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Victims of the Map: Dissolution of the Blessed Nubian Land Leena Badri

Victims of the Map: Dissolution of the Blessed Nubian Land

By: Leena Badri

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Ethnic identities often fall victim to the creation of the modern political map, which ignores diversity in favor of a more homogenized national identity. Africa is certainly no exception, as the arbitrary carving of colonial borders has grouped together a wide array of tribes and ethnicities into single territorial units. The specific focus of this essay is the creation of the Egypt-Sudan border, which divided the Nubian peoples, an ethnolinguistic group indigenous to the land between the first Nile cataract in Egypt and the third cataract in Sudan, into two separate populations belonging to different countries.

The modern history of the Nubians has been colored by constant relocation, displacement, and economic struggle. By analyzing the experiences of the Nubians around the last heightening of The Aswan Low Dam in 1933 up until the immediate years following the construction of the High Dam in 1960, this essay argues that the consolidation of the Egyptian and Sudanese nation-states dissipated Nubian culture by enveloping the group within the nationalist framework of each respective country. However, this gradual assimilation also resulted in the reinforcement of “Nubian” as a separate ethnic group, as exposure to the wider public increasingly emphasized the ‘otherness’ of this identity. Firstly, it is imperative to understand the historical significance and internal diversity of the Nubians, as these factors remain the foundation of their character. Professor Emerita of Anthropology at University of California, Los Angeles, Sondra Dungan Hale characterizes the Nubians as, “a continuous population which has experienced occasional eclipses and resurgences.”1 The territorial space identified as ‘Nubia’ extends from the first cataract of the Nile at Aswan in Egypt to around the third cataract at Dongola in Sudan.2 Historically, Upper Nubia was home to the magnificent Kush Kingdom around 1070 BC, while the Meroe Kingdom around 700 BCE flourished in Lower Nubia.3 Nubia’s rich history meant that the region had frequent contact with diverse groups such as the Romans, Greeks, Assyrians, and Turks.4 In the sixth century, Nubia was enveloped under the Church of Constantinople, which unified the territory under one church and ruler. During this period, the Byzantine and Nubian cultures combined to create a high level of art and culture, and some artifacts from that period are still visible today.5 However, due to increasing Arab incursions into Nubia in the seventh century, ties with the Constantinople Church were weakened, leading to a decrease in the practice of Christianity.6 However, the Arab rulers did not conquer the area, but instead adopted treaties with the Governor of Egypt which allowed for trade and tribute to commence between the two states. Although naturally Islam began to influence the people of Nubia.7 Frequent exchanges with the Ottoman Empire in the fifteenth and nineteenth century further diversified Nubian identity. The area came into contact with many groups and thus, “Nubians have some frequent claims of Bosnian, Magyar, Kurdish, and Turkish descent.”8 Furthermore, the influence of Muslim rulers further extended the impact of Islam.9 In the nineteenth century, the Nile at Nubia experienced three invasions: those of Mohamed Ali Pashaand Ismail Pasha, and the reconquest in 1896. In essence, “Nubia was the corridor through which all civilizations, religions, and wars entered the country.”10

The complex history of the Nubians meant that their modern identity grew to be increasingly diverse and complex. The many religions, languages, and values they were exposed to developed into a cultural and linguistic mosaic. This is most evident through the array of local dialects that are spoken amongst the several tribes of the area, which are often jointly identified as the “Nubian” language.11 However, although differing in tribal affiliation and dialect, Nubians self-identify through their common social structures, strong communal ties, shared oral literature, beliefs, artistic artifacts, and, most importantly, their deep spiritual tie to the Nile and their agricultural lands.12 Often referred to by inhabitants as, “The Blessed Land,” Nubia’s fortunate position alongside the Nile and amongst fertile lands characterized it as an almost magical utopia that bestowed infinite blessings amongst its peoples.13 It was certainly considered as such by its inhabitants, who held deep pride and affection for their land.14 However, the carving of the Egyptian- Sudanese border divided this beloved territory, effectively sidelining its internal diversity and forcing it

