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Recommended Strategy
Recommended U.S. Strategy for the Cyprus Conflict
Although the situation within Cyprus is stable for now, the regional offshore energy dispute and intensified Turkish belligerency are raising the potential for renewed escalation in the Cyprus conflict. The highly charged visit by Erdogan in November 2020 to Varosha, a disputed town near the dividing line between the RoC and northern Cyprus, is yet another indicator that the situation in Cyprus is at a critical juncture, thereby requiring renewed and proactive U.S. policy focus. The United States cannot afford to wait until the protracted Cyprus conflict boils over, creating another regional armed conflict attracting intervention by U.S. great power rivals and spilling instability into the geostrategic Eastern Mediterranean. Thus, this section outlines a more strategic approach to the Cyprus conflict that grounds U.S. policy within broader U.S. interests mentioned below.
In May 2014, Joseph R. Biden became the first U.S. Vice President to visit Cyprus since Lyndon Johnson in 1962, stating that he had “come to primarily underscore the value the United States attaches to our growing cooperation with the Republic of Cyprus.”97 Since Biden uttered those words in 2014, the risks to U.S. interests in Cyprus and the geostrategic Eastern Mediterranean have grown due to an increasingly belligerent Turkish foreign policy and resurgent great power competition with Russia. What happens within the Cyprus conflict has growing implications for achieving U.S. interests in the Eastern Mediterranean region.
On the Cyprus issue, we argue in this section that the incoming administration should be concerned with five broad U.S. interests: (1) fostering strategic stability in the increasingly volatile Eastern Mediterranean, (2) limiting the influence and ambitions of Russia in Cyprus, (3) reaffirming a strong NATO alliance, (4) enhancing stability in Cyprus to protect U.S. regional interests and support UN efforts to create conditions for a settlement, and (5) maintaining the U.S. military’s ability to project power into nearby regional hotspots. Subsequent sections will turn to translating these generalized U.S. interests into recommended objectives that include actionable policies on the Cyprus problem.
Since the Second World War, U.S. administrations have grasped the importance of the Eastern Mediterranean for deterring U.S. geostrategic rivals and securing the U.S. alliance network in Western Europe. Although the Cyprus conflict has been largely stable since the 1970s, the surrounding regional context has been far more volatile and violent. The Arab Spring that swept the Middle East and North Africa in 2011 saw popular protests morph into violent revolts, sparking civil wars and insurgencies in Syria and Libya. In 2014, Vice President Biden echoed the importance of Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean security architecture during his visit to the island, when he declared that “this island can and should be the bedrock of stability and opportunity for Europe and for the East Mediterranean.”98
The United States is already grappling with instability in the Eastern Mediterranean owing to internationalized civil wars in Libya and Syria. An unstable Cyprus would add another source of regional instability. Flare
ups between Turkey and Greece or Cyprus may require the United States to deploy naval assets to “keep the peace,” which diverts U.S. attention and resources away from securing American interests in other regional conflicts. Recently, tensions escalated over hydrocarbon deposits near Cyprus between countries in the Eastern Mediterranean energy framework — consisting of Cyprus, Greece, and Israel — and Turkey. Ankara is increasingly wielding “gunboat diplomacy” to assert its claims and those of the self-proclaimed TRNC. Turkey’s aggressive maritime posture, support for a two-state solution for Cyprus, and perpetual conflict with Greece all contribute to instability in the region and cast a shadow on prospects for a settlement of the Cyprus conflict.
Interest Two: Limit the influence and ambitions of Russia in the region
The United States should be concerned about the deepening Russian influence in the RoC and the region. Moscow views its relationship with the RoC as a strategic military partnership, which allows Russia to project power in the region and sow dissent within NATO. Russia has supplied military equipment to Cyprus since the 1990s, fostering closer military relations with Nicosia, and Moscow recently signed a deal with the RoC expanding Russian naval access to Cypriot ports. Russia has increased its financial penetration in Cyprus, which would reduce the RoC’s reliance on Europe and the West.
The era of great power competition has raised the potential for renewed violence in the Cyprus conflict. Given the rising Russian use of Syrian ports in the Eastern Mediterranean, it is increasingly important that the United States and its allies carefully monitor Russia’s expanding influence in the region. Additionally, Russia is adept at recognizing and exploiting cleavages to weaken American alliances. The most recent example is Turkey’s procurement of S-400 missiles from Russia, which caused a rift in U.S.-Turkish relations and ultimately led to the removal of Turkey from the F-35 program and the imposition of limited sanctions.99 Maintaining U.S. partnerships with regional allies in the face of continuously more aggressive Russian foreign policy will be a key challenge.
