Aspects of Negation in English and Slovenian

GaĹĄper Ilc

GaĹĄper Ilc

GaĹĄper Ilc is an associate professor at the English Department of the University of Ljubljana, where he teaches various courses on English linguistics. His areas of interest include both theoretical and applied linguistics, ranging from generative syntactic analysis and discourse analysis to contrastive English-Slovenian analysis. His current research focusses on various aspects of negation and polarity sensitivity from the perspective of syntax, semantics and pragmatics. He has published internationally and is the (co-)author of a number of research papers and book chapters. In 2017, he was the guest co-editor of the academic journal Jezikoslovlje for the thematic issue on negation. He has served as a programme/ organising committee member in several international conferences on English or general linguistics. Since 2008, he has been president of the testing committee for the Matura in English, which designs the examination material for the national examination in English.

ISBN 978-961-06-0153-1

ISBN 978-961-06-0153-1

9 789610 601531

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Aspects of Negation in English and Slovenian

Aspects of Negation in English and Slovenian

Aspects of Negation in English and Slovenian provides a linguistic analysis of negation phenomena in English and Slovenian. The main objective of this monograph is to present and discuss central issues pertaining to negation in both languages, including different expressions of negation, syntactic derivation of negative structures, negative scope, polarity, negation-related idiomatic expressions, negative raising, and multiple negation. In addition, this book devotes special attention to language-specific phenomena, including double negation and synthetic negators in English, and strict negative concord, the genitive of negation and pleonastic negation in Slovenian. The linguistic data discussed and analysed in the book are, in the majority of cases, attested and drawn from different referential corpora. The frame of reference used for the syntactic analysis of the linguistic data is the contemporary generative approach; however, other sections of the book, which are not syntax-specific, follow other descriptive frameworks.

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GaĹĄper Ilc

Aspects of Negation in English and Slovenian

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Aspects of Negation in English and Slovenian Book series: Razprave FF (ISSN 2335-3333) Author: Gašper Ilc Reviewers: Tatjana Marvin, Irena Zovko Dinković, Allan Richard James, Biljana Mišić Ilić Proofreading: Paul Steed Layout: Jure Preglau Cover photo: Pau Sayrol on Unsplash © University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Arts, 2019.

All rights reserved.

Published by: Znanstvena založba Filozofske fakultete Univerze v Ljubljani (Ljubljana University Press, Faculty of Arts) Issued by: The Scientific Research Institute of the Faculty of Arts For the publisher: Roman Kuhar, the dean of the Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana Design: Lavoslava Benčić Printed by: Birografika Bori d. o. o.

Ljubljana, 2019 First edition Number of copies printed: 200 Price: 19.90 EUR

The book was published with support from the Slovenian Research Agency.

The authors acknowledge the financial support from the Slovenian Research Agency (research core funding No. P6-0218).

CIP - Kataložni zapis o publikaciji Narodna in univerzitetna knjižnica, Ljubljana 811.111'367 811.163.6'367 ILC, Gašper Aspects of negation in English and Slovenian / Gašper Ilc. - 1st ed. - Ljubljana : Znanstvena založba Filozofske fakultete = Ljubljana University Press, Faculty of Arts, 2019. - (Book series Razprave FF, ISSN 2335-3333) ISBN 978-961-06-0153-1 298448896

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Kazalo vsebine Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1 Theoretical preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1.1

Definition of terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1.1.1 Classical cornerstones of negation: contraries vs contradictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1.1.2 Negation and negators in natural languages . . . . . . . . 11 1.1.3 Negative quantifiers, negative polarity items and n-words . 13 1.1.4 Scope of negation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 1.1.5 Affixal negation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 1.1.6 Negative raising . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 1.1.7 Multiple negation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 1.1.8 Pleonastic negation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 1.1.9 Jespersen’s cycle and grammaticalisation . . . . . . . . . . 36

1.2

Theoretical framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 1.2.1 Chomskyan generative approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 1.2.2 Deriving sentential negation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