to be shaped by modern political developments. The difference in treatment of the Egyptian Nubians and Sudanese Nubians by British colonial powers influenced the statuses and experiences of the two groups following independence. As Fleuhr-Lobban succinctly summarizes, “the British colonial master of the two lands…constructed the basic racial hierarchy in the Nile Valley, which placed Nubians in an intermediate position between the Egyptians of the Nile Delta and the [Black people]of Sudan.”15 Thus, Egyptian Nubians were considered to be of ‘lowly’ status due to their proximity to Blackness, while Sudanese Nubians were praised for their identity as more ‘Arabized’ Muslims who had Turkish and Bosnian heritages. Sudanese Nubians were considered Arabized riverain Muslims, and thus were treated favorably, allowing them to assume high-level positions predating and following the formation of an independent Sudan. As discussed by Sharkey, “Arabized riverain Muslims” were the manufacturers of the “core culture” of Sudan which excluded the inhabitants of non-Muslim formerly slaveholding areas.16 The British reinforced this hierarchy by often hiring Nubians for various service positions and clerical jobs. Their involvement within the colonial bureaucracy also meant that they did not remain isolated but traveled to Khartoum frequently, which increased their contact with Arabic and Islamic culture.17 Furthermore, Nubians were also granted admission to Gordon College, which was the first educational institution in Sudan, and produced the engineers of the mainstream Sudanese national identity who would later on lead the country into independence.18 Their seamless acceptance into Sudanese national identity meant that once independence came, the Nubians were in a prominent position and were well-represented in civil and political arenas.19 Sayed Ibrahim Ahmed, one of the most recognizable Sudanese personalities and an educational activist, was a Nubian who fought for the independence of the country.20 Since independence there have been eight Nubian prime ministers.21 Sudanese history books reflect a strong Nubian presence; their ability to assimilate within the nationalist framework shows that their distinctive identity did not hinder their ability to assimilate. Although they were well-represented and assimilated in the public sphere, Sharkey explains how “they became a part of the mainstream without losing a sense of their distinct Nubian identity.”22 Researcher Hasan Dafalla corroborates this, stating, “It is generally observed that the Nubians…do not freely mix with other Sudanese. They tend to cling together.”23 As an honora-

-ble sect of Sudanese society, Nubians continued to value and nourish their distinct identities. They considered their territory a ‘sanctuary’, and their home village remained a ‘point of reference and identity.’24 This is significant because it shows how although the national identity happily incorporated the Sudanese Nubians within its fold, their ethnic affiliation remained the core of their identity. They still continued to partake in their traditional cultural practices, converse in Nubian dialects, and reside in their territorial area. As there was no pressure for them to conform, they enjoyed the stability their identity offered them. While Nubian affiliation to Arab ancestry served to benefit the Sudanese Nubians, Nubian affiliation to Blackness and tribal affiliations in Egypt disadvantaged and tainted the experiences of Egyptian Nubians. Kronenberg states how, “one who has become acquainted with Nubians from the viewpoint of the Sudan, comes at a surprise when reading about Nubians in Egypt, to find frequent references to ‘slaves’ and ‘blacks’, or to witness the efforts that are made to deny that Nubians are of slave origin.”25

It was not only the proximity to Blackness that exposed Egyptian Nubians to discrimination and ‘otherness’, but also the reality of their diverse linguistic and territorial groups. There were two main linguistic groups that existed in Old Egyptian Nubia amongst many others: the Kenuz who spoke a Matoki dialect of Nubian, and the Fedija who spoke a related but different dialect.26 Although they shared many cultural similarities, there remained sharp intra-Nubian differences, and each major tribe lived together in their respective district.27 It is important to note that although the Nubians aligned themselves based on district and tribe, they were all relegated to the same position within the greater Egyptian domain. Nubians were constantly treated as a collective in order to more efficiently prescribe and brand their ‘otherness’. This also increased the amount of discrimination and stigmatization they faced.28

