Mykola Riabchuk "Eastern Europe since 1989: between loosened authoritarianism and unconsolidated dem by sew_uw

Dr. Riabchuk’s examination of the political processes after the fall of communism begins with a look at how Eastern Europe was construed by various Western authors in centuries past and in seven chapters discusses the collapse of the Soviet empire, the hybrid democratization processes throu ghout the region, Russia’s abortive transition, and an analysis of what to expect in the future. The authors that Mykola Riabchuk draws on to weave his tale of change in the region are well-known to students at the Centre for East European Studies, but Professor Riabchuk’s concise and illuminating examination of the processes as a whole invite further exploration of the topic and is a useful tool in the study of the region today. Thus book is a useful addition to the syllabuses of courses offered by the Centre and with a bit of editing future editions of this extremely interesting work will become part of the canon on Eastern and Central Europe. Dr. John S. Micgiel, visiting professor Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw

LAT

ISBN 978-83-61325-88-8

Jubileusz

Studium

Europy Wschodniej

9 788361 325888

Uniwersytet Warszawski

1990-2020 STUDIUM EUROPY WSCHODNIEJ

U N I W E R S Y T E T WA R S Z AW S K I

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Erudycyjna książka Mykoły Riabczuka, długoletniego profesora gościnnego Studium Europy Wschodniej z pewnością powinna się znaleźć w sylabusach każdej uczelni, na której wykłada się o procesach transformacji w Europie Wschodniej. Uznawaną za klasyczną interpretację przemian w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej Samuela Huntingtona – „postęp demokracji w świecie” Autor zestawia z inną często przywoływaną analizą Roberta Putnama („path dependence”), przedstawiając ramy interpretacyjne procesów lokalnych z globalnego punktu widzenia. Rzecz jasna, tego rodzaju podejście zawsze jest obarczone ryzykiem zbyt wielkiego uogólnienia, co Mykoła Riabczuk uświadamia czytelnikowi. Analizując przyczyny niepowodzeń lub tylko częściowego powodzenia reform, Autor wprowadza pojęcia systemu hybrydowego oraz szarej strefy w nieco innym, niż powszechnie przyjętym znaczeniach, wykazując, jak opanowana do perfekcji „sztuka imitacji” udaremnia głębsze przemiany gospodarcze i społeczne. Mykoła Riabczuk kończy swój cykl wykładów pytaniem o przyszłość demokracji w Europie Środowo-Wschodniej i powraca do dwu głównych schematów interpretacyjnych procesów transformacji (Huntigntona i Putnama), wyraźnie zaznaczając, że sukces demokratyzacji i jego trwałość zależy nie tylko od czynników hisotrycznych, konstelacji geopolitycznej, ale nade wszystko od determinacji społeczeństwa i liderów. Absolutny „must read” – nie tylko dla osób zajmujących się Europą Środkowo-Wschodnią. Prof. Aleksandra Hnatiuk Uniwersytet Narodowy „Akademia Kijowsko-Mohylańska” Studium Europy Wschodniej, Uniwersytet Warszawski

BEO

Mykola Riabchuk EASTERN EUROPE SINCE 1989: BETWEEN LOOSENED AUTHORITARIANISM AND UNCONSOLIDATED DEMOCRACY

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B i b l i o t h e c a E u r o pa e O r i e n t a l i s

Mykola Riabchuk (1953) is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Political and Nationalities’ Studies, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, and a guest lecturer at the University of Warsaw and Ukrainian Catholic University in Lviv. Since 2014, he headed the Ukrainian PEN-center and the jury of the “Angelus” international literary award. Dr. Riabchuk penned several books and many articles on civil society, state/nation building, nationalism, national identity, and postcommunist transition in Eastern Europe, particularly in Ukraine. Five of his books were translated into Polish, and one into French (De la « Petite-Russie » à l`Ukraine, 2003), German (Die reale und die imaginierte Ukraine, 2005), and Hungarian (A ket Ukraina, 2015). His last book “At the Fence of Metternich’s Garden. Essays on Europe, Ukraine, and Europeanization” was written in English and published by ibidem Verlag in 2020.

Mykola Riabchuk

EASTERN EUROPE SINCE 1989 BETWEEN LOOSENED AUTHORITARIANISM AND UNCONSOLIDATED DEMOCRACY Essays From Lectures

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Eastern Europe Since 1989

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Mykola Riabchuk

EASTERN EUROPE SINCE 1989

Between Loosened Authoritarianism andÂ Unconsolidated Democracy Essays From Lectures WARSZAWA 2020

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Editorial Reviews/Recenzje wydawnicze Prof. Aleksandra Hnatiuk Studium Europy Wschodniej UW, Uniwersytet Narodowy „Akademia Kijowsko-Mohylańska” Dr John S. Micgiel, visiting professor Studium Europy Wschodniej UW Editing of the series “30 volumes for the 30th anniversary of SEW”/ Redakcja językowa serii „30 tomów na 30-lecie SEW” Marek Gołkowski (Studium Europy Wschodniej UW) Secretariat of the series/Sekretariat serii Aleksander Skydan (Studium Europy Wschodniej UW) Proof-reading/Korekta językowa: Studium Europy Wschodniej UW (Lauren Dubovski) Cover and book design/Projekt okładki i książki Studium Europy Wschodniej UW (Hubert Karasiewicz) Indexes/Indeksy Author Layout/Skład i łamanie „TYRSA” Sp. z o.o. Concept of the publishing series „Bibliotheca Europae Orientalis”/ Koncepcja serii wydawniczej „Bibliotheca Europae Orientalis” Jan Malicki Printing & binding/Druk i oprawa Duo Studio Distribution/Kolportaż: tel. +48 22 55 27 990 e-mail: wydawnictwa.studium@uw.edu.pl © by Studium Europy Wschodniej UW & Mykola Riabchuk Warsaw 2020 UNIWERSYTET WARSZAWSKI First edition ISBN 978-83-61325-88-8 W serii „30 tomów na 30-lecie Studium” – tom No 9/30

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W serii „30 tomów na 30-lecie Studium Europy Wschodniej” tom № 9

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Zadanie Publiczne współfinansowane przez Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych RP w konkursie „Dyplomacja Publiczna 2020 – nowy wymiar”

The publication expresses only the point of view of the author and cannot be equated to the official position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Poland

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Jubileusz. Studium Europy Wschodniej. 1990–2020 „30 tomów na 30-lecie”

ZAS BIEGNIE niezwykle szybko. Tym na pozór banalnym stwierdzeniem chciałbym opisać odczucia moje własne, jako osoby od lat kierującej Studium Europy Wschodniej, a także i moich kolegów, którzy stwierdziwszy fakt zbliżającego się Jubileuszu 30-lecia, przyjęli to z ogromnym zaskoczeniem. To prawda, można się zastanawiać, jak to się stało, że 30 lat przebiegło tak szybko, ale ogromnie uspokaja nadzieja, wręcz przekonanie, że tego czasu nie zmarnowaliśmy. Nasze 30-lecie to bowiem setki konferencji, to setki wydawnictw, to już tysiące absolwentów szkół i programów stypendialnych, to także rozległa współpraca międzynarodowa, która zaowocowała wręcz założeniem kilku Stacji SEW poza granicami. A wreszcie to przywrócenie, w 1998 r., po ponad półwieczu nieistnienia regularnych studiów wschodnich w Polsce (ostatni nabór studentów, w Wilnie i Warszawie, przeprowadzono latem 1939 r.). A dziś, w dniu Jubileuszu 30-lecia, Studium może się chlubić grupą już kilkuset absolwentów – młodych dobrze wykształconych specjalistów „od spraw wschodnich”, osiągających niekiedy już poważne kariery, pochodzących przy tym zarówno z Polski, jak i dzięki stypendiom rządowym, z całego regionu. Tu mogę jedynie potwierdzić – „kadry są najważniejsze”... Zacząłem się zastanawiać, jak można i jak należy ten Jubileusz uczcić. Zbiegło się to z faktem, że rok 2020 jest naprawdę rokiem nadzwyczajnym. Rozwój epidemii koronawirusa przyniósł decyzję zamknięcia najpierw zajęć akademickich i przeniesienia ich do systemu on line, a następnie przejście całego Zespołu Studium

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na wiele tygodni do pracy zdalnej. To, wbrew pozorom, pomogło w decyzji o sposobach uczczenia Jubileuszu, albowiem pozwoliło zmienić bieżące obowiązki administracyjne na spisywanie, opracowywanie i korekty tekstów. Postanowiliśmy bowiem uczcić Jubileusz jednostki dydaktyczno-naukowej w sposób wzorcowo naukowy – przez wydanie serii książek. Początkowy plan obejmował jedynie edycję kilku podręczników profesorów wizytujących, którzy wykładali dla studentów Studiów Wschodnich w ciągu ostatniego 10-lecia. Ale następnie plany i ambicje stawały się coraz większe i rozległe. W ich wyniku seria podręczników profesorów wizytujących zajmie jedynie pierwsze 10 pozycji. Jest to seria bardzo ważna, bardzo znacząca, a książki te latami będą służyć studentom Studiów Wschodnich i zapewne nie tylko. Ale ta sytuacja wirusowa oraz kierująca niżej podpisanym ambicja nadzwyczajnego uczczenia Jubileuszu doprowadziły do rezultatu, jestem przekonany, również nadzwyczajnego. Oto w roku, w którym wirus zablokował lub uniemożliwił większość prac na uczelniach, nam udało się przygotować 30 tomów w ogromnej większości całkowicie oryginalnych, bądź na nowo opracowanych. Tak właśnie zespół Studium Europy Wschodniej przygotował i uczcił Jubileusz swego 30-lecia – „30 tomów na 30-lecie Studium”. Dziękuję Autorowi niniejszego Tomu, dziękuję Autorom artykułów, dziękuję wszystkim Autorom całej serii, dziękuję wszystkim osobom, dzięki którym ten wspaniały plan udało się w tak trudnym czasie zrealizować. Składam gratulacje obecnym i dawnym Wykładowcom, Pracownikom i Współpracownikom Studium, którzy mają prawo do słusznej dumy z Jubileuszu. JAN MALICKI Studium Europy Wschodniej Uniwersytet Warszawski

Tom niniejszy nosi numer 9.

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30 years of Centre for East European Studies (1990–2020) „30 volumes for the 30th anniversary”

IME IS RUNNING very fast. With this seemingly banal statement, I would like to describe my own feelings as the person who has been in charge of the Centre for East European Studies for years, as well as my colleagues who, having discovered the upcoming Jubilee, received it with great surprise. True, you may wonder how it happened that the 30 years passed so quickly, but it is extremely reassuring to hope, even to the belief that we have not wasted this time. Our 30th anniversary means hundreds of conferences, hundreds of books published, thousands of graduates of schools and scholarship programs, as well as extensive international cooperation, which has resulted in the establishment of several Centre for East European Studies abroad. Finally, in 1998, after more than half a century of non-existence, the regular Eastern studies were restored in Poland (the last recruitment of students, in Vilnius and Warsaw, was carried out in the summer of 1939). And today, on the 30th Jubilee, the Centre can be proud of a group of several hundred graduates – young, well-educated specialists in „Eastern affairs”, already achieving serious careers, both from Poland and, thanks to government scholarships, from all over the region. Here I can only confirm – „Cadres decide everything”... I began to wonder how this Jubilee could be celebrated and how it should be celebrated. This coincided with the fact that 2020 is truly an extraordinary year. The development of the coronavirus epidemic has resulted in the decision to first close academic classes and transfer 9

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them to the Internet, and then move the entire Centre team to work remotely for many weeks. Contrary to appearances, this has helped in the decision to celebrate the Jubilee, as it has allowed us to change the current administrative duties into writing, editing and correcting texts. We have decided to celebrate the Jubilee of the teaching and research unit in an exemplary scientific way – by publishing a series of books. The initial plan was only to edit a few handbooks of visiting professors who have taught to students of East European Studies over the past 10 years. Nevertheless, then the plans and ambitions grew larger and larger. As a result, the series of visiting professors’ textbooks will only take the top 10 positions. It is a very important, very significant series, and these books will serve students of East European Studies for years and probably not only them. But this viral situation and the ambition of the undersigned to celebrate the Jubilee in an extraordinary manner will also lead to, I am sure, an extraordinary result. Here is the year when the virus blocked or prevented so many activities in universities, we still managed to produce 30 volumes, the vast majority of them entirely original or reworked. This is how the team of East European Studies prepared and celebrated the Jubilee of its 30th anniversary – „30 volumes for the 30th anniversary of the Centre”. I would like to thank the author of this volume, and all the authors of the entire series, all the people who made this wonderful plan possible. I would like to congratulate the present and former Lecturers, Employees and Associates of the Centre who have the right to be justly proud of the Jubilee. JAN MALICKI Centre for East European Studies University of Warsaw

This volume is numbered 9.

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Contents Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Chapter 1: What’s in a Name? Eastern Europe as a Historical Phenomenon and Discursive Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 The paradoxes of “philosophic geography” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Inventing “Central East Europe” and Kundera’s fallacy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 The development of underdevelopment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 The end of “Central East Europe” and the new continental fault-lines. 34 Chapter 2: End of Communism and Collapse of Empire: Structural Determinants, External Factors, and Short- and Long-Term Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Systemic decline. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Gorbachev’s rescue mission. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The end of the communist bloc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Dysfunctional institutions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Soviet disintegration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Divergent trajectories. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . In search of social capital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Chapter 3: East European Democratization in the Global Context: Blind Spots of the Transition Paradigm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Huntington’s “three waves” of democratization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The “thin” and “thick” notions of democracy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Democracy measurement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ushering in the “forth wave” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . “Fourth wave” anomalies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The “transition paradigm” and its pitfalls. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

41 42 47 49 52 55 58 61 67 67 72 76 79 83 85

Chapter 4: Hybrid Regimes in Post-Communist Eastern Europe: Transition in a “Gray Zone”. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 Democracy’s global hegemony . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

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Between “feckless democracy” and “dominant power politics”. . . . . . . 95 Perfecting the art of imitation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 The sustainability of semi-authoritarian regimes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 Western linkages and elite defections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

Chapter 5: The Dubious Strength of “Weak States”: Ukraine’s Ambiguous Transformation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 Non-revolutionary changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 The rise of electoral authoritarianism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 The strength and weakness of a “blackmail state”. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 Revolutionary upheavals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 Chapter 6: Making a Nation-State Out of the Empire: Russia’s Aborted Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 Russia’s secession from “Russia” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 In search of a new identity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145 East Slavonic “centers” and “peripheries”. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149 Putin’s rise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151 Whitewashing a rogue regime. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155 Under siege. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160 Chapter 7: The Future of Europe, the Future of Democracy. . . . . . . . . . . . . 166 Path-dependence versus path-defiance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169 East goes West. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172 Eastern partnership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178 Dark clouds and a silver lining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185 Addendum: Charts, Maps, Tables, and Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192 Bibliography. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195 Index of Names. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206 Indeks of Places . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208

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Introduction

his book summarizes a cycle of lectures delivered at SEW in the past decade. It examines political processes in Eastern Europe after the fall of the communist system and the collapse of the Soviet empire in 1989–1991. The unfolding developments not only ushered the whole set of new independent states onto the international scene but also revealed the striking diversity of their subsequent trajectories. The primary goal of the course is to explore the structural factors that determined their different development as well as the role of domestic and international actors that influenced the direction, speed, and scope of post-communist transformations. While the author keeps all of East Europe in mind, from the Baltic to Adriatic and the Black Sea, the main focus is on the post-Soviet part of Eastern Europe, the so-called “Western New Independent States” (a.k.a. “New Eastern Europe”), and specifically on Ukraine, as the most complicated, ambivalent, and graphical case of both the decommunization and decolonization processes. For a number of historical and geopolitical reasons, Ukraine became a laboratory of different policies and approaches to the transition, a focal point where different domestic and international forces interact, and a penetrating lens for the comparative scrutiny of similar and dissimilar processes in the region and their determinants. The tracing of this process is combined with political analysis of historical developments in post-communist Eastern Europe, drawn primarily from the theories of hybrid regimes, illiberal democracies, path-dependence, and revolutionary breakthroughs. The book is intended to be of use for historians, political scientists, experts, policy makers, and anybody interested in contemporary Eastern Europe. The book consists of seven chapters that roughly correspond with the seven lectures that comprise the course. The first chapter discusses the notion of Eastern Europe from the point of view of so-called “Philosophic Geography,” which attributes to different regions peculiar ideological connotations, and influences both their perception and international policies with regard to those entities. The second chapter – of a more historical nature – traces the process of the dual collapse of both the communist and

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the Soviet imperial systems, with due attention to both the structural and contingent factors of their collapse. The third chapter brings to the fore the notion of democracy and the set of values that it entails, and examines the process of democratization in Eastern Europe within a broader global and historical context. The fourth chapter deals with the phenomenon of “hybrid regimes” or so-called “imitative democracy” – as the most typical and ambiguous outcome of post-dictatorial transformations in both Eastern Europe and other parts of the world. The fifth chapter is a case study of Ukraine that exemplifies the peculiar syndrome of many hybrid regimes – “feckless democracy,” defined also as “pluralism by default.” The sixth chapter explores the opposite syndrome – of “dominant power politics,” as exemplified by today’s Russia; this case study also provides insight into the neo-imperial politics of that state, largely fueled by unsolved identity problems. The last, seventh chapter deliberates over the alleged democratic backsliding in Eastern Europe and all over the world, and the challenges faced by the European Union that indicate rather a crisis of institutions and policies than of ideas and principles. Each chapter is supplemented with a list of suggested reading, and a detailed bibliography is additionally provided at the end of the book. A set of relevant graphs and tables is included in the addendum to illustrate the dynamics of post-communist transition in Eastern Europe in charts and figures. This book would never have emerged without the encouragement and guardianship of Professor Jan Malicki, so he deserves my greatest thanks. I also appreciate the hospitality of the Ukrainian Institute at Harvard University, which supported my work in Cambridge, Massachusetts with a research fellowship, and the Jacyk Program at the University of Toronto, which provided me with valuable internet access to library resources during the quarantine.

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Chapter 1 What’s in a Name? Eastern Europe as a Historical Phenomenon and Discursive Construction

“I

n the beginning, there was no Europe. All there was, for five million years, was a long, sinuous peninsula with no name, set like the figurehead of a ship on the prow of the world’s largest land mass. [...] Modern geographers classify it, like India, as a subcontinent of Eurasia: “a cape of the old continent, a western appendix of Asia’.”1 This is how Norman Davies defines the primary object of exploration in his seminal, thousand-plus pages long history of Europe. His quip is well-grounded: the continent, with an area of 10 million square miles, makes up only 6.7% of the total land area on the Earth – being 4.5 times smaller than Asia, three times smaller than Africa, and 2.4 times smaller than North America. From a genuinely geographical point of view, Europe is really a mere extension of the greater Eurasian landmass [Fig. 1.1.], a large but not giant entity roughly the size of China, Canada, or the United States. All continents have clear borders, being isolated from other landmasses by water; this is actually the main reason to define them as separate “continents.” Europe is the only exception: its eastern border is a pure virtuality, invisible on the ground and poorly defined in textbooks. It will suffice to mention that its border today, along the Caucasus and Ural Mountains, was established only in the 18th century. Initially, it was drawn along the Don River somewhere to the north, into the obscure lands of the Arctic. It oscillated for centuries, until was finally fixed by sheer political will and academic convention.

separate “continents”

1 N. Davies, Europe: A History [eBook], Pimlico Random House, London, 1997, p. 24, 128.

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Mykola Riabchuk

Figure 1.1. Europe in the early 18th century. Source: Didier Robert de Vaugondy, Universal Atlas (1737).

global leadership

So, why and how did this small piece of land, with dubious provenance and uncertain borders, acquire its status of a separate continent, on par with the others, or even the continent, inasmuch as the both global history and geography hinges on it? The question partly contains the answer. It was Europeans who “discovered” and comprehensively named all the other continents, mapped and explored them, and incorporated various local stories into the history of their own, disguised as global and universal. There was no global history until that point – just a chaotic and seemingly endless story of rise and decline of different empires and civilizations. It was Europe who took the lead in the race in the late Middle Ages, displaying a rapid rise and defying decline in global leadership [Fig. 1.2.]. Just as the histories of war are said to be written by the victors, the history (and geography) of the globe is written by the strongest, the richest, and the most discursively powerful participants in the process. The very structure of modern world maps – with Europe placed in their upper, “superior”

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part – largely reflects the dominant position of the continent, belonging to Western scholars and their institutionalized knowledge.2 In fact, there is no logical reason to construct maps as they are conveniently constructed – with the northern pole at the top – and not vice versa. It just looks “normal” to us, and we never question this “normalcy”; we check neither the reason for it (Europe’s hegemonic position) nor its consequences (the “naturalization” of that position, its discursive strengthening and its reproduction).

Figure 1.2. Queen Europe (Regina Europa). Source: Sebastian Müntzer, Cosmography (1554).

The paradoxes of “philosophic geography”

urope ushered in modernity as we know it today, and therefore, all things modern, including history and geography, are distinctly “European,” that is, Eurocentric. It does not mean that this hegemonic position goes completely unchallenged – both internationally, in the world, and domestically, in Europe. Starting from Edward Said’s acclaimed book Orientalism and a powerful surge of postcolonial studies in international, primarily Western academia, the dominance of the West (i.e., of Europe, inasmuch the America is Europe’s extension) is examined and deconstructed not only in social, political, and economic terms (as it

“philosophic geography”

2 N. Danforth, The End of History and the Last Map. Cartography and conflict in the post-Cold War world, [in:] “Foreign Policy,” 14 February 2020, https://foreignpolicy. com/2020/02/14/map-cartography-shaped-war-peace-end-of-history.

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was successfully done long ago by the Marxists), but also in terms of cultural paradigms, mental short-cuts, master narratives, and dominant discourses. This might be an interesting subfield of study per se, but its particular relevance for our debate stems from the fact that Eastern Europe has been constructed by Westerners as a kind of “internal Orient” – not so alien, remote, and exotic as the “true” Orient of the Middle East discussed by Said, but sufficiently wild, backward, and barbarian to be dismissed, ridiculed, and occasionally patronized. Larry Wolff, in his erudite and insightful book on the “invention” of Eastern Europe by the 18th-century French philosophes provides a detailed account of how the imaginary dividing line between the “cultured” South and “barbaric” North had been gradually redefined and reoriented, so as to separate the advanced and “progressive” West from the backward and “retrograde” East. The shift coincided with, and was consequential to, the decline of Italian city-republics and the rapid growth of the new centers of the emerging capitalist world-economy in London, Paris, and Amsterdam. Just as the new centers of the Enlightenment superseded the old centers of the Renaissance, the old lands of barbarism and backwardness in the north were correspondingly displaced to the east. The Enlightenment had to invent Western Europe and Eastern Europe together, as complementary concepts, defining each other by opposition and adjacency.3

But the shift was also collateral to the Enlightenment notion of “progress” as opposed to stagnation and backwardness, and the notion of “civilization” as an alternative to wildness, savagery, and barbarism. Wolff provides a great many anecdotal examples of othering and stereotyping that accompanied the shift – starting from Adam Olearius’s sudden discovery that the Muscovites have “the skin of the same color as that of other Europeans” to John Ledyard’s description of the border between Poland and Prussia as “the great barrier of Asiatic and European manners,” to Count de Ségur’s impression at the very same border that he “left Europe completely and retreated ten centuries in time” and to Mozart’s burlesque rendition of his trip from Vienna to Prague as an exotic journey from the West to the travestied “East” (even 3 L. Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1994, p. 5.

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though Prague, in fact, is located to the north of Vienna and, as Wolff remarks with a grain of salt, slightly to the west).4 Ledyard is credited in Wolff’s book as the inventor of so-called “Philosophic Geography” – that is, geography subordinated to specific philosophical values (ideological preferences). This is a kind of geography that led chancellor Metternich to proclaim, two hundred years ago, that Asia begins at the end of Landstrasse, i.e., in the southeastern outskirts of Vienna. And nowadays, it still makes his co-citizens believe that the Ukrainian border is much further away from Vienna than the Swiss border (even though in fact it is hundred kilometers closer), or that Kraków and Budapest are located closer to Moscow than to Paris. “Philosophic Geography” played an important and often disastrous role for East Europeans, especially at the end of the Second World War and its aftermath. The Yalta Conference held in February 1945 in Crimea meant a meeting of the heads of three allied states (the U.S.A., the U.K., and the Soviet Union) that discussed, inter alia, the future of Europe after the near and apparently inevitable defeat of the Nazi Germany. But for the hapless Easterners, it meant also their complete betrayal and cynical transfer by the Western allies from Nazi dominance to Soviet [Fig. 1.3.]. Remarkably, only Greece was spared from that ordeal, largely if not exclusively because of its image of the “cradle of the European civilization,” land of “immortal glories,” as Churchill had put it – contrary to all other, presumably unremarkable and therefore disposable nations of Eastern Europe. This was fully in line with “Philosophic Geography,” so the real continuity of modern Greece and Greeks with that homonymous “cradle” and its vaunted “glories” did not matter.5 “Philosophic Geography,” as Larry Wolff sarcastically remarked at another occasion, “was a free-spirited sport, so much that it was not actually necessary to travel to Eastern Europe in order to participate in its intellectual discovery.”6 Edward Said, in his classic book, defined Orientalism as “a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having 4 As quoted in Wolff, p. 6, 8, 11; and Davies, p. 54. 5 On the “invention” of modern Greece, see R. Beaton, The Romantic Construction of Greece, [in:] P. Hamilton (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of European Romanticism, Oxford University Press, p. 601–617. 6 Wolff, p. 7.

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Figure 1.3. Europe in 1948–1990. Source: Judt, 2005.

authority over the Orient.”7 Larry Wolff follows the suit when defining Western “knowledge” of Eastern Europe as a “style of intellectual mastery, integrating knowledge and power, perpetrating domination and subordination. As in the case of the Orient, so also with Eastern Europe, intellectual discovery and mastery could not be entirely separated from the possibility of real conquest.”8 It was not only Napoleon who employed this knowledge (having subsumed the Slavonic cultures and languages under the aegis of the École spéciale des langues orientales); and not only Hitler and Mussolini who brought some tenets of “Philosophic Geography” to their extremes. It was also, ironically, their opponents and nemeses, Churchill and Roosevelt, who employed that peculiar “knowledge” to justify the takeover of Eastern Europe by their indispensable Soviet ally. However similar the structure of Western knowledge of the European “East” and non-European “Orient” was, there were also important differences in both the ways of their othering and 7 E. Said, Orientalism, Pantheon Books, London, 1978, p. 3. 8 Wolff, p. 8.

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stereotyping, and in the practical use of that knowledge. The “Orient” was deemed completely alien, primordially and inexorably. It could be attractive at best – as a source of exoticism – or it could be menacing and destructive at worst, as a source of wildness and irrationality. It could be managed, placated, harnessed, and kept at bay, but never brought on par with “us.” The East of Europe was seen as semi-barbarian, backward but not completely alien. Redemption was possible, the gap between “more cultivated nations” and “those nations becoming cultivated at a later date” could be bridged, manners polished, laws and customs improved, backwardness overcome – under the enlightening guardianship of the Westerners.

Eastern Europe was located not as antipode of civilization, not down in the depths of barbarism, but rather on the developmental scale that measured the distance between civilization and barbarism... Eastern Europe was essentially in between, and by the nineteenth century these polar oppositions acquired the force of fixed formulas.

The ambiguity resulted from the principled contradiction between the Philosophic Geography that “casually excluded Eastern Europe from Europe, implicitly shifting it into Asia,” and scientific cartography that defied such construction and brought East European lands back onto the continent. Such uncertainty encouraged the construction of Eastern Europe as a paradox of simultaneous inclusion and exclusion, Europe but not Europe. Eastern Europe defined Western Europe by contrast, as the Orient defined the Occident, but was also made to mediate between Europe and the Orient. One might describe the invention of Eastern Europe as an intellectual project of demi-Orientalization.9

Orientalism

Balkanization

While Larry Wolff’s focus was primarily on Central East Europe and, to a degree, on Russia, Maria Todorova produced a sagacious book on the Balkans, drawing also on Said’s concept of “Orientalism” and, more generally, on Michel Foucault’s notion of “knowledge” as power, and of discourse as its symbolic manifestation and practical implementation. She was particularly concerned with the term (and phenomenon) of “Balkanism” and its catch-all derivative “Balkanization” – a Schimpfwort (swear 9 Wolff, p. 7, 13.

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word) that “not only had come to denote the parcelization of large and viable political units but also had become a synonym for a reversion to the tribal, the backward, the primitive, the barbarian.” What upset her in particular was the complete decontextualization of the term and its paradigmatic attachment to a great variety of irrelevant problems. The Balkans are not merely described as the “other” of Europe, as all East European lands are typically described. They are featured as particularly wild, and their inhabitants as primordially wicked and prone to irrational violence. “As with any generalization, this one is based on reductionism, but the reductionism and stereotyping of the Balkans has been of such degree and intensity that the discourse merits and requires special analysis.”10 In many regards, the experience of East Europeans with their Western brethren has been very traumatic. It has been overloaded with false expectations, bitter resentments, and poorly hidden psychological complexes – of inferiority, betrayal, abandonment, cheating, and underappreciation. They could not help but feel the gap between the lofty ideals proclaimed by the Western democracies, and their practical policies driven much less by ideals and much more by pragmatically calculated national interests. It was apparent long before the disgraceful attempt to accommodate Stalin in Yalta (1945) at the cost of Poland and other East European nations,11 or to appease Hitler in Munich (1938) at the cost of Czechoslovakia. Two decades earlier, British Prime Minister David Lloyd-George disclosed his principles with a charming imperial candidness, when declaring the will to trade not only with Bolsheviks but “even with cannibals.”12 And in 1933, at the height of the genocidal famine masterminded by Bolsheviks in Ukraine, the British Foreign Office, fully in line with those principles, reported secretly: The truth of the matter is, of course, that we have a certain amount of information about famine conditions in the south of Russia [sic],

10 M. Todorova, Imagining the Balkans, Oxford University Press, New York & Oxford, 1997, p. 3. See also V. Goldsworthy, Inventing Ruritania: The Imperialism of the Imagination, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1998; and M. Bakic-Hayden, Nesting Orientalisms: The Case of Former Yugoslavia, [in:] “Slavic Review” 1995, vol. 54, no. 4, p. 917–931. 11 S. Plokhy, Yalta: The Price of Peace, Viking, New York, 2010. 12 H. Fisher, Mr. Lloyd George’s Foreign Policy 1918–1922, [in:] “Foreign Affairs,” March 1923, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-kingdom/1923-03-15/ mr-lloyd-georges-foreign-policy-1918-1922.

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similar to that which had appeared in the press... We do not want to make it public, however, because the Soviet government would resent it and our relations with them would be prejudiced.13

This does not mean that the gap between noble ideals and the mundane reality of geopolitics could be completely bridged, or that the conflict between normative values and practical interests could be easily solved. Hans Morgenthau, the standard of the “realist” school in modern political thought, argued that “ethics in abstract” is not applicable in the field. The morality of political decisions should not be judged by intentions but by results. Essentially, this is anything but a recast of the old Karl von Clausewitz dictum on the politics as the art of possible.14 There is certainly some rationale in this pragmatic approach, but there is also a dangerous loophole in a seemingly logical argumentation that allows the (mis-)representation of any immoral steps as pragmatic, reasonably calculated, and only feasible. Nobody could expect NATO to bomb Moscow to stop Russian genocide in Chechnya – as they bombed Belgrade to rescue the Kosovars. And nobody wished the West to liberate the annexed Tibet or Crimea as they liberated Kuwait after Saddam Hussein had “re-unified” it with Iraq. Still, short of military invasion, there are many other instruments in international politics that could be employed, but usually are not. And this acquiescence reflects not so much the vaunted pragmatism of the Western leaders as their trivial cynicism and lack of integrity.15 All this has put Eastern Europeans in an awkward position. On the one hand, they have had many good reasons to feel betrayed, belittled, and alienated from the West. This could naturally result, as elsewhere on the globe, in zealous anti-Westernism,

13 M. Carynnyk, L. Luciuk, and B. Kordan (eds.), The Foreign Office and the Famine: British Documents on Ukraine and the Great Famine of 1932–1933, Limestone Press, Kingston, 1988, p. 397. 14 H. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Knopf, New York, 1948. See also D. Jones, M. Smith, Return to reason: reviving political realism in western foreign policy, [in:] “International Affairs,” 2015, vol. 91, no. 5, p. 933–952; B. Gewen, The Book That Shaped Foreign Policy for a Generation Has More to Say, [in:] “New York Times,” 9 May 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/09/books/ review/hans-morgenthau-politics-among-nations-henry-kissinger-george-kennan. html. 15 A. Motyl, The Surrealism of Realism. Reading the War in Ukraine, [in:] “Foreign Affairs,” 2015, vol. 94, no. 1, p. 75–84; M. Riabczuk, Metafory zdrady, [in:] “Kultura Enter,” 2009, vol. 2, no. 11–12, http://kulturaenter.pl/article/metafory-zdrady.

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nationalism, xenophobia, isolationism, and autarky. But, on the other hand, this political stance and ideological niche had already been occupied by the Soviets. Very few independently minded Easterners wished to identify themselves with the hated regime and to join its anti-Western crusade. Whatever hard feelings they may have had against the seemingly haughty and arrogant West, they had to choose it as the lesser of two evils. They were, in a sense, “Westernizers by default.” Their ambivalent hate-love attitude toward their Western brethren had been pronouncedly articulated by East European intellectuals in the 1980s, when they invented a peculiar concept of “Central East Europe” as a powerful argument for their “European belonging” and a passionate plea for “return to Europe,” to “normalcy.” For the Westerners, it was a timely reminder that the region could be more than “footnotes to Sovietology,” as Timothy Garton Ash aptly put it – that “East Berlin, Prague, and Budapest are not quite in the same position as Kiev or Vladivostok” and that “Siberia does not begin at Checkpoint Charlie.”16 (Whether Siberia really begins in Kyiv and whether Ukraine’s capital is exactly “in the same position as Vladivostok” was not discussed at the time, with some dramatic consequences apparent today).

Inventing “Central East Europe” and Kundera’s fallacy Central Europe

espite the semantic similarity to the earlier nineteenth-century term Mittleuropa [Fig. 1.4.], “Central Europe” was completely devoid of Pan-Germanic ideological connotations. On the contrary, it asserted the uniqueness and sovereignty of an endangered, small nation squeezed, for the latest part of their history, between Russia and Germany. Of many texts that elaborated the topic, Milan Kundera’s essay “The Tragedy of Central Europe” (1984) gained probably the highest prominence. Published originally in French,17 it was translated into a few dozen languages, 16 T. Ash, Does Central Europe Exist?, [in:] “New York Review of Books,” 9 October 1986, https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1986/10/09/does-central-europe-exist. 17 M. Kundera, Un Occident kidnappé, ou la tragédie de l’Europe centrale, [in:] “Le Débat” 1983, no. 5, p. 3–23.

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Figure 1.4. Habsburg Empire, 1914. Source: Wikipedia.

including the most-quoted English version in the influential New York Review of Books. The message Kundera conveyed to the Western audience was two-fold. On the one side, he provided multiple evidence of the region’s traditional, centuries-long engagement in European cultural life and substantial contribution to the common heritage. The region, he wrote, was neither different nor separate from the West, but integral and indivisible. It was actually a part of the West, unjustly cut off from its illustrious body and “stolen,” “kidnapped” (as the French title implied) by the sinister, essentially anti-European Russia. This does not make yet the region indisputably “Eastern.” Because Central Europe, in Kundera’s poetical narrative, is not a state, but a culture or a fate:

Its borders are imaginary and must be drawn and redrawn with each new historical situation. Central Europe therefore cannot be defined and determined by political frontiers [...] but by the great common situations that reassemble peoples, regroup them in ever new ways along the imaginary and ever-changing boundaries that mark a realm inhabited by the same memories, the same problems and conflicts, the same common tradition.

The second Kundera’s argument ran, subsequently, against the West’s parochial and myopic view of the region as allegedly

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“Eastern” and therefore different and rather legitimately relinquished into the Soviet sphere of influence. This could not have happened, he argued, if Western Europe itself was not “in the process of losing its own cultural identity,” if it still understood “its unity as a cultural unity,” rather than seeing in Central Europe “nothing but a political regime,” and downgrading thereby one of the crucial parts of its culture and history to the empty political construct of “Eastern Europe.”18 Kundera’s article gained high appraisal and became programmatic for the whole generation of Central East European intellectuals. It explicitly legitimized their ulterior “European dream” and coveted “return to normalcy,” and implicitly delegitimized their forcible inclusion into the Soviet realm and political subordination to the presumably non-European power. Yet the article also encountered severe criticism from various quarters. One of the first and most renowned responses came from the fellow émigré writer Joseph Brodsky, who correctly pointed out at Kundera’s “reductionist approach,,” excessive “generalizations,” “limited or lopsided” notion of European civilization, and misuse of “handy dichotomies” like East-West, feeling-reason, them-us and so forth.

The sad truth about him (and many of his East European brethren) is that this extraordinary writer has fallen an unwitting victim to the geopolitical certitude of his fate – the concept of an East-West divide... His sense of geography is conditioned by his sense of history.19

communist totalitarianism

Brodsky made many other pertinent points in his article. In particular, he aptly remarked that the modern police state was a product of the French Enlightenment, that Das Kapital was translated into Russian from German, and that the Soviet version of communism (so loathed by Kundera) was as much a product of Western rationalism as of Eastern emotional radicalism. He duly reminded that communist totalitarianism was not only exported by Russia, but it also encountered very strong resistance there – much stronger (Brodsky goes ad personam) than in Kundera’s own country, either in 1948 or 1968; that foreign tanks happened 18 M. Kundera, The Tragedy of Central Europe, [in:] “The New York Review of Books,” 26 April 1984, p. 36–37. 19 J. Brodsky, Why Milan Kundera Is Wrong about Dostoyevsky, [in:] “The New York Times,” 17 February 1985, http://www.nytimes.com/books/00/09/17/specials/ brodsky-kundera.html.

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to invade Prague not only from the hated East but also from the celebrated West; and that the last European war was by and large the “Western civilization’s civil war.” Despite its stylistic prowess and shrewd observations, Brodsky’s article did not attain, however, the prominence of Kundera’s text – partly because of its personal wisecracks against the opponent, and partly because it focused too much on a defense of Dostoyevsky and Russia, appearing perhaps too partisan. But the main flaw of Brodsky’s essay was, as the Bosnian writer Adin Ljuca contends, the same as Kundera’s: both failed to dig out of “handy dichotomies” and overcome them, both remained at the level of a “bad ping-pong match” (“‘a traumatized Czech’ vs. ‘a bigsouled Russian’ who, despite everything, seeks an alibi for himself”) – “as if Evil originated in the East or in the West,” rather than in each person’s words and deeds, choices and responsibility.20 The problem was barely new, as it had been already raised in 1968–1969 in the polemical exchange between Kundera and Vaclav Havel – specifically in the latter’s response to Kundera’s article “The Czech Lot” published a few months after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Havel adamantly rejected Kundera’s “pseudo-critical illusionism” epitomized, in his view, in the concept of the “Czech lot”: I do not believe in this fate, and I think that first and foremost we ourselves are the masters of our fate; we will not be freed from this by pleading selfishness nor by hiding behind our geographic position, nor by reference to our centuries-old lot of balancing between sovereignty and subjugation. Again, this is nothing but an abstraction cloaking our concrete responsibility for our concrete actions.21

Havel, with his impeccable moral sensitivity, very astutely noticed the threat of relativism, fatalism, and collective irresponsibility that may have resulted from assigning the “geographic position” a discursively overblown role. Ironically, 15 years later, the same essentialized and oversimplified “geographic” argument

20 A. Ljuca, From Nowhere with Love, [in:] “Spirit of Bosnia,” 5 March 2017, http://www. spiritofbosnia.org/volume-8-no-2-2013-april/an-essay-from-nowhere-with-love/. 21 Quoted in B. Herman, The Debate That Won’t Die: Havel and Kundera on Whether Protest Is Worthwhile, [in:] “RFE/RL Headlines,” 11 January 2012; https://www. rferl.org/a/debate_that_wont_die_havel_and_kundera_on_whether_protest_is_worthwhile/24448679.html.

