Occupy Wall Street), an autonomous student organisation supporting Occupy Wall Street, is one of the activists keeping the movement alive in New York City. While he is unsure of how things will turn out, he is content with the achievements this far and determined to stay involved because, he says, “there is a structural problem with capitalism”. The 22 year-old is articulate, sports glasses and a beard, and describes himself as a Marxist — something you rarely come across in the United States. He is involved in the “outreach working group” of NYU for Occupy Wall Street. His work comprises signing up interested students for mailing lists, handing out flyers and hanging up posters for upcoming events. With all

this on top of his coursework and social life, Paul is a pretty busy guy. NYU4OWS formed in September as an organizing body for students that wanted to express their solidarity with the Wall Street occupiers. “An open group of people that could relate with Occupy Wall Street”, Paul says. The group started organising student marches and tried to gain support among the NYU community. Soon, the student marches started gathering larger crowds and some events included prominent guest speakers such as Judith Butler, Slavoj Zizek or Joan Baez. NYU4OWS has also launched new initiatives. One of these is the people’s university: a series of free lectures around the issues addressed by the Occupy Wall Street movement, the last of which hosted the leader of the French new anticapitalist party Olivier Besancenot. With growing numbers, NYU4OWS also started addressing issues related to student life at NYU. “We fight at NYU”, Paul says. The students are protesting against student debt and skyrocketing tuition fees — NYU is one of the most expensive schools in the country and many students have to take up loans to pay for their education. Budget cuts, bargaining rights for student unions, a university business model that is “profit-driven”

and corruption are also in the aim of NYU4OWS. “We organised a student week of action to protest against cuts in financial aid and teacher pay and point out the links between Wall Street and NYU”, Paul explains. Apart from that, NYU4OWS has also joined forces with other student groups supporting the “occupy” movement in the United States. The group has issued statements of solidarity with student protesters after incidents of police violence at the colleges of U.C. Davies and U.C. Berkeley. Most notably, however, the NYU students helped organising coordinated protest marches and other events with protesters from other New York schools, namely the College University of New York, Columbia University or the New School. The “99%” have achieved one important thing: bringing the issue of income inequality and social justice into the public debate. Does this mean the end of the movement? When asked about it, Paul shrugs. “It’s hard to tell what direction things will take in the next month”. The eviction from Zucotti Park was a hard blow, he says, because of the “symbolic value of the occupation”. But as the core of NYU4OWS he is determined to keep on fighting. “The momentum needs to be continued”.

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Voting in America Stephen Hartka

Photo credit: Adam (madmolecule) via Flickr CC Voting rights have been a contentious issue throughout American history. Even following the American Revolution and its rhetorical rallying cry of consent of the governed, early restrictions on voting confined the electorate to a small minority of white male property owners. It was not until 1965, with the Voting Rights Act that ended the Jim Crow era in the South, that the American electorate became anything close to universal. Juxtaposed with the idealised political battles of past generations, American voting rights activists today find themselves grappling with a rather banal beast: procedural obstacles to voting. During George W. Bush’s first presidency, states began passing a slew of voting laws that make voting increasingly difficult for certain parts of the population. With the 2012 presidential election getting closer, the issue has become increasingly contentious. Lawrence Norden, Deputy Program Director at the Brennan Center, believes that, following two exceptionally close 24

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presidential elections — 2000 and 2004 — and President Obama’s massive turnout of first-time voters in 2008, “suddenly small things seemed important…[and] we’ve seen a politicisation of the rules by which we run elections”. Where Democrats see a calculated attempt to surgically disenfranchise voters in key “swing states”, Republicans boast of a campaign to crack down on systemic voter fraud. Mississippi is the most recent state to implement new rules that would require all voters to present a photo ID in order to vote on Election Day. Republican state legislators touted the bill as a means to combat voter fraud. Rickey Cole, executive director of the Democratic Party of Mississippi, argues that the little fraud that does exist, mainly dealing with absentee ballots, will not be effectively dealt with under this type of legislation. For Mr. Cole, these rules will lead to an “administrative nightmare” and saddle the state of Mississippi with millions of dollars in administrative costs. He adds that,

contrary to popular sentiment, for many citizens who lack a photo ID, “it’s not because they don’t want to vote, in many cases these people are of advanced age, isolated or in situations of poverty.” The US does not have a national ID card and the most common form of photo ID is a driver’s license. The bottom line is that the rules will be “difficult and disruptive to implement, and will prevent people from voting.” Mississippi is only one of seven other states that have passed legislation in the past year that requires voters to present photo IDs. One state has adopted and implemented similar legislation and twenty-four other states have laxer measures with various loopholes for voters without ID. In addition to the photo ID legislation, dozens of other states have introduced or enacted legislation that erects other procedural obstacles to voting such as proof of citizenship, restrictions on voter registration drives, cutting down on early voting periods, preventing students from voting out of their home

DOSSIER: DEMOCRACY state, reducing voter registration opportunities and disenfranchising people with past felony convictions. Republican lawmakers defend these measures as a part of a nationwide effort to crack down on voter fraud. Efforts to bring attention to and combat fraud date back to the year 2000, when the Bush administration directed the Department of Justice to begin vigorously prosecuting any case of voter fraud. The administration fired U.S. Attorneys considered to be lax on voting fraud. Despite political pressure to turn up cases of fraud very little evidence of systemic fraud has been discovered to back up these fears. According to the Advancement Project, a civil rights organisation, between 2002 and 2005, the Department of Justice convicted five people of voting multiple times and eighty-six people were found guilty of “improper voting.” Generally, these people were unaware of or misunderstood voting requirements. In addition to the political pressure in the Department of Justice, think tanks, such as the dubiously named American Center for Voting Rights (ACVR), have churned out numerous reports and studies to raise public awareness of voting fraud and push for strict “voter-ID laws”. On the legislative front, the American Legislative Exchange Council, a politically conservative non-profit policy organisation, has helped develop much of the “cookie-cutter” legislation being implemented across the country to suppress voter fraud. Since the US is a federal state, procedural electoral matters are decided at the state level, giving rise to a plethora of legislative inroads. For many Democrats, these efforts amount to a centrally orchestrated campaign intent on depicting voter fraud as not only pervasive, but a danger to the very fabric of American democracy. Democrats maintain that this legislation tends to overwhelmingly affect traditional democratic voters and is essentially voter suppression disguised as procedural changes. For example, research from the Brennan Center finds that low-income, elderly and African-American voters dispro-

portionately lack a photo ID (15%, 18% and 25% respectively, compared with the national average of 7%). Much of the legislation has also targeted extremely effective voter registration drives, run by the besmirched ACORN and other community organizing outfits, considered by many Republicans to be at the root of systemic voter fraud. In the months preceding the 2008 presidential elections, hundreds of thousands of people were registered to vote, 60,000 in Florida alone. Mr. Cole laments that Republicans

