Global Productivity

Page 432

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CHAPTER 7

GLOBAL PRODUCTIVITY

Expanded Africa Sector Database (Mensah and Szirmai 2018). The Asian Productivity Organization Productivity Database, United Nations data, International Labour Organization ILOSTAT, and national sources are used for supplementary purposes. Following Wong (2006), local currency value added is converted to U.S. dollars using the 2011 purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rate obtained from Penn World Table for international comparisons of productivity levels.4

Sectoral productivity gaps Continuing wide productivity differentials across sectors. Productivity differs widely across sectors, offering large potential productivity gains by factor reallocation across sectors (figure 7.1; Gollin, Lagakos, and Waugh 2014; Rodrik 2013). Productivity in mining is usually high because the sector is highly capital intensive and dominated by major global companies. Productivity in agriculture tends to be lowest, in part because of the proportion of smallholder ownership and family farms (Cusolito and Maloney 2018; Fuglie et al. 2020; Lowder, Skoet, and Raney 2016).5 But there are also some services subsectors, such as trade services, with productivity below that of manufacturing. In the average EMDE, productivity in the lowest-productivity sector—agriculture, which accounts for 10 percent of value added and 32 percent of employment—is 85 percent lower than the average productivity.6 In advanced economies, the corresponding difference is considerably narrower. Over time, the productivity gap between the agricultural sector and other higherproductivity sectors has narrowed. Thus productivity in higher-productivity sectors, relative to productivity in agriculture, declined in the average EMDE from 350 percent in 1995 to 310 percent in 2017 and, in the average LIC, from 500 percent in 1995 to 400 percent in 2017. Wide sectoral productivity differentials across countries. Productivity in all sectors is lower in EMDEs than in advanced economies, and lower again in LICs. Agriculture productivity in EMDEs is 20 percent of advanced economy productivity. In part, this gap reflects slow technology adoption in the agriculture sector in some of the poorest EMDEs, which tend to be characterized by smallholder ownership and family farms 4 van Biesebroeck (2009) builds expenditure-based sector-specific PPP estimates for Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries, using detailed price data. 5 Mechanization tends to increase agricultural labor productivity through both capital deepening and embodied new technology, but mechanization in LICs is often hindered by frictions such as untitled land (Chen 2017). Also, Restuccia, Yang, and Zhu (2008) show that agricultural labor productivity is positively associated with the use of relatively advanced intermediate inputs (for example, modern fertilizers and high-yield seeds) and argue that certain distortions in factor markets may severely dampen the incentives for their use. 6 This is consistent with findings by Bartelsman and Doms (2000) and Levchenko and Zhang (2016). Because agricultural workers often do not work full time in agriculture, the sectoral gap is diminished if productivity is measured per hours worked instead of per worker (Gollin, Lagakos, and Waugh 2014). However, even after taking into account hours worked and human capital per worker, a large sectoral gap remains for a large number of countries (Hicks et al. 2017).


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Annex 7B Marginal productivity gap

4min
pages 452-453

References

14min
pages 456-463

Annex 7A Data and methodology

6min
pages 448-451

References

13min
pages 421-428

Sectoral productivity gaps

2min
page 432

Annex 7C Firm TFP data, estimates, and methodology

5min
pages 454-455

Annex 6C Commodity-driven productivity developments: Methodology

2min
page 420

Conclusion and policy implications

2min
page 412

Drivers of productivity: Technology vs. demand shocks

2min
page 391

Annex 6A SVAR identification of technology drivers of productivity

8min
pages 413-416

PART III Technological Change and Sectoral Shifts

0
pages 383-386

Effects of demand shocks

2min
page 397

Figure 6.1 Global labor productivity surges and declines

7min
pages 388-390

Sub-Saharan Africa

2min
page 350

Figure 5.22 Factors supporting productivity growth in MNA

7min
pages 333-335

Figure 5.19 Drivers of productivity growth in LAC

9min
pages 325-328

South Asia

4min
pages 337-338

Conclusion

2min
page 363

Figure 5.13 Drivers of productivity growth in ECA

10min
pages 314-317

Middle East and North Africa

2min
page 329

Latin America and the Caribbean

2min
page 318

Figure 5.12 Drivers of productivity growth in ECA in regional comparison

5min
pages 312-313

Europe and Central Asia

2min
page 305

Figure 5.7 Drivers of productivity growth in EAP

3min
page 301

PART II Regional Dimensions of Productivity

0
pages 281-284

Sources of, and bottlenecks to, regional productivity growth

4min
pages 290-291

Figure 5.1 Evolution of regional productivity in EMDE regions

4min
pages 288-289

East Asia and Pacific

2min
page 295

References

12min
pages 274-280

Evolution of productivity across regions

2min
page 287

Annex 4F Productivity measurement: PPP vs. market exchange rates

4min
pages 268-269

Annex 4C Beta-convergence testing

2min
page 257

Figure 4.4 Convergence club memberships

2min
page 242

Annex 4D Estimating convergence clubs: Commonalities in productivity levels

7min
pages 258-260

Testing for convergence and its pace

4min
pages 236-237

Conclusion and policy implications

7min
pages 253-255

Convergence clubs

7min
pages 239-241

Annex 3B Robustness

2min
page 213

Conclusion

2min
page 204

Figure 3.8 Episodes across different types of events

4min
pages 193-194

Annex 3A Data, sources, and definitions

2min
page 206

How has productivity convergence evolved?

2min
page 231

Figure 3.4 Episodes of war

2min
page 187

What policies can mitigate the effects of adverse events?

2min
page 203

Figure 3.5 Correlations between war frequency and productivity growth

7min
pages 188-190

Figure B3.1.1 Severity of pandemics, epidemics, and climate disasters

6min
pages 179-181

Figure B3.1.3 Impact of epidemics

6min
pages 184-186

Annex 2A Partial correlations

2min
page 146

Figure 3.2 Episodes of natural disaster

4min
pages 175-176

Box 3.1 How do epidemics affect productivity?

1min
page 178

Adverse events: Literature and stylized facts

2min
page 171

Conclusion

2min
page 145

Figure 2.13 Developments in financial and government technology

2min
page 143

Figure 2.12 EMDE infrastructure and education gaps

2min
page 142

Policy priorities

4min
pages 140-141

Figure 2.11 Post-GFC slowdown of the drivers of productivity growth

10min
pages 136-139

References

12min
pages 101-108

Analyzing the effects of drivers

1min
page 128

Developments in drivers of productivity

2min
page 134

Figure 2.1 Innovation

5min
pages 114-115

Box 2.1 Review of recent firm-level total factor productivity literature

8min
pages 130-133

Summary of stylized facts

2min
page 126

Long-run drivers

4min
pages 112-113

Box 1.1 Productivity: Conceptual considerations and measurement challenges

9min
pages 85-88

Conclusion

2min
page 96

Annex 1A Cyclical and technology-driven labor productivity developments

1min
page 100

Figure B1.1.1 Labor productivity decomposition and natural capital in EMDEs

7min
pages 89-91

References

13min
pages 65-70

Key findings and policy messages

4min
pages 32-33

Future research directions

2min
page 64

Synopsis

2min
page 39

PART I Productivity: Trends and Explanations

0
pages 71-74

Evolution of productivity

2min
page 78

Sources of the slowdown in labor productivity growth after the GFC

2min
page 83

Implications of COVID-19 for productivity

11min
pages 34-38
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