2 Expressing negation in English . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 2.1

Expressions of negation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 2.1.1 Negative markers, absolute synthetic negators and approximate negators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 2.1.1.1 Negative markers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 2.1.1.2 Absolute synthetic negators . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 2.1.1.3 Approximate negators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 2.1.2 Affixal negation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

2.2

Deriving sentential negation in English . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 2.2.1 Verbal negators not and n’t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 2.2.2 Absolute synthetic negators and approximate negators . . 80

2.3

English negative polarity items (NPIs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

2.4

Negation-related idiomatic expressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

2.5

Negative raising . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

2.6

Multiple negation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

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3 Expressing negation in Slovenian . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 3.1

Expressions of negation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 3.1.1 Negative marker ne . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 3.1.1.1 Verbal negative marker ne and sentential negation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 3.1.1.2 Negative marker ne and non-sentential negation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110 3.1.2 Affixal negation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 3.1.3 N-words . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124

3.2

Deriving sentential negation in Slovenian . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132 3.2.1 Verbal negator ne . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132 3.2.2 N-words . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134

3.3

Slovenian polarity sensitive indefinites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142

3.4

Negation-related idiomatic expressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144

3.5

Genitive of negation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151

3.6

Negative raising . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160

3.7

Pleonastic negation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

3.8

Multiple negation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180

4 Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185 Povzetek . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189 Name index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213

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Preface Što se bijeli u gori zelenoj?

Al su snijezi, al su labudovi?

Da su snijezi, već bi okopnuli labudovi već bi poletjeli.

Nit su snijezi, nit su labudovi nego šator age Hasan age.

On boluje u ranama ljutim.

Oblazi ga mater i sestrica a ljubovca od stida ne mogla.

Kad li mu je ranam bolje bilo on poruča vjernoj ljubi svojoj: »Ne čekaj me u dvoru bijelomu. ni u dvoru, ni u rodu momu!« ‘Hasanaginica’

What's so white upon yon verdant forest?

Snow perhaps it is or swans assembled?

Snow would surely long ago have melted.

And a flight of swans would have departed.

No! not swans, not snow it is you see there, 'Tis the tent of Aga, Hasan Aga; On his couch he lies, severely wounded.

And his mother seeks him, and his sister, But for very shame his wife is absent.

When the misery of his wounds was softened, Hasan thus his faithful wife commanded: »In my house thou shalt abide no longer— Thou shalt dwell no more among my kindred.« translated by Maximilian August Mügge

Branded by Aristotle’s views on the asymmetric relation between affirmation and negation, negation has long been, with few exceptions, considered a linguistic underdog, a scarlet subject of linguistics. A considerable amount of energy seems to have been expended into frantically trying to prove that negation is dispensable, informationally weak and pragmatically more demanding. And yet, it may be for this very reason – supporting an ugly duckling rather than a Goldilocks – that I have found the topic of negation so intriguing as well as challenging, and have dedicated to it many years of my academic work.

My main objective when writing this book, which focusses on a descriptive and contrastive perspective, was to present and discuss central issues pertaining to negation in English and Slovenian, including expressions of negation, syntactic derivation of negatives, negative scope, polarity sensitivity, negation-related idiomatic expressions, negative raising, and multiple negation. In addition, this book devotes special attention to language-specific phenomena, including double negation and synthetic negators in English, and (strict) negative concord, the genitive of negation and pleonastic negation in Slovenian. The linguistic data discussed and analysed in the book are, in the majority of cases, attested, and drawn from different referential corpora. For English, three corpora are used: The British National Corpus (BNC), the British Web Corpus (ukWaC), and the Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA). The Slovenian data is taken from the Slovenian reference corpus FidaPLUS v2.

