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Δημήτρης Αντωνίου PhD(Hon), FRCS,Γενικός Χειρουργός, Ογκολόγος

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αναδημοσίευση και γενικά η αναπαραγωγή του παρόντος έργου (πλήρους

έκδοσης) με οποιοδήποτε τρόπο, τμηματικά ή περιληπτικά, στο πρωτότυπο ή σε μετάφραση, ή άλλη διασκευή, χωρίς γραπτή άδεια του εκδότη και συγγραφέα, σύμφωνα με τον ν. 2121/1993 και την Διεθνή Σύμβαση της Βέρνης (που κυρώθηκε με τον ν. 100/1975).

Contents CONTENTS Index: …………………………………………………………………..…..8 Chapter I: Metaphysics……………………………………..……….9 Chapter II: Philosophy of Mind…………………………..….103 Chapter III: Philosophy of Science………………………….171 Chapter IV: Theory of Knowledge…………..….…..…..367 Chapter V: Philosophy of Religion…………….….….…..441 Chapter VI: Philosophy of Politics……………..……...…523 Appendix: …………………………………………………………..…591 Curriculum Vitae…………………………………………………….611

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Philosophical Writings RBE_ANTONIOU_assignment1.

The assignment that follows has been written by, and is entirely the work of, <Dimitrios Antoniou>.

Universals vs Particulars: I) Universals: Ontological vs Existential status: Ontological status: i) In Realism universals are ontologic realities, independent from their ontic existential in the physical world, status, i.e. they are real ontological entities even as uninstantiated (unexemplified) properties, been exclusively in the realm of all possible worlds and constituting of the a priori knowledge. They are anterebus. ii) In Nominalism, the positive (even possible) existential status of each universal (as instantiation in the physical world) is a necessary precondition for their positive ontological status. Only the instantiated universals exist.

Some uninstantiated universals are instantiated over instantiated ones. Universals are post-rebus. Universals in nominalism correspond to Aristotelean 2nd substance. In nominalism, tropes are existent.

Definitions: Identity conditions: The instantiations (exemplifications) of each universal over its instances (objects) constitute “numerical identity”, i.e. all instantiations are one and the same thing (i.e. the universal exemplified one and the same over many, a=a), rather than more than one. This is a Type-identity (numerical Identity) of the same repeated, over the physical, abstract property. The universals instantiated over abstract properties, are being encoded by the latter (a=a). Numerical identity implies qualitative identity too (but not the reverse -see below in tropes).

Necessity- Contingency: The instantiation of the universals over the physical is contingent (as accidental predicates), except of the necessary essential universals, such as them being been “natural kinds”, or these which 12

Chapter I: Metaphysics are instantiated over abstract properties which encode the former (encoding account of property identity).

Knowledge status: Universals -considered in the Realistic realm as uninstantiated realities- are unknowable through the nomic (classical) logic, whereas they, as such, can be intuitively conceived, or in the domain of paraconsistent logic. Universals can be known through the (classical) nomic logic only as in space-time experienced instantiations. We can nevertheless know from the uninstantiated universals those which are instantiated over instantiated universals.

Causal power- universals as physical laws (N-relations): Universals can confer causal power to their instances (but they are not the “causes” of phenomena). They are second order properties (N-relations, physical laws) over first order necessities (causal relations), such as: all Fs are Gs causal relations, in the mode N (F,G) (dispositional power of universals). Different universals can confer the same causal power over their instances and the reverse. The instantiation of a universal has the same causal power in all possible worlds, in which that instantiation exist.

Essentiality: It is a monadic property (universal) which the individual object (physical or abstract) has in every possible circumstances in which the individual (could) exist. The Universal (property) is the extension of the object and vice-versa. The abstract object encodes the universal.

Instantiation: A relation of Supervenience of the Universal over the physical.

Supervenience: A term introduced by Davidson in the domain of philosophy of mind, according to which: The physical with exactly the same properties refer to theories (mental events) with exactly the same physical content, in “one (mental) to one (physical event” relation. This part argues against the empirical equivalence form of scientific scepticism (overdetermination problem-scepticism), “many (theories) over one (physical event”).

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Philosophical Writings II) Tropes: Ontological status: Tropes (properties of the same genus) and the object (material or abstract) which have them, they both necessarily coexist in our physical world, Tropes are not instantiated (exemplified). Abstract objects encode tropes and in this case the ones are the extension of the others. Tropes are in-rebus.

Identical conditions: Tropes (particulars) constitute “qualitative identity”, although they do not ever constitute “numerical identity”. And this because things are qualitatively identical when they are exactly similar, like twins!, which, albeit being exactly similar, they nevertheless are two distinct in number beings, rather than one and the same (a=b, token-identity, inter-species identity).

Necessity-Contingency status: Tropes are contingent, except of the essential tropes, such as them consisting the abstract objects. In this case the latter encode the former.

Knowledge status: Tropes are known through the usual laws of nomic (classical) logic and experience.

Causal power: Tropes confer causal power to the objects Physical Laws as tropes: Tropes, as physical laws are contingent generalizations of accidental generalizations, or they are contingent regularities of accidental regularities. They are ‘statistical laws” (compare with the universals considered as necessary metaphysical Nrelations physical laws).

RBE_ANTONIOU_assignment2.

The assignment that follows has been written by, and is entirely the work of, <Dimitrios Antoniou>.

Realism: A breakdown of the classical logic Introduction: Classical Aristotelean logic is a picture of our physical world, leading to true conclusions by using true premises and three non-logically proven “laws of logic” as inference rules. The latter are not proven either by logic 14

Chapter I: Metaphysics or by experience and therefore they are a priori truths inside nature where they are discovered by our mind. The three “laws of logic” are: 1) The law of identity: a=a, 2) the law of non-contradiction: the “a” cannon be at the same time “non–a" (“-a”), 3) the law of excluded middle: the a can be either “a”, or “non-a” (“-a”) (exclusive disjunction) but there cannot be something third in between them. This last law is supplementary to the second law and being conceived in relation with the latter, implies that if we prove that “non-non-a” (double negation) it comes nevessarily that there is “a”. Classicl logic is thus a two truth-value logic (bivalent truth logicBoolean logic) in the sense that it accepts that there are only two truth-values, such as” “truth” or “false”, “existence” or “non-existence” etc. A modification of classical Aristotelean logic- the first order logic- goes one step further and constructs infinite logical possible worlds which are neverhteless coherent with our actual world and in which the law of excluded middle still holds.

But, firstly founded by I. Kant, a different logic –the intuitive logic- was emerged, which is grounded on the ommition of the 3d law of classical logic and admits thus the existence of a “third truth”, resulted from the combined negation of the two “classical” disjoined truths.

This “third truth” is therefore- by analogy with the above examples- “non-true” and “non-false” (mind the “and”) and –according to Kant- constitutes the right conception of metaphysical realities (universals). Thus the trivalent (three-truth-value) intutive logic constructs a “theoretical metaphysical world”, which-prima facie- is not coherent, or even it is contradictory with our actual world. The extremely surprising fact is that this metaphysical world and its foundational intuitive logic, were eventually scientifically proven to be consistent with our own actual world, which should therefore be considered as a metaphysical world! Here are the historic evidences for the truth of this last claim:

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Philosophical Writings Metaphysics and Philosophy Vs Science-Part-II Objective metaphysical truth, Objective Physical Reality: Can we experience pure metaphysical universals? Is Idealism real?

This posting is in absolute agreement with Ilhaam`s (my tutor) statement that: “Putting it this way helps to draw the relation between objective truth and mind-dependent reality. The latter refers to the issue of whether what counts as reality is dependent on our minds or not - the former refers to what is true. So we have, what counts as reality, on the one hand, and what counts as true, on the other - the former is prior to the latter”.

Definition: Epistemic knowledge is the body of “rationally justified true beliefs”. The truthness of these beliefs are tested against their agreement (or coherence) with the actual physical reality, or against their agreement with any possible physical reality, being in accordance with our actual physical reality, or finally against some “a priori” taken as true statements (see below).

I claim that the apparent (as phenomenon) physical reality is mind-dependent (i.e. is the result of mind and senses).

This physical reality could be objective (reveals the things as they really are), or modulated by the mind and the senses. Thus one way of knowing the physical is by experience (knowledge by acquaintance), which is an “inferior” in quality knowledge, bound on experience (Berkley`s idealism). Therefore the truth for our world obtained by experience could be objective or not.

For obtaining “objective epistemic knowledge of the physical reality” (i.e to reveal if the physical reality it perceives is objective of modulated), the mind is calling in

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Chapter I: Metaphysics The Old Metaphysics: From the Trancendental Realism (Plato) to the Transcendental Dialectic (Aristotele, Kant) Definitions: Existent, ontic, Dasein (ον), is: “how the things appear” in the physical world as “phenomena”.

Being, ontology, Sein (Eriegnis), essence, substance, logic, Είναι, is: What the things really are, or what they should be, or should have been, or the difference (or dynamic relation of) between the ontic and the Being, or how the ontic aims to become Being.

These realities are abstract and exist in an abstract realm.

I) Trancendental Realism: Presocratic era (600- 450 b.c.): According to Heraclitus the essential principle of the world is the “ever flowing change”, or the “is being”, or “is becoming” and not the merely static “it is” (his idea is inherited in Aristotele`s, Hegel`s and Bergson`s ontology and philosophy).

Everything is changing, Gods and mortals. Only the abstact principle of changing (ontology) is unchanged and stable.

But changing means an eternal circle of “is been born” and “is been dead” (ontic). From the “non-existent” is coming into existence the “existent” and vise-versa. The former gives existence to the latter and vise versa! The vivid power of Zero and Death (Heidegger, Sartre). This is then the first ever metaphysical notion in the history of philosophy.

In Heraclitus`s ontology there exist only one real thing in the world and this is the abstract everlasting and stable principle of the “ever flowing change” (ontology). Its physical realization, in the form of the temporary and “consumed” “born-dead” (ontic) have a trivial existential value. They are mere phenomena of the abstract principle (ontology) itself. We then see that Heraclitus, for the first time in philosophy (along with Parmenides), introduced the distinction (difference) between “ontology” and “ontic” as a qualitative (not yet structural) dialectic relation. This implies that we can logically conceive (understood) the

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Philosophical Writings ABOUT “TIME” A) The question we are facing is as to whether the many time “moments” (instances-units) are indiscernible identical and constitute thus “numerical identity”, or not.

Assumption A: Lets assume that time exist as “emptiness”, that it exists independently from the physical, or without any physical content. This assumption then implies a very plausible model of time ontology, which is this: if we assume –in the domain of this assumption- that there is “numerical identity” then in order to explain the “flowing” (or “running-passing”) of time, we are led to adopt a model of time such as a blowing balloon, in the sense that the distance of two time points on its surface increase over time. This explicitly means that the time-units (in this model) are increasing in duration, i.e. that a time unit –a, becomes later on 2a….etc. But this does not imply any difference between the time-moments-units, because what comes out is always “time-units” of necessarily undetectable different duration (think of it, it needs a lot of abstraction). Time is “ageing”. But this model is coherent with entropy and with the well scientifically established continuously dilated universe. I remind that “numerical identity” consists of the known to us “one over many” notion of the Universals.

