ADBR JAN-FEB 2020

DE F E NCE | INDUS T RY | IN T EGR AT E D

OPCON E V O L U T I O N JAN-FEB 2020 Volume 39 No. 01

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CONTENTS

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Volume 39 No. 1 JAN-FEB 2020

FEATURES & ANALYSIS

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12 AT RISK US Navy to delay Triton buy 14 LRASM For USN and RAAF F/A-18Fs 16 HIGHER FREQUENCY ADF HF upgrade 18 SUBS REPORT ANAO SEA1000 report 22 TARGET TIGER Airbus proposes Tiger ARH upgrade 26 OPCON EVOLUTION 2OCU transitions to F-35A 34 SYNCHRONISATION Integration lessons from Vietnam 42 SEAD Suppress to Distress 48 OSINT - PLA-AF Order of battle 56 OSINT - SAVAGE SKIES PLA-AF AAMs

34 COVER

REGULARS

The RAAF’s fighter training squadron, 2OCU, transitions from the F/A-18A/B to the F-35A.

4 EDITORIAL 6 BATTLESPACE 72

ON TARGET

Felix Defence 7 Finlay Rd Eumundi QLD 4562 Australia adbr.com.au adbr@felix.net.au +61 (07) 5442 8377 Twitter: @DefenceBusiness

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JAPAN REGIONAL STRATEGY

64 JOINT DATA ADF datalink projects 68 INFORMATION ADVANTAGE Link 16

DEFENCE

ADBR is published by:

58 POWER OF GAMES Wargaming works

Managing Editor Andrew McLaughlin andrew@adbr.com.au Publisher John Conway john.conway@felixdefence.com

Assistant Editor Steve Gibbons

Art Director Daniel Frawley

Senior Contributor Max Blenkin

Sub Editor Bruce McLaughlin

Contributors this issue Dougal Robertson, John Conway, Dr Thomas Whittington, Peter Knott, Peter Hunter

Felix Advantage 2020.

All material published in ADBR is copyright and may not be used without the express permission of the publisher.

ISSN 1033-2898

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INITIAL POINT

Initial Point

PARTNERSHIPS & PRIORITIES

By Andrew McLaughlin

he recent news that the draft US FY21 Presidential Budget (PB21) will likely see the production of MQ-4C Tritons for the US Navy paused for two years is undoubtedly of concern to ADF planners.

After numerous stop-starts and much navel-gazing going back to 2000 when a Global Hawk crossed the Pacific nonstop from Edwards AFB to land at RAAF Edinburgh, Australia finally signed on to the Triton as a cooperative development partner in 2017. Despite the program’s much smaller scale, Australia’s status as a cooperative partner on Triton is arguably more important than that of the JSF program.

With six Tritons planned – and possibly more as new capabilities are introduced – Australia would have about one-tenth of the global fleet, not the two to three per cent we have on the F-35. So in theory, Australia has a more important ‘seat at the table’ because its percentage stake in the program is much larger.

Raising this stake even further is the fact that Australia’s region of planned Triton maritime ISR coverage is colloquially referred to as the US Navy’s ‘sixth orbit’ in reference to the US Navy’s five global basing locations for its Tritons.

The reality is that Australia has the third largest Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the world, and RAAF Tritons will be capable of operating in key strategic regions such as the Indonesian Archipelago, Straits of Malacca, eastern Indian Ocean, South Pacific, and Southern Ocean – regions that US Navy Tritons based on Guam or in the Middle East just can’t cover.

Since Australia signed on to Triton, many things have changed, while others haven’t advanced much at all.

In 2017 the US Navy’s plans to deploy Tritons to Guam were imminent, but this didn’t happen until January 2020.

The all-important Multi-Int signals intelligence (SIGINT) package which forms part of the RAAF’s baseline is also late and requires a further cash injection, and now the US Navy is pausing production for two years.

While some of the issues aren’t related nor attributable to developmental delays, during these intervening years our potential future adversaries have continued to develop their own systems at a rapid pace. This is particularly true with advanced anti-access and area denial (A2AD) capabilities that are specifically designed to kill or mission-kill strike, ISR, and high value airborne assets such as tankers and AEW&C systems.

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Dougal Robertson examines this in some details from page 56 of this issue.

The growing vulnerability of slow and high-flying ISR assets was highlighted in June 2019 with the Iranian shootdown of a US Navy Global Hawk over the Straits of Hormuz.

And, while this early model Global Hawk was only operating some 30km from the Iranian coast which is not representative of how Triton will be employed, the capabilities of adversary ground, ship, and air-launched anti-aircraft systems are rapidly developing and will undoubtedly have far greater reach than the mediumrange system used by the Iranians.

Regardless of the state of the US defense budget, the importance of the maritime ISR mission is not going away. Manned aircraft, ships and submarines just cannot replicate the capabilities and flexibility of, nor the coverage from a high-altitude long-endurance (HALE) unmanned system with advanced sensors and communications like those on Triton.

There are no doubt numerous political considerations to play out behind the scenes before the PB21 is finalised, many of which we in Australia couldn’t possibly understand.

But regardless, Australia needs to assert its influence as a partner – we’re not just a customer – on this vital project, and start holding its US Navy partner to account on its long-term commitment to Triton.

BETTER LATE THAN NEVER While this magazine is the January-February issue of ADBR, unfortunately most readers won’t see it until late March.

Due to ill-health, I was laid up for most of February which has pushed back production of this issue by several weeks. But we wouldn’t have even got this far without an awesome backup team headed by Publisher John Conway, and contributors Max Blenkin and Dougal Robertson who helped kept the website ticking over.

It’s also great to welcome Steve Gibbons – who, until late last year edited Australian Aviation magazine – to the team as Assistant Editor. Steve’s support this issue with the admin and production side of the editorial process has allowed me to focus on regaining my ‘SA’ and to catch up on my writing, and I look forward to working with him on future issues.

GOOGLE EARTH/ADBR

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AMRAAM ER expands current NASAMS System capabilities and intercepts targets at significantly higher altitudes and longer ranges

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A powerful missile mix with current AMRAAM – one system – one launcher – same logistics

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DEF ENCE NE WS ROUNDUP

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BATTLESPACE

Schiebel completes S-100 Camcopter heavy fuel tests for RAN

Schiebel has announced it has successfully completed acceptance testing of a heavy fuel engine on its Camcopter S-100 UAS currently being tested for the Royal Australian Navy.

Designed to be compatible with heavy fuels already carried at sea for marine and helicopter gas turbines, the adoption and successful testing of the heavy fuel-powered S2 engine on the S-100 will negate the requirement to carry dedicated aviation fuel in separate bunkerage.

Initially JP-5 (F-44) and Jet-A1 fuels have been cleared, while other fuel types are planned to be approved in future.

Significantly, Schiebel says the new S2 engine increases the operational performance and maintainability of the S-100.

The S-100 was fitted with a representative payload of an L3Harris Wescam MX-10 electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) camera, an automatic identification system (AIS), an L3Harris Bandit transceiver, and a Mode-S automatic dependent surveillance broadcast (ADS-B) transponder.

The S-100 is being trialled by the RAN as it seeks to develop the requirements for its Project SEA 129 Phase 5 unmanned system that will be embarked aboard the new SEA 1180 Arafura class offshore patrol vessels from 2024.

Boeing retains RAAF Super Hornet and Growler sustainment

Boeing Defence Australia has been granted a four-year extension to its contract to provide maintenance services for the RAAF’s fleet of 24 F/A-18F Super Hornets and 11 EA-18G Growlers.

SCHIEBEL

Located at RAAF Amberley near Brisbane, the Air Combat and Electronic Attack Sustainment (ACEAS) contract extension is valued at $280 million and supports 230 Boeing and subcontractor staff.

“The contract … provides a highlyexperienced maintenance, engineering, supply, project management, and weapon system integrator workforce to Defence,” Minister for Defence Industry, Melissa Price said in a statement.

“This partnership continues to recognise Boeing’s commitment and performance in supporting these Air Force capabilities.“

JSF program records 500th delivery

The multi-national Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program has logged its 500th delivery, with the handing over of an F-35A to the USAF. The 500th delivery is a key milestone for the once-ailing program, and is another sign of growing maturity. Of the 500 jets delivered, 354 are F-35A conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) models – including 20 for Australia – 108 are F-35B short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL),

and 38 are F-35C carrier variants (CV).

Another milestone that coincided with the 500th delivery was the logging of 250,000 hours by the global F-35 fleet, including all test and developmental test flying.

“The F-35 is delivering an unprecedented 5th Generation combat capability to the warfighter at the cost of a 4th Generation legacy aircraft,” Lockheed Martin’s F-35 program vice president and general manager Greg Ulmer said in a statement.

Lockheed Martin says the F-35 is operated by nine nations on their home soil and from 23 bases, and that four nations have used the aircraft in combat operations.

It adds that 985 pilots and nearly 9,000 maintainers have been have been trained on the jet.

Skeldar launches V-150 VTOL UAS UMS SKELDAR has announced the launch of a new V-150 vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) unmanned system aimed at supporting tactical operations, surveillance, police, and homeland security operations.

Smaller than the company’s larger

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V-200 system, the V-150 can carry multiple payloads totalling 42kg in two payload bays and has an endurance of 2.5 hours with a 12 kg payload. Skeldar says it will increase this to four hours in the near future with additional development. The air vehicle is powered by a turbine engine that uses heavy fuels, and its modular design allows for high levels of maintainability and minimum turnaround times.

“The new V-150 is the perfect partner for our flagship SKELDAR V-200,” David Willems, VP Business Development and Strategy for UMS SKELDAR said in a statement. “The V-150 has been developed as an easy to use, simple to maintain UAV that can assist organisations with a wide range of smaller critical activities that ordinarily would entail manned crews taking on at an increased cost.”

Possible payloads include electrooptical/infrared (EO/IR) sensors, small tactical synthetic aperture radars (SAR), and signals intelligence (SIGINT) payloads, and area-motion imagery sensors.

Third AWD delivered to Navy

The third and last Hobert class air warfare destroyer (AWD) has been handed over to the Royal Australian Navy by its shipbuilder, the AWD Alliance.

NUSHIP Sydney was provisionally accepted by the RAN at the Osborne shipyard in Adelaide on February 27 after the completion of builder’s sea trials, initial provisioning, and acceptance trials. Sydney will now undertake additional trials and a workup period out of its city namesake, prior to its planned commissioning in May. “I congratulate the 5,000 workers who have worked directly on this program over

LOCKHEED MARTIN

the past decade, from the design phase through to the construction, integration and delivery of these magnificent ships,” Minister for Defence, Senator Linda Reynolds said in a statement, Built under Project SEA 4000 along with sister guided missile destroyers (DDGs), HMA Ships Hobart and Brisbane, Sydney was launched in May 2018, and commenced an initial two-month period of builder’s sea trials in September 2019.

The three new DDGs replace the fleet air defence capability previously conducted by the Adams/Perth class DDGs which were retired in 2001, and more recently by the Perry/Adelaide class FFGs, the last of which was decommissioned in late 2019.

Raytheon Aust awarded ADF JATTS contract

Raytheon Australia has been awarded a $330 million eight-year contract to provide Joint Adversarial Training and Testing Services (JATTS) for the ADF.

The new contract sees the consolidation of three existing contracts under which Raytheon provides representative adversary aircraft, aerial targets, and electronic warfare capabilities for all three services of the ADF. In particular, Raytheon’s capabilities are brought to bear during exercises and work up periods, and for the development of new airborne, maritime and ground-based capabilities.

The JATTS contract also has various ‘portals’ that will allow additional resources and companies – such as the manned and unmanned systems operated by Air Affairs Australia – to be brought in for major events such as Exercises Pitch Black and Talisman Saber, the biennial Air Warfare Instructor Course (AWIC), or for longer-term development periods of Australian-specific capabilities such as the new LAND 19 Phase 7B Enhanced NASAMS short-range air-defence system.

The JATTS contract will support a core of 88 staff based at Nowra in NSW.

Joint F-35 data reprogramming centre opens

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The RAAF’s F-35A Lightning II capability has taken several advances, the most recent of which is the opening of the multinational mission data reprogramming lab in Florida.

The Australia Canada UK reprogramming lab (ACURL) is located alongside the US reprogramming lab at Eglin AFB. and is tasked with producing and upgrading mission data files (MDF) for F-35 sensor performance, fusion upgrades, operational techniques, and electronic threat library refinements.

The opening of the ACURL follows the

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announcement that TAE Aerospace had completed the repair of its first F135 engine fan module at its new 15,000 sqm Turbine Engine Maintenance Facility (TEMF) near Ipswich in Queensland. TAE was named in 2015 as the company responsible for all F135 Maintenance, Repair, Overhaul and Upgrade (MRO&U) depot work in the AsiaPacific region.

RAAF commences flight tests of C-130J with Litening AT targeting pod

The RAAF commenced flight trials in late January of one of its 12 Lockheed Martin C-130J-30 Hercules transports fitted with a Northrop Grumman AN/AAQ-28(V) Litening AT targeting pod.

Availability of the advanced Litening sensor pods comes from RAAF draw down of its fleet of F/A-18A/B classic Hornets.

The pod is mounted on a pylon outboard of the C130J engines on the port wing, and has a wide field of regard forward, behind and on both sides of the aircraft. The pod can record video in both day and night and includes a forward looking infrared (FLIR) camera.

“Historically, RAAF Hercules crews have relied on radio, instruments and their own senses to understand the environment,” Commander Air Mobility Group (AMG) AIRCDRE Carl Newman said in a statement.

“This trial will examine how the Litening pod can improve crew situational awareness to mitigate mission risks.”

The integration of the Litening pod with the aircraft was designed and performed

by C-130J sustainment contractor Airbus Australia Pacific at the C-130J’s home base of RAAF Richmond near Sydney with support from Northrop Grumman and Lockheed Martin. The test aircraft is also the first C-130J to receive communications and other enhancements under the RAAF’s Plan Jericho.

Primes held to account to achieve maximum Australian industry content

The Government says it will hold defence primes 100 per cent responsible for achieving maximum Australian industry content (AIC) on major defence procurement projects underway.

Defence Industry Minister Melissa Price

BOEING

said she wanted to ensure the Defence Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group (CASG) possessed the people with commercial and private sector experience to guide defence procurement at this vital stage.

“As we enter the delivery phase of these major projects I am 100 per cent focused on holding the primes to account on their obligations. That’s why I have directed Defence to establish an independent AIC audit program,” she said.