Tactics such as “caging”, false information on voting modalities and unequal distribution of voting facilities persist. have, for years, fed the myth that “Democrats have this floating troop of voters that goes from precinct to precinct”, he adds that “if we’re [Democrats] so damn good at it, why do we lose elections all the time?” Critics also argue that organisations, such as the ACVR, have falsely given an air of credibility and provided academic legitimacy to worries of voter fraud by providing ample politically biased research resources for policy makers to quote. “[T]he voter fraud issue is a complete canard, though admittedly an effective one,” said Mr. Norden. Once digested by public discourse, false information can be very difficult to purge. The perception of prevalent voter fraud is widely held and in an age when photo ID is needed for a number of banal activities, such as entering an office building or boarding a plane, these seemingly benign procedural changes appear normal. There have no doubt been isolated cases of electoral fraud, particularly on the local level where low turn-out and small-scale operations make fraud feasible. However, the Department of Justice’s inabil-

ity to uncover a substantial number of fraud cases and the findings from numerous nonpartisan studies show that there is no evidence of systematic voter fraud. Behind the smokescreen of this anti-fraud crusade lie both nefarious political canniness and a deeply ingrained conservative attitude about voting rights. Mr. Norden considers that “changes to the laws are not about philosophical differences […] they are, too often, about cold political calculation”. Indeed, when speaking in front of a group of evangelical republicans in 1980, Paul Weyrich, a founding member of the Heritage foundation, a conservative think tank, said: “I don’t want everybody to vote…our leverage in the elections quite candidly goes up as the voting populace goes down.” However, in some respects, political calculation remains somewhat tangential to a residually conservative philosophy on the right to vote. The idea of universal suffrage, although widely accepted, has not automatically translated into a principled effort to systematically facilitate access to the ballot box. For instance, in November 2011, in an attempt to defeat a ballot measure that would restore same-day registration, some Maine Republicans argued that citizens not registered by Election Day were not “engaged” enough to vote. The interplay of these two factors has led to an increasing politicization of voting rules and left a large part of the population unresponsive to worries about the erosion of voting rights in the country. After considerable public outcry and pressure from the civil rights community, the US Attorney General, Eric Holder, has promised that voting rights are among the Justice Department’s “most important priorities”, although he has not yet released any specifics of ongoing investigations. Stephen Hartka is a first year graduate student at Sciences Po studying international public management. He received his undergraduate degree from the University of Virginia in Foreign Affairs and French Literature in 2010. The Paris Globalist | Vol. 6 Issue 1

An Afghan elder shows his purple inked finger to indicate that he voted during the heavily anticipated 2009 Afghanistan elections. Photo credit: U.S. Army Garrison - Miami via Flickr CC

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Forced to be Free

The challenge of creating a legitimate democracy in Afghanistan Stacia Koster In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, young democracies are numerous and on the rise. Unlike countries like Egypt and Tunisia however, where the demand for democracy is entirely home-grown, Afghanistan’s democratic government was brought to fruition largely as part of an American agenda. The fact that foreigners constructed the current Afghan democracy complicates Afghan perceptions of their democratic institutions, raising the question of whether the current democratic institutions within Afghanistan can ever be seen as legitimate by the Afghan people. In a country where no official census has been taken since the 1970s (and even then the results were marked by widespread inaccuracy), it is difficult to ascertain who exactly constitute the “Afghan people” as a demographic population, let alone to determine their general perceptions of the current democratic institutions within Afghanistan. “There are major differences between the opinions of people in Kabul and those in rural areas,” says Dr. Amin Tarzi, the current head of Middle Eastern Studies at the Marine Corps University in Virginia. “Urban areas are overwhelmingly represented in surveys, and what you

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end up with is mostly guesstimates.” Despite the difficulty of surveying a balanced sample of Afghan society, one thing all Afghans seem to share is a history of dramatic regime shifts and foreign occupations. From republicanism in the 1970s, to Soviet-inspired communism in the late 1970s and 80s, to Islamism and Talibanism in the 1990s, Afghanistan played host to a number of different foreign and domestic regimes even before the beginning of the United States’ occupation in the wake of September 11th. In Tarzi’s view, “each new ‘ism’ created a worse situation than the one before.” In light of this, it is unsurprising that during the first few years of the U.S. occupation of Afghanistan, many Afghans were wary of the motives of the United States, who some viewed as being inadvertently responsible for enabling the Taliban during the war with the Soviets in the 1970s. Perhaps their fears were not entirely baseless. Thus far, Afghanistan has been given a “very bad taste of democracy,” in the words of Tarzi, who claims recent elections and other early exercises in democracy have highlighted many of the problems in Afghanistan’s democratic institutions. The most recent of these experiments in democracy was the 2010 elections of the Wolesi Jirga, the lower house of parliament. These elections sent mixed signals about the state of Afghanistan’s current democratic institutions. Despite widespread insecurity and Taliban threats, Democracy International, an organisation that works to promote free and legitimate elections, estimates that 5.6 million turned out to dip their fingers in ink on Election Day. This figure was 1.3 million higher than expected, based on Democracy International’s estimates. Clearly, many Afghans still saw voting as an avenue to exert their rights as citizens and prop up their democratic institutions. However, the events following the election have highly undermined the democratic institutions in Afghanistan. In the days immediately after the election, the Independent Election Commission (IEC), the group 28

that facilitates Afghan elections, released the preliminary results of the September 18th vote, congratulating themselves and the Afghan population on a job well done. Two months later, after accounting for fraud and “recalculating” the results, the IEC announced that twenty-four candidates who had originally been pronounced winners had actually lost. Candidates were understandably aggravated and challenged the legitimacy of the IEC and the September 18th elections. In response to this, President Karzai issued an executive order to create a special court to examine the election, openly defying the IEC (an institution legitimized by the Afghan constitution) and overstepping his prescribed duties as executive. Afghans were concerned not only by the inefficient and/or corrupt nature of the IEC but also by the relative ease with which Karzai expanded his power as executive. Despite the fact that many facets of life have improved in Afghanistan in the last few years, including the financial stability of households, women’s rights and access to education, perceptions of corruption within the government are still disconcertingly high. Afghanistan is ranked second-last – 176th out of 178 countries – on Transparency International’s corruption index. According to Democracy International, voter turnout, which was almost 80% in Afghanistan’s first democratic election in 2004, has gone down significantly with each new election, and was between 40 and 50% during the last election. The sharp decrease in voters could be one indication of a prevailing feeling of insecurity in some regions of Afghanistan and a gradual decline in interest in others. The latest results from the Asia Foundation, which conducts surveys of the Afghan population every year, indicated that the number of Afghans who are somewhat or very dissatisfied with democratic institutions in Afghanistan has risen by 8% in the past five years while the number who are somewhat or very satisfied with democracy has fallen from 76 to 69%. The Asia Foundation findings

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“Afghans need to determine their destiny for themselves. Leave Afghanistan for Afghans!”

Woman voting in Afghanistan. 2005. Photo credit: UNOPS/Marie Frechon. Canada in Afghanistan via Flickr CC. suggest that this fall in confidence could be related to the 2010 parliamentary elections; 49% of Afghans felt that the elections were free and fair while almost an equal number, 46% of Afghans, felt that they were not. Another small-scale survey distributed for an academic report in the spring of 2010 to thirty young Afghans in Kabul provides further insight into the way that Afghans see both their current government and the role of international actors in propagating that government. The survey asked respondents open-ended questions about their

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Further reading: Tarzi, Amin. Afghanistan: Political Reform. Beyond Settlement: Making Peace Last after Civil Conflict. By Vanessa E. Shields and Nicholas Baldwin. Fairleigh Dickinson UP, 2008. Rene, Ruth. Afghanistan in 2010: A Survey of the Afghan People. The Asia Foundation. 2011. Democracy International. Election Observation Mission to Afghanistan Parliamentary Elections 2010. United States Agency International Development. June 2011.

