Hidden Debt

Page 64

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H IDDEN DEBT

BOX 1.2  Low-, Medium-, and High-Risk Scenarios for Computing Losses to the Government from Contingent Liabilities of Public-Private Partnerships In the event that a project is terminated, it is safe to assume that the government will lose the entire public equity. Based on the considerations discussed so far in this chapter, equation (1A.1) in annex 1A can be written as follows, assuming that three scenarios—low, medium, and high risk—are considered for the loss given distress: ELi,99%= PDi,99% (Debti LGDDebt + Public Equityi + Private Equityi LGDEquity).

(B1.2.1)

In the low-risk scenario, the loss on debt given distress of the government from a project (LGDDebt) is assumed to be the recovery rate estimated by Moody’s Investors Service (2019): (LGDDebt = 0.793). Assuming this, the government does not cover the loss of private equity and only loses its own equity in the PPP, (LGDEquity = 0). In the medium-risk scenario, the loss on both debt and equity given government distress from a project is assumed to be 1 (LGD Debt = 1; LGDEquity = 1). That is, the government guarantees the total financing of the project, but does

not compensate the private party for the foregone return. In the high-risk scenario, in addition to ­compensating for all the debt (LGDDebt = 1), the government compensates the private party ­ 150 percent of the equity it invested in the ­project (LGDEquity = 1.5), in line with the aforementioned contract terms for India’s road sector. The expected losses from contingent ­liabilities due to PPPs in country c, reported with 99 percent confidence—that is, with 99 percent confidence that the maximum annual loss will not exceed the calculated amount—are the sum of the expected losses within the set of all active projects in the country, Ic: ELc ,99% = ∑ i∈Ic ELi ,99%.

(B1.2.2)

Note: In the calculation of ELi ,99% for each project, correlations across projects in the same country are taken into account via both the distress probabilities, which control for country-specific factors, and their standard errors, c­ alculated using the delta method. The delta method uses the variance-­covariance matrix of the regression analysis, in which the observations have been assumed to be correlated within the country (clustered at the country level).

equity to compensate the private party for the loss of expected return on its investment. Estimating Fiscal Costs of Active PPPs in South Asia India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh have the highest estimated fiscal costs from early termination of active PPPs in the region, while Afghanistan and Bhutan have the lowest. The estimated fiscal cost from early termination over the remainder of the contract periods of the PPPs ranges from $9.7 billion to $18.5 billion in India; $1 billion to $2 billion in Pakistan; and $379 million to $730 million in Bangladesh (see table 1F.1 in annex 1F). Even though Sri Lanka’s current PPP portfolio is about half the size of Bangladesh’s portfolio in terms of the number of projects, and almost 50 percent larger than Nepal’s portfolio in terms of total

investments, the fiscal cost estimates in Sri Lanka are less than one-sixth of the estimates in Bangladesh and less than 80 percent of the estimates in Nepal. The main reason is that the PPPs in Sri Lanka have mostly passed 40 percent of their contract period, while the portfolios in Bangladesh and Nepal are younger.21 In most South Asian countries, about 39 percent to 50 percent of the fiscal costs from early termination of active projects are due to the risks of early termination during the 2020–24 period. Nepal is the exception to this trend because the costs increase at a slower pace. In the low scenario, for India the fiscal cost due to the risk from PPP cancellations is estimated not to exceed $853 million (8.8 percent of total costs) in 2020, with 99 percent confidence. In the 2020–24 period, the estimated fiscal cost (value at risk


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Notes

3min
page 192

Annex 4B. The Kalman Filter

3min
page 189

4.1 Recommendations for Improving Fiscal Reporting and Transparency in Pakistan

6min
pages 186-187

following Contingent Liability Shocks

3min
page 179

Debt, India

2min
page 175

Estimating Contingent Liability Shocks, Adjustment Costs, and Mitigating Factors Using Data for India

6min
pages 171-172

Assembly Elections

2min
page 180

Outcomes in South Asia

5min
pages 184-185

The Promise and Risks of Fiscal Decentralization in South Asia

1min
page 159

Notes

2min
page 154

Annex 3C. Productivity Estimation

3min
page 153

Only a Combination of Internal and External Policy Reforms Can Help Better Manage Contingent Liabilities from SOEs in South Asia

9min
pages 143-145

3.8 Share of Persistently Distressed Firms in India, 1991–2017

2min
page 135

Describing the Opaque and Complex SOE Sector in South Asia Using Data

6min
pages 129-130

Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, 2005–17

12min
pages 138-141

The Importance of Paying More Attention to the Hidden Liabilities of SOEs in South Asia

11min
pages 125-128

Annex 2A. Methodology for Determining Bank Distress

6min
pages 107-108

2.1 Main Findings of the Overall Analysis

3min
page 102

Analyzing the Effect of Firms’ Banking with SOCBs Compared with Private Banks

3min
page 101

Private Banks Adjust in Times of Distress

8min
pages 98-100

Commercial Banks, 2009–18

2min
page 93

Understanding Bank Distress and Its Main Factors

3min
page 92

2.3 India: Branch Networks and Total Credit, 2018

5min
pages 87-88

The Upsides and Downsides of State-Owned Commercial Banks

4min
pages 83-84

Annex 1D. Imputing the Missing Values for Predictions

2min
page 75

Improving Government Capacity, Due Diligence, and Contract Design to Better Manage the Fiscal Risks of the Growing PPP Programs in South Asia

2min
page 70

in India, 2001–17

2min
page 57

South Asia, by Country, 1990–2018

2min
page 63

1.5 Distribution of the Percentage of Contract Period Elapsed, 1990–2018

5min
pages 58-59

Features of Contract Design That Matter: Exploring the Link between PPP Contract Design and Early Terminations of Highway PPPs in India

3min
page 68

Government from Contingent Liabilities of Public-Private Partnerships

3min
page 64

Portfolio in South Asia, as a Percentage of GDP, 2020–24

2min
page 65

ES.1 Applying the Purpose, Incentives, Transparency, and Accountability (PITA) Recommendations in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Contexts ...................xvi 1.1 The Hidden Debt of National Highways in India

3min
page 53

O.2 Analytical Framework: Links from Distress to Adjustments to Impacts

9min
pages 32-34

The Need to Carefully Manage the Fiscal and Economic Risks of PPPs

5min
pages 49-50

Balancing the Efficiency Gains from PPPs against Their Risks and Liabilities Booming Infrastructure PPPs, Their Country and Sector Distribution, and Signs

6min
pages 51-52

Policy Recommendations

8min
pages 43-45

O.1 Implementing the High-Level Policy Recommendations for Public-Private Partnerships, State-Owned Commercial Banks, State-Owned Enterprises, and Subnational Governments

4min
page 46

O.9 Checks and Balances on Government Executives Help Prevent Distress of Public-Private Partnerships

2min
page 42

Notes

3min
page 47

Analytical Framework

2min
page 31
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