“It will investigate and report on whether major contractors are meeting their AIC obligations.”

Navy Chief VADM Michael Noonan said he was committed to AIC but there were aspects of naval capability which simply could not be made in Australia, citing the combat system of Collins and Attack class submarines.

However, that would change as the shipbuilding program proceeded.

Loyal Wingman aperture opens for Australian defence industry

The potential market for Boeing Australia’s ‘Loyal Wingman’ Airpower Teaming System (ATS) has received a significant boost following the US Government’s decision to fund two new Boeing F-15 Eagles, designated F-15EX, for the United States Air Force (USAF).

The US Navy and Boeing recently announced the successful demonstration of two autonomously controlled EA-18G Growlers under the control of a third Growler to prove the effectiveness of F/A-18 Super Hornet and EA-18G Growler aircrew to remotely control fighter and

attack platforms from the cockpit.

It follows that a F-15EX Loyal Wingman would fit into a similar manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T) mission system architecture.

As well as being able to carry 22 air-to-air missiles, more significantly the F-15EX has a new, powerful digital mission computer, large format next generation cockpit displays, and an electronic warfare and threat identification system: the Eagle Passive Active Warning Survivability System (EPAWSS).

This would make the F-15EX a potent mothership for a Loyal Wingman formation and provide commonality across US Navy and USAF platforms with similar upgrades planned for the Super Hornet Block III. Furthermore, mission computer upgrades are potentially on the cards for existing F-15 users such as Japan, South Korea, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Singapore, opening additional export opportunities for the ATS, as well as operational air power teaming opportunities with regional partners.

As reported in an exclusive feature in ADBR at the 2019 Avalon Airshow, the ATS represents the first full-scale Australiandesigned high performance aircraft development program since the Jindivik drone in the 1950s and 60s.

Rafael demonstrates drone laser shoot-down capability

Israeli defence and technology company Rafael has demonstrated its laser counterdrone system, achieving 100 per cent success in a series of test scenarios featuring multiple and manoeuvring small drones.

Rafael said their Drone Dome Counter

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Unmanned Aerial System (C-UAS) successfully demonstrated its hard-kill laser system after detecting and identifying a series of small distant targets. Those targets appear to have been readily available Chinese-made DJI Phantom drones.

The entire system was mounted on the back of a Land Rover and controlled by a single operator.

Rafael says Drone Dome is an innovative end-to-end C-UAS solution for securing air space from hostile drones.

Cirrus secures three defence technology contracts

Sydney-based engineering and technology company, Cirrus Real Time Processing Systems, has secured three new defence contracts for Air Force and Navy systems.

One contract is with the RAAF for the development of lightweight, deployable and interoperable electronic warfare (EW) sensors for the localisation of radio frequency transmitters.

Another is with the Royal Australian Navy for the extension of the Cirrus Generic COMCEN (communications centre) Simulator (GCS) to additionally simulate the behaviour of the maritime tactical wide area network (MTWAN) functionality that operates in concert with a ship’s COMCEN. The third, also with the RAN, follows the Commonwealth’s exercise of an option for the expansion of engineering services provided for additional tactical electronic warfare (TACEW) recently delivered by Cirrus to the RAN (HMAS Watson) under an earlier contract.

US approves sale of RAN surface combatant capabilities and services

The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) has announced State Department approval of a foreign military sale (FMS) to Australia of long-lead items, engineering development activities and other defence services for the RAN’s Hobart and Hunter class surface combatant programs.

The sale will support the RAN’s three Project SEA 1000 Hobart class DDGs and nine planned SEA 5000 Hunter class frigates. Included in the sale are three Lockheed Martin Aegis weapon system shipsets in the latest MK 6 Mod 1

US MC

configuration to upgrade the Hobart class vessels, and the first three Aegis shipsets for the first three Hunter class frigates.

Also for the first three Hunter vessels are three Mk41 vertical launch systems (VLS), three Mk35 gun weapon systems, three pairs of Phalanx close-in weapons systems (CIWS), six shipsets of the latest configuration of the cooperative engagement capability (CEC) system for both classes, and various other supporting communications, sensors, processing, command and control, and navigation systems.

Importantly, the deal also includes six shipsets of the AN/SRQ-4 Hawklink radio terminal sets which allows the surface combatant to have over-the-horizon radar, acoustic, EO/IR and network links to embarked MH-60R Romeo combat helicopters. This capability was a surprising omission when the RAN specified the MH60R and Hobart class requirements and, along with CEC, is a significant capability enhancement.

Defence services to be provided include the development and integration of an upgrade to the Aegis combat system to provide an integrated air and missile defence (IAMD) capability and growth capability for ballistic missile defence (BMD).

Other services will provide for the integration of the Aegis system with the global combat ship design upon which the Hunter class is based, the integration of the Hunter’s CEAFAR 2 Phased Array Radar with Aegis and CEC, and the integration of the MH-60R with the Aegis systems of both classes.

RAN Maritime Warfare Centre expanded The RAN has formally opened an expanded Maritime Warfare Centre (MWC), an entity that will integrate the former smaller Australian Maritime Warfare Centre (AMWC) and the service’s test and evaluation into a single organisation.

Previously responsible for maritime warfare policy, doctrine and tactics, the AMWC was also responsible for the Fleet Cross Force Capability Division, signature analysis and ranging, weapon system performance, operational analysis in conjunction with Defence Science and Technology (DST) Group, and the Fleet Operational Knowledge Exploitation Cell.

The integration of the Royal Australian Navy Test and Evaluation Authority (RANTEA) will enable the MWC to provide expanded test and evaluation, tactical development and operational analysis throughout the capability life cycle. It has been located at Fleet Base East at Garden Island in Sydney.

Raytheon awarded contract for more AMRAAMs

Raytheon Missile Systems has been awarded a US$768.3m (A$1.12bn) contract by the Pentagon to produce an unspecified number of AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles under Lot 33 production.

The contract will see 47 percent of the value of the contract for the AMRAAMs produced for 21 nations including Australia,

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expects to phase out from 2030.

The acquisition of the F-35 will be another step forward in Singapore’s efforts to transform its armed forces into an integrated, networked force.

The STOVL variant of the F-35 will enhance the RSAF’s ability to generate air power in times of conflict if access to conventional airbase facilities are denied.

Singapore is a little over 700 square kilometres in size, with its main island less than 50 km at its widest point, and it is planned one of its three main airbases will be closed in the early 2020s to free up land for commercial purposes.

DEFENCE

Singapore, South Korea, Canada and the UK, with the balance being for the US services.

The AIM-120 AMRAAM is currently the US’s premier medium-range air-to-air missile. There are several current production versions of the AMRAAM including the AIM-120C-5, C-7, and AIM-120D, and these are available in several discreet sub-variants depending on the customer and their requirement.

The RAAF operates all three current versions of the AMRAAM and employs the weapon from the F/A-18A-B Hornet, F/A-18F Super Hornet, EA-18G Growler, and F-35A Lightning II. The Australian Army will operate the AMRAAM from its new Project LAND 19 Phase 7B Enhanced NASAMS system from 2022.

C-27J fuselage trainer arrives at Amberley Singapore approved to acquire F-35B The US State Department has approved Singapore’s request to acquire 12 F-35B short takeoff vertical landing (STOVL) variants of the of the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II aircraft.

The initial approval is for four aircraft with a further eight options, and the cost of the deal is estimated to total US$2.75bn (A$4bn) including 13 engines, electronic warfare systems and other support systems.

The Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) has long expressed an interest in acquiring the F-35 to replace its fleet of 60 Lockheed Martin F-16C/D fighters which it

EOS

A Leonardo/L3Harris C-27J Spartan fuselage trainer has arrived at RAAF Base Amberley near Brisbane to provide enhanced training for RAAF C-27J loadmasters and ground crews.

Built from a retired G.222/C-27A – the C-27J’s predecessor – the fuselage trainer has been equipped with the more modern cargo handling systems and loadmaster station of the C-27J. It will provide highfidelity training for 35SQN crews, and to develop new load carrying methods and systems without the need to use a real aircraft.

EOS RWS ordered for LAND 400 Phase 2

The Commonwealth has signed a $45m contract with Electro Optic Systems (EOS) Defence Systems for the provision of 82 R400S-MK2-D-HD remote weapons stations (RWS) for the Boxer 8×8 combat reconnaissance vehicle being acquired through Project LAND 400 Phase 2.

Supplied to the project as government furnished equipment (GFE), the RWS will equip about 40 per cent of the planned fleet of 211 Boxers. EOS says the R400SMk2-D-HD RWS is capable of mounting a variety of weapons including small calibre machine guns, lightweight cannons, and anti-tank guided missiles.

“These cutting edge Remote Weapon Stations will provide a superior selfprotection capability for our Boxer 8×8 combat reconnaissance vehicle crews,” Defence Minister Senator Minister Reynolds said in a statement.

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AT RISK?

TRITON

RAAF TRITON PROGRAM AT RISK? RAAF Triton acquisition plans are in doubt due to production and development delays

BY ANDREW McLAUGHLIN

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he RAAF’s planned acquisition of six Northrop Grumman MQ-4C Triton unmanned high-altitude long-endurance maritime ISR systems is potentially at risk due to the reallocation of programmed US Navy production funding, and reported delays in the development of the planned integrated functional capability (IFC) 4.0 version of the aircraft.

Originally approved through a Gate 1 process in 2014, Triton was selected under Project AIR 7000 Phase 1B to complement the RAAF’s planned 12-15 AIR 7000 Phase 2 Boeing P-8A Poseidons to conduct long-range surveillance of Australia’s maritime approaches. The RAAF’s planned manned-unmanned maritime surveillance model closely matches that planned for the US Navy, which currently has programs of record for 132 P-8As and 68 MQ-4Cs, albeit on a somewhat smaller scale.

The RAAF is acquiring the Triton through a A$200 million development, production and sustainment cooperative program with the US Navy which gives the RAAF input into system and sensor operating modes and development. To this end, at least eight RAAF and Australian Defence personnel are embedded within the US Navy’s Triton project office at NAS Patuxent (Pax) River near Washington DC to work on the aircraft’s development.

To date, the ADF has committed about A$1.7 billion to AIR 7000 Phase 1B, being for an initial two air vehicles, the $200 million co-operative program commitment, the construction of facilities at RAAF bases Edinburgh and Tindal, and supporting information technology infrastructure. The project has a total budget of between A$3 billion and A$4 billion.

But the new uncertainty follows the draft FY2021 President’s Budget which shows the Pentagon’s Department of Navy has allocated no funding to Triton production Lots 6 and 7 in FY 2021 and FY 2022, after just 14 of the planned 68 US Navy Tritons will have been delivered.

Indeed, ADBR understands that the planned US$400m from these two years of the programmed Triton Lot 6 and Lot 7 production funding will be diverted elsewhere, with about half of

it to bolster IFC4 development, and the balance to be part of the Pentagon’s contribution to building President Trump’s border wall.

“The United States President’s 2021 budget proposes to significantly increase funding for the multi-intelligence configuration of the MQ-4C Triton aircraft system, known as IFC-4,” Northrop Grumman Australia Chief Executive AVM Chris Deeble (Ret’d) told media in a February 28 statement. The budget also proposes pausing production of Triton in 2021 and 2022 while the development of IFC-4 is completed.”

It’s important to note the draft US budget is just that, a draft. With elements within Congress pushing back against the stripping of DoD funding for the border wall, the budget isn’t expected to be signed off anytime soon, adding further uncertainty to production planning.

“Defence is aware of the United States (US) Administration’s budget request to Congress, which includes a proposed pause on Triton production funding for two years until 2023,” a February 28 Defence statement to the ABC reads. “It is important to note that this request is not the final US Defense budget.

“The US Congress plays a significant role in the US budget process and will consider the President’s request as it prepares budget legislation for 2021,” the Defence statement adds. “Until the legislation is approved, the pause on Triton funding is not confirmed.”

On top of the baseline IFC3 configuration currently in service, the US Navy has already contracted Northrop Grumman for more than US$80m for IFC4 development through four separate awards since July 2018. But that development is reportedly lagging and requires additional funding.

The IFC4 configuration is planned to incorporate the Northrop Grumman-developed ‘multi-intelligence’ (MULTI-INT) package which will incorporate signals (SIGINT) and electronic intelligence (ELINT) capabilities more advanced than the US Navy’s current Lockheed EP-3E Aries version of the P-3 Orion. IFC4 is considered by the RAAF to be its required baseline configuration, as is the incorporation of automatic dependent surveillance – broadcast (ADS-B) which ADBR understands is also at risk of delays.

‘It is important to note that this request is not the final US Defense budget.’

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In conjunction with the Triton’s maritime AN/ZPY-3 multifunction active sensor (MFAS) radar and multi-spectral targeting system-B (MTS-B) electro-optic/infrared (EO/IR) sensors and satellite communication (SATCOM), MULTI-INT will give the system an incredibly capable real-time, high-altitude maritime surveillance capability across multiple spectrums.

The diversion or deferral of US Navy Lot 6 and 7 production funding could mean RAAF Tritons planned for manufacture in these lots will be more expensive due to reduced production numbers, and also adds doubts that the US Navy will continue with the Triton program at all after the production halt. To this end, Australia is seeking assurances from the US Navy that it remains committed to the Triton program.

“Australia is currently discussing the impact of the Triton production pause with the US Navy and Northrop Grumman,” Defence says. “As a cooperative partner in the Triton program, the Department is working closely with both the US Navy and Northrop Grumman to understand impacts on Australia’s Maritime Patrol Program.”

AVM Deeble added, “The Triton industry team recognises that pausing production would have a negative impact on the timely delivery of this capability to the warfighter, and we are committed to working with various stakeholders to sustain Triton production and ensure our US and Australian customers receive this critical capability.”

To mitigate any cost increases due to reduced production, the RAAF has reportedly been asked to take the US Navy’s deferred production slots. While this could reduce or maintain the cost of Australia’s aircraft, the RAAF would need to be ready to take these aircraft earlier than the current planned funding profile and operational introduction schedule.

“The proposed production pause may represent an opportunity for the Australian government to bring the Triton capability forward, while ensuring affordability,” said AVM Deeble. “Production slots opened up by the US Navy could potentially be filled by Australian aircraft. This would ensure earlier delivery of assets

to Australia while protecting affordability for both Australia and the United States.”