Stacia Koster studies International Studies at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore. She is currently on exchange at Sciences Po Paris under the Journalism Exchange Billboards encouraging people to “go vote” feature armed guards. In this case, there’s a real one just program for International Students. below the sign. Kabul, 2009. Photo credit: Todd Huffman via Flickr CC.

everyday lives in Afghanistan, their perceptions of the foreign presence within Afghanistan and their opinions on Afghan progress over the past decade. Those surveyed were permitted to remain anonymous for their safety, but many chose to identify themselves based on age, occupation, gender and first name. Their comments indicated that while some positive perceptions of democratic institutions still persist, there is no shortage of pessimism with regards to the state of democracy in Afghanistan. Despite his acknowledgment that there have been some improvements in education, civil rights and economic prospects, survey respondent Sayed, a 31-year-old UN employee, insists that ultimately, “nothing significant has changed in the last 31 years in Afghanistan. The biggest change I have always wished/prayed for has yet to come.” Afghan perceptions of the role of the international community in Afghanistan have been similarly mixed. Though some of the survey respondents did note positive changes in Afghan society over the past ten years, there was

also a note of bitterness in many of their responses. Sayed writes that despite seeing an incremental improvement in Afghanistan he still has “big doubts regarding the faithfulness of the West,” while Mirwas, a 30 year-old technical assistant to the Ministry of Education laments that “American neocolonization is a curse for peace and stability.” Western politicians adopt a somewhat more nuanced view. Pamela Wallin, a Canadian Senator and Chair of the Senate’s National Security and Defense Committee believes that while the international community has played and continues to play an important role in making Afghanistan more secure, the job of constructing a strong democracy within Afghanistan is up to Afghans. “The goal right now is preparing Afghans to provide their own security for their citizens,” says Senator Wallin. She notes that while Canada continues to create schools to educate the Afghan population, it is ultimately up to Afghanistan to create a sustainable democracy. Only then will Afghans truly trust the legitimacy of their democratic institutions. The importance of Afghan self-suf-

ficiency is echoed in the words of a 28 year-old finance officer who states emphatically that, “Afghans need to determine their destiny for themselves. Leave Afghanistan for Afghans!” Ultimately, when evaluating democracy in Afghanistan it is important to keep things in perspective. “We must try not to impose our standards,” Wallin urges, emphasising that though Afghan democracy may not take a Western form, it is much more important that it be based in Afghan contexts and traditions. In terms of prospects for Afghan democracy, Wallin is optimistic: “Ultimately, Afghans have the memory, the assistance and the will.” Hamid, a 23-year-old student adopts a similar view: “All Afghanistan needs is system. Once we acquire a system we will not need anybody’s help nor will we need to copy any other country’s government.” It remains to be seen whether or not the current democratic government in Afghanistan will evolve into the system to which Hamid refers.

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China’s non-interventionism and democracy in the world order Furui Ren Left: Chinese engineers join UN peacekeeping force in Darfur. Nyala, Sudan, 2008. Photo credit: United Nations via Flickr CC Right: Child and Chinese flag. Photo credit: Dave Watts via Flickr CC

When speaking of democracy, we almost always understand it from the definition imposed by the Western world. Abstract notions such as the separation of powers, free elections and the rule of law are so extensively used in the media that we take them for granted without further reflection. Nevertheless, people brought up in the West rarely realize that there exists another layer of democracy, namely democracy in world order. Just as individual citizens have the right to choose their own governments, sovereign states should also have the right to choose their own path of development, the path which best suits their cultures and traditions. And except in extreme situations such as mass genocide, the latter right should not be deprived of by an exterior force. Western countries, especially the US, tend to regard their own political system as superior to that of autocratic states. As a result, “the promotion of democracy” has become a legitimate

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excuse for them to infringe on the sovereignty of countries they regard as politically or culturally retarded. Investment aid based on certain required conditions is frequently applied by the West to “promote democracy and human rights” in developing countries. Furthermore, neo-conservatives in the US and NATO sometimes regard military intervention as an acceptable means of achieving the noble goal of “promoting democracy”, which in reality often leads to serious humanitarian crises, internal political disorder and economic breakdown of the targeted country, as was in the case of Iraq. In recent years, the rise of China has led neo-conservatives to believe that a new “Cold War” world order is coming back. Not only has China’s fast economic growth awed them, they also fear the possibility of China promoting or at least sustaining like-minded autocratic regimes elsewhere. Indeed, over the past decade, often teamed up with Russia, China has insisted on “stability” instead

DOSSIER: DEMOCRACY of “democracy” when addressing political issues with regards to neighbouring autocracies like Burma. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is another example that illustrates China’s position; denounced by some Western observers as a “club of autocrats”, the SCO promotes “stability” and “diversity” among its (mostly Central Asian) member states. “Diversity” refers to the right of each sovereign state to choose its own path of development as well as the respect for such a right from the regional community. In the end, “non-interventionism” actually describes China’s position much better than “promoting autocracy”. China merely chooses not to base other foreign policies, such as investment aid, on political grounds the way Western countries do. Some argue that “non-interventionism” is no more than an excuse to protect autocratic regimes from being condemned and attacked from the outside. However, we must remember that democratic states also uphold the ideology of “noninterventionism”, for instance India and Brazil. For many Asian countries including China, stability and national unity are essential. For these countries, sovereignty, stability and unity are not only considered as preconditions for economic development, but also as prescriptions for past grievances. In the case of China, the “one century of humiliation” suffered at the hands of Western and Japanese imperialists has led today’s government to cherish national sovereignty above all else, and has led a considerable portion of the Chinese population to regard any foreign intervention as “neo-imperialism”. I am not denying that “non-interventionism” has its own drawbacks and might in some cases hinder progressive development within a state, even at times to the point of legitimising certain atrocities committed by state actors such as when China and Russia jointly vetoed the UN Security Council resolution condemning the Syrian regime. Nevertheless, China’s principle of “non-interventionism” is no worse than the Western discourse on the

“promotion of democracy”. Indeed, in many cases, non-interventionism has advantages over the positive promotion of democracy. The first advantage of non-interventionism is that such a principle is based on the very idea of “self-determination” of sovereign states and therefore shows equal respect for all

rights, China invests in Africa indiscriminately of the nature of the regimes. Of course, this has aroused criticism from the West condemning China’s indifference towards democracy and human rights; nevertheless, some academics from Africa consider that the Chinese non-interventionist model is in reality helping Africa much more than the Western conditionality model. The Zambian economist Dambisa Moyo, for instance, suggests that Western aid to Africa does more harm than good and it is Chinese investment that helps the Continent develop. The aim of this article is not to argue against the notion of democracy. On the contrary, the author believes in democracy so much that she believes that even the democratisation process should be “democratic”. The “Arab Spring” has re-affirmed that even without foreign intervention, people can muster up enough willingness and courage to overthrow autocratic regimes (as demonstrated by the cases of Tunisia and Egypt). Rather, this article aims at dialogue and mutual-learning: while autocracies like China can learn democracy and rule of law from the West, there are also things for the West, especially the US to learn a little bit from China: namely the idea of non-interventionism. It is not necessary that Western countries take up this ideology, although it offers a new perspective with regards to international affairs and make policy-makers realize that Western norms are not necessarily superior in all the circumstances.

