The Docket - June 2020 by Town Square Publications, LLC

THE

DOCKET The Official Publication of the Lake County Bar Association • Vol. 27 No. 6 • June 2020

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Contents THE DOCKET • Vol. 27, No. 6 • June 2020

FEATURES 12 For Illinois Insureds, a Path (And Maybe Several) to Pandemic Business Interruption Coverage Does Exist BY JEFFREY BERMAN

18 Residential Parent Designation Ramifications Under the School Code

A publication of the

BY FIONA A. MCCORMICK AND KATHERINE A. MCCOLLUM

300 Grand Avenue, Suite A Waukegan, Illinois 60085 (847) 244-3143 • Fax: (847) 244-8259 www.lakebar.org • info@lakebar.org THE DOCKET EDITORIAL COMMITTEE Jeffrey A. Berman,Co-Editor Hon. Charles D. Johnson,Co-Editor Jennifer C. Beeler Hon. Michael J. Fusz Hon. Daniel L. Jasica Sarah A. Kahn Kevin K. McCormick Hon. Raymond J. McKoski Tracy M. Poulakidas Stephen J. Rice Neal A. Simon Hon. James K. Simonian Rebecca J. Whitcombe Alex Zagor STAFF Dale Perrin Executive Director Jose Gonzalez Membership Coordinator Katherine Montemayor Office Manager

AD SIZE 1/8 Page 1/4 Page 1/2 Page Full Page Inside Front or Inside Back Cover

Back Cover

ONE ISSUE

6 ISSUES

22 Videoconferencing Got you Down? This column might help. BY STEPHEN J. RICE

COLUMNS 2 President’s Page Firsts

BY PATRICIA L. CORNELL, PRESIDENT

4 The Chief Judge’s Page Just Zoom In

8 Monthly Case Report 11 Letter to the Editor 24 The Meeting Minutes March 19, 2020

BY TARA R. DEVINE, SECRETARY

26 In the Director’s Chair Times Like This… BY DALE PERRIN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

LCBA EVENTS

IFC 2019 LCBA Office Rental Pricing 3 New LCBA Members 5 Grapevine 20 2020-2021 Officers and Directors 25 Lawyer Referral Service 28 Monthly Committee Meetings 28 Bulletin Board BC Member Reception

BY CHIEF JUDGE DIANE WINTER

6 Bar Foundation

BY NICHOLAS A. RIEWER, PRESIDENT

12 ISSUES

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The

President’s Page

Firsts

t seems 2020 is going to be a year of many “firsts.” This is my first President’s page. Unfortunately for all of you, before getting to other firsts of this year, I feel compelled

Hon. Patricia Cornell President Joseph Fusz First Vice President Tara Devine Second Vice President Kathleen Curtin Treasurer Katharine Hatch Secretary Stephen J. Rice Immediate Past President David Del Re Thomas Pasquesi Dwayne Douglas Daniel Hodgkinson Hon. Jacquelyn Melius Craig Mandell

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to introduce myself. I have been involved with the Lake County Bar Association officially since 2003. The main reason for my involvement was Tom Gurewitz. I began working for Tom in high school. He was adamant that I participate in the Bar Association as much as possible, and I remain grateful for his insistence. My employment with Tom led me to learn much about the LCBA because he was so heavily involved. I started as the Chair of the Young and New Lawyers Committee and I held that position for several years. I also served as the Vice Chair for the Family Law Committee and eventually as the Chair. I became a board member for the LCBA in 2015, ultimately being slated for the position of Second Vice President. Enough about me – I want to get back to the “firsts.”

I administered the oath for the first virtual swearing in of the board for the Association of Women Attorneys of Lake County on May 6, 2020. The Lake County Bar Association and Lake County Bar Foundation will have had (by the time this article appears in the Docket) their respective boards sworn in virtually on June 2, 2020, also a first. This is also the first year our State’s Attorney will be waiting to announce the recipient of the Ben Ori Award because we cannot have an installation dinner for this event. Waiting for a future “in person” event will allow the recipient of the Ben Ori award, as well as the new LCBA/LCBF board members, a proper recognition and celebration. The LCBA will be reviewing and approving a budget for the upcoming year. However, this budget will require the

BY PATRICIA L. CORNELL PRESIDENT board to take into consideration the changes in the economy, social distancing and virtual court – for the first time. I know I’m not the only one with “firsts.” Lawyers and judges alike are learning how to have court through virtual programs for the first time; both are attempting to work from home with children or high risk family members; lawyers are attempting to keep their law firms afloat; everyone is attempting to deal with isolation from friends, family and colleagues; and every day we read the number of cases and the number of deaths on the news - just to point out a few. My initial feelings were of sadness. I felt terrible that the new LCBA/LCBF board members would not be recognized as they should. The LCBA golf outing and various seminars also had to be continued

because of the stay at home order. But then I thought about all the positives that have come out of this situation. Families were able to spend more time together. People may have found themselves catching up with friends that they didn’t make time for in the past. You may have finally had time to read a book; make a home cooked meal; or even design and mail out to family members a book of recipes inherited from a relative. Many of you were also able to teach yourself (in order to teach your children) first grade math! There has been an abundance of support to the citizens of Lake County. Many members of our legal community volunteered to donate blood; to

obtain and drop off nonperishable items for not one, but two, food drives; volunteered at the actual food drives by moving the food and packing boxes; made signs for the essential hospital workers and drove by the hospital; organized drive by birthday parties for the public; mentored Waukegan students for a virtual oratory contest; created videos of themselves reading books for children; packaged hand sanitizer and masks for distribution throughout Lake County; purchased lunches for employees or co-workers; and supported local businesses by eating out and tipping more than normal. The Lake County Bar Association began holding virtual committee meetings. The bench and the

bar both participated in several committee meetings in order to work together during this crisis. The Young and New Lawyers Committee even hosted a virtual trivia night. And, Steve Rice is even putting together Zoom training for the members! The totality of these events changed my initial feeling of sadness to hopefulness. It is my hope that we all see the value in not only seeing each other but knowing and supporting each other; that the Lake County Bar Association members continue to see the value in membership; and that everyone looks forward to and actually attends meetings, seminars and award ceremonies in person.

Welcome

New LCBA Members ATTORNEYS

Kelse Banks Lake County State’s Attorney’s Office Gregory Kobus Law Office of Gregory M. Kobus Brian Wilson Lake County Public Defender’s Office Daniel Wysocki Albert L. Wysocki, A Professional Corp. STUDENTS Aaliyah Bahena Agata Kiejzik

June 2020

Just Zoom In

ot Court? No Worries! Just Zoom In. As I’m writing this month’s message, we are on the brink of opening our court proceedings via Zoom. It has been a rush of activity for both judges and the staff. Zoom video conferencing was selected because of the easy-to-use features which hopefully will assist the public to attend court. Different Zoom options should also assist the Judges who will host the court calls and the

attorneys who must manage their clients while everyone is remote. The Judges met by division to work out whether to enable waiting rooms, chat functions, breakout rooms and the other functions available on Zoom. We have also been working with the Clerk’s Office, State’s Attorney, Public Defender and Sheriff to develop or adapt our processes for our new virtual world. Have we all the nuances of converting to remote attendance for

The

Chief Judge’s Page court proceedings been figured out? NO. Are remote appearances perfect? NO. Our main goal has been to re-open the courthouse and have judges and attorneys get back to work. To accomplish that goal, we worked quickly to set up the court calls through our website. Our Judicial Information Services team led by Winnie Webber ordered

Judge Victoria A. Rossetti conducting a mock Zoom session with other judges.

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BY CHIEF JUDGE DIANE WINTER and installed speakers, webcams, and desktops while trouble shooting connectivity and audio issues throughout the courthouse complex. The 19th also updated old data ports and cables. Anything older than 3 years was deemed too old to reliably support audio and video functions. The Nineteenth Judicial’ s website home page https://19thcircuitcourt.state.il.us/ was updated for Remote (Zoom) Hearings and is now the entry point for attending court. Look for this icon to attend a Zoom court hearing. While the technology was updated and installed, the judges learned about conducting remote court appearances. In the later part of May, the Judges participated in practice mock court sessions.