Given the concern about great power competition, the United States should also pay attention to China’s growing interest in Cyprus. China’s involvement in Cyprus is still nascent and primarily economic in nature, yet its investments are growing on the island. Budding economic cooperation between Cyprus and China could create opportunities for Chinese-Cypriot cooperation in both the economic and security sphere in the future.
Interest Three: Reaffirm a strong NATO Alliance
Escalating skirmishes over disputed maritime boundaries around Cyprus and in the Aegean Sea are threatening an already tenuous relationship between Greece and Turkey, two members of the NATO alliance. Both countries have been NATO members since 1952 and are critical elements of NATO’s southern flank. Tensions grew in August 2020, when Turkish and Greek warships collided in the Eastern Mediterranean, after Ankara deployed its research vessel to an area that Athens claims as its maritime territory. The prospect of conflict between Turkey and Greece threatens the integrity of NATO as the strength of an alliance rests on the relationships between its members.
A growing bilateral crisis between Greece and Turkey also has implications for both the Cyprus conflict and regional security structures. Turkey’s adventurism in the Mediterranean is drawing France into the maritime disputes, with President Macron offering political and military support to Greece. The 2019 maritime deal between Turkey and Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA) included a military cooperation pact that expanded military cooperation, providing the GNA security against opposition
forces backed by France and Egypt.100 Furthermore, Turkey’s purchase of the Russian S-400 system, agreement with Libya’s GNA on Eastern Mediterranean maritime boundaries, and involvement in the Syrian conflict have hardened divisions within the NATO alliance. As the incoming administration seeks to strengthen relationships within NATO, managing Turkey’s ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean and returning to a productive relationship with Ankara are important prerequisites.
Disputes between NATO members may prevent the execution of drills and other preparatory activities, thereby undermining the organization’s efficacy. Just as important as its military might is NATO’s deterrence capabilities — if its credibility is downgraded or its ability to respond quickly is diminished, there could be detrimental effects for the alliance’s deterrence capabilities. Perceived weaknesses in the alliance could inspire attacks against members, particularly if they suspect an anemic response. Thus, with NATO forces deployed globally assisting American troops, a key pillar of U.S. national security has been and remains the integrity of NATO.
Interest Four: Enhance stability in Cyprus to protect U.S. regional interests and support UN efforts to create conditions for settlement
Although reaching a resolution to the Cyprus dispute is a lower priority for U.S. interests, ensuring that the conflict does not intensify and spill over into the Eastern Mediterranean is vital to broader U.S. interests. Indeed, an escalation of the domestic dispute would draw in other powers, such as Turkey, Greece, or even Russia, which could further aggravate tensions within NATO, jeopardize maritime access, and destabilize the region. Confidence building measures that supplement UN-led multilateral efforts towards a settlement, can mitigate the potential for violent conflict or destabilizing the status quo.
The UK’s SBAs afford the U.S. military additional options for future contingencies in the Eastern Mediterranean, Middle East, and North Africa. Unfettered access to the Eastern Mediterranean provides the United States and our allies with strategic military options in an increasingly volatile region. The SBAs allow for effective military response capabilities, which in turn enhance the U.S. ability to exercise military force through alliance coalitions. British aircraft based at the SBAs have joined the U.S.-led military operations in Syria and NATO operations in Libya.101 By providing key British military capabilities in the region, the SBAs enhance the U.S. military’s ability to conduct military operations through alliances.
Having access to the SBAs can also be crucial during a regional emergency that requires rapidly evacuating U.S. citizens and U.S. government personnel from unstable countries. The close proximity of Cyprus to multiple regional conflicts, including Libya and Syria, makes the SBAs well positioned to host evacuated U.S. personnel if conditions in a regional country deteriorate rapidly. For instance, during the 2006 war between Israel and Lebanon, several thousand U.S. diplomats and personnel were evacuated by naval transport and helicopter from the U.S. Embassy in Beirut to Cyprus. The evacuation of nearly 15,000 American citizens from Lebanon during July and August 2006 was one of the largest oversea evacuations of American citizens in history.102 Another crisis in Lebanon is possible given simmering tensions between Hezbollah and Israel and civil unrest surrounding the poor state of the Lebanese economy.