“One century of humiliation” suffered at the hands of Western and Japanese imperialists has led today’s Chinese government to cherish national sovereignty above all else, and [...] to regard any foreign intervention as “neo-imperialism”. members of the United Nations. It is disputable whether democracy for nationals in a certain state is superior to democracy for states on the international arena. Supposing that internal political democracy is the ultimate goal for all states to achieve, even those with the strongest autocratic traditions such as China, non-interventionism allows these states to explore their own path based on their distinctive cultures and traditions towards democracy. In such a case, the democratisation process might take longer, yet as the whole process never detaches from the country’ traditions, democracy will certainly be more endurable once it does arrive. Indeed, even the SCO notion of “diversity” does not explicitly deny the possibility of democratisation. If such a democratisation process is peaceful and endogenous, then it conforms to the SCO ideology, at least from a theoretical point of view. Secondly, non-interventionism allows China to fully engage in trade and investment relationships with Third World countries in Africa. Whereas the US and the EU often base their investment aid programs on certain political requirements, namely democracy and human

Furui Ren is a Chinese student pursuing a Masters in Economic Law at Sciences Po. She spent a year on exchange at King’s College in the UK. She obtained her undergraduate degree from Sciences Po’s Europe-Asia Campus in Le Havre. The Paris Globalist | Vol. 6 Issue 1

DOSSIER: DEMOCRACY DEMOCRACY DOSSIER:

Singapore: The decline of the single-party system? Manuela Suarez The 2011 elections gave an unexpected jolt to the Singaporean political spectrum. The People’s Action Party (PAP), which has been in power over the past 46 years, obtained a surprisingly low share of the total vote in the last parliamentary elections. With 60% of the votes, it retained power by the smallest margin in more than 20 years. 2011 also saw the first multicandidate presidential elections in the history of Singapore, where PAP Candidate Tony Tan only narrowly won with 35.20%. Opposition candidate Tan Jee Say got 25% of the national vote. Where most countries are concerned, these are not significant breakthroughs. In Singapore, where the political realm is characterised by its single-party rule, it is a landmark in history. In Singapore, voting in the presidential and parliamentary elections is compulsory for adults. As a result, voter turnout is always well over 90%, making the elections a fairly authentic photography of voters’ preferences. But since the PAP first took the reins of power, it has implemented a paradoxical regime: while taking the British parliamentary political system as a model, it has not established a system that fully abides by the traditional definition of democracy. The current regime is a special blend of parlia32

Photo credit: Manuela Suarez mentary democracy and a single ruling party, astounding economic development and a repressive legal system. In 2002, Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way from Harvard University depicted Singapore as a “façade” electoral regime, with electoral institutions but without any consequential contestation of power. David Camroux, researcher at the Centre for International Studies and Research (CERI), underlines the importance of colonial influence over the city’s politics: “Colonial governments were judged not by their representativeness, but rather by their efficiency. In Singapore, good government equals good administration. Whether the government is representative or not is secondary”. He defines Singapore as a soft democracy as it embodies some democratic ideals. However, this commitment does not suffice to characterise Singapore as an authentic democracy, which traditionally entails free, open and fair elections as well as respect for fundamental rights. Camroux further notes that even though the rights of Singaporeans are generally respected and protected, this is not always the case for non-Singaporeans who represent as much as a quarter of the population. But all values aside, the recurring landslides for the PAP reflect

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general satisfaction for the government’s efficiency at maintaining wealth and welfare to Singapore. In a mere fifty years, the island state has emerged as one of Asia’s top economies. This impressive growth is undoubtedly thanks to the regime, democratic or not. The Corruption Perceptions Index published by Transparency International ranked Singapore first in 2010 in terms of expectations of accountability of the government. Globally, Singapore is often referred to as a corruption-free country. Camroux describes Singapore as a functioning welfare state which provides social goods and prosperity for most of its population. Singapore boasts of one of the lowest unemployment rates among developed nations: below 2%. The city-state has excellent public transportation, quality public housing and one of the world’s lowest crime rates. Indeed, economic prosperity came at the cost of true democracy. George Yeo, former foreign minister of Singapore, stated on the subject of Singapore’s success that “cultural characteristics like strong families, hard work, emphasis on education, high savings and a practical view of life have served us well”. In the same email exchange, he also added “by and large, Singaporeans know that if we don’t work, we don’t eat, and that the world does not

DOSSIER: DEMOCRACY owe us a living”. Mr. Yeo believes Singapore is unique because of its constant need to adapt to its specific geographical and social circumstances: “Singapore is changing and it will continue to change,” he says. “For better or for worse, it is always a challenge that each generation has to respond to.” But these generations have historically fallen under the thumb of the Lee “dynasty”. Lee Kuan Yew, founder of modern Singapore, headed the PAP as the first Prime Minister of the country from its independence in 1965 until 1990. He then handed over the position to his second in command, Goh Chok Tong. Since 2004, Lee Kuan Yew’s son, Lee Hsien Loong, has honored his father’s legacy by becoming the current Prime Minister. The PAP’s power is reinforced by rigorous laws, ranging from hefty fines for petty crimes such as jaywalking, littering or spitting, to the draconinan Internal Security Act (ISA), which allows the government to arrest and detain individuals without trial. Between 1959 and 1990, more than a thousand people were detained under the ISA. Opposition parties often have to fight for legal survival: they can be challenged by defamatory lawsuits or charged for lacking the required permits to hold public events. These challenges generally result in huge fines and, sometimes, the bankruptcy or imprisonment of the opposition leader. Chee Soon Juan, the current leader of the Democratic Party, is one such

dramatic example. Since joining an opposition party, he has been jailed multiple times, bankrupted and dismissed from the National University of Singapore. Even in Lee Kuan Yew’s memoirs, “From Third World to First”, he expresses the freedom of the press and media must serve the elected government’s purposes. On top of these curtailments of liberties, caning and capital punishment are legal forms of sanction. In 2010, Amnesty International, a human rights organization, registered more than eight executions, which is a high per capita rate when compared to the size of the population, which is only 5 million. It came as no surprise when The Economist ranked Singapore as a hybrid regime, characterised by a blend of democratic and authoritarian rule, in the magazine’s 2010 Democracy Index. However, as of 2011, this excessive use of power seems to be falling in popularity. Young voters are at the forefront of the struggle for an authentic democracy in Singapore. Social media is becoming an increasingly popular instrument for sharing ideas and sentiments, deploring high living costs, low salaries and lax immigration laws. In addition to proactive youngsters, religious groups have also taken action to protect fundamental rights. In particular, they lobby to limit restrictions on the press and on freedom of expression. After stepping down as Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew had remained in cabinet, first serving as senior minister from 1990 to

Campaign poster for Tony Tan. Singapore, August 2011. Photo credit: renielet via Flickr CC

Former Minister of Foreign Affairs George Yeo (right) at the launch of the French edition of Lee Kuan Yew’s memoirs. Paris, December 2011. Photo credit: Kamma Thordarson

2004 and, later, as minister mentor from 2004 to 2011. After the parliamentary elections in May 2011, he and fellow former Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong retired from politics announcing: “After a watershed general election, we have decided to leave the cabinet and have a completely younger team of ministers to connect to and engage with the young generation.” Indeed, the PAP has acknowledged the 2011 general elections as a wake-up call. Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong said they marked a “shift in the political landscape” and added his party would undergo “soul-searching”. Going forward, it seems clear that the successful formula of the Singaporean miracle, so acclaimed over the last fifty years, will be redefined.

Further reading: Steven Levitsky, Lucan Way. Elections Without Democracy. The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism. Journal of Democracy Vol 13, N° 2. John Hopkins University Press 2002 Lee Kuan Yew. From Third World to First: The Singapore Story: 1965-2000. 2000 Bayan. Singapore elects a new president. The Economist. 28 August 2011

Manuela Suárez is pursuing a dual master degree in Environmental Sciences and Policy at Sciences Po Paris and Pierre et Marie Curie University. She spent a year on exchange at the National University of Singapore (NUS).