Structurally, the book is organised into three major sections. The first, introductory section, ‘Theoretical preliminaries’, presents the basic and key concepts from a general and cross-linguistic perspective on negation, and addresses in detail those that are further elaborated on in subsequent sections. It is worth noting that the 5

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function of this section is purely introductory, since addressing these complex issues from different theoretical viewpoints would require a book on its own. Section 2, ‘Expressing negation in English’, discusses the properties of negation in English, and is followed by Section 3, ‘Expressing negation in Slovenian’, which delves into the nature of negation in Slovenian. Both sections follow the same structure: from general issues such as different expressions of negation, negative scope, syntactic derivation of the negatives, (negative) polarity items, negation-related idiomatic expressions, negative raising, and multiple negation, to language specific issues such as the genitive of negation and pleonastic negation in Slovenian. Some chapter sections are based on my previous research and have been incorporated into the book to offer a better and a deeper insight into the subject matter. The frame of reference used for the syntactic analysis of the linguistic data is the contemporary generative approach (Chomsky, 1995 et subsq.), however, other sections of the book, which are not syntax-specific, follow other descriptive frameworks. This strategy has been adopted intentionally, since I want the book to prove beneficial to a wider range of users. It is my firm belief that various linguistic theories may come and go, rise and fall, yet the linguistic observations and the collected linguistic data remain valid, and can be used by future researchers.

It is also my sincere hope that the present book will motivate further research into the intricacies of negation, without whose antithetical powers a Slavic soul would, indeed, be lost.

I would like to thank the reviewers for their insightful comments, which have helped me improve the content and the presentation of my work. My thanks are also to Paul Steed for thorough proof-reading, Jure Preglau for editing the manuscript, and Matevž Rudolf for assistance and support. Needless to say, all inaccuracies and misinterpretations are mine.

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1

Theoretical preliminaries

1.1

Definition of terms

1.1.1

Classical cornerstones of negation: contraries vs contradictions

It may not be completely unfitting to open a book on negation by using a litotes to be immediately followed by a reference to Aristotle. While the former perfectly exemplifies negation’s complex and intricate nature, the latter marks the beginnings of the linguistic study of negation (Wood, 1933; Horn, 2001, 6ff ). In Categories, Aristotle addresses the question of negation from the perspective of different opposition, and recognises four distinct relations (Cat., 11b17): (a) relatives (the double and the half), (b) contraries (the good and the bad), (c) privation and possession (blindness and sight), (d) affirmation and negation (‘he is sitting’ and ‘he is not sitting’).

When referring to the Aristotelian approach to logic, the s.c. term logic, a clear distinction has to be drawn between terms and propositions. A term (orig. horos) is a basic element of the term logic. It is a word, a part of speech which signifies something, for example, Socrates, man, horse, human, runs, double, ill.1 A term on its own can neither be true nor false (Cat., 2a4). A proposition is a combination of two terms – the subject term and the predicate term –in such a way that the predicate term is either affirmed or denied of its subject (e.g., Socrates is ill or Socrates is not ill). In contrast to individual terms, for each proposition it can be ascertained whether it is true or false.

The first three relations given above (i.e., (a)-(c)) pertain to terms, whereas the last relation ((d)) involves propositions. Relatives involve pairs of terms which are in a reciprocal or interferential relation, for example, X is the double/the grandfather/ the employer of Y iff Y is the half/the grandchild/the employee of Y. Contraries are defined in terms of mediate and immediate contraries. Two terms are immediate contraries if they are such that there is no continuum, i.e., no intermediate stage, no scale, between the two: an animal may either be healthy or sick but not both or neither. In contrast, mediate contraries operate on a continuum, in which two contrary terms mark the endpoints of the continuum with identifiable intermediate stages, for example bad and good, fast and slow. Privation and possession, as the 1

It signifies “either substance or quality or qualification or a relative or where or when or being-in-a-position or having or doing or being affected. To give a rough idea, examples of substance are man, horse; of quantity: four-foot, five foot; of qualification: white, [etc.].” (Cat., 1b25ff )

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name suggests, pertain to the opposing terms that refer to the same entity, which receives the possession of a particular quality by nature, and can be later deprived of it. For instance, an entity is described as blind only if it is expected that in typical circumstances this entity would be sighted (i.e., not blind). Therefore, for example, we can attribute blindness to humans, but not to object, such as chairs and tables.

