Key Actor Interests

Greek Cypriots

The official Greek Cypriot position is reunification of the island through BBF that features a strong central government and the legal and territorial integrity of the island.44 The RoC and the Greek Cypriot community support a resolution that would provide for a single state and government for the entire island of Cyprus. The majority of the population opposes the current status quo. The Greek Cypriots primarily trust the RoC government to facilitate a fair peace agreement. They strongly distrust the United Kingdom and the Turkish Government as peace brokers.45

The BBF approach faces three significant challenges: apprehension over power-sharing agreements, concerns that political equality for Turkish Cypriots would hinder governance, and a fear of secession by Turkish Cypriots supported by Turkey. These challenges were demonstrated in the Annan Plan, which proposed a BBF structure with a parliamentary system and a presidential cross-voting arrangement. The proposed Senate structure allowed Turkish Cypriots veto power, which Greek Cypriots feared would impede joint decision-making. Greek Cypriots also feared that a strong central government would make Turkish Cypriots more politically powerful, eventually facilitating Turkish-backed de facto division of the island.46

The discovery of natural gas off the Cypriot coast has complicated negotiations for a peace settlement. The RoC rejects Turkish and Turkish Cypriot access to what Nicosia and the international community view as the sovereign natural resources of the RoC.

Turkey’s commitment to protecting the interests of Turkish settlers in northern Cyprus creates an additional challenge for Greek Cypriots. Nicosia worries that Turkish Cypriot fears about security are exaggerated to form the basis for eventual Turkish intervention. Indeed, the 2017 UN attempt to abolish the Turkish and Greek unilateral security guarantees failed definitively. Going forward, Greek Cypriots have acknowledged that the process of withdrawing Turkish troops, albeit incomplete, could be a starting point for a peace settlement.47

Turkish Cypriots

The self-proclaimed TRNC is a territory in northern Cyprus recognized only by Turkey. Turkey offers the Turkish Cypriot minority military protection through a decades-long deployment of Turkish troops. Turkish Cypriots have long viewed Turkish soldiers on the island as their only protection against cultural and even physical extinction. Furthermore, the Turkish Cypriots are perpetually reliant on Turkey to sustain their economy given international embargoes against their ports. Ankara maintains substantial political, economic and territorial influence over the Turkish Cypriots. The self-proclaimed TRNC supports a resolution that would provide for two separate and internationally recognized states. They would strongly oppose a resolution that would provide for a single state and central government for all of Cyprus in any form that compromises political equality of Turkish Cypriots. Turkish Cypriots primarily trust the Turkish Government, given their political and economic dependence on Turkey, and their self-proclaimed TRNC leadership to reach a fair peace deal representing their interests. They strongly mistrust the Greek Government and RoC leadership in the peace process.48

The increased presence of Turkish settlers

has changed the demographics north of the Green Line. A paucity of accurate statistics on Turkish Cypriots complicates negotiation towards political equality for this minority community.49 Efforts have been made to integrate Turkish Cypriots in Turkish culture, given their ethnic, cultural and religious differences from Turkish settlers (who represent Laz, Kurdish, Turk and Arabic communities).50 However, Turkish Cypriots are concerned that their Cypriot culture is being diluted with the increased arrival of Turkish settlers.

As an unrecognized state, the self-proclaimed TRNC has no international backing and support without Turkey’s protection. Yet, Turkey’s insistence on maintaining the anachronistic Treaty of Guarantee, a right to intervention, and a permanent troop presence, continues to impede the Turkish Cypriots’ flexibility in settlement talks. The Turkish Cypriots repeatedly have emphasized a desire for “bizonality and political equality of the two communities,” but it is unclear how achievable that plan is without Turkey’s support.51 Furthermore, now that Ersin Tatar, a right-wing Turkish nationalist with close ties to Ankara, has won the self-proclaimed TRNC’s presidential election, unification appears to be a more distant vision than before. Indeed, Tatar supports Turkey’s call for separate sovereign administrations of the island.52

