Introduction

The island of Cyprus has emerged as a geopolitical hotspot in the Eastern Mediterranean, requiring greater U.S. policy attention in the coming years. Historically, the Cyprus problem has been rooted in competing ethnic and nationalist identities between the two communities of the island: the majority Greek Cypriots and the minority Turkish Cypriots. Although Cyprus suffered bouts of intense violence in the early Cold War period, the situation on the island has settled into a protracted status quo.

The two Cypriot communities remain deadlocked in a conflict that involves competing claims to territory, ethnic identities, and geopolitics between the two communities’ “motherlands,” Greece and Turkey. Although Cyprus has experienced low levels of violence since the 1980’s, new sources of tension pose threats to the stability of the island’s current environment. Interstate disputes over the island’s offshore hydrocarbon resources are intensifying. The economic aspirations of the Turkish Cypriots in the North, especially among youth, continue to go unmet. Russia has deepened its financial and military ties to the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) over the past decade, Turkey has adopted an increasingly aggressive stance in the Eastern Mediterranean, and China has signaled a burgeoning economic interest in Cyprus.

Despite the island’s relatively stable history, intractable conflicts do not remain frozen forever. Instead, they can deteriorate with little warning, as illustrated by the recent escalation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the situation in Western Sahara. The incoming administration should stay ahead of the conflict curve and chart a strategic policy for Cyprus that addresses novel threats to the status quo and regional stability. This report seeks to build upon existing U.S. foreign policy doctrine that positions the Eastern Mediterranean as a strategic space deserving special attention through a tailored foreign policy framework. The transition to a new administration presents an opportunity for considered analysis of this conflict and region of the world to redefine America’s compelling interests and priorities. Our analysis also considers potential scenarios that can threaten the stable status quo.

To that end, this report presents a comprehensive strategy on the Cyprus conflict linking it to U.S. foreign policy priorities in Cyprus, the Eastern Mediterranean region, and the broader international environment. The analysis and policy recommendations put forward in this report make the following assumptions about the character of the conflict and its regional environment. • At the local level, we assume the continuation of the internal conflict’s status quo, characterized by a largely stable security situation between the

Greek and Turkish Cypriots. To the extent that any inter-communal conflict occurs in the coming years, our strategy assumes that violence would be rare and hyperlocalized as it has been since Turkey’s military intervention in 1974. • Our report assumes that Turkish President

Erdogan remains in power through at least the first several years of the incoming administration and maintains Turkey’s aggressive foreign policy approach in the region. A sudden leadership change in

Turkey, such as through a military coup or an electoral defeat in Turkey’s national elections scheduled for 2023, would necessitate reevaluating the U.S. strategy for Cyprus that is recommended in this report.

The Cyprus Problem: History and Background

Today, the stalemated conflict in Cyprus is largely non-violent. Yet, the status quo belies the island’s turbulent and violent history throughout the 20th century. To this day, the island’s violent experience in the last century continues to resonate strongly among Greek and Turkish Cypriots. One need only stroll along the UN-patrolled Green Line bisecting the island to observe the scars of past violence and the competing historical narratives between the two communities.

Numerous internationally led negotiations have foundered since the conflict’s history. UN Special Envoy Jane Holl Lute led the most recent initiative aimed at finding common ground between the two sides, which ultimately proved unsuccessful. Understanding the historical narratives will prepare the incoming administration to avoid the strategic mistakes made by past U.S. administrations on the Cyprus problem. This section reviews major periods in the conflict’s history, to include: 1) the pre-independence period, 2) the Turkish military intervention in 1974, and 3) subsequent attempts to broker a peace settlement.