If U.S. relations with Turkey continue to sour, having an additional base for U.S. forces in the region outside of Incirlik grants the UK and the
United States more freedom to plan. Erdogan routinely threatens the closure of Incirlik to punish what he views as undesirable U.S. policy actions. In November 2020, Erdogan reacted to a recent U.S. Senate resolution recognizing the Armenian genocide with a threat that Turkey would shut down Incirlik and a second U.S. military installation, Kurecik radar station, “if necessary.”103 Some U.S. observers have called for drawing down U.S. forces at Incirlik due to concerns that it gives Erdogan greater credibility within Turkey’s domestic political scene and undue leverage over the United States. If the incoming administration decided to draw down the U.S. force at Incirlik, it could potentially redeploy such personnel to the SBAs which would still provide access to the Middle East region.
Any hard decisions on Incirlik and the SBAs must be taken with consideration of the fact that Erdogan may, for purposes of shoring up domestic political support, overreact to U.S. action and attempt to close Incirlik or more closely involve the Turkish military with the Russian military. However, failing to provide the U.S. military with alternative basing options presents a strategically undesirable reliability on an undependable ally.
Proposed U.S. Policy Objectives on Cyprus
This report lays out three objectives that should guide the incoming administration’s strategy on the Cyprus conflict. Objective One relates to Interests One, Three and Five; Objective Two relates to Interests Two and Three; and Objective Three relates to Interest Four.
Under each strategic objective, this report recommends short-term and medium-term policies based on in-depth research by each workshop participant and interviews with former and current officials from various stakeholder governments, the RoC, the self-proclaimed TRNC, the UK, and the United States, as well as the UN. Short-term recommendations are those actions that the United States can realistically achieve within the first two years of the incoming administration’s first term. Medium-term recommendations involve complex policy actions that would likely require more than two years to accomplish and are less crucial to securing the most important U.S. interests.
The recommended policies seek to leverage the full toolkit of U.S. national power, to include military, economic, and political, requiring coordination across departments and branches of the U.S. government. U.S. departments and agencies with envisioned roles in our recommended strategy include the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury and Commerce, and the U.S. Intelligence Community. Congressional support and outreach to the American Greek activist community, one of the most influential ethnic lobbies on Capitol Hill, will also be important for implementing policies requiring legislation.
Objective One: Limit Turkey’s destabilizing actions in the regional hydrocarbon competition
With its increasingly aggressive posture in the region, Turkey has become less reliable as a U.S. ally and a partner in the NATO alliance. On the hydrocarbon dispute, unilateral maritime delimitation efforts by Turkey are creating new tensions in the conflict that could jeopardize stability in Cyprus. In midNovember, President Erdogan made a highly provocative visit to the self-proclaimed TRNC, meeting with the newly elected leader in northern Cyprus, Ersin Tatar, and declaring his support for a two-state solution for the conflict. Turkey’s militarized approach in the hydrocarbon dispute and its provocative rhetoric on the internal conflict pose risks to the conflict’s stable status quo. The transition to the incoming administration offers an opportunity to reset expectations
on the regional hydrocarbon issue and, more generally, in the U.S.-Turkey relationship. Tensions between the United States and Turkey, which are currently the highest in decades, revolve around Turkey’s S-400 acquisition, its democratic backslide, and its military adventurism in multiple regional civil wars.104 Erdogan himself harbors a growing list of grievances against the United States. These include U.S. support to the Syrian Kurdish militias, unfounded suspicions regarding U.S. involvement in the 2016 coup attempt, and Fethullah Gulen’s presence in the United States.105 Most recently, the U.S. government imposed sanctions on Turkey in December 2020 for Turkey’s acquisition of Russia’s S-400 air defense system, which Erdogan called a “hostile attack” on Turkish sovereign rights.106 The United States must clearly signal it will not tolerate designs by the Turkish government or any foreign power to lay claim to gas and oil resources through force of arms and will defend regional states that are pursuing peaceful commercial collaboration, including the RoC, Israel, and Greece. As such, we recommend the following:
Short-term Recommendations
Frame the Greece-Cyprus-Israel energy triad as an anchor of regional stability that the United States will support: The United States should support and promote the regional energy cooperation among three American partners (Greece, Cyprus, and Israel) as a democratic foundation for the region and a strategic regional partnership
Hydrocarbons in Focus
Exploratory drilling off the coasts of Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey have unearthed substantial natural gas reserves at the turn of the last decade.112 Three gas fields were discovered in Cyprus’ maritime zone at a time when the island was experiencing an economic slump. The hydrocarbon discovery gave Cypriots hope that they might reduce their dependence on oil imports, become a gas exporter country, and boost their economy.113 The hydrocarbon discovery was also strategically important to Europe, given the EU’s goal to diversify its energy resources to reduce dependence on Russia.