Judges have also attended the many webinars put on by the Supreme Court of Illinois Judicial College, National Center for State Courts, as well as several by LCBA committees. The Circuit also launched a promotional campaign to inform the public they can attend their court session via Zoom. I am especially proud of the efforts of Judges Veronica O’Malley and Janelle Christensen who wrote

and directed a YouTube video titled Got Court? No Worries! Just Zoom In. They recruited Judges Reggie C. Matthews and Ari P. Fisz, as well as our Executive Director, Todd Schroeder; Director of Judicial Operations, Michael Cuffee and Public Information Officer, Kasey Morgan who all contributed to the final presentation. The video can be found at https://youtu.be/oJMslmrt6jI in case you haven’t seen it yet. Additionally, we

The

Grapevine

MICHAEL STRAUSS RECOGNIZED BY THE ISBA The Illinois State Bar Association’s Standing Committee on Legislation recognized Michael Strauss with the 2019-2020 Richard H. Teas Legislative Support Award which acknowledges an ISBA member’s meritorious service provided in support of ISBA’s legislative efforts in the Illinois General Assembly. This award is given in memory of Richard H. Teas, a long-time member of the ISBA’s Trusts and Estates Section Council, who contributed hours of his own time in analyzing, drafting, and testifying on legislation. He was highly respected by legislators and legislative staff for his competence, ethics, and diplomacy. A reception to honor Michael and all award winners will be held in the near future. BRIAN SALVI RUNS VIRTUAL 10K Salvi, Schostok & Pritchard, P.C. Partner Brian L. Salvi ran a virtual 10K, hosted by the Cleveland Marathon, on Saturday, May 16 in support of the Concussion

Legacy Foundation. The Concussion Legacy Foundation is an organization that is working towards finding a cure for chronic traumatic encephalopathy (CTE) while providing support and resources to those affected by concussions and CTE. Mr. Salvi is a member of the CLF’s Chicago Advisory Board. Way to go, Brian! HEIDI WICKSTOM ELECTED TO AAJ BOARD OF GOVERNORS Salvi, Schostok & Pritchard attorney Heidi L. Wickstom

have a printed flyer (English and Spanish) to distribute to litigants coming to the courthouse after June 1st to advise of the steps to take to attend their court date virtually. Hopefully, most litigants will be able to use their smart phones to get to court. Those without technology will be directed to the law library where we have set up “Zoom Rooms.” Each such location will have a computer with speakers and a camera. We will also

have staff available to assist the litigants with connecting to the courtroom. The same services will be available at the Depke Juvenile Complex and eventually the Court Tower. We look forward to seeing everyone in the courtrooms again via Zoom. Please be patient and understand that the 19th Circuit will adapt processes as needed to meet the needs and goals of our justice system.

has been elected to the American Association of Justice’s Board of Governors as the Revitalization Governor. The Revitalization Governor position is reserved for only one lawyer in each state, and it is a two-year term. As part of her duties, Ms. Wickstrom will assist with fundraising and membership drives for AAJ and assist with political engagement on behalf of AAJ and the state trial lawyer organization.

not easy to choose this year’s inaugural slate because of the caliber of all the honorees and the accomplishments they have made. Everyone who was nominated is truly a leader in our profession.” Ms. Devine joined Salvi, Schostok & Pritchard P.C., in 2004 and became the firm’s first female partner in 2011. In 2018, Ms. Devine was promoted to Managing Partner of the firm’s Lake County office.

TARA DEVINE RECOGNIZED Salvi, Schostok & Pritchard is pleased to announce Lake County Managing Partner Tara R. Devine has been recognized by the Chicago Daily Law Bulletin and Chicago Lawyer Magazine as one of the 2020 Salute! Women in Law honorees. Ms. Devine was among 50 Illinois attorneys selected to the inaugural list from more than 500 nominations. The Chicago Daily Law Bulletin & Chicago Lawyer, products of Law Bulletin Media, announced all 50 honorees of their inaugural Salute! Women in Law Awards through a live webinar on Friday, May 8. The 2020 Women in Law honorees will be recognized at a celebration on September 2, 2020 at the Ivy Room (12 East Ohio Street Chicago, IL 60611). “We’re so excited to recognize all of the incredible women who are leading the way in Chicago’s legal community,” said Ginger Lamb, vice president and publisher of the publications. “It was

She concentrates her practice in the areas of personal injury, nursing home negligence, wrongful death, medical malpractice and product liability cases. Ms. Devine has helped achieve numerous multi-million dollar verdicts and settlements on behalf of her clients, including a recordsetting $148 million jury verdict on behalf of a dancer paralyzed by a collapsed pedestrian shelter at O’Hare International Airport. The verdict is the largest personal injury verdict ever awarded to an individual plaintiff in Illinois history.

June 2020

Have We Failed History?

n the early 1900s, there was a section of Tulsa, Oklahoma, commonly known as the Greenwood District. What made this area stand out at the time BOARD OF TRUSTEES Nicholas A. Riewer President Carey J. Schiever Vice President Joann M. Fratianni Secretary Perry S. Smith Jr. Treasurer Jeffrey A. Berman Immediate Past President Jennifer L. Ashley Nandia P. Black Douglas S. Dorando Kristie Fingerhut Hon. Fred Foreman (Ret.) Joseph M. Fusz Scott B. Gibson Kenneth J. Glick David J. Gordon Keith C. Grant Amy L. Lonergan Fredric B. Lesser Steven P. McCollum Joseph McHugh Joseph Morrison Michael G. Nerheim Michael Ori Shyama Parikh John Quinn, Sr. Melanie Rummel David Stepanich Hon. Henry C. Tonigan (Ret.)

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was that it was a thriving business district of affluent African-Americans. This area was commonly referred to as the “Black Wall Street”. “Black Wall Street” was a community of more than 300 blackowned businesses, including two theatres, doctor’s offices, pharmacists, and even a pilot who owned his own private airplane. The success of this community caused some white people in Tulsa to become envious and even angry. On the morning of May 30, 1921, the tension between the black and white communities reached a tipping point. According to historians, a 17-year-old white girl named Sara Page, an elevator operator in the Drexel building, and a 19-year-old black man named Dick Rowland, came into contact with each other. Apparently, Rowland would use the elevator almost every day to gain access to the building. On this particular day, after he got in the elevator

BY NICHOLAS A. RIEWER PRESIDENT and the doors closed, Page and Rowland were in the elevator for a few moments, when there was a scream. After the doors opened, Rowland ran away and was later arrested. Page initially claimed that she was assaulted; however, historic accounts say that Rowland tripped leaving the elevator and grabbed Page’s arm and she screamed, causing an onlooker to go to the authorities. Although Page never pressed charges, the authorities did. The rumor mill started chugging, and by the end of the day, the rumor was that Page had been raped. Tulsa police arrested Rowland the following day and began an investigation. An inflammatory report in the May 31st edition of the Tulsa Tribune stirred a confrontation between blacks and an armed white mob around the courthouse,

where the Sheriff had taken Rowland to the top floor for his own protection. Shots were fired and the outnumbered African-Americans began retreating back to their homes in the Greenwood District. In the early morning hours of June 1, 1921, Greenwood was looted and burned by white rioters. In a span of just 24 hours, 35 square blocks of homes and businesses were burned, destroying over 1,200 houses. The initial reports at the time said that 36 people had died, but historians now believe that as many as 300 people died. Many black Tulsans felt that Dick Rowland would be lynched after his arrest. Interestingly enough, his charges were later dismissed, as they were highly suspect from the start. But in the meantime, hostile groups gathered and the

confrontation worsened, and municipal and county authorities failed to take action to calm the situation. As the violence continued, civic officials selected many men, all of them white, and some of whom had participated in the initial violence, making them deputies. The deputies did not stem the violence; rather, they added to it. Public officials even provided firearms and ammunitions to these individuals and the Oklahoma National Guard participated in mass arrests of nearly all of Greenwoodâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s black residents. The residents were removed to other parts of the city and detained in holding centers. While these people were detained in the holding centers, white rioters went into the Greenwood District and stole, damaged or destroyed whatever property was left behind in the homes. The newly-minted deputies also deliberately burned or otherwise destroyed homes, churches, schools, businesses, and even a hospital. Not one of these criminal acts was then or has ever been prosecuted or punished by a governmental agency, whether municipal, state or federal. This year, the 99th Anniversary of the Tulsa Race Massacre comes amid nationwide demonstrations sparked by the death of George Floyd in Minneapolis, Minnesota. The Tulsa Race Massacre has been called the singleworst incident of racial violence in American history. I attended grammar school in the 1960s and high school in the 1970s. The first

time I ever heard of the Tulsa Race Massacre was within the last week since the death of George Floyd. In reading articles on the incident, it appears that the massacre was absent from any history books. Oklahoma schools did not even talk about it. Newspapers did not print any information about the massacre, which apparently was completely ignored. I personally never remember learning about the Tulsa Race Massacre during any of my education. Not only did we not learn anything from this tragedy, but it appears that the government officials were able to sweep this under the rug. Ninety-nine years later, a black man died needlessly at the hands of a white police officer. I also find it ironic that 99 years ago, the â&#x20AC;&#x153;deputiesâ&#x20AC;? did not stem the violence; rather added to it. A few days ago, police officers were ordered to clear out the peaceful demonstrators near the White House, using tear gas, rubber bullets, and force, to accommodate the Bible photo op. Have we learned nothing? It is clear that as a society, we still have a long way to go in pursuit of equality for all, regardless of race or religion. We must lean from our historical failures and say something when we see injustice. I know this is much easier said than done, but we must move in that direction. Finally, to the 99.9 percent of law enforcement personnel who do an exemplary job and risk their lives on a daily basis, I would like to say thank you for everything you do to keep all of us safe.

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June 2020

May 2020

Monthly Case Report Editor’s Note: Monthly Case Report is provided by 19th Judicial Circuit Law Librarian, Emanuel Zoberman

Illinois Second Appellate – Civil Tirio v. Dalton, Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District, September 30, 2019, --- N.E.3d ---, 2019 IL App (2d) 181019, 2019 WL 4744771. Background: County clerk primary candidate brought defamation action against primary opponent and company which printed negative flyers regarding candidate, seeking identity of members of funding group responsible for creation of defamatory statements. The Circuit Court, McHenry County, No. 18-MR-302, Kevin G. Costello, P.J., granted candidate’s petition to identify parties and granted funding group’s petition to intervene. Opponent, printing company, and funding group appealed. Holdings: The Appellate Court, Schostok, J., held that: 1 Public-interest exception to mootness doctrine allowed for review of order requiring identification of funding group members responsible for disseminating allegedly defamatory information after members’ names had already been revealed; 2 Allegations that county clerk primary candidate had slush fund that he used to pay for vacation imputed commission of crime of theft, as would establish that statements were defamatory per se; 3 Allegations did not fall under innocent-construction rule, as would make statements not actionable for defamation per se; 4 Allegations did not constitute speech protected from defamation under the First Amendment; 5 Candidate sufficiently alleged that allegations were false and made with either knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard as to whether they were false; 6 The Circuit Court was within its discretion in denying motion of candidate’s political opponent to stay enforcement of order to identify anonymous authors; and 7 The Circuit Court’s indirect civil contempt finding ordering county clerk primary candidate’s political opponent incarcerated was warranted.

