Hidden Debt

Page 125

South Asia’s State-Owned Enterprises: Surprise Liabilities versus Positive Externalities

S

tate-owned enterprises (SOEs) in South Asia offer many important benefits. They provide public goods and help address market failures related to risky, longterm investments and natural monopolies. However, because their operations and ­liabilities are backed by government guarantees, they also expose governments to large financial risks and potential (contingent) liabilities. Using firm-level panel data from India, this chapter assesses whether SOEs are more prone to financial distress than comparable private firms—and thus impose unforeseen liabilities and expenditure needs on the governments. It further studies whether SOEs’ financial distress relates to the persistent underperformance and indebtedness of some SOEs or to the greater risks that SOEs confront compared to private firms. Drilling deeper, the chapter tests alternative hypotheses for the underperformance of SOEs, including weak corporate governance and soft budget constraints in the form of both debt and equity bailouts. To illustrate some

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possible positives of SOE operations, the chapter searches for evidence that SOEs could provide strategic direction in their industries when they undertake riskier longterm investments, such as into research and development (R&D). In other words, can SOE investments in R&D crowd in additional R&D investment of private firms in the same industry?

The Importance of Paying More Attention to the Hidden Liabilities of SOEs in South Asia Nonfinancial state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have a large footprint in South Asia. Total SOE revenues amount to nearly 8 percent of GDP in Sri Lanka, 12 percent in Pakistan, and 19 percent in India (see table 3A.1).1 These shares are significant by international standards, although some other countries—​ ­particularly formerly socialist countries of Eastern Europe and East Asia—have much larger SOE sectors. The total number of SOEs

Note: This chapter draws on the background research paper: Melecky, M., S. Sharma, and D. Yang. 2020. “StateOwned Enterprises: The Distresses, Adjustments, and Fiscal Contingent Liabilities in South Asia.” Background paper for Hidden Debt. World Bank, Washington, DC.

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Notes

3min
page 192

Annex 4B. The Kalman Filter

3min
page 189

4.1 Recommendations for Improving Fiscal Reporting and Transparency in Pakistan

6min
pages 186-187

following Contingent Liability Shocks

3min
page 179

Debt, India

2min
page 175

Estimating Contingent Liability Shocks, Adjustment Costs, and Mitigating Factors Using Data for India

6min
pages 171-172

Assembly Elections

2min
page 180

Outcomes in South Asia

5min
pages 184-185

The Promise and Risks of Fiscal Decentralization in South Asia

1min
page 159

Notes

2min
page 154

Annex 3C. Productivity Estimation

3min
page 153

Only a Combination of Internal and External Policy Reforms Can Help Better Manage Contingent Liabilities from SOEs in South Asia

9min
pages 143-145

3.8 Share of Persistently Distressed Firms in India, 1991–2017

2min
page 135

Describing the Opaque and Complex SOE Sector in South Asia Using Data

6min
pages 129-130

Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, 2005–17

12min
pages 138-141

The Importance of Paying More Attention to the Hidden Liabilities of SOEs in South Asia

11min
pages 125-128

Annex 2A. Methodology for Determining Bank Distress

6min
pages 107-108

2.1 Main Findings of the Overall Analysis

3min
page 102

Analyzing the Effect of Firms’ Banking with SOCBs Compared with Private Banks

3min
page 101

Private Banks Adjust in Times of Distress

8min
pages 98-100

Commercial Banks, 2009–18

2min
page 93

Understanding Bank Distress and Its Main Factors

3min
page 92

2.3 India: Branch Networks and Total Credit, 2018

5min
pages 87-88

The Upsides and Downsides of State-Owned Commercial Banks

4min
pages 83-84

Annex 1D. Imputing the Missing Values for Predictions

2min
page 75

Improving Government Capacity, Due Diligence, and Contract Design to Better Manage the Fiscal Risks of the Growing PPP Programs in South Asia

2min
page 70

in India, 2001–17

2min
page 57

South Asia, by Country, 1990–2018

2min
page 63

1.5 Distribution of the Percentage of Contract Period Elapsed, 1990–2018

5min
pages 58-59

Features of Contract Design That Matter: Exploring the Link between PPP Contract Design and Early Terminations of Highway PPPs in India

3min
page 68

Government from Contingent Liabilities of Public-Private Partnerships

3min
page 64

Portfolio in South Asia, as a Percentage of GDP, 2020–24

2min
page 65

ES.1 Applying the Purpose, Incentives, Transparency, and Accountability (PITA) Recommendations in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Contexts ...................xvi 1.1 The Hidden Debt of National Highways in India

3min
page 53

O.2 Analytical Framework: Links from Distress to Adjustments to Impacts

9min
pages 32-34

The Need to Carefully Manage the Fiscal and Economic Risks of PPPs

5min
pages 49-50

Balancing the Efficiency Gains from PPPs against Their Risks and Liabilities Booming Infrastructure PPPs, Their Country and Sector Distribution, and Signs

6min
pages 51-52

Policy Recommendations

8min
pages 43-45

O.1 Implementing the High-Level Policy Recommendations for Public-Private Partnerships, State-Owned Commercial Banks, State-Owned Enterprises, and Subnational Governments

4min
page 46

O.9 Checks and Balances on Government Executives Help Prevent Distress of Public-Private Partnerships

2min
page 42

Notes

3min
page 47

Analytical Framework

2min
page 31
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