Chapter 2: Unequal Impact of COVID-19 on MENA Households 51
in the Republic of Yemen, lockdown measures remained relatively mild. In some instances, like Tunisia, where five survey rounds were conducted, the consequences of at least the first wave of lockdown measures could be monitored relatively closely. In other instances, such as Djibouti, the surveys came after the lockdowns were implemented. This intercountry variation offers valuable research opportunities to explore how lockdowns affect socioeconomic outcomes. In this chapter, the level of ambition is more modest, as we limit ourselves to presenting the variation in socioeconomic outcomes and describing some emerging patterns.
Impacts on Employment: Work Stoppages Before the pandemic, many countries in MENA were already struggling with persistent high levels of unemployment. Once the pandemic struck, employment opportunities were further depressed. One of the questions asked by nearly all COVID-19 phone surveys centers on the impact of the pandemic on employment. Among the countries and economies sampled, a great variation in outcomes is observed, with work stoppages being much higher in some countries than others. During wave 1 of the lockdown, Tunisia topped the list, with 64 percent of its workers forced to stop working, followed by Egypt with 41 percent (figure 2.1). At the bottom are Djibouti with 25 percent, the West Bank and Gaza with 22 percent, and Iraq with 15 percent. One possible reason for these differences is the variations in these countries’ economic structure. Another is that the initial phone survey in Tunisia was conducted during a period when the economic lockdown was at its strictest. Indeed, as the lockdown eased, one observes a rapid decline in work stoppages in Tunisia. The percentage of workers who stopped working had decreased by half during wave 2 and declined sharply to less than 10 percent in the latest waves (wave 4 and wave 5, conducted 4 and 5 months later, respectively). For Egypt the high rate of work stoppage precedes the moment when the most stringent lockdowns were implemented. Yet mobility data suggest that by the time of the survey, citizens had already voluntarily reduced their movements; and as in Tunisia, the Egypt survey coincides with the height of the (de facto) lockdown. In contrast, in Djibouti, Iraq, and the West Bank and Gaza, the phone surveys were completed largely after deconfinement. The HFPS results thus suggest that (a) at the height of the economic lockdowns, when mobility was severely restricted, (about) half of those who worked prior to the pandemic stopped working; and (b) once the lockdowns were eased, many, but certainly not all, returned to work. Both findings are supported by figure 2.2, which suggests the presence