Coupled with delays to the MULTI-INT development, this could mean early RAAF Tritons might also require a later hardware or software retrofit, adding further cost to, and reducing capability from, the RAAF’s planned schedule. But with the additional funding allocated to the completion of IFC4, the planned schedule to complete its development in early 2022 should precede completion of the RAAF’s first airframes by about one year.

As a consequence of the US budget uncertainty, Defence has reportedly been asked to submit three options to the Defence Investment Committee (IC) in early March on how to proceed on the program: to take the US Navy production slots; to delay the program by an estimated two years until US production ramps up; or to abandon the Triton program altogether. Regardless of which option is recommended by the IC, this will either require additional funding and/or approval by the National Security Committee of Cabinet.

If the decision is taken to abandon the program, the RAAF might have to consider alternative capabilities such as additional manned P-8As, MC-55A Peregrine ISR aircraft, or perhaps a maritime ISR version of the unmanned General Atomics Sky Guardian that will be introduced under Project AIR 7003.

The IFC4 delay adds to other Triton program schedule delays, including the planned early operational capability (EOC) of two Tritons on the island of Guam. Originally scheduled for early 2018, the Guam deployment was subsequently delayed to late 2018 and then late 2019, but didn’t actually occur until January 2020.

“The Triton program is progressing well, with two aircraft now in Guam representing the first operational deployment of Triton, allowing the system to provide vital maritime ISR capabilities in one of the world’s vital trade regions,” AVM Deeble said. “These two aircraft are the first in what is planned to be a 68 aircraft fleet providing critical 24/7 maritime surveillance for the US Navy around the globe.”

‘“Australia is currently discussing the impact of the Triton production pause...’

DEFENCE

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14

LRASM

LRASM

New anti-ship missile to proliferate in region

BY ANDREW McLAUGHLIN

DEFENCE

A

ustralia has been approved by the US State Department to acquire the Lockheed Martin AGM158C long-range anti-ship missile (LRASM).

The proposed deal for up to 200 LRASMs was announced on February 7 by the US Defense and Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), and is valued at an estimated US$990m (A$1.49bn). If contracted, LRASM will meet the Project AIR 3023 Phase 1 enhanced maritime strike requirement to equip the RAAF’s Super Hornet, and possibly the Lockheed Martin F-35A and the Boeing P-8A Poseidon with an anti-ship missile.

A typical Super Hornet LRASM loadout would be two missiles on wing stations, although the jet can carry four LRASMs if no external fuel tanks are carried. The F-35A is yet to be cleared to employ LRASM, but the US Navy plans to integrate it with the F-35C version and, despite the C model’s larger wingspan, much of the integration and stores release work should be transferrable to the F-35A if the RAAF decides to go down that road.

The DSCA approval also includes 11 ATM-158C LRASM Telemetry Variants, DATM-158C LRASM Captive Air Training Missiles (CATM), as well as extensive technical and logistic support services. Telemetry missiles do not have a warhead, but can be fired against dummy or virtual targets to validate datalinks, sensor performance, and target discrimination. CATMs are not launched and do not have an engine or warhead, but can be integrated with an aircraft’s combat system to provide targeting and pre-launch training, and for aerodynamic test work.

The DSCA announcement came just a few weeks after the US Navy achieved an early operational capability (EOC) milestone of LRASM on the Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet. Already cleared for service on the USAF B-1B Lancer in December 2018, the LRASM adds a new long-range anti-ship capability to the US Navy and possibly the RAAF, both of which currently rely on the AGM-84 Harpoon as their primary air-launched anti-ship missile.

Based on the low-observable AGM-158A JASSM as operated by the USAF and RAAF, and its longer-range AGM-158B JASSMER derivative, the jet-powered LRASM has a range of more than 500km. It uses an advanced multi-mode sensor, datalinks, anti-jam GPS, and a ship recognition database to discriminate between adversaries and friendly or non-combatant vessels, and has a 1,000lb blast fragmentation warhead.

“LRASM will play a significant role in ensuring military access to operate in the Pacific and in the littorals by providing a long-range surface warfare capability,” a US Navy spokesman told Navy News.

Apart from AIR 3023 Phase1, LRASM is also a contender for the Project SEA 4100 Phase 1 program to equip the new Hobart class DDGs and Hunter class FFGs with a long-range surfacelaunched anti-ship missile.

The US Navy is developing a ship-launched version of LRASM that can be employed from the Mk41 vertical launch system (VLS) as used on the Hobart class and slated for the Hunter class. The RAN is likely to also consider the KONGSBERG Naval Strike Missile (NSM), while the RAAF has also shown interest in the air-launched Joint Strike Missile (JSM) version of the NSM.

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The DSCA announcement came just a week after the US Navy’s PMA-290 P-8 program office requested solicitations from industry to integrate the LRASM and other advanced weapons with the P-8A. Currently cleared to employ the Harpoon from four wings pylons, and mines and torpedos from fuselage stations and a small internal weapons bay, the addition of two or possibly four LRASMs to the P-8’s arsenal would dramatically extend that aircraft’s anti-ship warfare reach.

Other weapons reportedly under consideration for the P-8A include the ADM160 miniature air launched decoy (MALD) – an air-launched missile with an electronic warfare suite that enables it to electronically mimic other aircraft types or to electronically disrupt adversary radar or communications systems. Also planned are the GBU-53/B Stormbreaker small diameter bomb and BRU-55 bomb rack, new versions of the JDAM and Mk62/63/65 series of mines, and the Universal Armament Interface (UAI) – a systems designed to allow new weapons to be integrated with an aircraft without having to update the aircraft’s operational flight program (OFP).

The US Navy’s NAVAIR indicated in a January release that integration work will commence in 2021 and is expected to take up to five years as part of a broader program to expand the aircraft’s mission-set against modern adversary maritime developments.

With Australia a cooperative development partner on the P-8A program and expected to stay in lockstep with the US Navy on spiral upgrade developments, it is likely many of these weapons

systems will find their way onto RAAF P-8As as they are cleared.

The RAAF took delivery of the last of its current order for 12 P-8As on December 12 when the aircraft arrived at its home base of Edinburgh near Adelaide, just three years after the first P-8A arrived in-country in November 2016. The 12 P-8As were ordered in three batches each of four aircraft, and Australia retains options for an additional three P-8As which are yet to be confirmed.

Hot on the heels of the Australian approval to acquire LRASM, Japan also announced its intention to acquire the missile for its soon-to-be refurbished fleet of F-15J fighters.

A January 27 article in Jane’s quotes a Japanese Defense Ministry official as saying the LRASM would be acquired as a “stand-off defense capability” as part of that country’s Mid-Term Defense Program. Japan has also committed to buy the KONGSBERG JSM to equip its F-35A fighters, although this weapon can be carried internally in the stealthy F-35, whereas the larger LRASM is an externallycarried weapon.

With its advanced targeting, large warhead and low-observable design, LRASM will likely be highly-effective against enemy warships in any future conflict. But one element it lacks compared to the latest Chinese and Russian anti-ship systems is speed, with these adversary systems now capable of high supersonic or even hypersonic speeds including in the terminal phase of flight, whereas the LRASM is subsonic.

These high speeds not only provide for shorter flight times from launch, but they also make these systems much harder to react to and intercept by kinetic or laser-based defensive systems.

‘...two or possibly four LRASMs to the P-8’s arsenal would dramatically extend that aircraft’s anti-ship warfare reach.’

LRASM uses ship-recognition software to avoid friendly and non-combatant vessels.

LOCKHEED MARTIN

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16

EDHFCS

EDHFCS

HIGHER FREQUENCY

BY MAX BLENKIN

H

igh frequency (HF) communications dates from the dawn of radio, and would have been long obsolete for military use were it not for two useful characteristics – it works over long distances, and will continue to function when satellites are unavailable.

For those reasons, the ADF has continued to invest in HF capability, with the latest step, Joint Project 9101 ‘Phoenix’ Enhanced Defence High Frequency Communications System (EDHFCS) designed to update and enhance existing HF infrastructure.

Tenders for the project closed on February 28, with the assessment process scheduled to run potentially into early 2022.

Final operational capability (FOC) would be achieved in the period 2028-30.

The 2016 Defence White Paper mandates a very significant improvement in Defence information and communications technology, including fixed and deployable networks underpinning operations, to address long-term under-investment in these vital enabling capabilities. The accompanying Integrated Investment Plan (IIP) cited a cost of $1-2 billion over the period 2017-2030 to improve HF communications systems, including long-term sustainment.

The JP9101 industry brief explains what defence has in mind. It says Defence has historically under-utilised its HF system over the last two decades because satellite communications had been perceived as reliable and convenient.

There were a couple of reasons for that – growth in demand for communications, and Defence doctrine of information superiority and network-centric operations which had led to dependencies on rich information exchanges in operations. But space is increasingly congested and contested, with the growing prospect that in a future conflict, the ADF might have to operate with degraded or denied satellite access.

‘There is an alternative system available now,’ the industry brief reads. ‘The purpose of the EDHFCS is to provide survivable, reliable long-range secure and non-secure tactical HF communications on and over continental Australia and offshore to at least 2,000 nautical miles from the Australian coast.’

The network now comprises transmitters at Darwin, North West Cape, Riverina, and Townsville, with network management in Canberra, and an integration and test site in Brisbane. The core of this capability remains in good shape thanks to the long running program to modernise the DHFCS, commonly called ‘DIF-CUS’.

The previous JP2043 Phase 3A HF Mod program was ambitious, complex, protracted and troubled but ultimately successful. Launched in 1996, Boeing was chosen as prime contractor. The project involved consolidating 11 different HF sites for all three services into a single joint operation. FOC was achieved in 2017.

DHFCS will be substantially automated, choosing the best frequency and node to receive and transmit messages, and allowing the reduction of operators from 50 to just eight per shift.

With this hard-won expertise in HF, Boeing is now bidding as prime for JP9101, and is partnering with BAE Systems Australia which is responsible for the upgrade of the JORN HF over-thehorizon radar system.

EDHFCS will deliver substantially greater network capacity and global coverage for a range of capabilities – analogue voice, digital voice, messaging, applications data, imagery and video and the Link 22 secure tactical datalink. But while the upgrade proceeds, the existing system needs to remain in service.

Boeing Defence Australia Joint Systems Director Murray Brabrook told a March 3 media briefing that Boeing Defence Australia (BDA) and BAE Systems Australia had unmatched HF experience that would bring in the best of Australian defence industry.

“BDA has designed built and sustained DHFCS which is recognised as world leading capability,” he said. “No other defence prime contractors can bring the same level of expertise in HF technology to Project Phoenix. The HF technology partnership we have forged with BAE Systems will bring additional capability benefits to defence as we share technology, investment and lessons from both DHFCS and JORN,” he added.

Brabrook said their DHFCS solution would feature a collaboratively developed spectrum frequency management system to support inter-operability of JORN and DHFCS. As both use the HF spectrum, there’s potential for interference, a problem which is now handled manually.

What’s proposed is an automated system to manage potential frequency conflicts.

“We have very strong Australian content, 90 per cent including the combined scope of Boeing and BAE and input also from an additional Australian small to medium sized companies,” he said, adding that this was a large scale engineering developmental project which involves some risks, including remediating asbestos in facilities at North West Cape.

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ANAO REPORT

ANAO REPORT

SUBS REPORTS ANAO releases report into the SEA 1000 future submarine program

BY MAX BLENKIN

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he Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) has detailed just how fraught negotiations were with Naval Group on the contract for construction of the 12 new Attack class submarines, with the Commonwealth revealing that one option was to walk away and start again.

The ANAO report, released on January 14 noted lead negotiator RADM Greg Sammut, head of the new submarines project, said negotiation of the Strategic Partnering Agreement (SPA) had been challenging and had taken longer than anticipated.

In its latest examination of the Future Submarine program, the ANAO – described by some defence analysts as glass half empty type of people when it comes to examining complex defence projects – actually gave defence a big tick.

‘Defence, through the Strategic Partnering Agreement, has established a fit-for-purpose strategic partnership framework that addresses the Government’s objectives for the Future Submarine Program,’ it said.

‘The Agreement includes provisions which address 11 of the 12 documented contract goals and provide a basis for establishing a successful strategic partnership and delivering shared program objectives. Defence has assured the Government that the remaining contract goal has been addressed.’

The ANAO made no recommendations, though it did identify some key messages relating to procurement, including instances of good practice identified in this audit.

That relates to establishing and maintaining expert oversight, identifying risks and mitigation strategies and active management of complex acquisition projects.

Now for the bad news. The project is already running nine months late. That’s against Defence’s pre-design contract estimates, with two major contracted milestones pushed out.

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‘As a result, Defence cannot demonstrate that its expenditure of $396 million on design of the Future Submarine has been fully effective in achieving the program’s two major design milestones to date,’ ANAO said. ‘Defence expenditure on design represents some 47 per cent of all program expenditure to September 30, 2019.’

These milestones are the Systems Requirements Review (Definition Phase, Platform Systems) intended for March 2019 but achieved in October 2019, and the Preliminary Design Review (Platform Systems) planned for March 2020 and now set for January 2021.

Defence is optimistic it can recover some of that delay.

It said lessons from the initial concept studies review highlighted the need to allow additional time for Naval Group to meet Defence’s requirements for a high level of design maturity before progressing to subsequent phases.

‘As challenging as construction will be (where 90 per cent of the funding will be spent), success will be driven by preparations during the design of the Future Submarine, when much of the engineering effort will be required, supported by enabling disciplines including program management and procurement,’ Defence said in its ANAO report response.

Negotiation of the SPA – the over-arching agreement between the Commonwealth and Naval Group – began in November 2017 and concluded in November 2018. In that time there were 12 negotiation sessions running for more than 100 days.

Various reports indicated there were problems, citing the difficulties in reaching agreement on key provisions. This was attributed to differences in corporate culture – on the Australian side a procurement process more attuned to doing business with the Americans but with Naval Group being a majority French government-owned entity used to doing business the European way.

‘Defence is optimistic it can recover some of that delay.’

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ANAO REPORT

THRESHOLDS The ANAO report adds a little bit to what is known of the year-long process and how it proceeded. A Negotiation Reference Committee comprising senior Defence officials and three external advisors was established in November 2017 to provide advice and guidance to the negotiating team. Additional oversight came from the Naval Shipbuilding Advisory Board (NSAB), established in December 2016 to provide expert third party advice to government on all aspects of naval shipbuilding.