In modern semantic theory (cf. Lyons, 1977; Lehrer and Lehrer, 1982; Cruse, 1986; Murphy, 2010), different terminology is used to refer to these opposite relations.

Typically, the terms antonyms and antonymy are used when describing the relation between words of opposite meaning. Lyons (1977, 279) makes a further distinction between opposites (also: contradictories, complementaries, immediate contraries) and antonyms (also: (mediate) contraries). For example, the pair happy/sad is antonymic, since the assertion of p entails the negation of q (e.g., if one is happy, one cannot be sad), but the negation of p does not entail the assertion of q (e.g., if one is not happy, one need not be sad). On the other hand, the pair true/false is complementary, since the assertion of p entails the negation of q, and the negation of p entails the assertion of q (e.g., something can only be true or false). As such, in Lyons’s terms, antonyms, but not opposites, are scalar, i.e., describing two extremes of a scale. This opposites/antonyms dichotomy is adopted by many contemporary authors (cf. Lehrer and Lehrer, 1982; Cruse, 1986; a.o.). The situation, however, is not as clear-cut as it may seem, because there are cases in which a binary pair displays properties both of opposites and antonyms. The pair, honest/dishonest is complementary, since the assertion of p entails the negation of q and vice versa, but they are also scalar (i.e., contrary) in the sense that one can be neither honest nor dishonest. For this reason, other authors (cf. Murphy, 2010) use the term antonyms as an umbrella term for all contraries, and further differentiate between non-gradable/binary/complementary antonyms (i.e., contradictories), gradable antonyms (i.e., contraries), and gradable complementaries (i.e., antonyms that are both contradictories and contraries). Murphy’s (2010) inventory of antonyms also includes converses (relatives in Aristotle’s terms) and reversives/reversatives, such as untie/tie. The present book follows Murphy’s (2010) classification and uses the term antonyms as an umbrella term consistently for all binary pairs that display different types of opposition.

In Aristotle’s view, the affirmation/negation relation is restricted to propositions.

Affirmation is an affirmative statement which affirms the predicate term of its subject term. Conversely, negation is a negative statement which denies the predicate term of its subject term.2 The relation between these two propositions is always 2 “An affirmation is a statement affirming something of something, a negation is a statement denying something of something.” (De Int., 17a25)

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contradictory:3 if one is true, then the other has to be false, and vice versa. It has to be pointed out that Aristotle makes a clear distinction between the affirmation/ negation dichotomy, on one hand, and the truth values, on the other. Affirmation only affirms its predicates of its subject term, but it does not establish whether the proposition is true or false. To Aristotle, the truth value of the proposition can be determined only in its relation to reality, i.e., how well it corresponds to the world/ reality.4 To exemplify, there is nothing in the affirmative statement Trump is a Republican or its negative counterpart Trump is not a Republican that would lead to the conclusion that either sentence is true. Assuming that Trump exists, the only requirement on the affirmation/negation relation is that one of the statements is true. Only by examining which of the two statements accurately describes reality can we determine which of the two is true and which false.

In De Interpretatione and Prior Analytics, Aristotle discusses the logical relation between the affirmative/negative pairs of propositions and identifies four possible combinations, which can be best exemplified with quantified expressions and the square-of-opposition diagram, as developed by Boethius in the sixth century AD. A

contrary

E

contradictory I

subcontrary

Example

First-order predicate logic formulae

A

every man is white all men are white

E

no man is white

∀x(Mx→Wx)

I

some man is white

O

some man is not white not every man is white

O

∀x(Mx → ¬Wx) or ¬∃x(Mx ˄ Wx) ∃x(Mx ˄ Wx)

∃x(Mx ˄ ¬Wx) or ¬∀x(Mx→Wx)