After the last heightening of the Aswan Low Dam in 1933, Egyptian Nubians suffered the loss of their agricultural land which forced them to migrate in droves to metropolitan centres in search of economic opportunities.29 Labor migration increased their contact with suburban Egyptians which both exposed them to mainstream culture and the Arabic language and cemented their ‘outsider status’. Nubians were often referred to as “barabra” in Egyptian Arabic, a word derived from the Greek word ‘barbaros’ used to describe foreigners. They also worked as domestic servants or in

service jobs.30 Fernea describes how, “to most baladi [meaning of the country] Egyptians, Nubians were not ‘baladi’ enough, they lacked the necessary qualities of Egyptian-ness.”31 Nubians were often ridiculed for their tribal dialects as Egyptians claimed they spoke ‘barbari’, pointing to their imperfect recitation of Arabic words and Islamic prayers.32 Egyptian Nubians’ inability to speak perfect colloquial Egyptian Arabic and recite Islamic prayer flawlessly also represented their inability to conform to the Egyptian nationalist identity. As David DiMeo discusses, “the presence of a distinctive Nubian language within the borders of Egypt disturbed this straightforward definition of Egypt as an Arabicspeaking nation. Egyptian nationalists could thus find more to bind them linguistically to fellow Arabs in Morocco or Yemen than with some of the people within their own borders.”33 This formal separation was also expressed within the political sphere: Maja explains how “because Egyptian nationalist leaders tended to view minorities as being incompatible with nation-building, census data thus effectively erased indigenous and minority presence, and it is therefore almost impossible to estimate the current number of Nubians in Egypt.”34 Thus, discrimination against Nubians was evident within multiple arenas, and implemented most strongly after a nationalist vision arose. Nationalism suggests the existence of a perfect ‘national subject’ and by adopting certain defining features that will reinforce this idea, nationalism simultaneously rejects the wide array of identities that exist within the state.

Therefore, it is unsurprising that the exclusion of the Nubians from the framework of Egyptian nationalist ideology resulted in the reinforcement and strengthening of Egyptian internal identity. As noted, the Nubians had distinct inter-tribal affiliations which relegated them into sub-categories. However, during the years leading up to the Aswan High Dam, the root of their shared common identity grew to be “based on political and economic grievances from the Egyptian government.”35 They grew to take even more solace in the protection which their villages and land gave them. In contrast, the harsh environment of the city led migrants to seek the comfort and companionship of one another. Working-class Nubians remained within their social groups in the city and established unofficial ‘clubs’ where they would often gather, which eventually came to include, “recreational facilities, lessons in Arabic, and job recruitment.”36 In this way, they continued to be isolated even amongst suburban populations as their failure to integrate into the Egyptian ‘national’ image – as their fellow Nubians in Sudan had done – regulated and cemented their ‘outsider’ status. As Egypt and Sudan gained independence in the 1950s, they grew to become deeply nationalistic states – particularly Egypt, where Gamal-Abdel Nasser’s populist fervor had captivated the Arab world. This political period witnessed an increase in the marginalization of Nubians as the strengthening of the independent nation-state required them to assimilate and sacrifice for the ‘greater good.’ Before their resettlement in 1964, Egyptian Nubians had lived with an ‘illusion of independence’ as their territories had remained isolated from the wider population. Each district had a local Nubian chief official responsible for reporting to the government and executing their orders.37

Similarly in Sudan, ‘The Nubians had clung to their narrow strip of fertile land along the banks of the Nile…they were separated from the rest of mankind… their Nile remained their sole life-giver.”38 The descriptions of Nubian life in both Sudan and Egypt during the time leading up to the construction of the dam are reminiscent of an isolated utopia. Their way of life was sacred to them, as their ceremonies and traditions remained the core of their social and cultural lives. However, each heightening of the Aswan low dam in 1913 and 1933 resulted in damage to the crop and agricultural area, which increased the migration of men into the city in search of income.39 This meant that men would often be away for extended periods of time, which put a dent in the traditional way of life. The strengthening of the independent state would only bring more disruption as the fabric of Nubian cultural identity would slowly begin to unravel. As the post-independent Egyptian state positioned itself as the leader of the free Arab world it requested the unfaltering loyalty of its citizens as dedicated and passionate nationalists. As DiMeo states, “Few modern states experienced this combination of populist enthusiasm and systematic imposition of nationalism more fully than Gamal Abdel-Nasser’s Egypt.”40 Although the political period witnessed the rapid industrialization and emancipation of Egypt, it was also characterized by the development of a specific national community. This effectively united modern Egyptians but isolated the Nubians, whose darker skin and lack of mastery of the Arab language was ill-suited for the PanArab nationalist structure being crafted. The ‘otherness’ of the Egyptian Nubians did not mean they were exempt from being asked to sacrifice for the ‘greater good’ of the nation. After all, it was President Nasser who first used the term Nubian officially as he drew attention ‘to the great patriotic sacrifice of the Nubians’ who would soon have to lose their