In re Marriage of Wilhelmsen, Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District, October 24, 2019, --- N.E.3d ---, 2019 IL App (2d) 180898, 2019 WL 5445905. Background: Father filed motion to reconsider modification of judgment of dissolution, which had reduced father’s child support obligation, ordered father to pay 40% of non-minor child’s college expenses, and provided for no modification of father’s obligation to contribute to minor children’s college savings plans. The Circuit Court, Lake County, Charles W. Smith, J., No. 13-D-1116, denied motion. Father appealed. Holdings: The Appellate Court, Hutchinson, J., held that: 1 Father’s contributions to minor children’s college savings plans could not be credited against his contributions to non-minor child’s higher education expenses; and 2 Father’s contributions to minor children’s college savings accounts were not involuntary. Affirmed. ______________________________________________ In re Marriage of Slesser, Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District, September 10, 2019, --- N.E.3d ---, 2019 IL App (2d) 180505, 2019 WL 4267772. Background: Wife filed action for dissolution of marriage. Husband filed amended petition for declaratory judgment. Wife filed response. The Circuit Court, Du Page County, No. 15-D-2434, John W. Demling, J., entered judgment against husband. Husband appealed. Holdings: The Appellate Court, Hutchinson, J., held that:

Affirmed.

1 Husband failed to show by preponderance of evidence that funds transferred from trusts were actual loans; and 2 Trial court’s valuation of lot that did not acknowledge debt obligations to trusts was not against manifest weight of evidence.

Hutchinson, J., filed concurring opinion. ______________________________________________

Affirmed. ______________________________________________

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Maurissa J. B. v. Ingrida K., Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District, December 5, 2019, --- N.E.3d ---, 2019 IL App (2d) 190107, 2019 WL 660636. Background: Mother petitioned for emergency order of protection against stepmother on behalf of child, alleging physical and emotional abuse of child by stepmother. After trial court granted the emergency order of protection, the court held a hearing on entry of a plenary order of protection. The Circuit Court, McHenry County, Mary H. Nader, J., granted order of protection prohibiting all contact between stepmother and child for two years. Stepmother appealed. Holdings: The Appellate Court, McLaren, J., held that: 1 Trial court’s finding that stepmother harassed child was against manifest weight of evidence; and 2 Evidence was insufficient to support finding that environment or atmosphere created by stepmother was psychologically injurious to child. Reversed. Jorgensen, J., filed dissenting opinion. ______________________________________________ Kun Mook Lee v. Young Rok Lee, Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District, September 3, 2019, --- N.E.3d ---, 2019 IL App (2d) 180923, 2019 WL 4164729. Background: Invitee brought negligence action against landowner after he fell and was severely injured while attempting to remove a tree limb with a chainsaw by climbing two ladders tied together with the top ladder leaning against the limb to be cut. The Circuit Court, Lake County, Diane E. Winter, J., granted summary judgment for landowner. Invitee appealed. Holdings: The Appellate Court, Birkett, P.J., held that: 1 Tree-trimming procedure presented an open and obvious danger; 2 No exception to open and obvious rule applied; 3 Invitee was more than 50% liable for his injuries; and 4 Invitee assumed the risk of his actions. Affirmed. ______________________________________________

Illinois Second Appellate – Criminal People v. Maillet, Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District, July 1, 2019, --- N.E.3d ---, 2019 IL App (2d) 161114, 2019 WL 2754563. Background: Defendant was convicted, following bench trial, in the Circuit Court, De Kalb County, Robbin J. Stuckert, J., of two counts of unauthorized video recording. Defendant appealed. Holdings: The Appellate Court, Burke, J., held that: 1 Rule of lenity did not apply to statute prohibiting unauthorized video recording in another person’s residence without that person’s consent; 2 Statute prohibiting unauthorized video recording of another person without consent in a restroom included restrooms in a person’s own residence; 3 Statutes prohibiting unauthorized video recording of another person without consent in a restroom or in that other person’s residence were not overbroad under First Amendment; and 4 Statutes prohibiting unauthorized video recording of another person without consent in a restroom or in that other person’s residence did not violate substantive due process. Affirmed. ______________________________________________ People v. Pabello, Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District, December 9, 2019, --- N.E.3d ---, 2019 IL App (2d) 170867, 2019 WL 6698088. Background: Following petitioner›s conviction of two counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, which was affirmed by the Appellate Court, 2014 WL 2999714, petitioner filed pro se postconviction petition. The Circuit Court, Lake County, Christopher R. Stride, J., advanced the petition to the second stage and appointed counsel, and, after State agreed to proceed to a third-stage hearing, issued a written order denying the postconviction petition. Petitioner appealed. Holdings: The Appellate Court, Hutchinson, J., held that: 1 Rule describing duties of postconviction counsel did not govern counsel’s performance at third-stage hearing; and 2 Postconviction counsel’s performance at thirdstage hearing was reasonable. Affirmed. ______________________________________________

June 2020

People v. Conroy, Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District, November 12, 2019, --- N.E.3d --_, 2019 IL App (2d) 180693, 2019 WL 5884583.

People v. Buchanan, Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District, December 17, 2019, --- N.E.3d ---, 2019 IL App (2d) 180194, 2019 WL 6873625.

Background: After a bench trial, defendant was convicted in the Circuit Court, DuPage County, No. 17-CM-1359, Alexander F. McGimpsey, J., of prostitution. Defendant appealed.

Background: Following conviction for first-degree murder and sentence to life imprisonment, petitioner filed petition for relief from judgment alleging his conviction and sentence were void for lack of jurisdiction. The Circuit Court, Lake County. No. 02-CF-3794, George D. Strickland, J., dismissed the petition. Petitioner appealed.

Holdings: The Appellate Court, Michael J. Burke, J., held that: 1 Rational basis review, rather than strict scrutiny, was proper standard by which to test whether statute prohibiting prostitution violated defendant’s due process right to privacy; 2 Statute prohibiting prostitution was rationally related to legitimate governmental purpose of protecting safety, health, and welfare of the people; 3 Statute prohibiting prostitution was not unconstitutional as applied to facts and circumstances of defendant’s case; and 4 Court did not have authority to invalidate statute prohibiting prostitution as unconstitutional on public policy grounds.

Holdings: The Appellate Court, Birkett, P.J., held that: 1 Any error in the Circuit Court’s assignment of allegedly unauthorized associate judge to hear petitioner’s criminal case did not deprive it of jurisdiction; and 2 The Circuit Court had no authority to appoint Office of State Appellate Defender (OSAD) to petitioner’s appeal. Motion to withdraw granted; affirmed. Hudson, J., concurred in result only.

Affirmed.

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LETTER TO THE EDITOR Dear Editor, I write on the concept of withdrawing an Appearance as the attorney of record for a client in the Circuit Court of the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, Lake County, Illinois. The procedure that the Judges wish to follow is that unless and until either the green card from return receipt certified mail may be presented in court or the return envelope that the addressee did not retrieve the envelope, there can be no withdrawal. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 13 is entitled Appearances-Time to Plead-Withdrawal. Subparagraph (c)(2) requires that notice of withdrawal be given “by personal service, certified mail, or a third-party carrier, directed to the party represented at the party’s last known business or residence address. Alternatively, the attorney may give such notice electronically, if receipt is acknowledged by the party.” Illinois Supreme Court Rule 12 is entitled Proof of Service in the Trial and Reviewing Courts; Effective Date of Service. Sub-paragraph (b) is entitled Manner of Proof. Paragraph (5) says that “in case of service by mail, or by delivery to a third-party commercial carrier, by certification under Section 1-109 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the person who deposited the document in the mail or delivered the document to a third-party commercial carrier or courier, stating the time and place of mailing or delivery, the complete address that appeared on the envelope or package, and the fact that the proper postage or delivery charge was pre-paid;”. Sub-paragraph (c) of Rule 12 is entitled Effective Date of Service. By delivery to a third-party commercial carrier or courier, the service “is complete on the third court day after delivery of the package to the third-party carrier.” If the U.S. Mail is used, service is complete “four days after mailing.” Notice that there is no requirement that service is only effective upon presentation of certified mail card or the return of the certified mail envelope or proof from the third-party courier that notice was actually given. Illinois is a notice by mail state. Mailing is effective and service completed if Rule 12 is obeyed. In People ex Rel. Devine vs. $30,700.00, the Illinois Supreme Court, at 199 Ill. 2d. 142 (2002) held that when the State’s Attorney of Cook County gave notice of a forfeiture attempt by certified mail and provided a certificate signed by an Assistant State’s Attorney that the items had been mailed listing the address to which, when, where deposited, and that postage was prepaid, it was not necessary for the State’s Attorney of Cook County to provide the certified mail receipt signed by the addressee. The Court distinguished this case, People ex Rel. Devine from an eviction case, Avdich vs. Kleinert, 69 Ill. 2d. 1 (1977). In that case, the Court said that a certified mail receipt was required because of the Landlord and Tenant Act which says “by sending a copy of said notice to the tenant by certified or registered mail, with a returned receipt from the addressee.” Since the forfeiture statute in People ex Rel. did not contain that language, it was not necessary for there to be a certified mail receipt. Similarly, since Illinois Supreme Court Rule 13 does not contain the language about a certified mail receipt, service pursuant to Rule 12 is legally sufficient. The Illinois Supreme Court said in Bright vs. Dickey, 166 Ill.2d 204 ( 1995), the last three sentences, that court rules hold the full force of the law, are not mere suggestions, and are to be obeyed. It is respectfully submitted that there is no authority for the courts in Lake County, Illinois to require the green card or the return envelope before the withdrawal order may be granted if notice has been certified by the attorney in compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 12. Sincerely,