Turkey

The historical goal of Turkish policy in Cyprus was to prevent the island from falling under Greek hegemony. While countering Greece in Cyprus remains strategically salient, new Turkish interests are influencing Ankara’s Cyprus policy. Erdogan views Turkish interests in Cyprus through the prism of a tense regional struggle over hydrocarbons, maritime law, and the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean. Domestically, Erdogan is pursuing a nationalist foreign policy in the region, including in Cyprus, Libya, and Syria, with the aim of appealing to the nationalist sentiments of the large majority of Turkish voters, which have by and large supported Turkish adventurism in the region. Erdogan likely calculates his aggressive stance in the region by buttressing political support among his AKP party and the MHP party, an ultranationalist Turkish party that entered into coalition with the AKP in 2018.53 These matters have raised the stakes of the Cyprus dispute for Turkey, and for international actors who wish to integrate Turkey into a settlement process for Cyprus. Since the 1974 invasion, Turkey has focused on fortifying its military presence in the Turkish-occupied zone of northern Cyprus and supporting the self-declared state of the Turkish Cypriots. Between 1999 and 2010, Turkish foreign policy softened toward the Cyprus conflict as Turkey and the EU negotiated Turkey’s candidacy for EU membership. Turkish leaders were dismayed at the failure of the Annan Plan Referendum in 2004 and the subsequent admission of the RoC into the EU. Starting in 2016, Turkish foreign policy took a nationalist and hardline turn after Erdogan forcibly repressed a military coup against his rule.

The broader bilateral relationship between the United States and Turkey has grown increasingly strained. During the Bush and Obama administrations, the United States upheld Turkey as an example of a modern, secular and westernizing democracy on the edge of the Muslim world. However, today Turkey is no longer a reliable ally to the West. Erdogan’s policies seem part of an irredentist attempt to reclaim the influence of the former Ottoman Empire. The recent evolution of Turkish foreign policy constitutes a strategic pivot away from the West in an effort to establish Turkish dominance in the region.

Turkey’s demands for an internal Cyprus political settlement have remained relatively consistent since the failure of the Annan Plan in 2004. Generally, Turkey’s minimal conditions for a negotiated settlement are threefold. First, security guarantees must be credibly extended to the minority Turkish Cypriots. Second, any

settlement of the Cyprus conflict must also include a concomitant economic opening by the international community towards the currently embargoed self-proclaimed TRNC. Third, Turkish Cypriots in northern Cyprus must be granted a degree of political autonomy under any governance framework in a future settlement, regardless of whether such a deal creates a unified Cypriot state or a looser federation. In November 2020, while making a defiant speech at a ceremony in northern Cyprus, Erdogan insisted that a two-state solution to the conflict should be negotiated on the “basis of sovereign equality” because there are “two separate peoples and states” on the island.54 The two-state solution would see the permanent division of the island between the Turkish Cypriot North and the Greek Cypriot South rather than a negotiated solution based on the BBF framework. Erdogan’s public support for a two-state solution could be part of a concerted effort to apply greater Turkish pressure against the RoC in future negotiations.

Former Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoglu outlined these three objectives in 2010, stating that Turkey’s goal was “to establish an arrangement in Cyprus where the existence, security, freedom, and economical welfare of the Turks living in Cyprus are guaranteed and assured.”55 The contours of these three Turkish objectives have evolved to some degree based on fluctuations in the Turkish foreign policy. Beyond its three ongoing core demands for an internal political settlement, the Turkish government also insists on its right to preserve a robust Turkish military presence in northern Cyprus. Previous peace talks have struggled to overcome Turkey’s insistence on this issue. Between 2016 and 2017, UN-mediated talks in Switzerland between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots collapsed in large part because of Turkish resistance to reducing Turkey’s military forces on the island. Turkish negotiators also pushed for the continuation of the Treaty of Guarantee, or a framework modeled closely to it, as part of a deal. In the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey is employing a dual-track policy of naval power projection and regional outreach to assert its claims over natural gas deposits near Cyprus and in the Aegean Sea.56 Erdogan and the Turkish military have declared a new doctrine of “Blue Homeland” that aims to achieve Turkish naval supremacy over 189,000 square kilometers of waters in the Eastern Mediterranean.57 Erdogan indicated his intent to expand naval competition in the waters near Cyprus during a public speech in September 2020, suggesting that Turkish maritime pressure on the issue will intensify in the coming months.