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Is democracy a joke to you? An interview with comedian-turned-mayor of Reykjavík, Jón Gnarr Kamma Thordarson

The Icelandic parliament, Alþingi, was first put together in 930, and Icelanders proudly refer to it as the oldest parliament in the world. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, however, Icelanders watched their banks melt down, Eyjafjallajökull erupt and politics go haywire, leading frustrated Icelanders to call for the creation of a separate parliament to draft a new constitution, hoping that they might in this way prevent future crises. (After all, erupting volcanos can’t be avoided, but bankruptcies can.) The working draft of the constitution was available online, allowing all Icelanders to participate in drafting their constitution via social media. Iceland is the perfect place for such experiments with democracy. With 320 000 people, direct democracy has a chance. Icelanders were surprised and outraged by the financial meltdown of their country. They demanded changes. In 2010, a cheeky redhaired comedian in Reykjavik got tired of the political status quo and decided to start his own party as a joke, campaigning for “sustainable transparency”. What started out as a joke campaign ended up getting the leader of the Best Party (yes, that is the real name) into office. Today, ex-comedian Jón Gnarr has been mayor of Reykjavik since June 2010 and is possibly one of Iceland’s most popular political figures. We called him to find out how the job suited him and whether he thinks democracy is a laughing matter. 34

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We want a city that’s cuddly, warm and clean.

Video trailer for the documentary ‘GNARR’, based on leader of the Best Party Jón Gnarr’s journey in becoming mayor of Reykjavik. Social media was used extensively in his joke campaign. The documentary is to be released in February 2012.Video credit: Sigvaldij via Youtube

Do you think that people voted for you in protest to the other options available to them?

I think people voted for me because of my qualities, especially honesty and humour. I am pretty well known and people trust me so in this time where people doubt both the political and financial systems I think they mostly wanted to vote for somebody they trusted. There has been a lot of negativity and hopelessness since the collapse [of the financial system], and I think people longed for something uplifting, something fun.

tion was something we made online, such as our song ‘Simply The Best’. We only put one advertisement in a newspaper, and it was a personal ad that read “The Best Party wishes to get into contact with men and women of all ages who are curious to try new things.”

You attended Iceland’s Gay Pride parade dressed as a drag queen and recently suggested people use condoms in order to halt population growth and help ease the budget deficit in Reykjavík. Do you see yourself as an How important do you think entertainer even in office? social media and the internet I am a comedian, it is part of were for your campaign? who I am and what I am. In my mind

We totally used it. Because of the political ties to traditional media we decided to use social media such as Facebook and Youtube. Everything we did that caught people’s atten-

it’s the same as being gay. Being a comedian, I mean. I am a comedian and I always will be a comedian, no matter what circumstances I find myself in.

DOSSIER: DEMOCRACY [As for the] the condom campaign, I see myself as a feminist and think that it is unfair that everything to do with birth control ends up as the woman’s responsibility. Men getting cut – as I like to call it when men get vasectomies – is an inexpensive contraception that has very few side effects. I wanted people to pay attention to this, and it caught a lot of attention. In Iceland we always think local, but we live in a global world. One of the most pressing problems of the world today is population growth. We will be 7 billion people and I think we have to take responsibility for that like all others. I don’t have the solution for this but I wanted to make people think about it. I feel that the Gay Pride parade shows how joyous the people of Reykjavik can be, and what we can accomplish when we stand together. I find it incredibly beautiful and enjoyable. The Gay Pride parade in Reykjavik is also different from elsewhere. Here it is really a family parade and you see people of all ages, ranging from newborns to people who are a hundred years old. I find taking part in the parade fun and [I like] supporting the struggle for gay rights. I also think globally. Although the gay community has many rights here in Iceland, they don’t have them everywhere.

Tell me about a funny incident at work.

I once got a letter from Germany, from a German couple that sent me pictures of their newborn baby that they just christened Jon Gnarr. They asked me to be the baby’s godfather. I laughed terrifically. I found it tremendously funny. It made me very happy but of course I can’t be this baby’s godfather. One of the things that gives me personal pleasure, that I find really fun, is when my colleagues leave their computers on and I can access their Facebook pages. I especially like to post cute kitty videos on Helga Kristin’s wall, who is actually rather afraid of cats and finds them unpleasant creatures. I find this so unbelievably fun that I laugh and my eyes tear up while I’m pretending to be Helga talking about kittens online.

Mayor of Reykjavik Jón Gnarr dressed up as a drag queen for the Gay Pride parade. Reykjavik, 2011. Photo credit: Dagur Brynjólfsson (dalli58) via Flickr CC

Is democracy a joke to you?

No. Democracy is dead serious and we have to defend democracy and keep it alive. We must make it a daily part of peoples’ lives. Sadly, there is a trend, especially in America, where people choose not to take part in democracy. People even decide not to vote because they feel it doesn’t make a difference. My generation has little interest in politics and going into politics in this fun way, with jokes, shows people that they can have an impact and that it can be fun. It is important and we must all take part in our own way. We also have to make sure that the financial system doesn’t steal democracy from us.

How do you feel you’re doing in comparison to former mayors of Reykjavik?

I fully believe that all mayors of Reykjavik have done their best and had different results for many reasons. I came into office without any preparation in the most difficult time of Reykjavik’s history and am very proud of my performance. Kamma Thordarson is an Icelandic student who did her BA at the Europe-Asia campus of Sciences Po in Le Havre and is currently enrolled in the dual degree of Journalism and International Affairs where she specialises in Energy. The Paris Globalist | Vol. 6 Issue 1

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« La vitesse, c’est le pouvoir »

Les États semblent complètement dépassés par le nouveau diktat de l’instant qui fait apparaître de nouveaux comportements individuels et de masse. De nouveaux outils, entre Twitter et autres réseaux sociaux, permettent aux foules de se mobiliser de façon structurée à partir d’une impulsion dont l’origine spatio-temporelle est impossible à prévoir et à détecter en temps utile. La ruche s’anime. Ce principe d’attaque spontanée, imprévisible et violente est depuis toujours l’arme principale de rébellion contre les États, les autorités. Les premiers terroristes, les Sicaires, n’égorgeaient-ils pas les paisibles ménagères romaines qui faisaient leur marché au forum pour effrayer l’occupant ? La nouveauté vient de l’enrichissement sur deux niveaux de ce comportement : il est devenu d’une part massif, au sens qu’il mobilise virtuellement toutes les forces possibles d’un mouvement en un point précis, et d’autre part cybernétique, s’adaptant et se perfectionnant à mesure des obstacles rencontrés. Avec un simple téléphone portable, des cailloux et autres barres de fer, le citoyen lambda devient un combattant de guérilla urbaine coordonné à des milliers d’autres, reçoit ses ordres en temps et lieux réels, se mobilise et bat en retraite au rythme du traditionnel hit and run. Dans le même temps la finance mondiale s’accélère au point d’être mesurable en débit de bande passante : les programmes et algorithmes passent des ordres de bourse à une vitesse virtuellement inexistante, et ils s’adaptent en temps réel aux valeurs qui y sont relatives. Là encore la cybernétique et la massification précipitent la crise ; comment les États peuventils réagir quand d’une seconde à l’autre tout peut basculer ? Quand l’escalade de la spéculation atteint le point de rupture, quels sont les recours ? Du symptomatique au mortel, on ne compte plus en mois mais en heures. Entre négociations sur le budget états-unien et mutualisation des dettes européennes, on voit à quel point les États ont peine à faire face. Qu’ils soient démocratiques ou autoritaires, les Étatsnations de toute nature sont incapables de faire face aux conséquences de l’accélération des interactions de l’activité humaine. Elle rend réelle la théorie qui fait de la viabilité/sécurité d’un système celle de son maillon le plus faible: Wikileaks en est la preuve la plus éclatante. Cette accélération, qui parachève le règne de l’instant, ainsi que l’a depuis longtemps anticipé Paul Virilio, représente le prochain défi des structures étatiques. De leur adaptation dépendra leur pérennité.