Assumption B: If we assume that time is necessarily bound with the physical, then in order to explain the “flowing” (or “running-passing”) of time, we are led to adopt a model in which the time-units are kept constant in duration, but the time moments-units do not constitute “numerical identity” but rather “qualitative identity”, because they are different, due to their ever changing physical content (phenomena). I remind that “qualitative identity” consists of the known to us “tropes”. Time can be necessarily bound to the physical in many ways such as: i) time is the cause of the physical (this is indeed a physical 70

Philosophical Writings DETERMINISM Vs INDETERMINISM Which is more unpredictable, the human being or the physical universe? – Entropy.

Take a box A, with volume (V) and put in an inside corner of it a small amount of a gas, consisting of N molecules.

The molecules in a short time will be dispersed and cover all volume of the box equally. In every point of the inside the box, there is the same density of molecules (number of molecules/unit volume). We say that in such a situation the gas has reached its highest possible entropy and thus its greatest unpredictability (indeterminism). What is then the physical meaning of entropy and how is correlated with indeterminism?

The situation of the highest entropy can be expressed like this: Under stable conditions of volume(V), pressure (P) and temperature (T) inside the box, “if we could take an instant (dt0) picture of the molecules in the box and measure their instant velocities, we would sketch a “velocity distribution diagram”, which would reveal the “percentage (%) of the molecules which are in a definite range of velocities”. F.e. the diagram would show that between the range of velocities ab there are 30% of the molecules and so on. This can be said otherwise such as: The distribution diagram shows what is the probability for every molecule to be found -in every time instance (dt0)- in a definite range of velocities. F.e. in the above example the diagram tells us that every molecule has – every time- 30% probability to have velocity between the range ab. But we do not know which exactly molecules we will find inside this range every time we make the measure. Therefore for each definite molecule we have an infinite uncertainty (and thus infinite unpredictability and indeterminism) about its velocity it actually has at any time instance. What we know more is that every molecule has equal probabilities (with the rest) to attain all the possible velocity levels. And lastly we know that the range 90

Philosophical Writings Inclusive and exclusive Disjunctive syllogism An Inclusive Disjunctive syllogism is of the form: a) Either P or Q. Not P. Therefore Q. OR b) Either P or Q. P. Therefore Q. Thus Inclusive Disjunctive syllogism means “and/or”, where at least one term must be true, or they can both be true (this kind of syllogism suits to my foregoing model) An Exclusive Disjunctive syllogism is of the form: a) Either P or Q. P. Therefore not Q. Thus Exclusive syllogism (“xor”) means one term must be true and the other must be false. Both cannot be true and both cannot be false.

Anomalous Monism, in the Scientific Realm: From the above, we see that Anomalous Monism establishes: i) “absolute knowledge” (i.e. circumvents scientific skepticism”) by the firm establishment of the “one(mental) to one (physical) event” relation, ii)the indeterminancy of the mental, on the grounds of iii) its physicalism.

The causal exclusion problem But then a problem arises inside Anomalous Monism, firstly proclaimed by Jaegwon Kim (Korean-American philosopher, b. in 1943), according to whom: «Take any mental event m, which stands in a causal relation, say as a cause of a physical event p, instantiated thus a physical law which covers this causal relation” (*). Thus –according to anomalous monism`s theory- mental m falls under a certain physical kind M description (perhaps a neural realizer) and p falls under a physical kind P and an

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Philosophical Writings can cause physical effects by strict physical laws. Thus is important to find a solution to it, more convincing than this given by the Davidsonians. (*)Jaegwon Kim: “The Many Problems of Mental Causation”. From Mind in a Physical World (MIT Press, 1998), pp. 29-47 and in “Philosophy of Mind, classical and contemporary readings”, David j. Chalmers ed., Oxford University Press, NY, Oxford, 2002, pp. 170-179.

Solution to Anomalous Monism`s “causal exclusion problem” Solution to Anomalous Monism`s “causal exclusion problem” and the determinism embodied in it, gives Jaegwon Kim`s argument, by his proposal of non(physically) reductive functionalism, or equivalently, of mental reduction to functional states, rather to physical states and the strictly correlated with it, materialistic emergentism and multiple realizability (*), which are a kind of dualism (scientific realism)(see below). (*) Jaegwon Kim: “Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction”. From Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 52: 1-26 and in “Philosophy of Mind, classical and contemporary readings”, David J. Chalmers ed., Oxford University Press, NY, Oxford, 2002, pp.135-149. (**) always remember that the existence of a Grant Unifying Physical Theory, which could unify all these contradictory physical theories, is impossible, according to Godel`s incompleteness theorem.

Definitions: 1) Types, tropes and tokens: Tropes are unrepeated particularized entities characterizing uniquely and belonging to individual objects, which can be called also token-properties, whereas properties-types are abstract entities, which unify a number of objects sharing the same tropes. Thus types are abstract generalizations,

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Chapter II: Philosophy of Mind concepts, universals, or predicates, which resemble classes of tropes.

2) Multiple Realizability (MR): It claims that it is possible that physical with very different, but not-disjoined properties, to refer to the same theory, the latter being evaluated on its content. This is the multiple realization phenomenon of typical scientific realism (dualism), which saves supervenience and Anomalous Monism, along with emergentism, to slip into physicalism or empirical reductionism. Further, MR argues against the “overconfirmation” “sceptical” argument in positivism, which claims that there cannot be many physical notdisjoined events which all confirm the very one and same theory.

3) Materialistic Emergentism: The functional property F of a composite (consisting of more simple parts) physical object, overrides the simple sum of the functional properties f-s of the constituent parts. We might say that F is “non-structural”, in that the occurrence of the property is not in any sense constituted by the occurrence of more fundamental properties and relations of the object's parts.

F is a manifestation of the level of the organization of the matter of the object into question. Emergentism, states that a system`s emergent property is this which is more the sum of the system`s ontological (physical) properties and therefore emergentism is related to property dualism, whereas it contrasts with reductionism. And this, can also be conceived as a form of monistic “physicalistic functionalism”.

Materialistic emergentism and Multiple Realizability: The solution of the causal exclusion problem leads to physicalistic functionalism.

I remind that: According to anomalous monism`s theorythe mental m falls under a certain physical kind M (which could be the physical realizer of the m) and p falls under a physical kind P and an appropriate causal physical law

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Philosophical Writings emergentism, to slip into physicalism or empirical reductionism and argues against the “overconfiramtion” “sceptical” argument in positivism. It also saves the indeterminancy of the mental (see also further below).

Finally, Multiple Realization keeps Supervenience dictum of the “mental dominance over the physical”, in the sense that the former (mental) determines the physical properties of the latter (physical).

Pict.1. Supervenience, empirical equivalence scepticism and Multiple Realization.

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Chapter II: Philosophy of Mind Philosophical Consequences: Thus, Kim, in solving the “exclusion problem” of the Anomalous Monism, by the introduction of the Supervenience and Multiple Realizability, creates a physical world which can be subsumed by General Unifying Physical Theories, therefore giving truth value to theory of many possible worlds and to abstract mathematics. He also creates a humankind with free will and dominator upon its physical fate and destiny.

Last, Kim`s humankind is more plausible and evolutionary advantageous, since its mental evolution is separated by its physical evolution and more importantly, its mental states set the condition for its physical evolution (and not the reverse)(see also below).

Multiple Realizability (MR) by Hilary Putman. Type and Token Identity Hilary Putnam (American Philosopher, b. in 1926), in his paper “Psychological Predicates”, in W.H. Capitan and D.D. Merill, eds. Art, Mind and Religion (University of Pittsburgh, 1967), was the first to inject MR into debates on the mind-body problem. Putman introduced this picture, which, overrides the causal exclusion problem of Davidson`s Anomalous Monism:

Pict. 2. Multiple Realizability: It can be seen that more than one P (physical) can instantiate one M (mental), but not vice versa (this is in agreement with supervenience). Causal relations between states Ps, are represented by the arrows (M1 goes to M2, etc.).

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Pict.3. Multiple Realization Ramification.

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Chapter II: Philosophy of Mind The relationship between the psychological (mental) and physical kinds is something like this: There is no single neural kind N that realizes “pain”, across all types of organisms or physical systems; rather there is a multiplicity of neural-physical kinds, Nh, Nr, Nm… such that Nh realizes pain in humans, Nr realizes pain in reptiles, Nm in Martians etc. Perhaps, biological species, are too broad to yield unique physical-biological realization base; the neural basis of pain could perhaps change even in a single organism over time. But the main point is clear: any system capable of psychological states (that is, any system that has a “psychology” and “mental states”) falls under some physical structure type T, such that systems with structure T share the same physical base for each mental state-kind that they are capable of instantiating (we should regard this as relativized with respect to time, to allow for the possibility that an individual may fall under different physical structure types at different times). Thus physical realization bases for mental states must be relativized to species (type identity), or, better, physical structure-types (type-identity).

Law: If anything has mental property M at time t, there is some species-specific (type-identity) physical structure type T and physical property P, such that it is a system of type T at t and has property P at t, and it holds as a matter of law, that all systems of type T (type-identity) have M at a time, just in case they have P at the time.

The biological specific-species ramification of T represents its “type-identity”, whereas the ramification of T across each member of a specific biological species, represents its “token identity”. Finally, the variations (in time, on not-) of T, inside each member of a specific biological species, represents the “token-token” identity.

In summary: The mental state M, for “pain”, represents a abstract functional mental (psychological state) (in analogy with a “Quantum state”) than is realized onto different species-specific physical structures T (type-identity), i.e. onto the neural “pain” systems of humans, reptiles, birds etc. The human Th neural system for pain, is ramified into

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Chapter II: Philosophy of Mind Further, consider Maxwell`s theory of the electromagnetic field which was first introduced to account for electricity and magnetism, but it unexpectedly predicted the existence of electromagnetic waves and thereby accounted in part for the behaviour of light and also X-rays, infrared, microwaves and so on.

Also, MR refers to Unifying Theory of Electromagnetism and Weak Nuclear Power, in the awaiting for the Grand Unifying Theory, to include to the above, the Strong Nuclear Power and Gravity.

Multiple Realizability Explicitly, in Realism (Dualism) Proposition first: We refer to previous pict.3, in which Ms mental states can be conceived as a “phantom”, “quantum”, abstract, primary functional and “potentially (being) realized mental entities, which are reduced (corresponds) to similarly abstract functional Ts (=Th, Tr, Tm), which nevertheless are “secondary”, in the sense that they are emergent of their physical (physicochemical) properties. Thus, we establish the mental reduction Ms to functional states Ts, rather to mere structural (physicochemical) physical states. Finally, Ts, are really (explicitly) reduced and physically manifested as a,b,c, physical properties (nerve fibers), each of which (a,b,c) manifests a certain physico-chemical structure and function (carrying different kinds of pain). We see that more than one a-s can instantiate one M, but not vice versa. The Th, Tr, Tm are not between themselves disjunctive (type-identity, or species-identity). The same as for the a,b,c. But, the M (and Ts) are realization disjunctive to a,b,c, but not the a,b,c between themselves (a,b,c are not existentially-realization and causally disjunctive between themselves).