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would be used to acquire a special status of the “stolen West” for a few privileged nations deemed “Central European” and therefore exceptional, different from all other captive nations, by the very fact of their historical and geographical provenance. Kundera, in fact, succumbed to the same playbook of “Philosophical Geography” that he seemed to vehemently renounce in its Soviet, “geopolitical” reincarnation. In both its editions, the 18th-century exclusivist pathos manifestly prevailed. This led even sympathizers of the idea to express some cautious criticism of Kundera’s simplifications and his manipulative use of facts and terms. Timothy Garton Ash descried in particular how Kundera and his followers opt for the term “Eastern Europe” or “East European” when the context is neutral or negative, but prefer to speak on the “Central” or “East Central Europe” when the statement is “invariably positive, affirmative, or downright sentimental.” He reminded assiduously that not only Kafka, Bartok and Hašek were “Central Europeans,” but Adolf Hitler as well; that nationalism and racism are as much part of the local legacy as multiculturalism and tolerance; and that a “super-bureaucratic statism and formalistic legalism taken to absurd (and sometimes already inhuman) extremes” had been region’s particular features long before the advance of Soviet communism. “Aren’t there specifically Central European traditions,” he asked waywardly, “which at least facilitated the establishment of communist regimes in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and traditions which those regimes signally carry forward to this day?”22 Ten years later, Tony Judt reiterated the same criticism even more forcefully: To suppose that this part of the Continent was once a near-paradise of cultural, ethnic, and linguistic multiplicity and compatibility, producing untold cultural and intellectual riches, has been part of the Western image in recent years. Yet [...] in truth Central Europe, from the Battle of the White Mountain [1620] down to the present, is a region of enduring ethnic and religious intolerance, marked by bitter quarrels, murderous wars, and frequent slaughter on a scale ranging from pogrom to genocide. Western Europe was not always much better, of course, but on the whole it has been luckier, which is almost as good.23

22 Ash, op. cit. 23 T. Judt, The Rediscovery of Central Europe, [in:] “Deadalus,” 1990, vol. 119, no. 1, p. 48.

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The development of underdevelopment

erhaps the best account of East European woes and flops, underperforming and lagging behind was provided by the Hungarian émigré intellectual György Schöpflin in his seminal 1991 article on the political traditions of Eastern Europe.24 Drawing largely on the concepts of Jenö Szücs,25 he made some caveats that partly absolved him from the sin of essentialism. He spoke not about primordial entities called “East” and “West” but about two different, historically informed political traditions that variously correlate but never thoroughly coincide with different specific states, stretching from the west of Europe (France and Britain) to its “far east,” represented by Russia. This allowed him to mitigate Jenö Szücs” simplifications and avoid Huntington’s reductionist attempts to conceptualize the interstate differences (and imminent conflicts) in terms of different “civilizations” that indiscriminately pull into one bag very different political entities for the only reason of their alleged religion-based affinity [Fig. 1.5.].26 Schöpflin’s “political traditions” are genuine abstractions, pure “Weberian” ideas that can be imagined and theorized but in the real world are discernible and operational only to a certain degree. Western Europe represents in his model one end of the ideological spectrum, while Russia represents the other, and Eastern Europe falls in between – both culturally and geographically [Fig. 1.6.]. The two traditions, as he contends, fundamentally differ in conception, generation, legitimation, and exercise of political power. Western tradition evolved from the initial division of power between the secular and church authorities, largely facilitated by the supranational character of the Catholic church. This introduced something absent in non-Western traditions – the idea of limitation of power by formal rules (starting from the Magna Carta [1215], the English precursor of all modern constitutions), 24 G. Schoepflin, The Political Traditions of Eastern Europe, [in:] “Daedalus,” 1990, vol. 119, no. 1. See also G. Péteri, Between Empire and Nation-State: Comments on the Pathology of State Formation in Eastern Europe during the ‘Short Twentieth Century’, [in:] “Contemporary European History,” 2000, vol. 9, no. 3, p. 367–384. 25 J. Szücs, The Three Historic Regions of Europe, An Outline, [in:] “Acta Historica Scientiarum Hungaricae,” 1983, vol. 29, no. 2–4, p. 134–181. 26 S. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, [in:] “Foreign Affairs,” 1993, vol. 72, no. 3, p. 22–49, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/1993-06-01/ clash-civilizations.

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Figure 1.5. The fault lines between civilizations, according to Huntington. Source: Wikipedia.

and the idea of contractual relations between rulers and subjects (something unfathomable in the Ottoman, Russian, and other “eastern” empires). The early rivalry between the secular rulers and the church resulted in a fragmentation of power that enabled the emergence of the relatively independent third parties, with their own sources of power. Three of these spheres – commercial, scientific, and urban – appeared to play a particularly important role. All of them were indispensable for rulers, and none of them could have been fully controlled and totally subordinated. Traders and usurers had goods and money, scholars had knowledge, and artisans had unique skills. Nothing could be arbitrarily suppressed or expropriated without ultimate harm for the expropriators themselves. Western rulers were increasingly forced to operate within the framework of formal rules, developing reciprocal relations with their subjects, and staying accountable not only to God but also to the people. This meant emergence of legality – “a set of autonomously enforceable rules not within the hands of the ruler.”27 To be sure, the process was long-lasting and convoluted, and there were a lot of breaches and derogations, as György Schöpflin admits. But the fact that they were viewed as breaches indicates the strength of the underlying tradition; no ruler ever succeeded in capturing the

27 Schoepflin, p. 57.

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high ground of absolutism in this respect, apart from limited periods of time.

Another important aspect of Western tradition was the development of electoral democracy that originated from voting practices in the church, which gradually diffused to the city and state councils, and ultimately expanded from the narrow circle of privileged elite to increasingly broader strata of people entitled to vote. All this was either missing – as in Eastern and Southeastern Europe (where the fusion of the Orthodox Church with the authorities left little room for any autonomous social actors), or was rather weak – as in Central East Europe (where the relative backwardness of the Prussian and Austrian empires vis-à-vis their Western counterparts handicapped the development of the subordinate nations as well, even though local Catholic and Protestant Churches were not etatized, as was the case in Byzantium, Muscovy, and eventually Russia). Eastern Europe, in sum, “constituted a transitional zone between the Western tradition of the division of power and the Eastern tradition of concentration of power”: In Eastern Europe, there were indeed elements of autonomy, but

Figure 1.6. The Eastern boundary of Western Christianity. Source: Huntington, 1993.

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the role of the state was generally stronger than in the West. The power of the ruler was, in fact, challenged, but these challenges were on the whole rebuffed, with the result that the power of society failed to develop and could not attain the necessary critical mass. Instead, the state emerged as far more dominant than in the West, whether in politics or in economics. The experience of foreign rule and the corresponding weakening or destruction of native institutions made a further contribution to the emergence of the dominant state. The degree of dependence – smaller under the Habsburgs, greater in the Ottoman [or Russian] Empire – thus affected both the extent of native political experience and the survival of native political traditions, usually in an attenuated and distorted form.28

East European nations

All the East European nations entered the “Age of Nationalism” (as Hans Kohn famously called the “long” 19th century) with the common agenda of catching up in modernization, but in all of them, modernizers had to rely too much on the state, insofar as all other institutions were too weak. This made their mission rather impossible: all modern political systems hinge heavily not only on a functional state, but also on strong civil society – a set of autonomous spheres and centers of power, the space of citizens’ free communication and interaction. The state, by its very essence, can neither substitute for civil society nor create it from above. It can mobilize the population for some specific, short-term modernizing goals (usually of military or quasi-military character) but cannot ensure a long-term sustainable development which requires bottom-up initiative, free entrepreneurial and intellectual activity, and fair political and economic competition. Even though most East European nations attained independence after the First World War, they inherited all the problems of the former empires they used to belong to. In economy, it was underdeveloped industry and outdated agriculture, the excessive role of the state and rather limited grassroots entrepreneurial activity, a weak bourgeoisie and patrimonial peasantry, aversion to risk-taking, and a lack of market discipline and responsibility. In politics, it was the predominance of hegemonial systems; weak, corrupt and often coopted opposition; the neo-feudal character of bureaucracy (mostly from the nobility and gentry); and the persistently crucial role of tight networks of informal influence. In 28 Ibidem, p. 61–62.

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the social milieu, it was ethnonational segmentation and social fragmentation, low social mobility, and limited inter-strata communication. The values of Gemeinschaft (a traditional community of birth-based status, ascription, and static life-styles) generally prevailed over the values of Gesellschaft (civic engagement, initiative, and solidarity). In most regards, the East European nations lagged behind their Western counterparts and faced, in the 20th century, the same problem of catching up in the modernization they encountered 100 years earlier. They differed substantially from each other in terms of their development, with the most conspicuous difference being determined by their past belonging to either more advanced Austrian and German empires (Catholic/Protestant realm) or more backward Russian and Ottoman empires (Orthodox or Muslim area). Central East Europe was definitely the closest in its development to the West, so the myth of the “kidnapped Europe” is not completely off-base. Schöpflin does not discuss this issue but implies, rather reasonably, that the Soviet and, more generally, communist dominance was not the only and probably not the main reason for the region’s backwardness. Deeper historical/structural factors had been in play [Fig. 1.7.], and, as the author appropriately remarks, “the development of Greece [that was not ‘liberated’ by the Soviets] in the first two to three decades after the war is instructive in this respect.”29 One may perhaps extend this line of argumentation by saying that even in 1990 or 2020, Greece would still have looked more like it did in the ’60s or ’70s, if it had not been taken under the guidance and guardianship of the European Community. On the other hand, the same line of argumentation implies that geographic-cum-geopolitical labeling may play crucial role in some nations’ destiny. The only reason that Greece looked, by the 1990s, more advanced than Czechoslovakia was that it was recognized (arbitrarily) as “Western” and forcefully pulled into the West European political and economic orbit, while Czechoslovakia (and many more nations) were designated as “Eastern” and left in the cold. This makes “Easterners” understandably wary of this kind of labelling and determined to distance themselves as far as possible from a dangerous geographic (“philosophical-geographic”) 29 Ibidem, p. 88.

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Figure 1.7. Multiple fault lines in Europe, after Norman Davies. Source: Davies, 1996.

zone that bodes them no good but, most likely, exclusion, abandonment, and betrayal.

The end of “Central East Europe” and the new continental fault-lines

“C

entral Europe” is a discursive life-belt that gives some nations a chance to be rescued on the safe board of the Western flagship. But it fits only a few of them – Czechs, Hungarians, and partly Slovaks who also hate to be “East Europeans”, and perhaps Slovenes who loathe to be “Balkan.” Others need to extend the term hyphenating it into “Central-East Europe” like Poles or Romanians, or invent something else like “Nordic” for the Balts, or Mediterranean for Croats, Montenegrins and perhaps Albanians. Bulgarians have no choice because the very term Balkans stems from the name of mountains on their territory. And Ukrainians, Moldovans, and Belarusians have either to go to “Eurasia” (the new code-name for Russia and its truncated sphere of

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“legitimate interests”) or to become a “New Eastern Europe” after the “old” Eastern Europe has disappeared. John-Paul Himka, a renowned Canadian historian, has quipped at this “new geography” of the continent that has a West, a Center, but no East. “Foucault would have loved this geographical gaping wound,” he remarked sarcastically, referring to the penchant of the French philosopher to analyze discursive twists and tricks, and “to determine the power relations that constitute organization and accumulation of discourses we consider to be knowledge.”30 Such an analysis would definitely reveal, as Himka implies, that the “division into regions is not a value- or narrative-neutral act”; regionalization has a strong “political meaning”; and any naming/renaming indicates the “repositioning and reconfiguration of power relations.”31 From this point of view, the concept of “Central Europe” had been originally conceived as a discursive attempt of the “powerless” nations subjugated by the Soviets to acquire some power by identifying themselves symbolically with the West and persuading the West to reciprocate. It was an attempt to employ the soft power of “Europe” to counterbalance the hard power of Moscow. Little surprise that the concept gained broad popularity inasmuch as it was perceived first and foremost as a liberating, “emancipatory” project, “a metaphor of protest.”32 Little if any attention was paid at the time to its peculiar spatialization and potential exclusiveness. The situation has changed dramatically in 1989–1991, after the collapse of the Soviet empire, when the concept of “Central Europe” ceased to be a tool of symbolic emancipation in the utopian realm of culture and became a tool of discursive lobbing in the callous field of practical politics. As the fight for inclusion into the privileged Western clubs of the EU and NATO began, the other, exclusivist side of the concept came to the fore: “the lopping off from the old Eastern Europe of its eastern portions, now included in ‘The Former Soviet Union’ or ‘Eurasia’, and of its southern

Central Europe

collapse of the Soviet empire

30 J. Himka, What’s in a Region? Notes on “Central Europe’, [in:] “HABSBURG” H-Net, 8 May 2002. 31 Or, as another Kundera’s critic forewarns, “structures can become self-generating, and the apportioning of knowledge is geared to a subsequent validating of the structure” (Todorova, 141). 32 Todorova, p. 147.

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portions, now ‘Southeastern Europe’ or, more frequently, ‘The Balkans’.”33 The transformation of the Central European concept from an emancipatory idea to a politically expedient tool was accompanied by a parallel transformation of the concept of Europe from a cultural definition identified with liberalism and democracy into ‘the international solidarity of capital against poverty’... Far from becoming a region-building notion, it was harnessed as an expedient argument in the drive for entry into the European institutional framework.34

In sum, as the Ukrainian philosopher Volodymyr Yermolenko bitterly remarked,

the idea of the ‘stolen West’ may have been liberating for central Europe, but for the Europe situated further east it was disastrous. Instead of breaking down the wall between East and West, it simply shifted it further eastwards. The idea should have been used to fight totalitarianism everywhere, but instead localized it geographically in the territories of the former USSR, thereby placing a permanent ‘curse’ on our east European lands... Instead of remaining faithful to his own dictum and seeing just how much diversity there is on the whole of the European continent, [Kundera] chose to split it into two parts, in opposition to each other – the humanist West versus the demonic East that had stolen [Central European] part of the West.35

Still, despite its eventual negative implications, the concept of “Central Europe” (rebranded as “Central East Europe” to include the Poles and perhaps some other East European nations) initially played a rather positive role insofar as it mobilized “Central East Europeans” to reject and resist Soviet semi-colonial dominance, and established some benchmarks for future “pro-European” development. As the same Ukrainian author soberly recognizes, the “simplified idea” of Central Europe, all its exclusivist traits notwithstanding, did work: It is impossible to imagine the institutional expansion of the European Union after 2000 without the shifts in thinking that took place in the 1980s – largely thanks to Kundera and other artists and intellectuals.

33 Himka, op. cit. 34 Todorova, 159. 35 V. Yermolenko, Dreams of Europe, [in:] “Eurozine,” 6 February 2014, http://www.eurozine.com/dreams-of-europe.

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The scheme was attractive, simple and effective – and very necessary at the time.

It also means, in the context of our debate, that we should not reject the notions of “Central,” or “Eastern,” or “Central Eastern” Europe wholesale – only because they are vague and ideologically charged. All terms in the humanities are pure abstractions, products of either a common sense or academic convention. All are applicable only to the degree that we consent to their a priori established meaning, and only for the specific analytical goals within the specifically outlined field of study. Any term may become ambiguous and contentious if we overstep these self-imposed limitations. Here and further on, we speak about “Eastern” Europe as both geographic reality and a discursive construction, the product of Yalta settlement, the Iron Curtain, Soviet/communist dominance, and, ultimately, of democratic anti-totalitarian revolutions and more or less successful post-communist transitions. All these processes had their own peculiarities in different countries, determined by domestic and the external actors, and, notably, by different historical legacies that variously interacted with new circumstances and policies. Of particular importance were the legacies that reinforced the new, politically determined divide on the continent, but also those that determined apparent differences within the seemingly homogeneous “communist” bloc. All these earlier fault-lines largely but never fully coincided with the new one and among themselves, keeping some undetermined, “fuzzy,” ambivalent zone that contributed to the general ambiguity of all these divides. One of them is the line between “Catholic” Europe and “Orthodox” Europe (with Protestants subsumed under the Catholic fold as their later offshoot). However irrelevant might look this divide in today’s secular world, it established two different patterns of cultural orientation in the early Middle Ages that still endure. It impacted the second dividing line, political – “insofar as religion played an important role in articulating the fundamental relationships between the sovereigns and their subjects and played a central role in imperial legitimation” in both the East and the West. This line ran historically along the eastern borders of Rzecz Pospolita and the southern borders of the Kingdom of Hungary that

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were followed by and for the most part absorbed by imperial Habsburg Austria and imperial Germany, with the exception of the Russian portion of the Polish partition.36

New Eastern Europe

And finally, we recognize as a rather important the third faultline – of “economic differentiation” – that cuts Europe roughly from Danzig/Gdansk in the north to Trietse in the south.37 For a number of reasons, the demographic and economic development of regions west of this line, since the Middle Ages, was more dynamic than east of this line, and that performance tended to drop to the east and the southeast [Fig. 1.7.]. Again, this fault-line correlated, even though it did not coincide, with the other two, inasmuch as both cultural settings and power relations had undeniable impact on different imperial policies and different patterns of economic and political modernization. This explain, in particular, “the varying trajectories of the Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman empires west, east, and southeast of the dividing line.” These and some other factors are likely to explain also the varying trajectories of post-communist states scrutinized in this book. We accept the definition of all of them in a “Cold War” mode as “Eastern” Europe, but also recognize three sub-regions within this politically redundant entity determined by their past development. Under communism, their historical differences were suppressed and obscured, but in 1989–1990 they resurfaced and, as I intend to argue, have even been reinforced by the specific policies of the West. These regions are “Central” (or “Central East”) Europe, the Balkans (South East Europe), and the “New Eastern Europe” that consists of the western republics of the former Soviet Union [Fig. 1.8.] and, potentially, of Russia – in case it stops pretending to be a “separate civilization” and changes its current, staunchly anti-Western position for one more cooperative and reconciliatory. Of all these nations and regions, the “New Eastern Europe” is our primary concern for two reasons. First, the post-communist transformation appeared here to be the most complicated and convoluted, and brought very mixed and controversial results. And secondly, the resurrection of Russia as an aggressive, revisionist, 36 L. Johnson, Response to John-Paul Himka, [in:] “HABSBURG,” H-Net, 13 May 2002. 37 G. Stokes, Eastern Europe’s Defining Fault Lines, [in:] G. Stokes, Three Eras of Political Change in Eastern Europe, Oxford University Press, New York & Oxford, p. 13.

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Figure 1.8. Europe today. Source: Judt, 2005. Source: Judt, 2005.

neo-imperial power brings new challenges to the whole region and continent in general. Ukraine as a frontline country – one that defies Russian pressure and struggles with the legacies of the past and the perils of the present – may serve well as a focal point for the broader study of the region, of the post-communist changes, and of the “Philosophical Geography” that impacts them.

Chapter readings

Ash T., Does Central Europe Exist? [in:] “New York Review of Books,” 9 October 1986. Brodsky J., Why Milan Kundera Is Wrong about Dostoyevsky, [in:] “New York Times,” 17 February 1985. Davies N., Europe: A History [eBook], Pimlico Random House, London, 1997. Foucault M., The Archeology of Knowledge, trans. A. M. Smith, Pantheon, New York: 1972. Halecki O., Borderlands of Western Civilization. A History of East Central Europe, Simon Publ., Safety Harbor FL, 1980 [1952]. Havel, V., Czech Destiny? 1969, http://www.academia.edu/2503514/ Czech_Destiny_Vaclav_Havel_ [accessed 28 July 2020].

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Himka J.-P., What’s in a Region? Notes on “Central Europe’, [in:] “HABSBURG,” H-Net, 8 May 2002. Huntington S., The Clash of Civilizations? [in:] “Foreign Affairs,” 1993, vol. 72, no. 3. Judt T., The Rediscovery of Central Europe, [in:] “Deadalus,” 1990, vol. 119, no. 1. Kundera M., The Tragedy of Central Europe, [in:] “New York Review of Books,” 26 April 1984. Motyl A., The Surrealism of Realism. Reading the War in Ukraine, [in:] “Foreign Affairs,” 2015, vol. 94, no. 1, p. 75-84. Plokhy S., Yalta: The Price of Peace, Viking, New York, 2010. Riabchuk M., Metaphors of Betrayal, [in:] “Eurozine,” 14 October 2009, https://www.eurozine.com/metaphors-of-betrayal/ Said E., Orientalism, Pantheon Books, London, 1978. Schoepflin G., The Political Traditions of Eastern Europe, [in:] “Daedalus” 1990, vol. 119. Stokes G., Three Eras of Political Change in Eastern Europe, Oxford University Press, New York & Oxford. Szücs J., The Three Historic Regions of Europe, An Outline, [in:] “Acta Historica Scientiarum Hungaricae,” 1983, vol. 29, no. 2-4. Todorova M., Imagining the Balkans, Oxford University Press, New York & Oxford, 1997. Yermolenko V., Dreams of Europe, [in:] “Eurozine,” 6 February 2014, http://www.eurozine.com/dreams-of-europe Wolff L., Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1994. Zagajewski A., A High Wall, [in:] Cross Currents, 1987, vol. 6.

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Chapter 2 End of Communism and Collapse of Empire: Structural Determinants, External Factors, and Shortand Long-Term Consequences

n November 9, 1989, a petty and until that moment completely obscure East German border guard, Harald Jaeger, lifted the gates and let his fellow citizens walk freely to the western part of Berlin – a decision that led, shortly, to the destruction of the notorious Berlin Wall and, ultimately, to the end of East Germany itself. Harald Jaeger had never been any kind of a dissident, but he could not help but feel that night “the grandeur of the historical moment.” “Their will was so great,” he said years later, of those demanding to cross into West Berlin, “there was no other alternative than to open the border.”1 That event largely symbolized the end of the communist system in Eastern Europe, brought in 1945 by the Soviets and firmly consolidated by 1948–1949 by their local communist clients. The destruction of the Berlin Wall was an iconic moment of those events, multiplied in the media and scholarship, in verbal and visual arts as an epitome of what had happened shortly before that in Warsaw and Budapest and what was to happen eventually in Prague, Sofia, and Bucharest. It became a symbol of liberation and of the people’s will, solidarity, and yearning for freedom. Yet, ironically, it also simplified the complexity of the process and unintendedly obscured its real beginning and real end. The year 1989, duly glorified as annus mirabilis, would have barely happened without a protracted struggle of captive nations for their freedom and, on the other hand, without dramatic political

the Berlin Wall

1 Anne Applebaum, History Will Judge the Complicit, “The Atlantic,” July/August 2020, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/07/trumps-collaborators/612250.

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changes in Moscow, the capital of the vast empire [Fig. 2.1]. The fact that the communist system was economically inefficient, politically illegitimate, and ideologically declining made its collapse inevitable, but the exact timing of that collapse had not been predetermined. There are quite a few regimes, inefficient and illegitimate, abhorred domestically and ostracized internationally, that still survive by the sheer enslavement and terrorization of their own populations. The complex interplay of both the structural factors and various domestic and international contingencies that brought the communists down is our primary concern in this chapter.

Figure 2.1. Communist states and union republics by 1989. Source: Wikipedia.

Systemic decline

he communist system had not been established peacefully anywhere – either in China, or Central Asia, or the Caucasus, or Ukraine, or in Russia itself. It always stood for violence and dictatorial imposition of the utopian communist-type economy and the only allegedly “truthful” and “scientific,” and therefore mandatory, communist ideology. The system remained quite viable for decades – partly because of its large-scale terror,

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surveillance, and intimidation, and partly because of massive propagandistic brain-washing and inculcating subjects with a utopian vision of the “world revolution,” the liberation of all working people, and the ultimate communist brotherhood. This quasi-religious faith could not survive for much longer. It was challenged, on the one side, by persistent economic hardships, increasingly visible and frustrating vis-à-vis the impertinent prosperity of the ‘capitalist’ West, and, on the other side, it was severely damaged in the mid-50s by the official, however partial and equivocal, disclosure of Stalin’s crimes. The Soviet expansion westward made the bad things only worse. First, in 1939–1940, under the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement, they swallowed three tiny Baltic republics, the eastern part of Romania (a.k.a. Moldova), and eastern parts of the Nazi-occupied Poland (a.k.a. Western Ukraine and Western Belarus).2 Then, in 1944–1945, they incorporated into the Soviet empire the East European nations “liberated” by the Red Army and transformed into fully dependent satellite states, with identical communist-led totalitarian regimes [Fig. 2.2.]. The newly acquired territories, however, had a population that was exposed to а different political culture and, most importantly, had a distinct and fairly robust national identity that largely precluded internalization of the Soviet power and ideology as “their own.” For many if not most of them, the puppet local regimes were merely what they were – illegitimate alien imposters established by cunning and force, and kept in power by foreign troops and intelligence. Little surprise that these territories witnessed either protracted guerilla resistance to the Soviet rule (as in post-war Lithuania, Western Ukraine and Poland), or sporadic uprisings (as in Berlin-1953 or Budapest and Poznan-1956), or peaceful attempts at political emancipation (as during the “Prague Spring” of 1968 and spectacular rise of “Solidarity” in Poland in 1980–1981). All these and many more minor revolts were suppressed by force, but each suppression increasingly demonstrated the weakness of local regimes, their dependence on external support and the lack of domestic legitimacy.3

2 W. Risch, A Soviet West: nationhood, regionalism, and empire in the annexed western borderlands, [in:] “Nationalities Papers” 2015, vol. 43, nr. 1, s. 63–81. See also R. Szporluk, The Soviet West – or Far Eastern Europe? [in:] R. Szporluk, Russia, Ukraine, and the Breakup of the Soviet Union, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2000, p. 259–275. 3 V. Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics: Eastern Europe from Stalin to Havel, Free Press, Amsterdam, 1992.

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Figure 2.2. Eastern Bloc. Source: Wikipedia.

The Soviet rulers that came to power after Stalinâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s death were no liberals: they simply wished to secure their own survival inasmuch as under the Stalin dictatorship, nobody, even the top elite,

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could feel immune from daily terror and random arbitrary purges. So, they restricted the power of the secret police and replaced the large-scale indiscriminate terror with selective persecution of particularly naughty dissidents. The partial softening of the domestic policies and limited opening to the external world had a price. It facilitated the diffusion of information that in practice meant the slow but steady expansion of the Western “soft power” and subsequent erosion of the communist myths and de-legitimization of the Soviet system. Dysfunctional state-run economy only exacerbated the problems. The status of “super-power” that ran militarily on par with the United States was achieved by the Soviet Union at the cost of the ruthless exploitation of human and natural resources, the grim poverty of the population, the de facto enslavement of peasants, and the scarcity of virtually all consumer goods sacrificed for the sake of military-industrial production. To compete with Americans in the arms race, the Soviets had to divert 30–40% of their resources to military spending – five times more than the U.S.A. By 1986, the Soviet foreign debt had reached $30.7 billion, and it jumped to $54 billion by 1989, after the prices of oil, the Soviet main export, rapidly plummeted.4 Plagued by low productivity, the wrong investments, and general inefficiency, the Soviet state-run economy exposed particular backwardness in agriculture, largely predetermined back in the 1930s by forcible, often genocidal “collectivization” and a lack of any incentives for decent work. No Party decrees and appeals to people’s enthusiasm were able to pull the branch out of deadlock. Since the early 1960s, the agricultural growth in the Soviet Union, despite all the government measures, was close to zero. This forced the authorities to import more and more food for their own citizens and international clients. That meant a steady increase of export of natural resources, primarily oil, to acquire hard currency. In 1979, however, the Soviets shot themselves in the foot when invading Afghanistan and installing the puppet communist government in Kabul. This enraged not only the West but also a large group of the Muslim, oil-producing countries that joined their

genocidal “collectivization”

4 T. Judt, Postwar. A History of Europe Since 1945, Penguin Press, London, 2005, p. 592, 595.

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the Soviet gerontocratic regime

efforts to substantially lower oil prices. Within a couple of years, the Soviet Union had gone bankrupt.5 To aggravate the Kremlin’s economic woes, the United States accelerated the arms race (in some cases bluffing with non-existent advanced programs and weapons), while the Afghans launched a massive resistance to Soviet occupation, making its costs, both financial and human, increasingly high. In Poland, workers refused to suffer indefinitely from economic hardships, and established the independent trade-union to defend their rights. Within a few months, the movement precipitated into a formidable force that united millions of people and challenged the dominance of the communist party. The martial law introduced by the Polish authorities in December 1981 under Soviet pressure stalled the protests but did not solve any underlying problem. “Solidarity” remained popular both domestically and abroad, and its cells, however oppressed and harassed, continued underground activity. All these factors stockpiled into a daunting existential problem for the Soviet gerontocratic regime. They made changes not really inevitable but highly probable and desirable. Two more developments were likely to impact the Kremlin’s decision making. On the one side, neighboring communist China, which had been reasonably considered in Moscow, since the 1960s, as a hostile state, launched a large-scale economic reform at the end of the 1970s. Their apparent success made the country, in Moscow’s eyes, not only a greater threat but also a more attractive model for emulation. On the other side, within two and a half years (1982–1985), three Soviet elderly leaders passed away one after another, symbolically reflecting, with a grain of black humor, the senility and decrepitude of the entire system. This probably tipped the balance for the youngest member of the Soviet politburo, the 54-year old Mikhail Gorbachev. He was arguably promoted by the former head of the Soviet KGB Yuri Andropov, with a likely mandate for Chinese-style reforms. 5 Y. Gaidar, Collapse of an Empire: Lessons for Modern Russia, Brookings Institute Press, Washington, D.C., 2008. See also S. Saradzhyan, The Soviet Collapse and Its Lessons for Modern Russia: Gaidar Revisited, [in:] “Russia Matters,” 22 December 2016, https:// www.russiamatters.org/analysis/soviet-collapse-and-its-lessons-modern-russia-gaidar-revisited.

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Gorbachev’s rescue mission

he first year of Gorbachev’s rule largely confirmed this assumption, as his major political rhetoric was about “acceleration” (uskorenie) and further “perfecting” (sovershenstvovanie) the Soviet system rather than any radical renovation. All the problems had still been framed, in the old Soviet fashion, as a struggle between things good and things even better. It was most likely the Chornobyl disaster in April 1986 that forced Gorbachev and his reform-minded associates to reconsider their course and undertake more radical policies discursively marked as “renewal” (obnovlenie), “opening” (glasnost) and “reconstruction” (perestroika). The disastrous explosion at the nuclear plant was not a unique event per se since, essentially, no industrial country can be fully secured from technological catastrophes. But the U.S.S.R. was “unique” in a sense that no catastrophes had ever officially happened in that communist paradise. The Chornobyl disaster was thus handled in a typical Soviet way. First, the authorities tried to thoroughly silence it and then, after the wind had brought radioactive nuclides as far as Scandinavia, they attempted to variously play down the scale and consequences of the catastrophe. The event elucidated the immanent problem of all totalitarian systems. Their closed, strictly censored social environment not only hinders the flow of information and, therefore, development of new ideas and entrepreneurial activity, but also makes the system the deadly threat for both its own citizens and the globe.6 The new Gorbachev policies had a snowball effect, exponentially widening the space of freedom and civic activism. Bans on various names, books and topics had been gradually lifted, the scope and scale of social debate extended, and political pluralism and civic engagement spectacularly enhanced. In 1989, as most East European nations witnessed a social awakening, greatly encouraged by the opening in the Soviet metropole, Mikhail Gorbachev indicated, in a number of public speeches, that “each socialist state has a right to follow its own trajectory without external interference” and that the scale and character of their reforms is “entirely a matter for the people themselves.” This was

“renewal” (obnovlenie)

“opening” (glasnost)

“reconstruction” (perestroika)

6 S. Plokhy, Chernobyl: History of a Tragedy, London: Allen Lane, 2018.

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command state-run economy

a clear renouncement of the “Brezhnev doctrine” that established the ‘limited sovereignty’ for the Soviet bloc nations, i.e., sovereignty only to the degree that their internal or international policies did not harm the interests of the entire bloc. Officially, the doctrine was proclaimed in 1968, in order to justify the invasion of the Soviet-led troops in Czechoslovakia, but it had in fact determined Soviet policy vis-à-vis satellites since the very inception of the communist bloc.7 Now, as the satellites were left alone, without Soviet surveillance but also without the supply of cheap energy and other resources, the communist regimes in Eastern Europe entered the unchartered waters of a sudden independence from Moscow but a frightening dependence on their own people. By indicating that he would not intervene, Gorbachev “decisively undermined the only real source of political legitimacy available to the rulers of the satellite states: the promise (or threat) of military intervention from Moscow. Without that threat the local regimes were politically naked. Economically they might have struggled for a few more years, but there, too, the logic of Soviet retreat was implacable: once Moscow started charging world market prices for its exports to Comecon countries (as it did in 1990) the latter, heavily dependent on imperial subsidies, would have collapsed in any event.”8 The Gorbachev “thaw” had definitely unfrozen the deeper intrinsic moods and processes in the satellite states that had never been completely eradicated: rejection of the communist system and yearning for freedom, for material well-being, and for independence from Moscow’s neocolonial tutelage. All these yearnings that could be articulated ideologically as liberal, social democratic, and nationalist gave rise to a broad democratic movement that united, in a broad coalition, very different political forces with different priorities, but a common agenda: to move from communist dictatorship to liberal democracy, from the command state-run economy to free market, and from Soviet dependency to real sovereignty. All this was summed up in a simple catch-word – “return to Europe,” where all the East European nations had allegedly always belonged. 7 M.J. Ouimet, The Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy, Chapel Hill & London, University of North Carolina Press, 2003, p. 10–11. 8 T. Judt, op. cit., p. 632.

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The end of the communist bloc

he radical changes began in Poland, where the communist regime was the weakest and opposition the strongest. The protracted negotiation between the government and “Solidarity” resulted in the agreement that outlined the pacted transition from the communist rule to multi-party democracy and market reforms. Today, as agreement is retroactively criticized as being too soft on the old regime, unnecessarily pliant and concessive, one may duly remind that the whole deal was negotiated at a peculiar time when the ‘Brezhnev doctrine’ was still in force, Gorbachev’ stance and trajectory was not that clear, Western support was fully on Gorby’s side – and not on the side of the ‘radicals’ who arguably endangered his reformist efforts and, perhaps most crucially, it was the time when hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops were still staying in Poland and nearby, at all its borders. The first step, however modest and moderate, was very successful: “Solidarity” totally crashed the communists in pacted elections on June 4, sending a clear signal to other communist states that changes were possible. This provoked a “domino effect” that led to the end of communist rule in almost all Eastern Europe by the end of 1989 [Fig. 2.3.]. First, the similar pacted transition occurred in Hungary, where the communists, in October, accepted the opposition’s demand for free and fair elections that were eventually, in May, won by the anti-communist parties. In August 1989, they opened the border with Austria, making thereby a fatal breach in the notorious “Iron Curtain.” Thousands of Eastern Germans rushed to the West via this loophole. This caused a deep political crisis in the DDR that led to the fall of the communist government, the dismantling of the Berlin Wall, and ultimately, just a year later, the reunification of the DDR with the Western Bundesrespublik.9 In Prague, similar mass protests toppled down the communist government by the end of November; and in Sofia, the Bulgarian communist party was forced to abandon its monopoly on power and announce multiparty elections in June next year. Only in Romania, the revolution turned violent as the regime ordered the security forces to shoot protesters. More than a thousand people

“Solidarity”

“Iron Curtain”

9 T. Ash, The Magic Lantern: The Revolution of 1989 Witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin, and Prague, Random House, New York, 1990.

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Figure 2.3. Fall of Communism: timeline, 1989–1991. Source: IMF, 2014. Yugoslavia

were killed, and probably only the intervention of the Romanian military on the side of protesters prevented escalation of bloodshed. By the end of December 1989, the interim non-communist government was formed, and democratic multiparty elections were announced to be held the next year. The exit of two other communist-run Balkan states from the Marxist utopia appeared even more complicated than that of Bulgaria or Romania, where – unlike in Central East Europe – the communists retained their power throughout the 1990s (in Bulgaria, they rebranded as “socialists” and fairly won democratic elections in June 1990, while in Romania, they simply “dissolved” into other organizations and institutions, enabling the election of the first non-communist president only in 2014). Likewise, in Albania, mass upheavals forced the communists to hold multi-party elections in March 1991, but this brought about few changes, since the rebranded communists successfully overplayed the opposition and retained power. The most dramatic events unfolded, however, in Yugoslavia, a multi-ethnic federation of six nominally “sovereign” republics [Fig. 2.4]. Here, the communists changed not only the names but agendas, putting a bet on nationalism – for the sake of either national liberation (as in Slovenia and Croatia)

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Figure 2.4. Yugoslavia, 1945–1991. Source: Judt, 2005.

or the preservation of dominance within the quasi-federation or, eventually, within its substitute in the form of “Greater Serbia.”10 A series of bloody wars had followed throughout the 1990s – first, a short, one-week offensive of the Yugoslav (in fact, Serbian) army against Slovenia in 1991, then a much longer assault on Croatia (1991–1995) and a much bloodier partition of Bosnia (1992–1995), and finally, an incursion of Serbian forces in Kosovo, the autonomous region within the Republic of Serbia that declared its independence. In the two latter cases – in Bosnia and Kosovo, Belgrade used the volunteer units as proxies, pretending that the Serbian army was not engaged in the genocidal war. This did not spare, however, the Serbian leaders from international condemnation, sanctions, and, ultimately, the intervention of NATO to stop ethnic cleansings and the indiscriminate slaughter of civilians. The annus mirabilis of 1989 was therefore not a fairy tale. It was marked not only by cheerful celebrations but also bloodshed – at the end the of the year in Romania and, eventually, for nearly a decade, in different parts of Yugoslavia. It was marked also by a dreadful massacre in June 1989, on the very same day “Solidarity” celebrated its electoral victory – as the communist

annus mirabilis

10 T. Judt, Postwar, p. 665–685.

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the communist bloc

government in Beijing deployed tanks to crush protesters in Tiananmen Square, drowning the Chinese hopes for democratization in blood. Timothy Garton Ash, who quipped famously in November 1989 that the regime change “in Poland took 10 years, in Hungary 10 months, in the GDR ten weeks, perhaps in Czechoslovakia it will take 10 days” – was only partially correct.11 Because the seemingly rapid changes would have barely happened without the protracted, often painstaking and desperate resistance of many people – not only the dissidents who sacrificed their freedom, health, well-being and even lives for the civic ideals but also the common citizens who defied the system, rejected its lies, and variously refused to collaborate. It was certainly Gorbachev who facilitated the changes, who enabled them to occur exactly at that very time and in that part of the world. In this sense, it was really “Mr. Gorbachev’s revolution,” as Tony Judt put it; he was indeed its “permissive and precipitating cause” – just because Eastern Europe’s crowds and intellectuals and trade union leaders would have barely won their struggle if Mikhail Gorbachev did not let them win.12 This is true, but the other part of the truth is that he “cannot take direct credit for what happened in 1989 as he did not plan it and only hazily grasped its long-term import.” His primary goal was to rescue his country from bankruptcy and to save the inner empire (the Soviet “federation”) by abandoning its outer part (the communist bloc) as unsustainable.

Dysfunctional institutions

orbachev was certainly not a revolutionary; his only (but highly important) difference from all the other members of the Politburo was that he belonged to a much younger generation. His formative years coincided not only with Stalin’s rule but also with Khrushchev’s “thaw” of the 1950s, when he was a student of law at Moscow University and reportedly a good friend of Zdeněk Mlynář, one of the eventual leaders of the Prague 11 T. Ash, The Revolution of the Magic Lantern, [in:] “New York Review of Books,” 18 January 1990, https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1990/01/18/the-revolution-of-the-magic-lantern. 12 T. Judt, op. cit., s. 132, 633.