The RoC and the EU believe that the RoC has the legal authority to sign international agreements and issue licenses for resource exploration within its EEZ, given that the RoC is the internationally recognized government of the island. The RoC government established a sovereign wealth fund for hydrocarbon revenue and declared its intention to share profits from these resources with the Turkish Cypriots once the conflict is resolved and the island is united.114
Yet, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots condemn Nicosia’s action as unfairly unilateral. Turkish Cypriots, with support from Ankara, have called for a suspension of RoC hydrocarbon activity or the development of a bicommunal body under UN supervision that would determine a profit-sharing mechanism for hydrocarbon resources.115 Turkey objects to the Greek Cypriot administration of hydrocarbon activities both because Ankara does not recognize the RoC as the legitimate government of Cyprus and because Ankara claims that a portion of the RoC’s EEZ overlaps with Turkey’s continental shelf.116 Turkey’s claims are not reflected in internationally recognized agreements and Ankara refuses to sign the UN Convention for the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).117
Cyprus’ major gas fields lie outside the area disputed by Turkey and the self-proclaimed TRNC, offering some hope that geopolitical contests will not impact their development.118 That has not prevented Turkey from growing increasingly confrontational to defend against perceived territorial encroachment and the threat of competition from Cypriot gas. Turkey may also be reacting to its own exclusion from the newly formed EastMed Gas Forum (EMGF), a partnership of Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Greece, Italy, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority aimed at developing a regional gas market in the Mediterranean. Turkey has been further isolated by the EastMed pipeline project, an intergovernmental agreement between Cyprus, Israel, and Greece to build a pipeline that could transport 10 billion cubic meters of gas per year and would stretch from Israeli and Cypriot gas fields to Italy via Greece.119 Turkish vessels have long interfered with energy exploration activities and have most recently conducted live-fire military exercises off the coast of Cyprus.
The hydrocarbon discovery has not been an external catalyst that brought the two sides together; rather it has exacerbated tensions and made the conflict more difficult to resolve. The gas issue has triggered a new constellation of geopolitical threats for Cyprus, but at present, the island has not reaped any of the expected economic benefits, and it could be several years until Cyprus can extract and transport its gas reserves. At that point, Europe’s primary market for natural gas may be saturated. In addition, Turkey is likely to undermine any attempt by Cyprus to export gas through a marine pipeline to Cairo.120 Finally, the COVID-19 pandemic has substantially decreased the price of natural gas, which reduced investor interest in Cypriot energy exploration.
Regardless of whether the EastMed pipeline is viable, the project will deepen cooperation among Israel, Greece and Cyprus. The United States is expanding its own cooperation with these states through the 3+1 strategic framework, a forum that presents opportunities for collaborating on natural gas, environmental issues, and cyber security.121
that may expand into greater maritime military cooperation. Within the first months of the Biden Administration, the U.S. State Department should declare U.S. support for emerging partnerships in the realm of hydrocarbon exploration between regional states, including Greece, Cyprus, Israel and Egypt. Such messages would anchor regional stability and Turkey’s growing influence in the region.
Work with regional partners, including Israel, Greece and Cyprus, to increase joint military exercises in the Eastern
Mediterranean: These could range from non-inflammatory exercises that occur in the jurisdiction of a member of the GreeceCyprus-Israel triad to more provocative exercises that take place in disputed waters. However, this risks further isolating Turkey and providing fuel for Erdogan to further inflame ethnonationalism in Turkey. Turkey could escalate tensions with more provocative acts in disputed areas.
Medium-term Recommendations
Encourage a bicommunal initiative to establish a profit-sharing mechanism for hydrocarbon revenues derived from resources off the coast of Cyprus: The United States should support Track 1.5 efforts to facilitate resource sharing and joint ownership of hydrocarbons by funding academia and think tanks. Track 1.5 provides an opportunity for officials within the RoC government to act in an unofficial capacity to
begin discussions on an intransigent issue. RoC policy, that negotiations with Turkish Cypriots regarding resource sharing will only occur once the conflict is resolved, constrains government officials from negotiating on hydrocarbon sharing mechanisms. As a result, unofficial diplomacy is required to make progress on negotiating the details of how potential profits from natural gas could be shared between the two communities.
