2.1 Key service delivery indicators

TABLE 2.1 Key service delivery indicators

YEAR(S)

CHAD G5 SAHEL SSA MNA AFGHANISTAN IRAQ 2010–18 Average GDP per capita growth (annual %) 0.14 1.4 0.9 1.3 1.8 2.4

2018 Lower-middle-income poverty rate (US$3.20/day) 68.1 63.2 .. 19.8 .. ..

2017 Life expectancy at birth, total (years) 53.7 59.8 61.3 74.1 64.5 70.4

2018 Rural population (% of total population) 77.0 67.0 59.8 34.6 74.5 29.5

2018 Access to electricity (% of population) 2017 Individuals using the internet (% pop.) 11.8 27.8 47.7 96.5 97.7 99.9

6.5 13.3 25.4 65.1 13.5 75.0

2017 Access to basic drinking water (% pop.) 38.7 57.2 60.9 94.1 67.1 96.5

2012–18 Literacy rate, adult total (% ages ≥15) 2016–18 Fertility rate, total (births per woman) 2017–18 Youth unemployment (% ages 15–24) 2018 Employment in agriculture (% of total) 2017 UN Human Development Index (HDI) score 2018 WGI Government Effectiveness score 22.3 36.6 65.6 79.0 43.0 85.6

5.7 5.7 4.7 2.8 4.6 3.7

3.0 8.3 11.5 27.5 17.3 25.3

76.7 58.6 53.0 16.0 43.4 18.4

0.4 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.7

–1.5 –0.9 –0.8 –0.3 –1.5 –1.3

Sources: World Development Indicators, (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator) and World Bank 2020b. Note: .. = negligible; G5 Sahel = Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger; MNA = Middle East and North Africa region; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa; WGI = Worldwide Governance Indicators.

population has access to basic drinking water, it falls to 29.47 percent in rural areas.10 The situation is similar for electricity, with 41.84 percent of the urban population having access to electricity, compared to only 2.75 percent of the rural population.11

Government effectiveness is constrained by limited public administration capacity, a concentration of resources and decision-making in the capital city, low levels of revenues, and sensitivity to shocks such as COVID-19. Chad’s institutional capacity is fragile (with a 2009–19 Country Policy and Institutional Assessment [CPIA] average of 2.6) and highly concentrated, with 55 percent of civil servants based in N’Djamena and almost 100 percent of financial resources executed at the central ministry level (World Bank 2021b). The decentralization initiated in 2012 is still largely in the planning stages. Transfer of resources and responsibilities has been limited, and the scale-up of transfers is hampered by insufficient local capacity and inadequate central resource management institutions to formulate, plan, and execute public policies as well as to manage crises. Consequently, there are insufficient linkages between policy planning, implementation, and citizens’ service delivery needs. The absence of holistic crisis response plans, along with inadequate institutional frameworks and procedures, has also limited the efficiency of the government’s response to crises, eroding the social contract and trust in the state.

Chad’s performance on selected indicators of transparency, accountability, and corruption is below that of peers in the Sahel region and SSA. In 2019, Chad scored 20 on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, ranking 162nd out of 180 countries—below all G5 Sahel and CEMAC peer countries (table 2.2), with the exception of the Republic of Congo (19) and Equatorial Guinea (16). While Chad’s Open Budget Index score improved significantly, from 0 in 2010 to 14 in 2019, it remained below the average of G5 Sahel (22.5), CEMAC (15.6), and SSA (31). Chad’s performance on the CPIA in terms of transparency, accountability, and corruption was an average of 2.5 in 2018—comparable to that of CEMAC peers, but below the average for G5 Sahel (3.0).