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An Unsustainable Status Quo
A Complacent Conflict
Although Cyprus has been divided for nearly 50 years, the island has experienced few instances of violence since 1974. Yet, the length and relative stability of the conflict has produced an embedded sense of complacency, both on the island and within the international community. This relative comfort with the conflict’s status quo has reduced the incentive for actors to commit to long-term and extensive negotiations toward a settlement.
The success of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), which will soon reach its sixtieth year of operation on the island, may actually impede peacemaking, since the absence of war reduces the parties’ incentive for negotiation.34 The United States and the UN likely do not want UNFICYP to become a perpetual peacekeeping force. In addition, numerous barriers to restarting talks, including the issues of security guarantees and non-recognition of the government in the North, reinforce the complacency surrounding a solution. Furthermore, the conflict is old enough to have become grounded in the identity and belief systems of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. Transforming ingrained understandings of the conflict and the ‘other’ will be difficult to disrupt. Although the status quo may be comfortable, it is not sustainable. The history of protracted conflicts illustrates that stalemates often evolve into flashpoints of conflict — and frequently with little warning. The 2016 and 2020 clashes in Nagorno-Karabakh were triggered after approximately two decades of a relatively nonviolent ceasefire. Meanwhile, one RoC government representative cautioned that the dynamics of the Cyprus conflict are “shifting quickly.” That official’s warning demonstrates the need for renewed efforts to manage the conflict to prevent tensions from escalating further and forestall Turkey’s creeping annexation from hardening the island’s division.
Unforeseen developments could escalate the conflict, given that it features half a century of mutual suspicion and distrust. Recent developments, such as the energy dispute in the Eastern Mediterranean and Turkey’s call for a two-state solution,35 could lead to violence within the next decade. A compounding factor is the growing economic frustrations of a younger generation of Turkish Cypriots in the North. Lessons from conflicts in the Balkans, Northern Ireland, and Israel-Palestine illustrate how young people may inherit, internalize, and accelerate the grievances of their parents.36 Policymakers should prepare in advance for the potential that violence is renewed on the island.
Regionally, the Cyprus conflict could impact the energy dispute in the Eastern Mediterranean, perhaps jeopardizing U.S. economic interests and international freedom of movement. Unilateral maritime delimitation efforts by Turkey and exploration of offshore hydrocarbons have created new tensions in the conflict that could jeopardize the stability on the island. It is not unlikely that Turkish and Greek or Cypriot ships could experience an altercation off the coast of Cyprus or in the Aegean Seas that could trigger a broader conflict. Furthermore, prolonging the dispute for too much longer increases the likelihood that Turkey deepens its involvement in the conflict. The international community will find it more difficult to coordinate a peace process between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots if Turkey continues to increase its interference in the energy dispute.
On a global scale, maintaining the status quo could harm U.S. interests in limiting Russian
influence in the region, and that of China to a lesser extent. The continued presence of UN peacekeepers on the island enables Russia and China to exert power through their positions on the UNSC for the biannual UNFICYP mandate renewals. In addition, Russia actively benefits from the conflict’s existence. So long as the RoC and Turkey do not recognize one another, the EU and NATO are not fully able to cooperate. Moreover, the conflict perpetuates the rift between NATO members Greece and Turkey.
Finally, on a hyper-local scale, the reliance of the RoC’s economy on tourism is endangered by the continuation of the status quo. The existence of the border wall and constant potential for instability is not desirable for the tourism industry. Given the number of locations competing with Cyprus for tourists, managing the conflict internally should be an important goal for the Greek Cypriots if they wish to maintain a competitive edge in this industry.
The conventional assumption holds that the next ‘ripe’ moment for a settlement would be Turkey’s eventual accession to the EU. However, Turkish irredentism and worsening relations with the West impede this goal. Instead, the imminent transition to the new Administration is an opportunity to prepare for future negotiations by introducing new ideas and policy interventions. Laying the groundwork in President-elect Biden’s early days could be a catalyst for a future settlement process.
The following section outlines potential scenarios and how they may play out if the current status quo were to be maintained.
For decades, Turkey has been the only external power influencing politics and the economy in northern Cyprus. In recent years, Turkey has strengthened its control over the statelet by imposing economic regulations, supporting increased settlement by Turkish nationals, and dictating northern Cyprus’ foreign policy. Ankara’s rhetoric has grown more bellicose, as illustrated by Turkey’s more aggressive support for a two-state solution, Erdogan’s support for opening Varosha beach, and Ankara’s promotion of Turkish Cypriots’ rights to independently pursue hydrocarbon exploration off the coast of northern Cyprus. U.S. policymakers have yet to address Turkey’s creeping annexation in northern Cyprus as it does not pose a direct threat to U.S. interests on the island. While an explicit attempt at annexation, such as Russia’s military interventions in Georgia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014 or Israel’s legislation that effectively annexed the Golan Heights and East Jerusalem, may seem unlikely, the United States should pay attention to Turkey’s creeping annexation of the self-proclaimed TRNC. Just as Israel has attempted to change the facts on the ground in the West Bank through Israeli settlements, Ankara could establish the self-proclaimed TRNC as a Turkish territory through gradual and piecemeal measures and the settlement of Turkish nationals.37 Creeping annexation tightens Ankara’s grip on a portion of the divided island and would prevent the reunification of Cyprus. Indeed, Ankara’s new support for a two-state solution indicates that the country is interested in blocking a settlement that would unify the two Cypriot communities.38
Creeping annexation of northern Cyprus by Turkey would significantly limit the prospects for achieving unification of the island. Moreover, as Ankara’s interest in exploiting hydrocarbons off the coast of Cyprus grows, creeping Turkish annexation over northern Cyprus likely will cause Ankara to become even more bullish on regional energy disputes, challenging the RoC’s sovereignty over its energy resources and fostering greater instability. Finally, tighter Turkish control
over the statelet could exacerbate tensions in the region and within NATO by bringing Turkey into even closer proximity to the RoC and Greece.