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Spring of 1968. “Like all the reform Communists of his generation, Gorbachev was first a Communist and only then a reformer.” His reform agenda was largely informed by the vague vision of “socialism with a human face” and based more on ad hoc improvisations and hectic responses to daily challenges than on any wellthought, comprehensive master plan. To invigorate the stagnant, corrupt, and inefficient economy, he had to introduce free-market reforms that were vehemently rejected by both the ideological hardliners attached to Stalinist dogmas and the corrupt officials who benefited from the inept system and had little interest in any changes. To reform the economy, which was his primary and most urgent concern, he had to reform the Party. And to do this, he needed public support; he had to rely on civil society as the only alternative to the ruling elite – the deeply entrenched and highly conservative nomenklatura. Yet ironically, there was virtually no civil society in the totalitarian Soviet Union, so it also had to be created almost from scratch.13 Opening (glasnost) was a logical first step in this direction, as well as the encouragement of civic activity and the tacit acceptance of informal grassroots civic organizations that had been traditionally harassed in the Soviet Union, regardless of their political or rather apolitical innocence. All these changes required abandonment or at least a relaxation of control. But, as Tony Judt sarcastically remarks, communism fully depends on control – communism, in fact, is a total and thorough control: of economy, of knowledge, of movement, of opinion, and of people. In an authoritarian system, he argues, power is indivisible:

free-market reforms

relinquish it in part and you must eventually lose it all... Once the sustaining supports of censorship, control and repression were removed, everything of consequence in the Soviet system – the planned economy, the public rhetoric, the monopoly of the Party – just collapsed... Gorbachev progressively eroded the very system through which he had

13 C.f. George Schoepflin’s observation on a similar situation in the newly born East European states in the 1920s–1930s: “The crux of this problem lay in the existence of comparatively strong autonomous spheres and centers of power in Western Europe on which a new ‘modern’ political system relying on civil society could be based, whereas these were weak to nonexistent in Eastern Europe. This led to the situation where the functions performed by these autonomous centers had to be performed by some other agency in Eastern Europe and there was only one – the state. Thus from the outset the East European modernizers were involved in a contradiction, that of having to construct civil society from above” (G. Schoepflin, op. cit., p. 64).

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risen. Employing the vast powers of a Party General Secretary, he eviscerated the Party dictatorship from within... Gorbachev, in the view of one of his close advisers, was “a genetic error of the system”.14

The latter remark is certainly an overstatement: the system was doomed, regardless of Gorbachev’s will or his very emergence on non-emergence. He impacted the timing, speed, and character of the Soviet collapse, but not its essential, structurally determined inevitability. The very paradox of his incoherent reforms was that the less control he applied onto the system, the less manageable it became. With no mechanisms and tradition of self-management, no full-bodied civil society and political opposition, the Communist party remained the only force able to manage the very complex and heavily centralized system. The problem was further exacerbated by the bogus character of the Soviet state institutions. At first glance, they look “normal,” intrinsic to all democracies – federal and republican parliaments, governments, city councils, courts, and so on. But none of them could function effectively and coherently on its own, within the framework of written laws and rules, without the shadow guidance and guardianship of the Communist party that represented the real authority and executed (with the KGB) the real power. And since informal power prevailed, the formal rules and laws were of secondary importance. Some of them contradicted each other, some were missing, and some were not supported by proper bylaws, regulations, and clear procedural requirements, so as to be unambiguously applied. All these details were unnecessary as long as the Communist party was the main and, in fact, the only arbiter and decision-maker. But as soon as the Party weakened, its repressive power restricted and its authority declined, the bogus “show-window” Soviet institutions began to act independently, along the poorly written and arbitrarily interpreted rules, without clear subordination and proper accountability. This contributed to the political and economic mess in the country, further delegitimizing the Party’s rule and the authority of all institutions.15 14 T. Judt, Postwar, p. 596–597, 603. 15 V. Bunce, Subversive Institutions: The Design and the Destruction of Socialism and the State, Cambridge, 1999.

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Soviet disintegration

erhaps the most important side-effect of this process was the emergence of strong secessionist movements in the union republics that had already had ready-made “national” institutions for further political emancipation. Moreover, they had even had a clause in the Union constitution that stipulated the right of each “union republic” to secede. The clause was quite murky since nobody ever predicted that this sheer declaration would be, at some point, implemented. Therefore, no legal procedures for the secession had ever been outlined; this was another huge open space for political arbitrariness and unsolvable conflicts. The Party predictably started to fracture “under the centrifugal pull of anxious local administrators protecting their own interests.” In March 1990, Mikhail Gorbachev was elected the first (and the only) president of the Soviet Union by the members of Parliament. This position had never existed before and was apparently devised to give him more “secular” authority and provide a life belt for the safe departure from the sinking ship of the Communist party. Many Soviet republics had followed the suit, introducing the position of president into their constitutions and thereby further weakening the power of the federal center that was executed primarily via the Communist party hierarchy. In June 1991, the Russian parliament elected Boris Yeltsin the president of the Russian Federation, further empowering him in his rivalry with the Union president Mikhail Gorbachev. In March 1990, for the first time in the Soviet history, competitive elections were held to republican parliaments. Even though the multi-party system and political opposition had not been legalized by that time, oppositional movements and candidates actively participated in the elections as “independents” and won a clear majority in some republics (primarily in the Baltics) or made up a plurality or substantial and influential minority (as in Russia or Ukraine). One of the first legislative acts of the newly elected parliaments was a declaration on “national sovereignty,” passed first in the Baltics and then in Russia, Ukraine, and elsewhere. In most cases, the document did not stipulate full secession but recognized republican laws/constitutions superior to those of the Soviet Union. This meant de facto transformation

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“renewed” federation

of the U.S.S.R. into a loose confederation of motley nation-states, united much more by their common dislike of the federal center than any common agenda or values. Unable and perhaps unwilling to curb the dissent with repressions, Gorbachev reached the republican leaders with an attempt to persuade them not to secede but to reestablish the “renewed” federation on genuinely democratic, fair, and consensual principles. In March 1991, he held the all-union referendum asking citizens whether they would like to preserve the “renewed” Soviet Union as a voluntary union of free, equal, and friendly republics. Many republics, however, boycotted the referendum, arguing that their goal was complete independence; while Ukraine – the key element of Gorbachev’s project – supplemented the voting bill with the second, “republican” question. It was about the kind of “renewed” federation, specifically about the priority of the republican constitution and laws over those of the Union. More than 80% of Ukrainians supported this proposition, empowering Ukraine’s leader, the head of the national parliament, and the top communist apparatchik Leonid Kravchuk, for a tougher stance in negotiations with Moscow. Throughout the following months (April–July 1991), Kravchuk skillfully played for time, rejecting Gorbachev’s invitations to Moscow for negotiations on the “renewed federation.” He argued that his authority was insufficient to discuss such an important document and that only the newly elected Ukrainian president would be legitimately mandated to do this. The nationwide presidential election for the newly established position was scheduled for December 1, 1991. This drastically ran against Gorbachev’s plans to finalize the document by the end of the summer, and evoked apparently even more anxiety among his conservative allies-cum-rivals in the Politburo. In August, shortly before the scheduled signing of the new Union Treaty that Ukraine and some other republics refused to join, a group of top communist hardliners (including the ministers of defense and interior and the head of the KGB) declared themselves the “State Committee on the State of Emergency” (GKChP) and introduced martial law all over the country. They effectively locked Mikhail Gorbachev in his Crimean dacha but got very strong rebuff from Boris Yeltsin and some other republican leaders and parliaments. Yeltsin condemned the illegal takeover of power as a coup d’état and called

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in the co-citizens to defy the usurpers. This apparently undermined the legitimacy of the conspirators (which was low anyway) and facilitated the de facto boycott of most of their commands and orders. After three days of staying in power with no real power, the putschists surrendered to the forces loyal to Yeltsin and Gorbachev, who had been brought, in the meantime, out of his Crimean seclusion.16 The failed coup attempt exposed the complete fecklessness of the central power and triggered a chain of political declarations of national independence, starting from the Baltics and ultimately ending in Central Asia. Ukraine was the only republic that approved the decision of the national parliament by a popular referendum on independence, held on the same day as presidential elections, December 1. A week later, the newly elected Ukrainian president Leonid Kravchuk met his Russian counterpart, Boris Yeltsin, and the head of the Belarusian parliament, Stanislav Shushkevich, in the Belarusian reserve region of Belavezha. As the representatives of the states that founded the Soviet Union back in 1922, they agreed to dissolve the ill-fated communist “federation” and establish instead a loose Commonwealth of Independent States with mostly consulting functions. By the end of 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev resigned from the position of president of a state that had ceased to exist. He should be certainly credited for the peaceful dismantling of the communist system and the Soviet empire, even though he did not intend to dismantle, but only to reconstruct them. A lack of systemic thinking, a poor understanding of real problems, and the virtual absence of any coherent and comprehensive plans severely undermined all his efforts. It is one of the curiosities of Communist reformers that they always set out with the quixotic goal of reforming some aspects of their system while keeping others unaffected–introducing market-oriented incentives while maintaining central planning.17

16 S. Plokhy, The Last Empire: The Final Days of the Soviet Union, Basic Books, New York, 2014. 17 T. Judt, Postwar, p. 602.

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Divergent trajectories

post-communist states

ith all the acclaim for Gorbachev’s role in liberation of captive nations, we should understand, however, that nothing would have happened if the captive nations themselves were not ready to adopt the “gift,” to use the chance, to jump at the opportunity as soon as it happened. They had to behold and beware, to do substantial homework in civic enlightening, networking, and mobilization. The very fact that not all the satellites had equally (if at all) benefited from Gorbachev’s thaw and empire’s decline, graphically confirms the importance of endogenous factors, of domestic organic work, and of the internal preparedness for change. Of the 29 post-communist states that departed in 1989–1992 from the debris of the collapsed totalitarian project, only a tiny minority fully used “Gorbachev’s gift” and transited successfully toward Western-style liberal democracy, the rule of law, and a full-fledged market economy [Fig. 2.5]. Perhaps not incidentally, all the seven successful transitions occurred in the states qualified earlier as “Central” (or “Central East”) European – Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia (which split peacefully in 1992 into Slovakia and the Czech Republic), post-Yugoslav Slovenia, and three tiny Baltic republics – Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia (all of them were occupied by the Soviet Union in 1940 but internationally, were never recognized as legitimately “Soviet”). The geography of successful transitions rather confirms than disproves the Huntingtonian fault-line in Europe that divides the realms of Western and Eastern Christianity or, to put it differently, the historical realms of the German and Austrian empires, largely congruent with the earlier realms of Hungarian, Polish, Germanic, and Swedish dominance.18 Perhaps only Croatia fell rather unduly to the “wrong” side of the fault-line, but this happened mostly because of external factors – the war with Serbia that detracted the country initially from democratic reforms but did not preclude it from the eventual catching up. All the other post-communist states – in the European part of the former Soviet Union, South Caucasus, Central Asia, and in the Balkans – either failed in transition or proved to have very mixed, 18 S. Huntington S., The Clash of Civilizations? [in:] “Foreign Affairs,” 1993, vol. 72, nr. 3, p. 30.

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Figure 2.5. Civil rights and political liberties in Europe and post-Soviet republics, 1981–2009. Source: Freedom House.

controversial, and ambiguous results. Again, barely incidentally, all of them belong to the Huntingtonian realm of the Orthodox Christian or Muslim civilizations that politically coincides with the realms of Russian and Ottoman rule [Fig. 2.6.]. As of today, we can see consolidated autocracies in Belarus, Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, unconsolidated (competitive) authoritarian regimes in Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, hybrid regimes in Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, and Macedonia, and unconsolidated democracies (promoted by the EU but otherwise hybrid) in Romania and Bulgaria.19 It might be tempting to embark on historical/civilizational determinism and conclude that the past determines the future, and that structural factors – like historical/cultural legacy – play 19 Z. Csaky, Dropping the Democratic Façade, [in:] “Nations in Transit,” Washington, D.C., Freedom House, p. 12–13, 20–25.

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Figure 2.6. Democracy scores in post-communist states, 2018. Source: Freedom House.

Figure 2.7. Post-communist nations on the Global Cultural Map, after Ronald Inglehart. Source: WVS.

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an important, perhaps decisive role in nations’ development [Fig. 2.7.]. One of the earliest attempts to elucidate the issue in the context of the eventual post-communist transformations was made in 1992 by the renowned American sociologist Robert Putnam in his comparative study of institutional reforms in southern and northern Italy in the past two decades. He referred to the post-communist states only in passing, but his theorizing elucidates both the past and prospective trajectories of the (post-) communist states.

In search of social capital

utnam’s primary goal was to explain very different results of the same administrative reforms carried out in Italy’s north and south. The difference that he discovered was striking, and its only plausible explanation hinged on the fact that the regions historically belonged to very different political entities and de facto different civilizations, informing quite different political cultures and social environments. Italy’s north had an important historic tradition of popular participation in the public life of the city-states. In the south, the tradition was missing insofar as it historically evolved within various autocratic entities. This resulted in different amounts of “social capital” accumulated in the north and the south – i.e. different levels of mutual trust among citizens, solidarity, and ability to cooperate on common, socially important goals. A high level of “social capital” encourages equal, horizontal ties between citizens, rather than vertical patron-client relations. It is closely related to the emergence and functioning of civil society – the network of formal and informal civic communities that determine the efficacy of democratic institutions. Sociologists often illustrate the importance of social capital, i.e., mutual trust and cooperation, with the classic textbook story of two prisoners. They are arrested as suspects, the story maintains, but the investigator has no clear evidence against them to present in court. So he plays a game by keeping them in separate cells and persuading each to confess to the crime. The police officer knows that all human beings have an instinct of self-preservation, focused on the primary need to take care of oneself. The

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social capital

investigator presents the two prisoners with a dilemma. They could rescue themselves by admitting that their partner committed the crime, being assured that only their associate will receive punishment in this case. There is, however, the third option that the investigator wisely does not mention. If both prisoners refuse to confess, he would be obliged to release both of them due to a lack of evidence. The solution to the “prisoners’ dilemma” (a.k.a. “collective action problem”) is rather simple and efficient, but to achieve it, both partners must fully trust each other. Each of them must be fairly confident that his accomplice would not cheat or betray him. Only on this condition can their relations (and social relations in general) be truly cooperative and mutually beneficial. To make it possible, they need to have some shared experience that encourages mutual trust. In practice, social capital is very difficult to accumulate and very easy to waste. It is accrued through daily experiences of trust and cooperation, the honest fulfilment of contracts and obligations, and by treating others as you would like them to treat you. In small communities where everybody knows one another, such as a classroom, a village, or an ancient Greek polis, the development of this “capital” is easier. This is because all transgressors are visible and can be easily sanctioned, abandoned by friends, excluded from a game, or even expelled from the polis. Problems emerge in larger societies where most members are anonymous. We do not know these other people but must cooperate with them daily. This involves potentially risky activities such as depositing money in a bank, hoping that we shall receive it back at some point, buying medicine with the hope that it really is the substance indicated on the label, and electing a deputy in the hope that she or he will follow their declared political line. In some societies, these expectations are almost always fulfilled, and we call such polities developed nations. In some other societies, these expectations are most likely to remain unfulfilled. We call these places failed states. In some societies, however, like in most post-communist states, expectations are only met some of the time. And the degree to which expectations are met largely determines the fraction of the real value of citizens’ labor, skills, and property that they can ultimately receive in the marketplace.

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The rest of the value is lost as a “tax” on corruption, a kind of “insurance” against uncertainty. Of course, lawbreakers can be found everywhere. This is because selfishness is as human as co-operation, and free-riding is tempting for many people. All societies, to some degree, have mechanisms of control and punishing for anti-social behavior. But in civic communities, formal rules only play a supporting role to mechanisms of self-control and individual responsibility. Each citizen is supposed to be aware of the fact that free-riding is not a victimless crime, but rather something that affects other people’s lives and the sustainability of the system in general. This understanding of civic behavior stems primarily from bottom-up, daily experiences in society. At the top of the state, these ideals are simply maintained and encouraged or, in some cases, dismissed by lawlessness and corruption tolerated by the state. Putnam’s evidence shows that Italy’s northerners are more likely to actively participate in elections and protest actions, sign petitions, and subscribe to local media, discuss local news, and belong to various civic organizations – not only large, long-established, with nationwide membership, but also small and often informal, like “amateur soccer clubs, choral societies, hiking clubs, bird-watching groups, literary circles, hunters’ associations, Lions Clubs,” and so on.20 All these engagements strengthen people’s civility – give them an experience of interaction, planning, and scheduling, discussing and compromising, and holding personal and collective responsibility. Soviet communism eroded those weak spots of civility that existed before. Totalitarian regimes never tolerate independent civic organization, even if they are apolitical and lack influence. In fact, the only societal grouping that remains beyond the totalitarian state’s full control is the family. It is only here that some mutual trust can be preserved. The regime eventually tried to take over this societal unit by infecting it with ideas such as the myth of Pavlik Morozov – a young boy and exemplary Soviet subject who denounced his own parents to the KGB.21

civic organizations

20 R. Putnam, Making Democracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, Princeton University Press, 1993, o. 91. 21 C. Kelly, Comrade Pavlik: The Rise and Fall of a Soviet Boy Hero, Granta, London, 2005; K. Csaba, Pavlik Morozov: A Soviet Case Study of ‘Dark’ Social Engineering, [in:] A. Podgorecki, J. Alexander, R. Shields (eds.), Social Engineering, Carleton University Press, Ottawa, 1996, p. 113–130.

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This is why the (re-)emergence of civil society and (re-)accumulation of positive social capital appeared to be a very difficult task. Everywhere beyond Central Europe, the traditions of civility had been very weak or, as in Central Asia, virtually non-existent. This led Robert Putnam to make very grim prognosis for the post-communist states, especially in the post-Soviet region:

The fate of the Mezzogiorno is an object lesson for the Third World today and the former communist lands of Eurasia tomorrow, moving uncertainly towards self-government. [...] Many of the formerly Communist societies had weak civic traditions before the advent of communism, and totalitarian rule abused even that limited stock of social capital. Without norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement, the Hobbesian outcome of the Mezzogiorno – amoral familism, clientelism, lawlessness, ineffective government, and economic stagnation – seems likelier than successful democratization and economic development. Palermo may represent the future of Moscow.22

The verdict looks sad and discouraging but not pessimistic. Indeed, any country’s development is determined by history, cultural milieu, and civilizational belonging. The president of Basilicata, as Robert Putnam acerbically remarks, cannot move his government to Emilia, i.e., from the “uncivic” south to the “civic” north. And, by the same token, the prime minister of Azerbaijan cannot move his country to the Baltic shores. No miracles can happen, and no rapid changes should be expected. “Most institutional history moves slowly.” But it does not mean that nothing can be changed at all and all efforts are futile. At the end of his book, Putnam rejects accusations in fatalistic determinism: The full results of the regional reform are far from an invitation to quietism. On the contrary, [they] demonstrate that changing formal institutions can change political practice. The reform had measurable and mostly beneficial consequences for regional political life. As institutionalists would predict, institutional changes were (gradually) reflected in changing identities, changing values, changing power, and changing strategies... The regional reform allowed social learning, ‘learning by doing’. Formal change induced informal change and became self-sustaining.23

22 Putnam, p. 183. 23 Ibidem, p. 184.

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In other words, changes are possible everywhere, but in some places, they require much more time and effort than in the others. The past, indeed, substantially determines the future but also opens up a vast avenue of opportunities that could be completely wasted or fully utilized and, therefore, effectively broadened and developed. Three decades of post-communist and post-Soviet developments illustrate not only “path-dependence” (“the point of arrival largely depends on the point of departure”) but also the importance of human agency at the levels of both national leadership and the common people.

Chapter readings

Applebaum A., History Will Judge the Complicit, [in:] “The Atlantic,” July–August 2020. Ash T. G., The Revolution of the Magic Lantern, [in:] “New York Review of Books,” 18 January 1990. Ash T. G., The Magic Lantern: The Revolution of 1989 Witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin, and Prague, Random House, New York, 1990. Bunce V., Subversive Institutions: The Design and the Destruction of Socialism and the State, Cambridge University Press, 1999. Csaky Z., Dropping the Democratic Façade, [in:] “Nations in Transit,” Freedom House, Washington, D.C., 2020. Farr J., Social Capital: A Conceptual History, [in:] “Political Theory,” 2004, vol. 32, nr. 1. Fukuyama F., The End of History?, [in:] “The National Interest,” 1989, no. 16, p. 3-18. Gaidar Ye., Collapse of an Empire: Lessons for Modern Russia, Brookings Institute Press, Washington, D.C., 2008. Huntington S., The Clash of Civilizations?, [in:] “Foreign Affairs,” 1993, vol. 72, nr. 3. Judt T., Postwar. A History of Europe Since 1945, Penguin Press, London, 2005. Kelly C., Comrade Pavlik: The Rise and Fall of a Soviet Boy Hero, Granta, London, 2005. Neef C., The Gorbachev Files Secret Papers Reveal Truth Behind Soviet Collapse, [in:] “Spiegel,” 11 August 2011, https://www.spiegel.de/ international/europe/the-gorbachev-files-secret-papers-reveal-truthbehind-soviet-collapse-a-779277.html. Ouimet M., The Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill & London, 2003.

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Plokhy S., The Last Empire: The Final Days of the Soviet Union, Basic Books, New York, 2014. Plokhy S., Chernobyl: History of a Tragedy, Allen Lane, London, 2018. Podgorecki, J. Alexander, R. Shields (eds.), Social Engineering, Carleton University Press, Ottawa, 1996. Putnam R., Making Democracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, Princeton University Press, 1993. Riabchuk M., Civil Society and National Emancipation: The Ukrainian Case, [in:] Zbigniew Rau (ed.), The Reemergence of Civil Society in Eastern Europe and the USSR, Westview Press, Boulder, 1991. Risch W., A Soviet West: nationhood, regionalism, and empire in the annexed western borderlands, [in:] “Nationalities Papers,” 2015, vol. 43, nr. 1. Szporluk R., The Soviet West – or Far Eastern Europe? [in:] R. Szporluk, Russia, Ukraine, and the Breakup of the Soviet Union, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2000. Tismaneanu V., Reinventing Politics: Eastern Europe from Stalin to Havel, Free Press, Amsterdam, 1992.

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Chapter 3 East European Democratization in the Global Context: Blind Spots of the Transition Paradigm

he “annus mirabilis” of 1989 and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 evoked great enthusiasm among not only politicians who greeted the end of the Cold War, but also intellectuals who cheered the expansion of freedom and human rights onto the new territories. One of the first and most remarkable attempts to conceptualize the unique historical developments was Samuel Huntington’s article “Democracy’s Third Wave,” inspired by the regime changes in Eastern Europe but yet not certain about the Soviet future.1

Huntington’s “three waves” of democratization

he text was published in Spring 1991, nearly half a year before the Soviet collapse. Nonetheless, the author observed that the number of democracies in the world had doubled within the past quarter century (1975–1990) – from 30 to 60. He defined it as the “third wave of democratization,” by “wave” meaning a group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occurs within a specified period of time and in which those transitions significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction.2 The first “wave” of democratization, in his view, was a century-long process that began in the 1820s, with the widening of 1 S. Huntington, Democracy’s Third Wave, [in:] “Journal of Democracy,” 1991, vol. 2, no. 2, p. 12–34. 2 S. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 1991, p. 15.

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suffrage to a large proportion of the male population in the United States, and continued until 1926, bringing 29 democracies into being. Then, with the spread of authoritarian and overtly fascist regimes in Europe, a “reverse wave” began, which reduced the number of democratic states in the world, by 1942, to 12. The second wave of democratization ushered by the Allies’ victory in WWII and enhanced eventually by the process of decolonization brought the number of democratic states to 36 in 1962. But again, the second “reverse wave” brought the number of democracies back down to 30 by 1975 [Fig. 3.1.].

Figure 3.1. Percentage of competitive systems, by year. Source: Doorenspleet, p. 393.

Far from being a sheer exercise in statistics, the attempts to conceptualize the global processes of democratization as distinct ‘waves’ aimed at finding some inner logic in these developments and identifying the factors that affect both expansion and contraction of democracy. Huntington featured five major factors that impacted the timing and character of the “third wave.” First, by the end of the 1960s, democracy had been broadly accepted as a normative value. This substantially undermined the legitimacy of authoritarian regimes both domestically and internationally. Secondly, the impressive economic growth of the 1960s “raised living standards, increased education, and greatly expanded the urban middle class in many countries.” The demand for more freedom and human rights in many countries increased noticeably.

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Thirdly, after the Second Vatican Council of 1963–1965, the Catholic church reconsidered its social doctrine and activity, taking a more active stance against authoritarianism rather than defending the traditional status quo. Fourthly, external actors, primarily the European Community and the United States, contributed to the promotion of global democracy. One may also recall that in 1975, all European nations (except pro-Chinese Albania) plus the U.S.A. and Canada signed the Helsinki Accords, which laid the ground for eventual work of the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe). Its third (“humanitarian”) tenet stipulated the protection of human rights and freedom of movement. The communist governments had no intention to implement the “inconvenient” paragraphs honestly (and they actually did not do it until “perestroika”). But the very fact that they signed the document facilitated legitimate pressure on them – both domestic, from dissident groups, and international, from other signatories of the Agreement. And fifthly, as in all “wave”-like processes, snowballing played an important role by making the earlier cases of successful transition into patterns to emulate and encouraging other nations to follow suit. Of course, snowballing only works in countries that have favorable conditions for democratization – as was proved by the East Europeans as soon as the Soviets removed their control. Otherwise, as Huntington sardonically remarks, “neither the White House, the Kremlin, the European Community, nor the Vatican was in a strong position to promote democracy in places where it did not already exist.”3 In the second part of his essay (and eventually in the eponymous book), Huntington examines the main obstacles to democratization and breaks them down into the political, cultural, and economic. Lack of past democratic experience is rubricated as a political obstacle, even though it can be also defined as cultural. Crucially, “twenty-three of 30 countries that democratized between 1974 and 1990 had had some history of democracy, while only a few countries [of nearly a hundred] that were nondemocratic in 1990 could claim such experience.” This indicated that the further prospects for the “third wave” were rather uncertain and the “reverse wave” was more likely. 3 S. Huntington, Democracy’s Third Wave, p. 12–13, 16–17.

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The other political obstacles to democratic transition, as listed by Huntington, were a lack of genuine commitment of the national leaders to democratic principles, the hyper-activity of revolutionary radicals and the reaction of conservatives, and foreign pressure or even intervention. In our case, of a particular interest is his remark about the home-grown character of communism in some countries (like Russia, or China, or Cuba, or Yugoslavia) where dictatorship might be more stable inasmuch as it is reinforced also by nationalism.4 This is exactly the opposite to what happened in most East European countries, where regimes were seen as alien, imposed by Moscow. In these cases, nationalism reinforced anti-communist movements that were framed as both anti-authoritarian, democratic, and anti-colonial, nationally liberating. The cultural obstacles essentially boil down to the nation’s civilizational belonging: the further from the West and Western forms of Christianity (Catholic or, most preferably, Protestant), the lesser the chances for a successful appropriation of Western, i.e. liberal democratic norms, values, and institutions. This did not bode well for democratization in the Balkans and the Soviet Union: “Historically these areas were part of the Czarist and Ottoman empires; their prevailing religions were Orthodoxy and Islam, not Western Christianity. These areas did not have the same experiences as Western Europe with feudalism, the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, and liberalism. [Now] the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Iron Curtain may have shifted the critical political dividing line eastward to the centuries-old boundary between Eastern and Western Christendom. Beginning in the north, this line runs south roughly along the borders dividing Finland and the Baltic republics from Russia; through Byelorussia and the Ukraine; south and then west in Romania, cutting off Transylvania from the rest of the country; and then through Yugoslavia roughly along the line separating Slovenia and Croatia from the other republics. This line may now separate those areas where democracy will take root from those where it will not.”5 [Fig. 1.6.]. 4 Ibidem, p. 21–22. See also R. Szporluk, Communism and Nationalism. Karl Marx versus Friedrich List, Oxford University Press, New York & Oxford, 1985. 5 Huntington, op. cit., p. 22–23.

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In the less restrictive version of the cultural argument, Huntington gives a chance for democratization to the Orthodox Christian nations (and to the non-Western but Catholic nations of Latin America), but he raises serious doubts about the compatibility of democracy with Confucianism and Islam (being often cited as “peculiarly hostile to democracy”). Evan Japan, in his view, is problematic, as it emphasizes the group over the individual, authority over liberty, and responsibilities over rights. “The maintenance of order and respect for hierarchy are central values. The conflict of ideas, groups, and parties is viewed as dangerous and illegitimate. Most important, Confucianism merged society and the state and provided no legitimacy for autonomous social institutions at the national level.” Islam, even more contentiously, “rejects any distinction between the religious community and the political community.” To the extent that governmental legitimacy and policy flow from religious doctrine and religious expertise, Islamic concepts of politics differ from and contradict the premises of democratic politics.

Not a single Islamic state has succeeded, so far, in maintaining a viable democratic system for any period of time (except for the rather ambiguous case of Turkey). By the end of his essay, Huntington backtracks, however, from the argument that particular cultures can be permanent obstacles to change. First, he recognizes that all cultural traditions, including Islam and Confucianism, are

highly complex bodies of ideas, beliefs, doctrines, assumptions, and behavior patterns. And any major culture, including Confucianism, has some elements that are compatible with democracy, just as both Protestantism and Catholicism have elements that are clearly undemocratic. Confucian democracy may be a contradiction in terms, but democracy in a Confucian society need not be. The real question is which elements in Islam and Confucianism are favorable to democracy, and how and under what circumstances these can supersede the undemocratic aspects of those cultural traditions. [Secondly], cultures historically are dynamic, not stagnant. The dominant beliefs and attitudes in a society change. While maintaining elements of continuity, the prevailing culture of a society in one generation may differ significantly from what it was one or two generations earlier... Cultures evolve and

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[...] the most important force bringing about cultural changes is often economic development itself.6

Conversely, economic underdevelopment represents a serious obstacle to democratization. “Most wealthy countries,” Huntington writes, are democratic, and most democratic countries – India is the most dramatic exception – are wealthy. The correlation between wealth and democracy implies that transitions to democracy should occur primarily in countries at the mid-level of economic development. In poor countries democratization is unlikely; in rich countries [except for the oil-producers] it usually has already occurred... The conclusion seems clear. Poverty is a principal – probably the principal – obstacle to democratic development... The two most decisive factors affecting the future consolidation and expansion of democracy will be economic development and political leadership... Economic development makes democracy possible; political leadership makes it real... Democracy will spread to the extent that those who exercise power in the world and in individual countries want it to spread.7

The “thin” and “thick” notions of democracy

espite its alleged theoretical flaws and related controversies, Huntington’s article (and eventual book) largely framed the discussion about post-communist transformations within the next decades. Quite a few authors questioned validity of Huntington’s theorizing from both the empirical and conceptual points of view. The main empirical flaw, as the Dutch scholar Renske Doorenspleet astutely noticed, dwelled in considering the number of states in the world as rather constant. In fact, it substantially increased in the 1960s (from 93 to 137) as a result of decolonization. Therefore, the proportion of states that were democratic fell from 32% in 1957 to 27% in 1972 (in Huntington’s calculations), but in real numbers it actually increased – from 30 democracies in 1957 to 37 in 1972. So, this can hardly be qualified as a “reverse wave” – unless we ignore the fact that 6 Ibidem, p. 24, 28, 30–31. 7 Ibidem, p. 33–34.

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the new independent states were not part of any “transition” to autocracy but merely born (in most cases) autocratic.8 The conceptual flaws of the “three waves” metaphor looked even more serious. They stemmed essentially from different notions of democracy that spawned disagreement on which countries and since what time could be qualified as “democracies,” and therefore how the “waves” should be framed – chronologically and numerically. Huntington drew his study on the minimalist notion of democracy that emphasized the importance of electoral competition but cared little about political rights and civil liberties. Renske Doorenspleet attempted to partially fix this flaw by applying the requirement of inclusiveness in а stricter and more coherent way. This led her to reschedule the beginning of the “first wave” from the 1820s to the end of the 19th century, when women in some countries had been finally allowed to vote. The “first wave” became therefore not only shorter but also lower; consequently, the “reverse wave” appeared less steep [Fig. 3.2.]. She introduced also the notion of “interrupted regimes” that were transiting neither to democracy nor autocracy but merely occupied by foreign powers. Still, she did not pay much attention to the notion of civil liberties, citing a lack of relevant data as the main reason for the omission. Indeed, the systemic study and comprehensive indexing of political rights and civil liberties on a global scale began only in 1973. For the earlier times, only electoral competition (or lack thereof) could be easily assessed, and only political inclusiveness (as conformity to universal suffrage) could be credibly verified. There might be, however, a more fundamental reason for drawing analyses of pre-1973 democratization processes on the minimalist (“electoral”) notion of democracy. Strictly speaking, throughout the whole 19th century, not a single country could be qualified as a full-fledged liberal democracy. And only a few were meeting the required criteria for the most of the 20th century – until the end of Europeans’ colonial rule in Africa, effective ban on racial discrimination in the U.S. in 1965, granting women the voting rights in Switzerland in 1971, and so on. By 1972, only 20 states could be conclusively qualified as liberal democracies and 20 more states could be defined as illiberal 8 R. Doorenspleet, Reassessing the Three Waves of Democratization, [in:] “World Politics,” 2000, vol. 52, no. 3, p. 386, 395.

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Figure 3.2. Percentage of minimal democracies, by year. Source: Doorenspleet, p. 394.

democracies, i.e., democracies with serious breaches of some important requirements. All the other states – more than 100 at the time – were autocracies: some of them multiparty, with a hegemonic “party of power” and marginalized or spurious opposition, but most of them close to dictatorial.9 This made scholars generally agree with the conceptualization of the first two “waves” of democratic transition as defined first and foremost by the minimalist, purely electoral criteria. But also, it compelled them to take a closer look at the third “wave” as consisting of two very different parts and to apply a much “thicker” notion of democracy as consisting of great many indicators available from independent international researches and watchdogs since 1973. The extended dataset enabled them to develop a more nuanced, differentiated approach to the different kinds of democracy (as well as autocracy), and to work more intensively on “thin” and “thick” notions of democracy and their essential qualities. Most generally, democracy is understood today as a form of government where all the important decisions are made either directly by the elected bodies or by the executive institutions informed and regulated by the elected bodies. The legitimacy of these bodies (and therefore of their decisions) is based on their representative character. All of them are assembled by the people’s majority will through the free and fair, recurrent, inclusive, and competitive elections. No electoral competition can be really 9 J. Møller, S.-E. Skaaning, The Third Wave: Inside the Numbers, [in:] “Journal of Democracy,” 2013, vol. 24, no. 4, p. 99.

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fair and meaningful unless there is “some degree of civil and political freedom beyond the electoral arena so that citizens can articulate and organize around their political beliefs and interests.”10 In other words, there should be a rule of law that fully protects political rights and civil liberties: securing citizens’ right to elect and be elected, disseminate and receive information, organize political parties and assemble meetings, and prevent electoral fraud and the coercion of voters. This is rather a “thin” notion of democracy that largely corresponds with Robert Dahl’s classical concept of polyarchy as consisting of eight components, or institutional requirements:

almost all adult citizens have the right to vote; almost all adult citizens are eligible for public office; political leaders have the right to compete for votes; elections are free and fair; all citizens are free to form and join political parties and other organizations; all citizens are free to express themselves on all political issues; diverse sources of information about politics exist and are protected by law; and government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference.11

The “thicker” notions of democracy pay more attention to its quality besides these basic standards. It seemingly stresses the obvious – that the goal of democracy is not democracy itself but good governance. It ponders how well the system ensures political and civil freedom, popular sovereignty (control over public policies and the officials who make them), political equality (in citizens’ rights and powers), and fair and effective rule (standards of transparency, legality, responsibility and accountability).12 In a comprehensive study on the qualities of democracy, Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino identify eight dimensions in which democracies vary in quality, and divide them into three different (functional) groups: The rule of law, participation, competition, and vertical plus horizontal accountability are content-relevant but mainly procedural, concerned mostly with rules and practices. The next two dimensions are substantive: respect for civil and political freedoms, and the progressive implementation of greater political (and underlying it, social and

10 L. Diamond, L. Morlino, The Quality of Democracy, [in:] “Journal of Democracy,” 2004, vol. 15, no. 4, p. 21. 11 R. Dahl, Polyarchy, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970. 12 L. Diamond, L. Morlino, op. cit., p. 21.

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economic) equality. Our last dimension, responsiveness, bridges procedure and substance by providing a basis for measuring how much or little public policies (including laws, institutions, and expenditures) correspond to citizen demands and preferences as aggregated through the political process.13

All these dimensions are closely linked and tend to move together, either toward democratic improvement and deepening, or toward decay. They reflect the elements of democracy that are so densely interactive and overlapping that in most cases, it is rather difficult to decide where one dimension ends and another begins. Civil and political rights are the key indicators of a high-quality democracy, but without the rule of law, no dimension would effectively solidify. In sum, modern liberal democracy can be seen as a “complex synthesis of three historical currents or traditions: democracy, liberalism, and republicanism.” People’s participation in electoral process and demand for responsiveness from the elected leaders represent the democratic element of the tradition. The mechanisms that protect both the individual and group rights under the law (including the rights of minorities) make up the liberal element. And the republican element (through unelected instruments of horizontal accountability) enforces the supremacy of law and ensures that public officials serve the public interest.14

Democracy measurement

owadays, scholars employ a wide range of democracy datasets provided annually by reputable international institutions that monitor global changes, collect relevant information from all over the world, and engage the most competent experts to assess the state of democracy and its various indicators in each country. The recurrent character of evaluations and a high number of engaged specialists mitigates the possible bias and arbitrariness in such assessments where the subjective factor cannot be fully excluded. The large number of assessment criteria and operationalized indexes also enhances the ultimate plausibility of the data. The results serve not only to compare the situation 13 Ibidem, p. 22. 14 Ibidem, p. 29–30.

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in different countries or to trace the internal dynamic in each of them, but also to empirically investigate the relationship between democracy and many other economic and social variables. One of the richest and most popular datasets is provided by the U.S.-based NGO Freedom House. They annually assess the state of democracy in all independent states along a seven-point scale and according to seven indicators: National democratic governance, Electoral process, Civil society, Independent media, Local democratic governance, Judicial Framework and Independence, and Corruption [Fig. 3.3.]. The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, where “one” represents the lowest and “seven” the highest level of democracy. The countries which have the highest average of all the seven assessed indicators (from 5.01 to 7.00 points) are recognized as Consolidated Democracies; the countries that score from 4.01 to 5.00 points are Semi-Consolidated Democracies; the countries in the range of 3.01 to 4.00 points are defined as Transitional or Hybrid Regimes; 2.01 to 3.00 points refer to Semi-Consolidated Authoritarian Regimes; and the countries with the minimal rating of 1.00 to 2.00 points are categorized as Consolidated Authoritarian Regimes.15 A “thicker” assessment of democracy in various countries is provided by two other Freedom House ratings that refer actually not to global democracy but to global freedom. They employ many more indicators, however, that ultimately outline a subtler, more detailed picture. One of their ratings – of political freedom – is based on 10 indicators (each assessed from 0 to 4), and the other one – the rating of civil liberties – is based on 15 indicators, also assessed from 0 to 4. The total rating of freedom can make up thereby (ideally) 100 points (40+60). The countries with the aggregate rating of 71 points and more are defined as “Free,” countries with 40 to 70 points are “Partly Free,” and those with 39 points and less are defined as “Non-Free” [Fig. 3.4.]. In most cases, the Consolidated and Semi-Consolidated Democracies fall into the “Free” category, while the Consolidated and Semi-Consolidated Authoritarian Regimes are defined as “NonFree.” The Transitional/Hybrid Regimes are qualified as “Partly Free,” while occasionally, some Semi-Consolidated Democracies 15 Freedom in the World Research Methodology, Washington, D.C., Freedom House, 2020, https://freedomhouse.org/reports/freedom-world/freedom-world-research-methodology.

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Figure 3.3. Democracy scores: methodology of evaluation. Source: Freedom House.

and Semi-Consolidated Autocracies also fall into this category because the levels of democracy and of freedom are strongly correlated but not fully congruent. Democracy datasets are provided today by a few other organizations. Some of them, like the Democracy Index, compiled by

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Figure 3.4. Democracy scores: political rights and civil liberties. Source: Freedom House.

the U.K.-based Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU),16 or the Human Freedom Index (HFI), co-produced by the Cato Institute (U.S.A.), the Fraser Institute (Canada), and the Liberales Institut (Germany), cover a very limited time-span (since 2006 or even 2008, and not annually).17 Some, like the Polity Project by the Political Instability Task Force (U.S.A.)18 or Varieties of Democracy by the Swedish V-Dem Institute,19 stretch their research back to the 19th century but cover a smaller number of countries and draw on rather minimalist definitions of democracy. Nonetheless, all these data may serve very well some specific purposes, for example to study in more detail the economic freedoms from the HFI dataset, or to pay more attention to the political culture, political participation, and/or functioning of government, operationalized by the EIU.