Pre-Independence Period: From One Foreign Ruler to Another

The Ottoman Empire

Throughout its history, Cyprus has been the bridge between three continents: Europe, Asia, and Africa. Cyprus is the third largest island in the Eastern Mediterranean, a geostrategic location of crisscrossing maritime lines of communication.1 The island has fallen prey to the intervention and occupation by ancient regimes and foreign powers.2 The Ottoman Empire’s rule over the island began in 1571, when it wrested control over the island from Venice. Ottoman administration of the island lasted for 308 years and shaped the island’s political geography in ways that are seen today. During Ottoman rule, thousands of Turkishspeaking Muslims were settled on Cyprus, diluting the Greek Cypriot dominance on the island. This small but meaningful Turkish minority became a growing concern not just for the Greek Cypriot population that inhabited the island, but also the Greek state that aimed to have Cyprus achieve enosis i.e. reunite with Greece. The Ottoman millet system of governance further solidified the divide between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, creating separate systems of education that accentuated cultural differences.3

British Colonial Rule

In the 1878 British-Ottoman agreement, Britain gained de facto control over Cyprus and ruled the island until the 1960s. The impetus for Britain’s acquisition of the island centered on the island’s geostrategic location in the Eastern Mediterranean, which provided an outpost from which to counter Russian imperial designs.4 Within Cyprus, the British authorities created two separate councils for the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, dividing the population along ethnic and religious lines. This limited selfgovernance in Cyprus matched how Imperial Britain ruled other parts of the British Empire.5 While the Greek majority often rebelled against British rule, the Turkish Cypriots largely preferred British rule over the island’s enosis with Greece. Some Turkish Cypriot movements advocated for taksim, or partition of the island.6 Although only present in small areas of the island, Turkish Cypriots enjoyed significant minority rights in the Greek majority state of Cyprus — rights that Turkish Cypriots feared would be revoked if Cyprus successfully achieved enosis.

In 1955, a violent nationalist guerrilla organization, the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA), arose with an aim of achieving enosis and ridding the island of its “undesirable” Turkish Cypriot minority. Turkish Cypriot communities launched an armed retaliation in the 1950s-60s, which led to the creation of the paramilitary

organization, the Turkish Resistance Organization (TMT).7 From 1964 until 1974, most Turkish Cypriots were cramped in scattered enclaves, comprising only 2 to 3 percent of the island’s territory and existing under a parallel administration of their own.

The Constitutional Government: 1960 to 1963

In August 1960, Cyprus gained its independence from Britain after a multi-year resistance campaign organized by the EOKA. The island’s independence was the product of three separate international agreements signed in 1960: the Zurich Agreement, the Treaty of Guarantee, and the Treaty of Alliance. The treaties were agreements between the three “guarantor powers” (Britain, Turkey, and Greece) and the newly independent Republic of Cyprus.8 Today, the treaties also represent continuing obstacles to achieving greater convergence between the interests of Greek and Turkish Cypriots on a negotiated settlement.

The Zurich Agreement created the binational and consociational constitution for the independent Cypriot state. The constitution stipulated that the president of a unified Cyprus would be a Greek Cypriot elected by the Greek Cypriot community, and the vice president would be a Turkish Cypriot elected by the Turkish Cypriot community.9 The Treaty of Guarantee was signed by Britain, Greece, and Turkey, and sought to defuse the dispute between the three guarantor powers. Under the Treaty of Guarantee, each of the guarantor powers committed to forging a consensus if faced with a Cyprusrelated crisis.10 If no consensus was possible, however, the guarantor powers reserved the right to intervene unilaterally on the island.11 The Treaty of Alliance provided for soldiers from Greece and Turkey to protect the island. The 1960 Treaty of Establishment also created the Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs), which allowed Britain to retain 98 square miles of the island as sovereign British territory for military purposes.12 Though they were signed six decades ago, the treaties have become part of the conflict’s modern lexicon.

Almost immediately after the island’s independence, the constitution was beset with problems. For instance, Greek Cypriots resented what they viewed as the overrepresentation of Turkish Cypriots in the national legislature and military. Turkish Cypriots for their part resented the dominance of the Greek language in official government business and glaring economic inequalities between Greek Cypriots in the South and Turkish Cypriots in the North.13 In 1963, the Greek Cypriot President Makarios III issued plans to modify the constitution, leading to increased tensions and violent clashes between the two communities. Starting in 1964, the Greek Cypriots enforced an economic blockade of northern Cyprus in part to stem the flow of lethal arms and strategic materials to Turkish Cypriots.14 This greatly affected the living standards of Turkish Cypriot communities around the island and led to the de facto division of Cyprus.15