land and homes ‘for the benefit of all Egyptians.’41 The use of the word ‘patriotic’ is significant because by framing their resettlement as an act of duty to the nation, Nasser sent a subtle reminder that their ethnicity came second to their national identity. The Nubian connection to indigenous land is not merely symbolic but deeply cultural and personal, and making their displacement a direct attack on their ethnic heritage. On November 8, 1959 an agreement was reached between the United Arab Republic and the Sudan which outlined the construction of at least two dams, the Aswan High Dam in Egypt and the Roseries Dam in Sudan.42 The only mention of Nubians was in Item 7 on the agreement, which outlined each government’s responsibility to transfer inhabitants from the affected area.43 The development of the Aswan High Dam symbolized Nasser’s triumph, and was his crowning project that promised to elevate Egypt to a new status and spur its development.44 Its completion was thus imperative, as Nasser had much to prove to the international community and his fellow countrymen. However, the excitement over the construction concerning the dam was not shared by the Nubians who would have to uproot their lives and relocate to unknown areas. The experience of Egyptian Nubians under Nasser had grown to be increasingly characterized by radical change and frequent disruption to their way of life. The regime’s focus on security had isolated Egyptian Nubians, as it became difficult for them to enter Sudan and visit their relatives – they had to complete a long bureaucratic process in order to register themselves and enter Sudanese Nubia.45 This further weakened the fabric of the greater Nubian community as many relatives were divided from each other. The worst came with the construction of the dam, which increased the anxieties and concerns of both Egyptian and Sudanese Nubians. At a conference in 1986, Sudanese Nubian Ali Osman proclaimed that, “there was no doubt in our minds and sentiments that the building of the High Dam was a selfish political and cultural aggression mounted by the…governments of Egypt and Sudan against the peaceful Nubians.”46 Osman’s opinion was reflected in many traditional Nubian songs, tales, and poems which expressed similar disapproval and dissatisfaction.47 Even in Sudan where Nubians enjoyed a certain level of comfort, political rallies and protests against relocation took place. Some leaders were even arrested and jailed for months as a result of their dissent.48 Loss of land was not the only point of contention: their resettlement also symbolized that “they are not a single people, but they are in fact Egyptian Nubians and Sudanese Nubians who could and would live apart.”49 Relocation represented how the state would enforce the continued physical separation of the Nubians, and signified the state’s lack of respect for their collective identity. Furthermore, the aloof attitudes of their respective governments signaled that the Nubians had no autonomy and would remain victim to the modern nation-state and its apparatus. While the Sudanese government did attempt to approach relocation in a somewhat just and considerate manner, the evacuation of Egyptian Nubians was a “relatively orderly affair” that did not seek to accommodate the concerns of Egyptian Nubians.50 The Sudanese government made efforts to maintain the appearance of taking the Sudanese Nubian population’s interests into consideration.51 They implemented a national committee for the High Dam which aimed to “safeguard the interests of the settlers.”52 The committee eventually decided upon Khashim Al-Girba, a town in the north-east, as the area of resettlement.53 The town was suburban, which meant that the Nubians would come into frequent contact with urbanized populations. It is unlikely that this arrangement was a coincidence. As Hasan Dafala, the Sudanese civil servant placed in charge of the Sudanese relocation efforts explains, “the planners followed an evolutionary concept of development and modernization: a better society and economy would replace the antiquated, traditional way of life of the Nubians.”54 The phrase “replaced the antiquated, traditional way of life” is important to analyze because it depicts how the government hoped that the Nubian’s movement to suburban areas would assimilate them into the mainstream national identity. As their villages isolated them from the wider population, their existence remained a point of contention for the government. Even though Sudanese Nubians were treated more favorably than Egyptian Nubians, their distinct identity remained a looming presence that threatened the composition of modern Sudanese society.