At present, Cyprus’ major gas fields lie outside areas disputed by Turkey or the selfproclaimed TRNC, offering some hope that geopolitical contests will not impact their development. However, as exploration and drilling activity intensifies in contested areas, Turkey is growing increasingly confrontational in defending against perceived encroachment. The discovery of a major gas field in the RoC’s claimed continental shelf, that either overlaps with the continental shelf claimed by Turkey or is contested by the self-proclaimed TRNC, could serve as a catalyst for conflict. Ankara claims that Blocks 1, 4, 5, 6, and 7, delineated by the RoC, overlap with Turkey’s continental shelf.39 A major hydrocarbon discovery in this region could provoke a standoff between Turkish and Cypriot ships if both countries issue licenses to explore the disputed area. Since Turkey does not recognize the government of the RoC, there could be no negotiations to defuse and resolve the dispute, increasing the likelihood of escalation into violent conflict.
A major gas field could also be discovered in an area contested by the self-proclaimed TRNC. This scenario presents the possibility for even more provocative Turkish action, acting at the behest of the self-proclaimed TRNC, within the territorial waters of the RoC. In 2018, Turkish naval forces interfered with a drilling vessel chartered by the Italian company Eni that was licensed by the RoC. The incident occurred in an area that was indisputably within Cypriot waters but to which both the RoC and the self-proclaimed TRNC had granted licenses for exploration. Turkish drilling vessel Yavuz was operating in disputed waters until October 12, 2020 while the Turkish seismic survey vessel Barbaros Hayreddin Pasa is still operating south of Cyprus. Moreover, Turkey conducted live-fire military exercises off the coast of Cyprus in September 2020.40
While it is possible that a major hydrocarbon discovery in waters claimed by both the RoC and self-proclaimed TRNC could provide an opportunity for discussing a revenue sharing agreement, this is an unlikely outcome. Precedent has shown that hydrocarbon exploration and discovery off the coast of Cyprus has exacerbated conflict, both on the island and between major powers in the Mediterranean region.
HMS Enterprise visiting Cyrus and carrying out rescue exercises in September 2020. Source: Sovereign Base Areas Administration and British Forces Cyprus
Scenario Three: An Accidental Naval Incident Between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean Sea
In a bid to reassert its national sovereignty over its “Blue Homeland” and “rightful claims” to hydrocarbons in the Aegean Sea, Turkey sends out exploration vessels to disputed waters. They pair this action with the resumption of unregistered overflights from the Turkish military. Greece denounces these flights as transgressions of international air traffic regulations and sends its own jets to intercept. While the air confrontation avoids the mistakes of the past,41 the situation on the sea escalates.
Greek naval ships attempt to intercept the Turkish exploration vessel and force it to leave the disputed area. The exchange results in a collision, leading to significant damage to the Turkish ship as well as loss of life. Seeing this as an escalation, Turkey dispatches military vessels to the disputed area and claims a right to defend itself and the “territorial integrity” of its maritime boundary. A red line is drawn around the disputed area with Turkey vowing to defend it with military force. Greece sends its own ships in response. The Turkish navy uses warning shots to deter Greek approaches into the disputed area.
In such a scenario, the United States should call for an immediate end to the warning shots as well as the buildup in the disputed waters. Furthermore, the United States should be prepared to denounce Turkey’s provocative actions by establishing a territorial zone. The United States may have to send its own naval assets to manage the boundary of the newly claimed maritime territory of Turkey between the Greek and Turkish naval forces until a resolution is reached between Athens and Ankara.
Scenario Four: Increasing Violence Between Greek and Turkish Cypriots
It is December 2021. In light of a successful COVID-19 vaccination campaign in Cyprus, the RoC and the self-proclaimed TRNC have agreed to partially reopen crossing points for Turkish Cypriots to enter the southern part of the island.42 A group of thirty Turkish Cypriots, consisting of families and migrant laborers assemble at the buffer zone to be escorted to RoC territory by UNFICYP soldiers. However, as they step across the gate, a group of farright Greek Cypriot protesters ambush them with stones and Molotov cocktails.43
The scuffle ends with one Turkish Cypriot woman dead and sixteen others, including children, severely injured. Authorities capture the perpetrators, but within weeks the RoC courts acquit them with slaps on the wrist. Outraged by Greek Cypriot violence against Turkish Cypriots and the RoC’s reluctance to administer justice, Turkish Cypriots begin organizing to take revenge. They recruit and deploy youth groups to harass and assault Greek Cypriots across the Green Line. President Anastasiades of the RoC, President Sakellaropoulou of Greece, and Prime Minister Mitsotakis of Greece condemn the violence as “depraved indecency” while President Erdogan applauds the Turkish Cypriots’ “activism.” Rhetoric between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots grows more hostile until both sides are threatening one another with armed force.
If such a scenario occurs, we recommend that the United States issue a public statement condemning all acts of intercommunal violence occurring in Cyprus. The United States should urge the UN to deploy additional peacekeeping troops to Cyprus to curb civilian-initiated violence. The United States should also urge the RoC, Greece, and Turkey to de-escalate tensions with the threat of harsh sanctions should armed conflict break out.