Vers le dépérissement de l’État ?

Si l’humanité en est arrivée à ce point de vitesse, où l’espace n’est plus qu’un temps (ne dit-on pas que Paris est à 12 heures de Pékin et à 8 heures de New-York ?), de nouvelles questions se posent. Ou plutôt d’anciennes questions reviennent en mémoire. Si le schéma Kantien d’une humanité arrivant à maturité n’est pas encore pertinent, il n’en reste pas moins que la condition humaine n’a jamais été aussi unifiée qu’elle ne l’est aujourd’hui. Depuis le nucléaire et les bombes A, elle se sait mortelle. Les ressources vivrières qu’elle produit sont suffisantes pour assurer sa viabilité et nourrir chacun de ses individus. Les contacts entre nations, ethnies et cultures sont permanents, intenses et progressifs. Dans le même temps, elle doit, dans sa globalité, faire face au défi du pourrissement de la branche sur laquelle elle est assise. Les États-nations, 36

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La vitesse syndrome du déclin de la puissance Guillaume Levrier

Guillaume Levrier

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De l’immolation de Bessbouss en Tunisie à l’opération libyenne Mermaid Dawn, on aura retenu du printemps des peuples arabe le rôle clef de la vitesse, l’avènement de l’instant au détriment de la sédimentation. Le Léviathan lourd et lent a été vaincu par la foule, le grand corps sclérosé, pourtant dominant par son organisation et sa puissance, a été défait par l’essaim. Parallèlement, l’économie mondiale, et la finance qui la régule, s’emballent pour finalement se trouver en bute à l’inertie des États, dont la lenteur à trouver des mécanismes d’adaptation et des réponses communes a précipité la crise. L’État-nation comme instrument de puissance révèle un peu plus chaque jour son obsolescence.

Photo credit: Ana Patrícia Almeida via Flickr CC

si efficaces à exacerber leurs différences et à les protéger les uns des autres, apparaissent bien déconfits face à ces nouvelles contradictions qu’ils n’arrivent pas à dépasser. Serait-ce l’heure de sortir l’Internationale de son cercueil ? L’exploitation de la potentialité de la vitesse n’est en effet pas neutre. Si elle a pris le pas sur d’autres phénomènes, qui se révèleront peut-être plus important dans le futur (comme par exemple la contagion, qui y est étroitement liée, ou encore la furtivité), c’est principalement à cause de la pression de l’inégalité, symptôme de l’inadéquation de notre système de valeurs avec notre condition. Les rapports de force s’inversent sans cesse, l’asymétrie instable est devenue la règle dans l’océan des flous. Les repères de puissance s’estompent, les États doutent de leur potentiel ce qui accroit leur inertie. Individuellement, les inégalités de richesse et de pouvoir sont paradoxalement d’autant plus insupportables pour ceux qui les subissent qu’elles apparaissent comme des impasses. Les stars adulées dépriment, se droguent ou se suicident, les riches dépensent leur argent pour tromper leur ennui, Barack Obama se fait des cheveux blancs ; bref, plus rien ne va plus. Les indignés, disciples des Hessel et des Morin, représentent les 99% désespérés de ne plus vouloir se projeter sur le 1% restant. L’espoir d’une vie meilleure disparaît alors que les religions semblent depuis longtemps dépassées, leur prétendue intemporalité les isolant des préoccupations de mortels. Si le sacré progresse dans la plupart des pays du monde, autre symptôme des crises à répétition qui poussent les peuples dans la peur et l’incertitude, la religion en tant qu’administration de ce sacré a raté le coche de la modernité, de la vitesse. Au XV° siècle, les religions juives, chrétiennes ou musulmanes étaient capables de délivrer un même message au même moment à une communauté analphabète répartie sur plusieurs continents (que ce soit la messe du dimanche ou les prières vers la Mecque), un tour de force qui devrait nous impressionner aujourd’hui, ce peut être même la première incarnation de la mondialisation. Malgré tout cette avance considérable n’a pas été capitalisée, probablement parce que depuis plusieurs siècles les grands penseurs sont des laïcs. En perdant le fil de la pensée, les religions se sont égarées sur leur rôle et de leur frustration sont nés les débordements que nous connaissons aujourd’hui. La faillite de notre système, car elle est inéluctable, n’est pas forcément de mauvais augure. Elle sera douloureuse, comme tous les accouchements, mais offre de nouvelles perspectives encore inconcevables il y a peu. Les modèles capitalistes, communistes, altermondialistes auront été autant d’échecs, mais leur développement aura apporté des bases solides à de nouvelles structures. L’information deviendra inexorablement libre, les langues orales se ressembleront de plus en plus, la science et l’éducation deviendront les valeurs maîtresses. Le pire est devant nous. Le meilleur aussi. Guillaume Levrier est un étudiant de 3ème année actuellement en échange à l’Université de Pékin. Il s’intéresse à la philosophie politique, et en particulier sur la place du mythe en politique. The Paris Globalist | Vol. 6 Issue 1

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Demonstration in support of the no-fly zone in Libya. Boston, March 2011 Photo credit: Lauren Frohne via Flickr CC

Libya and the future of R2P Marina Tondo

“It would be a shame if R2P becomes the collateral damage of the Libya operation.”

On October 31st, 2011, NATO announced the formal end of the international intervention in Libya. Even if the mission is over, the debate about its legitimacy has not yet subsided. The legal “grey area” on which the intervention was justified and the liberal interpretation of the mandate has left many wondering if the intervention, which entailed the violation of Libya’s sovereignty, was legal and legitimate or if the international community went far beyond what was authorised in the Security Council resolution in order to carry out a regime change. The Libyan Intervention, authorised by the United Nations Security Council was justified, for the first time upon the doctrine of “The Responsibility to Protect” (R2P). The R2P concept was adopted in 2005, in the UN Word Summit Outcome Document created by the UN General Assembly. Its core theory states that in cases where the national state is unwilling or incapable to protect its population from genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity, the international community has the right and duty to intervene, even through coercive military force. David Rieff, a war journalist, commented that the application of R2P “ has fatally failed in Libya because the basis of the theory was distorted in

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several ways.” In the Libyan mission many aspects have crossed the line of legitimacy. As Rieff stated, “NATO went too far and stretched the limits of the 1973 resolution, with blockades, arming rebels, dispatching military “conseillers” on the ground and helping the armed rebellion through aircraft support.” The resolution was aimed at securing civilians zones but, as Rieff added, “NATO not only did not stop after securing Benghazi, it also bombed civilian populated areas like Sirte.” Rony Brauman, former president of Doctors without Borders said “ in order for R2P to be legitimate; the following principles need to be satisfied: legitimate power, use of force as a last resort, just cause (for example the seriousness of immediate threat on such a scale that justifies military intervention), the use of proportional means, right intention and reasonable prospects of success. If the first and the last aspects were present, the three remaining were not.” Firstly, it can be argued that the military intervention was not the last resort. The urgency with which many commentators treated the situation has been criticised as unjustified. As Brauman argued “the urgency of

