Hidden Debt

Page 93

ST A TE - OWNED B A NKS VERSUS P RIV A TE B A NKS IN SOUT H A SI A

FIGURE 2.7 India: Characteristics of the Average Client Firms of Scheduled Commercial Banks, 2009–18 Return on assets Investment to assets Debt to assets Debt to equity Total assets 0

0.50

1.00

1.50 PVTBs

2.00

2.50

3.00

3.50

SOCBs

Sources: World Bank staff calculations using Prowess data. Note: All numbers are in percent except for total assets, which are in Rs, 100 billion. PVTBs = domestically owned private banks; SOCBs = state-owned commercial banks.

to the central government in part or entirely, depending on the budget constraints SOCBs face—that is, softer versus harder budget constraints. Gauging this loss involves estimating the probability of SOCB distress (PD) and financial loss given SOCB distress (loss given distress, LGD). The second type is the economic loss from SOCB distress due to forced adjustments by distressed SOCBs, such as in the form of changes in capital, debt, lending, or investments, which in turn can affect firms, consumers, and the government. Here, the focus is on the loss of private firms’ investment due to the frequent distress of SOCBs: that is, unrealized investments compared with the counterfactual of private firms being able to make investments through financing from banks not in distress regardless of whether those banks are private or state owned.

Identifying Distress Using Financial Soundness Indicators We define a distress event as the breach of a threshold. In principle, the threshold could be determined by an economic relationship or a practical rule of thumb. The threshold value together with an actual value of an indicator variable then help identify a distress event.

A bank is considered to be in distress when it does not have enough revenues to cover its interest due: that is, when its ICR drops below 1. As robustness checks, we used three other indicators: ROA dropping below zero percent; the bank capital to risk-weighted assets ratio (CRAR) measured against a threshold related to the amount of capital above the minimum prudential requirement that banks want to keep;10 and the bank’s z-score, a popular solvency indicator in the literature (Laeven and Levine 2009; Ashraf and Shen 2019). The average annual probability of distress for a given group of banks— such as private banks or SOCBs—could be estimated as the average probability of ­distress using historical data on identified ­d istress events (see equation (2A.1), in annex 2A, for details). For the big picture of the analyzed data, figure 2.8 plots the ICRs for banks in India (panel a) using Prowess data—disaggregating new and old private banks—and in Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka (panels b, c, and d) using Fitch Connect data.11 One can observe that in India, the ICR of new private banks is comfortably above 1 most of the time for most of the individual banks—even though some outliers fall below 1. The situation is progressively worse

67


Turn static files into dynamic content formats.

Create a flipbook

Articles inside

Notes

3min
page 192

Annex 4B. The Kalman Filter

3min
page 189

4.1 Recommendations for Improving Fiscal Reporting and Transparency in Pakistan

6min
pages 186-187

following Contingent Liability Shocks

3min
page 179

Debt, India

2min
page 175

Estimating Contingent Liability Shocks, Adjustment Costs, and Mitigating Factors Using Data for India

6min
pages 171-172

Assembly Elections

2min
page 180

Outcomes in South Asia

5min
pages 184-185

The Promise and Risks of Fiscal Decentralization in South Asia

1min
page 159

Notes

2min
page 154

Annex 3C. Productivity Estimation

3min
page 153

Only a Combination of Internal and External Policy Reforms Can Help Better Manage Contingent Liabilities from SOEs in South Asia

9min
pages 143-145

3.8 Share of Persistently Distressed Firms in India, 1991–2017

2min
page 135

Describing the Opaque and Complex SOE Sector in South Asia Using Data

6min
pages 129-130

Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, 2005–17

12min
pages 138-141

The Importance of Paying More Attention to the Hidden Liabilities of SOEs in South Asia

11min
pages 125-128

Annex 2A. Methodology for Determining Bank Distress

6min
pages 107-108

2.1 Main Findings of the Overall Analysis

3min
page 102

Analyzing the Effect of Firms’ Banking with SOCBs Compared with Private Banks

3min
page 101

Private Banks Adjust in Times of Distress

8min
pages 98-100

Commercial Banks, 2009–18

2min
page 93

Understanding Bank Distress and Its Main Factors

3min
page 92

2.3 India: Branch Networks and Total Credit, 2018

5min
pages 87-88

The Upsides and Downsides of State-Owned Commercial Banks

4min
pages 83-84

Annex 1D. Imputing the Missing Values for Predictions

2min
page 75

Improving Government Capacity, Due Diligence, and Contract Design to Better Manage the Fiscal Risks of the Growing PPP Programs in South Asia

2min
page 70

in India, 2001–17

2min
page 57

South Asia, by Country, 1990–2018

2min
page 63

1.5 Distribution of the Percentage of Contract Period Elapsed, 1990–2018

5min
pages 58-59

Features of Contract Design That Matter: Exploring the Link between PPP Contract Design and Early Terminations of Highway PPPs in India

3min
page 68

Government from Contingent Liabilities of Public-Private Partnerships

3min
page 64

Portfolio in South Asia, as a Percentage of GDP, 2020–24

2min
page 65

ES.1 Applying the Purpose, Incentives, Transparency, and Accountability (PITA) Recommendations in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Contexts ...................xvi 1.1 The Hidden Debt of National Highways in India

3min
page 53

O.2 Analytical Framework: Links from Distress to Adjustments to Impacts

9min
pages 32-34

The Need to Carefully Manage the Fiscal and Economic Risks of PPPs

5min
pages 49-50

Balancing the Efficiency Gains from PPPs against Their Risks and Liabilities Booming Infrastructure PPPs, Their Country and Sector Distribution, and Signs

6min
pages 51-52

Policy Recommendations

8min
pages 43-45

O.1 Implementing the High-Level Policy Recommendations for Public-Private Partnerships, State-Owned Commercial Banks, State-Owned Enterprises, and Subnational Governments

4min
page 46

O.9 Checks and Balances on Government Executives Help Prevent Distress of Public-Private Partnerships

2min
page 42

Notes

3min
page 47

Analytical Framework

2min
page 31
Issuu converts static files into: digital portfolios, online yearbooks, online catalogs, digital photo albums and more. Sign up and create your flipbook.