Gary L. Schlesinger

June 2020

For Illinois Insureds, a Path (And Maybe Several) to Pandemic Business Interruption Coverage Does Exist

BY JEFFREY BERMAN

n March 15, 2020, Governor Pritzker issued Executive Order 2020-07, declaring a public health emergency throughout Illinois as a result of the COVID-191 outbreak and a confirmed report that SARS-CoV-2 was present in the State.2

The Order closed to the public all restaurants, bars, and movie theaters through March 30, 2020, in an effort to address the ongoing pandemic. Governor Pritzker thereafter ordered all “non-essential businesses” to close and issued further Executive Orders, dated April 1, 20203 and April 30, 2020,4 which modified the scope and extended the duration of the original Order several times; it currently remains Jeffrey in effect through May 29, 2020. As of Berman, 1

2 3 4

SARS-CoV-2, is a highly contagious coronavirus which has rapidly spread around the world. It remains stable and transmittable in aerosols and on various surfaces for prolonged periods of time. The illness caused by SARS-CoV-2 is called COVID-19. https://www2.illinois.gov/Pages/Executive-Orders/ExecutiveOrder2020-07.aspx. https://www2.illinois.gov/Pages/Executive-Orders/ExecutiveOrder2020-18.aspx. https://www2.illinois.gov/Pages/Executive-Orders/ExecutiveOrder2020-32.aspx; https://www2.illinois.gov/Pages/Executive-Orders/ExecutiveOrder2020-33.aspx.

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the time each of the Executive Orders were issued, civil authorities had confirmed the presence of SARS-CoV-2 throughout the State. In the wake of government edicts and orders, including Governor Pritzker’s Executive Orders closing non-life-sustaining businesses and restricting access to business premises, Illinois businesses are sustaining huge financial losses. Many businesses insure against of the law catastrophic events like the unforefirm of seen COVID-19 pandemic through Anderson + all-risk property insurance policies. Wanca, has These policies promise to indemnify extensive for losses incurred when business experience in complex operations are involuntarily suspendcommercial ed, and when access to the premises is litigation, prohibited because of loss or damage insurance to the property, or by a civil authority and insurorder that restricts or prohibits access ance coverage litigation matters in state and federal courts across the to the property. This coverage is comcountry. He presently serves as a monly known as “business interrupCo-Editor of the Docket. tion coverage” and is standard in most

commercial property insurance policies. Business owners are submitting claims for business interruption insurance losses in the wake of the pandemic but, unsurprisingly, many insurers’ reaction is to abruptly deny coverage. This has led to a burgeoning proliferation of lawsuits. While the ultimate outcome of those suits is undetermined, Illinois law is favorable to insureds, and policyholders and their counsel certainly should not accept knee-jerk, blanket denials from their insurers at face value. The scope of coverage provisions under most allrisk policies that contain business interruption coverage is broad. They state that losses caused by a suspension of business are covered so long as they involve covered direct loss, often defined as accidental physical loss or accidental physical damage. These policies are meant to cover most kinds of losses that may happen, except by the willful or fraudulent acts of the insured, or other specifically excluded causes.5 All the insured must do is establish there was an accidental loss in order to trigger coverage.6 The burden then falls on the insurer to affirmatively prove coverage is precluded by a specific exclusion.7 If the insurer cannot meet that burden, then

the loss is covered. Many insurance companies are taking the absolute position that COVID-19 losses cannot satisfy the requirement of direct physical loss or physical damage. They espouse an arguably myopic view that only tangible, structural losses meet this requirement. Courts, however, have rejected that view on numerous occasions in numerous contexts. For example, the conclusory statement that the actual or potential presence of a harmful substance like SARS-CoV-2 does not result in property damage is contrary to existing Illinois law. Illinois courts have held that the mere presence of a dangerous substance, even without structural damage, constitutes physical loss or damage triggering coverage under an all risks policy.8 In a comparable case, homeowners had to vacate their homes because their well was contaminated by E. coli bacteria.9 The insurer made the same argument about physical loss that the insurers make now about SARS-CoV-2, but the court rejected it. Instead, the court held that the policy’s physical loss or damage requirement could be met well short of structural harm, citing as example when: (1) the property is contaminated to such an extent that its function is nearly eliminated or destroyed; (2) the structure is made useless or uninhabitable;10 or (3) an imminent threatened release of contamination causes a loss of use or utility.11

Some policies have virus exclusions, but an insurer’s reliance on them to deny coverage may be misguided.

See Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Am. Hardware Mfrs. Ass’n, 387 Ill. App.3d 85, 109 (1st Dist. 2008); Board of Educ. of Maine Tp. High School Dist. 207 v. Int’l Ins. Co., 292 Ill.App.3d 14, 17 (2d Dist. 1997); see also TMW Enters., Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 619 F.3d 574, 576 (6th Cir. 2010) (“As an ‘all-risk’ policy, this insurance policy basically covers everything unless specifically excluded.”); Village of Rosemont v. Lentin Lumber Co., 144 Ill.App.3d 651, 664 (1986) (“recovery under an all-risk policy will be allowed for all fortuitous losses not resulting from misconduct or fraud”). Board of Educ. of Maine Tp. High School Dist. 207, 292 Ill. App.3d at 17-18; see Johnson Press of America, Inc. v. Northern Ins. Co. of N.Y., 339 Ill.App.3d 864, 887 (1st Dist. 2003) (All an insured must show is (i) a loss occurred, (ii) the loss resulted from a fortuitous event, and (iii) an all-risk policy covering the property was in effect at the time of the loss); Gulino v. Economy Fire and Cas. Co., 2012 IL App (1st) 102429, ¶ 16; see also Intermetal Mexicana, S.A. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 866 F.2d 71, 75 (3d Cir. 1989) (“Under an ‘all-risk’ policy, the only questions which need be decided ... are whether [the plaintiff] has suffered a loss and, if so, whether such loss is excluded from coverage under the policy.”). Johnson Press, 339 Ill.App.3d at 887 (the burden falls on the insurer to show that the loss resulted from a peril expressly excluded from coverage); Gulino, 2012 IL App (1st) 102429, at ¶ 16 (same); see also Betz v. Erie Ins. Exch., 2008 PA Super 221, ¶ 17-19, 957 A. 2d 1244, 1256-57 (2008) (“So long as reasonable people could conclude that the claimed loss is covered by language anywhere in the policy or the amendatory endorsements, the insured has carried his burden as concerns an “all-risks” policy. Any other construct would merely encourage insurers to orchestrate a shell game of exclusions and exceptions to exclusions … in full recognition that the ultimate risk of loss would rest upon the insured notwithstanding his payment

of an extra premium for coverage he reasonably thought he was getting.”); DENC, LLC v. Philadelphia Indemnity Ins. Co., 421 F.Supp.3d 224, 231 (M.D. N.C. 2019)(same). 8 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. No. 211 v. Int’l Ins. Co., 308 Ill.App.3d 597, 600-602 (1st Dist. 1999). 9 Motorists Mut. Ins.Co. v. Hardinger, 131 F. App’x 823 (3d Cir. 2005). 10 Id. at 826; see also, e.g., Widder v. Louisiana Citizens Property Ins. Corp., 82 So.3d 294 (La. App. 2011) (finding covered physical loss where lead contamination rendered a home uninhabitable); Farmers Ins. Co. v. Trutanich, 123 Or.App. 6, 858 P.2d 1332 (1993) (odor from neighboring meth lab was covered direct physical loss despite no structural damage). 11 Hardinger, 131 F. App’x at 826. In a number of other cases “physical loss” was based on a “loss of functionality” (Southeast Mental Health Ctr., Inc. v. Pacific Ins. Co., 439 F.Supp.2d 831 (W.D. Tenn. 2006) (corruption in computer software was covered as physical loss); Oregon Shakespeare Fest. Assn. v. Great American Ins. Co., 2016 WL 3267247 (D. Or. June 7, 2016) (smoke that infiltrated theater caused covered direct property loss by rendering it uninhabitable and unusable for its intended purpose, even without structural damage to the building)), or by an inability to occupy or use the structure (Hughes v. Potomac Ins. Co., 199 Cal.App.2d 239 (1962) (landslide leaving dwelling uninhabitable was covered direct physical loss, despite no physical injury to structure); W. Fire Ins. Co. v. First Presbyterian Church, 165 Colo. 34, 39 (1968) (gasoline vapors from soil underneath building rendered it uninhabitable and its use dangerous, was covered loss because loss of use equates