The remarks of the respective heads of state to the Nubian people serve as another indication of their frame of mind and level of concern for the group. Sudanese President Abboud arrived in Wadi Halfa, the unofficial capital of Sudanese Nubia, on December 6, 1960 and delivered a passionate speech. He began by stating, “I had the impression that the impact of the event was hard upon you…and so I thought of coming here to stand by during this critical moment; but when I saw you today, I found you in a morale higher and spirit better than our own.”55 Dafalla, who witnessed

the speech, remarks how, “At this point his voice was choked…and tears were seen to fall from under his glasses.”56 The sincerity of Abboud’s emotion is undermined by the fact that it was clear that significant efforts were made to showcase that the administration was concerned. He continued on to say, “I promise to accept your choice of place, none of you will be forced to go anywhere against his will.”57 Abboud’s sentiments were perhaps an attempt to demonstrate how important Nubians were to Sudanese society. After all, he landed in Wadi Halfa with the Nubian Minister of Health Dr. Mohamed Ali. However, many Nubians considered Abboud’s speech merely a performance, aimed at quelling any dissent that might threaten his nationalist ideology.58

Nevertheless, Abboud’s passionate remarks paralleled Nasser’s speech to Egyptian Nubians on January 10, 1960 in Aswan. Nasser considered the High Dam an irrefutably positive development: he proclaimed to the Nubians that “this will be an opportunity for you to also participate in the industrial renaissance in which we are walking today.”59 Framing the High Dam as an ‘opportunity’ for Nubian participation in the modern nation-state is representative of Nasser’s continued push for Nubians to prove their commitment to the country. He described acceptance of resettlement as “cooperation based on preserving our sovereignty and independence”60 – once again invoking nationalistic terminology to emphasize the importance of the state. While Nasser’s speech is a testament to his dedication to the build-up and modernization of Egypt, it is also indicative of how any resistance or opposition to thesedevelopment efforts was synonymous with a lack of nationalistic vision and devotion. The construction of the High Dam in 1964 was a devastating blow as it submerged Old Nubia and all of its villages along with its agricultural land, date trees, and historic remains.61 The relocation of Egyptian Nubians had taken place in 1963: they were transported from the land along the Nile and the Sudanese border to an area at Kom Obo, 40 kilometers north of Aswan.62 Meanwhile, Sudanese Nubians were also evacuated in 1963 from Wadi Halfa to Khashim al Gharbia. The resettlement communities built by the government were unceremoniously arranged according to family size, with no regard for the established tribal ties that existed in Old Nubia.63 The houses in Old Nubia were organized by tribal district and kinship networks and were often large and spacious, with distinct artistic patterns on the outside of significance to Nubian culture. However, the new spatial organization in the resettled organizations meant that “tribes and families who used to live next to each other, were separated and dispersed amongst non-

relatives and strangers.”64 This put a dent in the practies and identities of the distinct tribes as the organic nature of the community was disrupted. In Egypt in particular, new foreign neighbors posed another source of concern, as Kom Ombo was inhabited by a large number of upper-class Egyptians, or The Sayiidis.65 These new segregated communities disconnected Nubians from their tribal elders and networks and left them to integrate into the suburban atmosphere. Contact with mainstream Egyptian life also increased after the government failed to properly execute land compensation. Each household received about one acre upon arrival, and were promised the same amount of land they had in Old Nubia. However, according to Fahim, by 1979 only 60 percent of resettled families received new land.66 Furthermore, the quality of the new land was incomparable to that of Old Nubia. For example, the soil of Old Nubia was rich and plentiful, and the proximity of tribal networks meant that it was often cultivated in a communal way.67 Furthermore, after resettlement, a new law dictated that, “every person receiving land must become a member of the local government controlled ‘co-operative’ which can require the planting of certain crops, in the instance of New Nubia, each landowner was required to put 40% of his land to sugar cane.”68 The consequent disruptions to both Nubian communities and agricultural practices further distanced Nubians from the practices that constituted their unique identities. The lack of agricultural income also meant that Nubians in both Egypt and Sudan migrated in droves to major cities following resettlement in order to seek opportunities for wage labor.69 In Egyptian Nubia, some villages had no adult men present due to the increase in labor migration.70 Increased contact with the city centers meant Nubian men grew to be exposed to orthodox Islamic practice that differed from their own religious practices, and were required to converse more frequently in the Arabic language.71 However, both Nubian women and men were continuously aware of their status as ‘other.’ They continued to be stigmatized for their skin color and grew to be more aware of their ‘otherness’ amongst the mainstream population.72 Although the Egyptian government hoped resettlement would ignite Nubian assimilation into the national fabric, the Nubians only grew to be increasingly conscious of the differences between them and their fellow countrymen. The pre-relocation ritualistic way of life was distorted and erased by mainstream Arabic and Islamic culture in both the Egyptian and Sudanese nation-