The Turkish government opposes the internationally recognized definition of EEZs, as delineated under UNCLOS, and supported by Greece and the RoC. They claim that islands do not generate full maritime zones when they are competing directly against continental land areas. The United States contends that states, which includes island states, should negotiate with their neighbors to delimit EEZs. Turkey is adamant that Cyprus, along with Greece’s network of islands in the Eastern Mediterranean, is not entitled to the full extent of the EEZ. Instead, the Turkish position is that Cyprus is making EEZ claims that, in fact, belong to Turkey.

Greece

Greek policy toward Cyprus mirrors the struggle between Greece and Turkey for influence in the Eastern Mediterranean. In the eyes of Athens, the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus and its subsequent military presence demonstrate an irredentist Turkish desire to expand eastward into former Ottoman territories, posing a direct threat to Greek sovereignty. In response, Greece continues to call for sanctioning Turkish aggression in international forums, maintaining a military presence in the RoC, and increasing engagement in gas exploration efforts off the coast of Cyprus, both to counterbalance Turkish exploration and in the hope that gas

U.S. - EU Cooperation in Cyprus

As a member state of the EU, the RoC plays an influential role in EU institutions given the European Council’s consensus decision-making process. Similarly, EU membership has given the union unique influence in Cyprus, particularly through the application of EU laws known as acquis communautaire. Many EU laws and policies align with broader U.S. policy goals in Cyprus, offering opportunities for the United States to work closely with the EU to advance common interests. Notably, the United States and the EU decided to place limited sanctions on Turkish officials in December 2020 over Turkey’s decision to activate the Russian S-400 air defense system and its activities in the Eastern Mediterranean.83 While the sanctions were limited and applied for different reasons, they indicate broader U.S.-EU geopolitical alignment in Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean.

Without displacing the role of the UN in the Cyprus problem, the United States and the EU could expand their involvement between the two communities to build confidence and attempt to settle issues outside of the immediate conflict. Although it would require significant shuttle diplomacy and concessions from both parties, one step could be to urge Turkey to drop its veto of RoC membership in NATO’s Partnership for Peace in exchange for the RoC allowing goods to be exported and imported directly to northern Cyprus from EU member states. This measure could entrench steps toward EU acquis communautaire and lessen northern Cyprus’ dependence on Turkey. Moreover, Cyprus remains the only EU member state that is not a member of NATO or the Partnership for Peace.84 Joining the Partnership would allow for better EU-NATO coordination due to current policies inhibiting cooperation until all EU members are affiliated with the alliance.85 Such a step could also expand U.S.-Cyprus and even UK-Cyprus cooperation under the auspices of the alliance. Other positive outcomes could include the RoC ending its veto over engagement between EU defense institutions and Turkey.

Another area of potential U.S.-EU cooperation is travel security and terrorism. As an EU member state, Cyprus is obligated to join the Schengen Area, which it is currently working to achieve.86 Assuming it eventually joins the Schengen Area, the RoC will likely turn its efforts to join the U.S. Visa Waiver Program (VWP). As a result, the EU and United States have an opportunity to concurrently push Cyprus to implement the requirements for both programs now. While Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs, Carl Risch’s announcement of a working group with the RoC on the VWP suggests progress is being made, an interagency U.S.-EU working group on Schengen-VWP would ensure consistency, allow the two powers to align the timing of possible announcements, and collectively ensure the strongest protections for both EU and U.S. citizens.87 Moreover, such a joint U.S.-EU working group could be extended to other EU countries that are not yet Schengen or VWP participants including Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania.