Figure 1.1: The Square of Opposition 3

4

“Thus it is clear that for every affirmation there is an opposite negation, and for every negation an opposite affirmation. Let us call an affirmation and a negation which are opposite a contradiction. I speak of statements as opposite when they affirm and deny the same thing—not homonymously, together with all other such conditions that we add to counter the troublesome objections of sophists.” (De Int., 17a26) “This will be plain if we first define what truth and falsehood are: for to say that that which is is not or that which is not is, is a falsehood; and to say that that which is is and that which is not is not, is true; so that, also, he Who says that a thing is or not will have the truth or be in error. But it is said that neither that which is nor that which is not either is not or is.” (Met. Γ.7., 1011b25ff )

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The left side of the square represents affirmation, which is mnemonically indicated by the two vertices A and I, standing for Latin AffIrmo (to confirm). The right side of the square represents negation, which is mnemonically indicated by the two vertices E and O for Latin nEgO (to negate). The two horizontal lines indicate different quantification: the top side with vertices A and E represents universal quantification, whereas the bottom side with vertices I and O particular quantification.

The logical relation between the two universal propositions A and E is contrary (i.e., A and E are contraries): X and Y cannot be true at the same time, but can be false at the same time. The logical relation between the two opposing universal and particular propositions A and O, on the one hand, and E and I, on the other, is contradictory (i.e., the pairs A/O and E/I are contradictories): if one proposition of the pair is true, then the other is false, and vice versa. The logical relation between the two particular propositions I and O is subcontrary (i.e., I and O are subcontraries): the two propositions cannot be false at the same time.5 In Prior Analytics, Aristotle excludes subcontraries from a list of genuine opposites since, as he claims, the affirmative particular and the negative particular proposition are only opposites verbally.6 Aristotle’s argumentation builds on two principles which are to this day still considered to be the fundamental postulates of logic: the Law of Non-Contradiction (also known as the Law of Contradiction) and the Law of Excluded Middle. The Law of Non-Contradiction (henceforth: LNC) requires that something either is or is not, but it cannot both be and not be.7 The Law of the Excluded Middle (henceforth: LEM) necessitates that we must either assert or deny, and that there is nothing in the middle of a contradiction.8 While the LNC governs both the contraries and contradictories, “since it is impossible for a contradiction to be true simultaneously of the same thing, it is obviously impossible too that contraries should simultaneously hold good of the same thing” (Met. Γ.6., 1011b15ff ), the LEM applies to contradictories only because “an intermediate is impossible in contradiction but possible between contraries” (Met. Ι., 1055b2).

5

6 7

8

“I call an affirmation and a negation contradictory opposites when what one signifies universally the other signifies not universally[. ][…] But I call the universal affirmation and the universal negation contrary opposites[. ][…]

So these cannot be true together, but their opposites may both be true with respect to the same thing[. ]” (De Int., 17b16ff ).

“I say that verbally there are four <pairs of> opposite premises, to wit: ‘to every’ and ‘to no,’ ‘to every’ and ‘not to every,’ to some’ and ‘to no,’ and ‘to some’ and ‘not to some.’ In truth, however, there are three, for ‘to some’ and ‘not to some’ are only opposites verbally.” (Prior Analytics, 63b24-27) “For the same thing to hold good and not to hold good simultaneously of the same thing and in the same respect is impossible (given any further specifications which might be added against the dialectical difficulties). This is the firmest of all principles, for it fits the specification stated. For it is impossible to for anyone to believe or not believe that the same thing is and is not[.]” (Met. Γ.3., 1005b18ff ) “Nor, on the other hand, is it possible that there should be anything in the middle of a contradiction, but it is necessary either to assert or to deny any one thing of one thing.” (Met. Γ.7., 1011b23ff )

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The Aristotelian distinction between contraries and contradictories also plays an important role in our understanding of different scopes of negation. The wide scope of negation, standardly labelled as sentential or clausal negation, is closely related to Aristotle’s contradictories, whereas more local scopes of negation are linked with contraries (for details see section 1.1.2 – 1.1.5).