states. The protection of the Nubian village was lost, and exposure to the established national culture slowly diluted traditional Nubian rituals and practices. Although there were significant attempts to hold on to customary practices, the new structure and environment made it increasingly difficult to preserve the blending of pagan religious practices and Islamic components which formed the core of Nubian identity. Loss of traditional practices extended to the commemoration of life-events such as weddings, deaths, and births, which involved the Nile as the symbolic heart of Nubia.73 Soon, pressure from male labor migrants to, “stamp out pagan and popular practices,” as they were ‘unorthodox’ and ‘religiously incorrect’ began to develop.74 Fahim details this experience in Egypt, and explains how religious factionalism was not unique to Nubians, but was, “an extension of a nation-wide movement.”75 Increased contact between Nubian men and orthodox leaders during their urban work experiences produced the pressures to conform.76 Nile ceremonies were almost completely eliminated as the new resettlement location was too far from the river.77 The slow death of Nubian cultural practices is simultaneously evidence of their slow assimilation into mainstream culture. Their proximity to urban centres infiltrated their ethnic structures and gradually eroded the internal composition of Nubian societies. Sudanese Nubians were acquainted with the cultural structure of the country, and thus were able to assimilate more seamlessly. Khartoum was home to many Nubian clubs, which allowed migrant laborers to assimilate into the urban work structure while also maintaining their heritage.78 Furthermore, they did not face heavy discrimination against their skin color and thus had a different experience than did Egyptian Nubians. Geiser states that “unquestionably, one of the major objectives of the Egyptian administration in planning the resettlement has been to integrate Nubians more fully into national life.”79 Young Nubians were enrolled in the national education system which operated exclusively in the Arabic language, and promoted Egyptian popular culture and nationalist ideology.80 Their proximity to upper-class Egyptians and the wider population also meant an increase in the influence of orthodox Islamic practices. Men began to pray at the local mosque before wedd-ings – a practice that was unusual in Nubian culture –while women began to pray five times a day and prioritized the memorization of the Quran.81 Exposure to Egyptian society was also exacerbated by television, which was a staple of the resettled Nubian household.82 Through modern devices and communal networks mainstream culture flowed into the crevice of every Nubian home.

The exposure of Nubians to the Arabic-Islamic structure in their respective countries both eroded Nubian linguistic and cultural diversity, and also reinforced their self-perception as a distinct ethnic group. As noted, the populations of Old Nubia were not cohesive nor uniform but were divided amongst tribal lines. In their former home, these differences were apparent and inherent to their societal structure. While resettlement led to a significant rise in assimilation, which continued to grow throughout the years, it also resulted in Nubians discarding their tribal markers and uniting under the umbrella term of ‘Nubian’ – the identity prescribed to them by outsiders.83 As the distance grew between them and their intra-group affiliations, they tended to hold on to their core identity. By identifying simply as Nubian, they effectively preserved the image of their ‘blessed land’ and declared their fondness for it. In the present day, Nubian languages continue to die out, with only elders being able to speak their dialect fluently.84 Nubian customary practices have also become a relic of a historic past, as popular Egyptian and Sudanese culture has become dominant. However, the Nubian experience is not uncommon. The carving of arbitrary modern borders has often threatened the very existence of ethnic groups as they become vulnerable to the nationalist ideologies that glorify a specific ethno-linguistic and religious identity as indicative of the ideal citizen.