In that sense M and Ts can be thought of as “functional 2nd order” properties and the a,b,c as “first order physical properties” (see also below).

Proposition second: M and Ts(=Th, Tr, Tm) can be conceived of as each having a concrete and definite

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Philosophical Writings Multiple Realization and Methodologyin the Neurological and Psychological Sciences (extracts)

By Kenneth Aizawa and Carl Gillett,Centenary College and Illinois Wesleyan University. http://www.academia.edu/1270072/Multiple_Realization_and_M ethodology_in_the_Neurological_and_Psychological_Science

Part 1 – Mechanisms, Realization and Multiple Realization.

To understand the questions at issue, and also the key claims of the received view,it will help if we start by considering an actual case of realization from the neurosciences (*).

For example, we know that, under appropriate background conditions,voltage-sensitive potassium ion channels play a key role in neurons by quickly allowingthe passage of potassium ions whilst blocking other ions. And the sciences have provideda compelling mechanistic explanation of how such ion channels do this in terms of the properties and relations of the complex protein molecules that are ‘subunits’, i.e. parts,of these channels. In this case, putting things very crudely, we know that, under therelevant background conditions, the chemical properties and spatial alignment of thecomplex protein sub-units mean that the sub-units change their relative spatial positionsin very particular ways when there are changes in the charge of adjacent cells. (SeeFigure 1 for a textbook illustration of the structure of the sub-units taken from Levitanand Kaczmarek (2002), p.111). Basically, when the charge changes, then the sub-unitsadopt new spatial relations to each other which leave them together forming a ‘gate’ such that the chemical properties of the individual protein sub-units facilitates the fast passage of potassium ions, whilst blocking other ions. (*)Following the recent metaphysical debates over realization, we will assume a causaltheory of properties under which a property is individuated by the powers it potentiallycontributes to individuals. We will thus use a version of Shoemaker (1980)’s account andto cover as many participants in the debate as

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Pict.4. A model for the solution of causal exclusion problem, via a realization of the mental on a multi-functional expressed physical token. A step to emergentism.

In our model we have thus to consider the mental m and physical types M as determinable entities, which both become determinate entities (are realized) first via their multiply ramifications in tropes ms and Ms (circumventing thus identity-type theory) and finally via the identification of the mental tropes ms with the functional properties Fs of the Ms (see pict.1). .

Thus the solution to the causal exclusion problem comes by postulating a â&#x20AC;&#x153;second orderâ&#x20AC;? property of the physical tropes Ms, which I introduce as being the multiply multiplication (ramification) of each physical trope Ms to many functional (abstract-mental) Fs (token-properties).

This explicitly means that each physical trope Ms -with a definite and stable physical structure and with physical properties reducible to its physical structure and to the physical science in general- expresses a spectrum of (abstract) functions Fs which all fall under the same 154

Philosophical Writings iii) They are the most differentiated cells of the human body, in the sense that they are of the least entropy cells and thus of the highest functional comlexity self-organized living structures, whose multi-functional properties are not-reducible to their physical structure. Thus â&#x20AC;&#x153;differentiatedâ&#x20AC;? cells should not be thought as cells with the highest functional specificity, but instead as cells with the highest functional plurality inside the same type. This is a field for research inside the framework of philosophy of mind.

New Fields of Research? - Cell Differentiation and Philosophy of Mind

Pict.5. New Fields of Research. Cell Differentiation and Philosophy of Mind.

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Chapter III: Philosophy of Science FROM THE PRE-SOCRATIC (6th ce. BC) TO THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION OF THE 17TH CE.- THE CAUSALITY IN SCIENCE What kind of “Cause” we are dealing with?

In the history of science two prevailing but opposing, concepts of the “physical cause” were developed. The first was the Realistic type, according to which, “causes”, in the conceived and physical form of “physical laws”, do really exist in the universe, as abstract, unobserved existences, which establish non-contingent, “permanent and necessary connections” between objects and matters of fact in our physical universe. The opposite AntiRealistic (anti-causality) type, is that originated by Hume`s argument against induction (see below), according to which, “causes” or “physical laws”, in the above Realistic view, do not really exist at all, but what we see and conceive as such, are merely contingent, “constant connections”, or “regularities” or patterns of behavior of matters of fact in our universe (Skepticism in science). We present here a third concept of the “physical causality”, which reconciles the above two dialectically opposing kinds of “causality”. In this latter “third concept of physical causality”, the “old” or “classical” concept of “physical law” does not “cause” the physical phenomena, but it “explains” or “predicts” them instead. We`ll keep this latter concept in our discussion of Scientific Realism in this book. We present this latter view, being put in the context of a brief history of the scientific thought, from ancient Greece to the Great Scientific Revolution of the 17th ce.

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Chapter III: Philosophy of Science THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD: DEDUCTION, INDUCTION and FALSIFICATIONISM. There follows methods of “theory development (discovery)” and of “theory justification (confirmation)”: A) ON THE DEDUCTION: Deduction was a type of logic syllogism, introduced by Aristotele in his “Organum” and dominated the scientific reasoning until 16th ce, when Francis Bacon (1561-1626), proposed «Inductivism» as the new method of scientific research and reasoning which should replace Aristotelean Deduction. Deduction is –prima facie- a pure syllogistictheoretical (reasoning) inference in accordance with the laws of logic. Logic is the study of reasoning abstracted from what the reasoning is about. According to Hume, deduction is the type of syllogism concerning «relations of ideas» (on contrary to «induction» which concerns «matters of facts»). The truth or falsity of the conclusion of the deductive syllogism, is established internally, i.e. from the logical relations among the ideas contained in the deduction and not externally to them, i.e. on empiricism (as it holds to induction instead). Therefore, all a priori and analytic true propositions are deductively true (although they could also be empirical verified too, f.e. «all bachelors are unmarried»). Hume, continues that this is done, because the negation of the truth of a deductively true proposition will imply a contradiction. On this reasoning, the method of «reduction ad absurdum» is established. A deductively valid argument is one where it is nor possible for the premises all to be true, while the conclusion is false, i.e. in a deductively valid argument all true premises imply necessarily a true conclusion (but the reverse does not necessarily hold (see below)). And this knowledge is certain (compare with the uncertain knowledge of an inductive argument induction with true

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Chapter III: Philosophy of Science Hume`s argument against Induction I) Hume (1711-1776) makes a distinction between two types of proposition, namely those than concern “relations of ideas” and those that concern “matters of fact”.

According to Hume, any true proposition about “relations among our ideas” is provable by deduction, because its negation implies a contradiction. This is the basis of the method “reduction ad absurdum”. Such propositions are then a priori true and analytic (although not exclusively, i.e. they can be empirically true too). On the other hand, Hume argued, that knowledge about “matters of fact” can be derived only by experience, because the ideas involved are logically unrelated and hence the propositions are not deductively provable. Therefore, there is no contradiction to suppose that the claimed “matters of fact” is not true.

D. Hume, along the two other English Empiricists, i.e. John Locke (1632-1704) and George Berkeley (1685-1753) shared their belief that there are no innate concepts and than all our knowledge of the world is derived from and justified by, our experience and sensory perceptions, hence they all deny that any a priori knowledge of matters of fact is possible.

But then, Hume, crucially wondered, “how we can be sure that the Sun will rise tomorrow, just because it happened in the past?” (this is an Induction truth reasoning). How we can verify the truth of events that we haven`t yet experienced? After all to deny that the Sun will not rise tomorrow, is not a contradiction, because we have no reason to believe that this indeed will happened just because it always happened in the past. And this, because we do not have any logical and empirical reason to believe that the future will be like the past (induction). To believe otherwise (that the future will be like the past), implies that we appeal to the a priori truth of the induction principle, but here what it is actually the in question is the validity of that principle. Lastly, Hume rejects all a priori truths (as a genuine empiricist). Thus, to appeal to 201

Chapter III: Philosophy of Science My friend Wittgenstein says on this in his T-L-P 6.37: “A necessity for one thing to happen because another has happened does not exist. There is only our logical necessity”. I`d substitute the last phrase for this: “There is only a constant mental habit”, which explicitly means that we cannot rationally and safely expect that the future facts will be repeated unchanged, based on their being occurred in the same way in uncountable times in the past.

And this because we`d argue that the near past instances were once “future instances” in respect to “older” past instances and so on.

C) FALSIFICATIONIOMISM (and Induction) Carl Popper`s Falsificationism. A solution to Induction Problem?

The theory of the scientific method, originated by Popper and developed by Lakatos, according to which science is fundamentally about trying to falsify theories, rahter than trying to find evidence in their favor. A Theory is Scientific, only if it is falsifiable (can be falsified). None, on experience grounded confirmation method (like induction) can ever confirm or falsify any theory, which therefore, can never be proved as true or false by the general generalization of the induction. Popper pointed out that there is a logical asymmetry between confirmation and falsification of a universal generalization of inductive inference. The problem of induction arisen because no matter how many positive instances of a generalisation are observed, it is still possible that the next instance will falsify it (weak confirmation). However, if we take a generalization such as all swans are white, then we need only observe only one swan that is not white to falsify the hypothesis (strong falsification). Popper`s falsificationism tried to solve the induction problem by arguing that science is fundamentally about falsifying rather than confirming theories, and so he thought that science could proceed without induction, because the

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Philosophical Writings objects consist entirely and exclusively by “mental abstract ideas” ! and therefore such objects are minddependent.

Berkeley`s argument is as follows: a) We experience only mind-dependent “ideas” and not material objects (idealism). b) All our ideas come from experience (concpept empiricism). c) The words “material object” cannot stand for any idea and are therefore meaningless (immaterialism).

Thus Berkeley is an anti-realist empiricist ontologically and cognitively. As a consequence of this attitudes he attacked the distinction between primary and secondary properties. iv) Immanuel Kant`s (1724-1804) ontology and a priori synthetic knowledge i) Ontology: Kant`s ontology is aiming at reconciling the two forms of Metaphysical Realism (realism and empiricism) and Berkeley`s and Locke-Hume empiricisms in claiming that: There is indeed a mind-independent external world (in agreement with empiricism) but this world, albeit the only real, cannot be perceived and known by us, because it is outside of our sensory powers. That “hidden” world is called, after him as “noumena” (this is the world of abstract art). Thus Kant, coincides “noumena” with Locke`s primary properties of the world. The “noumena” are appeared to us as the “phenomenal” world, after it being configurated by our minds, whose offering to this configurating process is his a priori possession of the “categories” of time and space, into which the events and objects of the world took place. And this is the mind-dependent anti-realistic contribution to its ontology (and cognitive process). ii) Cognition: Extending his ontology Kant is proposing a similar model for our knowledge of the world. Its important element is that he believes that the human mind possesses the ability to think and get knowledge by reason alone of how the actual world is (not the noumenal, but

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Chapter III: Philosophy of Science ON SCIENTIFIC REALISM Scientific Realism-I -Definitions: “Assertoric” (abstract, unobservable) Theories (statements): “Assertoric” is the theory which “genuinely asserts (refers to) something about the physical or abstract world”. For a theory to be assertoric it does not have to be true. For the Metaphysical and Scientific Realists, theories are assertoric to real abstract entiitis, for the Empiricists (positivists) theories are assertoric to observable (physical) objects (see Reductive Empiricism in Positivism). Finally, the Antirealists claim that theories are not “assertoric” (do not refer to anything) and merely are used to systemize relations between physical phenomena (see Semantic Instrumentalism in Anti-realism).