Objective Two: Counter Russia’s influence in the Republic of Cyprus
The RoC continues to maintain financial and military ties with the Russian government through illicit money laundering and occasional port calls by Russian naval assets. Such strategic interactions between Russia and the RoC, an EU member state, work against the U.S. agenda of competing with Russia, a key great power rival. Russia for its part aims to fill vacuums of U.S. leadership in the Eastern Mediterranean, advance its counterNATO agenda, and deepen its official ties with the RoC. Greater Russian involvement in Cyprus would sow further instability in a region where Russian intervention is already undermining U.S. regional interests, such as in Libya and Syria.
During interviews, current and former senior U.S. officials acknowledged that it would be difficult for the United States to completely replace Russia on the island. Many U.S. officials based their assessment on Russia’s deep cultural ties to the Greek Cypriot community, such as their shared Orthodox religious identities, and sizable Russian investments on the island that have enriched Greek Cypriot elites through “pay to play” politics. That said, U.S. officials noted the RoC government has been more receptive recently to U.S. requests for downgrading the RoC’s official cooperation with Russia. We propose the following steps to drive a greater wedge between the RoC and Moscow. Given the long history of cooperation between the countries, these measures are aimed at incrementally chipping away at Russia’s influence and positioning the United States as the RoC’s strategic partner of choice.
Short-term Recommendations
Work through official, diplomatic channels with the RoC government to express that the United States categorically opposes the Russian Navy’s port calls in the RoC: The U.S. government should also consider declassifying intelligence demonstrating that Russian military vessels stopping at Cypriot ports are not conducting humanitarian missions in the region but rather supplying military arms to the Syrian regime and Russian forces in Syria.
Renew the conditional waiver on defense trade regulations and consider expanding it to incorporate
lethal military equipment: The U.S. government’s restrictions on the transfer of military arms to the RoC were created in the 1980s with the aim of preventing an arms race on the island [see Appendix B for background on the U.S. Defense Trade Regulations with the RoC]. Given that the Turkish military maintains tens of thousands of troops on the island, the United States should renew waivers for non-lethal equipment, consider expanding the scope of non-lethal equipment that the United States transfers, and consider allowing lethal aid, although that could cause tensions with the Turkish government. Russia is Cyprus’ main supplier of arms, but the United States should seek to supplant that position by renewing the existing waiver and reviewing possible mechanisms to expand it. The United States should ensure the extension to the defense trade regulations is conditional on RoC efforts to make progress on limiting Russian port calls.
Strengthen capacity in the RoC to combat Anti-money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism (AML/ CFT): The United States should support RoC enforcement of anti-money laundering
UK Sovereign Base Areas in Focus
The SBAs are two military bases that are considered sovereign UK territory on the island of Cyprus. In the 1960 Treaty of Establishment, the UK negotiated with the future Cypriot government to retain 98 square miles, around 3 percent of the island, making up two bases, one in the southwest known as Akrotiri or Western SBA and one in the east known as Dhekelia or Eastern SBA.122 Today, the SBAs host over 3,100 military personnel, 4,000 dependents and civil servants, and 11,000 Cypriot nationals, according to the SBA administration.123
The bases have served as key staging areas for UK and U.S. military operations in the Middle East and North Africa.124 In fact, RAF Akrotiri is the largest British air base outside the UK mainland. RAF Akrotiri hosts the majority of SBA air assets, which include strategic airlift, search and rescue capability, air-to-air refueling aircraft, air superiority fighters, and ground surveillance aircraft. The base also hosts the 903 Expeditionary Air Wing, which was reformed in late 2014 to support UK operations against the Islamic State over Iraq and Syria, known as Operation Shader. In May 2019, the UK deployed several of its F-35Bs to RAF Akrotiri to participate in strikes against ISIS.125
In addition to the anti-ISIS strikes, the base was used as the staging ground for the UK’s contributions to other coalition operations in the region. In 2011, aircraft were deployed from RAF Akrotiri as part of Operation Ellamy, which was the UK mission enforcing the NATO no-fly zone in Libya.126 RAF Akrotiri was also the launching pad for UK Tornado aircraft involved in the 2018 U.S., UK, and French strikes against Syrian military bases over the Syrian government’s use of chemical weapons in Douma.127
policies and conduct risk assessments of highrisk sectors in the economy in accordance with recommendations by the EU Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL). Additionally, the United States should encourage the IMF and other financial institutions that have provided financial assistance to Cyprus to support the implementation of anti-money laundering efforts in Cyprus. The United States, in collaboration with the RoC, can create joint investigative teams to share bank information, identify shortfalls in the AML/CFT legal and regulatory framework, and provide recommendations to improve enforcement; and conduct risk assessments of high-risk sectors, including real estate, casinos, legal persons and arrangements. Wealthy Russians will have less incentive to invest in the RoC and will lose influence if there is less Russian money on the island.