Ushering in the “forth wave”

ith the panoply of various data, the metaphor of the “third wave” as allegedly lasting from 1974–1976 to the present became, by the mid-1990s, untenable. The collapse of the outer (1989) and inner (1991) Soviet empires marked a definite change in the ongoing democratization processes – in both quantitative and qualitative terms. In quantitative terms, the 16 Democracy Index, London, Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019, https://www.eiu.com/ topic/democracy-index. 17 Human Freedom Index, Cato Institute, Washington, D.C., 2019, https://www.cato.org/ human-freedom-index-new. 18 Polity5 Project, Center for Systemic Peace, Washington, D.C., 2019, http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html. 19 Varieties of Democracy, V-Dem Institute, Gothenburg, 2020, https://www.v-dem.net/ en/.

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number of electoral democracies, in 1990–1994, had almost doubled – from 60 to 117, bringing to life three times more democratic regimes than in the previous decade and a half [Fig. 3.5.]. In qualitative terms, the new (“explosive”) wave presented profoundly

Figure 3.5. Global distribution of political regimes, 1972–2012. Source: Møller & Skaaning, p. 99.

different mode of transitions. They were so different from the third wave democratic transitions in the 1970s and 1980s that they, as Jørgen Møller and Svend-Erik Skaaning argued, should not even be grouped under the same rubric.20 In fact, decommunization triggered the fourth wave of regime change that led not only to different kinds of democracy but also to various forms of refurbished authoritarianism [Fig. 3.6.].

Chronologically, the postcommunist transitions occurred within the time span typically referred to as the third wave of democratization. The wave metaphor, however, connotes some relationship between cases that is only weakly present. Transitions to democracy in Southern Europe [Greece, Portugal and Spain] and Latin America did not cause, trigger, or inspire communist regime change. The temporal proximity of these cases was more accidental than causal... Causal mechanisms at play were so different and the regime types so varied that the postcommunist experience may be better captured by a different theory and a separate label – the fourth wave [...] However, the fact that Southern European and Latin American transitions occurred first

20 J. Møller, S.-E. Skaaning, op. cit., p. 107.

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Figure 3.6. Distribution of political regimes in Eastern Europe, 1972–2012. Source: Møller & Skaaning, p. 102.

had significant path-dependent consequences for how we conceptualized and explained the postcommunist transitions.21

The successful transitions that occurred within the “third wave” were theorized as a result of transitional moments, in which the balance of power between supporters and opponents of the authoritarian regime was relatively equal and also uncertain. Because neither side had the capacity to achieve its first preferences through the use of force, the sides opted to negotiate power-sharing arrangements with their opponents, which represented second-best outcomes for both. Often called ‘pacts’, these power-sharing arrangements negotiated during transition were then institutionalized as a set of checks and balances in the new democracy.22

The established transition paradigm considered four groups of choice-making actors: soft-liners and hard-liners within the ruling elite, and moderates and radicals in the opposition. In successful transitions, the reformers (soft-liners in the ancien régime) imposed democracy from above with support from the moderates in the opposition, who helped to neutralize revolutionary radicals and marginalize the conservatives and reactionaries in the ancien régime. It was broadly believed (and proved) that non-pacted

21 M. McFaul, The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship. Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World, [in:] “World Politics,” 2002, vol. 54, no. 2, p. 213, 242. 22 Ibidem, p. 213.

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transitions were likely to fail and that revolutionary transitions were most likely to produce nondemocratic outcomes. The Western policies of wholehearted support for Mikhail Gorbachev and deterrence of the alleged “radicals” (including both Yeltsin and “nationalists” in the Union republics) largely reflected that belief and fear to provoke the influential conservatives in the communist leadership and to put perestroika at risk. The strategic pacting between the main actors was seen as pursuing three major goals – to (1) limit the agenda of policy choice, (2) share proportionately in the distribution of benefits, and (3) restrict the participation of outsiders in decision-making.23

All these requirements in the “third wave” transitions were achievable: the agenda envisioned political democratization but did not mix it with potentially destabilizing economic reforms; the distribution of power between the challenged and challengers was relatively equal; and radicals on both sides were successfully marginalized. Conversely, the successful “fourth wave” (post-communist) democratic transitions did not follow the pacted path. Their agenda was very broad, since it included not only democratization but also the creation of a market economy virtually from scratch. In some cases, they pursued also the task of (postcolonial) state-building or even nation-building – defined as a “triple” or even a “quadruple” transition (as, e.g., in the post-Soviet and post-Yugoslavian republics).24 As to the equal distribution of power between the ancien (communist) régime and democratic opposition, it did not facilitate successful transitions in the “fourth wave,” but instead caused a persistent stalemate and political bickering. Ultimately, it allowed the ancien régime to overplay its opponents and marginalize them within the new authoritarian system (as in Russia or Belarus), or, alternatively, it produced highly volatile and dysfunctional quasi-democratic regimes (as in Ukraine or Moldova). The “fourth wave” democracies emerged successfully only in the countries where democrats enjoyed a decisive power 23 Ibidem, p. 217. 24 T. Kuzio, Transition in Post-Communist States: Triple or Quadruple?, [in:] “Politics,” 2001, vol. 21, no. 3, p. 169–178.

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advantage. Democratic transition was secured by their hegemonic position and their political will to create institutions of power sharing and checks and balances according to their long-cherished democratic ideals, rather than to mold them on par with the ancien régime through negotiations and compromises. By the same token, no compromises were achieved or even sought in the countries where ancien régimes retained their hegemonic position – as in post-Soviet Central Asia. They simply transformed the loosened Soviet authoritarianism into new forms of dictatorship. And finally, it was not the exclusion of radicals that facilitated successful “fourth wave” transitions but, on the contrary, their engagement and, more generally, a large-scale political mobilization of masses. Lack of mass mobilization facilitated preservation of dictatorships; insufficient mobilization (and, more generally, weakness of civil society) led to compromises with the ancien régime and resulted ultimately in the defeat or stagnation of democratic processes.

“Fourth wave” anomalies

ichael McFaul recognizes, however, that there were some important exceptions (“anomalies”) in the otherwise comprehensive and viable models of post-communist transformation. Some of them can be caused by unsettled border issues that fuel domestic and international conflicts. This usually strengthens authoritarian incumbents and weakens their democratic challengers (by diluting their democratic agenda and narrowing popular base). The Azeri-Armenian conflict over Karabakh provides the earliest and perhaps most graphic example of territorial disputes derailing democratization. Many more examples come from the former republics of Yugoslavia, as well as from Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and probably Russia (inasmuch as the Chechen wars facilitated the consolidation of Putin’s authoritarianism). The other group of “anomalies” within the “fourth wave” is seen as determined by geographic location that can override, occasionally, the “causal influence of the initial mode of transition by offering neighboring states incentives to join the norm of the

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region.”25 In some cases, it can be a highly negative impact of authoritarian neighbors like Russia or China that impede or completely prevent democratization; in other cases, it can be a positive impact of democratic states, primarily of the EU, that support democratization in a package with many other reforms. Essentially, all the Balkan states can be qualified, in this view, as “democratic overachievers” insofar as all of them started their transition from communism with a deeply entrenched old elite and a rather weak democratic opposition. In the early 1990s, their prospects for democratic development were grim, as they performed worse, in the international ratings, than the Western republics of the former Soviet Union. A decade later, however, they became welcome candidates into the European Union and NATO, and some of them have even already acquired membership. Democratic consolidation in all of them has undoubtedly benefited from proximity to the West. Conversely, initially successful transitions to democracy farther from Europe, such as Armenia or even Kyrgyzstan, have had less success in consolidating. Neighborhoods matter. It is location – and not Christianity, education, or economic development – that provides the causal push toward democracy. Initially uncertain regimes in Bulgaria and Romania [and, more generally, in the Balkans] have become increasingly more democratic over time, as these countries have aggressively sought membership in Western institutions such as the European Union and NATO. [Their] leaders have real incentives to deepen democracy, because both countries have a reasonable chance of joining these Western institutions.26

In conclusion, McFaul does not specify the conditions under which “pacts can facilitate democratization and the conditions under which pacts are inconsequential.” He only suggests that the “confrontational” democratic imposition from below is not a new phenomenon, unique to the post-communist world. He reminds that the neither American nor French transitions were pacted but resulted from revolutions. No pacting or negotiation accompanied the democratic transitions in Germany, Austria, and Japan, where regime changes were externally imposed. And postcolonial 25 M. McFaul, op. cit., p. 239. 26 Ibidem, p. 241–242.

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transitions, featured prominently in the “second wave,” had also been, in most cases, revolutionary rather than pacted. So,

in the long stretch of history, the successful transitions from communism to democracy may look more like the norm, while the pacted transitions and transitions from above in Latin America and Southern Europe may look more like the aberration.27

The reasons for “aberration” might be multiple but one of them looks apparent: all the pacted “third wave” transitions occurred in the countries that had already had some democratic experience in the past, had a full-fledged market economy, functioning state, and well-developed national identity. None of them had to pursue a double, triple, or quadruple transition, as the post-communist and postcolonial nations had to. They could afford a pacted transition framed as a “return to the (interrupted) norm” since they did not have irreconcilable goals and incompatible agendas, and therefore no revolutionary breakthrough was needed.

The “transition paradigm” and its pitfalls

he study of the third-turned-fourth wave of democratization provided additional insights on the emergence of hybrid regimes in the “grey zone” between democracy and authoritarianism, which led to further revision of the so-called “transition paradigm.” The eponymous article published by Thomas Carothers in 2002 argued that the dramatic fall of authoritarian regimes in different parts of the world in the past two decades created an impression of “the worldwide democratic revolution.” The impression was not fully groundless, since nearly all the new leaders distanced themselves from their authoritarian predecessors and declared their desire to replace the old system with a democratic rule. Rather naturally, all the newly emerged regimes were recognized as “transitional,” meaning their intended and dedicated transition toward a full-fledged democracy. An analytic model of democratic transition was extended into a universal paradigm and applied wholesale to nearly 100 countries – about 20 in Latin America, 25 in Eastern Europe and the former 27 Ibidem, p. 242–243.

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Soviet Union, 30 in sub-Saharan Africa, 10 in Asia, and 5 in the Middle East [Fig. 3.7.].

Figure 3.7. Global trends in governance, 1800–2017. Source: Polity4 Project, CPS.

“Once so labeled, their political life was automatically analyzed in terms of their movement toward or away from democracy, and they were held up to the implicit expectations of the paradigm” that supported some sort of “democratic teleology.”28 Carothers questioned this paradigm as based on essentially wrong or questionable assumptions. The first and the biggest mistake of many “transitologists,” in his view, was a wishful belief that “any country moving away from dictatorial rule can be considered a country in transition toward democracy.” On the contrary: the most common political patterns to date among the ‘transitional countries’ [...] should be understood as alternative directions, not way stations to liberal democracy... Precarious middle ground between full-fledged democracy and outright dictatorship is actually the most

28 Th. Carothers, The End of the Transition Paradigm, [in:] “Journal of Democracy,” 2002, vol. 13, no. 1, p. 6–7; see also the follow-up discussion in “Journal of Democracy,” 2002, vol. 13, no. 3.

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common political condition today of countries in the developing world and the postcommunist world... Most of the ‘transitional countries’ are neither dictatorial nor clearly headed toward democracy. They have entered a political grey zone. They have some attributes of democratic political life, including at least limited political space for opposition parties and independent civil society, as well as regular elections and democratic constitutions. Yet they suffer from serious democratic deficit, often including poor representation of citizens’ interests, low levels of political participation beyond voting, frequent abuse of the law by government officials, elections of uncertain legitimacy, very low levels of public confidence in state institutions, and persistently poor institutional performance by the state.29

The second assumption, which should have been revised, expected any democratization to unfold in three strictly defined stages: (1) gradual opening of the regime that enables political fermentation and some forms of dissent, (2) political breakthrough that means collapse of the old regime and rapid emergence of the new government, and (3) fast and coherent consolidation of the democratic system. The three-stage sequencing contributed to “democratic teleology” by implying democratization to be a kind of a natural process. In reality yet, many breakthroughs occurred without initial opening, some consolidations occurred without clearly seen breakthroughs, and most crucially, in too many cases, opening and breakthrough did not lead ultimately to any kind of democratic consolidation. The third assumption, revised by Carothers, put too much weight on democratic elections, with the sincere belief that they not only legitimize the government but also broaden the political participation of citizens and the strengthen the democratic accountability of the state. In practice, however, too many governments learned how to manipulate elections to enhance their domestic and international legitimacy but not give citizens any power of real decision-making or accept any responsibility and accountability. Elections in many cases remained a meaningless ritual rather than credible proof of democratization.30 The fourth assumption averred that that the underlying conditions in transitional countries – “their economic level, political 29 Ibidem, p. 6, 9–10, 14, 18. 30 A. Schedler, Elections Without Democracy. The Menu of Manipulation, [in:] “Journal of Democracy,” 2002, vol. 13, no. 2, p. 36–50.

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history, institutional legacies, ethnic make-up, sociocultural traditions, or other ‘structural’ features – will not be major factors in either the onset or the outcome of the transition process.” Advance of democracy in some unusual places like Mongolia, Albania, or Mauritania seemed to confirm this assumption, leading many experts and politicians to believe that “anybody can do it” and that “no preconditions” for successful democratization are needed. This led to a thorough neglect of structural factors that still played an important, though not totally deterministic role in democratic transitions. And the last, fifth assumption, questioned by Thomas Carothers, stipulated the existence of a strong, coherent, and functioning state in all places where democratization was launched. The process was generally conceived as a “redesign of state institutions” and “modification of already functioning states.” Yet in actuality, many democratizers had to simultaneously build a new state from scratch, or to cope with a completely dysfunctional old one. Democracy-building and state/nation-building did not mutually reinforce each other as many used to believe but, rather, ran against each other, with the ultimate sacrificing of the democratic agenda for the sake of the statist/nationalist. In sum, these assumptions “apply the transition paradigm to the very countries whose political evolution is calling that paradigm into question.”31 They effectively endorse democratic credentials to countries that neither are democratic nor intend to democratize in any meaningful way. Scholars have invented a few dozen adjectives to define the vast array of “qualified democracies” between outright dictatorship and well-established liberal democracy, including semi-democracy, formal democracy, electoral democracy, façade democracy, pseudo-democracy, weak democracy, partial democracy, illiberal democracy, virtual democracy, and so on.32 One may supplement the list with Putin’s invention of the “sovereign” – “managed,” “directed,” and “steered” – democracy, that simply continues a great national tradition of Potemkin-style virtuality. Larry Diamond defined all those show-window democracies as “hybrid regimes” and aptly remarked that most of them were 31 Th. Carothers, op. cit., p. 7–10. 32 D. Collier, S. Levitsky, Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research, [in:] “World Politics,” 1997, vol. 49, no. 3, p. 437, 441–442.

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neither themselves democratic nor any longer “in transition” to democracy. Virtually all of them, he claimed, were quite deliberately pseudo-democratic, “in that the existence of formally democratic political institutions, such as multiparty electoral competition, masks (often, in part, to legitimate) the reality of authoritarian domination.”33 The study of these regimes is an urgent task because of both their massive proliferation and their increasingly skillful mimicry of real democracies. The transition paradigm would be rather misleading than helpful in such research. Its rejection, however, does not mean that countries in the gray zone are doomed never to achieve well-functioning liberal democracy. It does not mean that free and fair elections in “transitional countries” are futile or not worth supporting, or that international actors should abandon efforts to promote democracy in the world. It means, however, that democracy promoters should approach their work with some very different assumptions. They should recognize, as Thomas Carothers suggests, that “imitative democracy” is not an exceptional category but a state of normality for many societies, for better or worse.

Chapter readings

Bunce V., Should Transitologists Be Grounded, [in:] “Slavic Review,” 1995, vol. 54, no. 1. Carothers Th., The End of the Transition Paradigm, [in:] “Journal of Democracy,” 2002, vol. 13, no. 1. Collier D., Levitsky S., Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research, [in:] “World Politics,” 1997, vol. 49, no. 3. Dahl R., Polyarchy, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970. Diamond L., Is the Third Wave Over?, [in:] “Journal of Democracy,” 1996, vol. 7, no. 3. Diamond L., Thinking about Hybrid Regimes, [in:] “Journal of Democracy,” 2002, vol. 13, no. 2. Diamond L., Morlino L., The Quality of Democracy, [in:] “Journal of Democracy” 2004, vol. 15, no. 4. Doorenspleet R., Reassessing the Three Waves of Democratization, [in:] “World Politics,” 2000, vol. 52, no. 3. 33 L. Diamond, Thinking about Hybrid Regimes, [in:] “Journal of Democracy,” 2002, vol. 13, no. 2, p. 24.

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Freedom in the World Research Methodology, Washington, D.C., Freedom House, 2020, https://freedomhouse.org/reports/freedom-world/ freedom-world-research-methodology. Fukuyama F., The Origins of Political Order. From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 2011. Fukuyama F., Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 2014. Huntington S., Will More Countries Become Democratic?, [in:] “Political Science Quarterly,” 1984, vol. 99, no. 2. Huntington S., Democracy’s Third Wave, [in:] “Journal of Democracy,” 1991, vol. 2. no. 2. Huntington S., The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 1991. McFaul M., The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship. Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World, [in:] “World Politics,” 2002, vol. 54, no. 2. Knudsen I., Frederiksen M., Ethnographies of Grey Zones in Eastern Europe: Relations, Borders and Invisibilities, Anthem Press, London, 2015. Kuzio T., Transition in Post-Communist States: Triple or Quadruple?, [in:] “Politics,” 2001, vol. 21, no. 3. Møller J., Skaaning S.-E., The Third Wave: Inside the Numbers, [in:] “Journal of Democracy,” 2013, vol. 24, no. 4. Munck G., Verkuilen J., Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: Evaluating Alternative Indices, [in:] “Comparative Political Studies,” 2002, vol. 35, no. 1. O’Donnell G., Delegative Democracy, [in:] “Journal of Democracy,” 1994, vol. 5, no. 1. Przeworski A., The ‘East’ Becomes the ‘South’? The ‘Autumn of the People’ and the Future of East- ern Europe, [in:] “PS: Political Science and Politics,” 1991, vol. 24, no. 1. Schedler A., What Is Democratic Consolidation? [in:] “Journal of Democracy,” 1998, vol. 9, no. 2. Szporluk R., Communism and Nationalism. Karl Marx versus Friedrich List, Oxford University Press, New York & Oxford, 1985.

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Chapter 4 Hybrid Regimes in Post-Communist Eastern Europe: Transition in a “Gray Zone”

n the second chapter of this book, we outlined the structural factors that determined the collapse of the Soviet empire and the communist system, and additionally examined a set of specific contingencies that accelerated the process and informed its peculiar character in specific places at a specific time. Still, a principle question remained unanswered: why did all the new-born regimes opt for a democratic way of development or, at least, accept it formally, at the normative level, as the only desirable form of government to be embraced and installed? Michael McFaul, at the end of his article on the “fourth wave” of democracy, puts forth this question and recognizes that “the explanation cannot simply be culture, history, or location, since much of East-Central Europe and the Baltic states also produced autocratic leaders with fascist ideas earlier in the century.” He implies that the primary reason for their choice nowadays might be “the balance of ideologies in the international system.” Since the enemies of communism, during the Cold War, called themselves democracies, the challengers to communism within these regimes did not have much choice but to adopt the ideological orientation of the international enemies of their internal enemies.1 In a sense, they appeared to be “democrats by default”; most of the dissident movements in the communist states professed their commitment to “Western values” that stood primarily for democracy, human rights, and political liberties. The nationalist-authoritarian strands were rather marginal in these movements and had been either co-opted by the nationalist-leaning communist authorities or further marginalized by the mainstream opposition. 1 M. McFaul, The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship. Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World, [in:] “World Politics,” 2002, vol. 54, no. 2, p. 228.

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This explanation serves well in the cases where democrats firmly took power and unambiguously put their countries on a democratic track of development. In many more countries, however, anciens régimes remained largely unchallenged or retained enough power and resources to coopt democratic leaders or lure them into dubious “power-sharing.” Nonetheless, even in these cases, the new-old regimes declared their “democratic choice” and employed the whole set of respective rhetoric to prove their democratic credentials. Why did they commit themselves to something they never believed and often opposed, and barely had any serious intention to implement?

Democracy’s global hegemony

he most plausible explanation dwells in the fundamental axiological shift that occurred in the second half of the 20th century and completely delegitimized, at the normative level, all non-democratic forms of government. The shift looked so remarkable that Francis Fukuyama celebrated it with his renowned article “The End of History,” published in the early months of 1989 – that is, before the communist system in Eastern Europe and even less so in the USSR began to crumble. He drew his far-reaching conclusions on the earlier observations of some social and political changes in communist China and the Soviet Union. This does not mean that he predicted the close end of the Soviet empire or professed something of the kind for China. His emphasis was on the fact of the total exhaustion of two main systematic alternatives to Western liberalism – fascism after the Second World War, and communism nowadays, as indicated by market reforms in China and glasnost and perestroika in the Soviet Union: What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government. This is not to say that there will no longer be events to fill the pages of Foreign Affairs’s yearly summaries of international relations, for the victory of liberalism has occurred primarily in the realm of ideas or consciousness and is as yet incomplete in the real

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or material world. But there are powerful reasons for believing that it is the ideal that will govern the material world in the long run.2

The abundant criticism of Fukuyama’s concept was based largely on ignorance or misunderstanding of Hegel’s original idea of History, upon which the American scholar drew his theory, but not so much on his Eurocentric assumptions and something that can be tentatively called the “Enlightenment fallacy” (belief in progress, reason, individualism, and freedom as universal values). Most “transitologists,” however, accepted Fukuyama’s idea as it looked pretty convincing – either in 1996, when Larry Diamond agreed that “no antidemocratic ideology with global appeal has emerged to challenge the continued global ideological hegemony of democracy as a principle and a formal structure of government,”3 or in 2013, when Jørgen Møller and Svend-Erik Skaaning confirmed that “there are today no serious challengers to democracy as a regime form. The democratic Zeitgeist, though less ebullient than it was just after the Cold War ended, still reigns.”4 Indeed, there is a good reason to talk about “democracy’s global hegemony” in today’s world, since virtually nobody dares now to reject the idea and profess autocracy as a viable and permanent alternative. In fact, there are only six states on the globe that officially admit to being undemocratic – Saudi Arabia, Oman, the UAE, Qatar, Brunei, and the Vatican. All of them (with the exception of the Vatican, which is officially a theocracy), are oil-producing entities that can defy “democracy’s global hegemony” because, on the one hand, they are firmly fenced off from international pressure and, on the other, they can provide rather high living standards to their subjects (who can hardly be named citizens, for they lack the adequate civil rights). All other governments and mainstream politicians tacitly accept democracy as the only game in town, even if they fervidly dislike and resist it. Even dictatorships that have no chances to pass for democracy under any disguise recognize the “abnormal,” exceptional character of their non-democratic rule and justify it as a temporary involuntary measure in response to some 2 F. Fukuyama, The End of History?, [in:] “The National Interest,” 1989, no. 16, p. 4. 3 L. Diamond, Is the Third Wave Over?, [in:] “Journal of Democracy,” 1996, vol. 7, no. 3, p. 32. 4 J. Møller, S.-E. Skaaning, The Third Wave: Inside the Numbers, [in:] “Journal of Democracy,” 2013, vol. 24, no. 4, p. 106.

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extraordinary, force-majeure circumstances (domestic conspiracy or uprising, external aggression or subversion, natural or technological disaster, economic crisis, and the like). The reason might be a fear of international sanctions and ostracism, since the most powerful nations today are democracies, with the self-assigned role of international guardians of human rights; but there might be also a deeper reason that stems from the broad international recognition of democracy at the normative level as not only the most desirable but also the only legitimate form of government. It was the British prime-minister Winston Churchill who in 1947 gave a humorous but still very popular definition of democracy as “the worst form of Government except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.” It explains both the historical viability of the system and its attractiveness and global outreach today. Democracies, as a rule, are much better off than autocracies – their economies are more efficient because fair competition restricts rent-seeking, the free flow of information facilitates creativity and innovation, free elections enhance the quality and accountability of the government, checks and balances constrain corruption and nepotism, the welfare system provides a security net for outsiders and the handicapped, and the rule of law protects people’s freedom and dignity. All this makes a pro-democracy choice rather “natural,” as it means, by and large, Western-style modernization, Western rules of the game, and, ultimately, Western well-being. What remains underestimated in this pro-democracy drive is a set of requirements (“preconditions”) that should be met to install a democratic system in a peculiar social and cultural environment. One should remember that liberal democracy is not the “norm” in the history of human development but rather an exception; it emerged in Europe only under very special circumstances and because of many contingencies.5 Its uniqueness does not mean that it cannot be replicated elsewhere but, as Robert Putnam observed, it would require much time, commitment, purposefulness, and effort. In the second chapter, we have briefly discussed some requirements, like a substantial level of social capital; most of them – urbanization, secularization, modernization, emergence of middle class – relate to society at large. But there 5 F. Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order. From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 2011, p. 3–18.

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are also some specific requirements that relate primarily to the ruling elite, its political will, and its managerial skill. In too many cases, the dominant political-cum-economic groups with a vested interest in the rent-seeking impede democratization, even though they ostentatiously claim to support it.6

Between “feckless democracy” and “dominant power politics”

here are two main strategies to preserve a corrupt system and bar any possible rivals from fair competition without possibly spoiling relations with the democratic West and undermining their own international legitimacy. One strategy aims at a covert emasculation of the democratic system so that it should look “normal” but with a skillfully distorted level field to the benefit of the dominant group. The other strategy cares less about imitation but much more about the rhetorical whitewashing of the crudely authoritarian system as a peculiar kind of “democracy.” The “peculiarity” is usually justified by some local traditions – of the unique “spirituality,” much-coveted “sovereignty,” or by the need to withstand the Islamist or separatist threat, and so on. The latter strategy is usually applied by countries like Russia or China that can afford the preservation of a poorly (mostly rhetorically) disguised authoritarian system without major international repercussions. The former strategy, of imitation, is usually applied by the weaker, more vulnerable regimes that cannot afford free non-democratic riding and must fix up their manipulative skills daily. The outlined strategies largely correspond with two main political syndromes exposed by governments in a wide “gray zone.” One of them is defined as “feckless pluralism,” and the other syndrome is labeled “dominant power politics.” Countries whose political life is marked by feckless pluralism tend to have significant amounts of political freedom, regular elections, and alternation of power between genuinely different political groupings.

6 A. Åslund, The End of Rent-Seeking, [in:] A. Brown (ed.), When is Transition Over?, Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, Kalamazoo MI,1999, p. 51–68; L. Balcerowicz, Understanding Postcommunist Transitions, [in:] “Journal of Democracy,” 1994, vol. 5, no. 4, p. 75–89.

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Despite these positive features, however, democracy remains shallow and troubled. Political participation, though broad at election time, extends little beyond voting. Political elites from all the major parties or groupings are widely perceived as corrupt, self-interested, and ineffective. The alternation of power seems only to trade the country’s problems back and forth from one hapless side to the other. Political elites from all the major parties are widely perceived as corrupt, self-interested, dishonest, and not serious about working for their country. The public is seriously disaffected from politics, and while it may still cling to a belief in the ideal of democracy, it is extremely unhappy about the political life of the country. Overall, politics is widely seen as a stale, corrupt, elite-dominated domain that delivers little good to the country and commands equally little respect. And the state remains persistently weak. Economic policy is often poorly conceived and executed, and economic performance is frequently bad or even calamitous. Social and political reforms are similarly tenuous, and successive governments are unable to make headway on most of the major problems facing the country, from crime and corruption to health, education, and public welfare generally.7

Feckless pluralism, according to Thomas Carothers, is most common in Latin America, a region where

most countries entered their attempted democratic transitions with diverse political parties already in place yet also with a deep legacy of persistently poor performance of state institutions.

In the post-communist world, he contends, Moldova, Bosnia, Albania, and Ukraine have at least some significant signs of the syndrome, with Romania and Bulgaria teetering on the edge. Of the great many variations of feckless pluralism, Carothers mentions the cases, where “the parties that alternate power between them are divided by paralyzing acrimony and devote their time out of power to preventing the other party from accomplishing anything at all”; “the main competing groups end up colluding, formally or informally, rendering the alternation of power unhelpful in a different manner”; “the political competition is between deeply entrenched parties that essentially operate as patronage networks and seem never to renovate themselves”; and where “the alternation of power occurs between constantly 7 Th. Carothers, The End of the Transition Paradigm, [in:] “Journal of Democracy,” 2002, vol. 13, no. 1, p. 9–10.

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shifting political groupings, short-lived parties led by charismatic individuals or temporary alliances in search of a political identity, as in Guatemala or Ukraine.” These varied cases, he concludes, share a common condition that seems to be at the root of feckless pluralism – “the whole class of political elites, though plural and competitive, are profoundly cut off from the citizenry, rendering political life an ultimately hollow, unproductive exercise.”8 The other political syndrome in the gray zone between consolidated democracy and consolidated dictatorship, according to Carothers, is dominant-power politics: Countries with this syndrome have limited but still real political space, some political contestation by opposition groups, and at least most of the basic institutional forms of democracy. Yet one political grouping– whether it is a movement, a party, an extended family, or a single leader–dominates the system in such a way that there appears to be little prospect of alternation of power in the foreseeable future... Whereas in feckless pluralism judiciaries are often somewhat independent, the judiciary in dominant power countries is typically cowed, as part of the one-sided grip on power. And while elections in feckless-pluralist countries are often quite free and fair, the typical pattern in dominant-power countries is one of dubious but not outright fraudulent elections in which the ruling group tries to put on a good-enough electoral show to gain the approval of the international community... As in feckless-pluralist systems, the citizens of dominant-power systems tend to be disaffected from politics and cut off from significant political participation beyond voting. Since there is no alternation of power, however, they are less apt to evince the ‘a pox on all your houses’ political outlook pervasive in feckless-pluralist systems. The state tends to be as weak and poorly performing in dominant power countries as in feckless-pluralist countries, though the problem is often a bureaucracy decaying under the stagnancy of de facto one party rule rather than the disorganized, unstable nature of state management (such as the constant turnover of ministers) typical of feckless pluralism.9

Carothers suggests that political systems marked by both feckless pluralism and dominant-power politics are relatively stable – albeit certainly not as stable as consolidated democracy or outright authoritarianism. Indeed, feckless pluralism may achieve a kind dysfunctional equilibrium – “the passing of power back 8 Ibidem, p. 11. 9 Ibidem, p. 11–12.

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and forth between competing elites who are largely isolated from the citizenry but willing to play by widely accepted rules.” And the dominant-power politics might be even more stable and deeply entrenched – “with the ruling group able to keep political opposition on the ropes while permitting enough political openness to alleviate pressure from the public.” Neither configuration, however, is permanent. “Countries can and do move out of them–either from one to the other or out of either toward liberal democracy or dictatorship.”10 The need to mask undemocratic practices and imitate democracy (or, at least, a vaguely defined “democratic transition”) is a relatively new phenomenon. It became particularly urgent in the non-hegemonic context that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. This made post-Soviet Russia disengage in the worldwide promotion of quasi-Leninist dictatorships and the West less tolerant, let alone supportive, of anti-communist dictatorships that used to sell themselves out as bulwarks against anti-Western forces. The “Western liberal hegemony,” as Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way contend, increased the cost of building and sustaining authoritarian regimes substantially. It “undermined the legitimacy of alternative regime models, eliminated many alternative sources of financial and military support, and created strong incentives for peripheral states to adopt formal democratic institutions” and “to remain on good terms with Western governments and institutions.”11 The “Western liberal hegemony” is executed nowadays both directly – through diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, or even, in some cases, military intervention, as well as indirectly – through explicit conditionality (as in the case of EU membership) or the activities of transnational NGOs. Even though some autocratic governments “benefit from pockets of international permissiveness created by economic and security interests that trump democracy promotion on Western foreign policy agendas” (like war on terrorism or need for a cheap oil), most of them do comply, at least superficially, with the dominant international rules. They, by and large, 10 Ibidem, p. 13–14. 11 Levitsky S., Way L., Autocracy by Democratic Rules: The Dynamics of Competitive Authoritarianism in the Post-Cold War Era. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, 28–31 August 2002.

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adopt the institutional forms of democracy, including regular elections, yet they manipulate the political process and the degree of political liberty sufficiently to ensure that their basic hold on power is not threatened. They are trying to carry out a political balancing act: allowing enough democracy to gain international legitimacy and to relieve domestic political pressure, but keeping hold of the levers of political power to a sufficient degree to maintain their power indefinitely. They typically permit some space for civil society to organize and operate [but without] any realistic chance of changing the basic power structures.12

Perfecting the art of imitation

he wide “gray zone” between fully fledged democracy and genuine dictatorship provides semi-authoritarian regimes with broad opportunities to hold onto power for many years under the guise of democratically elected and Western-oriented “fledgling democracies,” so called “democracies in transition.” For the purposes of mimicry, they employ a whole set of liberal-democratic rhetoric – in other words, they “manipulate the transition language to pursue political projects that have little to do with democracy, while defending themselves against critics by emphasizing how hard transition is and the need for patience.”13 At the same time, they apply the most sophisticated methods of power retention: Rather than openly violating democratic rules (for example, by banning or repressing the opposition and the media), [they are] more likely to use bribery, co-optation, and more subtle forms of persecution, such as the use of tax authorities, compliant judiciaries, and other state agencies to ‘legally’ harass, persecute, or extort cooperative behavior from critics.14

Some experts, sarcastically, generalize these methods as “salami slicing” or, else, as “Lenin’s polka-dancing – a step back, two steps forward.” Rather than openly steal elections or commit 12 Th. Carothers, Western Civil Society Aid to Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, [in:] East European Constitutional Review,” 1999, vol. 8, no. 4. 13 Th. Carothers, Reply to My Critics, [in:] “Journal of Democracy,” 2002, vol. 13, no. 3, p. 35. 14 S. Levitsky, L. Way, The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism, [in:] “Journal of Democracy,” 2002, vol. 13, no. 2, p. 53.

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egregious human rights violations that might provoke massive protests and international repudiation, semi-authoritarian rulers employ more sophisticated “step-by-step” tactics of random repressions (often ostensibly non-political) and occasional cheating (ostensibly not sanctioned by the top authorities). At the same time, they send reconciliatory messages to the Western capitals, promising to take more care in the “democratic transition” and offering all sorts of support in the war on international terrorism and the like. Western governments seem to be puzzled with this ambiguity. Should election results be recognized if the casting and counting of the votes is basically free and fair but the election campaign itself is extremely dirty? How many journalists should “disappear” and opposition leaders be killed in car “accidents” to trigger international sanctions against the government? How many media outlets should remain independent to qualify the country as still in “democratic transition?” Of course, the Western democracies may lose their patience one day and make the “electoral” autocrats feel all their wrath. But nobody can predict when and how this X-day will happen, and what is the last straw (or the last slice of salami). Such uncertainty obviously deprives semi-authoritarian rulers of self-confidence, making them nervous and a bit schizophrenic. The ambiguity actually stems from the very coexistence of autocratic rulers and democratic rules, creating an inherent source of instability. For obvious reasons, the feckless-pluralist systems are more susceptible to political fluctuations and regime change. The very fact that they have to imitate democratic procedures and institutions with the highest credibility possible – in order to preserve a democratic appearance and therefore international legitimacy – puts them in an awkward position. They have to distort democratic procedures and undermine institutions only minimally, so that the distortions look almost negligible and forgivable. Yet, on the other hand, the distortions cannot be too small, because in this case, the incumbents may lose elections, and therefore power, and therefore rent. All the time, they have to make painstaking decisions on how many irregularities to afford so as to win elections but not to discredit and delegitimize them. Keeping the middle line between “too much authoritarianism” and “too much democracy” or, in other words, between international sanctions and internal turn-over, is a major problem

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of semi-authoritarian rulers. Each of them looks for a specific solution for a specific country, depending on both internal and international circumstances. There are too many variables in this equation, including opposition itself, which strives to make real use of “paper laws” and “formal democracy,” thereby undermining incumbents’ attempts to fully “virtualize” democratic procedures and institutions. Some correlations and tendencies, however, can be discerned, and some developments in post-Soviet semi-authoritarian countries rationalized.

The sustainability of semi-authoritarian regimes

n a series of breakthrough articles, Lucan Way has examined the trajectories of various competitive authoritarian regimes and outlined three variables that are of particular importance in explaining the regime’s outcomes: (1) incumbent capacity, (2) opposition unity and strength, and (3) the international context. His analysis is based on the assumption (empirically confirmed) that “incumbents in competitive authoritarian regimes seek to remain in office, and extra-legal tactics (such as electoral fraud and various forms of repression) are among the options they consider as they pursue that goal.” He proposed a model that explores in detail the interaction of the three major variables and explains comprehensively “why some competitive authoritarian regimes democratize in the face of crisis while others remain stable or experience authoritarian retrenchment.”15 The model provides the students of semi-authoritarian regimes with a good instrument for the analysis of probable developments in the respective countries, as well as for appropriate policy recommendations. In this view, incumbent capacity has three main dimensions that are particularly important to regime survival: elite cohesion, coercive capacity, and electoral capacity. Elite cohesion refers to the degree of discipline and loyalty that executives can command from other regime elites. Coercive capacity stands for the government’s ability to control and repress opposition forces. It requires both an infrastructure of surveillance and repression, and effective control over that infrastructure. Electoral capacity means 15 Ibidem, p. 53.

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government’s ability to win elections through a combination of voter mobilization and fraud. Both ventures require an organizational infrastructure – a formal or informal “party of power.” Opposition capacity is measured along two dimensions: cohesion and mobilization capacity. Cohesion primarily means the opposition’s ability to unite into a broad anti-authoritarian coalition and to defy the government’s divide-and-rule strategies. Mobilization capacity stands for the ability of the opposition to mobilize citizens against the government. This depends on the strength of opposition-party organizations, the strength and independence of civil society (particularly labor, student, and human-rights organizations), and the degree to which civil society organizations are aligned with the political opposition.16 All these elements are extremely important, since, as another expert remarks, opposition victory in a semi-authoritarian regime “requires a level of mobilization, unity, skill, and heroism far beyond what would normally be required for victory in democracy.”17 Often, too, it requires international observation and intervention to preempt and prevent or to expose and delegitimate the electoral manipulations and fraud of the authoritarian regime. Therefore, the international context or, specifically, Western influence is duly featured as the third key variable that determines regime change or persistence. Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way contend that, in the post-Cold War period, ties to the West raise the cost of authoritarian entrenchment and strengthen incentives for elites to play by democratic rules. The scholars disaggregate Western influence into two dimensions: linkage and leverage. Linkage, in their view, includes geographic proximity, economic integration (actual and desirable), military alliances, flows of international assistance, international media penetration, ties to international NGOs and other transnational networks, and networks of elites employed by multilateral institutions and/or educated in Western universities. By leverage, they understand the ability of the Western governments and international bodies to influence non-democratic regimes who are certainly more compliant if they depend on the West economically and/or militarily. 16 Ibidem. 17 L. Diamond, op. cit., p. 24.

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The outlined model helps to interpret the developments in virtually all post-communist countries as a complicated interaction of three variables. It can be represented, also, as a close contest between the authoritarian state and civil society in the international context that has some “catalyzing” effect. In such a conceptual framework, one can easier understand the successful democratic transition in Central East Europe and the Baltics, where society was strong enough to take over the Leninist state and transform it into a liberal democracy. By a similar token, one can understand the aborted transition in Central Asia, where civil society had been meager if any. And finally, one can conceptualize the processes in the Balkans and western post-Soviet republics as a protracted struggle between two equally strong or, rather, equally weak rivals – a dysfunctional authoritarian state and an underdeveloped civil society [Fig. 4.1].

Figure 4.1. Divergent trajectories of post-communist states. Source: Freedom House.

The latter two cases are the most complicated and, therefore, the most interesting from the analytical point of view. In particular, if juxtaposed, they reveal the importance of Western influence – highly positive in the case of the Balkans, and rather neutral or negative in the case of the western post-Soviet republics.