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a military intervention underwent a propaganda construction. Not a single photo shoot of the tanks that were supposed to head toward Benghazi was taken.” More international sanctions and diplomatic efforts could have been undertaken before considering the coercive armed deployment.” Furthermore, NATO did not fully respect the use of proportional means and the “Do no Harm” principle. While, the exact figures are highly contested, the numbers that have been emerging are troubling. Finally, the issue of “Right Intention”, which is considered one of the most important moral values in “R2P” humanitarian intervention, was not the main goal. If the main purpose of the mission was humanitarian, why did the international community do nothing and remain silent when similar situations broke out in Yemen and Bahrain, where Saudi troops crushed revolts? On the Right Intention issue, Brauman commented that “the West presents Libya as a successful mission especially regarding the fall of Gaddafi. But the gap is that toppling Gaddafi regime was not the goal of the resolution.” The aim of the 1973 resolution was to secure the population and not a regime change. But since the very beginning of the rebellion in Libya, at the Paris Summit on 10th March 2011, French President Nicolas Sarkozy stated: “We are intervening in order to allow the Libyan people to chose their destiny themselves. We assure the Libyan people of our determination to be by their sides to help them realise their aspirations and to build their future and its institutions in a democratic framework”. Shortly after the summit, on March 28th, Sarkozy and British Prime MInister David Cameron declared: “Gaddafi must leave immediately. It is necessary to launch a representative transition process, a constitutional reform and the organisation of free and regular elections.” These statements paint a picture of the intent of the coalition to go beyond an authorisation to protect civilians even as the intervention was just beginning. As Rieff explained: “In the Libyan case, the use of proportional

means was not respected and NATO pursued ‘regime change’; providing weapons, military advisors and close air support to the rebels, who would probably never have never succeeded without NATO.” Micheal Walzer, a theorist of just war, wrote in Foreign Affairs magazine that “overturning tyrants and implanting democracy must be a national task, and, in this case, sadly, the Libyans did not succeed in doing that”. David Rieff added: “If the aim of NATO was only to secure civilians it would have been enough to destroy the tanks outside Benghazi. But it was decided from the beginning that Gaddafi had to go.” He sees the humanitarian justification for the Libyan war as nothing more than geopolitical interests. It is a way for Western countries to take part in the Arab Revolution, to accompany “l’histoire en marche”. In his opinion, the entire R2P doctrine is fundamentally flawed, because the only way to protect populations from their dictators, during a rebellion, would be through regime change. Rieff argues that “the protection of the population is not achieved trough securing portions of territory, only a government can do that.” Therefore, the entire doctrine of R2P, which does not include the goal of regime change, would fall apart. Garreth Evans, the creator of the R2P doctrine replied to David Rieff in a letter to the New York Times, saying that indeed it is true that the way the mission in Libya was carried out by NATO could have discredited R2P but it could also be a lesson for states, and point out the need to define with more precision the “criteria that should have to be satisfied before coercive military force is authorised by the SC, and which should govern its subsequent application”. His position would be ideal in a universe where states would care more for developing a more just world than they do for their own interests. The Libyan mission, the first practical attempt at R2P, was a huge success in the eyes of Western powers and NATO. A criminal dictator was overthrown and will not harm his population anymore. But the goal of the 1973 resolution was

not regime change. It was to protect the Libyan population. As Garreth Evans stated, the Libyan mission was NATO-ized and the limits of the R2P doctrine were not respected. Moreover, the current situation in Libya could create more harm than good with a large amount of weapons in the hands of possible futures militias. It seems likely that R2P, henceforth associated with regime change, is effectively intellectually impotent. The Indian ambassador to the UN, Hardeep Puri said that, “Libya gave a bad name to R2P” and showed his position by abstaining during a Security Council resolution that wanted to impose only non military sanctions on Assad’s regime in Syria. Both China and Russia vetoed the resolution on Syria and made it clear that from now on, because of the instrumentation of R2P in Libya, it will be difficult to pass a resolution justified on this doctrine. In this context, R2P risks being seen solely as an instrument to justify intervention in the domestic affairs of a state where parties have political or economic interests. Philippe Bolopion laments that, “it would be a shame if R2P becomes the collateral damage of the Libya operation.” This is unfortunately what will happen, making the Responsibility to Protect the real loser of the intervention in Libya. Marina Tondo is an Italian student pursuing a Masters in Human Rights and Humanitarian Action at Sciences Po Paris. She graduated in International Relations and Diplomatic Sciences and specialised in Libya.

Further reading: Rebecca J. Hamilton. The Responsibility to Protect: From Document to Doctrine – But What of Implementation? Harvard Human Rights Journal, Vol 19 David Chandeler. Libya: The End of the Intervention. International Relations Journal 2011 Gareth Evans. Hypocrisy and War. Gareth Evans. History in Motion, 2011 Natalie Nougayrède. «C’est quoi une guerre juste?» 2011 Rémy Ourdan. «Libye: le devoir de protéger instrumentalisé et discrédité.» Le Monde 2011 The Paris Globalist | Vol. 6 Issue 1

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L’Iran, une menace pour la stabilité du Golfe? l’exemple du Bahreïn

Raphaëlle Sardier

Président de l’Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Photo credit: Daniella Salcman via Flickr CC

Suite aux révoltes à Bahreïn début 2011, l’Iran a condamné la répression et l’intervention « hideuse » de l’Arabie Saoudite. Cela a irrité la dynastie de Bahreïn qui accuse son voisin d’ingérence. Vraie menace ou jeu diplomatique intéressé ? « Cesser de s’ingérer dans les affaires internes de ses membres »: voilà ce que le Conseil de Coopération du Golfe, dont Bahreïn fait partie, avait demandé à l’Iran en avril 2011. Mais revenons tout d’abord aux sources. En 1979, la révolution s’opère dans l’Iran chiite. L’ayatollah 40

Khomeini renverse le Shah puis proclame la République islamique, ce qui inquiète alors ses voisins sunnites. Plus de trente ans après, l’« exportation de la révolution » est toujours considérée comme une éventualité par les monarchies du Golfe. Elles ont donc dénoncé « l’interférence » de leur voisin: Début 2011, l’Iran avait en effet condamné la répression des révoltes à Bahreïn et appelé au départ des troupes étrangères ; avant d’annoncer en juin un « plan » iranien pour résoudre les problèmes de son voisin.