“Reducible” and “Irreducible” Theories: “Reducible” are the theories which can be defined and understood by physical terms. The opposite stands for the “irreducible”.

Thus, theories are irreducible for Metaphysical and Scientific Realists, reducible for Empiricists (Positivists), whereas for the Antirealists, they can be either reducible, or irreducible.

In Realism the ontology (being) of the unobservable (theoretical terms-universals) is taken to be an a priori real metaphysical mind-independent entity. Realism includes irreducible, asserting (semantic) and non-asserting (nonsemantic) universals.

Scientific Realism (SR) includes irreducible and asserting (semantic) entities, which should also be “knowable”, i.e. to be the content of our cognitive domain (knowledge).

This requires them to be “justifiably true”. Criterion for their “truth” is them to “refer” or to “correspond” to how things stand in the world (asserting and semantic). This makes them “knowable”, i.e. their correspondence can be

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Chapter III: Philosophy of Science aside the categories we currently use and step outside them in order to determine their origin. Since we cannot put aside our present categories, we have no way of telling whether what we use are Platonic categories, or whether these putative Platonic categories are reflections of a language where the categories come from our own mind.

The assignment that follows has been written by, and is entirely the work of, <Dimitrios ANTONIOU>.

Is Structural Realism the best of both worlds?- A comparative study-XII Aims: This article aims to give a comparative account of Typical vs Structural Realism, from which are derived interesting extrapolations encompassing various areas of philosophy and natural sciences and from which -I believeis revealed the superiority of the constructivistic conception of the world over its Realistic aspect.

Definitions: Strong underdeterminism on evidence (hereafter “scepticism”) comes into two necessarily conjoined forms: i) empirical equivalence, is the phenomenon of many rival and empirical equivalent theories evaluated from their physical content, ii) “one over many”, which is the phenomenon of one theory to explain, by its physical content, with the same power many physical showing different physical properties. Scepticism was predicted and explained by the Duhem-Quine theses which is historically jusitified in explaining and predicting the unsolving of the strong undetermination notion in science by the use of an Inference to Best Explanation (IBE) inductive method grounded on empirical evidences, such as the unified description of the privileged theory. To break the above sceptical problem, “Typical Realism” responded by proposing an IBE reasoning (abduction) being based upon epistemic superempirical, but still contextrelated, virtues of the phenomenally rival and empirical equivalent theories, such as the unifying explanatory power of the privileged theory. This kind of IBE is, in 249

Chapter III: Philosophy of Science algebra an isomorphism is a bijective map f such that both f and its inverse f −1 are homomorphisms (of the same shape). We can now create a set of isomorphic functions: ff^-1, f^2f^-2, f^3f^-3 etc., in which we can go from one to another by sybsequent inversions. Generally we can take isomorphic objects by a gradual variation of the parameters of any fucntion, such as f.e. y(x) =ax+bz.

Similarly in mathematics the omega-sequences and Weirestrasse`s functions are isomorphic. In chemistry, isomorphism is the existence of different chemical compounds (with different molecular formulas) but with the same crystal structrure. This is a reflexion of analogous chemical bonding patterns.The isomorhic compounds show different properties due to different effects the common crystal pattern exercise on to their differing constitutional atoms. F.e. the alums are all isomorphic compounds. What matters here is the structure (form) not the content. The former determines the latter. Isomoprphid are also the Zobatinsky`s chemical reactions. In physics and biology, isomorphic are the systems which show free-scale selfsimilarity, namely structure invariance under continuous scale variance, serially bifurcating chaotic systems and natural fibonacci sequences. These phenomena constitute “The fractal Geometry of nature” (Mandelbrot, 1977) and the discrete logistic map of Lotka-Voltera models biological system growth. Also other biological patterns based of lateral inhibition and different rates of diffusion for the participants and cell pattern-preserving growth models with polymorphism of the individual cells, are isomorphic too.

The response of Structural Realism to Scepticism through Isomorphism: We remind: Isomorphism claims structure invariance across theory`s content change.

The feature of Structural Realism (SR), which differentiates it crucially from Typical Realism, is that SR refers and evaluates theories in respect to their “abstract, mathematical form”, rather to their physical contents.

The significance and implications of this difference will be immediately justified.

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Philosophical Writings ANTI-REALISM- EMPIRICISM van Fraassen`s Constructive Empiricism-Structural

Empiricism (anti-realism) Structural Empiricism (SE) of van Fraassen, is a mindindependent anti-realistic theory, which aims to describe (instead of explain) the physical as it appears by theoretical terms (abstract beliefs), but denying any existential value to the latter. It selectively accepts the beliefs only instrumentally for accurately describing the observed and predicts the observable, without being interested to formulate JTBs (constituting knowledge) which correspond and explain the physical. For this reason SE accepts as semantic instruments even irreducible and non-assertoric abstract terms (like “the mean tax-payer”semantic instrumenatlism) as long they can describe the physical. For the same reason SE accepts theory-laden process, but always maintaining the lack of any existential value of the latter. In SE the beliefs are determinable (existable), not determined (existent), as they are in contrast in realism. SE does not enrich the physical with unobserved entities (as realism on contrary does), albeit plastically modifying it by theory-laden process. SE does not ever rise the question of the phenomenalism and of the existence of either “sense data” or the “things of themselves” behind them. SE implies a dichostacy between the existential value and their semantic value of beliefs (it reminds the similar Aristotelean dichostacy between the existential value and their semantic value of Forms). In SE the agent is not interested and does not give good (rational) reasons for what it observes. He only is satisfied by giving a reliable description of them by the assistance theoretical terms. SE aims to the description of the physical as it appears and functions, not to the truth (in the epistemic-philosophical sense of the word) of the (theoretical) beliefs themselves. It asks to the question “how the physical functions and appears” and not “why it

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Chapter III: Philosophy of Science coherent with “scientific pragmatism” (see below on “positivism”) (for more on Constructive Empiricism and Instrumentalism, see below in Scepticism).

ON CAUSALITY - I I) Realism: Causation is not a physical event! It is “relations of abstract properties” If the “cause” A makes the thing B to become C, then we say that B and C are related by the first order property of “B becomes C” (the significance been stressed here on the passive verb “becomes”) (or we say that B is C). But the B and C are then related by a second order property, i.e. that of their “cause” A, in the sense that “A caused B to become C”. This is expressed in logic as A(B,C). In realism the “cause A” is conceived as an eternal caual metaphysical necessity, or universal (Platonic Idea). Causal necessities (or universals) are the “physical laws” (like the low of gravity) and called N-relations (from the nomic relations, where “nomic” means “in accordance with the physical world”).

We then can say in general and in analogy with the above paragraph: Universals (causes)–in natural ontology- are second order properties of nomic necessitation (N-relations, physical laws) over first order necessities (causal relations), such as: all Fs are causally relater to Gs (causal relations), in the logical (mathematical) mode of N (F,G).

II) Anti-Realism (like Hume`s empiricism) on Causation: There is not metaphysical causal necessity Anti-realism claims that: There are not metaphysical causal necessities (N-relations-universals). The physical

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Chapter III: Philosophy of Science “Causation is the result of the physical events! Causation is co-evolving and co-existing with the physical events! There is no such thing as the preceding “cause” and the following “effect” in nature. “Causes” and “effects” are co-evolved synchronously. The evolving physical event consists of directional and relational properties between its objects.

These properties are wrongly perceived by ourselves as succeeding “causes” and “effects” in time. Physical and abstract stuff (causation) coexists and coevolving.

Causation is the mental expression of the physical (like mental-brain relations). We`ll see later that the same holds for space-time! i.e. the physical events creates the space and time in respect to which they are being been evolved.

The equivalence of matter, space, time, energy, causation Definitions: m = matter. Matter implies space, i.e. matter cannot be thought outside of space, therefore: mspace. Q: the opposite is sound? That its: space implies matter, or space can be conceived without matter (empty?). An: Space implies matter too. There is no “empty space” (se below).

Therefore we have: matter = f(space), i.e. matter is a property of space. t=time. We`ll see below the extraordinary fact that time=matter=space, following the above syllogism. ν= frequency in space (pixels/cm), or in time (beats/min) E=energy= f(m,t) !!!. i.e. we also will see that: energy is a property of space-time c= the velocity of light, equal to 300.000 km/h

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Philosophical Writings CONSTRUCTIVISM (anti-realism) Mental (social) Constructivism (MC) (by Th. Kuhn, Feyerabend, Wittgenstein)-I Social (mental) Constructivism claims that the pessimistic meta-induction sceptical problem can be solved by exclusively assigning to each rival and empirical equivalent theory one particular definite “world-picture”. MC claims that theories are mental constructs (anti-realism), crucially contextual influenced by the agent`s personal, social, and historical background (collectively called “paradigm” by Kuhn) in which they are constructed and further that our experiences consists of theory-laden observations, or mental interpretations of the physical, making thus the correspondence principle along with any kind of formal logic used with it, totally unreliable as criteria of theory truth. The various constructed worldspictures are phenomenalistic, integrative pluralistic and theory-relative (theory-worlds) and they exist as either synchronic and diachronic (Feyerabend), or diachronic (in succession) (Kuhn). The particular theoretical terms draw their meanings from the theories and the “paradigm” within which they occur. Hence a change of the theory or a shift of the paradigm causes a shift of the meaning and the reference of all its constituents. The theories are “incommensurable”. F.e. the same term “mass” refers to different existences in Netwonan and Relativistic Physics.

The rational method we use for the creation of each theory-world, is not any more any kind of formal logic, but it is instead the “coherence” (see below), which implies that we use the law of non-contradiction only to prove the incoherent propositions, but not to prove the coherent ones, while at the same time we do not consider the “law of excluded middle” as an “axiomatic law”. We have already constructed the world of General Relativity being based upon Vasilief`s paraconsistent logic, which by neglecting the “law of excluded middle” of the classic logic, “constructs” Riemman`s geometry of General

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Philosophical Writings ON SCIENTIFIC SCEPTICISM (SSc) Scientific Realism, Anti-Realism and Scepticism-I Realism claims that in order for one of its (mathematical) abstract theories to be assigned the value of being “scientific”, it should be “true”, and this is satisified only if the theory corresponds to a certain physical phenomeno (or object), where “correspondence broadly means “veriafiability”, confirmation”, or “falsification” of the mathematical concepts. The above truth-condition demands a one-to-one correspondence between the theory and its confirming it physical. But Scepticims invaded realism when it is realized the lack of such one-to-one correspondence, in two forms: i) many versions of the same theory (Newtonean-General Relativity) correspond to the same physical world, ii) many competing theories correspond too to the same world (Newtonean-Quantum) (this is the empirical equivalence skeptical problem), and the reverse i.e. one theory corresponds to many different physical phenomena. These facts combined with the analogous Duhem-Quine argument, gave rise to Scepticism, which the realists tried to respond with various ways with the Structural Realims being the best of all. We see then that Scientific Realism claims for a Dualistic aspect to the world (abstract theories and the physical), facing thus a problem analogous to unsolved mind-body problem which ended up as Scepticism. Thus, skepticism, denies the possibility for the existence of Fr. Bacon`s the “exclusion experiment”.