The 1974 Turkish military intervention

In 1974, a coup backed by the military junta in Greece toppled the Makarios regime and replaced him with a hardline Greek nationalist. In response, Turkey launched an invasion into northern Cyprus, justifying the action as consistent with Turkey’s right to intervene unilaterally under the Treaty of Guarantee. Turkish military airborne and maritime forces conducted a two-phased military intervention that captured the northern part of the island. The Turkish invasion was catastrophic for the Greek Cypriots. Thousands of Greek Cypriots were killed or wounded, with many more missing. Nearly 160,000 Greek Cypriots fled the fighting and were forced to abandon their homes in northern Cyprus. The Turkish invasion cemented the Cyprus conflict as a proxy war within the Greek-Turkish conflict. Consequently, Turkish Cypriot and Greek

Cypriot populations became more politically and economically divided.

Unsuccessful attempts at conflict resolution: 1974 to Present

Since the separation of the island in 1974, there have been numerous failed attempts at negotiating a solution. Although the internal security situation has remained stable, the conflict has settled into a limbo where the ceasefire prevails, but a resolution is nowhere in sight.

In 1977 and 1979, the Greek and Turkish Cypriots reached two High Level Agreements under the mediation of the United Nations Secretary General, setting the contours of negotiations for the following decades.16 As part of the 1977 High Level Agreement, both sides recognized the objective of future negotiations was forming a Bicommunal Bizonal Federation (BBF) that guaranteed the political equality of the two communities. The 1977 High Level Agreement also stipulated that freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, and the right of property were “open for discussion” under the BBF framework. These three issues have continued to remain the primary sticking points of ongoing discussions. In the 1979 High Level Agreement, both sides agreed to discuss the island’s “demilitarization” without specifying the precise mechanisms to achieve that outcome. Both sides also agreed the island’s independence should be “guaranteed against union in whole or in part” with any other country, principally Greece or Turkey.17

In 1999, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan began drafting a plan to create a United Cyprus Republic under a BBF framework with two constituent states: the Greek Cypriot State and the Turkish Cypriot State. The final April 2004 version of the plan provided for a six-member presidential council made up of four Greek and two Turkish Cypriots, an alternating president and vice president, a bicameral legislature divided proportionally to each community’s population, and a supreme court with equal numbers of Greek, Turkish, and non-Cypriot judges.18 The plan also advocated for a reconciliation committee to bring the two communities together. The plan also outlined a gradual demilitarization of the island, which aimed to eventually achieve a “total withdrawal” of Greek and Turkish forces.19 The Greek and Turkish contingents were each permitted a maximum of 6,000 forces until 2011.20 After 2011, Greece and Turkey were each allowed to keep 3,000 forces on the island until 2018 or the accession of Turkey to the European Union (EU), whichever occurred first. Thereafter, each contingent would be subject to a review every three years with the aim of achieving total withdrawal.21

However, the plan was rejected through popular vote in the 2004 Referendum, with 65 percent of Turkish Cypriots in favor, but only 24 percent of Greek Cypriots supporting the plan.22 Turkish Cypriots supported the increased economic power, disproportionate political power relative to population size, and territorial gains they would have enjoyed under the plan’s provisions. Greek Cypriots opposed the plan since it permitted Turkish troops to permanently remain on the island, and absolved Turkey of responsibility for the 1974 invasion and war crimes. Despite the failure of the Referendum and the continuation of the conflict, the RoC became a full member of the EU on May 4, 2004, after years of negotiations.23 The EU notably recognized RoC de jure control in northern Cyprus, which has further complicated the conflict.