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It is worth a reminder that all these countries had very similar democracy scores in the first half of the 1990s.18 (Actually, western post-Soviet countries stood, at the time, even better than the 19 post-communist see“1” Fig. 4.2.) 4.2. Democracy scores, Balkans; 1989–2000 (from the lowest to “7” the highest). CE & Baltics 1989 Czech Rep. 1.5 Estonia Hungary 3.5 Latvia Lithuania Poland 3 Slovakia 1.5 Slovenia The Balkans Albania 1 Bosnia Bulgaria 1 Croatia Macedonia Romania 1 Yugoslavia 3 Kosovo Post-Soviet Republics Armenia Azernaijan Belarus Georgia Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Moldova Russia / USSR 2.5 Tajikistan Turkmenistan Ukraine Uzbekistan

1990 6

1991 6 5.5 6 5.5 5.5 6 6 5.5

1992 6 5.5 6 5.5 5.5 6 6 5.5

1993 6 5 6 5 5.5 6 6 6

1994 6.5 5.5 6.5 5 6 6 4.5 6.5

1995 6.5 6 6.5 6 6.5 6.5 5.5 6.5

1996 6.5 6.5 6.5 6 6.5 6.5 5 6.5

1997 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 5 6.5

1998 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6 6.5

1999 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5

2000 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5

1.5

4.5

5.5 4.5

2.5 3.5

3 2.5

4.5 2 5.5 4 4.5 4 2.5

5 2 6 4 5 4 2 1

4.5 2 6 4 4.5 4.5 2 1

4 3 5.5 4 4.5 5.5 2 1

4 3 5.5 4 4.5 6 2 1

3.5 3 5.5 4 5 6 2 1

3.5 3 5.5 4 5 6 3 2

3.5 3.5 5.5 5.5 4.5 6 4 2

3 3 4 2.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 5 3 2.5 5 2.5

4.5 3 4.5 3.5 3 5 3 4.5 2 1.5 5 2

4.5 2 3.5 3 3 4 3 4.5 1 1 4 1

4 2 3 3.5 2.5 4 4 4.5 1 1 4.5 1

3.5 2.5 2 4 2.5 4 4.5 4.5 1 1 4.5 1.5

3.5 3 2 4.5 2.5 4 4.5 4.5 2 1 4.5 1.5

4 3 2 4.5 2.5 3 5 4 2 1 4.5 1.5

4 3 2 4.5 2.5 3 5 3.5 2 1 4.5 1.5

4 2.5 2 4 2.5 2.5 5 3 2 1 4 1.5

6 6 6

3.5

* The post-Soviet and post-Yugoslav republics are rated since the year of their secession. Source: Freedom in the World, annual surveys of political rights and civil liberties, 1990-2001.

Figure 4.2. Democracy scores, 1989–2000. Source: Freedom House.

All these relatively competitive political regimes emerged in the late ’80s and early ’90s, after the collapse of the Soviet/ Communist empire, largely as a mutation of the anciens régimes than the triumph of a strong and determined civil society. All of them had in common the continued dominance of an old elite with a dubious commitment to democracy, a lack of democratic 18 M. Emerson, G. Noutcheva, Europeanisation as a Gravity Model of Democratisation, [in:] “CEPS Working Document,” no. 214/2004, p. 7–8. 19 Z. Csaky, Dropping the Democratic Façade, [in:] Nations in Transit 2020, Freedom House, Washington, D.C., 2020, p. 25.

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history, a thin tradition of civility, and weak rule of law.20 The Balkan states, however, had the long-run membership prospects from the EU within the Stabilization and Association Agreements, and eventually improved their scores from “non-consolidated authoritarian regimes” to “non-consolidated democracies,” while the European post-Soviet states had no EU incentives and moved, in the second half of the 1990s, in the opposite direction – from “non-consolidated democracies” to “non-consolidated” (yet) authoritarianisms [Fig. 4.3.]. This just confirms the earlier observations of many experts: Transitions with the prospect of European integration in sight are clearly more prosperous and secure than transitions without it. This is not just a matter of increased foreign aid or direct investment, though both matter greatly. The incentive of European accession changes the political climate within applicant countries, overriding nationalist appeals and luring elites from almost all parties,21

EU conditionality differs fundamentally from other less successful forms of international pressure... Unlike all other Western states or transnational agencies, the EU demands full compliance with democratic norms and uses extensive and highly institutionalized monitoring. Perhaps most importantly, in contrast to standard political conditionality, the (real and perceived) benefits of EU membership are sufficiently large as to induce far-reaching concessions on the part of broad groups of the elite. The result is that countries such as Romania, with an equally troublesome post-communist legacy, have democratized to a remarkable extent. To date, the EU has not seriously considered Ukraine for membership. However, if this were to change, the prospects for democracy would improve dramatically.22

Still, the trajectories of the western post-Soviet republics diverged substantially in the second half of the 1990s, not only from the Western-guided Balkans but also from each other [Fig. 4.4.]. 20 On the preponderance of hegemonial systems and façade politics in the ‘pre-communist’ Eastern Europe, see G. Schoepflin, The Political Traditions of Eastern Europe, “Daedalus,” 1990, vol. 119, no. 1, p. 63. He reminds, in particular, that East European societies were too weak to exercise control over some key areas of state activity like taxation or military organization, and that governments in the region lost elections only twice (Hungary 1905–1906 and Bulgaria 1932) – only because of divisions in the ruling elite but not as a genuine result of the popular will (ibidem, p. 62). 21 A. Mungiu-Pippidi, Beyond the New Borders, [in:] “Journal of Democracy,” 2004, vol. 15, no. 1, p. 50. 22 L. Way, The Sources and Dynamics of Competitive Authoritarianism in Ukraine, [in:] “Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics,” 2004, vol. 20, no. 1, p. 15.

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Nations in Transit 2011 Table 9. Democracy Score Ratings History and Regional Breakdown

Mykola Riabchuk

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

Change

New EU Members Bulgaria Czech Rep. Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia Average Median

3.33 2.46 2.00 2.13 2.25 2.21 1.63 3.71 2.17 1.83 2.37 2.19

3.38 2.33 2.00 1.96 2.25 2.13 1.75 3.63 2.08 1.79 2.33 2.10

3.25 2.33 1.92 1.96 2.17 2.13 1.75 3.58 2.08 1.75 2.29 2.10

3.18 2.29 1.96 1.96 2.14 2.21 2.00 3.39 2.00 1.68 2.28 2.07

2.93 2.25 1.96 2.00 2.07 2.21 2.14 3.39 1.96 1.75 2.27 2.11

2.89 2.25 1.96 2.14 2.07 2.29 2.36 3.29 2.14 1.82 2.32 2.20

2.86 2.14 1.93 2.14 2.07 2.25 2.39 3.36 2.29 1.86 2.33 2.20

3.04 2.18 1.93 2.29 2.18 2.29 2.25 3.36 2.46 1.93 2.39 2.27

3.04 2.21 1.96 2.39 2.18 2.25 2.32 3.46 2.68 1.93 2.44 2.29

3.07 2.18 1.93 2.61 2.14 2.25 2.21 3.43 2.54 1.93 2.43 2.23

▼ ▲ ▲ ▼ ▲

The Balkans Albania Bosnia Croatia Macedonia Yugoslavia Serbia Montenegro Kosovo Average Median

4.25 4.83 3.54 4.46 4.00 n/a n/a n/a 4.22 4.25

4.17 4.54 3.79 4.29 3.88 n/a n/a n/a 4.13 4.17

4.13 4.29 3.83 4.00 n/a 3.83 3.83 5.50 4.20 4.00

4.04 4.18 3.75 3.89 n/a 3.75 3.79 5.32 4.10 3.89

3.79 4.07 3.71 3.82 n/a 3.71 3.89 5.36 4.05 3.82

3.82 4.04 3.75 3.82 n/a 3.68 3.93 5.36 4.06 3.82

3.82 4.11 3.64 3.86 n/a 3.79 3.79 5.21 4.03 3.82

3.82 4.18 3.71 3.86 n/a 3.79 3.79 5.14 4.04 3.82

3.93 4.25 3.71 3.79 n/a 3.71 3.79 5.07 4.04 3.79

4.04 4.32 3.64 3.82 n/a 3.64 3.82 5.18 4.07 3.93

▼ ▼ ▲ ▼

Non-Baltic Former Soviet States Armenia 4.83 4.92 Azerbaijan 5.54 5.46 Belarus 6.38 6.46 Georgia 4.58 4.83 Kazakhstan 5.96 6.17 Kyrgyzstan 5.46 5.67 Moldova 4.50 4.71 Russia 5.00 4.96 Tajikistan 5.63 5.63 Turkmenistan 6.83 6.83 Ukraine 4.92 4.71 Uzbekistan 6.46 6.46 Average 5.51 5.57 Median 5.50 5.54

5.00 5.63 6.54 4.83 6.25 5.67 4.88 5.25 5.71 6.88 4.88 6.46 5.66 5.65

5.18 5.86 6.64 4.96 6.29 5.64 5.07 5.61 5.79 6.93 4.50 6.43 5.74 5.72

5.14 5.93 6.71 4.86 6.39 5.68 4.96 5.75 5.93 6.96 4.21 6.82 5.78 5.84

5.21 6.00 6.68 4.68 6.39 5.68 4.96 5.86 5.96 6.96 4.25 6.82 5.79 5.91

5.21 6.00 6.71 4.79 6.39 5.93 5.00 5.96 6.07 6.93 4.25 6.86 5.84 5.98

5.39 6.25 6.57 4.93 6.32 6.04 5.07 6.11 6.14 6.93 4.39 6.89 5.92 6.13

5.39 6.39 6.50 4.93 6.43 6.21 5.14 6.14 6.14 6.93 4.39 6.93 5.96 6.18

5.43 6.46 6.57 4.86 6.43 6.11 4.96 6.18 6.14 6.93 4.61 6.93 5.97 6.16

▼ ▼ ▼ ▲

▲ ▲ ▲

▲ ▼ ▼

▲ ▲ ▼

▼

Notes: The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest. The 2011 ratings reflect the period January 1 through December 31, 2010.

Figure 4.3. Democracy scores, 2001–2010. Source: Freedom House. *The reverse score (from “7,” the lowest, to “1,” the highest) is applied.

In the beginning of the decade,20 all four countries – Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and Russia – had been relatively open and exhibited dynamic and competitive politics that resulted in electoral turnovers in all of them except Russia, where turnover was prevented by Yeltsin’s anti-parliament coup and subsequent redrafting the constitution. This competitiveness, however, was “rooted less in robust civil societies, strong democratic institutions or democratic leadership and much more in the inability of incumbents to maintain power or concentrate political control by preserving elite unity, controlling elections and media and/or using force against opponents.” It resulted primarily from the sudden

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Figure 4.4. Democracy scores, 2010–2020. Source: Freedom House.

collapse of the USSR that deprived authoritarian rulers of the organization, skill, and finances necessary to maintain power and/ or concentrate political control.23 In other words, the post-Soviet regimes in these countries emerged less as struggling democracies, where leaders strive to build more pluralistic institutions, and much more as a kind of failed authoritarianisms, aptly defined by a scholar as “pluralism by default” – a form of political competition specific to weak states that closely resembles Carothers’ notion of “feckless pluralism”: 23 L. Way, Authoritarian State Building and the Sources of Regime Competitiveness in the Fourth Wave. The Cases of Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine, [in:] “World Politics,” 2005, vol. 57, no. 2, p. 232.

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Figure 4.5. Democracy scores (2019) in specific categories. Source: Freedom House. * Countries rated from 3 to 4 are qualified as “hybrid regimes.”

Pluralism by default describes countries in which institutionalized political competition survives not because leaders are especially democratic or because societal actors are particularly strong, but because the government is too fragmented and the state too weak to impose authoritarian rule in a democratic international context. In such cases, leaders lack the authority and coordination to prevent today’s allies from becoming tomorrow’s challengers, control the legislature, impose

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censorship, manipulate elections successfully, or use force against political opponents.24

As a result, the persistence of meaningful elections, formally empowered courts and legislatures, and an independent media provides mechanisms through which opposition forces may periodically challenge the government. Such challenges present autocratic incumbents with a difficult dilemma. On the one hand, overt repression – canceling elections, jailing opponents, ignoring Supreme Court rulings, or closing legislature – is costly because the challenges are formally legal and often enjoy broad domestic and international legitimacy. On the other hand, if opposition challenges are allowed to run their course, incumbents risk losing their power.

Western linkages and elite defections

ost observers generally agree that in the countries where civil society is underdeveloped and democratic traditions are weak, any radical change is a direct or indirect consequence of fragmentation and split within the ruling authoritarian group. “Elite defection is an important component of pluralism by default”; “a highly divided elite is likely to undermine authoritarian consolidation by reducing the incumbent’s control over subordinate state agencies necessary to impose non-democratic rules of the game. Orders to the media to provide biased coverage, to security agencies to repress opposition, or to local governments to steal votes are more likely to be ignored.”25 The consequences of elite contestation are exacerbated by the fact that the main rivals of authoritarian rule emerge usually from within their close circle: not only did Boris Yeltsin occupy top positions in the Politburo under Gorbachev, his Ukrainian counterpart Leonid Kravchuk was a Central Committee member in charge of ideology, and all the subsequent Ukrainian presidents (except for the last one, the showman Volodymyr Zelensky) served as ministers or prime-ministers under their predecessors, whom, 24 L. Way, Pluralism by Default in Moldova, [in:] “Journal of Democracy,” 2002, vol. 13, no. 4, p. 127. 25 L. Way, Authoritarian State Building..., op. cit., p. 235.

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Figure 4.6. Democracy and corruption in post-communist states: inverse correlation. Sources: Freedom House 2016, Transparency International 2015.

in most cases, they challenged.26 All of them benefited from top positions, honing their political skills there, forging their public images, and establishing reputations of moderate and competent politicians. Acquiring these traits would have been impossible had they started their careers in the opposition; these leaders had always been either denied access to dominant media, demonized as dangerous radicals, or even worse, ridiculed as infantile and incompetent idealists. Elite defection certainly played a decisive role in the peaceful turnover of the Milosevic and Shevardnadze regimes in Serbia and Georgia, as well as in the fall of the communist powers in 1989–1991. A rather natural fragmentation of the ruling group would not have necessarily led to an overt defection of some of its 26 Some observers opine, however, that Zelensky was also a part of the system, in his own way: “Zelensky started from a privileged position. Contrary to the popular belief, he was not a candidate from outside the system, but somebody who co-created this system for years, growing over time to the role of a television tycoon... In a country where access to television is key to political success, it is much more than an ace up the sleeve. Zelensky has never shied away from politics. He knew all the most important politicians and oligarchs who often sat in the audience during his show and paid a fortune to be hosted on their birthday parties with private appearances. He was like a jester at the royal court – he may have amused this court, but at the same time he was an important part of it” (D. Szeligowski, Prezydent Wołodymyr Zełenski. Gdy fikcja staje się rzeczywistością, [in:] “Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny,” 2019, no. 3, p. 93).

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members or even to hidden sabotage. To make this possible, two more factors were usually needed – powerful pressure from “below,” from politically mobilized masses, and perceptible pressure from “above,” from international government and non-government bodies that can legitimize or delegitimize an authoritarian regime. Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way point out four arenas of contestation which exist in competitive authoritarian regimes due to the persistence of meaningful democratic institutions, and through which opposition forces may periodically challenge, weaken, and occasionally even defeat autocratic incumbents: the electoral arena, the legislature, the judiciary, and the media.27 One can easily notice that, in semi-authoritarian states like Ukraine, Moldova, or Montenegro, all these institutions have never been fully subjugated by the authorities. Elections have always been competitive and vote-counting rather fair, despite large abuses of state power during election campaigns. The national parliament has not become a puppet of the president – like in Russia, Belarus or Azerbaijan. Even though it had not had much power over government policy, it still “functioned as a key staging ground for opposition activity by giving deputies relatively easy access to media and immunity from prosecution.”28 The judiciary, albeit manipulated, oppressed, and often corrupt, retained some degree of independence, especially at the top level of the Supreme Court, where judges could not be removed from their position until age 65, when they are to retire. Local authorities in some regions and cities remained under the control of opposition. And independent mass media, including TV, although harassed and marginalized by the government, were still able to disseminate uncensored information within the society. All this resulted not only from the relative strength of society, which had some traditions of civility and proved to be more resilient under the authoritarian pressure than many observers could expect. Polarization and fragmentation of the Ukrainian, Moldovan, or Georgian elite has also been of paramount importance, since it effectively hindered the consolidation of presidential autocracy by creating, in fact, an informal system of checks 27 S. Levitsky, L. Way, The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism..., op. cit., p. 54. 28 L. Way, Kuchma’s Failed Authoritarianism, “Journal of Democracy,” 2005, vol. 16, no. 2, p. 133.

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and balances. The competing oligarchic clans on the one side, and the appreciable democratic opposition on the other side, interacted in multiple ways, making and unmaking whimsical situational alliances between different groups and members. One of the major problems the incumbent presidents had had to resolve was manipulating and giving concessions to these alliances, co-opting the prominent leaders of the opposition, and preventing the mass defection of their own supporters to the opposition camp. Such systems obviously contained the seeds of their own destruction:

In stark contrast to Communist Party apparatchiks or SBU [security service] officials, oligarchs provide a weak support base: They do not take orders easily, are by nature incredibly opportunistic, and have a weak sense of loyalty... The oligarchic system created key opportunities for opposition forces to emerge. First, capital flight, while bad for [national] economic development, was important in creating anti-incumbent source of power... [Second] source of political independence was the robust institution of parliamentary immunity... [Third], the opposition also benefited from the oligarchs’ tendency to distribute their resources widely among any and all groups that might be influential... Finally, president’s distribution of resources among competing groups increased the chances that these resources would fall into the ‘wrong’ hands... [In Ukraine] the opportunities for independent action embedded in the oligarchic system allowed for key defections beginning in 2001, when Kuchma’s former bodyguard released recordings which [...] severely undermined Kuchma’s reputation both at home and abroad.29

Good relations with the West, meanwhile, had become a priority for many oligarchs who, on a personal level, underwent a profound “Euro-Atlantic integration” – i.e., on the level of personal bank accounts, real estate, and the nice post-communist habit of educating their children in good Western universities, of treating themselves in Baden-Baden (rather than in the Kremlin hospital), and enjoying la dolce vita in the best international resorts. All these Western linkages made post-Soviet elites reluctant to undertake any radical steps that might have weakened their relations with the West. For many of them, the loss of power and some economic privileges was considered less catastrophic than 29 Ibidem, p. 137–138.

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the possible international sanctions that may have included visa denials, the freezing of bank accounts, business restrictions, and so on. Therefore, throughout the 1990s, the post-Soviet elites rather punctiliously played the role of “young democracies,” employed the rhetoric of “transition,” co-opted prominent members of opposition into the process of joint “state-nation building,” and kept power rather by manipulation than coercion. The balancing act, however, could not last for long. In most of post-Soviet republics, the old elite was strong and skillful enough to subjugate opposition and consolidate authoritarian rule. In the Balkans, Western support tipped the balance in the democratizing direction. And only in Ukraine and Moldova, also partly in Georgia and Armenia, did the awkward balance survive, leading rather to revolutionary upheavals (in Georgia and Ukraine) in response to incumbents’ attempts to consolidate authoritarianism, or to democratic turnover (in Moldova). In all these cases, however, the victorious democrats encountered the same problem that had dogged their predecessors: the structurally entrenched syndrome of “feckless pluralism” made the consolidation of democracy as problematic for them as it made consolidation of authoritarianism for their dismissed opponents. As Lucan Way perspicaciously warned them (in his description of “pluralism by default” and its paradoxical ambiguity): “The same state weakness and governmental fragmentation that promotes pluralism also undermines effective governance and may ultimately threaten long-term democratic consolidation.”30

Chapter readings

Bunce V., Regional Differences in Democratization: The East versus the South, [in:] “Post-Soviet Affairs.” 1998, vol. 14, no. 3. Bunce V., Rethinking Recent Democratization: Lessons from the Postcommunist Experience, [in:] “World Politics,” 2003, vol. 55, no. 2. Carothers Th., Western Civil Society Aid to Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, [in:] “East European Constitutional Review.” 1999, vol. 8, no. 4. 30 L. Way, Pluralism by Default..., op. cit., p. 127.

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Carothers Th., The End of the Transition Paradigm, [in:] “Journal of Democracy,” 2002, vol. 13, no. 1. Diamond L., Is the Third Wave Over?, [in:] “Journal of Democracy,” 1996, vol. 7, no. 3. M. Emerson, G. Noutcheva, Europeanisation as a Gravity Model of Democratisation, [in:] “CEPS Working Document,” no. 214/2004, p. 7–8. Fukuyama F., The End of History?, [in:] “The National Interest,” 1989, no. 16. Fukuyama F., The Origins of Political Order. From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 2011. Gelman V., Out of the Frying Pan, into the Fire? Post-Soviet Regime Changes in Comparative Perspective, [in:] “International Political Science Review,” 2008, vol. 29, no. 2, p. 157–180. Levitsky S., Way L., The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism, [in:] “Journal of Democracy,” 2002, vol. 13, no. 2. Levitsky S., Way L., Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War, Cambridge University Press, 2010. Knudsen I., Frederiksen M., Ethnographies of Gray Zones in Eastern Europe: Relations, Borders and Invisibilities, Anthem Press, London, 2015. McFaul M., The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship. Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World, [in:] “World Politics,” 2002, vol. 54, no. 2. McFaul M., Stoner-Weiss K. (eds.), After the Collapse of Communism: Comparative Lessons of Transition, Cambridge University Press, 2004. Møller J., Skaaning S.-E., The Third Wave: Inside the Numbers, [in:] “Journal of Democracy,” 2013, vol. 24, no. 4. Mungiu-Pippidi A., Beyond the New Borders, [in:] “Journal of Democracy,” 2004, vol. 15, no. 1. Way L., Pluralism by Default in Moldova, [in:] “Journal of Democracy,” 2002, vol. 13, no. 4. Way L., The Sources and Dynamics of Competitive Authoritarianism in Ukraine, [in:] “Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics,” 2004, vol. 20, no. 1. Way L., Authoritarian State Building and the Sources of Regime Competitiveness in the Fourth Wave. The Cases of Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine, [in:] “World Politics,” 2005, vol. 57, no. 2. Way L., Kuchma’s Failed Authoritarianism, [in:] “Journal of Democracy,” 2005, vol. 16, no. 2. Zakaria F., The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, [in:] “Foreign Affairs,” 1997, vol. 76, no. 6.

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early 60 years ago, in their seminal book on totalitarianism, Zbigniew Brzeziński and Carl Friedrich scornfully remarked that they would not discuss the constitution or structure of government of the systems in question – because there was little if anything to discuss. All these institutions that are very important in liberal democracies are of dismal importance in totalitarian party-states; all of them, the scholars contended, are nothing but window-dressings, empty forms with no essence.1 As far as genuine totalitarianism is concerned, a dismissive attitude towards state institutions might be thoroughly justified. However, what the analysts failed to predict or properly estimate at the time was the intrinsic ability of totalitarian institutions to acquire their own life and to pursue their own interests – separate if not different from those of the omnipotent and omnipresent Party. This ability was actually ingrained into them from their very conception; indeed, it was only massive purges and intensive reshuffling of personnel that kept them obedient and, as designed, purely decorative, suitable for rubber-stamping. As soon as the screws were loosened (partly during the Khrushchev thaw [1953–1964], largely yet during the Gorbachev perestroika [1985–1991]), all these poor creatures of the Bolshevik leadership – quasi-sovereign quasi-republics of the Soviet quasi-federation, with their fake parliaments and feckless governments, local councils and executives, writers’ unions, women’s leagues, and academies of sciences – woke up from hibernation, or, rather, from terror-inflicted paralysis, and began to live according 1 C. Friedrich, Z. Brzeziński, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, Praeger, New York, 1961, p. 18.

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to their own corporatist logic, emancipating themselves gradually from Party overlordship. Valerie Bunce, in her illuminating book on the “subversive,” “self-destructive nature of socialist institutions,” insists on the importance of “looking at institutions in a historically sensitive and empirically detailed way” and “viewing them as films, not snapshots.” Otherwise, she contends, we would barely understand “why economic and political liberalization came to dominate the elite agenda [in the 1980s]; why publics and many Communist elites, whether within states as a whole or within republics, were so willing and able to break with the regime; and why there were variations in when and how regime collapse occurred.”2 Recognizing importance of history and details also means acknowledging that institutions can appear to have one set of consequences, but in practice and over time, quite different, if not opposing ones... [The socialist] institutions did not just put some of the [socialist] states and most of [their] Communist parties ‘out of business’ (and some of these parties into business!); they also fashioned through the very process of self-destruction radically different alternatives to the existing order. This explains why these systems ended, or at least why the Communist Party in all cases lost its political and economic hegemony, and it also explains why the transition to the new order was in many cases so remarkably fast. There was, in short, a new system waiting in the wings.3

What seems very interesting here, and important for our prospective studies of post-communist authoritarianism, is Valerie Bunce’s observation that institutions may have quite different consequences over the long run from those intended or immediately apparent to the leaders guiding these institutions. Even of greater importance seems to be her idea that “not only did socialist institutions structure the very challenges that emerged and were ranged against them, these same institutions also became the basis for the construction of new states.” Or, as Mark Beissinger aptly remarks (in his review of Bunce’s book), no thick line can be drawn between socialism and what emerged afterward; institutions, in particular, have their own persistence, something that 2 V. Bunce, Subversive Institutions: The Design and the Destruction of Socialism and the State, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, p. 143. 3 Ibidem, p. 143–144.

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Beissiger calls “stickiness” – “even as they are being dismantled and in the midst of revolutionary changes.”4 Hence, in the following chapter, we are going to discuss the Ukrainian case as a graphic example of such persistence – we shall try to deconstruct the post-communist semi-authoritarianism in Ukraine as a modified version of late Soviet authoritarianism, adjusted to the new circumstances.

Non-revolutionary changes

he survival of the post-Soviet (and essentially crypto-Soviet) regime in newly independent Ukraine largely depended on their ability to gentrify and legitimize themselves – both domestically and internationally. To this aim, they had to co-opt the most prominent members of the democratic opposition within its ranks (for highly visible and representative but not influential positions) and to rebuild, or at least refurbish, the old institutions as allegedly new and democratic. But also, they had to fill the institutional void that emerged after the Communist party was banned and dissolved. More precisely, the regime had to re-establish the manageability and functionality of the old institutions that were not designed to function in any effective and coordinated way without the omnipotent and omnipresent guardianship of the Communist party. It was the Party that animated and drove the entire institutional mechanism, devised strategies, enforced decisions, supervised everything, rewarded leaders, penalized laggards, and so on and so forth. Some substitute for the Party had to be found to prevent the country from complete failure and further sliding into chaos, so evident in the early ’90s. Theoretically, the two goals were not utterly incompatible. Institutions could have been radically reformed in a liberal-democratic way – rather than refashioned to imitate democratic appearance. This is actually what had happened in the Central East European and Baltic states where old communist institutions were dismantled and new institutions, based on clear divisions of power and firm rule of law, were established. 4 M. Beissinger, [untitled], [in:] “East European Constitutional Review,” 2000, vol. 9, no. 1–2, p. 98–100.

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In Ukraine (and, for that matter, in the majority of other post-Soviet republics), no radical changes occurred in 1991. Ukrainian reformers, primarily from the liberal “national-democratic” camp, were preoccupied first and foremost with securing national independence. Ukraine, unlike the Baltic or Central East European states, had to complete not only a two-prong transition from totalitarianism to democracy and from a command economy to the free market, but also a transition from a Soviet quasi-republic with virtually no tradition of modern statehood to a sovereign state, and from an amorphous population with vague and confused identities to a solidified modern nation.5 On the one hand, Ukrainian “national democrats” had good reason to believe that, historically, a lack of national and, specifically, elite unity prevented Ukraine from gaining national independence at a number of earlier occasions. It might be suicidal, they felt, to antagonize the local – rather territorial than national – nomenklatura, who opportunistically supported the country’s pro-independence drive. On the other hand, they had probably little choice but to accept the de facto preservation of the ancien régime and rather evolutionary than revolutionary development of the political system, as their electoral base in the heavily Sovietized and Russified, i.e., largely un-civic and divided society, did not exceed 20–30% of the eligible voters at the time. What they could have been blamed for, only, was their failure to formalize their own role as either junior partners in a nomenklatura-led coalition of “national unit” or unambiguous members of a genuine opposition. Yet, ambiguity prevailed and resulted in a gradual compromising of “national democrats.” Even worse, their un-formalized, un-institutionalized, un-systemic cooperation with post-communists simply reflected their general and profound lack of understanding of how much institutions did matter and how important institutional reforms and arrangements should have been. All their relative electoral weakness notwithstanding, Ukrainian “national-democrats” could have certainly been much more active and purposeful in their demands for early parliamentary elections immediately after independence, for the adoption of the new Constitution (not passed until 1996), and for some other 5 T. Kuzio, Transition in Post-Communist States: Triple or Quadruple?, [in:] “Politics,” 2001, vol. 21, no. 3, p. 169–178.

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institutional changes like a new electoral law and new regulations to promote the role of political parties in coalition-building and government-making.6 All this was difficult but not impossible to achieve. The wind of political changes was in their sails, and the ruling nomenklatura was largely in disarray, ready for different concessions. And secondly, even though they relied politically on a minority of the population, it was an active, committed, vociferous, and mobilized minority – a great advantage vis-à-vis the ancien régime that drew upon a largely passive, obedient, and silent majority. The old system, which had not been radically reformed, eventually fought back, and rather predictably so. The main feature of that system was the concentration of political and economic power in the hands of a single player – the Communist party, which had held a monopoly on virtually everything. Even though there was, formally, a division of powers in the Soviet Union into executive, legislative, and judicial branches, they were not separated. On the contrary, all of them were fused under the supervision and autocratic rule of the Party that substituted de facto for the entire state and for the etatized society. It had also controlled the entire economy, thus laying the foundation for the eventual mutual reinforcement of political and economic power in the post-Soviet states and, as Paul D’Anieri aptly remarks, for large-scale corruption that both supported and was supported by this vicious circle: Political authority was a necessary and sufficient condition for acquiring economic power and wealth [in post-Soviet countries], sometimes on a fantastic scale. Simultaneously, economic power was necessary and nearly sufficient to obtain political power. This potent combination of political and economic power came to rest among a narrow set of elites closely connected with the state apparatus... To put it simply, political power is highly concentrated in Ukraine because it started out that way, and because the system tends to reinforce that concentration rather than to disperse it.7

6 For a detailed account of the first decade of Ukraine’s independent development see B. Harasymiw, Post-Communist Ukraine, CIUS Press, Edmonton & Toronto 2002; also T. Kuzio, Ukraine: A Decade of Independence, [in:] “Journal of Ukrainian Studies,” 2001, vol. 26, no. 1–2. 7 P. D’Anieri, Understanding Ukrainian Politics: Power, Politics, and Institutional Design, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, NY & London 2007, p. 13.

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The fact that Ukraine was historically, socially, culturally, and politically predisposed to such a development did not mean that it was utterly predetermined. Ukrainian democrats had their electoral stronghold in the western (‘Habsburgian’) part of the country [Fig. 5.1.] and were fairly competitive in the center – the his-

torical lands of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth [Fig. 5.2.]. The country probably could have avoided the consolidation of authoritarianism had Ukrainian reformers pushed institutional changes through more vigorously. The main goal should have been to strictly divide powers and, in particular, to strengthen the legislature as the main counterbalance to the executive that had been traditionally overpowered since Soviet times. “Ukraine’s slide to authoritarianism was a result of fundamental imbalance in the distribution of political power [...] System was very vulnerable to a chief executive who sought to use the state apparatus to control both the economic and political spheres of the country.”8 The fact that “Leonid Kravchuk did not seem to be such an executive, [n]or initially did Leonid Kuchma,” mattered little in view of a broader and much more powerful institutional logic. It implied, in particular, that any ambitious leader would try to amass 8 Ibidem, p. 14.

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Figure 5.2. Ukraine’s electoral map, 2004. Historical legacy of the PolishLithuanian Commonwealth. Source: Wikipedia.

his power and expand his prerogatives, and that any powerful institution would tend to convert its de facto power into legitimate power and vice versa. Therefore,

we should not necessarily conclude that the politicians themselves are different – that Western politicians are inherently honest and that others are not. The difference seems to be in how far politicians can go in different countries before something or somebody pushes back... The primary difference between the liberal democracies and the electoral authoritarian regimes is that in the former, power tends to equilibrate. In liberal democracies, politicians who become increasingly powerful tend to engender increasing opposition. In electoral authoritarian systems, in contrast, political and economic power tend to centralize, such that those who initially gain an advantage can then use that leverage to create further advantage. This self-reinforcing cycle is limited only by the competence and lifespan of the ruler.9

The “benign” behavior of Leonid Kravchuk and the early Leonid Kuchma in the first half of the 1990s barely stemmed from their benign law-abiding nature or sheer good will. Many times, 9 Ibidem, p. 240.

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Figure 5.3. Romania’s electoral map, 2014. Historical legacy of the Habsburg Empire in Transylvania. Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014_Romanian_ presidential_election.

at different occasions, both of them proved to be rather typical, quite mediocre post-Soviet men with a profoundly uncivic political culture and deeply entrenched belief that the ends justify the means, winners take all, and any law is inferior to political and/ or economic expedience. Actually, it was not only Kravchuk and Kuchma, the old members of Soviet nomenklatura, who repeatedly expressed disregard for law and civic merits, but also their younger adversaries and successors who still, even two and three decades later, cannot come to terms with those subtle matters. It looks more likely that neither Kravchuk nor the early Kuchma misused their power too blatantly just because they had not yet accumulated enough political and economic resources to effectively implement “power politics” – something that refers to the “ability of actors to pursue their goals by going outside the established rules” and includes “selective law enforcement, regulation of the economy, influence over the media and other measures.”10 Only by the end of his first term had Leonid Kuchma accrued the needed resources and acquired the needed skills to masterfully combine coercion and manipulation, bribery and blackmail, intimidation and cooptation. While this second period 10 Ibidem, p. 11.

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that ultimately led to the Orange revolution has been broadly covered in the literature,11 the initial stages of Ukrainian post-Soviet authoritarianism still require some in-depth exploration.

The rise of electoral authoritarianism

he non-revolutionary character of political change in Ukraine resulted not only in the preservation of largely the same institutions with basically the same personnel. This brought about, in turn, very slow, incoherent, and often confusing reforms that provided an excellent opportunity for the post-Soviet elite to pursue power politics in a highly ambiguous legal environment. Partial reforms created an economic “gray area” between the plan and the market that “allowed well-placed actors to get richer than they could either in a fully planned or fully marketized system.” Rather predictably, these rent-seekers did their best to “halt further reform in order to ‘freeze’ the economy in this highly lucrative intermediate position.”12 One may argue that a similar “gray area” had emerged and was “frozen” deliberately in the legal sphere, where a great many laws were either missing or overlapping, contradictory, incomplete, confusing, arbitrarily interpreted, and poorly enforced. This was a kind of a no man’s land, an unmarked territory up for grabs, a place where the might makes right and the strongest players can expand their landmarks by sheer force. The institutional logic was simple: “partial reform of a system with concentrated power leads to continued concentration of power.” Hence, given the original distribution of power in Ukraine in 1991, the partial opening of the system made it easier, not harder, for those with power to consolidate it... As a result, the powerful become more so, and those with lack of access to resources find themselves increasingly shut out.13

11 See in particular T. Kuzio, Ukraine under Kuchma. Political Reform, Economic Transformation and Security Policy in Independent Ukraine, Macmillan, London, 1997; M. Dyczok, Ukraine. Movement without Change, Change without Movement, Harwood, Amsterdam, 2000; A. Wilson, Virtual Politics. Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World, Yale University Press, New Haven & London, 2005. 12 P. D’Anieri, op. cit., p. 65–66, 71. 13 Ibidem, p. 52, 61.

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Figure 5.4. Poland’s electoral map, 2010. Historical legacy of the German and Russian Empires. Source: https://bigthink.com/strange-maps/348-an-imperialpalimpsest-on-polands-electoral-map.

Another broadly recognized factor that facilitated the development of electoral authoritarianism in Ukraine was societal fragmentation – all kinds of ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious, regional, and ideological divisions that made any consolidation of political opposition virtually impossible, and enabled the post-Soviet quasi-centrist elite to effectively use divide-and-rule tactics.14 Less attention, so far, has been paid to the role of peculiar institutional design and of “power politics” in the development of Ukrainian authoritarian system. Paul D’Anieri, in his illuminating analysis of the 1996 constitutional process, makes an important point that “the way in which constitution was adopted was much more important than its content.” He refers here to President Kuchma’s ability to go outside the constitutional process, to use 14 Societal fragmentation (and identity split in particular) actually appeared to be a mixed blessing, insofar as it impeded not only democratic but also authoritarian consolidation, thereby making Ukraine (and Moldova) increasingly different from Russia and Belarus – otherwise similar states but with a more homogeneous national (post-Soviet) identity, largely supportive for the incumbents. See L. Way, Authoritarian State Building and the Sources of Regime Competitiveness in the Fourth Wave. The Cases of Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine, [in:] “World Politics,” 2005, vol. 57, no. 1, p. 231–261.

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extralegal “raw power” and force the parliament to pass his version of the document under the threat of dissolution (however dubious from the legal point of view). This, not the advent of a constitutional order, was the key outcome. Two related points emerged from these facts. First, there is significant variation in the ability of legal rules in Ukraine to constrain actors. Second, the actors powerful enough to make the rules apply to others but not to themselves will prevail in political conflicts. While many saw the adoption of the 1996 constitution as a triumph for Ukrainian democracy, because the new document was superior on paper to what it replaced, it was in fact the beginning of the end of constitutional government... When the constitution can be ignored by the president, or when he can credibly threaten to ignore it, the quality and details of the constitutional provisions lose their importance.15

The way in which the 1996 Ukrainian constitution (as well as the Russian in 1993) was adopted paradigmatically exposed how, in the absence of rule of law, power politics determines both the writing of laws and their eventual implementation – through selective law enforcement. The constitutional design that legalized de jure an exorbitant de facto power of the executive (primarily of the president) greatly helped authoritarianism in Ukraine to strengthen its old roots. Two more institutional factors, however, contributed substantially to the process. First of all, electoral law encouraged strong, rich, and influential individuals to run for seats in majoritarian single-member districts rather than invest in the development of political parties. Secondly, it was the parliamentary order that encouraged divisions of parliamentary groups into the smallest factions rather than their consolidation into powerful coalitions. And finally, it was the constitution itself that did not provide any significant role for political parties in forming the government, thereby dispossessing them of any incentive to coalesce. So, Ukraine’s post-Soviet authoritarian development was determined not only by the “concentration of power in the Soviet system, which was transferred largely intact to the executive branch in independent Ukraine.” To make bad things worse, “this initial predominance of executive power has been maintained and exaggerated by the inability of the parliament to provide 15 P. D’Anieri, op. cit., p. 85.

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electoral authoritarianism

post-Soviet Ukraine

a sufficient institutional counterweight.”16 Initially, this was due to ideological fragmentation and the electoral law. But eventually, the fragmentation and disabling of the parliament became part of the purposefully manipulative tactics of President Kuchma and his administration. The rise and entrenchment of electoral authoritarianism (the system that formally imitates democratic procedures but informally tries to eliminate any real political competition) had not been an instant process in Ukraine after the fall of the Soviet Union. Not only did the would-be authoritarian leaders have to contend with high pro-democracy expectations both at home and abroad, but they also had to acquire new skills and sufficient resources to credibly manipulate the entire system in a seemingly democratic way. The executive branch they inherited from the Soviet Union was fragmented nearly as much as the post-Soviet legislature. To be sure, post-Soviet executives were much better positioned than any other institutions to accumulate resources. For the majority of Soviet citizens, they embodied real authority, “vlast,” to a much greater degree than the Parliament, which had been just a by-product of glasnost – a Hide Park, an extension of the liberated mass media, “govorilnia,” talk-shop. Yet the real problem of the first months and years of Ukraine’s independence was how to make versatile executive bodies work systemically, how to subordinate local executives to central executives, and how to achieve cooperation, responsibility, and accountability between and within different executive bodies and branches. The simple truth is that early post-Soviet Ukraine was as much non-democratic as late Soviet Ukraine – in terms of its institutions and ruling elites, their political culture, and their legal consciousness. The only difference was that post-Soviet institutions, without the Communist party, were largely in disarray and could barely reveal their authoritarian essence – being just too weak, fragmented, and dysfunctional. As a result, Ukraine, throughout its first years of independence, remained a relatively open country that exhibited dynamic and competitive politics. It was proven, in particular, in a rather free and fair presidential election in 1991 and in electoral turnover in 1994. Mass media, liberated already by late perestroika, 16 Ibidem, p. 73.