The most successful Anti-Realistic response to the above Skepticism in Realism, is –I think- Constructivism, which rejects the Dualistic aspect of the world in favor of an (anomalous) Monistic aspect of it. Explicitly Constructivism claims that each abstract theory really points to an existence which –in this case- consists of two coexistent entities, i.e. the theory and the physical which – potentially- confirms it. The latter is perceived as

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Chapter III: Philosophy of Science Davidson`s anomalous monism (or like emergentism). And this is the social (mental constructivism).

Answers to Question on Scepticism and van Fraasen`s Constructive Empiricism-II 1) What are the notions of empirical equivalence and empirical adequacy. i) Empirical equivalence is the situation in which many ontologically incompatible theories cannot be distinguished by any of all possibly available evidences because the all theories in question correspond (explain) and/or predict exactly the same empirical consequences for all actual and possible observations, f.e. the Newtonean and Riemannian Geometry (of General Relativity). ii) Empirical Adequacy is a term used is “constructive empiricism” of van Fraasen, which claims explicitly that: even an irreducible and non-assertoric –and therefore unknowable- theoretical term (theory) is regarded as scientifically successful, as long as it describes reliably and accurately what is observed. At the same time “constructive empiricism” maintains an agnostic stance for the “existence” of these irreducible, assertoric or non-assertoric metaphysical “entities”. In other words “constructive empiricism” denies the epistemic element of scientific realism, whereas claims agnosticism for the metaphysical element of the latter. Examples: the “mean value” of statistics (statistical laws), the “average per capital income” in economics, the “life expectance“ in medicine, the “idealized conditions for physical law construction and application”.

2) How the problem of induction viewed as a form of underdermination argument?

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Philosophical Writings apprehension, reason, or the two combined, and thence inferred the need for total suspension of judgment on the existence and function of the world (epoché).

ON POSITIVISM-I Positivism was emerged in 19th ce, as a fierce response against Kant`s proposition for the a priori and synthetic nature of knowledge and was further developed, in early 20th ce. Positivism is divided into two types: 1) Logical Positivism (Vienna`s Circle)(*)(anti-realism),in which the scientific theories are assertoric (to theoretical) and reducible (linguistically)to physical, by a mathematicsymbolic language (calculus), which is constructed by a rational reconstruction of the ordinary language, in which the theories (theoretical entities) are originally expressed.

A theory can be shown to be logically sound by a calculus in its mathematic logic (calculus) (in a non-circular mode).

For some of the Positivists, that was enough to prove the truth of falsity of the theory. For others it was required the satisfaction of the “Verification Principle” (see below).

The Logical (theoretical) and Physical worlds coincide in their plethos of entities. Here we include: A. Comte (17981857), (J. S. Mill (1806-1873)(inductivists), Moritz Schlick (1882-1936), Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970), Hans Reichenbach (1891-1953, of the Berlin Circle),(L. Wittgestein (18891951) finally adopted (Scientific) Realism, after denying his prior Logical Positivism) (I remind that in Scientific Realism, the theories are assertoric (to theoretical entities) and irreducible (linguistically) to physical). (*) also known as the Ernst Mach Society (Verein Ernst Mach), in honor of the philosopher Ernst Mach (1838-1916).

2) Logical Empiricism (after 1945)(anti-realism, instrumentalism), in which the scientific theories are assertoric only to physical (and not-assertoric to theoretical) and thus they are also reducible (linguistically) to physical, by a mathematic-symbolic language (calculus), which is constructed by a rational reconstruction of the ordinary language, in which the theories (theoretical 338

Chapter IV: Theory of Knowledge CHAPTER IV THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

Definitions: Ontology: Theory of what really, exists and which is its “essence” (substance).

Dualism: Dualist ontologic view comes in two main varieties: Interactionism holds that the mental and the physical are fundamentally distinct, but interact in both directions: Physical states affect mental states and mental states affect physical states. Epiphenomenalism holds that the mental and the physical are fundamentally distinct and that the physical states affect mental states, but denies that mental states affect physical states.

Monism: It is the ontologic opposite to dualistic view, according to which, there is only one existence, either the abstract world (Platonic world of Ideas-Realism), or the Physical one (Physicalism).

In fact all history of Philosophy- since the eve of it in ancient Greece in 7th ce. B.C., is a constant dispute for the superiority of dualism or Monism over each other. This ontologic dispute, was spread of onto the “scientific knowledge” counterparts of these two ontologic views, namely over “Scientific Realism” and “Empiricism”.

Scientific Realism: To know the physical means to know its abstract counterpart, which explains, describes and predicts the future behaviour of the former.

Empiricism: In its strongest form, empiricism is the view that all knowledge should be traced back to

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Chapter IV: Theory of Knowledge epistemically rational if you form your beliefs responsibly (justifiably) by your own subjective lights and norms (to the best of her knowledge). This means that if you blamelessly use the objectively wrong epistemic norms â&#x20AC;&#x201C;for example, if you blamelessly think that the con-tossing is a good way of deciding a defendant`s guilt and employ this method-then your belief is still epistemically rational. A deontic agent is always responsible and epistemic internalist (can give good reasons in favour of what she believes as true).

Non-deontic epistemic rationality: in contrast, a nondeontic epistemic rationality insist that the epistemically rational agent not only do not blamelessly contravene any epistemic norm, but that the epistemic norms in question should be , as a matter of fact, objectively the right ones (i.e. the truth-conductive ones). Thus the coin-tossing method to decide the guiltiness does not count as epistemic rational. But that view (non-deontic rationality) appears to break the very intuitive connection between epistemic rationality and responsibility (which holds in deontic rationality). We don`t hold the hapless agent, who forms her beliefs by tossing a coin, responsible for her epistemic failings, since isn`t her fault that she was taught the wrong epistemic norms. And yet, on non-deontic view, we should count her as not being epistemically rational nonetheless. In conclusion, on non-deontic view, one can be responsible and yet not, at the same time, be epistemically rational. A non-deontic agent is always an epistemic externalist (cannot give good reasons in favour of what she believes as true, but instead she relies upon her applied reliable, epistemic virtues) and conditionally, an internalist too (conditional conjuction).

Non-deontic rationality-which represents a more strong vies of epistemic rationality in comparison with the deontic- indicates that scientific knowledge does not 369

Chapter IV: Theory of Knowledge “astrological predictions” (C. Popper), which is not a “scientific knowledge”. (*) On contrary, if the JTBs are considered to bear a zeroprobability of been false, then they are identified with religious dogmas, or self-justifying and a priori truths (Platonic Ideas, or foundation truths). In that case, such zero-error beliefs, do not need a mental construction in order to be formed and therefore, they cannot be considered to be one`s mental achievement. But then, they cannot constitute scientific knowledge. JTBs (and scientific knowledge) are mind-dependent and therefore represent an anti-realistic process (although they can include metaphysical components, or foundational and a priori true truths, such as in Scientific Realism).

Scientific knowledge, without JBTs: We saw above, that the non-deontic rationality, taught us that, in science, we can be responsible and yet not epistemically rational (or, equivalently, the knowing does not require deontic epistemic rationality. This dissociates the responsibility from epistemic knowledge. Other instances of this dissociation are the following: a) Child`s knowledge: It is non-responsible (mentally unreflectively), but still epistemic rational, because it is formed by using reliable the child`s cognitive faculties and his mental standards and criteria. Moreover, it doesn`t seem to contravene any right epistemic norm. Thus, knowing does not require deontic epistemic rationality. b) Gettier`s case (true beliefs by luck). The beliefs are formed responsibly and reliably, by employment of the right epistemic norms, but the truth of them (beliefs) is lucky. But this is not considered as epistemic knowledge.

And again, here we encounter a dissociation of responsibility and epistemic knowledge. c) Chicken-sexer`s case: This is a case of epistemic rationality, in which the agent forms his true beliefs reliably (using his reliable cognitive faculties), but by using the right epistemic norms “blindly” and therefore, with no-

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Philosophical Writings one`s epistemic virtues and therefore have adequate supporting grounds in favour of one`s beliefs.

Deduction: Deduction is –prima facie- a pure syllogistic-theoretical (reasoning) inference in accordance with the laws of logic.

Logic is the study of reasoning abstracted from what the reasoning is about. According to Hume, deduction is the type of syllogism concerning «relations of ideas» (on contrary to «induction» which concerns «matters of facts»). The truth or falsity of the conclusion of the deductive syllogism, is established internally, i.e. from the logical relations among the ideas contained in the deduction and not externally to them, i.e. on empiricism (as it holds to induction instead). Therefore, all a priori and analytic true propositions are deductively true (although they could also be empirical verified too, f.e. «all bachelors are unmarried»). Hume, continues that this is done, because the negation of the truth of a deductively true proposition will imply a contradiction. On this reasoning, the method of «reduction ad absurdum» is established. A deductively valid argument is one where it is nor possible for the premises all to be true, while the conclusion is false, i.e. in a deductively valid argument all true premises imply necessarily a true conclusion (but the reverse does not necessarily hold (see below)). And this knowledge is certain (compare with the uncertain knowledge of an inductive argument induction with true premises). A sound argument is one that is valid and where all the premises are true (and hence so is the conclusion).

Here, the “truth” (or “falsity”) of the conclusion is-by definition of the deduction- not tested –for its own confirmation- against the physical world (experimentally and/or empirically), but its truth or falsity is derives interanally, i.e. from the form or structure of the syllogism itself (formalism). A deductively valid argument can have: a) one or more (or all) false premises and a false conclusion, or b) one or more (or all) false premises and a 378

Chapter IV: Theory of Knowledge ii) The non-deontic agent could responsibly apply (albeit blamelessly since he is deceived), the wrong epistemic norms and yet he can end up with true beliefs merely by luck. But in this situation, although he acts responsibly, he is nevertheless a non-rational (albeit he is not irrational), because he objectively employs the wrong epistemic norms. But in this case the agent is not getting genuine knowledge.

Note: The Gettier`s case resembles the deontic view in that although we are acting responsibly (justifiably) and rationally, we nevertheless end up again with justified and true beliefs merely by luck (and therefore they do not constitute knowledge).