Given shared concerns about Russian influence and terrorist financing, the United States and the EU can work towards AML/ CFT in accordance with recommendations by MONEYVAL and the 2020 U.S. International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR).107 The United States should provide inputs to the EU comprehensive policy on AML/CFT scheduled for 2021, which Cyprus would eventually implement.108 While engagement with the self-proclaimed TRNC is limited, the United States and the EU can improve AML/ CFT frameworks as part of the EU acquis communautaire in northern Cyprus. The EU is already providing technical assistance to northern Cypriot authorities under EU auspices so additional U.S. technical assistance to the EU could reduce the political
Unlike other overseas UK territories, the SBAs are run by the UK Ministry of Defense and do not contain settled British civilian populations. As a former UK official said, “They’re not colonies as such, they’re sovereign areas governed by the commander of British forces.”128 At the same time, the SBAs operate differently than most overseas U.S. military bases, which are typically leased from the host government for a set amount of time and are subject to greater restrictions at the direction of the host government.
Nevertheless, the RoC has generally opposed the continued presence of the SBAs. A former Cypriot official described the SBAs as a “bitter” price to pay for independence from the UK and a case of “amputated decolonization” since the areas remain under British rather than Cypriot control. Some scholars have also argued that the SBAs are inconsistent with the principles of self-determination in the UN Charter since the UK forced Cyprus to agree to the bases in order to secure independence.129
In international negotiations, the SBAs became an important issue of negotiation during the Annan Plan process. As an enticement to the Greek Cypriot community, in February 2003 the UK offered to transfer 45 square miles or almost half of its SBAs on the island, 90 percent to the Greek Cypriots and 10 percent to the Turkish Cypriots, if the two sides agreed to the plan.130 The areas would have largely been lands that were already inhabited by Cypriots and not used for direct military purposes. Additionally, the offer which was codified in Annex II of the Annan Plan also clarified the maritime borders around the bases, though the plan was never implemented after its failure to gain support in the RoC.131 The UK repeated the offer again in 2009.132 The status of the SBAs came up again during the negotiations at Crans Montana in 2017 and once more the UK reportedly offered to give up around half of its SBA territory as part of a negotiated settlement.133
sensitivity with the RoC and advance U.S. interests.109
To measure if these policies are working to decrease Russian influence in Cyprus we propose the following metrics: 1) the prevalence of Russian narratives in traditional and social media spaces, 2) a contraction in formal diplomatic relations, 3) frequency of Russian naval visits to Cypriot ports, and 4) influx of Russian money on the island. We delineate these monitoring efforts in Appendix C.
Continue and expand U.S. International Military Education and Training (IMET) for the RoC to promote U.S. defense doctrine and standards through professional military education, training, and relationship-building for
RoC officers: The United States introduced IMET for fiscal year 2021, and should seek to continue and expand the program in fiscal year 2022 to a larger cohort of officers. While this initiative would be subject to congressional appropriations, the new administration nevertheless should announce its intention to maintain and expand the program in fiscal year 2022 to signal the importance of the U.S.-Cyprus relationship to both the RoC and Congress.
Continue working within NATO to assess its deterrence capabilities in the Eastern Mediterranean: The United States should advocate that NATO commission an updated evaluation of its deterrence capabilities in its southern region, given changes, such as increased Russian influence and the Turkish purchase of the S-400s. The study should seek to understand the shifting geopolitical landscapes, including
A CH-47 Chinook flight engineer assisgned to the 1-214th General Support Aviation Battalion, enjoys the view during a training flight over the island of Cyprus on Jan. 15, 2020. Source: U.S. Army/Maj. Robert Fellingham
the implication of deploying lethal and non-lethal equipment to member states. The product of this assessment should be actionable recommendations for NATO and member states that guide the reallocation of resources to ensure NATO can respond to malign Russian influence in the region. This would not only be a chance for the United States and its allies to take stock of their capabilities but would also be an important opportunity for the upcoming administration to reset U.S. priorities in the region.