1.1.2

Negation and negators in natural languages

To form negation in logic, the negative operator ¬ is added to the proposition p, resulting in ¬p. The fact that this operation changes the affirmative preposition p to its negative counterpart ¬p has led logicians to the conclusion that affirmation is primary/fundamental/basic, and negation secondary/derived/complex, etc. (cf.

Horn, 2001, 45ff ). As such, negation has often been treated as redundant and dispensable. This stance is perhaps best summarised by Russell (1948, 530), who claims that “[t]he world can be described without the use of the word ‘not’”. Assuming that Russell refers to the concept described by the word not, and not the word as a sign (cf. Weingartner, 2000, 166), then such a generalisation is problematic, at least for natural languages. Sentences such as oil does not mix with water, and pigs cannot fly, for example, describe the world/reality, and can hardly be assigned a secondary/derived status, since they clearly do not presuppose the affirmatives. In addition, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to replace such negative sentences with the affirmatives, the long desire of many a logician from the past and the present (for details, cf. Horn, 2001, 45-79).

Turning to the linguistic properties of negation, it is perhaps fitting to start with a quote from Barwise (1991) that “[a]ll human languages contain one or more mechanisms of a negative character”, which are unique to human communication.

Indeed, as Dahl’s (1979, 81) pioneering research into the typology of negation in natural languages has shown, such mechanisms, by and large, involve either synthetic/morphological (e.g. affixation and stem modification) or syntactical/analytical means (e.g. negative particles and auxiliaries) of expressing negation.

When negation is expressed syntactically with a negative element that carries the negative meaning, then this element is standardly referred to as the negator. In this book, a distinction will be drawn between the terms ‘the negative marker’ and ‘the negator’. We define the negative marker as any functional word whose sole meaning is that of negation. Taking English as an example, the negative adverb not, and its clitic form n’t will be considered as negative markers, since they are fully grammaticalised – in the sense that their only semantic contribution is that

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of negation. Negative pronouns (e.g., nobody, nothing), and (semi-)negative adverbs (e.g., nowhere, hardly, scarcely), on the other hand, will be referred to as negators, because they can negate the structure syntactically, but will not be treated as negative markers since their function is not exclusively grammatical/functional. In sum, if a word is a negative marker, then it is automatically also the negator (e.g., not), but the reverse in not true: each negator is not necessarily also the negative marker (e.g., nobody).

The presence of various markers of negation in negative sentences and the absence of corresponding markers in affirmative sentences can be used to support the claim that negation is morpho-syntactically more complex than affirmation. It is questionable, however, whether this conclusion is really universal linguistically, since Dahl (1979, 82) also reports of languages in which negation does not seem to trigger morpho-syntactic complexity, at least not the one associated with the presence of an overt marker of negation that expands the affirmative structure. Examples of such languages are Mano and Kwaa, both belonging to the Niger-Congo language group. While in Mano negatives differ from affirmatives only prosodically (1), in Kwaa negation involves prosodic modification and word order change (2). In both cases, there is no overt lexical marker of negation. However, even in such cases, the negative structures are seen as marked in comparison to the unmarked affirmatives.

(1) a) ǹyídò b) n̂ yídò

‘I know.’

‘I do not know.’

Dahl (1979, 82)

(2) a) mà t màna

‘I bought bananas.’

Dahl (1979, 82)

b) /mà maná tὲ ‘I didn’t buy bananas.’

The next issue to address is the question of forming negation by way of transformation; namely, negation is typically described in grammar reference books as being syntactically derived from affirmative sentences by the addition of a special negative element. For example, Quirk et al. (1999, 776) claim that “[a] simple positive sentence […] is negated by inserting the clause negator not between the operator and the predication.” In a similar fashion, Biber et al. (1999, 158) point out that “[c]lauses are negated by the insertion of the negator not or by some other negative word.” Such generalisations may be practical when it comes to teaching languages, yet they do not capture the linguistic dimensions of negation. One cannot fail to notice that while in logic there is a clear-cut boundary between p and ¬p, in natural languages the boundaries are much more blurred. For example, sentences (4a,b) should be treated as negative counterparts of (3), since they display a high level of synonymity with the syntactically negated sentences (4a’,b’). Even though they are

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affirmative in form (i.e. with no overt marker of negation) they are semantically negative. Their negative status can be easily proven by using the diagnostic ‘much less’ test: only two negative sentences can be coordinated by the quasi-coordinator much less (as shown in (5) and (6)).