Gettier`s case differs from the deontic (and non-deontic views –ceteris paridus- in that in Gettier`s case we apply the right epistemic norms. The Gettier`s case and the examples given of the deontic and non-deontic rationality, show that: although rationality and responsibility are necessary for knowledge (JTBs), they are non-sufficient.

III) Externalistic Reliabilism: In Externalistic version of Virtue Epistemology (Reliabilism), knowledge is verified by the physical experienced existence or by the experimentally proved to exist. The physical existent is used as a criterion or as a foundational belief for knowledge. In Reliabilism therefore we are using our external cognitive (like perceptual) faculties for getting knowledge, and therefore –in principle- we get empirical-perceptual kind of knowledge (by acquaintance), as long as we do not contravene any sensual (perceptual) basic epistemic norm. Reliabilism is a rational process, which is using only our external cognitive (like perceptual) faculties.

In this domain, nevertheless, we may have a disjunction between responsibility and knowledge, as an agent can act rationally but irresponsibly when he forms his true beliefs by applying the right epistemic norms merely by luck, as it is analytically described in the “non-deontic”

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Philosophical Writings III) Reliabilism (the Externalistic version of virtue epistemology), expresses all the prementioned features of the non-deontic rationality, by substituting the term “rational” of the latter, for the term “reliable” in the former and therefore, in reliabilism, knowledge does not need and does not depend upon rationality, justification and responsibility (though it is not inconsistent with). Acting in the domain of Reliabilism, we move from the “JTBs” of the deontic`s view, to Reliable Beliefs, as being the constituents of knowledge.

Reliable are external to the agent`s methods which are more likely to produce truths and as such can be regarded f.e. the “laws of logic” (nominalistic view of logic), the carefully executed experiments, or the application of the agent`s reliable cognitive faculties (such as his perceptual faculties) that ended up to knowledge by «acquaintance». In reliabilism the agent is using- by definition- in his belief forming process only reliable and external to him epistemic methods (syntax), making thus knowledge a reliable achievement of his, but at the same time, reliabilism deprives knowledge of its essential core constructive feature, namely its being the agent`s mental (intellectual) achievement and this because reliabilism does not demand the agent`s responsibility as a necessary factor of his belief-forming process. The consequence of this is that the externalistic type of reliabilism allows, too, reaching true beliefs merely by luck, which as such cannot –by definition - constitute knowledge. This is evident in two counterexamples emerged in the domain of reliabilism, namely in: a) the Gettier-style example (like the example of the broken thermometer), in which, although the agent is applying responsibly his reliable perceptual (cognitive) faculties, it could still be a matter of luck that he has true beliefs, because he, albeit blamelessly (as being deceived) employs the wrong epistemic norms, and b) the “chicken-sexer`s” example, in which although the agent is applying his reliable perceptual (cognitive) faculties in getting his

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Chapter V: Philosophy of Religion CHAPTER V PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

The Problem of Faith I) From Rationalism to Existentialism The traditional Descartean rationalistic view, is that our “conscious” and our “essence” precedes our “existence” (“I” am thinking then I exist), following thus the old Greek Ideocratic philosophical tradition up to Hegel`s philosophy, where here “our essence” means “our self-consciousness”, (the Descartean “I”) or the definitions of ourselves that we create, or the private meaning we ascribe to our life, whereas “existence” here means us as being “real beings in the world”. According to this view the thinking, feeling, intending, morality etc-which constitutes “our human essence”, are transcendental floating freely around entities, waiting to be discovered and caught by the minds of human beings, giving them the purpose of their life. In that sense “our essence” is not a mental or moral achievement of ours, who merely discover the former. In this context the question: “which is the pre-existing essence of the human being?”, and the answer “such and such..”, do has meaning.

This view was totally reversed by the “intensionalism” (introduced by Artistotele, Brentano, Husserl and developed by Wittgenstein) according to whom we are conscious, think, or intend etc, always of something.

Following it, Existentialism (*) later came as a radicalization of the “intensionality”, by claiming that our “existence” (as “real beings in the world”) precedes “our essence” and that the latter is exclusively a mental achievement of the human mind. Human is born “naked” of “essence” and he creates freely its own “essential

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Chapter V: Philosophy of Religion On Arguments for God`s Existence A) THE ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN- The “infinitum” as God, or as an “ancillary God”?

The question set by the argument from Design is as to whether behind the –apparent- perfect harmonic design of our world, is hidden a “divine designer” which is the noncontingent God. Theists would give a confirmatory reply.

But, nevertheless, the argument from Design rises a lot of serious questions (similar to those arisen in the context of the Cosmological argument), as follows: 1) Is this particular existed harmonic-perfect design of our world we live in, contingent or not? i) If it is contingent, then our God calls for a super-God to dictate him (God) what kind of design and harmony will assert to our world.

And this implies also, that our sub-God involves in himself an element of contingency, something which is rejected by theists, ii) If the actual design of our world is notcontingent, then our God is not a perfect free and omnipotent being, who is being able to assert any design he wishes to the created world and in fact the existed well designed world is a Super-God, which determines its own design (and creation). And this is rejected by theists.

2) a) In the following argument, we are considering a perfect, non-contingent well designed world, or an infinite system of well-designed contingent worlds, in which the former world can “jump” to the next one of different design, in a discontinuous fashion. In this context, the well-designed world(s) –as theists suggests- entails the imprisonment of its own live members (animals and humans) in their own perfect constructed design. They are merely soldiers ordered to do what the perfect design and the designer (God) has determined for them to do. This is an exhaustive and unbearable determinism, in which the whole world is a universal prison in which any idea of freedom is forbidden, b) Similarly the whole world is 449

Philosophical Writings metaphysical speculations. The answer will be given in more details in a next posting in discussing the Cosmological Argument , but at this stage I`ll say this: The length-in time which is an integral part of our world, i.e the 4th dimension- (we can call it as the “temporal length) of the earth is infinite, since one can walk from east to west in linear fashion endlessly. But at the same time the surface of earth is finite! Conclusion: Infinitum is a physical reality.

Conclusion: The “infinitum” system of ill-designed worlds can function as an “alternative God”. But a theist would say that in fact it is God himself who makes this “infinitum” system of ill-designed worlds to exist. Thus we finally say that the “infinite” system of ill-designed worlds does not necessarily requires God for its existence (although it is not inconsistent with).

I am on the scientific side.

B) COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT-Part I Definitions: i) I call the “contingent with explanation” as “contingent”, or “true belief”, or “being” (knowledge), since it is a product of rationality, or logic, or virtuality and in any case it could be false ii) I call “necessary” (non-contingent), or “universal”, or “existence”, the a priori entity which cannot be proved or disproved by experience, or by rationality, since this is the precondition of the proof of all the contingent (true beliefs) (this is a “Realistic” thesis). A priori entities are f.e. God, and the laws of logic (law of identity, of contradiction and of the middle`s exclusion). iii) I call the known by mere experience as “known by acquaintance”, or “experienced”. iv) I`lll introduce here, for the needs of our discussion, another, prima facie, “strange entity, the “contingent without explanation”, such as an infinite chain of causes in our world (which according to Copleston do 452

Philosophical Writings C) ARGUMENT FROM APPARENT MIRACLES-I Hume`s Definition: A miracle may accurably be defined, a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity or by the interposition of some invisible agent.

The “classical” physical laws (such as the law of gravity, law of energy preservation, the laws of electromagnetism, strong an weak nuclear forces, law of the greatest entropy level), are not the cause of the existence and of the function of the physical world, but they are instead the existence of the world itself, or the expression of the existence of the world. The physical laws are not thus predicates of the existent world, but they are one of the its basic “essential” constituents. The physical laws express the relations between the physical objects, they are the mental expression (aspect) of the matter, which (mental expression) is merely discovered uniquely by the human mind. The latter does not create the former (as suggested in idealism). The other “essential” constituents of the world (except the physical laws), are the apparent break (negation) of the every time established physical laws, which are substituted for new ones. These apparent breaks of the old physical laws are interpreted, prima facie, as miracles by the human mind, until the latter understand the harmonic relation of the latter with the former. Thus the “history of miracles” is actually the “history of science”, which is evolved as the everlasting negation of itself (this is the biggest difference between science and religious dogmas). Examples of these “miracles” are: Life is a phenomenon towards “least entropy” (in respect to the physical world), the physical (natural) radioactivity, as a quantum phenomenon, is a phenomenon which breaks the law of energy preservation, since it predicts negative energy level! out of which positive energy is emerged! (tunneling phenomenon). It could be interpreted as a miracle in our world, which nevertheless can be rejected when we learn its real relation with our macroscopic “classical”, physical laws.

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Philosophical Writings MIRACLES-II I) From experience to conception: The observed physical world acts as a triggering factor (not as a directing factor) for us to mentally discover the “regular generalizations”, or the immaterial “relations” or “logical laws”, or the “physical laws” of the physical objects. These physical laws are not the cause of the physical phenomena, but they are the mathematical form of the latter. My mind then can build upon these physical laws and in agreement with them, an infinite (theoretically) number of more complicated or simpler mathematical concepts-physical laws which characterizes an infinite number of “possible worlds” which are all in agreement with our own actual world. The possible (mathematical-logical) worlds represent how differently our own world could have been existed. Therefore we can say that the physical laws of our own universe are not either necessary (albeit sufficient) for the existence of our own universe (because it could exist under different physical laws in the realm of possible worlds). F.e. we can conceive a possible world with different physical constants, or without gravity at all, or been consisted by anti-matter.

II) From conception to experience, or how we experience our world, according to how we conceive itAn imagined and miraculous world?

Can we conceive possible worlds and their physical laws entirely independently from our reality and which are even in disagreement with the latter (or not-necessarily in agreement with) and still being capable to describe accurately our world (reality)? If this could be true, it looks like a miracle. In this case we can conceive a number of worlds, even –at the extreme case- mutually excluded and which nevertheless can describe our world. Two questions now arise: i) Is this possible? Can we give reliable examples?, ii) if this is the case is this a miracle or it can be scientifically explained? Answers: i) The General 468

Chapter V: Philosophy of Religion it being experienced in a way, we could not ever have imagined to be able to. And this is really a miracle, i.e. it is a miracle to experience superlogical God`s actions inside our logical space and time (if it is true!).

D) ARGUMENT FROM RELIGIOUS IMAGES and EXPERIENCES-I These are supernatural, imaginary (illusionary), or true!, experiences that purpot to point to a (supernatural) realm beyond anything like the physical world that we encounter with our five senses in day-to-day activity. Such religious experiences-being instantiated through a sixth, spiritual, sense-provide to some people, surely to theists, strong evidence that there is such a supernatural realm, which they identified with God. i) I can know (“I am conscious of”, in Descartean sense) that I am having a speakable (senseful) image which corresponds to real or possible (potentially) real things. I know my “I” and my personal identity. ii) But I cannot be conscious of having an unspeakable (unreal) image, because in this case I am “thinking” only with and inside my own personal (private) language which represents an unreal imagined world. I “experience” the imagined in the domain of an unspeakable language and world, which involves myself too (the imagining person).