The Arab world itself has a unique history of nationalisms. The rise of independent Arab states in the 1950s and 1960s laid the structure for the ideologies that would characterize the Arab nations for years to come. Gamal Abdel-Nasser’s preoccupation with thwarting European influence and Ibrahim Abboud’s concern over internal oppositions to his rule meant that the internal stability of both the Egyptian and Sudanese nation was the main priority of their governments. The price of this stability was that Nubians had to endure constant hardship for the ‘greater’ good of the nation –a sacrifice that resulted in the dissolution of their traditional societies and practices. The Nubian experience demonstrates that the nationalist framework remains a

rigid and unforgiving structure that often leaves little room for alternative expressions of reality and individuality. The resettling of Nubians and the erasure of their cultural identity represents the modern nation-state’s declared requirement of assimilation, and its willingness to control ‘outsiders’ in order to maintain the cohesive image of a united peoples.

Notes

17 Fluehr-Lobban and Lobban, “New Social Movements,” 315. 18 Sharkey, Living with Colonialism, 13. 19 Hale, “The Changing Ethnic Identity,” 132. 20 Dafalla, The Nubian Exodus, 66. 21 Andreas Kronberg, “Nubian Culture in the Sudan in the 20th Century: State of Research,”(presentation, Nubian Culture: Past and Present: Main Papers Presented at the Sixth International Conference for Nubian Studies, Uppsala, Swedden, 11-16 August 1986), edited by T. Hägg, 390-418. (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International), 1987.

1 Sondra Dungan Hale, “The Changing Ethnic Identity of Nubians in an Urban Milieu Khartoum, Sudan,” PhD diss., (University of California, Los Angeles, 1979), 96.

2 Christine Gilmore, “‘A Minor Literature in a Major Voice’: Narrating Nubian Identity in Contemporary Egypt,” Alif: Journal of Comparative Poetics 35 (2015): 53. 3 Gilmore, “A Minor Literature:” 53. 4 Ibid. 5 Hale, “The Changing Ethnic Identity,” 82. 6Ibid. 7 Hale, “The Changing Ethnic Identity,” 84. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid. 10 Hassan Dafalla, The Nubian Exodus. (London: C. Hurst. in association with the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies Uppsala, 1975,), 45. 11 Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban and Richard A. Lobban, “New Social Movements in Nubian Identity among Nubians in Egypt and Sudan,” in New Social Movements in the African Diaspora: Challenging Global Apartheid, ed. Leith Mullings and Manning Marable, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, 314. 12 Gilmore, “A Minor Literature,” 53. 13 Robert A. Fernea and Aleya Rouchdy, “Contemporary Egyptian Nubians,” (presentation, Nubian Culture: Past and Present: Main Papers Presented at the Sixth International Conference for Nubian Studies, Uppsala, Sweden, 11-16 August 1986), edited by T. Hägg, 365–88. (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International), 1987. 370. 14 Ibid. 15 Fluehr-Lobban and Lobban, “New Social Movements,” 315. 16 Heather J. Sharkey, Living with Colonialism: Nationalism and Culture in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 30. 391. 22 Sharkey, Living with Colonialism, 30. 23 Dafalla, The Nubian Exodus, 62. 24 Kronberg, “Nubian Culture in the Sudan,” 396. 25 Kronberg, “Nubian Culture in the Sudan,” 391. 26 Robert A. Fernea and John G. Kennedy, “Initial Adaptations to Resettlement: A New Life for Egyptian Nubians,” Current Anthropology 7, 3 (1966): 398. 27 Fernea and Kennedy, “Initial Adaptations to Resettlement:” 368. 28 Ibid. 29 Fernea and Kennedy, “Initial Adaptations to Resettlement:” 369. 30 Fernea and Kennedy, “Initial Adaptations to Resettlement:” 369. 31 Fernea and Kennedy, “Initial Adaptations to Resettlement:” 370. 32 Fernea and Kennedy, “Initial Adaptations to Resettlement:” 379. 33 David DiMeo, “Unimaginable Community: The Failure of Nubian Nationalism in Idris Ali's Dongola,” Research in African Literatures 46, 1 (2015): 78. 34 Maja Janmyr, “Nubians in Contemporary Egypt: Mobilizing Return to Ancestral Lands,” Middle East Critique 25, 2 (2016): 131. 35 Fernea and Kennedy, “Initial Adaptations to Resettlement:” 368. 36 Fernea and Kennedy, “Initial Adaptations to Resettlement:” 369 -370. 37 Fernea and Kennedy, “Initial Adaptations to Resettlement:” 371. 38 Dafalla, The Nubian Exodus, 92. 39 Alan W. Horton, “The Egyptian Nubians: Some Information on Their Ethnography and Resettlement,” Northeast Africa Series 11, 2 (March 1964), 286. 40 DiMeo, “Unimaginable Community:” 73. 41 Fernea and Kennedy, “Initial Adaptations to Resettlement:” 369. 42 DiMeo, “Unimaginable Community:” 76. 43 Dafalla, The Nubian Exodus, 86. 44 DiMeo, “Unimaginable Community:” 77. 45 Sherif Mohyeldeen, The Egypt-Sudan Border: A Story of Unfulfilled Promise, (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2020), 2. 46 Ali Osman Moh Salih, “Nubian Culture in the 20th Century: Comments on Session IV,” (presentation, Nubian Culture: Past and Present: Main Papers Presented at the Sixth International Conference for Nubian Studies, Uppsala, Sweden, 11-16 August 1986), edited by T. Hägg, 419-432. (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International), 421. 47 Ibid. 48 Kronberg, “Nubian Culture in the Sudan,” 408. 49 Salih, “Nubian Culture in the 20th Century,” 42. 50 Kronberg, “Nubian Culture in the Sudan,” 390.