The EU also aims to create a Mediterranean gas hub south of Europe by supporting two strategic projects— the Cyprus East Med Pipeline and the Cyprus LNG terminal. The United States has a role to play in the EU’s natural gas market by reinforcing competition and optionality. The EU and the United States agreed to strengthen strategic energy cooperation in July 2018 and to work toward facilitating large-scale U.S. LNG exports to Europe. Since the political agreement, the EU and the United States have held the first business forum under the U.S.-EU Energy Council, as well as the May 2019 joint visit by Maroš Šefcovic and U.S. President Donald Trump to the Cameron LNG facility in Louisiana, which will start exporting to European and Asian markets at the end of 2019. 88

patronage will legitimize its claim to disputed maritime boundaries with Turkey.

Greece played a pivotal role in the conflict’s trajectory by lobbying for the RoC to accede to the EU without a settlement. Greece threatened to veto nine candidates’ applications for EU membership should the RoC membership be denied or postponed based on lack of a political settlement.58 In 2004, the RoC joined the EU through the Treaty of Accession. Since then, Greek Cypriots have enjoyed disproportionate economic growth and stability compared to Turkish Cypriots, thereby reducing pressure on Greece to act as the sole guarantor of the RoC. Since 2004, Athens has taken a less active role in Cypriot matters, following a doctrine of “Nicosia decides, Athens supports.”59 Domestic issues in Greece, such as the 2010 bailout and the Syriza-led populist backlash, have also rendered Greek policy toward Cyprus more reflexive in recent years. Today, Greek policy toward Cyprus is mainly driven by security considerations, heightened by energy interests and the contestation of its maritime borders with Turkey.

Athens’ main priority is to counter Turkish expansionism in the Eastern Mediterranean. As a result, Greece prioritizes maintaining its own regional sphere of influence. In Cyprus, this means protecting the territorial and political integrity of the island from Turkish aggression, both by enlisting the help of international partners and by maintaining troops in the RoC. Greek troops—known as the Hellenic Greek Force, or ELDYK—have been stationed on the island for the past 60 years.60 Greece lobbies for security guarantees against Turkish aggression more generally in international forums, including the EU, the UN, and NATO. In the broader Eastern Mediterranean, Athens’ security interests are intertwined with energy interests. Greece views its participation in gas exploration in the Cypriot EEZ both as a hedge against Turkish incursion and as a path to legitimizing its contested maritime claims.61 The RoC has delineated thirteen oil blocks within its EEZ and has been conducting exploratory drilling in the area since 2007. Greece will likely increase its participation in the EastMed Gas Forum to keep Turkey from advancing its regional ambitions. Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis will also likely continue to join the RoC in calling for EU sanctions on Turkey over its gas exploration in the RoC EEZ. Both measures hamper the prospects of a settlement.62

Russia

Russia has demonstrated largely consistent interests and foreign policy toward the decades-old conflict in Cyprus. After the Soviet Union fell, the Russian Federation deepened cooperation with the RoC, including through arms transfers and cultural connections. After joining the EU, Cyprus sometimes acted as a mouthpiece for Russian interests. In recent years, this relationship helped Moscow by facilitating Russian involvement in the Syrian war and providing a haven for Russian oligarchs. Meanwhile, the persistent conflict between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots accommodates Russia’s central objective to counter NATO hegemony. By preventing recognition of the RoC by Turkey and stoking tensions between Turkey and Greece, the Cyprus conflict hinders EU cooperation and NATO unity. Greek Cypriots have long maintained financial and military ties with Russia.63 Since the late 1980s, Russian support has helped the RoC fill a void left by the 1987 U.S. decision to end arms transfers to the island. At the time, the United States was trying to prevent an arms race that would thwart a solution to the conflict.64 Instead, Russia has supplied military equipment to the RoC since the 1990s, which also allowed Moscow to foster closer military relations with Nicosia. More recently, in 2011, Russia granted the RoC a 2.5 billion euro loan, a substantial amount for a nation with a national income of only 17 billion euros, to help the country weather a financial crisis. Two years later, the Kremlin improved the loan’s terms at a cost to Russia.65

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov meets with Cypriot President Nicos Anastasiades during his visit to Cyprus in December 2015. Source: Russian Embassy in Cyprus The Kremlin also expressed potent support for the RoC’s energy rights in its EEZ.