(3) a) John succeeded in finishing the paper in time. b) They have a lot of water to drink.

(4) a) John failed to finish the paper in time. a’) John didn’t succeed in finishing the paper in time. b) They are short of water to drink. b’) They don’t have a lot of water to drink.

(5) a) *John succeeded in finishing the paper in time much less type it correctly.

b) *They have a lot of water to drink much less to bathe in.

(6) a) John failed to finish the paper in time much less type it correctly. b) They are short of water to drink much less to bathe in. c) John didn’t succeed in finishing the paper in time much less type it correctly. d) They don’t have a lot of water to drink much less to bathe in.

In addition to expressing negation by using lexical items that are negative semantically but not syntactically (e.g. the negative implicative verbs such as to fail,9 to doubt, to deny, see above), the negative meaning can also be encoded by using affirmative sentences whose negative force is triggered by context and/or prosody, as is the case with irony in (7): (7) a) You are such a hero. Even a little girl can beat you up! b) How should I know how to cook a three-course meal! d) Hercule Poirot to sleep while murder is committed!

In sum, the above examples clearly show that negation cannot solely be analysed in terms of transformation from affirmative sentences, but should be rather treated as an independent syntactic phenomenon.

1.1.3

Negative quantifiers, negative polarity items and n-words

Negative quantifiers, negative polarity items, and n-words are categories commonly associated with negative contexts. Negative quantifiers (henceforth: NQs) are those lexical elements which are inherently marked for negation: they independently express negation, and cannot be used without the negative meaning (8a-b).

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For a detailed discussion of the failed to construction in English see Mackenzie (2008; 2009), and Stopar (2017) for a contrastive English-Slovenian analysis.

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GaĹĄper Ilc

GaĹĄper Ilc

GaĹĄper Ilc is an associate professor at the English Department of the University of Ljubljana, where he teaches various courses on English linguistics. His areas of interest include both theoretical and applied linguistics, ranging from generative syntactic analysis and discourse analysis to contrastive English-Slovenian analysis. His current research focusses on various aspects of negation and polarity sensitivity from the perspective of syntax, semantics and pragmatics. He has published internationally and is the (co-)author of a number of research papers and book chapters. In 2017, he was the guest co-editor of the academic journal Jezikoslovlje for the thematic issue on negation. He has served as a programme/ organising committee member in several international conferences on English or general linguistics. Since 2008, he has been president of the testing committee for the Matura in English, which designs the examination material for the national examination in English.

ISBN 978-961-06-0153-1

ISBN 978-961-06-0153-1

9 789610 601531

Aspects_naslovka_2.indd 1

Aspects of Negation in English and Slovenian

Aspects of Negation in English and Slovenian

Aspects of Negation in English and Slovenian provides a linguistic analysis of negation phenomena in English and Slovenian. The main objective of this monograph is to present and discuss central issues pertaining to negation in both languages, including different expressions of negation, syntactic derivation of negative structures, negative scope, polarity, negation-related idiomatic expressions, negative raising, and multiple negation. In addition, this book devotes special attention to language-specific phenomena, including double negation and synthetic negators in English, and strict negative concord, the genitive of negation and pleonastic negation in Slovenian. The linguistic data discussed and analysed in the book are, in the majority of cases, attested and drawn from different referential corpora. The frame of reference used for the syntactic analysis of the linguistic data is the contemporary generative approach; however, other sections of the book, which are not syntax-specific, follow other descriptive frameworks.

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