June 2020

This COVID-19 pandemic can easily meet those tests. In a recent decision addressing the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized that because SARS-CoV-2 can live for many days outside of a human host, it can spread not only through person-to-person contact, but also by contact with surfaces an infected person touched.12 The disease is highly contagious. It emerged in Wuhan, China, in December 2019, but by March 2020 cases had been confirmed in many areas across the United States. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court characterized the pandemic as a catastrophe and called any location where even two people can congregate a disaster area.13 to direct physical loss); Sentinel Mgmt. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 563 N.W.2d 296 (Minn. App. 1997) (asbestos contamination that did not result in tangible injury, impaired property and rendered it useless, and was covered direct physical loss); Murray v. State Farm, 509 S.E.2d 1 (W. Va. 1998) (home evacuated due to threat of falling boulders suffered covered physical loss because it was rendered unusable or uninhabitable, despite not suffering structural damage; possible risk of future rockfalls was sufficient); AFLAC Inc. v. Chubb & Sons, Inc., 260 Ga.App. 306, 308 (2003)). Courts likewise have found that a “physical loss” can also occur without a visible or physical change to the structure. Gregory Packaging, Inc. v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am., 2014 WL 6675934 (D. N.J. Nov. 25, 2014) (ammonia discharge that rendered packaging facility unfit for occupancy or use until dissipated, which made facility unusable for a period of time, was covered direct physical loss or damage without structural alteration); Mellin v. Northern Security Ins. Co., 167 N.H. 544 (2015) (cat urine odor emanating from another condominium unit that rendered the property temporarily unusable or uninhabitable caused direct physical loss even without tangible alteration to the property); TRAVCO Ins. Co. v. Ward, 715 F.Supp.2d 699, 709–10 (E.D. Va. 2010) (toxic gasses emanating from Chinese drywall rendered home uninhabitable was covered direct physical loss even without physical injury to structure itself), aff’d, 504 Fed.Appx. 251 (4th Cir. 2013). 12 Friends of Danny DeVito v. Tom Wolf, 2020 WL 1847100, at *10, n.11 (Pa. Apr. 13, 2020). 13 Id.

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That Court found that any affected business within the “disaster area” sustained property damage because SARS-CoV-2 is “spread by person-to-person contact, ... has an incubation period of up to fourteen days, ... can live on surfaces for up to four days and can remain in the air within confined areas and structures.”14 The Court rejected an argument that the virus must be detected at a specific location for it to fall within the disaster area.15 It also found the disease is no different from other disasters, like hurricanes and fires — typically insured events — because, like them, it can cause “substantial damage to property, hardship, suffering or possible loss of life.”16 Many policies do not define “physical loss” or “physical damage.” Considering the long line of cases finding property damage in a variety of contexts, perhaps the industry left that term vague to try to use it to deny coverage. However, in Illinois, the burden of drafting with precision rests with the insurance company.17 Coverage clauses are interpreted broadly to afford the greatest possible coverage.18 Ambiguities are interpreted in favor of coverage.19 Since there is an established body of case law interpreting the term in favor of coverage where properties are only functionally, as opposed to structurally, impaired, moreover, the term is ambiguous and should not be used to limit coverage for claims arising from this pandemic.20 Some policies have virus exclusions, but an insurer’s reliance on them to deny coverage may be misguided.21 The industry became aware of the possibility of virus-related causes of business interruption during several 14 15 16 17

Id., 2020 WL 1847100, at *13. Id. Id., 2020 WL 1847100, at *12. Gillen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 349 Ill.App.3d 779, 787 (1st Dist. 2004); see Johnson Press, 339 Ill.App.3d at 871–72, citing Michael Nicholas, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co., 321 Ill.App.3d 909, 914 (2d Dist. 2001) (burden is on insurance company which could have drafted policy and exceptions more clearly and specifically). 18 Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Acceptance Ins. Co., 342 Ill.App.3d 167, 171 (1st Dist. 2003); American Economy Ins. Co. v. Holabird and Root, 382 Ill.App.3d 1017 (1st Dist. 2014), citing United Services Auto. Ass’n v. Dare, 357 Ill.App.3d 955, 963 (1st Dist. 2005). 19 Sears, 342 Ill.App.3d at 171, citing State Security Ins. Co. v. Burgos, 145 Ill.2d 423, 438 (1991). 20 Where different courts have reached substantially different results in comparable contexts, it follows there is more than one reasonable interpretation, and thus the term is ambiguous: Although we are aware that ‘[a]n insurance policy is not ambiguous merely because two conflicting interpretations of it are suggested by the litigants,’ in evaluating the ambiguity of the phrase, we cannot ignore the body of national case law addressing the same or similar policy language and falling on both sides of this interpretive ledger. It is fair to say that even the most sophisticated and informed insurance consumer would be confused as to the boundaries of advertising injury coverage in light of the deep difference of opinion symbolized in these cases. Terra Nova Ins. Co. v. Fray-Witzer, 449 Mass. 406, 416 (2007). 21 The insurer bears the burden of proving the applicability of the exclusion as an affirmative defense. See Addison Ins. Co. v. Fay, 232 Ill.2d 446, 453-54 (2009).

recent health-related crises, including the 2002 SARS epidemic, 2009 HlNl swine flu pandemic, 2012 MERS epidemic, 2014 Ebola epidemic, and 2016 Zika epidemic. In 2006, after the SARS epidemic, the industry’s drafting arm, Insurance Services Office (“ISO”) created a new endorsement, entitled “Exclusion of Loss Due to Virus or Bacteria,” implicitly acknowledging that claims could be filed under existing policy language for business interruption losses resulting from the threat or presence of disease-causing agents. The endorsement, which some insurers have since incorporated in some policies, provides that the insurer “will not pay for loss or damage caused by or resulting from any virus, bacterium or other microorganism that induces or is capable of inducing physical distress, illness or disease.” In Illinois, exclusions are interpreted narrowly.22 This exclusion does not mention closures necessitated by disaster declarations or caused by orders responding to the imminent threat of contamination, catastrophe or natural disaster. A narrow reading of the exclusion, therefore, should mean that it would not apply where the losses arise from those other causes. 22 A provision that purports to exclude or limit coverage must be read narrowly and applied only where its terms are clear, definite, and specific. See Gillen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 215 Ill.2d 381, 385 (2005). “[P]rovisions that limit or exclude coverage are to be construed liberally in favor of the insured and most strongly against the insurer.” National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Glenview Park District, 158 Ill.2d 116, 122 (1994).

In addition, most policies recognize the distinction between a disaster that interrupts business operations and governmental action that limits access to property. Many policies provide coverage when a business suffers losses as a result of a civil authority’s orders.23 One illustrative decision arose out of a suit filed by the owner of fast-food restaurants for loss of business income due to Hurricane Floyd. A Florida County issued an order closing its restaurants and ordering citizens to evacuate. In the resulting coverage action, the Court held that the closure/evacuation order triggered Civil Author23 Civil authority orders that limit access to property trigger coverage. See Assurance Co. of Am. v. BBB Serv. Co., 265 Ga. App. 35 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (fast food restaurants forced to close due to temporary, mandatory evacuation order during Hurricane Floyd was covered; mere “threat” of loss triggered Civil Authority Coverage); Narricot Indus., Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 2002 WL 31247972, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2002) (insured forced to suspend operations at plant due to declaration of state of emergency following Hurricane Floyd was covered; Court rejected argument that losses were not covered because civil authority orders were merely “preventative” in nature); Throgs Neck Bagels, Inc. v. GA Ins. Co. of N.Y., 671 N.Y.S.2d 66 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (shop closed by Fire Department order for safety reasons following fire, suffered covered loss); Southlanes Bowl, Inc. v. Lumbermen’s Mut. Ins. Co., 208 N.W.2d 569, 570 (1973) (governor mandated closure of all places of amusement, including plaintiff’s bowling alleys, restaurants, taverns and motels, due to rioting after assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.); see also US Airways, Inc. v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 65 Va.Cir. 238 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2004) (losses were covered following order by the FAA that closed Reagan National Airport after 9/11).

June 2020

ity coverage because: (1) the order prohibited access to the insured premises; and (2) county officials issued the order after watching the storm progress, causing damage in its path to property other than the insured premises.24 The presence of the Civil Authority coverage extension in standard policy forms, moreover, demonstrates that the industry knew how to address coverage for actions related to a disaster, but failed to do so in the virus exclusion. An insurer’s failure to utilize distinct language reinforces a conclusion of ambiguity.25 Thus, the virus exclusion should not apply to business losses from this pandemic for this reason as well. Further, the exclusion is limited to losses “caused by or resulting from any virus.” There is no mention of excluding losses from concurrent causes such as closure orders or the threat of mass contamination. The closures and other orders are collateral to the virus in the chain of causation. Indeed, many businesses have no evidence that they or their employees were contaminated at all. They remained open for weeks or even months after the virus was known to exist. It was only the subsequent civil action orders that caused them to close, and thus were the efficient, or predominant cause of resulting business interruption losses.26 24 BBB Serv. Co., 265 Ga. App. at 36. 25 “Our courts have held that exclusions from the general coverage provided by an insurance policy must be stated in such clear, definite and explicit language as to warrant the conclusion that the insured understood and accepted them.” Elson, 295 Ill. App.3d at 7. “The rule that insurers should gain no advantage from their own drafting ambiguities is most rigorously applied to exclusionary provisions.” Id. 26 When two or more perils converge at the same point in time, contemporaneously and operating in conjunction, there is a “concurrent” cause or event. Controversy arises where at least one such cause is not covered. The general rule, including in Illinois, is that a loss is covered so long as the efficient or dominant cause is covered. Bozek v. Erie Ins. Group, 2015 IL App (2d) 150155, ¶¶ 21-23; see Garvey v. State Farm, 59 Cal.2d 395, 404 (1989) (when two or more causes join in causing an injury, one of which is insured against, the efficient proximate cause, meaning the predominant cause, is determinative as to whether the loss is covered); see also, e.g., Franklin Packaging Co. v. Cal. Union Ins. Co., 171 N.J. Super. 188 (1979) (vandals broke into warehouse causing a flood (excluded peril) that damaged goods; held vandalism was the efficient cause and thus loss was covered); Ocean Partners v. North