Thus I can imagine unspeakable (unreal) images only being “unconscious”, i.e. as if being in a mystical spiritual identification with the imagined. We can say: “My will does not obey me” (Augustine). But in this case: I do not know either what my images are (because they are unspeakable), nor of whether I am really imaging or I am really seeing (experiencing) something. I am losing myself and my “I”, I am losing my personal identity! This is –I

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Chapter V: Philosophy of Religion God`s essential and accidental Properties God`s essential Properties: Personhodd, Incorporeality/ Transcendence, Omnipresence/Immanence, Omnipotence, Omniscience, Eternality, Perfect Freedom, Perfect Goodness, Necessity God`s accidental Properties: Creator of the World, Creator of the Value, Revealer (of himself), Offerer of Eternal (Everlasting) Life The Incoherence of God`s essential and non-essential properties God is perfectly free and therefore omnipotent (God does necessarily what he wants, otherwise he`d call for a superGod to decide of what he`d do or not) to execute everything rational (logic). God does not choose to rational , he exists as such. The concept of an illogical God contravenes its personhood and it is nevertheless senseless. But the above properties contravene the following God`s properties: 1) God cannot create himself (a constraint onto his omnipotence), because otherwise he`d call for a superGod to create him.

2) Incorporeality, omnipresence and omniscience, contravene God`s rationality, because the former imply a spatialess and timeless God, whereas the latter (God`s rationality) entails a spatial and in-time functioning God, namely into the boundaries of logic (which is spatial and in-time). The offsprings (created world) should have the same substance (essence) with their parents (God).

3) God`s omnibenovelence entails that God can do only the good, putting thus a constraint upon his omnipotence and freedom. He cann`t do anything unloving. From it it comes that everything bad could not have been God`s creation.

Thus f.e. the physical disasters, suffering, congenital

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Chapter V: Philosophy of Religion God is the revelation of the world. This is anomalous monism`s view. In this view God is a a priori truth, in the sense that it (he) could not be proved by experience or by logic, but instead it (he) is the foundation of the proof of all logic theorems and of the real essence of the world, which is its “physical relations”. God is thus not provable, he merely exists. In this view then, God could be conceived as a “counterfactual” in the sense that “would God haven not existed the world would have not existed too”.

About God`s Existence and essential and non-essential Properties Question 14 As long as there are no compelling arguments or evidence that show that God does not exist, atheism is a matter of faith, not rationality.

You've just bitten a bullet!

You say that if there are no compelling arguments or evidence that show that God does not exist, then atheism is a matter of faith, not rationality. Therefore, it seems that you do not think that the mere absence of evidence for the existence of God is enough to justify believing that she does not exist. This view is also suggested by your earlier claim that it is not rational to believe that the Loch Ness monster does not exist even if, despite years of trying, no evidence has been presented to suggest that it does exist.

There is no logical inconsistency in your answers. But by denying that the absence of evidence, even where it has been sought, is enough to justify belief in the nonexistence of things, you are required to countenance possibilities that most people would find bizarre. For example, do you really want to claim that it is not

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Chapter V: Philosophy of Religion nevertheless, certain of “what I am thinking”, because we cann`t have trust our senses, or our memory, whereas the logic calls for a probable knowledge. From this comes that we cannot establish personal identity. But one may say, that still I am the same person (me) who is thinking (even the false). But then I am a false “personal identity” and therefore a non-existing “personal identity”. It comes that, despite my psychological continuity, I do not know my own thoughts (since my thoughts are false) and therefore I cann`t establish my own identity.

2) We assume that Personal Identity is one`s picture which distinguish him from the others (from the rest of the world). But as no-one can see his own eyes, no-one can distinguish himself from the rest of the world, because the one is the eyes-and the mind- of the world itself, through which the world gets its self-consciousness. When I point to myself as the “person who is acting anything”, then the subject (“I”) and the object (“I”) is one and the same. In this case of “I am in pain” the “I” is not demonstrative pronoun. If a=b, the “a” points at “b” as a demonstrative pronoun, but if a=a then “a” pointing at itself (“a”) is not a demonstrative pronoun. Therefore were the one tries to see himself separately from the rest of the world, he destroys the integrity of the world, rendering the ‘distinguishing” senseless. We thus end up to conceive personal (self) identity, as a self-determining activity, which denies itself.

3) By assuming that Personal Identity is one`s picture which distinguish him from the others (from the rest of the world), we assume that the one lies outside of space and time (outside of the world). In this case, the personal identity –as implying persistence over time- is senseless.

4) The multiply personality disorder, implies that “personal identity” cannot be logically established.

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Chapter VI: Philosophy of Politics CHAPTER VI PHILOSOPHY OF POLITICS

Metaphysics and Philosophy Vs Science Some general comments: According to Plato there exist (Platonic Realismus) (but it does not exist according to Aristotele-see next) the Idea of all Ideas, which is the Idea of Goodness –Truth (Beautifulness) (Καλό-Ωραίο-Aληθές). The Idea of all Ideas is a Metaphysical (ontologic) totally unschematized Being, alike an unschematized light which blinds everything aiming at its sight and which nevertheless lightens all other ideas by its magnificent light. All the other ideas, of submissive hierarchical significance, are more or less schematized and they consist the Philosophical realm (the Idea of Philosophy). Below the latter is the Physical realm, consisted by its human (ontic) beings (as biological-animal creatures) and all the physical objects, and phenomena, all considered as existences. The metaphysical-philosophical is the ontologic realm, the physical is the ontic realm. But the three realms are integratively interrelated. The metaphysical-philosophical realm is unspeakable and meaningless, because it provides the foundational principles for the meaning, knowledge, and understanding of the physical. The metaphysical-philosophical realm is the source of our scientific knowledge of our physical world, but the former itself is unknowable and meaningless. But, on the other site, the metaphysical is not-existed (or it is only existable) (Aristotele) and become really existed (as existence) only as its physical representative (phenomenon). The physical, without the philosophical, is only determinable, the metaphysical without the physical is only existable. The physical, in conjunction with the philosophical, becomes determinated, the metaphysical in conjunction the

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Chapter VI: Philosophy of Politics and Science say how the things are (as phenomena), philosophy (and metaphysics) say what the things really are, i.e. they reveal the essence of the things.

Political Philosophy Vs Political Science Lets try to define what the Political Philosophy and Political Science are explicitly dealing with correspondingly: Political Philosophy (next Philosophy) sets up the domain and the context of the discussion. It sets up what is to be discussed. It rises the questions and the problems under discussion. It also sets the rules (if any) for the execution of the discussion. Political Science (next science) deals of how to exercise the discussion and –more importantly- how to apply its conclusion to society.

Philosophy asks: Is the construction of a civilized state a realization of the essence of human kind? Is the state an integral part of the human`s Being (essence)?. Is behind this construction of the state an evolutionary causation, and what is it its characteristics and consequences upon the previous human being living in a state of nature?

Should we regard and judge civilized state as a logical construction (set) whose members may be behaving logically or illogically (under the influence f.e. of morals, religious beliefs, emotions, myths, mystique etc).

Philosophy asks: Is personal freedom an integral part of humans Being (essence)? Can it be vindicated in the context of a civilized state? Let the answer to the science, which should find the proper way of applying its conclusion on the matter onto the society. Philosophy asks: Are there (do we have) “human rights”? Give a rule for their definition. Where are they (human rights) come from? Are they are coming transcendentally (Plato, Descartes, Hegel), or are they existential (Husserl, Brentano, Heidegger)? Are the “human rights” given to humans (transcendentally), or ate they produced and given by the human themselves? Is the essence comes prior to existence (Plato, Descartes-Ideocracy-rationality), of together with it? (intensionality- existentialism). The former justifies

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Chapter VI: Philosophy of Politics What is the State-I The relation of the human as individual member of a civil state (Bourgeois) and as a citizen of a political construction (state), is that of “intensionality”, or coexistence (hypothetical contract theory), which explicitly can be said that the state (citizenship) is a necessary and sufficient condition for the full expression, evolution an justification of the human essence (nature) as a physical, moral and phsycho-social monad. We, as humans, wouldn`t have been the kind we are actually exist, wouldn`t we have been originated in a civil state, as citizens of it. This means that the citizenship should be conceives as been reduced to inter-individuality in the context of a state.

Two integrated essential features of the human being is freedom and equality in freedom fulfilled in the state.

Freedom is everyone`s right to protect and guarantee the execution of its own private (non-consequentialistic) rights and its own inter-individuality (citizenship). This means that the state should permit (by the consent law) to its individual members to freely express their objections, legal disobedience and their demand for the overturn of the established law, when the latter violates their individual interests. Freedom is the free movement of the citizen between his role of “ruler” (legislator-author of the law) to his role as the “subject to the law” and vise versa.

The reliable and real possibility of the minority to legally overturn the majority`s law (I am not obliged to obey all the laws all the times).

Political freedom is established on equal rights to everyone, in the sense that one`s rights correspond to all other1`s duties and vice versa. Thus everyone acts towards the other in the way he wants the other to act towards him (positive freedom). Thus freedom is my right for equality, which consists of two integrated elements: i) everyone`s right to be equal before the law and ii) everyone`s right to equality among unequal citizens.

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Chapter VI: Philosophy of Politics Justifying the State Social Contract Theories: (Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Aristotle, Plato) The social contract theory justifies the state on an express or tacit social contract between the citizen and the state for “universal political obligations” of the latter towards the former, on the condition of providing to the latter personal and private property security executed by the power of the state, which is voluntarily given to it by the citizens. The contract theory implies the voluntary consensus of the citizens for the allocation and acceptance of “political rights and obligations”. Political obligations apply to all citizens living within the border of the state and they (obligations) exist and allocated only by the consent of the former. This is the “universality principle” of the social contract theories. But because the political obligations are consented, the individual fully preserves and saves its own freedom and the state its liberal character. The political obligations, are assigned or taken up to and by the citizens, only as a result of their free and voluntary decisions Thus we all must obey “blindly” the consented laws, unconditionally and without any other consideration, only because they are laws and express our free consent and will.

My motive to obey the law is not a moral one, but my “legal” duty for its obedience and my fear for my punishment in case of its disobedience. In such a society the citizen`s actions aim to a legal end result -as it is defined the law- albeit the citizen`s probable illegal intension (dissociation between intension and real action Aristotle, Stoics, Kant). The consent may be express, like voting, or tacit, like receiving or accepting the benefits offered by the state. What binds any citizen to the state is the consent (and not a moral duty, or a utilitarian consideration of the former towards the latter). This is state of justice, in which the doctrines: “the moral and virtue is only the just” and “justice and virtue is

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Philosophical Writings On Liberty –I The liberty argument in the context of liberalism, it is best understood by the comparison of the two “dialectic” modes of it, namely that of Rousseau`s and Mill` theories of democracy, where the former express the “positive notion” and the latter the “negative notion” of liberty.

Definition: We start the discussion by stating that liberty (freedom) by definition-in a state of nature- means the unrestricted actions of the human being, uncontracted by others and which thus brings about inequalities in the world, provided the inequal abilities of human beings to exersize their freea actions. This is “freedom for survival, or “the liberty of nature”.