Medium-term Recommendations
Expand technical assistance to Cyprus that strengthens democratic institutions, reducing the incentives for illicit finance and Russian investment:
This technical assistance could involve trainings and capacity-building conducted by the State Department’s Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training (OPDAT) for banks, investigators, prosecutors, and the judiciary. These trainings would aim to increase the RoC’s effectiveness at prosecuting money laundering offenses and confiscating illegal proceeds. Moreover, the U.S. government should facilitate publicprivate partnerships between U.S. financial technology companies and the Cypriot banking sector and encourage American businesses to expand operations to Cyprus to improve access to finance and investments for Greek and Turkish Cypriots.
Increase U.S. funding for and engagement with local initiatives aimed at countering Russian-backed messaging and disinformation campaigns on the island: Moscow excels at conducting influence and disinformation campaigns to gain control over local political movements and sway public opinion. Historically, Russian soft power has similarly impacted events in Cyprus, including when Russian influence over AKEL likely swayed the Greek Cypriots to reject the Annan Plan
in the 2004 referendum.110 In fact, Cyprus is already the home base of one hub of Russianbacked information warfare. A publishing company called The Soul, run by Russian nationals, frequently buys Facebook ads targeting U.S. citizens with false information about controversial political issues.111 The Soul also produces pro-Russia content and spreads disinformation about local politics. The United States can increase funding to help local organizations, and the U.S. Embassy expand media and digital literacy programming on the island.
Objective Three: Shape conflict dynamics within Cyprus to support a future settlement process
The transition to the Biden Administration is an opportunity to lay the groundwork for future negotiations in the Cyprus conflict by introducing new ideas and areas of policy innovation. The United States should invest in relatively low-cost, high-impact efforts to reduce the trust gap between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Gradual efforts aimed at confidence building will improve the likelihood that future settlement negotiations succeed at a time when the conflict is sufficiently ripe for a settlement. Such investments today can better position the United States to create background conditions that incentivize cooperation on the part of the two communities. Laying the groundwork in President-elect Biden’s early days could be a catalyst for a future settlement process and better position the United States to exploit favorable changes to conflict dynamics.
Short-term Recommendations
Existing U.S. policies that should be continued during the incoming Biden Administration include:
Reiterate U.S. Support for the Bizonal, Bicommunal, Federation Framework:
For decades, the official U.S. position has been that the BBF framework is the starting point for a political resolution to the Cyprus conflict. This is in keeping with past U.S. administrations and international negotiations since at least the 1980s. In sustaining our support for the BBF construct, the United States should signal its desire to see one Cyprus governed under a federation system of government. The inflammatory calls for a two-state solution to the conflict by new president of the self-proclaimed TRNC Tatar and President Erdogan, including during their joint commemoration in November 2020 of the self-proclaimed TRNC’s founding, pose the most serious challenges to the BBF framework in decades. Without firm and high-level U.S. statements stressing the need for a solution based on the BBF, Turkish Cypriot leader Ercin Tatar and Erdogan may be emboldened to intensify their calls for a two-state solution.
Continue withholding U.S. official
recognition of the TRNC: The TRNC is a self-declared state that is only recognized by Turkey and is dependent on Turkey for its economic and military support. Although we suggest ways that the United States can deepen intercommunal ties, the United States should maintain its policy of non-recognition towards the TRNC.
Beyond these existing policies, the incoming administration should take the following measures to better prepare conditions within Cyprus for the future resumption of a negotiation process. These include:
Work through USUN to increase UN assistance to the bicommunal Technical Committees on Cultural Heritage, Economic & Commercial Matters, Gender Equality, Crossings, and Missing Persons in Cyprus: These Committees are led by representatives from the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities and are already implementing concrete confidence-building measures that promote reconciliation efforts between the two communities. The UNDP has also
facilitated bicommunal collaboration projects such as the restoration of the Monastery of Apostolos Andreas. Expanding and improving these confidence-building measures will promote people-to-people diplomacy and help both communities develop a shared identity. Initiating grassroots attitudes and perspective transformations among non-state actors would contribute to thawing tensions in official diplomatic negotiations.