Ahead of the start of negotiations, Defence established a long list of threshold issues. These included acquiring a regionally superior submarine fit for purpose, intellectual property (IP) and data rights, allocation of responsibilities between the Commonwealth, Naval Group and combat system supplier Lockheed Martin Australia, consequences of termination, break payments, contract architecture, and levels of Australian industry capability (AIC).

In December 2017, Defence approved a contract negotiation directive to instruct the negotiating team on roles and responsibilities, negotiation objectives and principles, the Commonwealth’s preferred and fallback positions on threshold negotiation issues, and the anticipated schedule.

RADM Sammut provided regular progress updates, and the ANAO cited from his December 2018 report, just after negotiations concluded: “The Future Submarine Program will be the most challenging acquisition program to be undertaken

by Defence,” RADM Sammut said.

“It will be a mega-project by all international standards. As challenging as construction will be… success will be driven by preparations during the design of the future submarine, when much of the engineering effort will be required, supported by enabling disciplines including program management and procurement.

“Negotiation of the Strategic Partnering Agreement with Naval Group has been challenging and has taken longer than anticipated,” he conceded.

The option of abandoning the deal emerged in a September 2018 NSAB submission to government which recommended Defence examine alternatives should negotiations not succeed. It also suggested Defence should assess whether program risks outweighed the benefits of proceeding, even if SPA negotiations succeeded.

Defence told the ANAO in response to the NASB recommendation that it had examined what additional service life of the current Collins class boats would be delivered under life-of-type extension, and – if necessary – the time this would allow development of a new acquisition strategy for the Attack class.

On three occasions during negotiations, Defence escalated issues for consideration of the Defence Minister and/or Prime Minister. That related to Defence’s approach to negotiations, liability caps

and, crucially, the right to terminate any contracts with Naval Group in event of a change of ownership.

That appears to have been a key sticking point.

The French position was that Australia did not have the right to terminate in those circumstances if agreement could not be reached, and Australia eventually accepted this position.

During the design and mobilisation phase, Defence identified differing systems engineering and industrial engineering methodologies between France and Australia which it designated as of extreme risk.

Lessons learned from the Collins submarine program indicated that production drawings provided for construction of an item in Australia did not always convey the “tribal knowledge” acquired by the original builder. That was to have been addressed

by Naval Group in a Transfer of Technology Forward Options Report which has been delayed.

To mitigate some of this type of risk and to allow time for development of Australian industry capability, Defence is proposing that some complex elements of the hull of submarine number one will be constructed in France.

KEEN INTEREST Considering the magnitude of the project, its enormous cost, and the numerous defence projects which have run into trouble in the recent past, it’s unsurprising the ANAO is taking a keen interest in the future submarine program.

Project SEA 1000’s cost is staggering, and dwarfs anything before. Last November, Defence advised the Senate that the acquisition cost of the future submarine was ‘in the order of $80 billion outturned’ with an estimated sustainment cost of $145 billion out-turned to 2080. Out-turned means the cost is adjusted up for future inflation.

This is ANAO’s third performance audit examining the future submarine program, and many more can be expected through to the end. In this latest report, the ANAO provided a useful timeline on the process to date.

(L-R) Then Minister for Defence Christopher Pyne, Prime Minister Scott Morrison, and French Minister for the Armed Forces, Madame Florence Parly, sign the Strategic Partnering Agreement (SPA) in February 2019. DEFENCE

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The RAN is at risk of a capability gap if the Collins class cannot remain capability relevant until sufficient Attack class boats are in service.. DEFENCE

In April 2016, then Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull announced the winner was DCNS, now Naval Group. To get the show on the road while the SPA was negotiated, Defence and Naval Group signed the Design and Mobilisation Contract in September 2016. That optimistically foreshadowed the SPA would be in place by October 2017.

The first contract entered under the SPA was the Submarine Design Contract signed on March 1 2019. The SPA and Submarine Design Contract supersede the Future Submarine Program Design and Mobilisation Contract. But the ANAO says the Program Design and Mobilisation Contract will remain open until specific items are delivered.

Meanwhile, Defence, Naval Group, and Lockheed Martin Australia – the chosen combat systems integrator – signed a tripartite co-operative arrangement in May 2017.

The ANAO report also provided a breakdown of where the money had gone. It said total spending from June 2016 through to September 2018 amounted to $834 million, of which Naval Group (France) received $446 million, Naval Group Australia $10 million, Lockheed Martin Australia $148 million, and ASC $47 million. The balance totalling around $150 million has gone to various other contractors and in defence costs, including travel and overseas postings.

Defence noted that it needed people with particular skills who were in short supply in both Defence and the Australian public service. It said it has been forced to compete on the international market, including against its own submarine partners, to acquire people with the right skills.

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TRANSITION In the meantime, with the first of the new Attack class submarines not set to enter service until the mid2030s, Navy will have to sustain the six Collins class boats. A delay of more than three years in delivery of the new subs will result in a capability gap, with a reduced number of the older Collins boats available.

Defence is still working on its key mitigation strategy, the Collins life-of-type extension program, Project SEA 1450, which has yet to proceed through first gate approval. However, it’s planned that life extension will begin with the first Collins full cycle docking in 2026.

To assist the transition from Collins class to the Attack class, Defence is considering installing subsystems and components in upgraded Collins boats that will be common to the Attack class. Defence says this will allow it to test these sub-systems and enable training of submariners before transitioning to the Attack class.

POST-REPORT RESPONSE Following the release of the report and subsequent media commentary, Defence issued an unprecedented joint statement attributed to Department Secretary Greg Moriarty, Chief of Defence GEN Angus Campbell, Chief of Navy VADM Mike Noonan, and Deputy Secretary National Naval Shipbuilding RADM Tony Dalton.

“Australia is fully committed to working with France and Naval Group to deliver the Attack Class Submarine fleet, which remains a strategically vital capability for our Defence Force into the future,’ the statement reads.

“Contrary to media interpretations of ANAO’s latest report on the future submarine program, Defence was not advised to ‘walk away’ from Naval Group by the Naval Shipbuilding Advisory Board,’”it added. “In line with best practice and following the advice of the Advisory Board, Defence has continued to assess all of the risks that attend this highly complex program. At each stage, we are adopting relevant risk mitigation strategies. The ANAO acknowledges that Defence has taken steps to manage risks.

“The ANAO also concluded that Defence established a fit-for-purpose strategic partnership framework with Naval Group. Having done so, Defence continues to actively manage its contractual arrangements with Naval Group as both parties work closely to meet the inevitable challenges that will arise with a program of this scale and complexity.

“Defence has continued to ensure that design of the Attack class has progressed to the required high levels of design maturity, providing greater certainty that our capability requirements will be met, and avoiding costly and lengthy delays that would otherwise eventuate during the construction phase of the program.”

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TIGER UPGRADE

TARGET

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irbus has proposed a novel solution for the Australian Army’s LAND 4503 requirement for 29 new armed reconnaissance helicopters (ARH), in contrast to product-driven solutions offered by Boeing and Bell.

It is proposing to not only extend the life of the existing 22 Tigers and enhance them with new technologies and capabilities, but to augment them with seven H145M light multirole helicopters to achieve the requirement for 29 airframes.

Airbus says its unsolicited proposal will exceed the Army’s operational requirements at a fraction of the cost of acquiring 29 new build helicopters. This claim is based on its ability to deliver its bid for less than $1 billion, compared with an estimated $3$4 billion for 29 new Apaches or Vipers including all the necessary unique support and training infrastructure, spares and stores.

Tiger is now performing well after a protracted and troubled introduction to Army service, but past poor performance has created a legacy of distrust in some areas of the Army and its political decision makers.

That distrust manifested in the 2016 Defence White Paper which declared that the government would replace the 22 Tigers with a new armed reconnaissance capability from the mid-2020s.

Airbus’s bid could see Tiger service life extended out to 2040 and potentially beyond. It would add upgrades such as improved connectivity and electronic warfare, and recognises that an armed reconnaissance capability need not be delivered exclusively by dedicated ARH platforms.

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Airbus helicopter campaigns lead Laurie Alexander told Australian media in December that Airbus wanted to keep Tiger in service.

“We want to operate that aircraft, fly it safely, credibly beyond 2040, and we also want to renew it,” he said. “We want to target those operationally desirable, needed upgrades for the Tiger to ensure it remains operationally credible in a modern battlespace.”

Australia chose the (then) Eurocopter Tiger as its successful Project AIR 87 Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter in 2001.

It was a huge advance on what came before – the Bell 206B Kiowa and the UH-1H Iroquois ‘Bushranger’. The key sensor on the unarmed Kiowa was an observer with binoculars, while the Bushranger was limited to a door gun and unguided, forward firing rockets or gun pods.

When introduced, Tiger was far and away the most complex weapons system in Army service.

The last of the 22 Tigers was delivered in 2011, but full operational capability (FOC) wasn’t declared until April 2016. Alexander said the review of the Tiger program in 2014 and an agreement between Airbus and the Commonwealth laid the groundwork for improvements.

“Unfortunately, those improvements weren’t well realised before the White Paper was released in 2016,” Alexander said. “But they are now being realised. We are seeing the benefits of those changes now.”

Airbus Asia-Pacific managing director (and CASG’s former Head of Helicopter Systems Division) Andrew Matthewson said Airbus realised it needed to do a lot more work.

TIGER UPGRADE

Airbus proposes a radical plan to meet the LAND 4503 ARH requirement

T TIGER

BY MAX BLENKIN

24

TIGER UPGRADE

“Some army officers today still think Tiger is where it was 10 years ago, but it’s not there at all,” Matthewson said. “It is now performing exceptionally well.

“We invested pretty heavily in root cause analysis between ARH and MRH, and what we needed to do on our end to improve. ARH came up with a whole bunch of areas we needed to address, and this is an ongoing program.”

On its side, Army reduced its overly ambitious annual target of 7,000 flying hours across the fleet to 4,500, allowing more time for maintenance and training which has subsequently lifted aircraft availability.

Better management cut costs, now down 30 per cent from $41,000 to around $27-28,000 per flying hour. That still sounds like a lot, but it comprises every cost, including maintenance, training, and the joint system program office.

So how does that cost compare to rival platforms?

“For the best reference, talk to the Brits,” Matthewson said. “They are happy to tell you.”

Figures quoted in the UK media in 2013 put the hourly operating cost of each of the UK Army’s 66 Apaches at £46,000 (A$89,000) – substantially more than even the Tornado strike aircraft.

Alexander said Airbus examined Tiger to assess what it did well and what would need to be done to keep the aircraft flying for up to two more decades.

Tigers operated by the French Army – now in the HAD configuration against the original HAP which most closely resembles Australia’s ARH – feature enhanced MTR390 engines with power increased by 14 per cent, a consequence of performance issues at high altitude in Afghanistan.

Airbus says it sees no need for Australia to reengine its Tigers, with Alexander saying Australian Tigers have sufficient power, delivering a good compromise between power and fuel economy.

French, German and Spanish Tigers are currently configured at what Airbus designates ‘Standard 2’, and are to be upgraded to ‘Standard 3’ by 2025 with a range of enhancements to weapons systems, sensors and connectivity.

Airbus isn’t proposing that Australian Tigers be upgraded to this standard, although some elements could be of interest if the Tigers are retained.

For example, the Israeli Spike LR anti-tank guided missile entering Australian Army service could be adapted to Tiger as integration work has already been undertaken for Spain.

Airbus says Tiger’s low weight – six tonnes fully loaded against eight tonnes for an Apache and 8.4 tonnes for Viper – makes it more agile

and manoeuvrable, while its all-composites structure with a lower radar signature makes it more survivable.

“But with any modern battlefield, threats levels will develop over time,” Alexander said. “EW at the moment is good, but at some stage in the future you are going to have to factor in upgrading the EW. This is a no-brainer.”

Airbus also proposes installing high-definition cockpit multi-function displays (MFDs) which will enhance the ability of the aircraft’s battle captain to make better use of data from the Safran Strix EO/IR sight mounted above the cabin.

At present, that data is compressed for display on the existing low-resolution MFDs, so some detail is lost. Other Tiger capabilities are already world-class, such as the Thales Top Owl helmet which displays flight and targeting data on the inside of the visor.

French Tiger pilots describe Top Owl as a true 5th generation capability, up there with the much-vaunted HMD helmets worn

by F-35 pilots, and better than anything available on other attack helicopters.

One of the key criticisms of Tiger to date has been its lack of a datalink giving it poor connectivity to other platforms and systems across the battlespace. But Airbus says Apache has only recently achieved this capability while it is programmed for a future upgrade of the Viper.

As delivered, Australia’s Tigers came with Eurogrid – one of the first digital battlespace communications tools – which was developed in Europe to allow a Tiger to talk to a ground station in a command post and share overlays and maps. Eurogrid was originally considered quite a capable system, but its shortcomings were soon apparent in that it couldn’t talk to other aircraft and systems.

‘When introduced, Tiger was far and away the most complex weapons system in Army service.’

Airbus’s proposal includes seven armed H145M helicopters to meet the requirement for 29 machines. AIRBUS

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Tiger is now cleared to operate from the RAN’s LHDs, and was recently proven operationally during Operation Bushfire Assist.

DEFENCE

In 2012 Airbus conducted a Tiger interoperability study, investigating the integration of other capabilities such as VMF (variable message format), Link 16, and the Army’s Battle Management System Torch developed by Elbit.

“The outcome of that was that the Commonwealth decided to integrate the interim tactical datalink (ITDL) so Army aviation could learn how the tactical datalink would work and operate on an army aircraft,” Alexander said.

This is a new capability which allows Tigers fitted with ITDL to talk to BMS Torch, but not all are so equipped. “It is really about doing by learning,” Alexander added. “They can actually have that capability, but there is no-one to talk to in Darwin (where Tiger is based). It is only used when they go on exercises, so it doesn’t need to be in every aircraft.”

However, more will be needed for full interoperability with current and emerging systems such as the RAAF’s AIR 7003 Predator and other unmanned aircraft. Thus, Airbus is proposing integration of a full Link 16 capability which would give Tiger access to other ADF systems, and new capabilities such as manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T) level of interoperability (LOI) two, expected to be specified in the LAND 4503 requirements.

NATO specifies five levels of MUM-T complexity.

Level one is the basic minimum, with processed imagery pushed out to the platform from the network. Level five gives the platform complete control of the platform including even launch and recovery.

Level two allows the platform to pull imagery directly from the source UAV and would, for example, allow a Tiger to take imagery from a forward UAV, scouting possible enemy positions, without getting into harm’s way.

