Global Productivity

Page 236

210

GLOBAL PRODUCTIVITY

CHAPTER 4

productivity growth underperformance, such that a minority of economies, but a majority of the population, has seen productivity gaps decline since the 1970s. Since the GFC, this surge in productivity growth has declined in several EMDE regions. In addition, historically, sustained convergence to the frontier is rare. In the following section, formal statistical tests of the convergence hypothesis are undertaken to assess the speed of convergence, before delving into more complex examinations of club convergence.

Testing for convergence and its pace Countries with lower initial levels of productivity have only recently begun to outperform productivity growth in high-productivity economies on a broad basis, suggesting the presence of unconditional convergence. This has occurred in recent decades at a slow pace but does not hold over the entire sample. Convergence potential may be hindered by unfavorable characteristics in some economies that hold back productivity growth, such as poor human capital or lack of infrastructure, a phenomenon dubbed “conditional convergence” (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992). This section explores the pace of unconditional and conditional convergence in a more formal statistical framework. Unconditional convergence Unconditional convergence can be assessed using a beta-convergence regression, which posits that productivity growth depends on its initial level: yi T – yi 0 = c + βyi 0 + ϵi T , where y is the natural log of output per worker at both time T and the initial period 0 under consideration and the disturbance term ϵiT captures shocks to productivity in country i that are unrelated to convergence drivers of productivity growth. The hypothesis that β < 0 implies that lower initial productivity produces faster cumulative growth (between time 0 and time T ). When all countries have access to the same technology, those with higher marginal returns to capital—in other words, capital-scarce poorer economies—should benefit from greater capital accumulation and higher growth. The coefficient β can then be converted to an annual rate of convergence, the percent fall in the average productivity gap that is estimated to have occurred each year.7 Literature. Early estimates of β-convergence found little evidence of its existence, often instead finding that initial income was positively related to the subsequent rate of growth (Barro 1991; Baumol 1986; Dowrick 1992).8 More recent tests for unconditional This is computed as (–1) ∗ ln (β + 1) /T, where T is the number of years under consideration, as in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992). 8 Barro (1991) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) apply the unconditional convergence testing procedure to U.S. states and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; Sala-i-Martin (1996) applies the procedure to Japanese prefectures and regions in five European Union countries. All studies have found little evidence of unconditional convergence. 7


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Annex 7B Marginal productivity gap

4min
pages 452-453

References

14min
pages 456-463

Annex 7A Data and methodology

6min
pages 448-451

References

13min
pages 421-428

Sectoral productivity gaps

2min
page 432

Annex 7C Firm TFP data, estimates, and methodology

5min
pages 454-455

Annex 6C Commodity-driven productivity developments: Methodology

2min
page 420

Conclusion and policy implications

2min
page 412

Drivers of productivity: Technology vs. demand shocks

2min
page 391

Annex 6A SVAR identification of technology drivers of productivity

8min
pages 413-416

PART III Technological Change and Sectoral Shifts

0
pages 383-386

Effects of demand shocks

2min
page 397

Figure 6.1 Global labor productivity surges and declines

7min
pages 388-390

Sub-Saharan Africa

2min
page 350

Figure 5.22 Factors supporting productivity growth in MNA

7min
pages 333-335

Figure 5.19 Drivers of productivity growth in LAC

9min
pages 325-328

South Asia

4min
pages 337-338

Conclusion

2min
page 363

Figure 5.13 Drivers of productivity growth in ECA

10min
pages 314-317

Middle East and North Africa

2min
page 329

Latin America and the Caribbean

2min
page 318

Figure 5.12 Drivers of productivity growth in ECA in regional comparison

5min
pages 312-313

Europe and Central Asia

2min
page 305

Figure 5.7 Drivers of productivity growth in EAP

3min
page 301

PART II Regional Dimensions of Productivity

0
pages 281-284

Sources of, and bottlenecks to, regional productivity growth

4min
pages 290-291

Figure 5.1 Evolution of regional productivity in EMDE regions

4min
pages 288-289

East Asia and Pacific

2min
page 295

References

12min
pages 274-280

Evolution of productivity across regions

2min
page 287

Annex 4F Productivity measurement: PPP vs. market exchange rates

4min
pages 268-269

Annex 4C Beta-convergence testing

2min
page 257

Figure 4.4 Convergence club memberships

2min
page 242

Annex 4D Estimating convergence clubs: Commonalities in productivity levels

7min
pages 258-260

Testing for convergence and its pace

4min
pages 236-237

Conclusion and policy implications

7min
pages 253-255

Convergence clubs

7min
pages 239-241

Annex 3B Robustness

2min
page 213

Conclusion

2min
page 204

Figure 3.8 Episodes across different types of events

4min
pages 193-194

Annex 3A Data, sources, and definitions

2min
page 206

How has productivity convergence evolved?

2min
page 231

Figure 3.4 Episodes of war

2min
page 187

What policies can mitigate the effects of adverse events?

2min
page 203

Figure 3.5 Correlations between war frequency and productivity growth

7min
pages 188-190

Figure B3.1.1 Severity of pandemics, epidemics, and climate disasters

6min
pages 179-181

Figure B3.1.3 Impact of epidemics

6min
pages 184-186

Annex 2A Partial correlations

2min
page 146

Figure 3.2 Episodes of natural disaster

4min
pages 175-176

Box 3.1 How do epidemics affect productivity?

1min
page 178

Adverse events: Literature and stylized facts

2min
page 171

Conclusion

2min
page 145

Figure 2.13 Developments in financial and government technology

2min
page 143

Figure 2.12 EMDE infrastructure and education gaps

2min
page 142

Policy priorities

4min
pages 140-141

Figure 2.11 Post-GFC slowdown of the drivers of productivity growth

10min
pages 136-139

References

12min
pages 101-108

Analyzing the effects of drivers

1min
page 128

Developments in drivers of productivity

2min
page 134

Figure 2.1 Innovation

5min
pages 114-115

Box 2.1 Review of recent firm-level total factor productivity literature

8min
pages 130-133

Summary of stylized facts

2min
page 126

Long-run drivers

4min
pages 112-113

Box 1.1 Productivity: Conceptual considerations and measurement challenges

9min
pages 85-88

Conclusion

2min
page 96

Annex 1A Cyclical and technology-driven labor productivity developments

1min
page 100

Figure B1.1.1 Labor productivity decomposition and natural capital in EMDEs

7min
pages 89-91

References

13min
pages 65-70

Key findings and policy messages

4min
pages 32-33

Future research directions

2min
page 64

Synopsis

2min
page 39

PART I Productivity: Trends and Explanations

0
pages 71-74

Evolution of productivity

2min
page 78

Sources of the slowdown in labor productivity growth after the GFC

2min
page 83

Implications of COVID-19 for productivity

11min
pages 34-38
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