51 Ibid. 52 Ibid. 53 Dafalla, The Nubian Exodus, 403. 54 Ibid. 55 Dafalla, The Nubian Exodus, 92. 56 Ibid. 57 Dafalla, The Nubian Exodus, 92. 58 Ibid. 59 Gamal Abdel Nasser, “The address by President Gamal Abdel Nasser to the People of Nubia,” translated by Leena Badri (speech, January 11, 1960), Bibliotheca Alexandrina, http:// www.nasser.org/MediaViewer.aspx?VideoID=SPCH-AUD-23392en.

60 Gamal Abdel Nasser, “The Address by President Gamal Abdel Nasser at the Opening of the Power Plant of the Aswan Low Dam,” translated by Leena Badri (speech, January 10, 1960), Bibliotheca Alexandrina, http://www.nasser.org/TextViewer.aspx? TextID=SPCH-806-en. 61 Maja Janmyr, “Nubians in Contemporary Egypt:” 128. 62 Mary Youssef, “The Aesthetics of Difference: History and Representations of Otherness in Al-Nubi and Wahat Al-Ghurub,” Alif: Journal of Comparative Poetics 35 (2015): 36. 63 Horton, “The Egyptian Nubians:” 295. 64 Ibid. 65 Peter Geiser, “The Myth of the Dam,” American Anthropological Association 75, 1 (1973): 186. 66 Fernea and Kennedy, “Initial Adaptations to Resettlement:” 374. 67 Ibid. 68 Horton, “The Egyptian Nubians:” 296. 69 Naglaa Mahmoud, “Islam, Migration, and Nubian Women in Egypt: Muhammad Khalil Qasim's Al-Shamandurah & Al-Khalah Aycha,” Dotawo: A Journal of Nubian Studies 5 (2018): 151. 70 Gilmore, “A Minor Literature in a Major Voice:” 287. 71 Mahmoud, “Islam, Migration, and Nubian Women:” 151. 72 Ibid. 73 Hussein M. Fahim, “Change in Religion in a Resettled Nubian Community, Upper Egypt,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 4, 2 (1973): 167. 74 Fahim, “Change in Religion:” 173. 75 Ibid. 76 Fahim, “Change in Religion:” 176. 77 Fahim, “Change in Religion:” 173. 78 Hale, “The Changing Ethnic Identity,” 369-370. 79 Geiser, “The Myth of the Dam:” 354. 80 Ibid. 81 Fernea and Rouchdy. “Contemporary Egyptian Nubians,” 377. 82 Ibid. 83 Geiser, “The Myth of the Dam:” 354. 84 Fluehr-Lobban and Lobban. “New Social Movements in Nubian Identity,” 313.

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