Use a Tiger on LHD pic

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THE LAND 2097 LINK The complementary H145M Airbus proposal is based on the twin-engined civil BK117/EC145/H145 airframe.

In H145M form it is available with a wide range of equipment, including a Safran Europhile 410 electrooptical/infrared (EO/IR) sensor, and a variety of air-tosurface weapons. It also adds the additional advantage over Apache or Viper of being able to carry several passenger or stores.

Airbus is also pitching H145M for Project LAND 2097 Phase 4, slated to deliver 16 light utility helicopters for use by Army’s 6 Aviation Regiment (6Avn) in the special forces support role for domestic and maritime counter-terrorism, special operational recovery, and combat search and rescue.

More than 1,300 BK117/EC145/H145s are in service around the world, including 400 US Army UH-72 Lakota light utility helicopters, variants of the EC145.

With Airbus’s ‘HForce’ weapons suite, the aircraft can be incrementally armed with gun and rocket pods, or precision air-to-ground missiles such as Hellfire or Spike on stub wing hardpoints.

It can carry 10 passengers in high density seating configuration, but for military use six fully equipped soldiers is a more comfortable fit. To make these new aircraft fully deployable, Defence has specified that four must be transportable aboard a C-17A Globemaster III transport, and rapidly unloaded and configured for deployed operations.

If the H145M is not selected for LAND 2097, Airbus says it could retain its proposed Tiger/H145M mix for LAND 4503, or could offer seven more Tigers to achieve the requirement of 29 airframes, albeit at a cost.

Obviously if another type is selected for LAND 2097, that would make the Tiger/H145M proposal less appealing. The main goal of the AIR 9000 program was to reduce the number of ADF helicopters types from nine to five.

And while the Seasprite program disaster, and continuing delays in integrating the MRH 90 into the special operations role have seen that plan derailed, the last thing the ADF would want is yet another helicopter type.

The RFT for LAND 2097 Phase 4 is expected to be released in conjunction with Gate 0 before the end of March, with a Gate 1 down-select expected to be achieved by the end of the year and acquisition starting in 2022-23.

The decisions for LAND 4503 are scheduled to follow a few months after, with IOC of 12 aircraft set for 2026, and FOC in 2028.

So, for Airbus, a key component of its proposal is the potential saving to the Commonwealth – estimated to be $2-$3 billion – as well as a more rapid path to FOC because Tiger already has an established sustainment and training system in place.

The Defence Integrated Investment Plan (IIP) cites a LAND 4503 program cost of $5-6 billion over the period 2021-2030, so any funding not spent on new attack helicopters could be directed to other capabilities during a period that will require increased defence spending.

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OPCON EVOLUTION The evolution of RAAF fast jet training from the F/A-18A/B to the F-35A

BY ANDREW McLAUGHLIN

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he RAAF’s fighter pilot and engineering workforce training responsibilities are evolving with the transition of No 2 Operational Conversion Unit (2OCU) from the Boeing F/A-18A/B ‘classic’ Hornet to the Lockheed Martin F-35A Lightning II. The transition was marked by the final operational Hornet sortie by 2OCU on December 11, when the squadron flew a 10-ship of Hornets around the Newcastle area near its home base of RAAF Williamtown in a ‘2’ formation. Coincidentally, on the same day, 2OCU’s first three F-35As arrived at Williamtown as part of a seven-ship ferry from Luke AFB in Arizona.

The final flight marked the end of a remarkable 35 years of Hornet operations by 2OCU which was the first RAAF F/A-18A/B unit, with the first six pilots having taken delivery of its first two jets in the US in late 1984 before ferrying them both, A21-

101 and -102 non-stop from Lemoore in California to Williamtown in May 1985. To this date, that marathon ferry flight, which included 13 air-to-air refuellings, remains the longest non-stop flight by any Hornet of any marque.

Tasked with converting pilots to and upgrading pilot qualifications on the Hornet, 2OCU had trained every RAAF fighter pilot since 1986. The squadron graduated its last group of new Hornet pilots with the return of the graduating class from Exercise High Sierra to RAAF Williamtown on December 4.

“2OCU’s critical role in preparing generations of classic Hornet fighter air crew with the skills and competency to engage in fighter combat has laid the very foundations of RAAF air power capability since the introduction of the platform in 1985,” the former commanding officer (CO) of 2OCU, WGCDR (now GPCAPT) Scott Woodland said in a December 12 statement.

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“Operational conversion has been at the cornerstone of the strength of the classic Hornet platform’s contribution – taking graduate Hawk 127 lead-in fighter pilots and testing and challenging them under the most gruelling of conditions and toughest air combat scenarios,” he added. “The result has been the delivery of highlytrained, focused personnel to frontline squadrons, performing with excellence at home and abroad on operations in defence of our national interests.”

The F-35 ferry flight which arrived on December 11 was led by CO 3SQN WGCDR Darren Clare, while the new CO of 2OCU WGCDR Jordan Sander was one of the ferry pilots. The seven jets comprised five aircraft that had been withdrawn from the multinational F-35A ‘schoolhouse’ run by the USAF’s 61st Fighter Squadron (FS) at Luke AFB in Arizona, and two newly-delivered aircraft.

The seven aircraft flew to Williamtown from Luke via overnight stops at Hickam AFB in Hawaii and Anderson AFB in Guam, and were supported by two RAAF KC-30A MRTTs. The new aircraft joined the six F-35As already in service with 3SQN at Williamtown, bolstering the strength of aircraft to ramp up the all-important Australian-specific validation and verification of the jet’s capabilities towards a projected initial operational capability

(IOC) later this year, and to reinforce the in-country pilot and engineering training efforts.

“We welcome the commencement of the next phase of pilot conversion training for the F-35A,” GPCAPT Woodland added. “This represents a fundamental shift for 2OCU; one which we are fully equipped and ready to continue to deliver a superior warfighting capability – supported by highly professional, highly skilled aircrew – performing with strength and focus when called upon by government.”

The Christmas reduced activity period provided 2OCU with an opportunity to bed down its new headquarters within Williamtown’s new secure ‘JSF precinct’, and to give its new members time to post in during the annual posting cycle.

As the RAAF’s newest F-35 squadron, 2OCU conducted its first flight in the aircraft on February 6. Despite its pilots previously training on the aircraft, most of them flying at the 61st Fighter Squadron (FS) at Luke AFB, this was the unit’s first official operational sortie.

The following week, on Thursday 13 February, technical maintenance crews from 2OCU, 3SQN, BAE Systems Australia, Lockheed Martin and Marand at Williamtown conducted the first removal of an F-35A engine by an RAAF unit.

WGCDR (now GPCAPT) Scott Woodland (5th from right) and 2OCU staff with their jets after the unit’s final classic Hornet sortie on December 11, 2019. DEFENCE

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TRAINING SYSTEM Like their Hornet brethren before them, new pilots converting to the F-35A will continue to come to 2OCU from 76SQN, the unit tasked with developing the RAAF’s fast jet pilots.

After completing basic flying training on the new PC-21 at RAAF East Sale and then qualifying for their ‘wings’ with No2 Flying Training School (2FTS) at Pearce also on the PC-21, those pilots streamed onto fast jets complete a conversion on the recently-upgraded Hawk 127 at 79SQN, also at Pearce.

After converting to the Hawk, pilots remaining in the fast jet stream move to 76SQN at Williamtown to learn combat and weapons tactics on the Hawk 127. Upon graduation from 76SQN, pilots are posted to 2OCU for an operational conversion course on F-35A, or to 1SQN or 6SQN at RAAF Amberley for the F/A-18F Super Hornet or EA-18G Growler respectively.

Previously new pilots completed basic flying training on the piston engined CT-4E at Tamworth before progressing to the PC9/A, and then the Hawk 127. But with the retirement of the CT-4E and PC-9/A in 2019, the PC-21 offers much higher fidelity and performance pilot training supported by modern synthetic training devices.

Unfortunately, reports indicate ongoing problems with the PC-21 training courseware being supplied

by industry through the Project AIR 5428 Pilot Training System, and this has reportedly caused a backlog in training throughput and the need for unspecified “work-arounds”.

But the PC-21 isn’t the only new training platform for new fast jet pilots. Following an extensive upgrade conducted under Project AIR 5438 lead-in fighter capability upgrade (LIFCAP) program by BAE Systems Australia, the RAAF’s 33-strong Hawk 127 fleet have received state-of-the-art avionics, training systems and other upgrades to provide better situational awareness and fidelity to prepare pilots for the F-35A. These upgrades include three new high fidelity simulators, desktop training devices and simulator mission debriefing systems, all of which are supplied and operated by CAE at Pearce and Williamtown.

Changes to the aircraft itself include new mission computers and operational flight program (OFP), a traffic collision avoidance systems (TCAS), mission simulated datalinks including radar, weapons, chaff/ flares and radar warning receiver, the ability to carry an ACMI pod, a new IFF system, new joint mission planning system (JMPS), and a comms/audio management unit (CAMU).

During the upgrade, structural upgrades were also conducted on the Hawk to ensure it meets its planned life of type into the early 2030s.

‘We welcome the commencement of the next phase of pilot conversion training for the F-35A.’

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TRAINING OUTPUT But if we go back to when the Hornet first entered Australian service in 1985, the RAAF was still flying the Macchi as its advanced jet trainer until 2001, nearly half of the Hornet’s service life. The Macchi was designed in the 1950s when 2nd and 3rd generation fighters like the Sabre and Mirage were in service, so it was a massive step to go from the Macchi to the then ultra-modern 4th generation Hornet.

“The data absolutely shows that the graduation rates at 2OCU with Macchi were far lower,” WGCDR Sander told ADBR. “When they turned up to the Hornet from Macchi, they jumped from that ‘steamdriven’ World War II cockpit, which is almost what it was! And then when Hawk came along, all of a sudden the pass rates were much better.

“So it’s clear the success 2OCU has had with the students and the pilots that we’ve been graduating is partly attributable to Hawk,” he added. “When we bought Hawk, the RAAF had a lot of input into designing its pilot interface to make it similar to that of the Hornet. So suddenly they had liquid crystal displays and a head-up display, and that was a big step up from the Macchi.

“But there were also no Hornet simulators back then either,” WGCDR Sander added. “So to step them up to the more advanced aircraft through that basic jet trainer I think was really, really important back then. I think Air Force has left that culture behind now, and I’m sure when Hawk gets to its end, with the quality of simulators and the potential of live virtual constructive training, we might just look at ourselves and ask, ‘What is the future of fast jet pilot training? Do we still need an interim aircraft, or can we go straight to the fighter?’

But WGCDR Sander was quick to defend the Macchi too. “I think the Macchi had enough performance to teach people the BFM (basic fighter manoeuvres) basics,” he said. “If you’re talking visual manoeuvring, I think the Macchi was okay for that, and I don’t think speed was a huge factor because, to me, speed just comes back to time.

“If a student is coming home from a mission to land back at Williamtown, they need to have a list of things and checks done. If you’re going faster, you’ve just got to do it further out, but it’s still the same amount of time to go through that process.”

Even though LIFCAP was only completed in 2019, experience already suggests the quality of students coming from 76SQN to 2OCU since they started flying the Hawk LIFCAP is higher still.

“The Hawk can now replicate radar intercepts and it can replicate threat reactions and other things,” Commander Air Combat Group (ACG), AIRCDRE Tim Alsop told ADBR. “Even though it’s all digitally emulated, it doesn’t matter because all you’re trying to do is give someone a certain set of information in a certain context, then work with them to get through decision points and to make sound tactical decisions, and then enact them safely. And if you

can do that 50 times before you get to a Hornet course, then you’re already up on the standards.”

“The junior pilot we get out the other end now is so much better than when I went through, as far as being able to go and do the job,” he added. “Even before LIFCAP we proved that with Operation OKRA where we were confident our D-CAT missionqualified air crew are ready to go into combat, and they performed magnificently. It is great to look back at the way that system evolved and the fact that a lot of very smart people had influence and input into that, and I think they really got the most out of that unit and that process.”

OPCON THROUGH THE HORNET YEARS What won’t change much between the classic Hornet and the F-35A is the length of time the OPCON takes. With recruitment rates expected to remain constant, and with fighter squadrons limited to the number of bograt pilots they can safely accommodate at one time, the pilot throughput of an F-35-equipped 2OCU will be similar to that of the Hornet.

“What hasn’t changed much is the length of the time that we devote to it,” WGCDR Sander said.

“So that will remain at about six months, and I think we’ve got that about right. But because the airplane has changed, the ‘customer’ operational squadrons have had to modify the skillsets they want their graduating pilots to have.

AIRCDRE Alsop pointed out that the OPCON course was always evolving even through the life of the Hornet as new capabilities were added. “I started flying the Hornet in January 1996,” he said.

“But even then, the jet was in transition. I started as it was leading on to one of its interim software updates, and the vibe even then was one of great excitement because we were going from, by today’s standards, quite a simple mission system to a real step up in the way the jet worked and the number of

Without a two-seat version, simulation will play a much greater role in the training of new F-35A pilots. ANDREW MCLAUGHLIN

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Changing of the guard - then WGCDR Woodland hands over to the new CO of 2OCU, WGCDR Jordon Sander.

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functions that the mission computer could complete.

“If we look at the jobs the Hornet does now, it’s 10-fold, and the capability it brings is probably 100fold what it could do back then,” he added. “This is because smart engineers and smart operators took us down a digital path when we did upgrades – to me, the sum of the parts is so much more than the whole. That’s a cliché I know, but it is so important.

“So it’s the core of that kind of thinking that is exactly what we need to take into F-35. That is about being part of a system that is quite astounding when you put capabilities together and you take the advantages of each of those, and you mitigate the disadvantages of any of them. And so the mindset we’re giving to the OPCON trainees is different. You may not go into the same amount of depth on certain topics, but you don’t need to because you’ve got to cover a lot more.

CATEGORIES

of each of those levels is completely up to us, it’s a very effective way for us to not only monitor progression, but also to monitor supervision and the way we grow the junior recruit. It also allows us to actually measure the predicted health of a squadron.”

But with pilots graduating from 76SQN to 2OCU having and requiring different skillsets due to the higher fidelity of training required for the F-35, there will be likely be differences in the competencies required for each Category. “I think academically what we’ll expect our people to know now – things like the RF spectrum – was previously considered B-CAT or even FCI knowledge,” WGCDR Sander said. “Now that knowledge will be almost D-CAT or C-CAT level of knowledge.”