In 2015, the RoC and the Kremlin pledged continued military cooperation, among ten other cooperative agreements, during a state visit of RoC President Nicos Anastasiades to Moscow. The 2015 military agreements between Russia and the RoC gave Russian ships access to Cypriot ports, which Moscow sought after losing a coastal military base in Syria.66 Russian vessels used in Syria have visited Cypriot ports that may have facilitated support for the Bashar al-Assad regime.67

Cyprus is of special interest to wealthy Russians seeking offshore banking. Rich Russians are known to funnel money to island accounts to avoid paying taxes in Russia, concealing the money’s source under alleged foreign investment. In 2011, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reported that Cyprus was the target for more than one third of outward Russian investment.68 Cyprus has encouraged this behavior to some extent: in 2013, following the RoC’s financial drought, the government awarded nearly 1,500 passports to Russian investors through a “citizenship by investment” scheme, also known as the “golden passports” scheme, where wealthy Russians essentially could purchase Cypriot citizenship. Those passports comprised almost half of the total 3,000 issued, but the policy, finally was suspended by the RoC government in November 2020.69 Ironically, the RoC’s status as an EU member, with a stable legal system, strong property rights, low taxes, and light regulation, makes it a desirable location for financially successful Russians to park their money. Cyprus is also a top destination for Russian tourists and expats. In 2017, at least a third of Cyprus’s three million tourists were Russian.70

In the late nineties, the desire of the RoC to join the EU added a new dimension to RussiaCypriot relations and Russia-EU relations. Moscow likely worried that Cypriot accession to the EU might hand Cyprus over to European and Western interests, at Russia’s expense. If the whole island acceded to the EU following a settlement of the Cyprus conflict, that would present an opportunity for Turkey to join the EU, thereby aligning NATO and the EU and

pushing Turkey away from Russia’s sphere of influence. In 2004, just when it seemed the Annan Plan would succeed, Russia vetoed a UNSC resolution that would have enabled UN peacekeepers to implement the terms.71 Russia also helped tank the island’s Referendum on the proposal by pressuring the Cypriot communist party Anorthotikó Kómma Ergazómenou Laoú (AKEL) to lobby against the plan, which eventually led to its rejection by the Greek Cypriot community.72 With its rejection, the RoC joined the EU divided from the self-proclaimed Turkish Cypriot leadership in the North.73

The relationship between Cyprus and Russia changed somewhat after the RoC gained membership in the EU, since EU accession naturally aligned the RoC more closely with Europe. Yet, there is evidence that the RoC occasionally elevates Russian interests within the EU framework, somewhat hindering total cooperation between the RoC and other EU states.74 Most recently, Cyprus refused to approve EU sanctions on Belarus, Russia’s ally, unless the body approved punitive sanctions on Turkey for “gunboat diplomacy” in the Eastern Mediterranean.75 The RoC also opposed EU sanctions against Russia in 2016, and even passed a resolution to remove them.76 Finally, the RoC is the only EU member that maintained military cooperation with Russia following Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea.77

Today, Moscow fears that U.S. policy changes will undermine Russian-Cypriot cooperation and lead to warmer relations between Cyprus and the West. Russia initially condemned early reports of the U.S. decision to partially waive defense trade regulations, calling it “anti-Russian plans” that would lead to the U.S. militarization of the island.78 Russia clearly fears increased U.S. support to Cyprus that may disrupt Russian military interests, or pull Cyprus closer to NATO.79 Russia’s anticipation of this development may activate and reinforce its opposition to any new attempts toward a settlement of the dispute, given that a settlement would overcome the main barrier to stronger Cypriot relations with NATO countries.