The Paris Globalist | Vol. 6 Issue 1

Il est vrai que les relations entre l’Iran et Bahreïn ont rarement été au beau fixe. Cela pourrait laisser penser que la République islamique est une menace pour l’archipel. En 1957, l’Iran avait déclaré Bahreïn province iranienne alors que le territoire était sous contrôle britannique. De plus, à partir de 1979, Téhéran souhaitait diffuser ses idées et se sentait menacé par l’hostilité des pays voisins : Il s’est donc attaché à soutenir activement les mouvements chiites par une « guerre de l’ombre », selon François Nicoullaud, ancien

ambassadeur de France en Iran. Pour Laurence Louër, spécialiste des liens entre chiisme et politique au CERI, cette politique étrangère a enclenché une « dynamique d’absorption » de ces mouvements. Enfin, n’oublions pas que la population de Bahreïn est à 70% chiite et que cela a de quoi préoccuper la monarchie sunnite. De là se sont développées certaines appréhensions de Bahreïn sur les possibles ambitions hégémoniques de l’Iran, appréhensions qui conduisent à de régulières accusations d’ingérence ou de déstabilisation. En juillet, trois individus ont été condamnés à dix ans de prison par Bahreïn : selon l’AFP, ils étaient tous trois accusés d’espionnage pour le compte de Téhéran. Cependant, il serait inexact d’affirmer que l’Iran menace directement Bahreïn. L’Iran n’a pas d’intérêts vitaux à Bahreïn, archipel de moins de mille kilomètres carrés. De plus, toujours selon Laurence Louër, la politique étrangère iranienne actuelle n’est plus celle des années 1980. Même si le pays n’a évidemment pas renoncé à sa diplomatie d’influence, il ne s’agit plus d’exporter la révolution. Le mouvement politique chiite bahreïni, attaché à son indépendance, n’est pas inféodé à l’Iran : son évolution dépend aujourd’hui de facteurs internes. Les révoltes de 2011, par exemple, étaient strictement liées à la situation politique et socio-économique du pays. Bahreïn souffre tout d’abord d’un important taux de chômage qui touche la population précaire, c’est à dire les chiites. Officiellement de 4% en 2008 selon l’Organisation Internationale du Travail, le chômage serait en réalité plus élevé : il est estimé à 15% par le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères français. Par ailleurs, les chiites, majoritaires, se sentent discriminés par la monarchie. En 2006, le scandale du « Bandargate » a pu renforcer cette impression. En effet, un rapport rendu public par Saleh al-Bandar accuse la monarchie de favoriser les sunnites – ce qui a été nié par les autorités. Mais le problème essentiel reste celui du régime politique. Sheikh Hamad ibn Issa Al Khalifa, émir puis roi de Bahreïn, avait promulgué une nouvelle constitution en 2002. L’opposition, dont le parti chiite alWifaq , s’y était opposée : elle souhaitait et souhaite toujours le respect de la Constitution votée en 1973. Bien qu’abrogée dès 1975, celle-ci consacrait une monarchie constitutionnelle où le Parlement jouissait d’un certain pouvoir de décision, du moins supérieur à son pouvoir

actuel. La mobilisation politique bahreïnie peut donc s’expliquer par des facteurs nationaux. Dans ce cas, pourquoi cette dénonciation persistante d’un expansionnisme chiite orchestré en sous-main par Téhéran et supposé déstabiliser le Golfe persique? Il faut alors replacer la question dans le contexte régional et aborder la question centrale du lien avec les États-Unis,

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De là se sont développées certaines appréhensions de Bahreïn sur les possibles ambitions hégémoniques de l’Iran, appréhensions qui conduisent à de régulières accusations d’ingérence ou de déstabilisation. auxquels les monarchies du Golfe, donc Bahreïn, sont alliées. L’Iran est loin de s’entendre avec Washington, avec qui les relations diplomatiques sont coupées depuis la prise d’otages de 1979. L’arrivée de Mahmoud Ahmadinejad à la présidence iranienne en 2005, ajoutée à la victoire des chiites en Iraq, a pu remettre au goût du jour l’hypothèse d’un « réveil » chiite. Mais si la rhétorique enflammée du président iranien peut attiser les craintes de Bahreïn, elle peut surtout lui être utile. Les accusations d’ingérence sont un moyen d’éluder les problèmes internes au pays. Bahreïn a dit vouloir dissoudre les mouvements chiites : il les accuse de porter atteinte à « l’unité nationale », un prétexte utile pour éliminer une opposition gênante. Pour les États-Unis, l’hypothèse d’un impérialisme chiite n’est pas considérée comme crédible, mais ils ont besoin du soutien de leurs alliés arabes. Cette « menace » peut donc être diplomatiquement utile, car elle peut contribuer à marginaliser l’Iran sur la scène internationale. Alors que les négociations sur le nucléaire sont tendues, diaboliser l’ennemi dans l’opinion publique est un moyen de légitimer les sanctions (voire une intervention), stratégie qui pourrait s’avérer payante. Il ne s’agit pas là de blanchir l’Iran : le gouvernement iranien trouve lui aussi son compte à jouer avec le feu et à entretenir l’ambiguïté sur ses objectifs régionaux – à l’égard d’Israël, à l’égard du nucléaire, à l’égard des chiites. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad profite du Printemps arabe pour soutenir les révoltes – alors que l’Iran The Paris Globalist | Vol. 6 Issue 1

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Des manifestants paradent avec des panneaux comparant le roi de Bah- Des groupes antigouvernementaux de Bahreïn prennent un pause pour la prière. reïn Hamad aux dictateurs déchus Hosni Mubarak (Egypte), Ben Ali Fevrier 2011. Photo credits: Al Jazeera English via Flickr CC (Tunisie) et Saddam Hussein (Irak). lui-même n’est pas exactement une démocratie, et qu’il a condamné son allié syrien du bout des lèvres. On peut ici souligner que le président iranien a évité de se référer aux demandes démocratiques des soulèvements, insistant plus sur l’hostilité aux États-Unis. Ces derniers, depuis 1979, ne se sont jamais départis de leur franche hostilité à l’égard de l’Iran, excepté pendant de très brèves périodes . Téhéran, qui prétend au statut de leader régional, souhaite se présenter comme le défenseur des peuples du Moyen-Orient, sunnites ou chiites, arabes ou persans. Cette politique étrangère provocatrice a aussi son intérêt pour la politique intérieure : contesté au sein même du régime, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad tente de regagner en légitimité. L’invocation d’un « monde extérieur hostile » peut en effet séduire les Iraniens en entretenant leur flamme nationaliste. L’hypothèse d’un futur « empire chiite » n’est pas crédible,

malgré les déclarations des monarchies du Golfe persique – qui voudraient d’ailleurs le renommer Golfe d’Arabie… Selon Bernard Hourcade – directeur de recherche au CNRS – ces monarchies craignent une montée en puissance de l’Iran, le « monstre économique et politique » aujourd’hui « hors de course ». Son potentiel, qui réside dans sa force géographique, pourrait contribuer à une modification de l’équilibre politique régional, surtout une fois les États-Unis partis d’Iraq et d’Afghanistan. On peut donc comprendre les tensions actuelles, mais en aucun cas grâce à l’argument confessionnel. Les explications sont à chercher du côté politique, où les différents acteurs défendent leurs intérêts de façon très pragmatique, très tactique, dans un contexte régional particulièrement tendu. Si l’Occident et ses alliés tendent à accuser l’Iran de beaucoup de maux, c’est essentiellement en raison des désaccords diplo-

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matiques. L’Iran, quant à lui, agite « l’épouvantail extérieur » dont le régime a besoin pour « faire monter les enchères nucléaires » et se légitimer, selon Armin Arefi, journaliste franco-iranien. La crise autour du nucléaire dure depuis 2006, date à laquelle le dialogue entre l’Iran et l’Union Européenne a été abandonné. Selon François Nicoullaud, cette crise prolongée semble aujourd’hui s’intensifier avec la possibilité d’une intervention, envisagée non pas en alternative mais en addition aux sanctions. S’il existe un vrai risque au Moyen-Orient, c’est de ce côté qu’il faut chercher. Raphaëlle Sardier est actuellement étudiante en Master “Droits de l’homme et action humanitaire” à Sciences Po Paris. Suite à un échange universitaire à Grenade, Espagne, elle s’intéresse particulièrement à la zone Moyen-Orient/ Afrique du Nord.

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