Not only does 2OCU have the responsibility for training the RAAF’s F-35 pilot workforce but, in conjunction with industry contractors, has also taken on the F-35 maintenance training. “This first six months for us is really a chance for us to build our squadron to a point where we can function like a squadron,” WGCDR Sander said. “I’ve got only a third of our maintenance workforce qualified on the F-35 so far, and the other two thirds – about 70 maintenance students – are on a course.”

NEXT GEN OPCON The F-35 OPCON is still evolving, and 2OCU’s executives are still finalising the courseware and course structure in preparation for the commencement of the first course later this year. To this end, the unit is taking some of the best of what was done with the Hornet, as well as the experience gained flying the F-35 at Luke AFB, as well as other RAAF exchange postings.

“You know, there’s a lot of wisdom in the classic Hornet world,” WGCDR Sander said. “Over 30 years they continuously tweaked and refined things. But the actual layout of the course will be similar: you learn to fly the aircraft in general flying, you then do some flying at night, you then do some formation work, and that’s the end of that phase before you move into air-to-air.

And then you go through a visual manoeuvring and BFM phase into intercepts before you move into an air-to-surface phase with a deployment at the end.

That is all very similar to Hornet.

“But we’ve got a lot of people who have spent time in the US and saw the way the US did business over there,” he added. “So when it comes to the details, we are going to use some of that. Examples might be in how we grade and things like that, and how much time is spent on the different elements like simulation, which will be a bit of a change from

‘So, it’s the core of that kind of thinking that is exactly what we need to take into F-35.’

While the RAAF intends to retain its category rating system for fighter pilots, there are indications the qualifications required to attain each of these categories may need to change.

“We are going to maintain D-CAT, C-CAT, B-CAT and even A-CAT, in a way that is not dissimilar,” WGCDR Sander explained. “I think the word picture for a B-CAT is what we call ‘highly proficient’, and where 81WG would call that person a four-ship flight-lead and things like that. A C-CAT would be that person who would be a pass flight lead for D-CAT’s. There will still be an A-CAT for that individual who has had a significant impact on the Wing and on the FEG, and it’s awarded by the Commander.

“That’s a system that, in my mind, is tried and true” AIRCDRE Alsop said. “While the definition

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Hornet. You’ll probably see the number of flights go down and the number of sims go up, but we finalised that level of detail yet.”

But while the number of flights might go down, the total amount of time spent in the air will likely be similar. A typical Hornet training sortie is between 60 and 90 minutes, while the F-35 has much greater endurance so this will likely grow to two hours or more.

“The F-35 does hang around longer than a classic Hornet, and at the training unit that’s going to give us opportunities to get more done in a single mission,” WGCDR Sander said. “So while that appears to be an advantage, it raises other issues.

If you run a traditional two-wave day of flying where aircraft come back, maintenance is performed, and we go flying again … if you extend the morning and afternoon wave times, you’ve extended the whole day. So we’ll need to consider if we have a maintenance workforce that can actually support that extended level of flying.”

New pilots coming to the F-35A will require similar basic flying skills to those converting to previous fighter types. “I think you still have to be a natural flyer because that gives you the capacity to think tactically,” WGCDR Sander said. “If flying doesn’t come naturally you are thinking about flying the aircraft, not necessarily about the mission.

“The ability to prioritise is also important, because you’re always overloaded,” he added. “There’s always going to be more stuff than what you can do tactically, maybe even domestically when coming to and from the airfield. So now they’re testing down through pilot training to make sure the right people come in the door who can feel safe – so that when they feel like they can’t cope anymore they can revert to the old school ‘aviate, navigate, communicate’ and be safe rather than focus on a tactical problem to the detriment of their safety.

“But what has changed now is (that) previously a lot of the wingman’s capacity was taken up flying in close or tactical formation, or driving a sensor, or both. But the F-35 won’t typically operate in close formation and it presents the air picture using sensors which are mostly automated. That will give the pilot more capacity. In this airplane, you generally know what’s going on which frees you up to be a tactical decision-maker, which is what I think makes the F-35 so potent.”

“So, instead of telling a 4th gen wingman, ‘Don’t go blind, shoot what I tell you to shoot, and if you get shot at, execute your defence,’ we’re now giving them priorities and just letting them execute. It’s now, ‘Priority one today is a dynamic target. If that comes up then we’re going to do this.’

So, your D-CAT wingman is now much more of a thinker.”

SIMULATION While simulation technology has matured greatly during the Hornet’s service life, like the airframe, it has also taken a generational leap with the F-35.

Indeed, with all versions of the F-35 only available as single-seaters, simulation is now an integral part of the conversion process as a pilot’s first flight will be solo.

“We have to rely on simulation a lot more because of the single seat,” AIRCDRE Alsop explained. “The Sabre community managed to make it work, but it was a much simpler aircraft and they could get away with taxiing around with someone sitting on the wing for a little while before they were sent off on their first solo. This is very different.

“But then the whole pilot training system now is different too,” he added. “Any tactical proficiency system now is so much more heavily weighted towards simulation. Even with the PC-21 – by the time a student or a trainee sees a sequence airborne they’ve done it five times in the sim. As a previous instructor, that’s fantastic. You can correct so many misunderstandings and other things on the ground, and then you can really get into the depth when you’re airborne. So it can only be a good thing.”

In comparison to the three classic Hornet HACTS simulators, the RAAF has bought 10 F-35A simulators, six of which have been installed at Williamtown while four will be installed at RAAF Tindal where 75SQN is based.

“For F-35, a lot of the basic skills can be done now in a webbased setting and with an almost Microsoft Flight Simulator-type setup that you can practice a lot of the hands-on throttle and stick integration,” AIRCDRE Alsop said. “You can do that at home, and you can practice it over and over again before you even get in the simulator. That’s something we’ve never been able to do before.

‘The ability to prioritise is also important, because you’re always overloaded.’

WGCDR Sander (2nd from right) shortly before the end of RAAF training operations at Luke AFB in November 2019. USAF

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2OCU conducted its first sortie in the F-35A on February 6. DEFENCE

“And you can sit there and it’s like being in the jet, and start playing with the menus,” he added.

“It’s incredible the amount of information that you can be presented with and how many options you have to select from for different tasks at different phases of flight. So getting to a point where you’re comfortable doing that before you get to the sim means that you can then concentrate on the actual employment of the aircraft and the aviating, as opposed to the systems operation.”

WGCDR Sander continued, “Simulation is becoming more important about how you do business. In the Hornet we have two cockpits at Williamtown and one at Tindal, and that’s quite limiting as we don’t fly around in sequence. We fly around as two-ships, three-ships, and four-ships. So that’s why Tindal has got four sims, so that they can do formation type training which is really important.

“So a new challenge for the F-35 OPCON, and how we put it together, is going to be the amount of academics and simulation upfront before they hit the flight line. It could take pilots six to eight weeks to hit the flight line, which is way longer than a first Hornet ride. So because they have that huge simulation phase, we need to work out what we’re doing for that time flying wise. Do we need to do something?

“And if we’re running overlapping transitions or refreshers, do we start the refresher course earlier so when the OPCON is in a phase of academics and heavy simulation, that refresher is in an airborne phase? This also smooths out the demand on the flight line, so we don’t have these big peaks and troughs in when we need to go flying, or simulating.

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“So, I think the answer about how much flying and simulating we’ll be doing, I think it’s going to be about 50/50. If you could do two flights a week and two sims a week, that’d be pretty good.”

In the meantime, while 2OCU is no longer producing new Hornet pilots, the jet still has about two years left in RAAF service. Williamtown-based 77SQN is scheduled to retire its Hornets at the end of this year and transition to the F-35A in early 2021, with Tindal’s 75SQN to follow the following year.

Several classic Hornets have already been retired and parked-up at Williamtown, while at least three of a planned 25 jets have been transferred to Canada to bolster the RCAF’s CF-18 Hornet fleet until replaced in the late 2020s. A March 5 media release from Defence Industry Minister Melissa Price stated that “up to 46” Hornets will be sold to US-based training services provider Air USA, although the actual number is believed to be about 38 with the remainder allocated to museums in Australia.

In closing, WGCDR Sander said the first half of 2020 is a rebuilding period for 2OCU. “We’re basically being left alone over this six months to just build a squadron and write the pilot training,” he said. “Then I think we’ll be given some validation and verification (V&V) tasks needed to achieve IOC. “This could be, ‘Hey, go to Townsville or Amberley.

We want to make sure the base knows how to deal with F-35. Do they have the right security forces? Do they know what to do if an F-35 takes the cable?’ Sometimes is not the sexy part of the capability of the airplane, but it’s important to ensure the entire RAAF is ready for F-35.”

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Next Generation Counter-air

BY JOHN CONWAY

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istory matters. While doctrine, tactics and plans tell us how to fight in the future, history teaches us what went wrong in the past.

In Vietnam, air power was used in a gradual approach to apply pressure against the political leadership of North Vietnam. It failed. US Air Force historian Richard Hallion wrote after the Gulf War that, ‘…air power was misused in Vietnam, with that misuse often clouding results attributed to the limits of air power when they really stemmed from limits on air power.’

But history can also teach us how to succeed by reminding us how we failed and what we did right, and some things did go right in Vietnam.

According to Hallion, the December 1972 Linebacker II offensive shattered North Vietnam’s air defence network and compelled the North Vietnamese government to the negotiating table. It also showed how the integration of combat power and the synchronisation of intelligence and tactics could lead to battlefield success. While almost 50 years have passed since Linebacker II, the lessons from the air war over North Vietnam are still relevant At the peak of Operation Rolling Thunder in 1967, the US lost 366 fixed-wing combat aircraft.

North Vietnam seized the initiative in the air war by exploiting weaknesses in the way the US had conceived, organised, and prepared for the campaign. The US was not prepared to fight a limited conventional war from the outset – the driving force design of Cold War politics had caught the USAF and US Navy wrong-footed.

In the quest for air superiority the US applied a Cold War defensive counter-air (DCA) mindset to Vietnam. But instead of the Soviet bomber stream, US aviators faced intense air-to-air combat against small, agile fighters. Meanwhile the US offensive strike capability was dominated by aircraft and tactics that had been optimised for nuclear weapons delivery over the vast open spaces of the Soviet Union, not against tightly integrated air defences in mountainous jungle terrain.

Back in the continental US national intelligence systems were compartmentalised, controlled, and highly adversarial. Intelligence sharing was hamstrung by administrative and technological issues and cultural factors.

The ‘Green Door Syndrome’ referred to the practice of hiding valuable intelligence feeds behind partitions. While this was intended to prevent exposing sensitive Cold War signals intelligence

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(SIGINT) capabilities and the extent to which the US was conducting its wider collection operations in South-East Asia (SEA), it also meant actionable intelligence took far too long to reach key decisionmakers, including aircrew fighting for their survival.

Despite pockets of tactical brilliance, there was a lack of operational synchronisation between the physical and information domains, and it was left to innovators at the tactical level to solve problems like the suppression of enemy air defence (SEAD). For example, ‘Project Wild Weasel’ – the development of a dedicated surface-to-air missile (SAM) detection and suppression aircraft – and the Iron Hand missions during Rolling Thunder relied on the bravery and ingenuity of US aviators.

What can the history of the Vietnam Air War teach us today? The integration of intelligence into counter-air operations provides an advantage in air combat. The US and North Vietnam both turned this into a decision-making advantage, providing an opportunity to get into the mind of an adversary command structure to understand intent, shape behaviour, and avoid strategic surprise.

Declassified Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Directorate of Intelligence memoranda from 1968 and National Security Agency (NSA) Cryptologic Quarterly publications from 1975 provide an alternative insight into the Vietnam War. These documents look beyond the platform-vs-platform engagements and bombing missions, and allow us to explore how to gain an information advantage.

AIR SUPERIORITY MEETS AIR DENIABILITY

F-105s rain 500lb bombs on North Vietnamese targets.

Military and political decision-makers back in the US imposed complex, highly restrictive rules of engagement on the USAF and US Navy. The intent was to bring North Vietnam to the negotiating table through a managed escalation, while avoiding wider confrontation with the Soviet Union and People’s Republic of China (PRC).

But the lack of a clear US strategy – the use of military force to achieve political goals – gave the North Vietnamese government enough time to mobilise the nation. It also gave away time and space for North Vietnam to build an integrated air defence system (IADS). The North Vietnamese understood strategy, and the IADS provided a link between strategy and task. It would provide air deniability and so draw out the war – a strategy of exhaustion applied to the US. This meant the US was forced into a defensive mindset from which it was almost impossible to recover. The US was reactive in planning and vulnerable to operational surprise, even though the intelligence enterprise was aware of increasing North Vietnamese air activity. The Pentagon was under-prepared for events like the Gulf of Tonkin incident in 1964, the Tet Offensive in 1968 (which led to the siege at Khe Sanh), and the Easter Offensive in 1972.

Complicating the tactical task for the US was a self-imposed 30-mile buffer zone along the Chinese border and around Hanoi, and a 10-mile

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buffer around the port of Haiphong. While intended to minimise the risk of escalation and contain Soviet and Chinese involvement, it also allowed the unencumbered supply of war materiel, including the Soviet-delivered components of the IADS. At the start of Rolling Thunder, policy, process and technology were fragmented to the point where the US faced the real possibility of losing the air war. It was only towards the end of the air campaign and the Linebacker raids that the combined weight of US air power was integrated and synchronised enough to destroy the North Vietnamese IADS. US air power eventually caught up with North Vietnamese decision-making, but it came at an extraordinary cost in lives and aircraft, measured in the thousands.

North Vietnam was quicker to understand the air deniability mission. The target was not US air power, it was the command and decision-making apparatus of the US military. North Vietnam also integrated its counter-air operations much faster than the US, which started the campaign with deep divides organisationally, doctrinally and culturally between Strategic Air Command (SAC) and Tactical Air Command (TAC).

While Washington directed the strategy, the weak link between military action and political outcomes meant USAF and USN air operations lacked a unified command arrangement, didn’t share intelligence or target lists, and integrated (joint) training before deployment didn’t exist.

A bombed-up F-105D in the early years of the Vietnam War.

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AIR CAMPAIGN The Vietnam air campaign can be divided into three phases between 1965 and 1975 – Operations Rolling Thunder, Linebacker I, and Linebacker II. Each demonstrated the growing influence of technology, characterised by the integration of intelligence and electronic warfare into US command and control systems and the use of precision-guided weapons.