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When drafters intend to extend an exclusion to losses from causes concurrent to the excluded losses, they know how to say it. For example, one common form of exclusion found in similar property policies states: “We will not pay for loss or damage caused directly or indirectly by any of the following. Such loss or damage is excluded regardless of any other cause or event that contributes concurrently or in any sequence to the loss.” Comparable language is absent, entirely, from the virus exclusion. This fact also should result in an interpretation that losses caused by concurrent causes such as closure orders are not excluded. Lastly, even if the virus exclusion could be interpreted to apply to losses caused by the pandemic, a strong argument exists that it should not be enforced based on regulatory estoppel because of statements the insurance industry made to regulators when seeking its approval. First, the presence of virus or disease can constitute physical damage to property, as the insurance industry has recognized since at least 2006. ISO and the American Association of Insurance Services (AAIS) represented hundreds of insurers in seeking approval of the new virus exclusion. ISO submitted to state regulators a memo titled “New Endorsements Filed To Address Exclusion of Loss Due to Virus or Bacteria,” dated July 6, 2006.27 These regulatory submissions, among other things, contained representations to the effect that policies had not been a source of recovery for losses involving disease-causing agents, which was false. They ignored the robust body of case law that had developed to the contrary. By 2006, courts repeatedly had found that policies covered a variety of claims involving disease-causing agents. Courts also had widely held that an accident, condition or event that made it impossible to use property for its intended purpose, caused covered physical loss or damage to such property. As a result, assertions by the industry that policies were not responding, or were not intended to respond to these claims, were blatant misrepresentations. As such, the proposed virus exclusion represented a substantial reduction in coverage. Such a reduction in coverage should come with proper disclosures to the insured, along with a reduction in premiums. The introduction of the exclusion, however, was misrepresented as a mere clarification and presented as a premium-neutral event. The reason for the industry’s position is obvious: just as when they presented misleading information to secure approvals of pollution exclusions in the 1970s,28 River Ins. Co., 546 F.Supp.2d 101 (S.D. N.Y. 2008) (clouds of particulate matter from fallen towers on 9/11 resulted in collapse of building deemed to be efficient cause and thus collapse exclusion did not bar coverage). 27 See https://www.propertyinsurancecoveragelaw.com/ files/2020/03/ISO-Circular-LI-CF-2006-175-Virus.pdf. 28 Industry representatives described the scope of “pollution exclusions” in a similar fashion. Thereafter, policyholders proved the insurers lied, misrepresenting what they intended to insure, in for example, Morton International Inc. v. General Accident Insurance Co., 629 A.2d 831 (N.J. 1993), and St. Paul Fire Insurance Co. v. McCormick & Baxter Creosoting Co. 923 P.2d 1200 (Or. 1996). As

the industry wanted to exclude an existing virus and contamination exposure while maintaining premium levels. Regulatory estoppel prevents insurance companies from asserting an interpretation of policies contrary to the interpretation they offered to a regulator in order to secure regulatory approval.29 Here, estoppel should prevent insurance companies from asserting that the virus exclusion applies to the types of losses that were covered before it was added which, as the industry conceded by adding the exclusion, and the body of case law shows, should include the types of losses caused by the pandemic. While addressing key issues, this article is not intended to suggest these are the only concerns and arguments available to a policyholder. For example, many policies contain additional terms extending available coverages. Some policies include Contamination coverage, Access & Egress coverage, dependent property coverage and other pertinent provisions, that may apply. Some policies include “contingent” coverage for losses resulting from the closure of a supplier. Some may also cover rents unpaid by tenants who suspend or terminate occupancy following a direct physical loss. It is thus critical that one read any potentially applicable policy carefully. The anecdotal information, to date, is that insurers are broadly denying business interruption claims arising out of the COVID-19 situation. However, wide-spread litigation is already underway challenging those denials. The suits likely will focus on critical common policy language and the circumstances of the pandemic, and they may yield broad declarations of coverage. The key takeaway is not to be discouraged by anyone suggesting at this point these claims conclusively cannot be covered. There is little downside to submitting a claim if your business operations have been suspended or if a civil authority has ordered a suspension of your operations or closing of the premises. Even if the insurer responds by issuing a denial, that does not foreclose the possibility of coverage. There is a path forward for many policyholders. They and their counsel are well-served to carefully examine all aspects of the available coverage, timely submit claims and continue to pursue their rightful recovery. a result, many courts and state insurance regulators deemed the exclusions unenforceable as to a wide variety of claims. 29 See Sunbeam Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 781 A.2d 1189, 1192-93 (Pa. 2001) (“regulatory estoppel (or “judicial estoppel” based on representations made to/positions taken before regulatory agencies) is an “equitable, judicially-created doctrine designed to protect the integrity of the courts by preventing litigants ... [from] adopting whatever position suits the moment”); see Seymour v. Collins, 2015 IL 118432, ¶¶ 36-37 (recognizing the doctrine under Illinois law, which applies to judicial, quasi-judicial administrative proceedings, and which serves to “protect the integrity of the judicial process by prohibiting parties from ‘deliberately changing positions’ according to the exigencies of the moment”); see also American States Ins. Co. v. Koloms, 177 Ill.2d 473, 489-493 (1997) (limiting the scope of the pollution exclusion consistent with the drafting history and regulatory approval process for the exclusion which illustrated the intent of insurance industry contrary to later efforts to broaden its reach).

June 2020

Residential Parent Designation Ramifications Under the School Code

BY FIONA A. MCCORMICK AND KATHERINE A. MCCOLLUM

utting together an Allocation of Parental Responsibilities Judgment (“Allocation Judgment”), formerly known as a Parenting Plan, takes a lot of time and consideration on the part of both attorneys and clients. Under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, if the parties don’t submit an agreed Allocation Judgment, the Court shall order one.1

1The Illinois Supreme Court has given them high priority and requires that a trial court resolve the allocation of parental responsibilities within 18 months, measured from the date of service of the petition or complaint to final order.2 The rule further provides that in the event this time limit is not met, the trial court shall make written findings as to the reason(s) for the delay.3 However, the 18-month time limit will not apply if the parties, including the attorney representing the child, the guardian ad litem or the child representative, agree in writing and the trial court makes a written finding that the extension of time is for good cause 1 2 3

750 ILCS 5/602.10. Ill. S. Ct. R. 922. Id.

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Fiona A. McCormick is a Partner at The Law Offices of David R. Del Re, P.C. Ms. McCormick concentrates her practice primarily in the area of Family Law. Katherine McCollum is an Associate Attorney at The Law Offices of David R. Del Re, P.C. Ms. McCollum practices in both Criminal and Family law.

shown.4 Often times these agreements are the result of mediation and negotiation, but they can also be the result of a trial. An Allocation Judgment must contain several required terms, such as provisions for the child’s living arrangements and for each parent’s parenting time.5 In 2016, the IMDMA underwent a big change when the word “custody” was removed from the statute and replaced with “allocation of parental responsibilities.” However, just because the IMDMA no longer includes the word “custody,” that does not mean that other statutes have stopped using it. One statute in particular that 4 5

Id. 750 ILCS 5/602.10.

continues using the word “custody” is Section 10-20.12b of the Illinois School Code.6 That section addresses the issue of a child’s residence for purposes of school registration. In that regard, the School Code states: (a) For purposes of this Section: ( 1) The residence of a person who has legal custody of a pupil is deemed to be the residence of the pupil. (2) “ Legal custody” means one of the following: (i) C ustody exercised by a natural or adoptive parent with whom the pupil resides. ustody granted by order of a court of compe(ii) C tent jurisdiction to a person with whom the pupil resides for reasons other than to have access to the educational programs of the district. (iii) C ustody exercised under a statutory short-term guardianship, provided that within 60 days of the pupil’s enrollment a court order is entered that establishes a permanent guardianship and grants custody to a person with whom the pupil resides for reasons other than to have access to the educational programs of the district. (iv) C ustody exercised by an adult caretaker relative who is receiving aid under the Illinois Public Aid Code for the pupil who resides with that adult caretaker relative for purposes other than to have access to the educational programs of the district. (v) C ustody exercised by an adult who demonstrates that, in fact, he or she has assumed and exercises legal responsibility for the pupil and provides the pupil with a regular fixed nighttime abode for purposes other than to have access to the educational programs of the district.

tion of responsibilities set forth in the agreement. Even with the enactment of Section 606.10 of the IMDMA, the issue of who is the residential parent for school purposes is often the source of substantial contention and confusion among litigants, attorneys, and judges. In February 2019, the Illinois Council of School Attorneys published a document entitled “Answers to Frequently Asked Questions Regarding Students with Divorced or Divorcing Parents.”8 This publication was prepared to provide guidance to school attorneys on several issues, including residency. A key point to take away from the publication is that, although the school has no statutory authority to obtain a copy of a party’s Allocation Judgment, a school can ask for it. If the parents do not provide the Allocation Judgment, the school can access it from court files through the Clerk of Court. Thus, the school can find out the actual parenting time allocation if there was a question regarding residency. It is important to ensure that the designation of the residential custodian for school purposes is consistent with the parenting time awarded to the parties. One potential complication regarding the issue of who is the parent with the majority of the parenting time can arise if the parties have an equal parenting time schedule. Section 606.10 of the IMDMA allows the court to designate one of the parties the residential parent, or if the parties agree, they will write this into the Allocation Judgment. Under the School Code, it would seem that either parent in the equal parenting time scenario would be able to register the children in his or her school district. If the Allocation Judgment designates a parent who does not have the majority of the parenting time as the residential parent, and that child is then wrongfully registered in the parent’s district, however, there are serious consequences for that parent. Those consequences are set forth in the School Code itself. The School Code provides that “[a] person who knowingly or willfully presents to any school district any false information regarding the residence of a pupil for the purposes of enabling that pupil to attend any school in that district without the payment of a nonresident tuition charge shall be guilty of a Class C misdemeanor.”9 Additionally, if the school determines a student is non-resident of the district, the parents will be sent notice of the non-resident tuition amount that is due, which can cost thousands of dollars.