Activate and increase funding for past and existing U.S. programs promoting bicommunal cooperation between
Greek and Turkish Cypriots: Since the 1980s, the United States has funded programs such as the Cyprus America Scholarship Program, Action for Cooperation and Trust, and Bicommunal Support Program. These programs have encouraged Greek and Turkish Cypriot youth and professionals to study
The Future of UNFICYP
UNFICYP’s presence in Cyprus, though important for deterring violence, has helped maintain a relatively comfortable status quo for nearly sixty years. It has had moderate success as a peacekeeping force, but it has not managed to help the Cypriots reach a peace deal after many decades.
UNFICYP is responsible for numerous humanitarian activities in Cyprus meant to bring together both communities, promote peace, and strengthen relationships. They also work in the buffer zone to remove mines and to facilitate farming by establishing and monitoring the supply of water and electricity across both sides. These components of the UNFICYP mission are seen as successful and are important tools in the peacemaking process.134
While the violent aspect of the conflict has been dormant for decades, there is legitimate fear on both sides about a future without UNFICYP. The Greek Cypriots fear Turkish aggression without the presence of UNFICYP as a deterrent. The Turkish Cypriots benefit greatly from humanitarian work that UNFICYP leads. The threat of UNFICYP’s withdrawal may give the UN enough leverage to reset the negotiations and add a sense of urgency to the discussion. However, previous threats of withdrawal have not moved the parties closer to negotiation so any plan that involves withdrawal needs to be credible and accepted by both parties.
Finnish UNFICYP soldiers bicycling to Nicosia from Dhekelia pass a checkpoint in 1964. Source: UN Photo/BZ Canadian UNFICYP soldier on sentry duty at Paphos Gate to OP on Hermes St. in Nicosia in 1973. Source: UN Photo/Yutaka Nagata
with, collaborate with, and learn from one another. By expanding and enhancing these bicommunal trust programs, the United States can encourage individual Cypriot citizens to recognize the value of multiculturalism and inclusion. These programs would also foster a new generation of diplomats who will approach settlement negotiations with more collaborative and considerate attitudes.
Support novel Track 2 efforts to facilitate confidence-building between
the two sides: Track 2 dialogue allows actors more bandwidth to explore innovative measures to enhance cooperation and understanding. Thus far, all Track 1 diplomatic efforts by the UN and other international mediators have failed. Therefore, the United States should support private citizens, civil society organizations, and academics to explore novel and innovative solutions that could foster a productive and cooperative environment for renewed settlement talks.
Medium-term Recommendations
Work to resolve the Missing Persons
issue: The United States should provide support to the Committee on Missing Persons (CMP). U.S. support will contribute to recovering and identifying the remains of the 2,000 persons reported missing during the inter-communal fighting in the 1960s and the events of 1974. Previous excavations conducted by the CMP have successfully returned close to 1,000 identified individuals to their families reducing ethnic tensions around a volatile issue.
Create forums for peacebuilding
involving key stakeholders: The U.S. should form a U.S. Institute of Peace Task Force to create and implement a roadmap for bridging ethnic, religious, social, cultural and political divides between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. The Task Force will engage communities on both sides, identify their needs and demands, and craft policy recommendations for strengthening intercommunal relations. It will work with local organizations to identify and bring together diverse stakeholders from both communities to engage in peacebuilding discussions.
Strengthen economic collaboration between Greek Cypriots and Turkish
Cypriots: U.S. officials should reactivate the Cyprus Partnership for Economic Growth to reduce economic disparities between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. The initiative will bring Greek and Turkish Cypriot-led businesses and chambers of commerce together through joint ventures.
Broaden ownership of the peace
process: U.S. policy should focus on increased participation from groups that have been historically marginalized in the peace process to form favorable public opinion on reconciliation efforts. This can help enable and sustain conditions for a peaceful settlement by empowering local actors and displacing the role of Turkey, Greece and Russia to maintain divisions between Greek and Turkish Cypriots for their own interests. The U.S. could expand women’s participation and leadership in negotiating and driving peacebuilding. Other groups that can be engaged include civil servants, religious leaders, students, academics and community workers.
Track 2 Performance Indicators
The U.S. State Department could evaluate the effectiveness of the Track 2 initiatives mentioned above based on metrics that include: political representation of women from Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities; frequency of contact between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot youth; number of joint programs on peacebuilding led by leaders in both communities; number of joint ventures between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot-owned businesses; and frequency of communication between RoC government officials and Turkish Cypriot leaders.