China

China’s interest in Cyprus is more recent and primarily economic but may be following a trend toward greater economic penetration that facilitates burgeoning security interests in the region. In 2016, the China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) sought to operate parts of Cyprus’ Limassol port.80 Although COSCO’s bid was unsuccessful, China nevertheless demonstrated that its state-owned firms are interested in expanding their economic reach into Cyprus and the broader Eastern Mediterranean. Similarly, China tried to buy a stake in Israel’s Haifa port, located close to an important Israeli naval base and the site of U.S. naval fleet exercises. These developments demonstrate Beijing’s possible intention to use economic means to facilitate ends that improve Chinese security monitoring and posture within the Eastern Mediterranean.81

The 5G issue, a notable source of tension between the United States and China, is playing out in Cyprus. Washington and Beijing waged a tug of war over whether the island would use Chinese 5G networks, such as Huawei, that would give China a substantial foothold in Cyprus. In October 2020, Cyprus and the United States signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Science and Technology that put Cyprus on a path to join the Clean Network, a Trump administration initiative to create a collection of countries that commit to using trusted and secure 5G networks. Yet, it is unlikely that Chinese 5G firms will abandon their desire to expand into Cyprus.82

The United States should be concerned with managing the conflict in Cyprus and tensions in the region to avoid greater internationalization of the conflict, competition with other great powers in the Eastern Mediterranean, and budding economic cooperation between Cyprus and China that could carry over into the security sphere.

The Gender Perspective

Work on the Cyprus question has largely overlooked the gendered perspective.89 Compared to other EU countries, gender inequalities in Cyprus are most pronounced in the political representation of women.90 Prior to 1974, the narrative of women involved in the conflict highlighted their status as victims or aides within the armed struggle between both sides. On the Turkish Cypriot side, women took up supporting roles for the paramilitary organization, TMT. On the Greek Cypriot side, women served as helpers and messengers for EOKA.91

Maria Hadjipavlou speaks at a panel discussion on sexual violence against women in Cyprus in December 2015. Source: UNFICYP/Juraj Hladky

More recently, incidents of rape around Nicosia have illustrated the failure of Cypriot authorities to protect women from sexual violence.92 Although official data are limited, interviews with Turkish Cypriot women revealed women’s suffering throughout the conflict.93 Often, men were prioritized by officials when negotiating prisoner exchanges and returns to the North, leaving women languishing in confinement for months or years. A 1974 law to legalize abortion was passed as an emergency measure to prevent pregnancies resulting from wartime rape of women on both sides of the conflict.

In 2009, a Gender Advisory Team (GAT) was established on the basis of UNSC Resolution 1325 (2000) to expand women’s participation in the peace process in Cyprus. The GAT recommended the following measures: • Increase women’s representation on key issues: property, economy, governance and citizenship; • Involve women belonging to minority groups in reconstruction and development initiatives; • Ensure gender-sensitive economic planning and resource-sharing; and • Overall, transition from a militarist, patriarchal and nationalist culture to a ‘peace culture.’

In addition, cooperation between civil society actors led to the creation of the Technical Committee on Gender Equality, which aimed to integrate gendered provisions into future peace negotiations and constitutional arrangements.94 Other initiatives include the “Home of Cooperation,” a center located in the buffer zone that engages Greek and Turkish Cypriot youth, artists, and activists in peace-oriented programming, and the “Hands Across Divide,” an organization that coordinates women’s participation in political intervention and leads gendered dialogues around the conflict.95

Women and girls are disproportionately impacted in conflict settings deeming their participation in peace building a necessary condition. Research on Women, Peace and Security shows that increased gender equality lowers the propensity of conflict and women’s participation in a peace negotiation increases the likelihood that the resulting agreement succeeds.96 The U.S. government should work alongside these initiatives and support local efforts aimed at fostering a gender-inclusive environment for future peace negotiations. To promote the agency and inclusion of Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot women, the United States should advance a settlement process that reduces institutional gender barriers and designs resolutions on territorial adjustment and missing persons that incorporates a gendered perspective.