The school can find out the actual parenting time allocation if there was a question regarding residency.

Section 606.10 of the IMDMA addresses any inconsistency between the IMDMA and other statutes that still use the term “custody” by providing for the designation of a custodian for purposes of other statutes.7 One referenced statute is Section 10-20.12b of the Illinois School Code. The IMDMA specifically says that for purposes of that Section of the School Code only, the parent with the majority of the parenting time is considered to have legal custody. This means that the designation won’t give either party any legal advantage or otherwise change the alloca6 7

105 ILCS 5/10-20.12b. 750 ILCS 5/606.10.

8 9

https://www.iasb.com/IASB/media/Documents/FAQDivorcedorDivorcingParents.pdf. 105 ILCS 5/10-20/12b(f).

June 2020

The question remains, can a court enter an order that designates a parent the custodian for school registration purposes even though that parent is not the parent with the majority of the parenting time? The answer under Section 606.10 of the IMDMA is no. This section says the court is to designate the parent with the majority of the parenting time the custodial parent for school purposes. There is nothing in the IMDMA or the School Code that would require the school to follow such an erroneous order if it were later discovered that the registering parent

did not have the majority of the parenting time. The reasons for this are clear from the School Code, which seeks to prevent a party from manipulating residency in order to access the educational programs of another district. The designation of the residential parent can seem like a small detail when drafting an Allocation Judgment. However, it is critically important for an attorney to make sure the correct parent receives the designation in order to avoid unnecessary consequences for clients under the School Code.

2020-2021 Officers & Directors

Hon. Patricia Cornell President

Joseph Fusz First Vice President

Kathleen Curtin Treasurer

Katharine Hatch Secretary

Tara Devine Second Vice President

Stephen J. Rice Immediate Past President

Board of Directors

David R. Del Re 2018-2021

Daniel L. Hodgkinson 2019-2022

Hon. Jacquelyn Melius 2020-2023

Dwayne Douglas 2019-2022

Craig Mandell 2020-2023

Thomas A. Pasquesi 2018-2021

20 The Docket

June 2020

Videoconferencing Got you Down? This column might help.

BY STEPHEN J. RICE

n the few pages that follow, I seek to answer the question: “Why does my computer NOT seem to work in this new age of constant video-conferencing?” There could be many reasons, but here are a few possibilities that you might be able to troubleshoot on your own.

I will start with likely culprits that are relatively easy to identify and fix, and then get progressively more complicated. If you already know your computer is a piece of junk, I have some laptop recommendations at the bottom of this column.

like one of these: Why is it important to know where your Wi-Fi router is? Because as you get farther away from the router, your connection will get progressively worse. So, if you are videoconferencing, and the connection is bad, then getting closer to your Wi-Fi router may make all the difference. (If you can plug into the router instead of using WiFi, that will give you the maximum performance, but don’t kill yourself with wires!)

1. START HERE: WHERE IS YOUR WIFI ROUTER, AND HOW FAR ARE YOU FROM IT? Maybe you still have a computer plugged into a modem, but more Stephen J. likely you are on a wireless (WiFi) Rice is an network. (Few laptops even have a Assistant State’s port for plugging in anymore—you Attorney in need a dongle. Even many desktop the Civil Dicomputers are no longer plugged in, vision of the but rather connected to the internet Lake County wirelessly.) State’s Attorney’s Your WiFi router likely came Office, and from your cable company, so look for the 2019-20 that—maybe it is behind a TV. Or President of perhaps it is in your office; it probathe Lake County Bar Association. bly is in a closet. It will look basically

22 The Docket

2. YOUR INTERNET PROVIDER IS GIVING YOU TERRIBLE SPEED. After you have found your WiFi router and are next to it, you should

next check the speed of your internet connection. You can do so here: www.speedtest.net. My cellphone—not using WiFi—gets speeds of around 17.5 Mbps. I know that doesn’t mean anything to you, but bear with me. We can use 17.5 Mbps as a starting benchmark: if you are not getting that from your internet provider, then you are getting ripped off! For context, I pay for really fast internet, and when I speedtest my phone through my WiFi router, the speed jumps to 238 Mbps. You don’t need near that speed (although if you have a lot of family members, you might want it), but you should be getting at least 50 Mbps. Like car insurance, if you have not changed providers in many years, then you are likely paying a lot and getting very little. Sometimes the internet provider is so embarrassed by what they’re providing you that you can get a much better deal just by calling. Other times, it pays to switch, even though that is a bit of a hassle. I have superfast internet because, for two years, it was really quite cheap ($39/month). They’ve got me now ($79—but that’s also about what I paid with my old provider, for much lesser speeds). I’ll likely change again soon!

advice is not the cheapest: I generally recommend you spend about $1,000, which is obviously a tough nut to swallow right now. Why? Computers in that price range—whether PCs or Apples—tend to be pretty future-proof, where “future” is 5 years. They also are solid values—you’ll get all the memory and speed you need. I have a 5-year-old Dell (the model referenced down below), and it performs as well today as it did when it was brand new. Here are three computers in the price range of approximately $1,000 that you can’t go wrong with (for more recommendations at all price points, see CNET.com’s laptop reviews: https://www.cnet. com/news/best-laptopsof-2020/) Apple: MacBook Air. Apple just came out with a new MacBook Air, and it has gotten stellar reviews. PCs: (1) Dell XPS 13. This laptop has been a perennial “top pick” on CNET and other tech websites, and for good reason: it is solidly built, good looking, powerful, and it has a non-touch screen version, which I recommend because non-touch screens have much less glare than touch screens. This computer is simply all-around excellent. (Lenovo’s Yoga series is perhaps a good second choice.) (2) A second, different option is a “hybrid,” meaning a tablet/laptop combo. Here, the choice is clear: the Microsoft Surface Pro 7 (which the newest iPad is trying to mimic). Costco regularly sells a package of Surface Pro + keyboard + pen (all normally sold separately, for some reason) in a $999 bundle. Best Buy likely has the same deal. The Surface Pro is a 100% full-power PC, plus a 100% fully functional iPad-like tablet, all-in-one. I now regularly take deposition notes using the pen. While writing on glass takes some getting used to, not having loose paper cluttering my files is a godsend. Even if you only use the Surface Pro as a laptop, it is a very good laptop—I love the keyboard in particular. There also is a much cheaper Surface Go, which I think gets good reviews, but you should avoid the Surface Pro X, which has gotten horrible reviews. Confusing, I know. (There also is a Surface Pro Laptop, to add to the confusion.) The current Surface Pro version is the “Surface Pro 7.” I now personally prefer the hybrid design, but if I had to go back to the XPS, I would be perfectly happy there too. And rarely does anyone complain about an Apple Computer. Good luck, and I hope this short article helps you relieve some of your videoconferencing woes.

Videoconferencing uses a fair amount of computer horsepower, so an old computer may just not have the oomph for it.

3. THE INTERNET BROWSER YOU ARE USING IS NOT VERY COMPATIBLE. Google Chrome tends to work with everything (because it has >60% market share among all internet browsers). Any other browser has . . . well, less market share, at the very least. 4. YOUR COMPUTER IS OLD. Videoconferencing uses a fair amount of computer horsepower, so an old computer may just not have the oomph for it. But now you’re thinking: “What constitutes an ‘old’ computer?” Although there are many variables, one rule of thumb might be: any computer older than four years. (Perhaps a better metric is this: if your computer cannot be updated to the newest operating system (whether it is an Apple or a PC), then your computer (or smartphone) is likely old enough to cause come hiccups or trouble. How do I know if my operation system is up-todate? Google “how do I tell if my computer is running the most recent operating system.” 5. IF I NEED A NEW COMPUTER, WHAT SHOULD I BUY? Because I’ve gotten this question a lot over the years and again very recently, I have some ready advice. My

June 2020

Board of Directors’ Meeting

The

March 19, 2020 ACTION ITEMS: 1. Consent Agenda: a. February Minutes – P4 b.February New Members – P6. Motion to approve Consent Agenda and Motion to approve New

Members; Motions seconded; Motions passed. 2. Treasurer’s report: a. June – February 2020 Financial Report – P7. Update by the treasurer on finan-

Amy L. Gertler, Esq. & Hon. Helaine L. Berger, (Ret.)