From 2008 to 2015, Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders engaged in multiple dialogues, all with limited success. From 2008 to 2010, RoC President Demetris Christofias and president of the self-proclaimed TRNC, Mehmet Talat, failed to come to an agreement.24 Starting in 2010, President Christofias negotiated with the newly elected leader of the Turkish Cypriots, Dervis Eroglu, but talks abruptly halted in 2012 due to public

Lessons Learned from Previous Talks

The Annan Plan

Several features of the Annan peace process led to its demise in the referendum stage. The proposed Senate structure gave Turkish Cypriots veto power, which Greek Cypriots feared would paralyze decision-making given the lack of trust between the two ethnic communities and their respective political representatives. Greek Cypriots feared that a strong central government would make the Turkish Cypriots more powerful and, therefore, open a pathway for taksim backed by Turkey. Moreover, the Greek Cypriots perceived the power-sharing as unfair as 18 percent of the population would have 30 percent of power. Moreover, the negotiators did not engage Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in their process, which reduced buy-in from ordinary Cypriots, particularly the Greek Cypriot community. A lack of transparency around the negotiations, coupled with the complexity of the plan, made it difficult for Cypriots to understand the terms and engage in a public and informed debate about its merits.

The 2015 - 2017 Talks

The discussants ultimately disagreed over core security issues in the settlement process. Attendance by Turkey at the Geneva conference foiled progress on security and territorial issues, as Ankara immediately opposed territorial concessions that Akinci accepted and refused to abolish the Treaty of Guarantee.33 In part, Ankara’s objective seemed to be stalling the talks, thereby demonstrating the potential for Turkey to behave as a spoiler in future negotiations. This round of negotiations also illustrated Turkey’s unwillingness to give up its role as a security guarantor of Cyprus, which will surely cause Ankara to inhibit future talks.

discontent on the island.25 In 2014, the newly elected RoC President Nicos Anastasiades resumed talks with Mr. Eroglu, but both sides failed to achieve any progress.26 Talks were once again suspended in late 2014 over disagreements regarding Turkish incursions into the RoC’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and energy negotiations.27

In 2015, UN Secretary-General António Guterres led the most recent round of UN-facilitated talks between President Anastasiades and president of the selfproclaimed TRNC, Mustafa Akinci. The international community viewed these talks as the best chance for Cyprus to achieve a settlement after witnessing considerable progress between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot negotiators. However, the negotiators soon found themselves at odds over security issues. Additionally, at the January 2017 Geneva conference, Turkey adamantly opposed the territorial concessions that Akinci accepted and refused to abolish the Treaty of Guarantee. In June 2017, Guterres presented the “Guterres Framework’’ as a last-ditch attempt to guide intercommunal discussions on six core issues: security, troops, territory, equality, property, and power-sharing. Ultimately, negotiations failed and Guterres closed the talks in July 2017.28 Within the Guterres Framework, which in part advocates for a new system of security guarantees, UN Special Envoy Jane Holl Lute has been repeatedly unsuccessful in compelling the sides to agree to a Terms of Reference document to initiate talks.29 The challenges in restarting negotiations have highlighted many barriers to achieving a settlement, including the issue of security guarantees, nonrecognition of TRNC sovereignty by Nicosia, how the two communities will maintain ties to Greece and Turkey, the status of Turkish immigrants in the North, and the ongoing dispute over energy resources.30

The historical precedent illustrates several significant challenges to reaching a settlement in Cyprus, but it also provides several entry points for future actors when the prospects for resolution ripen. For example, both sides seem willing to compromise on aspects of property rights and territorial transfers.31 With the right leaders in place, a compromise on one or both of these issues could facilitate discussion on other core sticking points. In the next round of talks, negotiators would do well to engage CSOs on both sides to foster debate and understanding about a plan’s terms and to gain support from local institutions and political parties.

Secretary-General António Guterres (centre) meets with Greek Cypriot leader Nicos Anastasiades (left) and Turkish Cypriot leader Mustafa Akinci in 2017. Source: UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe However, the challenges to future negotiations remain significant. Importantly, the UN has committed itself to a BBF solution through UNSC resolutions, which has limited the body’s flexibility in exploring or supporting novel approaches. In addition, decades of unsuccessful UN talks have contributed to broad skepticism among both communities of the UN-led process. Relatedly, peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts through both Track 1 and Track 2 avenues continue to suffer from “peace fatigue,” and have failed to effectively address the security angle of the conflict. Finally, the patriarchal character of Cypriot politics and historical exclusion of female participation threatens an inclusive and effective resolution to the conflict.32