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remained basically free, and civic freedoms achieved by that time remained uncurtailed. All this openness and competitiveness, however, was “rooted less in robust civil society, strong democratic institutions or democratic leadership and much more in the inability of incumbents to maintain power or concentrate political control by preserving elite unity, controlling elections and media and/or using force against opponents.” It resulted primarily from the sudden collapse of the USSR that deprived authoritarian rulers of the organization, skill, and finances necessary to maintain power and/or concentrate political control.17 In other words, the post-Soviet regime in Ukraine, as well as elsewhere in the former Soviet republics, emerged less as a struggling democracy, where leaders strived to build more pluralistic institutions, and much more as a kind of failed authoritarianism, aptly defined by Thomas Carothers as “feckless pluralism” or, in Lucan Way’s words, “pluralism by default” – a form of political competition specific to weak states.18 Over time, however, the post-Soviet elites had gained substantial wealth through shadow privatization and other dubious deals; learned how to manipulate elections, mass media, and political opponents; and eventually transformed the state’s weakness into a specific strength that primarily meant methods and scopes of coercion. President Kuchma played an important role in this consolidation – partly because of his personal skills and qualities but more importantly because as a president, he disproportionately controlled many resources and, therefore, “was able to take an initial advantage in power and expand it considerably”: The president’s power in Ukraine stems from his control over the executive branch, which is by far the most developed of Ukraine’s three branches. Because it is charged with executing and administering the laws of the country, the executive branch can alter the incentives of other actors. [...] Imbalance of power is the fundamental factor that has prevented Ukraine from becoming a liberal democracy... Moreover, rather than having a dominant equilibrating or ‘balancing’ tendency, in which smaller power centers in society tend to ally to challenge a potentially dominant actor, in Ukraine the tendency is towards concentration, rather than balance, of power... As a result, the powerful

17 L. Way, op. cit., p. 232. 18 L. Way, Pluralism by Default in Moldova, [in:] “Journal of Democracy,” 2002, vol. 13, no. 4, p. 127.

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become more so, and those with lack of access to resources find themselves increasingly shut out.19

By the mid-’90s, the situation was ripe for large-scale privatization, since the main players in Ukrainian politics and economics had accumulated sufficient resources to carry it out in the most beneficial way for themselves. Ironically, however, it appeared to be a mixed blessing. The dubious wealth and murky privatization made them potentially easy targets for surveillance and law-enforcement agencies directly subordinated to the president. All of them appeared to be on the hook, and it was up to the president now to decide who would be punished and when, and who would be generously granted an extended probation. Selective application of law became a powerful instrument of official, albeit informal, blackmail employed by the president and his associates. It allowed them to re-establish a kind of order throughout the country, to subdue local barons and, surprisingly, bring the threat of Crimean separatism (salient in the early ’90s) to virtual nil. By and large, this peculiar instrument of state domination eliminated the fecklessness of the earlier years and made the state institutions work, taxes paid, and oligarchs obedient. But the side effect of this relative “success” was a gradual elimination of pluralism – since it was “pluralism by default,” i.e., pluralism accompanied and supported by state fecklessness, rather than democratic traditions and institutions. All the disloyal subjects, members of the political opposition, and especially their business supporters became major targets of official blackmail. A great advantage of this new instrument of repression was that it allowed the persecution political opponents with apparently non-political charges, in full conformity with the letter of the law. In this regard, the new authoritarianism differed substantially from the former one. Formerly, the shadow power of the Communist party was based on communist ideology. It was deemed mandatory for everybody who held any more or less important position and/or strove for any social advancement. A kind of “ideological blackmail” was employed as a tool of state domination to extort loyalty from the subjects. Now, under the post-Soviet non-ideological regimes, loyalty could be achieved by other means: partly, as usual, by bribery and cooptation, partly by 19 P. D’Anieri, op. cit., p. 61.

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a new sort of blackmail – economical, facilitated by the advent of oligarchic capitalism.

The strength and weakness of a “blackmail state”

he notion of a “blackmail state” was introduced in 2001 by the American scholar Keith Darden, who examined an extensive collection of conversations of the Ukrainian president Leonid Kuchma with his aides, recorded secretly in his office by his fugitive bodyguard Mykola Melnychenko. The collection provided an excellent albeit dreadful illustration of how blackmail could be institutionalized, i.e., systemically employed by the government as an effective tool of state domination. The system, as outlined by Darden, is based on three elements:

“blackmail state”

The first is a permissive attitude of state authorities towards corruption. In Ukraine, corruption and illegality among the elite were accepted, condoned, and even encouraged by the top leadership, resulting in a general condition of impunity. The second element is extensive state surveillance. Even as the violation of the law is encouraged, the state (or rather the surveillance organs controlled by the President) continues to monitor and collect information on such illegal activities. Thanks to the surveillance organs, the state amasses a stockpile of files and criminal cases documenting the wrongdoings of office-holders as well as private actors. When compliance with state directives is required, this information is used for blackmail, with payment exacted – not in cash, but in political obedience.20

In other words, a selective application of law represents the third element of the system: “Opponents of the regime can expect to feel the full wrath of any new legislation; supporters can expect to be let off the hook.”21 Institutionalized blackmail became the main element of authoritarian rule in both Ukraine and some other post-Soviet countries. It was extremely suitable for “imitational” (a.k.a. “illiberal,” “partial,” “sovereign”) democracies, i.e., for the regimes that, on the one hand, could not allow free and fair political and economic competition that would most likely make them losers, but, on the other hand, could not afford openly 20 K. Darden, Blackmail as a Tool of State Domination: Ukraine Under Kuchma, [in:] “East European Constitutional Review,” 2001, vol. 10, no. 2–3, p. 67–71. 21 The End of an Era?, [in:] “Kyiv Post,” 25 October 2001, p. 6.

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undemocratic, dictatorial methods, due to specific domestic and international circumstances. Surprisingly yet, this key institution had not been recognized and identified properly until Melnychenko’s tapes resurfaced in 2000–2001 and Keith Darden published his breakthrough article. Even as late as 1999, after highly unpopular Leonid Kuchma won his second presidential term by the most outrageous “techniques” of state blackmail, and further consolidated his autocratic rule, many authors still defined Ukraine as a “weak” state – “where weak describes not the power of the state relative to other states but the ability of the government to adopt a policy and implement it in the society.”22 This misbelief largely stemmed from the early impression of many transitologists that “the disintegration of the Soviet state left an administrative and institutional void in Ukraine of magnificent proportions that has taken the considerable time to ‘backfill’. The political transition thus involves not only development of civic organizations, a free press and media, political parties, and interest groups but also building the capacity of the ‘quasi-state’ inherited from the USSR to enable it to perform even the most minimal functions of modern governance.”23 “Unfortunately,” a Ukrainian scholar polemically commented, “the belief in the institutional weakness of successive post-Leninist states has become uncritically accepted as conventional wisdom among transitologists. It must be said that the Ukraine inherited an elaborated system of administrative institutions from its Soviet predecessor. Though not being an ideal of effectiveness and efficiency, it could have shown much better performance had the interests of policy-makers coincided with the pursuit of developmental strategies.”24 The confusion may be to a degree terminological, coming from the sheer equation of “weakness” and “dysfunctionality.” The latter presumably means that the Ukrainian state is unable or, rather, 22 P. D’Anieri, The Impact of Domestic Divisions on Ukrainian Foreign Policy: Ukraine as a ‘Weak State’, [in:] State and Institution Building in Ukraine, ed. by T. Kuzio, R. Kravchuk, P. D’Anieri, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1999, p. 84. 23 T. Kuzio, Introduction: The ‘Quadruple Transition’, [in:] Politics and Society in Ukraine, ed. by P. D’Anieri, R. Kravchuk, T. Kuzio, Westview Press, Boulder, 1999, p. 5. 24 P. Kutuev, Development of Underdevelopment: State and Modernization Project in the Post-Leninist Ukraine, [in:] “Thinking Fundamentals,” IWM Junior Visiting Fellows Conferences, vol. 9, ed. by D. Shikiar, Vienna 2000, p. 10.

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unwilling to satisfy some basic needs of its citizens and to make the government institutions function properly, for the public good. It does not mean, however, that the Ukrainian government cannot adopt and implement the policy it really needs – the policy which benefits state officials and their “business partners.” In the latter regard, it was definitely not “weak” – at least by the end of the 1990s, when the blackmail-based authoritarianism had been firmly institutionalized and the tax administration and tax police became the most powerful instruments of state politics. The confusion, most likely, comes from the fact that “in most Western states politics is highly institutionalized,” and institutional theories typically assume that “all the key political processes occur within formal institutions.” In Ukraine, however, like in many other post-communist countries, “much of what is obviously important happens outside of formal institutions and in contradiction of the formal rules.”25 This may look unusual, even odd, for Western observers, but it is fully in line with the Soviet tradition – where the Communist party’s dominance was exercised largely outside formal institutions and aside from or even against written rules. A decade of Leonid Kuchma’s headship (1995–2004) and the eventual four-year tenure of Viktor Yanukovych (2010–2013) graphically confirm Paul D’Anieri’s analytical observation that the Ukrainian state, and the presidency in particular, is not weak, but [...] many of its capacities are exercised through informal mechanisms of control that have until recently been hidden from view... The new evidence suggests that pervasive corruption, combined with extensive surveillance and the collection of evidence of wrongdoing by the state, provided the basis for the Ukrainian leadership to use blackmail systematically to secure compliance with its directives. Corruption, rather than a sign of state weakness, is an essential element of an informal mechanism of presidential control in Ukraine and other post-Soviet states.26

In his eventual article on the same topic, Darden drew upon an extensive data from different countries to prove that on many terms – like the capacity to collect taxes, to provide public order and basic services, or to fight crime– the Ukrainian state was 25 P. D’Anieri, Understanding Ukrainian Politics, op. cit., p. 23, 45, 46. 26 K. Darden, op. cit., p. 67–71.

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pretty effective, nearly as effective as Western democracies, and certainly much more effective than the states deemed “weak” or “failed” [Tab. 5.5.]. In spite of the common belief, he contended, bribery and embezzlement were not necessarily evidence of the breakdown of the state’s administrative hierarchy. On the contrary, under certain conditions, they could reinforce that hierarchy.

Figure 5.5. Relative efficacy of the blackmail state. Source: Darden, 2008.

Traditional arguments have been right to emphasize that widespread graft is antithetical and harmful to a state grounded in the rule of law. Yet this view is incomplete. If we take a broader and more historical view of the state as a form of organized domination that is not necessarily based on law, it becomes clear that bribery and other corrupt practices can provide the basis for robust states of a different type. Where graft is systematically tracked, monitored, and granted by state leaders as an informal payment in exchange for compliance, it may even be essential to the basic integrity of some state – providing both an added incentive to comply with leaders’ directives and also the potent sanction of criminal prosecution in the event of disobedience. [...] While such state institutions may undermine the development of liberal politics and markets, informal states exercise considerable coercive, extractive, and other capacities that differentiate them significantly from the weak, fragmented states or syndicates for which they are often mistaken.27

In his earlier (2001) article, Darden suggested that blackmail-based authoritarianism is likely to be sustainable, since those who are in a position to alter this system are precisely those who derive the most benefit from it. So, he concluded, “without pressure from international community to divide rather than 27 K. Darden, The Integrity of Corrupt States: Graft as an Informal State Institution, [in:] “Politics & Society,” 2008, vol. 36, no. 1, p. 54.

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Figure 5.6. Control of corruption in Poland, Romania, and Ukraine, 2000–2015. Source: Transparency International.

concentrate the powers of the state, it will be difficult for opposition forces in Ukraine to cast off this system in the foreseeable future.”28 After the Orange Revolution (2004), he had to recognize, however, that “bribery and blackmail may substitute for genuine loyalty as the basis for a functioning administrative hierarchy, but they are an imperfect substitute from the perspective of regime stability. The Achilles heel of such graft-based states... is that they tend to be utterly lacking in popular support or legitimacy.”29 One should remember that electoral authoritarianism builds its legitimacy through seemingly free elections and other ostensibly democratic procedures. It differs substantially in this regard from traditional authoritarianism, which maintains power primarily through ideology and/or coercion. But the effectiveness of such a system has clear limits. The president’s power is significant but not total. Elections are manipulated in multiple ways but not thoroughly rigged. The authorities can tip the balance in their favor in a close race but can barely overcome a huge deficit of votes in case their candidate is too unpopular and the rivals are strong and unified. 28 K. Darden, Blackmail as a Tool of State Domination, op. cit. See also K. Darden, The Dark Side of the State: Formal and Informal Mechanisms of State Supremacy, a paper presented at the conference on State-Building in Post-Communist States: Toward Comparative Analysis, Yale University, 27–28 April 2001. 29 K. Darden, The Integrity of Corrupt States, op. cit., p. 53.

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Revolutionary upheavals

Orange Revolution

his is exactly what happened in 2004, when incumbent Leonid Kuchma, heavily compromised by the earlier tape scandal, picked up an unpopular prime minister, Viktor Yanukovych, as his successor to the presidency. To make Kuchma’s bad situation worse, the Ukrainian opposition unexpectedly became united, civil society proved to be stronger than was assumed, and elites defected from the president’s camp much more massively than anybody predicted. All these factors, combined with international pressure, made the defeat of the electoral authoritarian regime inevitable. The 2004 Orange Revolution marked Ukraine’s departure from authoritarianism but was barely an advent of liberal democracy. On the one hand, amendments to constitution imposed some important limits on the president’s power and increased the prerogatives of the parliament and prime minister. Electoral law and internal rules governing the parliament were changed to promote the development of strong political parties and coalition-building. Yet, on the other hand, all the changes were made during the revolution in haste, through difficult negotiations and compromises, and produced many incoherencies, omissions, and contradictions. Even more important, no comprehensive legal reform was carried out and no rule of law was established. All this made post-revolutionary Ukraine under the presidency of Viktor Yushchenko (2005–2010) much more akin to the Kravchuk-style “feckless democracy” of the early ’90s than to any kind of functional liberal democracy. The results of that fecklessness were also very similar: frustrated voters turned again to an authoritarian leader who promised some “law and order” amid the institutional chaos and internecine bickering within the “Orange” camp. Viktor Yanukovych, who lost elections to “democrats” in 2005, got revenge in 2010, even though he received half a million votes less this time than five years ago. The much lower turnover facilitated his victory: two million “Orange” voters abstained from voting this time. Very soon, however, it appeared that the “order” that Yanukovych and his oligarchic Party of Regions brought in Ukraine had nothing to do with “law” but a lot with the familiar “blackmail state” perfected under Leonid Kuchma. Once again, post-Soviet

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Figure 5.7. GDP per capita in Poland, Russia, and Ukraine, 1990–2018. Source: WIIW.

institutions proved their “stickiness.” Yanukovych did not have to work hard to reestablish the old habits and mechanisms. His rule, however, differed from Leonid Kuchma’s in two main regards. First, he stepped away from Kuchma’s tradition of balancing different clans and manipulating different political forces. He bet instead on his own clan, represented by the Donbas-based Party of Region, and moved apparently from “pluralistic” rent-seeking to monopolistic state-capture, and from divide-and-rule politics to thorough usurpation of power. This antagonized not only civil society and the democratic opposition, but also many entrepreneurs who became the primary targets of state-sponsored racket and raider takeover of lucrative businesses – and even some oligarchs who felt increasingly marginalized by the president’s mafia-style group dubbed “family.” On the other hand, Russia made some conclusions from its 2004 failure to secure the victory of Yanukovych as a preferable candidate. Moscow was utterly fed up with Kyiv’s “multi-vector policy” that enabled Ukrainian politicians to manipulate both Russia and the West against each other and effectively withstand the pressure from both sides. Neither Western demands for further democratization, higher transparency and rule of law, nor Russian demands for various political concessions and closer

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engagement in Russia-led integration projects succeeded under Leonid Kuchma’s rule, despite his ostentatious pro-Western and opportunistically interchangeable, pro-Russian rhetoric. Since 2005, the Kremlin has invested heavily in its Ukraine politics, both overtly and covertly, enhancing political, economic, propagandistic, and diplomatic pressure, as well as the subversive activity of professional agents and agents of influence. The particular greed and incompetence of President Yanukovych and his oligarchic “family” opened an additional window of opportunity for Russian intelligence as they effectively weaponized corruption in Ukraine’s murky political and economic environment.30 In 2013, they forced the Ukrainian government to step down from the signing of the Association Agreement with the EU that had been negotiated for many years and scheduled for initialing at the end of November. This triggered mass anti-government protests in Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities, fueled by the general dissatisfaction of vast strata of Ukrainian society with the increasingly authoritarian tendencies of Yanukovych’s rule. The Association Agreement did not envision membership prospects or promise great economic benefits but symbolized some chances for the “European” way of development and for sustainable national sovereignty out of the notorious Russian “sphere of influence.” Scrapping the Agreement and accepting multi-billion credit from Moscow as a reward was a signal for Ukrainian civil society that no free and fair elections should be expected in the nearest future, and no peaceful change of the corrupt government, no European-style modernization, but, rather, a consolidation of Putin-style authoritarianism in Ukraine. The Yanukovych regime responded to the peaceful protests with violence that escalated dramatically in December through February and culminated in a mass shooting of the protesters (about 100 people) by special forces, as well as the escape of the delegitimized president on February 21 to Russia. This triggered the invasion of Russian regular armed forces into Crimea and irregulars in Donbas. The de-facto Russo-Ukrainian war that followed (and still is pending) demonstrated not only the dire 30 M. Laurinavičius, Weaponizing Kleptocracy: Putin’s Hybrid Warfare, Hudson Institute, Washington, D.C., 2017; P. Massaro, A. Rausing, Russia’s Weaponization of Corruption (and Western Complicity), Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Washington, D.C., 2017; Zelikow P. et al., The Rise of Strategic Corruption. How States Weaponize Graft, [in:] “Foreign Affairs,” 2020, vol. 99, no. 4, p. 107–118.

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weakness of the Ukrainian state and the incredible penetration of all its structures by the Russian intelligence, but also the relative strength of Ukrainian civil society, which filled the institutional void and rescued the state from complete collapse in the first months of the Russian invasion.31 Still, the old institutions survived the shake-up of the new revolution and the exhaustive war, and seem to survive the reformist promises of the new government that overwhelmingly won the election in 2019, riding high on popular dissatisfaction with war, corruption, and the fecklessness of Ukraine’s “pluralism by default.” Ukraine seems to be entrapped in a vicious circle of oligarchic dominance and patrimonial rent-seeking, and it is very unlikely that this self-reproducing mechanism can be broken without external assistance – more or less as it happened in the Western Balkans, where new institutions were promoted under the EU’s guidance and supervision.

Chapter readings

V. Bunce, Subversive Institutions: The Design and the Destruction of Socialism and the State, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999. D’Anieri P., The Impact of Domestic Divisions on Ukrainian Foreign Policy: Ukraine as a ‘Weak State’, [in:] Kuzio T., Kravchuk R., D’Anieri P. (eds.), State and Institution Building in Ukraine, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1999. D’Anieri P., Understanding Ukrainian Politics: Power, Politics, and Institutional Design, M. E. Sharpe, Armonk, NY & London, 2007. Darden K., Blackmail as a Tool of State Domination: Ukraine Under Kuchma, [in:] “East European Constitutional Review,” 2001, vol. 10, no. 2–3, p. 67–71. Darden K., The Integrity of Corrupt States: Graft as an Informal State Institution, [in:] “Politics & Society,” 2008, vol. 36, no. 1. Dyczok M., Ukraine. Movement without Change, Change without Movement, Harwood, Amsterdam, 2000. Friedrich C., Brzeziński Z., Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, Praeger, New York, 1961. Harasymiw B., Post-Communist Ukraine, CIUS Press, Edmonton & Toronto, 2002.

31 M. Riabchuk, A. Lushnycky, Ukraine’s Third Attempt, [in:] V. Stepanenko, Y. Pylynskyi (eds.), Ukraine after the Euromaidan. Challenges and Hopes, Peter Lang, Bern, 2015, p. 47–58.

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Kowal P., Mink G., Reichardt I. (eds.), Three Revolutions: Mobilization and Change in Contemporary Ukraine I. Theoretical Aspects and Analyses on Religion, Memory, and Identity, ibidem-Verlag, Stuttgart, 2019. Kutuev P., Development of Underdevelopment: State and Modernization Project in the Post-Leninist Ukraine, [in:] Shikiar D. (ed.), “Thinking Fundamentals,” IWM Junior Visiting Fellows Conferences, vol. 9, Vienna, 2000. Kuzio T., Ukraine under Kuchma. Political Reform, Economic Transformation and Security Policy in Independent Ukraine, Macmillan, London, 1997. Kuzio T., Introduction: The ‘Quadruple Transition’, [in:] D’Anieri P., Kravchuk R., Kuzio T. (eds.), Politics and Society in Ukraine, Westview Press, Boulder, 1999. Kuzio T., Transition in Post-Communist States: Triple or Quadruple?, [in:] “Politics,” 2001, vol. 21, no. 3. Kuzio T., Ukraine: A Decade of Independence, [in:] “Journal of Ukrainian Studies,” 2001, vol. 26, no. 1–2. Way L., Pluralism by Default in Moldova, [in:] “Journal of Democracy,” 2002, vol. 13, no. 4. Stepanenko V., Pylynskyi Y. (eds.), Ukraine after the Euromaidan. Challenges and Hopes, Peter Lang, Bern, 2015. Way L., Authoritarian State Building and the Sources of Regime Competitiveness in the Fourth Wave. The Cases of Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine, [in:] “World Politics,” 2005, vol. 57, no. 1, p. 231–261. Wilson A., Virtual Politics. Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World, Yale University Press, New Haven & London, 2005. Zelikow P. et al., The Rise of Strategic Corruption. How States Weaponize Graft, [in:] “Foreign Affairs,” 2020, vol. 99, no. 4.

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Chapter 6 Making a Nation-State Out of the Empire: Russia’s Aborted Transition

xperts generally agree that the centrifugal forces of nationalism made a decisive blow to the Soviet empire and, collaterally, to the communist system. The low productivity and overall inefficiency of the command economy made the system increasingly unsustainable. This enhanced its vulnerability to various contingencies but did not doom it to collapse – as long as the regime controlled the army, and the police and was ready to crush any protest by force, or even to starve, if necessary, the impoverished population to death. Of all the contingencies that contributed to the end of the system (examined in more detail in Chapter 2), national-liberation movements played a decisive role for two reasons. First, they provided a loose and therefore broad ideological and institutional umbrella for all the people and groups dissatisfied with the incumbent regimes. And secondly, in the absence of civil society, they partially substituted for the much-needed networks of civic trust, solidarity and cooperation. The emergence of Russian anti-imperial (or, at least, non-imperial) anti-Soviet/anti-communist nationalism was the most unexpected and probably most important development at the time.

Russia’s secession from “Russia”

orbachev’s Soviet Union may have lost its East European satellites or even the Baltic republics that had never been internationally recognized as a legitimate Soviet possession. Yet, the full dissolution of the “inner empire” would have hardly been possible if Russia itself did not opt for secession from the Soviet Union. For many observers who used to consider the

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Soviet Union as merely “Russia” under another name, the very idea of the secession of Russia from “Russia” looked unfathomable, nearly schizophrenic. Many still tried to interpret the split as a trivial, elite quarrel, the revenge of a disgruntled group of the top Soviet nomenklatura led by Boris Yeltsin against Gorbachev and his “center.” A loyal communist and career apparatchik, Yeltsin headed the regional party committee in his native Svedrlovsk (now Yekaterinburg) when Mikhail Gorbachev summoned him in 1985 to Moscow and entrusted him with leadership of the largest and most important party organization in the capital city [Fig. 6.1.]. Two years later, however, he resigned from all his party positions, citing his disagreement with Gorbachev over the slow and feeble, in his view, pace of reforms. This and some other gestures cemented his popularity as an anti-establishment figure. In 1989, he won almost 90% of votes in his Moscow district in the first Soviet semifree elections. In 1990, he was elected head of the Russian parliament, and in June 1991, he became the first-ever president of the Russian Federation, unveiling an administrative position that had never existed in the union republics. This enhanced his legitimacy and authority, further empowering him in his rivalry with Gorbachev and the Union center. Later in August, after he led the resistance against the hard-liners’ putsch and rescued hapless Mikhail Gorbachev from his Crimean seclusion, very few people had any doubt as to who represented real power and authority in Moscow.1 It might be tempting to interpret both his earlier split with Gorbachev and his eventual alliance with the nationalist/independence-seeking leaders of the Soviet republics as sheer opportunism and the instrumentalization of ideological differences in his personal power struggle. But the very fact that his “separatist” drive did not provoke any serious backlash in Russian society, and that nobody rose up to prevent the Soviet republics from secession, to support the putschists and to rescue the Union center from complete abolition (as happened in a similar situation in Serbia), indicates that Russian anti-Soviet/anti-communist nationalism had developed some popular roots and that the idea of a sovereign Russia, emancipated from the obsolete Union structures, was not utterly alien to many Russians. In such a context, it 1 L. Aron, Yeltsin: A Revolutionary Life, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 2000.

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Figure 6.1. Boris Yeltsyn and Mikhail Gorbachev. Source: Judt, 2005.

is of a lesser importance whether Boris Yeltsin and his allies acted opportunistically or in good faith. Of greater importance was the fact that a substantial number of Russians, at both the elite and the mass level, were ready to accept a non-imperial vision of the new Russia and a non-imperial type of national identity [Fig. 6.2. and 6.3.]. Not all of them, of course, envisioned a complete break-up of the Soviet Union and the emergence of 15 independent states. Some forms of loose confederation were still on the table, and Yeltsin himself earnestly pursued the project. On December 8th, at the meeting with his Ukrainian and Belarusian counterparts that terminated the 1922 Union agreement, he persuaded them to sign additional document that ushered in the Commonwealth of Independent States as a loose substitute for the dissolved Soviet Union. This may have soothed the feelings of many pro-imperial Russians, but in most republican capitals, the document was interpreted primarily as a mechanism for the “peaceful divorce” rather than for a new integration.2 2 P. D’Anieri, Ukraine and Russia: From Civilized Divorce to Uncivil War, Cambridge University Press, 2019, p. 27–64.

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Figure 6.2. Contours of historical Muscovy (1390–1525) projected on today’s political map. Source: Wikipedia.

For the second time in its history, since 1917, Russia got a chance to revise its identity and become a “normal” European nation-state out of the multi-ethnic empire. “Normalcy” here means equal rights of all citizens, regardless of their ethnic and cultural background, and their loyalty to political institutions and impersonal constitutional principles (rather than to the royal dynasty or ruling Party) as the primary fundamentals of a nation-state. Nothing of this had been anywhere in imperial Russia or the totalitarian Soviet Union. The very idea of defining a nation in civic terms was as unfamiliar to Russians in 1991 as it was back in 1917. As a British scholar explains: In the pre-revolutionary period an ethnic definition of a nation through common culture and language prevailed and voluntary membership of a nation was denied. In the Soviet period a nation was also defined in scholarly literature as ‘an ethno-social community, characterized by

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Figure 6.3. Russia’s territorial expansion, 1300–1945. Source: Wikipedia.

ethno-cultural and socio-economic ties’ and formed by ‘an objective historical process’. As nations were defined by objective characteristics, national identity was a given, rather than open to change. Although the concept of a single Soviet people was supposed to unite different peoples regardless of their ethnicity by loyalty to the state, it did not allow for voluntary membership of a community as well and it also lost in the battle with the simultaneously encouraged ethnic nationalism. The spread of universal literacy and the Sovietized version of Russian culture as well as the destruction of social barriers which had existed in the tsarist empire could potentially lead to the creation of a civic nation of different peoples of the USSR. Yet the Soviet state did not encourage horizontal ties between members of society, thus preventing civil society and thereby a viable civic nation from being formed. It was only in the late 1980s that the concept of a civic (or political) nation as a multicultural community of citizens of a nation-state, who are united by loyalty to the constitution and political institutions, entered Soviet/ Russian discourse on nations and nationalism.3

3 Vera Tolz, Forging the Nation: National Identity and Nation Building in Post-Communist Russia, [in:] “Europe-Asia Studies,” 1998, vol. 50, no. 6, p. 1004.

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The key role of civil society in informing and sustaining a modern-day nation-state was particularly emphasized by the renowned American historian Roman Szporluk. In a series of articles published during Gorbachev’s perestroika and shortly afterwards, he recognized the re-emergence of civil society in the Soviet Union as an important aspect and precondition of the fullfledged modernization of the country. At the same time, he aptly noticed that the process profoundly threatened the integrity of the empire as it unleashed independent forces and social actors that challenged both the dominant ideology and the artificial, mostly coercive bonds that kept the multinational empire together:

new Soviet

“Soviet people”

Sooner or later the [communist] party will have to decide how its role as ‘the leading force’ in every aspect or public life [enshrined in the constitution] can be reconciled with autonomous expressions of opinion and autonomous actions necessary for the success of the economic and scientific transformation... The very existence of multinational empires is threatened by ‘civil rights’ [because] the restoration of the social sphere immediately produces a number of entities that want to perform the functions of the state, to exercise prerogatives of sovereign nations.”4 To put it simply, civil society in the multi-ethnic empire reemerges primarily along ethnic lines – as a number of separate ethnically based civil societies with their particular nationalistically driven, emancipatory agendas. This made another commentator to quip at the time that “liberalized Russia might be possible but a significantly liberalized Soviet Union is probably a contradiction in terms.5

Instead of new Soviet, i.e., “all-Union” political parties, movements, and associations, perestroika ushered in different national – not necessarily ethnic but definitely republican – civic organizations. This ran against the assumptions of many Western observers who considered the Soviet experience as a rather successful example of a non-capitalist path to modernity and inclusive nation-state building. Everything in the official characterization of the “Soviet people” corresponded, in their view, to the conventional Western definition of a political or civic nation. They missed, however, the crucial point – the absence of civic polity 4 R. Szporluk, Russia, Ukraine, and the Breakup of the Soviet Union, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2000, p. 236, 253. 5 P. Goble, Gorbachev and the Soviet Nationality Problem, [in:] M. Friedberg, H. Isham (eds.), Soviet Society under Gorbachev, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, NY, 1987, p. 99.

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in the totalitarian Soviet Union, impossible without political freedom, and therefore the absence of civic bonds that could unite multiethnic subjects of the empire into rightful citizens whose loyalty to the state would not be mandated by the communist party but freely exercised as their personal choice.

In search of a new identity

he lack of established civil society (besides some embryonic forms) in both tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union largely determined the failure of democratic reforms in both empires after their collapse, as well as the persistent inability of Russian state-nation builders to develop a modern (civic) Russian identity. In an illuminating study of Russian nationalism, Liah Greenfeld recognized that the basic ingredients of the Russian national consciousness, and the definition of the Russian nation, were already present by 1800. Throughout the next century, they were “in many ways articulated, refined, reconceptualized, and acted out – but never essentially modified.” They remained, in their core, fundamentally statist, not civic: The Russian national idea consisted in the following: The nation was (1) defined as a collective individual, (2) formed by ethnic, primordial factors such as blood and soil, and (3) characterized by the enigmatic soul, or spirit. The spirit of the nation resided in the ‘people’, but, rather paradoxically, was revealed through the medium of educated elite, who, apparently had the ability to divine it... The special individuals, who knew what the ‘people ‘wanted, naturally had the right to dictate to the masses, who did not know. Russian nationalism was ethnic, collectivistic, and authoritarian.6

The 20th century did not change much in this situation. Rather, the communist dictatorship eliminated even those weak offshoots of civil society that emerged in the Russian empire in the early 20th century. Totalitarian states, unlike their authoritarian cousins, hold zero tolerance for any ideological deviations or unsanctioned grass-root initiatives. While authoritarian states impose various limitations on civic associations and their activity, 6 L. Greenfeld, Nationalism. Five Roads to Modernity, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1992, p. 260–261.

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totalitarian states do not accept any forms of civility in principle. The totalitarian state fully absorbs, “etatizes” society, leaving no public space beyond its “guidance” and “guardianship.” Even the institution of family, which remained the only relatively independent cell within the thoroughly etatized social body, was under the persistent pressure of ideological indoctrination, surveillance, and invigilation. Some specialists argue that the Soviet Union was rather authoritarian than totalitarian in the 1920s (until Stalin consolidated his power) and then, after Stalin’s death, in the late 1950s through the 1980s. They cite the lack of large-scale state terror as the main indicator of the loosened totalitarianism. They ignore, however, the persisting ideological dictatorship executed by the communist party with the active support of the secret police. The Soviet totalitarian ideocracy required not only total absorption of the society by the state but also the indissoluble fusion of the state and the party. The latter largely explains why the “federal” structure of the Soviet Union should not be taken at face value. All the “republican” institutions at the sub-federal level – governments, parliaments, academies of sciences and even (in the case of Belarus and Ukraine) membership in the United Nations – played a purely decorative role inasmuch as the real power belonged the communist party. It had never been “federalized,” and, being identical with the state, could effectively execute the heavily centralized power via its local branches. The system could work, however, only as long as the state was fused with the party and society fused with the state. Gorbachev’s liberalization loosened the party’s grip over the state and weakened state control over society. The purely formal features of the Soviet bogus “constitutionalism” became increasingly meaningful; the show-window Soviet institutions began their autonomous existence, independent from the communist party and therefore from the centralized state. As early as 1986, Randal Collins perspicaciously predicted this development, largely unfathomable for most Western “Sovietologists”: The formal machinery for the dismemberment of the Soviet Union is already in place. The fifteen largest ethnically distinct areas are officially autonomous states, possessing local machinery of government... In current practice, this autonomy has little effect as the armed forces,

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monetary system, and economic planning are controlled by organs of the central government and political control is organized by a single national Communist Party. The importance of the autonomous ethnic-state structure, rather, is that it both maintains ethnic identities and provides an organizational framework that would allow genuinely separate states to emerge whenever the central government were seriously weakened.7

At the same time, Randal Collins was well aware of the general weakness of civil society in the Soviet Union and therefore did not expect it to play a major role in the eventual state-nation building:

The projected disintegration of the Soviet Union would most likely occur under the leadership of dissident communist politicians. Given the current monopoly of communists over political organization in the Soviet Union, it would be difficult for political change to come about in any another way, at least initially.8

His prediction was largely correct: only in the Baltic republics was civil society (and civic nationalism) strong enough to take over the dysfunctional Soviet institutions and completely rebuild them, often from scratch, in a liberal democratic fashion, without any (essentially dubious) cooperation with the former nomenklatura. In all other republics, the communist leaders either retained their power with only cosmetic rebranding of their nomenklatura images, or – in the places where civil society was a bit stronger – pacted with oppositional “democrats” but still retained the main share in the allegedly joint project of nation-state building. Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova initially belonged to the latter group. Russia’s chances for a successful democratic transition looked the most favorable insofar as it inherited the lion share of the Soviet assets, cadres, and institutions and, at the same time, had a leadership with proven anti-communist, pro-reform credentials and a strong commitment to radical market reforms. What loomed large in this generally optimistic setting, however, was the glaring absence of mass support for the radical changes and, worse, the apparent inability of the nascent civil society to 7 R. Collins, Weberian Sociological Theory, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986, p. 204. 8 Ibidem, p. 207.

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mobilize mass support for the reformist cause. To add insult to injury, the imperial, ancien régime forces appeared more capable to mobilize the disgruntled, impoverished population under the slogans of non-civic, imperial nationalism, amplified by the economic collapse and great-power resentment. By mid-’90s, it had become rather clear that “Yeltsin’s attempts, immediately following the demise of the USSR, to create a community of citizens of the RF who are united primarily by loyalty to new political institutions have already failed. Many arguments can be found in support of this judgment. The notion of a civic nation is still alien to the majority of Russia’s ‘social engineers’. Even some of the supporters of this notion, most notably the president, find it safer to rely on more traditional approaches when stakes in political battles are being raised too high. As far as society is concerned, the rift between political and business elites, on the one hand, and the majority of the population, on the other, with the two groups divided by mutual suspicion and resentment, poses a very significant problem for the development of a compound civic identity.”9 All this made the Russian reformers to slow down, backtrack, or even reverse their radical policies. “In 1991,” Roman Szporluk wrote on the popular mood of the time,

it looked as if Russia would lead the entire post-Soviet space in economic reforms and democratization – just as before Russia had been the driving force of Sovietization. Those Russians who had not accepted the disintegration of the empire but who supported democracy and market economy had reason to hope that Russia’s political and cultural leadership in de-Sovietization would make it possible for the Russian empire to be restored – this time in a liberal or ‘Western’ form. For this to have a chance to happen, however, economic and political reforms had to be safe in Russia itself. In 1996, this was less obviously the case than it has been five years earlier.10

9 V. Tolz, op. cit., p. 1018. 10 R. Szporluk, op. cit., p. 422.

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East Slavonic “centers” and “peripheries”

n a percipient 1998 article on the political systems of three East Slavonic republics, Dmitri Furman conceptualized Russia’s post-Soviet development as a fierce struggle of the advanced, reformist, westernizing “Center,” committed to the catching-up modernization of the country, with the conservative, rather backward, and often retrograde “periphery,” committed to “traditional” (Soviet and pre-Soviet) values, first of all to paternalism and irrational but deeply entrenched nativism and anti-Westernism.11 The “Center” was hypostatized primarily as Moscow and, to some degree, St. Petersburg – two capital cities where the lion’s share of educated, entrepreneurial, skilled, westernized elite had traditionally been concentrated, with the significant spillover of their views and values upon the rest of the local population. Moscow was the only city in Russia that clearly voted against the proposed preservation of the USSR in the March 1991 referendum (St. Petersburg and Yeltsin’s native Sverdlovsk were the two other cities that stood vigorously against the proposal, with almost 50 per cent of voters saying “no” – nearly twice the all-Russian average). The same dynamics had been observed in subsequent presidential and parliamentary voting. Furman compares Moscow, ruled by pro-Western reformers, to the besieged fortress encircled by the highly conservative, Sovietophile forces also represented in the Russian parliament by the brown-red, communist-cum-nationalist majority. He emphasizes that this is rather a social than a geographic divide, inasmuch as capital cities are not only major promoters of modernization but also its main beneficiaries. Peripheries, on the other hand, are its main losers – at least in relative terms, and in popular perception, if not in realty. In 1993, this confrontation culminated in Duma’s attempt to impeach president Yeltsin, who in response decreed the dissolution of the defiant parliament and shelled the rebellious MPs from tanks. This appalling violation of constitution did not evoke much condemnation in Western capitals, besides the habitual expressions of “deep concern.” Yeltsin’s argument that the bloodbath 11 D. Furman [in Russian]: Дмитрий Фурман, “Центры” и “периферии”. Политические системы трех восточно-славянских республик, [in:] “Свободная мысль,” 1998, no. 6, p. 44–56.

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and factual coup d’état were necessary to prevent the revenge of unreformed communists was tacitly accepted and condoned. This gave him free hand to radically change the constitution, greatly extending his presidential power. It may have looked justifiable as long as the president and his team were generally committed to democratic principles, tolerated free media, and pursued liberal market reforms, keeping at bay fundamentally illiberal communist and crypto-fascist forces. But it was obvious even then that any radical change in the president’s office may have put the entire construction at risk insofar as it did not have any effective checks and balances. This is actually what has happened in the next decade, after president Yeltsin retired and passed his authority to the ex-KGB officer and Russia’s prime minister by that time, Vladimir Putin. The “Center” was not conquered by the “periphery,” as Furman had warned and worried, but rather transformed itself into the “periphery” – by gradually appropriating its rhetoric, views, and values. This noticeably discharged the popular appeal of neo-fascists and communists, but did it at the cost of incorporation of their “peripheral” ideologies into the official ideology of the “Center.” Notably, Dmitri Furman applied the same conceptual framework to the analysis of post-Soviet developments in Belarus and Ukraine. In Belarus, in his view, the similar confrontation between the reformist “Center” and conservative “periphery” resulted in the 1994 victory of Alyaksandr Lukashenko in the presidential elections. The incumbent MP and former head of the Soviet collective farm beat, in a free competition, both the rebranded candidate of the former nomenklatura and the candidates of the Belarusian democratic forces. In Furman’s view, the elections epitomized a victory of the patrimonial Sovietophile province over the weak Belarusian “Center,” lacking both civic and ethno-nationalistic resources for an effective electoral mobilization. In Ukraine, the “Center-periphery” confrontation, social in essence, was blurred and softened by the “East-West” confrontation, which was essentially ethno-cultural and interregional. This, on the one hand, weakened the “peripheral” Sovietophiles inasmuch as they were concentrated mostly in the south east but virtually absent in the west. On the other hand, it strengthened the reformist, westernizing “Center” inasmuch as a substantial

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(Western) part of the “periphery” appeared to be its ally rather than its opponent on most crucial issues. And, most importantly, since the East-West confrontation in many cases looked stronger than the paradigmatic Center-periphery confrontation, the capital city acquired the role of mediator between the East and the West – a place where opposite views not only clashed but also were negotiated and mitigated. In the short run, Furman contended, this would make Ukrainian politics highly unstable and volatile, but in the long run, would develop a tradition of compromises and consensual decision-making.