It’s Settled®

mediation & arbitration

Meeting Minutes BY TARA R. DEVINE SECRETARY

cial report, including total revenue, total expenses, and net operating income. Also discussed upcoming changes of revenue and expenses for the next 30 to 180 days because of cancellations due to COVID-19. NEW BUSINESS: 1. COVID-19 (Coronavirus) and LCBA events: Discussion regarding events in next two months. 2. Jefferson Inn Dinner: CANCELED. 3. Appellate Reception for Thomas/Burke: CANCELED. 4. ****Update on Court status and process and administrative orders**** OTHER MATTERS: 1. Gridiron Update – P16 2. Real Estate Seminar Update – P18 3. Family Law Seminar Update

24 The Docket

Meeting Adjourned: Next Meeting April 30th 2020

BOARD MEMBERS PRESENT Stephen Rice President Hon. Patricia Cornell First Vice President Joseph Fusz Second Vice President Kathleen Curtin Treasurer Tara Devine Secretary Brian Lewis Past President Hon. Christen L. Bishop 2017-2020 Director Katherine S. Hatch 2017-2020 Director David R. Del Re 2018-2021 Director Thomas A. Pasquesi 2018-2021 Director Dwayne Douglas 2019-2022 Director Daniel Hodgkinson 2019-2022 Director Dale A. Perrin, Executive Director

LAWYER REFERRAL SERVICE

Why should YOU join the LCBA Lawyer Referral Service? The LCBA Lawyer Referral Service (LRS) is a valuable member benefit as well as a public service. LRS provides member attorneys with an opportunity to build business through client referrals. The service benefits the public by helping callers quickly find an attorney in the area of law in which they need help. The LRS is widely publicized and all LCBA members in good standing who carry the required malpractice insurance are eligible to join. The LRS program is designed to assist persons who are able to pay normal attorney fees but whose ability to locate legal representation is frustrated by a lack of experience with the legal system, a lack of information about the type of services needed, or a fear of the potential costs of seeing a lawyer. The Lawyer Referral Service is an intuitive win/win/win. We’re helping the public, by providing them with legal resources with some degree of reliability; we’re helping our members, by playing matchmaker with clients whom they can help for a minimal referral cost; and we’re helping the Bar Association and our public image by offering our services. Although not all of the matches will work out, the risks and costs are minimal and the rewards are great. Deborah Goldberg, Goldberg & Kane

“I have been a member of the referral service for many years, particularly in the fields of Trusts & Estates. The service has generated a stream of potential clients, some of which are not viable but many of which have ripened into clients for litigation or estate planning. Frankly, I don’t mind answering people’s questions about our field of law, which most people find confusing. The referral service has been a great way for potential clients to speak with me and discuss the issues before having to spend money and before I have to commit to the clients. I whole-heartedly recommend the LCBA’s Client Referral Service as a way to grow your practice.” Fredric Bryan Lesser, Lesser, Lutrey Pasquesi, & Howe LLP As a long-time member of the LCBA Lawyer Referral Service I know how useful it is to be a member of the service. I have obtained several cases through the service and would strongly recommend that attorneys seeking cases join. Compared to the many online services that claim to provide cases, the LCBA’s referral service actually delivers at a much lower cost. Steve McCollum, Law Offices of Steven P. McCollum, P.C.

AVA I L A B L E R E F E R R A L PA N E L S • Administrative • Appellate • Commercial

• Consumer • Criminal • Employment

• Environmental • Family • Real Estate

• Estate Planning, Wills, Trusts and Probate • Personal Injury / Property Damage

C O N TA C T T H E L C B A AT 8 4 7 . 2 4 4 . 3 1 4 3 O R AT I N F O @ L A K E B A R . O R G

L A K E C O U N T Y L AW Y E R . I N FO June 2020 25

Times Like This…

t is times like this, that I need a haircut. Seriously, my hair hasn’t been this long since college many years ago. I’m beginning to understand why it takes my daugheter so long in the shower. Washing my hair used to take 1-2 minutes. Now it seems like I can never get the soap out. Sorry, slight tangent there. What I started to say, is it’s times like this that having a community of trusted, like-minded individuals who you can count on is truly important. That’s what Associations are all about. We are a group of counterparts who understand the challenges you are going through. We are a group of fellow law professionals who you can ask for and receive advice if needed. We are a group of friends, in the same profession, who can serve as a sounding board if you need someone to listen. We are a trusted source for timely information and directions in times of immense change. All of this has never been so evident than these past couple of months. During this time of isolation and staying at home, it’s comforting to know you have people, other than family, you can call and count on. Not only to keep your sanity, but to stay in touch with what’s going on in the real world, specifically in your professional world. It’s unfortunate that

26 The Docket

we’ve had to forgo recent annual events such as our Spring Luncheons, the Civil Trial & Appeals Seminar & Golf Outing and the Installation Banquet (originally scheduled for this month). A virtual Swearing-In will be held in early June and hopefully some sort of a fun gathering later in the year. The always popular Annual Golf Outing has also been canceled for this calendar year. As of now, the Golf Outing will be held on June 17, 2021, at White Deer Run. Please mark your calendar and save the date. The biannual Foundation Gala, originally planned for November, has also been canceled. The Foundation Board is working on alternate Gala plans that may include an event in late Winter/early Spring or some sort of a virtual fundraising event or events. I’d like to welcome and congratulate new members of both the Association and Foundation Boards. New members coming on the Association Board include: Hon. Jacquelyn Melius with the 19th Judicial Circuit and Craig Mandell with Berger Schatz as 20202023 Directors. New Trustees coming on the Foundation Board include: Joseph McHugh with the Law Office of Joseph McHugh, Michael Ori with the Lake County States Attorney’s Office, Shyama Parikh with Shyama

In the

Director’s Chair

S. Parikh, PC, John Quinn, Sr. with Churchill, Quinn, Richtman & Hamilton, and David Stepanich with the Law Office of David M. Stepanich, PC. A tremendous Thank You for your time, service and leadership goes to Past President, Brian Lewis and 2017-2020 Director Hon. Christen Bishop who have come off the Association Board and to the Hon. Joseph Waldeck (ret.) who has come off the Foundation Board. A complete list of current Board members can be found on the corresponding President’s page in this issue and on the website. By the time you receive this issue you should have received your 2020-2021 Membership Dues Renewal invoice. Although we sent hard copies, you can still pay online by logging on to your Member Profile page and clicking the “Renew Membership” link near the top of the page. Please

BY DALE PERRIN EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR note, if you choose to pay with a credit card a $12.50 credit card processing fee will be added to the total.Your renewal invoice automatically includes the credit card fee as well as a fee for your Courthouse Access Pass, and a donation to the Foundation’s Charitable Fund. If you choose to pay with a check, simply send or drop off a check, minus the credit card fee, to the LCBA office. If you choose not to pay for your Courthouse Access Pass or give a donation to the Foundation with your due’s renewals, simply send a check for what you are paying for (ie: Dues and Pass or Dues and Donation). Contact the LCBA office if you need assistance. As always, your dedicated and hardworking LCBA/ LCBF staff are available and eager to assist you in any way possible. Stay safe. Stay well. And remember to support your local businesses.

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June 2020 27

Bar

Bulletin Board

Monthly

Committee Meetings

DAY

MEETING

LOCATION

TIME

1 Tuesday

Diversity & Community Outreach

LCBA

12:15-1:15

1st Thursday

Real Estate

Primo, Gurnee

5:30-6:30

Editorial 1st Thursday (Even Mo.) Docket Committee

LCBA

12:15-1:15

2nd Tuesday

LCBA

12:15-1:15

LCBA

4:30-5:30

Criminal Law

2nd Tuesday (Odd Mo.) Immigration 2nd Wednesday

Family Law Advisory Group (FLAG)

LCBA

12:00-1:00

2nd Wednesday

Civil Trial and Appeals

LCBA

4:00-5:00

2 Thursday

Young & New Lawyers

TBD

12:15-1:15

2nd Thursday

Trusts and Estates

LCBA

12:15-1:15

3rd Tuesday

Local Government

LCBA

12:15-1:15

3rd Tuesday

LCBF Board of Trustees

LCBA

4:00

3rd Wednesday

Debtor/Creditor Rights

Varies

5:30-6:30

3rd Wednesday

Family Law

C-105

12:00-1:00

3rd Wednesday (Odd Mo.) Employment Law

Varies

5:15-6:15

3rd Thursday

LCBA

12:00 noon

LCBA Board of Directors

• RSVP to a meeting at www.lakebar.org. • Meetings subject to change. Please check your weekly e-news, the on-line calendar at www.lakebar.org or call the LCBA Office @ (847) 244-3143. • Please feel free to bring your lunch to the LCBA office for any noon meetings. Food and beverages at restaurants are purchased on a individual basis.

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To place an ad or for information on advertising rates, call (847) 244-3143

Do you have a speaker idea or suggestion for our business meetings? We would like to hear from you! Send your ideas to: dale@lakebar.org 28 The Docket

June 2020 29

300 Grand Avenue, Suite A Waukegan, IL 60085 Tel: 847-244-3143 Fax: 847-244-8259

MEMBER RECEPTION

MEMBER RECEPTION SPONSORSHIP OPPORTUNITIES

LCBA Member Receptions will generally be held on the 4th Thursday of every month.

Your $500 sponsorship includes: • Recognition in advertising before the event and on signage at the event • Reception from 4:30 – 6:30 p.m. • Complimentary beer and wine. Upgrades available for additional fee.

Contact Dale Perrin at dale@lakebar.org to add your name to a reception.