This period also witnessed the rapid expansion of the North Vietnamese air defence capability from insignificant – no fighter aircraft, a small number of aging anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) systems and four fire control radars – to become the world’s most dense and lethal IADS. This IADS was organised around four functions – active and passive early warning, air surveillance, air defence which included aircraft and surface-to-airmissile systems, and the capability to control fighter aircraft, often termed ground controlled intercept (GCI). It had an information layer, a sensor layer, an effects layer, and a command layer.

By the end of Rolling Thunder in 1968 the IADS was a tightly-coupled system with 400 radars, 8,000 AAA pieces, 35 S-75 Dvina (NATO codename SA-2 Guideline) SAM batteries, 32 Sovietbuilt MiG-21 and 15 MiG-15/17 fighters, plus another 108 fighters based in the PRC.

‘At the start of Rolling Thunder, policy, process and technology were fragmented...’

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SYNCHRONISATION

When the US re-commenced bombing in the North in 1972 during Linebacker I, proficiency and technology had increased on both sides. But the US still lagged behind North Vietnamese command situational awareness and decision-making capability, due to limitations in radar coverage, airspace denial, and integration of intelligence.

North Vietnamese air defence represented everything the US was not. The air defence headquarters in Hanoi worked with North Vietnamese land forces using high frequency communications between all command elements.

It employed a common signals operating and planning process fed by extensive radar coverage, which allowed commanders to see the entire air battlespace on plotting boards and radar screens.

Radar coverage was augmented by over 5,000 signals intelligence (SIGINT) operators skilled in interpreting the increased air, logistics, weather checks, air traffic and other activities that preceded US bombing raids.

Consequently, North Vietnamese air defences often had 30-40 minutes warning of an air attack, which was more than enough time to prepare for the disruption and denial of US aircraft.

North Vietnam also employed sophisticated deception measures that exploited weaknesses in US tactics, radar coverage, unencrypted voice communications, and the geographical constraints imposed by Washington.

BEYOND INTEGRATION The North Vietnamese were integrated and synchronised. Meanwhile, the US was integrated but a long way from being synchronised. Most crucially US commanders lacked the shared situational awareness necessary for a decision-making advantage.

US airborne radars had poor range and look-down capability, and ground-based air surveillance radars provided only limited coverage for deep strikes into North Vietnam. There was no coordinated effort to degrade and destroy the North Vietnamese IADS, and the US continued to view air superiority as a defensive task, preventing bombers from attacking US targets.

Unity of command and intelligence integration, essential for successful counter-air operations, was divided between USAF 7th Air Force and USN Task Force 77 (CTF-77) stationed in the Gulf of Tonkin, so that within a few months the planned strategic bombing campaign quickly decomposed to a limited tactical interdiction effort. This was further evidenced by the need to procedurally split theatre airspace into ‘route packages’ to aid coordination and deconfliction of strike formations.

Meanwhile the North Vietnamese IADS continued to grow and US aircraft losses mounted to extraordinary levels by today’s standards.

Local commanders tried to make sense of the situation while Washington continued to impose

‘US airborne radars had poor range and look-down capability...’

The Lockheed EC-121K Rivet Top was introduced into air operations IN 1967.

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constraints and metrics, such as sortie rates. This led to a scientific approach to the measurement of air campaign success, encouraging the wrong operational behaviours, poor decisions, and insufficient emphasis on operational art.

However, there were significant events to come which changed leadership behaviour and decision-making in Washington, and accelerated the integration of intelligence into air operations.

This would move US air power slowly towards the required level of synchronisation.

OPENING THE GREEN DOORS US intelligence had been aware of the build-up of the North Vietnamese IADS as early as 1964, yet the dissemination of intelligence was constrained by policy, administration and technology barriers across NSA, CIA and the single service intelligence organisations. This was especially true for SIGINT. SIGINT is intelligence derived from electronic signals and systems such as communications, radars, and weapons systems. It can provide an essential insight into adversary capabilities, actions, and intentions. However, the default is to constrain SIGINT in policy, process and organisational bureaucracy. This stems from the need for operational security in collection and force application.

The decision to release SIGINT is therefore subject to gain/loss decisions involving the benefits

of providing intelligence to the operator, weighed against the potential downside of revealing sources and collection capabilities.

In Vietnam, three events involving the loss of life, materiel, and reputation progressively eased these restrictions and accelerated the release of intelligence to those who needed it most.

On April 4 1965 a flight of USAF F-105Ds was attacking a rail and road bridge complex 75 miles south of Hanoi. Despite US technical supremacy, a pair of MiG-17 Frescos shot down two ‘Thuds’ before the supporting USAF F-100 fighters could react. This was the first air-to-air victory by either side during the Vietnam air war, and it left the USAF reeling.

Three months later, following a raid by four USAF F-4C Phantoms on munitions facilities west of Hanoi, they were targeted by an SA-2 battery – one F-4C was shot down, and three aircraft were damaged. Two days later, 48 F-105Ds took part in raids known as Operation Spring High, but the North Vietnamese had an information and decision advantage, and had set a trap – the raid turned out to be against SA-2 decoys made from bamboo. The USAF lost six Thuds and five pilots to AAA in the raid and, once again, were outmanoeuvred by a more sophisticated and integrated counter-air system.

The third event was an international incident on May 8 1966 when four EB-66 EW aircraft and four F-4Cs inadvertently strayed into Chinese

‘Despite US technical supremacy, a pair of MiG-17s shot down two ‘Thuds’...’

An F-105 or F-100 moments after being hit by a North Vietnamese SA-2 .

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airspace. Four MIG-17s were scrambled to intercept the US aircraft, and the ensuing dogfight resulted in the loss of a Chinese MIG-17. Beijing threatened escalation, while the USAF claimed it had not crossed the border.

But imagery of jettisoned Phantom fuel tanks in the PRC provided evidence which infuriated Washington. The Pentagon demanded an investigation into why the aircraft had not been warned of the airspace violation. It became clear the problem lay not with SIGINT collection, but with the reliability and speed of dissemination of intelligence to aircrew via the US’s Hammock warning system.

INTELLIGENCE INTEGRATION Project Hammock had been in existence since November 1965 and was the result of an operational need for better tracking data on air activity to support raids deep into North Vietnam and provide early warning of low-level MiG attacks.

Hammock involved the collection of North Vietnamese air defence communications at an intercept site in Danang, and the establishment of an encrypted network between the USAF control and reporting post (CRP) at Monkey Mountain near Da Nang, and the US 7th Fleet in the Gulf of Tonkin to the US Navy controller called Red Crown.

The 7th AF Tactical Air Control Centre (TACC) at Tan Son Nhut Air Base was added to the network, but the system incurred duplication and it was slow. The manual conversion of tracks and the transmission to the CRP and TACC could take anything from 12 to 30 minutes to reach aircrew via the busy guard communications channel, and there was no assurance warning messages were received.

The USAF investigation into the PRC border incursion resulted in airborne communications relay platforms being integrated into the Hammock architecture. The TACC at Tan Son Nhut was shut down and a new one established at Monkey Mountain called TACCNorth Sector (TACC-NS), with embedded staff cleared to handle SIGINT. To further build situational awareness the SAC Lockheed EC-121K Rivet Top was introduced into air operations in 1967 and integrated into Hammock. The Rivet Top provided an airborne extension to the TACC-NS capability. Key technologies included the QRC-248 set which could display Soviet identification friend or foe (IFF) returns from the North Vietnamese MiGs, and display data from the SA-2’s Fan Song radar.

There was further integration of the NSA Ironhorse system which generated a visual display of SIGINT derived from North Vietnamese morse

and non-morse air defence communications. The Ironhorse system provided a level of computerenabled automation which accelerated the manual plotting systems at the heart of Hammock.

But the problem now was the sheer volume of data as air defence traffic rose exponentially during Rolling Thunder, and the Hammock system became overwhelmed. This required increasing levels of automation and improvements in latency.

Air combat activity peaked in 1967, and in early 1968 events on the ground diverted the USAF and USN air operations away from Rolling Thunder in the north to support the siege at Khe Sanh in the south. The Tet Offensive at the end of January further diverted attention, and poor weather prevented attacks on the north. President Johnson finally ordered a halt to the bombing campaign in April 1968.

Between the end of Rolling Thunder in 1968 and the start of Linebacker I in 1972, the US made significant improvements in its technology and TTPs. Yet the latter stages of the air war were again impacted by the ongoing integration of intelligence into counter-air operations, and it was the creation of a new weapons control facility – called Teaball – which finally allowed the US to achieve its goal of air superiority and bring North Vietnam to the negotiating table.

SYNCHRONICITY Linebacker I lasted seven months, and was in response to the surprise North Vietnamese crossing of the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) in March 1972, known as the Easter Offensive. Linebacker II was an 11-day operation in December 1972 and would become the final bombing campaign before the signing of the peace accords in Paris.

President Nixon had turned to air power because he wanted the withdrawal of 70,000 ground forces to go ahead regardless of the invasion so, in preparation, the number of F-4s in South-East Asia was increased by 185 to 374 and the number of B-52s increased from 86 to 210.

In the first three months of Linebacker I the US lost 48 aircraft, 21 to MiGs and 27 to ground-based air defences.

When the US lost another 13 aircraft the Commander 7th AF, General John Vogt, reported to the USAF Chief of Staff they were losing the air war.

Poor situational awareness for raids to the north and west of Hanoi remained a major problem, so Vogt initiated a project which would synchronise strike and counter-air missions to a level necessary to overwhelm the North Vietnamese IADS.

‘Poor situational awareness for raids to the north and west of Hanoi remained a major problem...’

Along with the F-105 and F-100, The McDonnell F-4C Phantom bore the brunt of early Vietnam missions..

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Teaball utilised a previously unexploited source of communications intelligence (COMINT) that included azimuth and range positions from North Vietnamese radars. These were passed by line of sight communications to the intercepting MiGs

by GCI. The communications were intercepted by U-2 aircraft and downlinked to USAF operators in Thailand. This GCI link had in fact been identified as early as 1965 by US Army intercept operators, but had not been recognised for its significance due to a lack of air domain expertise.

The range and azimuth data were fused in real time with other North Vietnamese tactical air communications, and 7th AF and CTF-77 multisensor information was combined into Teaball, creating an unimagined level of understanding of the battlespace. So despite the heavy losses in the early stages of the operation, by the end of Linebacker II the US had finally penetrated the North Vietnamese command layer, gained decision-making advantage, and air superiority.

The tables had been turned on the MiGs which by this stage were grounded. The IADS was rendered ineffective by a broader bombing campaign which denied the resupply of SAMs. The North Vietnamese eventually ran out of missiles, having fired 1,240 during Linebacker II alone.

Integration was an important factor in the outcome of the Vietnam air campaign, but a higherorder function was synchronisation. Once the US had synchronised the political, operational, tactical, physical and information domains, it was a match for the North Vietnamese. But before then, the US was reactive and defensive, and was losing.

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FORCE MULTIPLIER – EARLY WARNING AND CONTROL In a modern context, viewing future multi-domain operations simply as a function of tactical integration is unlikely to achieve the required decision-making tempo, advantage, and operational outcomes. A focus on synchronisation will encourage new thinking, and avoid framing our operational challenges exclusively in terms of platforms and legacy counter-air doctrine.

Synchronisation has a relationship with time, whereas integration does not. While our competitors chase systems integration, we should raise the bar and build the narrative around synchronisation.

The legacy of Hammock, Ironhorse, Teaball, and Rivet Top lives on in a single platform concept, articulated 50 years ago by the 13th AF Technical Research Detachment at Udorn in Thailand. ‘The Teaball concept should be integrated into the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS).

The concept of an air mobile weapons control centre which could be co-located with a ground COMINT source, in any theatre, should be developed.

‘The AWACS aircraft would receive COMINT plots, via secure satellite data link, either as a computer-generated track or voice tells. If space and payloads permit, COMINT collection stations should be incorporated into AWACS. The improved air picture that will be available with the advent of AWACS, when integrated with the information available in COMINT, will provide a degree of command and control never before achieved.’

John Conway is the Managing Director and senior analyst at Felix Defence. He has extensive operational experience as a fast jet operator and senior commander across the South Atlantic, Cold War Europe, Balkans and Middle East theatres of operation.

He is a board member at the Sir Richard Williams Foundation and spent over a decade working in the Australian Defence industry.

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SEAD

SUPPRESS

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SEAD is back on the airpower agenda. A2AD strategies coupled with technological advances are redefining the way this vital mission can be performed.

BY THOMAS WITHINGTON

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SEAD

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he US Department of Defense defines the Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD) mission as that which ‘neutralizes, destroys or temporarily degrades surface-based enemy air defences by destructive and/or disruptive means.’

The so-called ‘Endless Wars’ in the Afghan and Iraqi theatres have seen US and allied air forces operating in a largely benign air environment.

Afghanistan had no integrated air defence system (IADS) to speak of while Iraq’s air defences had, for all intents and purposes, been destroyed via the US-led Operation Desert Storm to evict Iraq from Kuwait in 1991, the subsequent enforcement of no fly zones over the north and south of the country, and the opening stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 which removed Saddam Hussein from power.

The war in Syria has been the transitional conflict for US and allied forces as the harbinger of the AntiAccess/Area Denial (A2AD) strategies that these forces may face in future confrontations.

Initially the conflict resembled an insurgency: a civil war pitting the regime of President Bashir al Assad against an assortment of opposition groups.

But Russia’s overt involvement from 2013 saw the deployment of at least two batteries of Almaz-Antey S-400 (SA-21 Growler) high-altitude, long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems.

This was concurrent with the commencement of US-led air strikes against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) insurgency group, and against chemical weapons targets belonging to the regime.

The latter followed Assad’s chlorine gas attack on the city of Douma in south-west Syria in April 2018.

Thus these retaliatory air strikes performed by British, French and US forces were undertaken in contested airspace, placing SEAD at centre stage as a key component to counter A2AD strategies, while underscoring the fact that the US and her allies can no longer expect to always conduct air operations in benign environments.

DOCTRINE Air power theorist Professor Daniel Baltrusaitis established a theoretical framework for the SEAD mission in the seminal 1997 paper Quest for the High Ground: The Development of SEAD Strategy.

He posited that SEAD can be performed at three distinct levels: Campaign, Localised, and Opportune.