Putin’s rise

utin’s ascendance to power in 1999–2000 did not send immediate shock waves either abroad or in Russia, even though there were some ominous signs that did not bode well for Russia’s future. When in August 1999, President Yeltsin appointed a colorless apparatchik virtually unknown to the general public as acting prime-minister, this did not come as a great surprise. The national economy was in rubbles after the 1998 global financial crisis and country’s default on foreign debt. The president’s health and work abilities deteriorated dramatically, largely because of apparent alcoholism, and a magical cure for all the problems was sought in the persistent re-shuffling of the cabinet. Vladimir Putin appeared to be the fifth prime-minister within fewer than 18 months and was considered initially as just another provisional figure to be scapegoated in due time. Putin himself could have barely boasted great experience in statecraft. His position at the top of the government was fifth in the past three years since he moved to Moscow from St. Petersburg, where he occupied, in 1990-1996, various governmental positions under the democratic Mayor Anatoly Sobchak. That work was tainted by corruption scandals, of which the most resonant was an $80 million “metals-for-food” affair,12 but none of these ended up in court. In 1997, he defended a dissertation in 12 N. Walsh, The man who wasn’t there, [in:] “The Guardian,” 29 February 2004, https:// www.theguardian.com/world/2004/feb/29/russia.features.

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economics that was eventually accused of plagiarism,13 but, again, this evoked no substantive reaction from the official bodies. Whatever professional skills he may have acquired in his numerous jobs, starting from KGB service in the 1970–1980s, he had certainly made and developed important connections in various spheres and gained indispensable insider’s experience of the work of the state apparatus. His one-year service (1998–1999) as the Director of the FSB (Federal Security Service, Russia’s successor to the notorious KGB) probably played the decisive role in his eventual, sudden rise to power. Today, not everybody remembers or can imagine that the Russian political scene, however corrupt and distorted, had been pretty competitive throughout the 1990s, more or less as in today’s Moldova, Ukraine, or the Balkan states. It was a feckless democracy, with weak rule of law but much freedom (though “by default”), where various business clans under the guise of political parties clashed and coalesced in a struggle for power and resources. A person from virtually nowhere, like Vladimir Putin, had little chances of winning a struggle against the seasoned competitors who had been campaigning already to replace the ailing Boris Yeltsin. A miracle had to happen – and it did. In September 1999, a series of powerful explosions occurred in Moscow and a few other cities, targeting apartment buildings in the night time that resulted in a very high death toll. Chechen terrorists from the de-facto independent “Republic of Ichkeria” were immediately accused of these barbarous acts – even though they vehemently denied any involvement (a rather unusual thing for terrorists, who typically emphasize their “authorship” in attacks, as it serves both intimidation purposes and to enhance their symbolical power). On September 23, Putin made his (in-)famous statement on the events that, in an apt observation of a Radio Liberty journalist, “set the tone for the 20 years of rule that followed.”14 “We will pursue them [terrorists] everywhere,” he said, using a criminal slang expression (“будем мочить”). “Excuse me for saying so: We’ll catch them in the toilet. We’ll wipe them out in the outhouse.” The 13 C. Gaddy, It All Boils Down to Plagiarism, [in:] “Washington Profile,” 31 March 2006, http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2006-78-3a.cfm. 14 M. Eckel, Two Decades On, Smoldering Questions About the Russian President’s Vault To Power, [in:] “RFE/RL Headlines,” 7 August 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/putin-russia-president-1999-chechnya-apartment-bombings/30097551.html.

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attacks gave him free hand to resume a genocidal war in Chechnya that had been highly unpopular in Russian society in its first edition, in 1994–1996. It spread panic and fear across the country, but also strengthened his image of a tough KGB guy who was able and willing to “make an order” after Yeltsin’s chaotic and feeble late rule. On December 31, 1999, Boris Yeltsin resigned and named Putin the acting president. Three months later, he easily won the elections in the first round, with 53% of the vote. The September explosions, however advantageous for his unexpected rise, could be seen as sheer contingencies if there were not some other mysterious events that still have not been properly investigated.15 Sergei Kovalyov, a Russian lawmaker and human-rights activist, who headed the independent parliamentary commission that investigated the bombings, is confident that it was a false-flag operation engineered by Russian security agencies. Its primary goal was to justify a new war in Chechnya, and to help bolster Putin’s credibility as a law-and-order leader. “It’s one of Putin’s original sins,” he says meaning that all of Russia’s eventual development was largely determined by that initial conspiracy.16 For most international experts, let alone politicians, the very assumption of such a dreadful political crime looked incredible. Even partial acceptance of this hypothesis would have relegated Russia into the rank of rogue states and its leaders into international pariahs. It would have certainly made all the lofty ideas of “mutually beneficial cooperation” with Moscow untenable, and habitual profiteering on Russian resources and laundered money inexcusable. All the subsequent behavior of the Kremlin regime has rather confirmed than disproved the initial hypothesis in its essence. Yet, it still remains a big problem for international 15 P. Goble, Moscow Won’t Release Reports on 1999 Apartment Bombings that Brought Putin to Power until 2060, [in:] “Window on Eurasia,” 11 March 2020, http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2020/03/moscow-wont-release-reports-on-1999.html. 16 M. Eckel, op. cit. He mentions, inter alia, that the work of the commission was obstructed by the FSB, and three of its members, oppositional MPs, were assassinated: Sergei Yushenkov was shot dead in his apartment, Yury Shchekochikhin poisoned by unknown substance, and Otto Latsis killed in a highly suspicious car accident. The chief investigator of that affair, Mikhail Trepashkin, was arrested and convicted by a military court, behind closed doors, to four years in prison for allegedly revealing state secrets. A prominent Russian journalist, Anna Politkovskaya, who investigated the bombings, was killed in 2006; and а former FSB officer Alexander Litvinenko, who worked with historian Yuri Felshtinsky on the book “Blowing Up Russia” (published in 2002 in New York), was poisoned in London by two FSB operatives.

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policymakers to call a spade a spade, and a rogue state a rogue state. Within a few years after his accession to power, Vladimir Putin took all mass media (except for some marginal outlets) under government control, purged the parliament from any real political opposition (in the 2003 manipulated elections), and got a grip on the defiant oligarchs, sending some into prison, some into exile, and the rest into obedience. The decade-long period of feckless pluralism in Russia ended for good, and a seemingly endless epoch of the dominant party politics was ushered in.17 Having no free press or parliamentary opposition, Putin made next bold steps toward consolidation of his authoritarian rule. In a skillful way of “salami slicing,” he cancelled the direct election of regional governors, drastically curtailed the rights of the “autonomous republics” within the Russian Federation, de facto prohibited public protests and meetings, curbed the activity of NGOs and restricted their international funding, extended the president’s terms from four years to six, and ultimately, in 2020, eliminated the constitutional restrictions on his presidential incumbency, opening the possibility for him to rule Russia for life [Fig. 6.4.]. All these manipulations were accompanied by political assassinations of regime opponents in both Russia and, increasingly, abroad; bullying and blackmail of weaker neighbors; cyber-attacks; interference into electoral process in different countries; military invasion of Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014); and an incessant, extremely toxic propagandistic campaign targeting both domestic and international audiences. The country is increasingly seen in the West as a rogue regime – “an unnatural entity more akin to a criminal enterprise than a nation-state,”18 a government that “operates as a mafia, but with imperial DNA.”19

17 V. Gelman, Out of the Frying Pan, into the Fire? Post-Soviet Regime Changes in Comparative Perspective, [in:] “International Political Science Review,” 2008, vol. 29, no. 2, p. 175–176. 18 M. Kimmage, The Wily Country: Understanding Putin’s Russia, [in:] “Foreign Affairs,” 2020, vol. 99, no. 2, p. 159. 19 A. Jafri, Future of Global Competition & Conflict (GCC) Russia Panel Discussion, NSI Report, June 2019, https://nsiteam.com/smas-future-of-global-competition-conflict-gcc-russia-panel-discussion/.

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Figure 6.4. Vladimir Putin and Dmitri Medvedev. Source: https://durdom.in.ua.

Whitewashing a rogue regime

hese highly critical views of Russia clash with attempts to represent it as a “normal country,” rather typical than exceptional for today’s world, or to interpret Russia’s increasingly

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“abnormal” behavior as a defensive reaction to various Western challenges and provocations. Such arguments come not only from experts and politicians who are openly on the Kremlin payroll – like the German ex-chancellor Gerhardt Schroeder, or numerous populist and far-right parties in Europe,20 or Moscow-funded international think-tanks.21 They come also from experts who whitewash the image of Putin’s Russia in seemingly good faith – either because they neglect or underestimate some crucial aspects of Russia’s behavior, or because they sincerely believe that Russia, whatever it does, still is a lesser evil than the West, in particular the U.S. The first approach can be graphically illustrated by the 2004 Andrei Shleifer’s and Daniel Treisman’s article “A Normal Country,” which compared Putin’s increasingly authoritarian rule not so much with the relatively liberal Yeltsin period but with the definitely totalitarian Soviet regime. This allowed the authors to praise Putin’s Russia for “an extraordinary transformation” within the past two decades – even though the major part of that transformation had occurred before Putin’s accession to power and was accomplished rather against than according to his ulterior will.22 When they come to the specifically Putin’s years at the helm, their assessments become more equivocal: “Russia’s economic and political systems remain far from perfect. But their defects are typical of countries at a similar level of economic development. Russia was in 1990 and is today a middle-income country, comparable to Argentina in 1991 and Mexico in 1999. Almost all democracies in this income range are rough around the edges: their governments suffer from corruption, their judiciaries are politicized, and their press is almost never entirely free. They have high income inequality, concentrated corporate ownership, and turbulent macroeconomic performance. In all these regards, Russia is quite normal. Nor are the common flaws of middle-income 20 See, e. g., Anton Shekhovtsov, Conceptualising Malign Influence of Putin’s Russia in Europe, Free Russia Foundation, Washington, D.C., 2020. 21 See, e. g., Kateryna Smagliy, Hybrid Analytica: Pro-Kremlin Expert Propaganda in Moscow, Europe and the U.S. A Case Study of Think-Tanks and Universities, Institute of Modern Russia, October 2018; https://imrussia.org/images/stories/Reports/Hybrid_Analytica/Smagliy_Hybrid-Analytica_10-2018.pdf. 22 A. Shleifer, D. Treisman, A Normal Country, [in:] Foreign Affairs, 2004, vol. 83, no. 2, p. 20.

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capitalist democracies incompatible with further economic and political progress – if they were, western Europe and the United States would never have left the nineteenth century.”23 (The latter argument is in particular remarkable, since it obscures a fundamental difference between the accumulation of capital in the 19th century and the late 20th. The 19th-century robber barons had little alternative but to invest their money in their own countries, gradually changing their legal systems toward rule of law so that to secure their own investments. The 20th-century barons in both the third and the second worlds do not need it. They funnel money abroad and subsidize Western economies rather than their own; they benefit from the rule of law in Switzerland and the UK, while at home, they benefit primarily from the lawlessness that facilitates their rent-seeking.)24 Putin’s assault on political freedoms and civic liberties [Fig. 6.5.] is similarly dismissed or downplayed: “Certainly, Russia’s political institutions and civic freedoms are imperfect in many ways. And the trend under Putin has been worrying and could deteriorate further. [But] Western condemnations of the country’s institutions in the last ten years have been grossly overblown.” Russia’s politics, as the authors contend, still remains “the most democratic in the region. And defects in the country’s democracy resemble those found in many other middle-income countries.” So, even though “pessimists predict an accelerating slide toward an authoritarian regime that will be managed by security service professionals under the fig leaf of formal democratic procedures,” Shleifer and Treisman firmly side with the optimists who “anticipate increased democratic competition and the emergence of a more vigorous civil society.”25 As time has passed and “pessimists” have been proved right, the notion of Russia’s “normalcy” has become rather untenable. Hence, a new set of pro-Russian arguments has come to the fore, borrowed primarily from the toolkit of “political realists” as they try to justify or downplay the most conspicuous (and menacing) Russian “abnormality” – in international politics. Russia, in their reasoning, is not a revisionist post-imperial state that seeks to 23 Ibidem, p. 22. 24 S. Babones, P. Babcicky, Russia and East-Central Europe in the Modern World-System: A Structural Perspective, Paper presented at the 10th Biennial Conference of the AACaPS, Canberra, 3–4 February 2011. 25 A. Shleifer, D. Treisman, op. cit., p. 37–38.

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Figure 6.5. Political persecutions as “fighting the extremists.” Source: Radio Liberty.

overturn the post-Cold War order but, rather, a defensive power striving to “ensure the universal and consistent application of existing norms”26 and to uphold a status quo that is “undermined by the transformative agenda and military activities of the United States and its allies.”27

26 R. Sakwa, Russia against the rest: The post-Cold War crisis of world order, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017, p. 155. See also his book Frontline Ukraine. Crisis in the Borderlands. Tauris, London, 2015; and its devastating review in T. Kuzio, When an academic ignores inconvenient facts, [in:] “New Eastern Europe,” 21 June 2016, https://neweasterneurope.eu/old_site/articles-and-commentary/books-and-reviews/2035-when-an-academic-ignores-inconvenient-facts. 27 E. Götz, C.-R. Merlen, Russia and the question of world order, [in:] “European Politics and Society,” 2019, vol. 20, no. 2, p. 5, https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2018.154 5181.

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“Leaders in Moscow,” their argument goes, “have long considered the possession of a sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space essential for national security and as a sign of their country’s great-power status. In insisting on the “sovereign choice” of smaller states in post-Soviet Eurasia to choose their military alliances, the West thus undermines Russia’s status and ignores the very real concerns Russia has regarding the world’s most powerful military alliance creeping up to its border.”28 Stubborn Western refusal to accept Moscow’s demands and recognize its “legitimate sphere of interests” is likely to “strengthen the potential for anti-Western nationalism inside Russia,” and, as a pro-Kremlin expert portends (with a hint of blackmail), to “push Putin toward more hawkish and provocative actions with regard to Ukraine or other Eastern European nations.”29 All these arguments, at a closer look, hold little if any water. “Decrypted in full, they imply that Russia is the preeminent country of all of the 15 successor states to come out of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and that the other 14 must defer to Moscow on important matters – in deference to Cold War history, and because Russia is bigger and stronger. Neutrality might just about work, but subservience would be better.” Such a position, as James Nixey comments, has little to do with Russia’s real security concerns but much more with a sheer “displeasure that its former satellites are lost to the Russian World.” But European security and fundamental principles of sovereignty and legitimacy cannot be organized according to Moscow’s whims. “Those who talk about respect for Russia’s interests need to also respect the interests of countries on Russia’s periphery. Interests are not rights.”30 Since 2014, geopolitical concerns have largely superseded domestic issues in expert debates about Russia and its trajectory of development. The main controversy is not so much about the essence of Putin’s regime – increasingly rogue and authoritarian – but about the causes of such a dramatic change and its probable future ramifications. One explanatory line, highly popular in the pro-Moscow camp, draws on the thesis that the Russian 28 Ibidem, p. 8. 29 A. Tsygankov, Vladimir Putin’s last stand: The sources of Russia’s Ukraine policy, [in:] “Post-Soviet Affairs,” 2015, vol. 31, no. 4, p. 299. 30 J. Nixey, The Russia Question: Sovereignty and Legitimacy in Post-Soviet Eurasia, Chatham House, 8 December 2016, https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/russia-question-sovereignty-and-legitimacy-post-soviet-eurasia.

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democratic transition was derailed in the 1990s by ill-advised economic reforms (“shock therapy” and predatory capitalism promoted arguably by the West) and the alleged “isolation” of Russia, which deepened its post-imperial trauma and feeling of humiliation. On the first issue, the counterargument says that shock therapy was not a matter of choice but of necessity, since the country was completely bankrupt, while wild capitalism arose not so much from the “ill-advised” reforms but from their poor implementation, especially in the legal sphere.31 As to the purported “exclusion” and “humiliation,” the reality was the opposite:

Since 1992, or even since the twilight of the Soviet Union, the West has been engaged in Sisyphean labors in its multi-pronged approaches towards Moscow-developing cooperation programs in nearly every possible field, rolling out red carpets, sparing no expense, sending invitations to international institutions (from the Council of Europe to the G-7) whose criteria Russia flaunted, turning a blind eye to the Kremlin’s crimes (e.g., in Chechnya), and pretending to believe in Russian democracy and free market in a desperate search to win over the country, make it a full-fledged, predictable partner, and fit it, as far as possibly feasible, into the post-Cold War international order... To no avail, though.” The West failed to deliver on the major Russia’s desire – to give it free hand in dealing with closest neighbors (seen as vassals) and not to obstruct coercive re-consolidation of its imperial “sphere of influence.32

Under siege

he alternative explanatory line, supported by both the Russian and international critics of Putin’s regime, draws on the mixture of two arguments. One of them, which is agency-based, attributes the failed democratic transition to ill-conceived policies and wrong choices by specific political actors (primarily Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin). The other argument, which is structural, refers to longue-durée factors, primarily to the Soviet totalitarian and Russian imperial legacies that pull 31 The long life of Homo sovieticus, [in:] “Economist,” 10 December 2011, http://www. economist.com/node/21541444. 32 R. Kuźniar, Mearsheimer and the Poverty of His Realism, [in:] “The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs,” 2014, no. 3, p. 141–142.

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Russian society toward the familiar autocracy. Today, as Putin has cemented his autocratic rule and acquired overwhelming support from his subjects, the second (structural) argument increasingly overweighs the first (agency-based) [Fig. 6.6. and 6.7.].

Figure 6.6. Russians’ regret over the Soviet Union’s collapse. Source: Levada Center.

Putinism, as Vladislav Inozemtsev has put it, “has deep roots in Russia’s political traditions and imperial history; in its economic foundations; and in widespread norms and expectations in Russian society... [It] has been also facilitated by Russia’s history as a colonial power. Because Russia was – and still is – an empire, democratic upheaval within its borders threatens to trigger the state’s breakdown and dissolution... Russia feels itself to be a nation that must continuously expand. But a nation that cannot come to terms with its legal boundaries cannot sustain democracy. Instead, it offers ideal ground for fascism and totalitarianism to flourish.”33 Russia’s failed democratic transition can be largely interpreted as a failure to construct a modern nation-state out of the empire, and to forge a civic national identity instead of the outdated imperial identity, conductive to anti-modern values and anti-Western attitudes. The persistent inability to get rid of its imperial “self” hampers Russia’s development in two crucial ways. First, the imperial type of identity feeds overblown great-power 33 V. Inozemtsev, The Kremlin Emboldened: Why Putinism Arose, [in:] “Journal of Democracy,” 2017, vol. 28, no. 4, p. 80, 83, DOI: 10.1353/jod.2017.0068.

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Figure 6.7. Reasons for Soviet nostalgia. Source: Levada Center.

ambitions and supports the false view of international politics as a “zero-sum” game, in the obsolete categories of 19th-century geopolitics. It detracts attention from important domestic issues to less relevant (if at all) international concerns, and depletes scarce national resources for irrational policies of presumably high symbolic but of little if any real significance (the 2014 Anschluss of Crimea might be a graphic example). And secondly, the imperial mindset alienates the nation from the outside world, primarily from the West, seen as enemy; it supports the paranoid feeling of the “besieged fortress” and prevents effective cooperation with advanced Western countries indispensable for a fully fledged modernization [Fig. 6.8.]. As Vladislav Inozemtsev concludes, “modern Russia’s imperial nature renders it a revisionist power that seeks to enlarge its territory by any means and to attract additional client states... Every additional year of the imperial revival aggravates the problems Russia does face and contributes to its overall demodernization... So long as Russia’s identity remains imperial, the West will be compelled to find ways to live alongside this defeated

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Figure 6.8. Russians’ pride and shame. Source: Levada Center.

superpower, which never truly became a modern state and presumably will not for decades to come.”34 In sum, “Putin’s Russia looks like a belch of communism and imperialism in a world lukewarm to both; it’s something built ‘from the top’ that is passively supported by the people rather than pushed forward by them. So the main task of the Western powers consists not in trying to undermine or destroy the current Russian regime, but simply to outlive it.”35 34 A. Abalov, V. Inozemtsev, Russia: The Everlasting Empire? [in:] “Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs,” 2019, vol. 13, no. 3, p. 335, https://doi.org/10.1080/23739770.2019.17150 55. 35 V. Inozemtsev, Putin’s Russia: A Moderate Fascist State, [in:] “American Interest,” 2017, vol. 12, no. 4, https://www.the-american-interest.com/2017/01/23/putins-russia-amoderate-fascist-state/.

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Chapter readings Abalov A., Inozemtsev V., Russia: The Everlasting Empire? [in:] “Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs,” 2019, vol. 13, no. 3. Aron L., Yeltsin: A Revolutionary Life, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 2000. D’Anieri P., Ukraine and Russia: From Civilized Divorce to Uncivil War, Cambridge University Press, 2019. Eckel M., Two Decades On, Smoldering Questions About the Russian President’s Vault To Power, [in:] “RFE/RL Headlines,” 7 August 2019. Furman D. [in Russian]: Дмитрий Фурман, “Центры” и “периферии”. Политические системы трех восточно-славянских республик, [in:] “Свободная мысль,” 1998, no. 6. Gelman V., Out of the Frying Pan, into the Fire? Post-Soviet Regime Changes in Comparative Perspective, [in:] “International Political Science Review,” 2008, vol. 29, no. 2. Goble P., Gorbachev and the Soviet Nationality Problem, [in:] Friedberg M., Isham H. (eds.), Soviet Society under Gorbachev, M. E. Sharpe, Armonk, NY, 1987. Goble P., Moscow Won’t Release Reports on 1999 Apartment Bombings that Brought Putin to Power until 2060, [in:] “Window on Eurasia,” 11 March 2020. Götz E., Merlen C.-R., Russia and the question of world order, [in:] “European Politics and Society,” 2019, vol. 20, no. 2. Greenfeld L., Nationalism. Five Roads to Modernity, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1992. Inozemtsev V., The Kremlin Emboldened: Why Putinism Arose, [in:] “Journal of Democracy,” 2017, vol. 28, no. 4. Inozemtsev V., Putin’s Russia: A Moderate Fascist State, [in:] “American Interest,” 2017, vol. 12, no. 4. Kimmage M., The Wily Country: Understanding Putin’s Russia, [in:] “Foreign Affairs,” 2020, vol. 99, no. 2. Kuzio T., When an academic ignores inconvenient facts, [in:] “New Eastern Europe,” 21 June 2016. Kuźniar R., Mearsheimer and the Poverty of His Realism, [in:] “The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs,” 2014, no. 3. Motyl A., The Surrealism of Realism. Reading the War in Ukraine, [in:] “Foreign Affairs” 2014, vol. 94, no. 1. Nixey J., The Russia Question: Sovereignty and Legitimacy in Post-Soviet Eurasia, Chatham House, 8 December 2016. Rubtsov A. [in Russian]: Александр Рубцов, Неототалитаризм, [in:] “Московские новости,” 10 November 1999. Rutland P., Putin’s Path to Power, [in:] “Post-Soviet Affairs,” 2000, vol. 16, no. 4, p. 313–354.

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Shekhovtsov A., Conceptualising Malign Influence of Putin’s Russia in Europe, Free Russia Foundation, Washington, D.C., 2020. Shleifer A., Treisman D., A Normal Country, [in:] “Foreign Affairs,” 2004, vol. 83, no. 2. Smagliy K., Hybrid Analytica: Pro-Kremlin Expert Propaganda in Moscow, Europe and the U.S. A Case Study of Think-Tanks and Universities, Institute of Modern Russia, Research Paper, October 2018. Szporluk R., Russia, Ukraine, and the Breakup of the Soviet Union, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2000. Tolz V., Forging the Nation: National Identity and Nation Building in Post-Communist Russia, [in:] “Europe-Asia Studies,” 1998, vol. 50, no. 6. Walsh N., The man who wasn’t there, [in:] “The Guardian,” 29 February 2004. Yaffa J., Between Two Fires: Truth, Ambition, and Compromise in Putin’s Russia, Tim Duggan Books, New York, 2020.

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Chapter 7 The Future of Europe, the Future of Democracy

hree decades of post-communist transformation brought rather mixed results in both the European and the Asian parts of the former Soviet empire. Of the 29 states that can be defined as post-communist, six are qualified today as “consolidated democracies,” four as “unconsolidated democracies,” ten as “hybrid regimes,” two as “unconsolidated autocracies,” and seven as “consolidated autocracies,” according to the Freedom House 2020 Democracy Score [Fig. 4.5.].1 Economically, they also performed very differently. While the leaders (Slovenia and Czech Republic) reached a level of GDP per capita close to the EU average (over $40,000 in purchasing power parity – PPP), the laggards (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) stood with the GDP (PPP) per capita at about $4,000. Notably, it was the economic field where the differences between the post-communist leaders and laggards increased gradually, following the period of a rather similar economic decline [Fig. 7.1.]. In the political field, gradualism played a minor role: most of the post-communist states occupied their new positions on the Freedom House list very fast and stood with their democracy scores rather steadily, with only minor shifts up and/or down [Fig. 4.1.]. The political and economic reforms are believed to reinforce each other, and democracy is usually seen as more favorable for economic growth than autocracy. The correlation, however, does not mean causation. There are many more factors that facilitate (or impede) economic development – like a country’s richness in natural resources, primarily gas and oil, or political stability and the absence of serious domestic and international 1 Z. Csaky, Dropping the Democratic Façade, [in:] “Nations in Transit 2020,” Freedom House, Washington, D.C., 2020, p. 12.

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Figure 7.1. Income growth in post-communist states and other regions. Source: WEO.

conflicts that may scare both international and domestic investors. This largely explains why stable authoritarian regimes like those in Russia or Belarus perform better than feckless democracies like Moldova or Ukraine [Fig. 7.2.]. Skilled and cheap labor (abound under communism) may ensure the transition of authoritarian states from the low to the middle income level. But it becomes insufficient at the second stage – when the country strives to jump from the middle to the high income level.2 Growth at this stage is based on “productivity improvements coming from innovation and entrepreneurship, development of technology-based products and services, a more sophisticated economic model that relies to a very large extent on 2 S. Babones, P. Babcicky, Russia and East-Central Europe in the Modern World-System: A Structural Perspective, Paper presented at the 10th Biennial Conference of the Australasian Association for Communist and Post-Communist Studies (AACaPS) in Canberra, 3–4 February 2011, https://ses.library.usyd.edu.au/bitstream/handle/2123/8065/ Russia-and-East-Central-Europe-in-the-modern-world-system.pdf [accessed on 15.08.2020].

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Figure 7.2. GDP per capita growth in post-communist states. Source: World Bank.

the quality of economic and political institutions.”3 Authoritarian states might be good, even perfect in imitation, but hardly so in creativity and innovation, in producing and fostering the breakthrough ideas. They may reach the middle income level like Russia or Turkey, but they can barely move further on without robust democracy. Scholars may wonder reasonably, like George Lawson, “whether capitalism thrives best under authoritarian or democratic forms of governance,” and may cite “some of the most rapid periods of growth – and the most unyielding forms of capitalism – that have occurred in authoritarian states” – like in China, Russia, or South Korea.4 But the latter case appears indicative in its own way: South Korea is the only country on Lawson’s list that has eventually reached the high income level, and did it exactly because of profound democratization. This can hardly be said about the “soft dictatorships” of China and Russia. They seem 3 B. Javorcik, Central Europe must return to the path of reforms, [in:] “EBRD News,” 8 November 2019, https://www.ebrd.com/news/2019/central-europe-must-return-tothe-path-of-reforms.html. 4 G. Lawson, Introduction: The “What,” “When” and “Where” of the Global 1989, [in:] G. Lawson, C. Armbruster, M. Cox (eds.), The Global 1989: Continuity and Change in World Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010, p. 12–13.

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apparently stuck at the middle income level and are very unlikely to break through economically without liberalizing politically.

Path-dependence versus path-defiance

n the political realm, structural factors, primarily cultural-cum-historical path-dependence, look more conspicuous and decisive than in the field of economy – at least as far as the post-communist states are concerned.5 Pre-communist legacies largely explain why the Baltic and Central East European states occupied, from the very beginning, an impressively high position of “unconsolidated democracies” in the Freedom House democracy ratings and quickly enhanced it to the level of “consolidated democracies,” staying there steadily for a few decades more. It also makes clear why the new states in the post-Soviet Asia remained, at best, at the level of “unconsolidated authoritarianism,” inherited from and secured by the Gorbachev perestroika. This also sheds light on the most complicated and controversial case of the post-communist nations in the Balkans and the European part of the former Soviet Union – which occupied the middle-level position of “hybrid regimes” before parting ways, in different directions, largely under external influences [Fig. 2.5.] The main advantage of the Central East European nations was a higher level of Westernization, achieved throughout history and not completely eradicated by Soviet, profoundly anti-Western communism. This meant a deeper penetration of Western political practices and institutions, stronger formal and informal ties with the West, a higher level of economic development, and a more robust civil society. Little surprise, then, that the communist system encountered the strongest resistance in these very states (as well as in Romanian Transylvania and Ukrainian Galicia – the regions west of the Huntingtonian fault-line [Fig. 1.7.]); and the earliest, most active, and best organized attempts at emancipation from the Soviet empire and the communist ideocracy occurred in these very lands. It was exactly these states where the democratic opposition appeared strong enough to completely (and peacefully) remove 5 G. Ekiert, D. Ziblatt, Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe One Hundred Years On, [in:] “East European Politics and Societies and Cultures,” 2013, vol. 27, no. 1, p. 90–97.

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the ruling communist elite from power – a success that was largely facilitated by the extremely low legitimacy and little support of that elite in society. And, most importantly, in those states, the victorious democrats managed to radically dismantle the old system and introduce the new rules of game, so that no regime change (including, in some cases, the return of the old politicians and rebranded communist parties) could seriously harm democratic institutions and the rule of law. Further south and east, the scale and scope of (pre-Soviet) Westernization was substantially lower (or, as in Central Asia, almost negligible); popular civic resistance to the communist rule was much weaker, meaning regimes could afford being tougher; and mass support for the new-born democratic opposition was not sufficient to bring them to power by the end of perestroika and completely replace the ancien régime. No regime changes occurred after the Soviet collapse in Central Asia, where the local rulers merely jettisoned the redundant communist ideology but retained all the old institutions, cadres, and practices under new names. And very mixed and ambiguous changes occurred in the Balkans and western (post-)Soviet republics, where the nascent democratic opposition appeared to be strong enough to challenge the ruling nomenklatura, but not strong enough to replace it in power and radically reform institutions. In most cases, they pacted with the ancien régime, were co-opted into the power structures as junior partners, and played a rather dubious role in partial reforms, in democratizing and nationalizing the post-communist state at the cost of legitimizing the ancien régime as allegedly “new” and “democratic.” Ultimately, as the old-new regimes got stronger domestically and more legitimate and self-confident internationally, their junior democratic partners became dispensable. This marked an apparent turn to familiar authoritarian practices nearly everywhere in the former Soviet Union – in Georgia (1992), Azerbaijan (1993), Belarus (1994), and Russia (2000), as well as less successful but persistent attempts to squeeze out democracy in Ukraine and Moldova. The same was likely to happen in the Balkans, were the authoritarian tendencies not tamed by a strong Western influence, primarily by the EU but also, specifically in the Western Balkans, by NATO.

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From the very beginning, the West treated the “Soviet” and non-Soviet post-communist states very differently. While the latter were considered undoubtedly “European” and sovereign, eligible for the eventual membership in the EU and NATO, depending exclusively on their ability to meet the required criteria, the latter were removed into a nebulous “Eurasian” space – fully in line with the infamous “Philosophical Geography,” and treated implicitly as a legitimate part of the Russian “sphere of influence.” No criteria were applicable, since the membership prospects were not on the agenda, and no incentives and guidance and guardianship for reforms were provided. This might be the main reason for the emergence of the developmental gap between the Balkan states and western “post-Soviet” republics that have otherwise been very similar in most terms. Experts rarely juxtapose these two groups, which still have quite proximate social, political, and economic indices. Even less willingly do they compare these nations’ positions in the early ’90s, when the Balkan states lagged actually behind Belarus, Russia, Ukraine and even Moldova in most social, political, and economic indices. As a rule, the experts compare today’s stagnant “New Eastern Europe” with much more advanced nations of Central Europe and the Baltics that occupied higher rankings from the very beginning and greatly benefitted from the EU accession track and, ultimately, membership. The comparison seems to be preferable, as it conveniently justifies the exclusion of the post-Soviet group from the European project and, as any circular argument, ultimately turns into a self-fulfilling prophecy. The Balkan nations, within this civilizational teleology, were assumed “European,” hence properly assisted, and hence proved “European”; while the western post-Soviet republics were, conversely, assumed “non-European,” hence left in the cold, and hence, predictably, proved “non-European.” Once again, since 1945, “Philosophic Geography” facilitated the new division of Europe, providing geopolitical “realists” with a ready-made set of quasi-historical narratives and ideologically warped arguments. It not only habitually redefined Russia as Europe’s significant “Other” (this presumably coincided with

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Russians’ own view of Europe and of themselves),6 but also tacitly recognized all the post-Soviet republics (except for the Baltic states) a legitimate sphere of Russian “privileged interests.” Most of them were not very happy with this new Yalta-style settlement, and some objected the newly acquired role of Russia’s “backyard” quite vociferously.

East goes West

T EU membership

he main troublemakers were Ukrainians and Moldovans, and eventually Georgians, who cited their European belonging and claimed their right to be treated on par with all other post-communist states of Europe – eligible, as sovereign nations, for membership in any international organization of their choice, insofar as they meet the established membership criteria. The European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization were the most attractive for all, as they epitomized East Europeans’ awe-inspiring dreams of prosperity and security. There was also a symbolic aspect of the coveted membership: it certified the successful transition and enhanced the international status of each new member. Predictably, most of the post-communist states lined up for membership, even though neither NATO nor the EU were eager to embrace the newcomers. The EU was reluctant for obvious economic reasons: the East European states were three to four times poorer than the average EU members [Fig. 7.3.], and required major financial assistance and institutional guidance. The criteria the EU membership were outlined in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty and detailed eventually in the 1993 Copenhagen declaration (hence the “Copenhagen criteria”). The documents stated that any European country that respected the principles of the EU and met specified political, economic, and legal requirements may apply to join [Fig. 7.4.]. Any aspiring candidate must be a full-fledged democracy with a firm rule of law and a functional market economy. It must also accept the so-called acquis communautaire, i.e., to bring its national laws into line with the body of European law built up over the history of the Union 6 I. Neumann, Russia as Europe’s Other, Paper presented to the Second Pan-European Conference in International Relations, Paris, 13–16 September 1995, https://core.ac.uk/ reader/6538476.

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Figure 7.3. GDP per capita and gross wages in Central and East Europe. Source: WIIW.

Figure 7.4. Enlargements of the EU, 1958–2013. Source: EU.

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and enshrined in thousands of documents. Eventually, the EU specified that any new membership is contingent on its “absorption capacity,” i.e., the ability of the Union to adopt and accommodate a new member. Also, fully in line with “Philosophical Geography,” it spelled out that countries’ classification as “European” is “subject to political assessment.” This allowed to arbitrarily relegate Ukraine and Moldova into an obscure “Eurasian” space, and define them in all EU documents euphemistically as the “partner states” or “neighboring states,” but never as “European.” In 1994–1995, the EU signed Association Agreements with Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria; four years later, it signed similar documents with Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia. All these agreements stipulated eventual EU membership for the signatories. In 2004, eight post-communist states ascended into the EU within the so-called “big-bang enlargement” (two more applicants, Cyprus and Malta, from the “non-communist” part of Europe, were added to the group, while Romanian and Bulgarian accession was postponed until 2007). At the end of the 1990s, the EU (alongside NATO) contributed to peace-building in the war-torn Balkans by offering to all the post-Yugoslav nations an attractive carrot (in addition to NATO’s sticks) in the form of Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAA). Besides the promises of substantial financial and technical assistance, they explicitly included also provisions for the future EU membership of the partner states. In 2013, Croatia ascended into the EU, while all the other Balkan states (except for Kosovo and Bosnia & Herzegovina) were officially recognized as candidates for membership. The road to NATO appeared bumpier at the beginning but easier at the end. NATO’s reluctance to accept new members from the former communist bloc sprang not so much from financial-cum-economic concerns as from some political and diplomatic hurdles. Yeltsin’s Russia was seen at the time as a fledgling democracy, rather friendly and predisposed to the West, so nobody wished to alienate Moscow and provide additional propagandistic trump cards to anti-Yeltsin, rabidly anti-Western opposition. There was also the problem of a few hundred Soviet troops still stationing in Eastern Europe, and the delicate issue of promises allegedly given by Western leaders to Gorbachev: not to expand the alliance further east. It was presumably a precondition for the

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German reunification in 1991, even though Soviet insolvency and German money played, in all evidence, far greater role. According to Tony Judt: Gorbachev tried at first to hold the unification negotiations hostage for a ransom of $20 billion, before finally settling for approximately $8 billion, together with some $2 billion more in interest-free credits. Overall, from 1990 through 1994, Bonn transferred to the Soviet Union (and latterly Russia) the equivalent of $71 billion (with a further $36 billion going to the former Communist states of Eastern Europe).7

The promise was rather informal and could not be formalized anyway, since it would have clearly contradicted the letter and spirit of the North Atlantic Charter. Nonetheless, it was quite a challenge for East Europeans to persuade Western leaders that they had a sovereign right to join any alliance of their choice, contingent only on their ability to meet the established criteria. To sweeten the pill for Russians who may have felt themselves abandoned and isolated, Western partners invited them to the prestigious club of the top world leaders, G-7, in 1994, and turned it into G-8 by 1998. The same year, the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council was established as both a practical tool for further cooperation and a symbolical gesture to appease the Kremlin. In March 1999, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic were admitted to NATO, heralding the way to further accession of the East European states to the Alliance. As of today, all of them, except for Serbia, Kosovo and Bosnia & Herzegovina, are NATO members (Bosnia is on the accession track, officially working on the Membership Action Plan). The situation is much more complicated in the post-Soviet space, where only two states – Ukraine and Georgia – explicitly expressed their desire to join NATO and applied, in 2008, for the Membership Action Plan. The application was rejected under the contrived pretext of the insufficient preparedness of both countries for such a move, even though the preparedness had been normally seen as the ultimate goal of the Action Plan rather than its precondition. The real reason for the rejection, as was unofficially recognized by Western diplomats, was an unwillingness to “irritate” Moscow that pursued, under Vladimir Putin, increasingly hegemonic politics in its neighborhood. 7 T. Judt, Postwar. A History of Europe Since 1945, Penguin Press, London, 2005, p. 642.

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The abstinence did not help. Later that year, Russia invaded Georgia after provoking a military conflict in its breakaway region of South Ossetia, and rapidly occupied a substantial part of the Georgian territory. As no international sanctions followed, Moscow perceived it as a green light for further expansion. In 2014, it employed the similar tactics in the Ukrainian regions of Crimea and Donbas. Thus, the NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine was effectively removed from the Alliance agenda, even though officially, the door remains open for both countries, and NATO continues cooperation with them within multiple partnership programs. EU policy vis-à-vis the post-Soviet states was rather similar to that of NATO. None of them have been ever considered as a prospective candidate for membership in the however remote future, and all the official rhetoric has been carefully crafted to avoid any hints at such a possibility. In the meantime, three post-Soviet republics – Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova – insisted on their right to join the Union after completing the due preparation work and fulfilling, at some point, the membership requirements. They demanded a clear recognition from the EU of such a right that was not tantamount to any “promise” but would have rather reiterated Article 49 of the EU Charter. Avoidance of doing this was condemned as duplicity and cynical collusion with Putin’s regime for sheer economic gains. However understandable these grievances are, and however justifiable the complaints, the real story is more complex. On the one side, the “Philosophical Geography” had certainly played a role in this case inasmuch as all the Soviet republics remained largely invisible to the outside world. All of them had been non-entities, “nowhere nations,” “unwanted step-children of Gorbachev’s perestroika,” as Western mass-media often described them at the time. For years and centuries, most of them were subsumed discursively under the notion of a single and monolithic “Russia.”8 On the other side, they contributed to the widespread confusion themselves when they agreed to join the Commonwealth of the Independent States – an ill-conceived and poorly defined 8 See, e.g., J. Matlock, The Nowhere Nation, [in:] “New York Review of Books,” 24 February 2000, A. Wilson, The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2002; N. Diuk, A. Karatnycky, The Hidden Nations: The People Challenge the Soviet Union, William Morrow, New York, 1990.