“Positive Liberty”: The end task of Jean-Jacques Rousseaus`s (1712-1778)democratic state is the “general will” which explicity means “equality of rights for all”.

But this comes in contrast with the above definition of liberty in a state of nature. Therefore, in the context of a civil democratic state, the above “liberty of nature” should be restricted by the consented law for the sake of general peace, security, alliance and morality and generally for “survival in quality”. Therefore, provided the natural inequalities of men, the establishment of such an “equality in freedom for all” calls for an –even imposedclassless cosiety and for the people to “be forced” to feel free in such social conditions, by paternalistically educated them that this is the way they “should feel free”! Only through the satisfaction of these pressumptions, wiil equality be a factor of social stability and peace in a civil state. Therefore in such a state “my freedom is realized in the equal freedom of others”, “I do not treat the others as I should not wish them to treat me” and “I do restrict my “unrestricted freedom of nature” for the sake of equality in freedom for the less able”. This Is the positive notion of freedom, which implies that the restriction of my idnividual freedom ends up enentually with an absolute 556

Chapter VI: Philosophy of Politics the others` just recognized freedom (the word “just” in the above sense). In this view then, the meaning of the word “equality” takes a different-from its old Rousseau`s (classical) content, meaning the “just inequality”. Thus equality –in this context- does not any more mean “equality of unequal people, or of unequal values” (as in Rousseau`s state), but it rather means “just (proportional) inequality”. Thus, such a state by employing the principle of “just inequality”, abolishes the inequalities and injustices of Mill`s state resulting from the employement of its negative liberty. And this same state, and for the same reason, frees also Rousseau`s state from its injust coerced classless status, from its unjust equality, from its need to the enforce social bonds and the need for its people to “be forced to be free”. In such a state “freedom” is the end task of the state (and not the instrument for the attainment of something else) and – philosohically- the Idea (of freedom) is identified with its content (freedom).

The Unsolved problem of Plato`s argument against Democracy We saw above that Rousseau`s and Mill`s liberal ideas and states, can be accomodated and applied even in a Platonic non-democratic state, which is governed by a liberalminded despot (King). And this because the “general will” (equality) of the first and the “hapiness” of the second model state, equals, functionally, as Platonic Ideas (Kings). In conclusion then, the above two liberal states can be governed by a (more or less) permanent selected (not elected by voting) body of excellence, consisting of wise, enlightened, virteous men, wich give reagularly reaoson to their citizens fror their decisions and actions.

And finally: Liberty can (or should) be mainly concerned with the area of its control, not with its source! (see also below).

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Philosophical Writings the very personal, private and, most importantly, the nonconsequantilistic religious ideas.

J-S Mill`s and J-J Rousseau`s Democracy- An Historic Utopianism A) Democracy as an instrument: Democracy, in Mill`s and Rousseau`s Democracy theory, is used as an instrument to achieve state`s end tasks, such as “common good” and “general hapiness” respectively. But both, the ultimate “tasks” and the (democratic) method proposed for achieving the tasks, are utopian ideas for the following reasons: 1) The essentials of democracy (as instrument viewed) are Liberty (freedom) and equality in freedom, which implies that them both been applied together, constitute a contradiction. This because Freedom is the individual’s right to fully develop and express its own personal and therefore variable and unequal, in respect to others, abilities, talents and personality, i.e. it is its right for freedom for inequality. Equality in freedom, on the other site, is an egalitarian claim of the state upon its own citizens, which calls for the legal (consented) suppression and leveling of freedom in inequality (as defined above) and this is inconsistent with the (true) freedom for inequality, even if it can be smoothen –to some degree- by defining freedom as “my right for unequal rights according to everyone`s abilities”.

2) Due to this contradiction between freedom and equality in democracy, they both can only be applied and historically realized as separate dialectical historical moments. But then democracy is never realized in history by the coexistence of its two essentials, namely freedom and equality. And this is evident in Raussau`s democracy, in which freedom is sacrificed for the sake of equality and in Mill`s democracy in which equality is sacrificed for the sake of freedom.

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Philosophical Writings state the common good, or the general hapiness? Answer: On none. It is true that, in all scientific fields, the end tasks of our investigations are not grounded purely on scientific or logical grounds, because this would reduce the range of their magnitute, significance and innovatory value and magnitude. We thus set the end tasks of our investigation on non-purely scientific grounds and then we use logical and sicentific methods to verify or to reject it (Popper). This applies obvioulsy in politics too in the above context of common good and general hapiness as end tasks of our policy functions. Further, continuing in the same argument, what if the pragmatic political conditions demand that, for the existence of the state, it is necessary to reject the common good, or the general hapiness as the end tasks of the state, for shorter or longer periods, provided that the existence of the state is the sufficient and necessary precondition for the satisfaction of all other end tasks of it?

“Can Plato’s (424/423 BC - 348/347 BC) argument against democracy be answered?”

The essential (intrinsic value) of Plato`s political institution is the philosopher`s (king`s) self-determined, unquenstionable, absolute truth of justice (realism), which as such should be the ruler over the uneducated demos.

His institution is thus intrinsically valued on its intrinsic metaphysical truth and justice, which entails a deeply class-divided society (king vs demos), a centrally judged and allocated distribution of rights and duties and thus a complete lack of individual freedom. Justice is equality in the restriction of individual freedom. Plato`s state treats people as members of groups (that of “demos”) rather than as individuals. Modern democracy, expressive and constitutive of liberal individuality, overturns Plato`s model and proposes a political institution in the form of a self-governed demos and which is instrinsically valued on its intrinsic values of individual freedom and equality in freedom for all, both constituting the notion of democratic 564

Philosophical Writings democractic, embodied with the expanded ideas of justice.

Bibliography: 1) Plato on utopia http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato-utopia/ Further comments on Democracy 1) Plato`s argument against democracy consists of his claim that the philosophers kings should rule the state, because their political-philosophical opinion is far better than that of the non-expertise citizen of the “demos”. This view implies an authoritative state in which individual freedom is totally suppressed and in which, for the sake of public order, a policy of “by the king`s (unwritten) law imposed equality of all” is adopted in the form of a classless society. This kind of state is for Plato the hypostasization of the Idea of justice. The mirror-image of Plato`s political institution is modern (pragmatic) Democracy, which defends itself against Plato`s argument on the grounds of expressing liberal justice, consisting of individual political freedom, equality of all in front of the law and finally in just inequality in rights and wealth. We thus see, that the restriction on the individual freedom, the Platonic state enforces, is the crucial factor which makes it rejectable from consideration in the modern political domain.

2) In ancient Greek politics (with the exception of the brief Athenian democratic era), metaphysics and philosophy played a constructive, or at least, a dialective construetive over the former, as gloriously expressed in Plato`s “Republic” (“Poleteia”). In Enlightened era, the metaphysics was subsituted for logic (individual rationality), for the same role over politics. In this assignment I`ll claim that metaphysics, philosophy and logic, should not (and cannot) play any of the above roles of the past over the modern democracies and in defending

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Chapter VI: Philosophy of Politics On Pragamtic Democracy Participatory democracy (to various degrees and modes) provides the necessary “democratic” training to its individual citizens and most importantly it aims (it is ambitious) to lead and write, as an author, the social history and not being been a mere follower of, or a mere chapter, the “social history” itself. But is it a realistic view? Or, it is, instead, required a “Platonic like” leader who can “write the social history”? It depends on the level of “demos” intellectual and moral qualities.

Pragmatic Democracy is not science, neither philosophy. It is an art of the historically necessary and feasible.

Democracy of this kind, in seeking the political proper, adopts, in analogy, a non-epistemic rationality.

Pragmatic individualsitic liberal democracy does not need philosophy for its justification, only perhaps for its formal articulation. It asserts a priority of the (global and present) historic (ontic), over the un-historic-metaphysical (ontologic). To be able to philosophise, you first need to guarantee a proper level of quality in living, and this is included in the domain of politics. First comes the pragmatic-global and present historic politics- and secondly its-contigent- philosophical articulation.

In this account of pragmatic democracy, there is no inconsistency between the “intrinsically driving-esoteric instrumental” and the “pure intrinsic” (justice) elements of democracy, since both at the end, are realized on liberty, equality in liberty (justice) and ethos.

The consciousness of the individual of its participation in the democratic process, as the essentiality of its political (and natural) existence, combined with expectations of offering and gaining of justice, fairness and just-rewards, constitute the motive spectrum which drives the individual

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Philosophical Writings in its democratic participation, which further will provide him with the necessary knowledge and dexterities to serve the peoples interests in the best way.

I do think that a combination of individualistic liberal democracy, in its higher possible degree of direct form (participatory and pragmatic democracy), effective protection of minority`s rights, frequent voting and an efficient body of government surveillance is the best answer to Plato`s strong argument against democracy.

About Law against the people`s will Surely a law against your will, desires and moral beliefs can be used for educational purposes, but then you take a seris of indignified risks, such as these: 1) You inspire in the mentallity of your governors a patronizing attitude towards you, in the sense that the former will treat you as a child who needs the fear of a law against your desires, in order to find your right way. This will create in the governors a Platonic view for their superiority in respect to you, and they will treat you as a citizen who does not deserve freedom,and who does not deserve any trust for your own decision. This is a step short of an dictaroric stance of the governors towards you, which can be expressed in various modes and degrees. You invite them to authorize you. This will lead to the follwing and worse consequence: 2) The governors- emdodied with the above feelings and thoughts -after your own invitation to them to “teach you”- will say to you this: “Look, you have confessed that you need a moral and legal guider and ruller, due to your (confessed) inability. Therefore you should obey the law I impose on you even against your beliefs and desires, because your beliefs are rubbish. Therefore –the governors continue- you must not only obey the laws against your

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Chapter VI: Philosophy of Politics Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) 1) The Social Contract, or Principles of Political Rigth, 1762 http://www.constitution.org/jjr/socon.htm http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com_staticxt&staticfile =show.php%3Ftitle=638&chapter=71079&layout=html&Item id=27 2) A Discourse on Political Economy, 1755 http://www.constitution.org/jjr/polecon.htm 3) A Discourse on the Moral Effects of the Arts and Sciences, Decipimur specie recti-Horace. http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com_staticxt&staticfile =show.php%3Ftitle=638&chapter=71081&layout=html&Item id=27 4) Works http://www.gutenberg.org/browse/authors/r#a1286 Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation http://www.laits.utexas.edu/poltheory/bentham/ipml/ip ml.toc.html John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) 1) On Liberty http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/m/mill/john_stuart/m645o / 2) Utilitarianism http://www.utilitarianism.com/mill1.htm http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/m/mill/john_stuart/m645u / http://www.gutenberg.org/files/11224/11224-h/11224h.htm 3) On Social Freedom http://liberologi.wordpress.com/2011/10/01/on-socialfreedom-by-john-stuart-mill/ John Stuart Mill: The subjection of women http://ia600408.us.archive.org/32/items/subjectionofwom e00millrich/subjectionofwome00millrich.pdf

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