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entity that had been broadly perceived at the time as a form of “new” Soviet Union. The West strongly supported Mikhail Gorbachev and was definitely against the dissolution of the Soviet Union for many reasons, including the nuclear proliferation concerns. To make bad things worse, Ukraine and other post-Soviet states did little to counter the rather negative image they had gotten after splitting from the presumably “democratic” Russia and thereby proving their arguably conservative, crypto-communist, anti-reformist characters. (Yeltsin’s “democrats” were just happy to describe the post-Soviet “separatists” and “nationalists” exactly in this way – as retrogrades who were so scared by the democracy thriving in Moscow that they had decided to find refuge in their ethnic fiefdoms.) Even though Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia remained the most democratic parts of the former Soviet Union, their democracy was too shallow, institutions too weak, and reforms too incoherent to persuade Brussels that they could be considered seriously as prospective members of the European family. Their recurrent arguments that the Balkan states did not perform any better in any field – either in economy, or rule of law, or quality of democracy – did not work for a simple reason. They could not afford to be merely on par with the Balkan states; they should have performed much better than them, better probably even than the really advanced post-communist states of Central-East Europe. It was the only way to overcome the deeply entrenched bias the West had had toward their “European” credentials, and to challenge its traditional “Russia first” policy. They had to prove they could be rather an asset than a liability for the EU. As long as Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia fail to do this, they are very unlikely to be embraced by the Union only because they are arguably “not worse” than Bulgaria, Kosovo, or Bosnia & Herzegovina. They may feel it unjust, but international politics is rarely about justice. In most cases, it is about interests. With all the respect to professed democratic values and international obligations, politicians are responsible first and foremost to their own citizens, and therefore must persistently seek a delicate balance between noble values and mundane interests, and to manage a difficult trade-off that depends on too many variables.

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Eastern partnership

o the EU’s credit, one must admit that it tried to engage the East European states in various cooperation programs since the very moment of their opening, i.e., the removal of political-cum-ideological barriers for closer relations. All of the post-communist states were invited to sign either Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) with the EU, or much deeper and more comprehensive Europe Association Agreements (EEA) that envisioned and guided the partner states toward EU membership. In 2003, on the eve of the “big-bang enlargement,” the European Commission published the “Wider Europe” Communication in an attempt to outline a more coherent and holistic approach to all the neighbors of the EU that were not considered as potential candidates to the Union in any foreseeable future [Fig. 7.5].9 It eventuated into a detailed European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) with the stated goal to avoid the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbors and to strengthen instead the prosperity, stability, and security in the continent and its vicinities. The ENP programs were offered to all the neighbors but conditioned on their respect to the values of democracy, rule of law and human rights. The key areas of cooperation identified in the ENP were the improvement of governance, economic development, security, and migration and mobility. Specific programs had to be tailored separately for each country, depending on its practical needs and implementation capacity. The detailed Action Plans, with clear timetables and benchmarks, had to be negotiated and agreed on with the partners. In many terms, the ENP was an apparent improvement over the PCA and the Common Strategy, which have long been criticized as being too static and having no potential to evolve and intensify. The ENP envisaged that “in return for concrete progress demonstrating shared values and effective implementation of political, economic and institutional reforms, including aligning legislation with the acquis, the EU’s neighborhood should benefit from the prospect of closer economic integration with the EU. 9 European Commission, Wider Europe Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours, COM(2003) 104 final, Brussels, 11 March 2003, http://europa.eu.int/comm/world/enp/pdf/com03_104_en.pdf.

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Figure 7.5. Eastern Neighborhood Policy. Source: EU.

Specifically, all the neighboring countries should be offered the prospect of a stake in the EU’s Internal Market and further integration and liberalization to promote the free movement of persons, goods, services and capitals (four freedoms). If a country has reached this level, it has come as close to the Union as it can be without being a member.”10 A great number of ENP measures, if coherently implemented and properly incentivized, were to help the neighboring countries become “more than partners but less

10 Ibidem. Notably, the clause on the “free movement of persons” has eventually disappeared from the final version of ENP, see: European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy: Strategy Paper, Communication from the Commission, COM(2004) 373 final, Brussels, 12 May 2004, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/ near/files/2004_communication_from_the_commission_-_european_neighbourhood_ policy_-_strategy_paper.pdf.

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than members” and share with the EU members “everything but institutions.” The document did not evoke, however, much enthusiasm among either the southern or the western neighbors. For the “southerners,” i.e., the mostly authoritarian states of North Africa and the Middle East, the democratizing conditionality of the ENP programs was by and large unpalatable. For the “easterners,” i.e., for the new independent states in the western part of the former Soviet Union, the very fact that the ENP placed them in one bag with the countries of North Africa and the Middle East was perceived as a perfidious attempt to exclude them from the European project, undermine their European identity, and implicitly push them off into the “Eurasian” space claimed by Russia.11 Overall, Ukrainians objected the ENP not so much for its substantive flaws as for conceptual duplicity. First, they argued, the notion of “integration not accession,” which laid at the heart of the “Wider Europe” Communication, failed to take into account the differing positions on EU membership of the four western CIS states, and treated them all uniformly as if they shared Russia’s objective of non-membership. And secondly, the application of the “Mediterranean” rather than “Balkan” model of integration to the Western New Independent States was broadly perceived as evidence of the notorious EU double standards. Rather than to promote inclusion of the western post-Soviet republics in “Europe,” the document effectively institutionalized their exclusion.12 The ENP also evoked much criticism within the EU, being dubbed as a product of “enlightened self-interest” that professes the engagement of eastern and southern neighbors but in fact cares much more about their containment. All the neighbors, the critics maintained, are seen primarily as “soft threats” – sources of illegal migration and refugees, arms and drug trafficking, illicit trade and organized crime, potential ecological catastrophes, inter-ethnic conflicts, and epidemic diseases. The ENP, as a Romanian expert sarcastically remarked, was not so much about 11 O. Sushko, Viva Enlargement! Celebration with a Bitter Taste, [in:] “Ukrainian Monitor,” June 2004, www.foreignpolicy.org.ua/eng/topic/index.shtml?id=3049. 12 T. Kuzio, EU and Ukraine: A Turning Point in 2004? Occasional Paper no. 47, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2003, p. 20–21.

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cooperation as about the management of the “new wall that separated Europe from the ‘desert of the Tatars’ to its east.”13 “Enlightened self-interest,” however, wisely implies that a new Iron Curtain is not a solution – for both normative (ethical and political) and practical reasons: as long as a huge difference exists in the quality of life on the two sides of the border, there will always be enormous pressure from the “Rest” to penetrate into the “West.” In the modern world, where security threats have been globalized, firm borders tend to be increasingly less effective against such challenges.14 The European Neighborhood Policy therefore tries to reasonably combine both approaches, containment and engagement, and apply two interconnected strategies: (a) the direct encountering and containment of “soft threats” emanating from the “European neighborhood’; and (b) the diminishment of these threats by bridging the economic, political, and cultural gap between the prosperous and democratic EU member states and their impoverished and authoritarian “neighbors.” While the EU tends to prioritize the first strategy, the neighboring countries are obviously more interested in the second. The discrepancy is settled or at least cushioned by negotiations over the action plans, the main instruments of the ENP prepared by the EU for each neighboring country. For obvious reasons, they reflect the interests of the stronger partner much more and pay, generally, more attention to the symptoms of the progressing disease (cross-border crime and other “soft threats”) than to its causes (the political, cultural, and economic exclusion of the neighboring countries, let alone the structural mechanisms of global inequality). By 2009, the European Union elaborated a more specific Eastern dimension of the European Neighborhood Policy and officially inaugurated it as the Eastern Partnership (EaP) initiative. Promoted primarily by Poland and Sweden, it was conceived as a complementary program to the Union for the Mediterranean that was lobbied within the ENP by the southern members of the EU. That allowed the decoupling of the EU eastern neighbors from the North African and Middle East countries, and to thereby 13 A. Mungiu-Pippidi, Beyond the New Borders, [in:] “Journal of Democracy,” 2004, vol. 15, no. 1, p. 53. 14 J. Zielonka, Challenges of EU Enlargement, [in:] “Journal of Democracy,” 2004, vol. 15, no. 1, p. 29.

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Figure 7.6. Countries of Eastern partnership. Source: EU.

recognize not only their very different cultural and historical backgrounds, but also their quite different contemporary political and economic realities, and, implicitly, their different plans and capabilities for eventual EU membership. The EaP not only envisioned a closer cooperation with six post-Soviet republics – Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan [Fig. 7.6.] – but also invited them to sign Association Agreements with the EU that contained a very important free trade component, which largely resembled the EU Stabilization and Association Agreements with the West Balkan states (without, however, explicit references to prospective EU membership). In 2013-2014, Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia signed the agreements, and by 2016, the documents were ratified by all of the EU members. Of the other three post-Soviet states that were eligible to participate in the EaP programs, only Armenia was actively engaged, and it even negotiated an Association Agreement with the EU. In 2013, however, it succumbed to Russian pressure (actually blackmail) and terminated the talks. A softer version of the EU-Armenia Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) was signed instead, in 2017. Belarus and Azerbaijan had been severely criticized in the EU for systemic human rights violations and therefore effectively excluded from most EU programs. Cooperation with Belarus

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was postponed officially in 2009; cooperation with Azerbaijan is maintained at a very low level. As for relations with Russia, they were guided by separate documents, since Moscow refused to be on par with other ENP participants and demanded exclusive, privileged treatment. The cooperation was framed in the so-called four European Union-Russia Common Spaces and handled under the 2011 agreement on EU-Russia strategic partnership. In 2015, it was frozen in response to Russian aggression against Ukraine. Russian-EU relations have deteriorated markedly within the past two decades, since Vladimir Putin’s accession to power, and in 2014 lapsed into what some observers characterize as a “new cold war.” The explanations of this downturn vary, depending on authors’ ideological orientations. Some treat it as a revival of Russian intrinsic imperialism (briefly suppressed but never eradicated under Boris Yeltsin); others interpret it as a response to alleged “humiliation” and Western arrogance. We discussed both interpretations in the Chapter 6, arguing that hegemonic, imperial, great-power feelings have not been extinguished in post-communist Russia, and a deep identity crisis still is haunting the nation. We also argued that both “arrogance” and “humiliation” are rather imaginary, partly induced by political propaganda and partly resulting from a persistent failure to modernize the country and render its capacities congruent with its inflated global ambitions. The fact that the feelings are largely imaginary does not make them less real (and painful) for those who experience them. Inferiority complexes and anti-Western resentments, unscrupulously manipulated by Putin’s elite, make the Russian world-view increasingly Manichean and conspiratorial, and Russian international politics become more and more confrontational and paranoid. Within this ideological setting, Eastern Europe is seen by Moscow as a battlefield, a sphere of incompatible Western and Russian “interests,” where only a zero-sum game is possible, and where any alleged advance of the West is perceived eschatologically as a further “encirclement” of Russia. Being unable to compete with the West in all things modern, Russia turns out to things “traditional” (if not overtly retrograde) as presumably of a higher spiritual value vis-à-vis the “decaying” West. And failing to attract other nations with its soft power (as the West successfully does),

Russian-EU relations

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takeover of Crimea

Russia employs harsh power to bully its neighbors and spoil global affairs. At the end of 2013, Russia overplayed its hand by forcing Ukrainian government to abandon the long-negotiated Association Agreement with the EU shortly before its signing. This provoked mass civic protests in Kyiv and other cities, aimed at the defense of not only the scrapped Agreement but also of the “European values” it arguably epitomized. The protests soon evolved into a revolution against the corrupt and incompetent government and, as a Western observer remarked with astonishment, it was the first and, so far, the only revolution in the world carried out under the flags of the European Union. Putin’s decision to intervene militarily at the end of February 2014 was one of his greatest mistakes, and which has brought grim results – primarily for Ukraine but also for Russia and the whole European and global order. He overstepped too many red lines and violated too many agreements, including the 1975 Helsinki Act, the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, and the 1997 Russia-Ukraine Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation (all of them stipulated the inviolability of the existing borders). Unlike many past violations of international rules that Moscow passed with impunity, this appeared to be the last straw that made the international community react and impose moderate but tangible sanctions. After the successful takeover of Crimea, Russian operatives and mercenaries advanced in Ukraine’s south east but were pushed back by Ukraine’s revivified army and volunteer battalions. A few months later, at the end of August 2014, Moscow had to deploy the regular troops to rescue phony “separatists” from full encirclement and ultimate defeat. The proxy Russo-Ukrainian war dragged into low-intensity fighting over the 400-kilometers-long tranches across the Donbas region. It resulted in 13,000 civilians and 2,000 Ukrainian troops killed, one and a half million people internally displaced, and enormous financial and material loses incurred. Peace talks were initiated in Minsk in 2014, under French and German mediation, but failed to bring any settlement and are very unlikely to succeed as long as Russia denies that it is a part of the conflict and insists on Ukraine’s direct negotiations with its Donbas puppet “governments.”

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To understand Putin’s position, one should keep in mind that Ukrainians and Russians, in his view, are “one people,” and Ukraine “is not even a country” (as he blatantly put it in 2008 at the NATO summit) but а historical error; Ukraine, in his mindset, cannot enjoy any sovereignty just because it belongs primordially to the Russian “sphere of influence” and self-entitled “privileged interests.” Consequently, as a British expert aptly remarks, the Minsk Accords for Putin are nothing but a tool “to break Ukraine’s sovereignty.” Western governments should therefore draw two conclusions: “First, they should understand “Minsk implementation” as the unequivocal defense of Ukraine’s sovereignty – meaning implementation of Ukraine’s interpretation of the Minsk Agreements... Second, such a stance would entail a longterm stand-off with Russia over Ukraine. This would last until Russia’s leaders accepted Ukraine as a sovereign country. That is unlikely to happen for years if not decades. Until then, Western governments should focus on helping Ukraine to build a resilient, modern country...”15

Dark clouds and a silver lining

he New Eastern Europe’s yearning for “Europe” may look odd today for many observers who read (and talk) about Europe’s decline, decay, and implosion. Eastern Europe is often mentioned as particularly vulnerable to the crisis. The latest (2020) Freedom House report admits that “the breakdown of the democratic consensus has been most visible in Central Europe and the Balkans, the subregions that made the swiftest progress on democracy indicators in past decades” [Fig. 7.7.].16 Elsewhere in Europe the situation is equally bad: the EU “faces a threefold crisis of slow economic growth and fiscal constraint, an influx of refugees from the Muslim world provoking a xenophobic reaction, and democratic deterioration in a number of countries.”17 And the global outlook brings little relief: “The world is now in a “third 15 D. Allan, The Minsk Agreements Rest on Incompatible Views of Sovereignty, Chatham House, 15 July 2019, https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/minsk-agreements-rest-incompatible-views-sovereignty. 16 Z. Csaky, op. cit., p. 1–2, 5. 17 M. Bernhard, Introduction, [in:] “European Politics and Society Newsletter,” Winter 2017, p. 3.

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Figure 7.7. Global expansion of democracy, 1974–2019. Source: Diamond, 2020 (based on Freedom House).

wave of autocratization,” disproportionally affecting a large number of established democracies”;18 “There is a diffusion effect that follows from the growth of illiberal norms, rhetoric and practices among the world’s most advanced democracies. There is a new illiberal and quite possibly authoritarian zeitgeist sweeping across the world.”19 In a series of articles and ultimately a recent book,20 Ivan Krastev and Stephen Holmes attempted to answer a daunting question: why the global democratic backsliding appeared the most evidently in Central East Europe, specifically in the countries considered the “poster children for post-communist democratization, Hungary and Poland” – the countries that advanced most in transition and “benefited handsomely from post-communist political and economic change.” They list a number of reasons for this unexpected outcome. One, the most obvious, was economic frustration (notwithstanding the fact that the majority of post-communist states doubled and even tripled their GDP per capita, and some have already overtaken the least advanced “old” 18 M. Bernhard et al., Parties, Civil Society, and the Deterrence of Democratic Defection, [in:] “Studies in Comparative International Development,” 20 December 2019, https:// doi.org/10.1007/s12116-019-09295-0. 19 L. Diamond, The authoritarian temptation, [in:] “Seminar,” 2017, no. 693, http://www. india-seminar.com/semframe.html. 20 I. Krastev, S. Holmes, The Light that Failed: A Reckoning, Allen Lane, London, 2019.

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Figure 7.8. Inequality growth in post-communist Europe. Source: World Bank.

EU members). Their relative economic success was tainted by “two decades of rising social inequality [Fig. 7.8.], pervasive corruption and the morally arbitrary redistribution of public property into the hands of small number of people. The economic crisis of 2008 had bred a deep distrust of business elites and the casino capitalism.”21 The second reason is dubbed as a “demographic panic” – “the combination of an ageing population, low birth rates and an unending stream of emigration” that strengthened the feeling of insecurity, both physical (from the imagined throngs of the thirdworld immigrants) and spiritual (from the EU liberal policy of multiculturalism that allegedly undermines national identity). The fear of third-world immigrants (“anti-immigrant hysteria without immigrants,” in Krastev’s and Holmes’s sarcastic words), is a psychological inversion for a much more real and severe threat – of demographic hemorrhaging of their own nations because of emigration [Fig. 7.9.]. 21 I. Krastev, S. Holmes, How liberalism became “the god that failed” in eastern Europe, [in:] “The Guardian,” 24 October 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/ oct/24/western-liberalism-failed-post-communist-eastern-europe.

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Figure 7.9. Population decline in post-communist Europe. Source: WIIW.

The “demographic panic” contributed to the identity crisis, while anti-Western resentment enhanced the appeal of xenophobic nationalism.22 The main reason, however, for the East European “illiberal counter-revolution,” in Krastev’s and Holes’s view, is “emotional and pre-ideological, rooted in rebellion at the humiliations that accompany a project requiring acknowledgment of a foreign culture as superior to one’s own... The region’s illiberal turn cannot be grasped apart from the political expectation of ‘normality’ created by the 1989 revolution and the politics of imitation that it legitimized. In this sense, imitation comes to feel like a loss of sovereignty.”23 As soon as the East European states became approved members of the European Union, Brussels lost its leverage over the candidates: the conditionality machine stopped working. Both the EU and the U.S. lost their luster and influence exactly at the time when they were most needed.24 And to add an insult to injury, the rise of an authoritarian China and a rabidly anti-Western Russia provided illiberal politicians worldwide with alternative role models and possible patronizing. The retreat of liberal democracy in Eastern Europe and, more generally, in the world might be a temporary phenomenon, 22 I. Krastev, Central Europe is a lesson to liberals: don’t be anti-nationalist, [in:] “Guardian,” 11 July 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jul/11/central-europe-lesson-liberals-anti-nationalist-yugoslavia-poland-hungary. 23 S. Holmes, I. Krastev, Explaining eastern Europe. Imitation and its discontents, [in:] “Eurozine,” 6 June 2019, https://www.eurozine.com/explaining-eastern-europe. 24 I. Krastev, Eastern Europe’s Illiberal Revolution. The Long Road to Democratic Decline, [in:] “Foreign Affairs,” 2018, vol. 97, no. 3, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ hungary/2018-04-16/eastern-europes-illiberal-revolution.

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reflecting the undulate character of two opposite processes – democratization and autocratization. Aleida Assmann believes that it is not so much a reaction against liberalism but primarily against its perverse form, neoliberalism, that came to the fore in the West in the past decades.25 But it might be also a more ominous sign of a deeper and perhaps incurable problem portended by Wallerstein – the growing discrepancy between the core and periphery of the World System.26 Whatever the outcome, democracy remains the only system that provides both sustainable economic development and respect to the human dignity, personal freedom, and equality under the law.27 Despite various setbacks, the post-communist nations became two to three times richer than they used to be under communism; they became incomparably freer, open to the external world, to new ideas and opportunities. Opinions surveys confirm that people are more satisfied with their lives than they were two-three decades ago, and very few of them regret the changes. Democracy still remains the most preferable system for the majority of the people, both in Eastern Europe and over the world. “What people want is not a retreat to dictatorship but a more accountable and deeper democracy.”28 Three decades of post-communist transformation proved that radical changes of social, political and economic conditions are possible, and depend not only on historical legacies, and not only on international climate and influences. They depend also on people’s determination, on the will and skill of their leaders, and a deep understanding that neither “Europe” nor “democracy” are millenarian objects but, rather, projects-in-the-making that require daily commitment and diligent work.

25 A. Assmann, Go East! [in:] “Eurozine,” 6 June 2019, https://www.eurozine.com/goeast/. 26 I. Wallerstein, The Agonies of Liberalism: What Hope Progress?, [in:] “New Left Review,” 1994, no. 1, https://iwallerstein.com/the-agonies-of-liberalism-what-hope-progress 27 L. Diamond, Breaking out of the Democratic Slump, [in:] “Journal of Democracy,” 2020, vol. 31, no. 1, p. 47–48. 28 L. Diamond, Why Wait for Democracy?, [in:] “Wilson Quarterly,” Winter 2013, http:// www.wilsonquarterly.com/printarticle.cfm?aid=2237.

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Chapter readings Allan D., The Minsk Agreements Rest on Incompatible Views of Sovereignty, Chatham House, 15 July 2019, https://www.chathamhouse.org/ expert/comment/minsk-agreements-rest-incompatible-views-sovereignty. M. Bernhard et al., Parties, Civil Society, and the Deterrence of Democratic Defection, [in:] “Studies in Comparative International Development,” 2020, vol. 55, no. 1, p. 1–26. Diamond L., Facing up to the Democratic Recession [in:] “Journal of Democracy,” 2015, vol. 26, no. 1, p. 141–155. Diamond L., Breaking out of the Democratic Slump, [in:] “Journal of Democracy,” 2020, vol. 31, no. 1, p. 36–50. Ekiert G., Ziblatt D., Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe One Hundred Years On, [in:] “East European Politics and Societies and Cultures,” 2013, vol. 27, no. 1. European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy: Strategy Paper, Communication from the Commission, COM(2004) 373 final, Brussels, 12.05.2004, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/ near/files/2004_communication_from_the_commission_-_european_ neighbourhood_policy_-_strategy_paper.pdf. Holmes S., Krastev I., Explaining eastern Europe. Imitation and its discontents, [in:] “Eurozine,” 6 June 2019, https://www.eurozine.com/ explaining-eastern-europe/. Judt T., Postwar. A History of Europe Since 1945, Penguin Press, London, 2005. Knott E., Perpetually “Partly Free’: Lessons from Post-Soviet Hybrid Regimes on Backsliding in Central and Eastern Europe, [in:] “East European Politics,” 2018, vol. 34, no. 3, p. 355–376. Krastev I., Eastern Europe’s Illiberal Revolution. The Long Road to Democratic Decline, [in:] “Foreign Affairs,” 2018, vol. 97, no. 3, p. 49–56. Krastev I., S. Holmes, The Light that Failed: A Reckoning, Allen Lane, London, 2019. Kuzio T., EU and Ukraine: A Turning Point in 2004?, Occasional Paper no. 47, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2003. Lawson G., Armbruster C., Cox M. (eds.), The Global 1989: Continuity and Change in World Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010. Lindberg S., The Nature of Democratic Backsliding in Europe, Carnegie Europe, 24 July 2018. Lührmann A., Lindberg S., A third wave of autocratization is here: what is new about it?, [in:] “Democratization” 2019, vol. 26, no. 7, p. 1095–1113.

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Mungiu-Pippidi A., Beyond the New Borders, [in:] “Journal of Democracy,” 2004, vol. 15, no. 1. Nations in Transit 2020, Freedom House, Washington, D.C., 2020. Neumann I., Russia as Europe’s Other, [in:] “Journal of Area Studies,” 1998, vol. 6, no. 12, p. 26–73, https://doi.org/10.1080/02613539808455822 . Robinson W., Globalization and the sociology of Immanuel Wallerstein: A critical appraisal, [in:] “International Sociology” 2011, vol. 26, no. 6, p. 723–745. Tausendfreund R. (ed.), Reassessing 1989: Lessons for the Future of Democracy, German Marshall Fund of the U.S., 2019. Wallerstein I., The Agonies of Liberalism: What Hope Progress? [in:] “New Left Review,” 1994, no. 1, https://iwallerstein.com/the-agonies-of-liberalism-what-hope-progress. Zielonka J. Europe’s new civilizing missions: the EU’s normative power discourse, [in:] “Journal of Political Ideologies,” 2013, vol. 18, no. 1, p. 35–55.

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List of Charts, Maps, Tables, and Documents Figure 1.1. Europe in the early 18th century. Figure 1.2. Queen Europe (Regina Europa). Figure 1.3. Europe in 1948-1990. Figure 1.4. Habsburg Empire, 1914. Figure 1.5. The fault lines between civilizations, according to Huntington. Figure 1.6. The Eastern boundary of Western Christianity. Figure 1.7. Multiple fault lines in Europe, after Norman Davies. Figure 1.8. Europe today.

Figure 2.1. Communist states and union republics by 1989. Figure 2.2. Eastern Bloc. Figure 2.3. Fall of Communism: timeline, 1989–1991. Figure 2.4. Yugoslavia, 1945–1991. Figure 2.5. Civil rights and political liberties in Europe and post-Soviet republics, 1981–2009. Figure 2.6. Democracy scores in post-communist states, 2018. Figure 2.7. Post-communist nations on the Global Cultural Map, after Ronald Inglehart. Figure 3.1. Percentage of competitive systems, by year. Figure 3.2. Percentage of minimal democracies, by year. Figure 3.3. Democracy scores: methodology of evaluation. Figure 3.4. Democracy scores: political rights and civil liberties. Figure 3.5. Global distribution of political regimes, 1972–2012. Figure 3.6. Distribution of political regimes in Eastern Europe, 1972–2012. Figure 3.7. Global trends in governance, 1800–2017.

Figure 4.1. Divergent trajectories of post-communist states. Figure 4.2. Democracy scores, 1989–2000. Figure 4.3. Democracy scores, 2001–2010. Figure 4.4. Democracy scores, 2010–2020. Figure 4.5. Democracy scores (2019) in specific categories. Figure 4.6. Democracy and corruption in post-communist states: inverse correlation.

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List of Charts, Maps, Tables, and Documents

Figure 5.1. Ukraine’s electoral map, 1991. Historical legacy of the Habsburg Empire in Ukraine: Vyacheslav Chornovil, the leader of democratic opposition, won elections only in three oblasts of the former Habsburgian Galicia. Figure 5.2. Ukraine’s electoral map, 2004. Historical legacy of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Figure 5.3. Romania’s electoral map, 2014. Historical legacy of the Habsburg Empire in Transylvania. Figure 5.4. Poland’s electoral map, 2010. Historical legacy of the German and Russian Empires. Figure 5.5. Relative efficacy of the blackmail state. Figure 5.6. Control of corruption in Poland, Romania, and Ukraine, 2000–2015. Figure 5.7. GDP per capita in Poland, Russia, and Ukraine, 1990–2018. Figure 6.1. Boris Yeltsyn and Mikhail Gorbachev. Figure 6.2. Contours of historical Muscovy (1390–1525) projected on today’s political map. Figure 6.3. Russia’s territorial expansion, 1300–1945. Figure 6.4. Vladimir Putin and Dmitri Medvedev. Figure 6.5. Political persecutions as “fighting the extremists.” Figure 6.6. Russians’ regret over the Soviet Union’s collapse. Figure 6.7. Reasons for Soviet nostalgia. Figure 6.8. Russians’ pride and shame. Figure 7.1. Income growth in post-communist states and other regions. Figure 7.2. GDP per capita growth in post-communist states. Figure 7.3. GDP per capita and gross wages in Central and East Europe. Figure 7.4. Enlargements of the EU, 1958–2013. Figure 7.5. European Neighborhood Policy. Figure 7.6. Countries of Eastern partnership. Figure 7.7. Global expansion of democracy, 1974–2019. Figure 7.8. Inequality growth in post-communist Europe. Figure 7.9. Population decline in post-communist Europe.

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Abbreviations CE CEE CE5

– Central Europe – Central Eastern Europe – 5 Central European states, the most advanced in transition (Poland, Hungary, Czechia, Slovakia, and Slovenia) CIS – Commonwealth of Independent States CPS – Center for Systemic Peace EaP – Eastern Partnership ENP – European Neighborhood Policy GDP – Gross Domestic Product IMF – International Monetary Fund OSCE – Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe SEE – South Eastern Europe WEO – World Economic Outlook, IMF database WIIW – Wiener Institut für Internationale Wirtschaftsvergleiche, Annual Database WVS – World Values Survey

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Index of Names Andropov, Yuri 46 Ash, Timothy Garton 24, 28, 52 Assmann, Aleida 189 Bartók, Béla 28 Beissinger, Mark 116–117 Brezhnev, Leonid 48–49 Brodsky, Joseph 26–27 Brzeziński, Zbigniew 115 Bunce, Valerie 116

Carothers, Thomas 85–89, 96–97, 107, 127 Chornovil, Vyacheslav 120 Churchill, Winston 19–20, 94 Clausewitz, Karl von 23 Collins, Randal 146–147 Dahl, Robert 75 D’Anieri, Paul 119, 124, 131 Darden, Keith 129–132 Davies, Norman 15, 34 Diamond, Larry 75, 88, 93 Doorenspleet, Renske 68, 72–74 Dostoyevsky, Fedor 27 Foucault, Michel 21, 35 Friedrich, Carl 115 Fukuyama, Francis 92–93 Furman, Dmitri 149-151

Gorbachev, Mikhail 46–49, 52–58, 82, 109, 115, 139–141, 144, 146, 169, 174, 177 Greenfeld, Liah 145

Habsburgs, the dynasty 32, 120 Hašek, Jaroslav 28 Havel, Václav 27 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 93 Himka, John-Paul 35 Hitler, Adolf 20, 22, 28 Holmes, Stephen 186–188 Huntington, Samuel 29–31, 58–59, 67– 72, 169 Hussein, Saddam 23 Inglehart, Ronald 60 Inozemtsev, Vladislav 161–162 Jaeger, Harald 41 Judt, Tony 28, 52–53, 175

Kafka, Franz 28 Khrushchev, Nikita 52, 115 Kohn, Hans 32 Kovalyov, Sergei 153 Krastev, Ivan 186–188 Kravchuk, Leonid 56–57, 109, 120– 122, 134 Kuchma, Leonid 112, 120–122, 124, 126–127, 129–131, 134–136 Kundera, Milan 24–28, 36 Kutuev, Pavlo 130 Lawson, George 168 Ledyard, John 18–19 Lenin, Vladimir 99, 103 Levitsky, Steven 98, 102, 111 Ljuca, Adin 27 Lloyd-George, David 22

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Index of Names

Lukashenko, Alyaksandr 150

Malicki, Jan 14 Marx, Karl 18, 26 McFaul, Michael 83–84, 91 Medvedev, Dmitri 155 Melnychenko, Mykola 129–130 Milošević, Slobodan 110 Mlynář, Zdeněk 52 Møller, Jørgen 80, 93 Molotov, Vyacheslav 43 Morozov, Pavlik 63 Morgenthau, Hans 23 Morlino, Leonardo 75 Mussolini, Benito 20 Napoleon Bonaparte 20 Nixey, James 159 Olearius, Adam 18

Putin, Vladimir 83, 88, 150–157, 159– 161, 163, 175–176, 183–185 Putnam, Robert 61, 63–64, 94 Ribbentrop, Joachim von 43 Roosevelt, Franklin Delano 20

Schroeder, Gerhardt 156 Ségur, Louis Philippe, comte de 18 Shevardnadze, Eduard 110 Shleifer, Andrei 156–157 Shushkevich, Stanislav 57 Skaaning, Svend-Erik 81, 93 Sobchak, Anatoly 151 Stalin, Joseph 22, 44, 52–53, 146 Szporluk, Roman 144, 148 Szücs, Jenö 29 Todorova, Maria 21 Treisman, Daniel 156–157

Wallerstein, Immanuel 189 Way, Lucan 98, 102, 111, 113, 127 Weber, Max 29 Wolff, Larry 18–21

Yanukovych, Viktor 131, 134–136 Yeltsin, Boris 55-57, 82, 106, 109, 140– 141, 148–153, 160, 174, 177, 183 Yermolenko, Volodymyr 36 Yushchenko, Viktor 134 Zelensky, Volodymyr 109–110

Said, Edward 17, 19, 21 Schöpflin, György 29–30, 33

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Index of Places Adriatic (region) 13 Afghanistan 45–46 Africa 15, 73, 86; North A. 180–181 Albania 34, 50, 59, 88, 96 America 17; Northern А. 15; Latin А. 71, 80, 85, 96, 167 Amsterdam 18 Arctic 15 Argentina 156 Armenia 59, 83–84, 113, 182 Asia 15, 18–19, 86, 166-167, 169; Central A. 42, 57–58, 64, 83, 103, 170 Austria 49, 84; Austrian Empire, see Habsburg Empire Azerbaijan 59, 64, 83, 111, 170, 182

Baden-Baden 112 Balkans 21–22, 34, 36, 38, 50, 58, 70, 84, 103–105, 113, 137, 152, 170– 171, 174, 180, 182, 185 Baltic (region) 13, 34, 55, 57–58, 64, 91, 103, 118, 139, 147, 167, 169, 172 Basilicata 64 Belarus 34, 43, 57, 59, 70, 82, 106, 111, 141, 146–147, 150, 167, 182 Belgrade 51 Berlin 24, 41, 43; B. Wall 41 Black Sea (region) 13 Bosnia and Herzegovina 27, 51, 59, 96, 174–175, 177 Britain 22, 29 Brunei 93 Brussels 177, 188 Bucharest 41

Budapest 19, 24, 41, 43; B. Memorandum 184 Bulgaria 34, 49–50, 59, 84, 96, 174, 177

Cambridge (Massachusetts) 14 Canada 15, 69, 79 Caucasus 15, 42, 58 Chechnya 23, 83, 152–153, 160 Chornobyl (a.k.a. Chernobyl) 47 China 15, 42, 46, 52, 69–70, 84, 92, 168, 188 Commonwealth of Independent States (C.I.S.) 141, 167, 176, 180 Copenhagen (criteria) 172 Crimea 19, 23, 56–57, 128, 136, 140, 162, 176, 184 Croatia 34, 50–51, 58, 70, 174 Cuba 70 Cyprus 174 Czechia (Czech Republic in 1992– 2016) 34, 58, 166, 174–175 Czechoslovakia (until 1992) 22, 27–28, 33, 48, 52, 58 Donbas 135–136, 176, 184 Don River 15

East 172; Middle E. 18, 86, 180–181 Emilia (province) 64 Estonia 58, 174 Eurasia 15, 34–35, 64, 159, 171, 174, 180 Europe 15–18, 21–22, 24–25, 35–38, 68, 84, 94, 142, 156, 166, 171–172, 174, 180–181, 185

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Index of Places

Central E. 24–26, 28, 34–38, 58, 64, 171, 185 East Central E. (a.k.a. Central Eastern E.) 21, 24, 26, 28, 31, 33–34, 36– 38, 50, 58, 91, 103, 118, 167, 169, 177, 186 Eastern E. 13–14, 18–29, 31–38, 41, 47–49, 52, 67, 69–70, 85, 91–92, 139, 159, 172, 174–175, 178, 183, 188–189 Mittleuropa 24 New Eastern E. 13, 35, 38, 58, 171, 185 Northern E. 18, 34 Southern E. 18, 80, 85 South Eastern E. 31, 36, 38, 167 Western E. 17–29, 31–33, 35–37, 43, 45, 49, 58, 70, 84, 92, 94, 98, 100, 102– 103, 105, 112, 131, 135–136, 149, 156–157, 159–160, 162–163, 169, 171–172, 174–177, 183, 185, 189 European Community 33, 69 European Union 14, 35–36, 84, 106, 136–137, 171–172, 174, 176–184, 187–188; Copenhagen France 14, 26, 29, 184, F. revolution 70, 84

Gdansk 38 Georgia 59, 83, 110, 113, 154, 172, 175–177, 182 Germany 19, 24, 26, 38, 58, 79, 84, 124, 173, 175, 184; East G. 41, 49, 52 Greece 19, 33, 62, 80 Guatemala 97 Habsburg Empire 31–33, 38, 58, 120 Harvard (University) 14 Helsinki 69; H. Act 184 Hungary 28, 34, 37, 49, 52, 58, 174– 175, 186 Iraq 23 Italy 61

Japan 71, 84

Kabul 45 Karabakh 83 Kazakhstan 59 Kiev, see Kyiv Kosovo 23, 51, 174–175, 177 Kraków 19 Kuwait 23 Kyiv 24, 135–136, 184 Kyrgyzstan 59, 84, 166 Latvia 58, 174 Lithuania 43, 58, 174 London 18

Maastricht (Treaty) 172 Malta 174 Mauritania 88 Mediterranean (region) 34, 180 Mexico 156 Mezzogiorno 64 Minsk 184–185 Moldova 34, 43, 59, 82–83, 96, 106, 111, 113, 147, 152, 167, 170–172, 174, 176–177, 182 Mongolia 88 Montenegro 34, 59, 111 Moscow 19, 23, 35, 42, 46, 48, 52, 56, 64, 70, 135–136, 140, 149, 151–153, 156, 159–160, 174–176, 183–184 Munich 22 Muscovy 18, 31 Occident 21 Oman 93 Orient 17–21 Ottoman Empire 30, 32–33, 38, 59, 70

Palermo 64 Paris 18–19 Poland 18, 22, 34, 36, 38, 43, 46, 49, 52, 58, 124, 135, 174–175, 181, 186

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Mykola Riabchuk

Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth 37, 120 Portugal 80 Poznan 43 Prague 18–19, 24, 27, 41, 43, 49, 52 Prussia 18, 31 Qatar 93

Romania 34, 43, 49–51, 59, 70, 84, 96, 122, 174 Russia 14, 21, 23–27, 29, 31, 34, 39, 42, 55, 57, 59, 70, 82–84, 106, 111, 125, 135–137, 139–145, 147–151, 153– 157, 159–163, 167–168, 170–172, 174–177, 180, 183–185, 188 Russian (Czarist) Empire 30, 32–33, 38, 59, 70, 124, 145 Rzecz Pospolita, see Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth

Saudi Arabia 93 Scandinavia 47 Serbia 51, 59, 110, 140, 175 Siberia 24 Slavonic 20 Slovakia 34, 58, 174 Slovenia 34, 50–51, 58, 70, 166, 174 Sofia 41, 49 South Korea 168 South Ossetia 176 Soviet Union 19, 24, 26, 28, 33, 35–38, 43, 45–46, 52–56, 58, 70, 82–84, 86, 92, 107, 115, 119, 126–127, 130, 139–149, 161–162, 170, 175–176 S. government 23, 44, 46–47, 67, 69, 125 S. empire 14, 45, 48–49, 91, 104, 139, 166, 169–170 post-S. regimes 64–65, 103–105, 107, 112–113, 117, 119, 123, 127, 129, 149–150, 156, 159, 169–171, 176, 180 Spain 80

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St. Petersburg 149, 151 Sudan 132 Sverdlovsk, see Yekaterinburg Sweden 58, 79, 181 Switzerland 19, 73, 157 Tajikistan 59, 166 Tiananmen Square 52 Tibet 23 Toronto (University) 14 Transylvania 70, 169 Trieste 38 Turkmenistan 59 Turkey 71, 168

Ukraine 13–14, 19, 22, 24, 34, 39, 42, 55–57, 59, 70, 82–83, 96–97, 106, 109, 111–113, 115, 117–120, 123– 132, 134–137, 141, 146–147, 150, 152, 154, 167, 170–172, 174–177, 182–185; Western U. 43, 150–151; Galicia 169 United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) 93 United Kingdom (U.K.) 19, 157 United States of America (U.S.A.) 15, 19, 45–46, 68–69, 73, 79, 84, 132, 156–158, 188 Ural Mountains 15 U.S.S.R., see Soviet Union Uzbekistan 59 Vatican 69, 93 Vienna 18–19; Landstrasse 19 Vladivostok 24

Warsaw 41 Western New Independent (N.I.S.) 13, 180 White Mountain (battle) 28

States

Yalta 19, 22, 37, 172 Yekaterinburg 140, 149 Yugoslavia 50–51, 58, 70, 82–83, 174

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