Campaign SEAD sees the mission performed at the operational level to roll back an adversary’s IADS across much, or all, of a theatre, contributing to the establishment of air superiority and air supremacy.

Localised SEAD missions are performed at a specific time in a specific area in a tactical fashion to suppress elements of an IADS, or non-networked local ground-based air defences to support a specific mission.

Opportune SEAD is concerned with “selfdefence and offensive attacks against enemy air defence targets of opportunity”. Ground-based air defences may be struck as and when detected during the course of a mission, solely for the purpose of protecting aircraft.

TOOLS SEAD can be brought to bear via specific aircraft, weapons and subsystems.

The RAAF’s purchase of 12 Boeing E/A-18G Growler air defence suppression aircraft has led the field vis-à-vis regional enhancements of SEAD capabilities. These aircraft currently use the AN/ ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming System (TJS), reportedly capable of jamming, from 30,000ft, ground-based air surveillance and fire control/ground-controlled interception (GCI) radars transmitting across 30MHz to 10GHz wavebands at ranges of up to 400 kilometres.

But the AN/ALQ-99 will soon be replaced, initially

by Raytheon’s AN/ALQ-249(V)1 Next Generation Jammer-Mid Band (NGJ-MB). This covers a 2GHz to 6GHz waveband and is considered a sea-change in capability by employing an active electronically scanned array (AESA) and a software defined

The Northrop Grumman AGM-88E AARGM is being acquired by the RAAF for the EA-18G Growler.

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architecture making the system more reliable and capable than its predecessor. The RAAF and the US Navy could receive these pods early this decade.

The ALQ-249(V)1 will be followed by the (V)2 Next Generation Jammer-Low Band (NGJ-LB) encompassing a 100MHz to 2GHz waveband (for which Northrop Grumman and L3Harris have been awarded development contracts), and the (V)3 Next Generation Jammer-High Band (NGJ-HB) covering the 6GHz to 18GHz band of the spectrum. These latter two pods could enter RAAF and US Navy service in the mid-to-late-2020s.

To replace the Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) gathering capabilities of the RAAF’s Lockheed Martin AP-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft, fitted as they are with an early version of BAE Systems’ AN/ALR-2001 Odyssey Electronic Support Measure (ESM). Gathering SIGINT across a 500MHz to 18GHz waveband, the air force will acquire four Gulfstream MC-55A Peregrine electronic warfare support aircraft (see ADBR NovDec 2019 issue).

The kinetic aspects of the RAAF’s SEAD posture will be enhanced via the acquisition of Northrop Grumman’s AGM-88E Advanced AntiRadiation Guided Missile, an evolution of the Raytheon AGM-88C HARM (High Speed AntiRadiation Missile). The ‘echo’ version adds a Global Positioning System/Inertial Navigation System (GPS/INS) and a Millimetric Wave Radar (MMW).

While the MMW will collect detailed radar imagery of the missile’s end game for later battle

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damage assessment, the GPS/INS addition is vital for nullifying the ‘switch off’ tactic where radar operators may believe that they are under attack and switch off their radar in hope that the incoming anti-radiation missile will lose its lock on the radar’s RF (Radio Frequency) emissions. The GPS/INS can store the coordinates of the targeted radar should it be deactivated.

The use of GPS coordinates also enables the missile to be loaded with a set of parameters within which it can engage targets but which beyond it cannot fly, thus helping avoid collateral damage.

In 1999 during Operation Allied Force, the NATOled effort to end ethnic cleansing in the Balkans territory of Kosovo, an AGM-88B erroneously hit houses and cars in the Bulgarian capital Sofia.

Some air forces may choose not to procure dedicated ARMs, as these weapons are not cheap – the AGM-88E has a reported unit price of up to US$870,000. Jamming pods offer a potential alternative. They are cost-effective as a one-time purchase open to repeated use, unlike ARMs which must be replenished.

New pods and ARMs are in the offing from European suppliers, including the pan-European Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) pod, Saab’s Electronic Attack Jammer Pod (EAJP), and MBDA’s SPEAR-EW loitering electronic attack weapon.

France, Spain and Sweden are jointly developing the AEA via a European Union initiative to develop an escort jammer to protect packages of aircraft in contested airspace. Specifically, the pod must

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SEAD

counter contemporary and emerging SAM systems with engagement ranges of up to 400km – a veiled reference to the S-400 which could greatly restrict EU air forces’ use of stand-off weapons during future conflicts, according to the original AEA solicitation.

While not disclosed, the pod may be effective against radars transmitting in frequencies of 2GHz to 40GHz, encompassing the majority of early warning, ground-based air surveillance, and FC/GCI radars that such aircraft may encounter in a future conflict.

The AEA programme may also reflect the reality that, in future, EU nations might have to perform operations outside NATO auspices if the US is unable or unwilling to offer assistance. Hence, they will require robust electronic attack capabilities to accompany the robust kinetic SEAD assets currently maintained by EU members in the form of the Panavia Tornado-ECR air defence suppression aircraft –flown by Italy’s Aeronautica Militaire and Germany’s Luftwaffe – deploying the AGM-88.

Saab’s EAJP is designed to engage low frequency radars across a 150MHz to 4GHz waveband. Early-warning and ground-based air surveillance radars transmitting in VHF/UHF wavebands are an increasing concern – Russia has made notable investments into such systems with NIIDAR’s Podsolnukh-E and NNIIRT’s 55ZH6M Nebo-M VHF radars which entered service from 2000 being two examples.

Such radars may be able detect aircraft with a low radar cross-section. While not capable of producing sufficient track quality for SAM systems, they could indicate to fighters an area where hostile aircraft may be present. Jonas Grönberg, Saab’s head of emerging EW products, says that the EAJP

is an escort jammer designed to get strike packages safely through contested airspace for use “against low frequency threats… to help get a strike package within stand-off range to fire their weapons”. The EAJP has been developed privately by Saab and a prototype is undergoing flight testing. Grönberg says the pod could complete development in the next three years.

Meanwhile MBDA has revitalised the airlaunched decoy via its SPEAR-EW initiative.

SPEAR-EW is an outgrowth of MBDA’s Select Precision Effects at Range-3 (SPEAR-3) air-tosurface weapon currently under development for the RAF. MBDA says the SPEAR-EW, “will act as a standin jammer to greatly increase the survivability of friendly aircraft and suppress enemy air defences”.

It is reasonable to assume the SPEAR-EW will transmit jamming waveforms across an 8GHz to 40GHz waveband, allowing it to engage a range of airborne, ground-based and naval FC/GCI and weapons guidance radars.

The concept of operations is for the SPEAREW to be launched while an aircraft is in contested airspace to jam hostile radars as and when they transmit. It could be teamed with the SPEAR-3 so that such threats can either be electronically or kinetically engaged. The UK Ministry of Defence has awarded MBDA and Leonardo a technical demonstrator programme contract, and MBDA says “both the electronic warfare payload and missile are already at advanced stages of maturity.”

A contract from the MOD to procure the SPEAR-EW may emerge, and MBDA says that the weapon could equip both the RAF’s Eurofighter Typhoon F/GR4 and Lockheed Martin F-35B Lightning jets.

Electronic warfare and SEAD will be essential elements to realise the full effectiveness of the low observable F-35A. DEFENCE

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DEBATES “In the past you had particular aircraft which specialised in SEAD missions. Will this be the case in the future?” asks Prof Baltrusaitis.

To an extent, the RAAF may have answered this question as it is already viewing the mission through a holistic prism where the whole force is employed to defeat A2AD postures. The RAAF says the service looks “across the force to support the SEAD mission”. In addition to the E/A-18G, other platforms such as the F-35A and Boeing F/A-18F Super Hornet will aid the fight by “mixing kinetic and non-kinetic effects” including the AN/ALQ-99, Next Generation Jammer and AGM-88s.

This mission, the RAAF says, could be aided

by Australia’s other armed services as and when required. “We have assets across the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to contribute to this mission including army and navy fires.”

This imperative to use and coordinate other segments of the RAAF and the ADF writ large is mirrored at the international level. “Due to platform commonality with the US Navy, we often look to them for doctrine and leadership, particularly in the context of the E/A-18G. The integration of the F-35A into the force also gives us shared interest with the US Air Force … Collectively, we train together with the US services in exercises such as Red Flag which is a natural way to test our ideas.”

The need to coordinate the force and work closely with allies is imperative vis-à-vis SEAD and A2AD. Any future confrontation with China or Russia is almost certain to be executed by a coalition, most probably under US or NATO leadership. Using SEAD to defeat A2AD, particularly at the campaign level, will require the close coordination of assets.

It will therefore be imperative to understand how allied air forces perform SEAD and how one’s own SEAD doctrine meshes therein, and with the joint force, to ensure success. The RAAF works hard to ensure this level of coordination with allies and partakes “in exercises with a wide array of nations which helps us form a wider view of ways to achieve this mission”.

At the technical level, debates are emerging concerning the employment of electronic versus kinetic effects to neutralise hostile radars. Saab’s Grönberg believes that in “10 to 15 years’ time it will be much more common that SEAD will be conducted primarily through EW assets directing jamming towards radars and the communications upon which networked IADS depend.”

Grönberg expects the possession of jamming pods to be “much more common than having ARMs,” which could result from the financial considerations discussed above. Nonetheless, he stresses that the choice of attack will be dictated by the desired

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effect: “Do you just want to suppress enemy radars, or do you want them completely out of the game?”

Cyber warfare could also influence SEAD. In June 2019 following the destruction of a US Navy RQ-4A Global Hawk UAS by an Iranian Sayyad2C/3 SAM, US Cyber Command mounted a cyber attack against Iranian air defences.

“Cyber has probably added a new dimension,” observes Prof Baltrusaitis, although he cautions that cyber capabilities must be tightly merged and coordinated with the rest of the SEAD and A2/AD effort. “You need to ensure that the cyber, kinetic and electronic elements are connected, and one force element is not taking out other nodes or effectors that other elements are exploiting. Even if you use jamming and cyber, you are always going to need some type of kinetic weapon, be that a dedicated SEAD weapon or not.”

This reality is recognised by the US electing to use cyber, kinetics and electronic attack to support the SEAD mission. As noted above, the US Navy is acquiring both the AGM-88E and the NGJ while the USAF will acquire Raytheon’s AGM-88F HCSM (HARM Control Section Modification) missile. The latter adds a GPS/INS in a similar fashion to the AGM-88E to be employed by F-16CJ Viper Weasel air defence suppression aircraft.

Following the retirement of its General Dynamics EF-111A Raven electronic attack aircraft in 1998, the USAF is currently bereft of any jammers that can target enemy radar systems beyond those routinely used for platform protection. Nonetheless the force is transitioning the equipment used onboard its Lockheed Martin/L3 EC-130H Compass Call communications jamming aircraft onto the Gulfstream/BAE Systems EC-37B Compass Call II for service entry from 2021.

The US is arguably in a unique position, as it can maintain dedicated SEAD capabilities such as the F-16CJ, EC-37B and E/A-18G due to the size of its defence budget. Other forces may find themselves having to make more vexing decisions on account of their financial realities. Fortunately, the renaissance of the electronic attack pod and avant-garde capabilities, such as the SPEAR-EW, alongside non-specific kinetic ordnance, presents an array of capabilities that their air forces can use to keep their aircraft safe in contested airspace.

These tools will be bolstered by revamped SEAD doctrines designed to counter A2AD postures, and to prosecute the mission at campaign, localised and opportune levels. The imperative to intermesh these SEAD doctrines between allied air forces, honed through regular exercises, will continue. Combining these doctrines and tools will result in potent unilateral and multilateral SEAD capabilities that adversaries must reckon with during future operations.

‘The RAAF looks “across the force to support the SEAD mission”.’

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OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE - PLAAF ORBAT

OSINT

THE PLA-AF In this second in a series of studying the orders of battle of nations in the Indo-Pacific region, we take an in-depth look at the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force

BY PETER KNOTT

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he People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) has transformed itself over the past couple of decades in step with the China’s development into a global economic powerhouse.

Gone are the copies of obsolete Soviet-era MiGs that equipped China’s PLAAF in the 1990s, replaced by the products of an increasingly sophisticated domestic aerospace industry.

However, the links with Russian technology remain strong, from the legitimate use of base aircraft designs and engines, to the more underhand methods of acquisition represented in accusations of widespread theft and espionage.

Aerospace industry products include China’s first stealth fighter, the Chengdu J-20 Mighty Dragon (title pic) which is already entering service with the PLAAF’s active fighter brigades, the Shenyang J-16 – a domestic version of the Russian Sukhoi Su-30 multirole fighter equipped with indigenous avionics, weapons and engines, and the Xi’an Y-20, a large airlifter that comes close to rivalling the Boeing C-17 Globemaster III in terms of payload.

In addition, China is also fielding a host of indigenous military-grade unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) and is exporting them in rapidly increasing numbers. Further development includes advances in stealthy UAS designs which are reportedly on the verge of entering service.

With these new types, the PLAAF is becoming an all-round modern air force with the capability for a wide variety of missions – from humanitarian assistance to long-range strike.

FIGHTER FORCE The PLAAF’s air combat arm is nothing like that of the turn of the century. Gone is the ‘old six’, a term of endearment for the Shenyang F-6 which was a locally built MiG-19 interceptor, and which had been in service in various guises since the 1960s. Similarly, the Chengdu J-7s – a MiG-21 clone the Chinese has steadily improved over the years – are also being drawn down.

In their place are increasing numbers of modern fighters generally regarded as at least equivalent to Western 4th generation types. The tip of the PLAAF spear is without doubt the Chengdu J-20 Mighty Dragon, a large, low-observable fighter that first flew – with no small amount of fanfare – in January 2011.

At approximately 66 feet in length, the J-20 is a relatively large aircraft. Delta wings combine with all-moving twin tails and forward canards to provide agility, while in stealth mode its weapons are carried internally in a large ventral weapons bay and two secondary bays at the sides of the long fuselage.

The main bay can carry four beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles, while two short-range missiles can be accommodated in the smaller side bays. The size of the bays suggests a focus on the air-to-air mission and that the J-20 is designed as a longrange stand-off interceptor. Avionics are said to be indigenous, although the prototypes and early production aircraft continued to be powered by the Russian Saturn AL-31 turbofan engine.

Stealth shaping is present on the J-20, with close-up photos indicating China has paid attention to refining manufacturing techniques to ensure production flaws do not compromise low-

The Shenyang J-16 is a Chinese-built version of the Sukhoi Su30.

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Production of the Chengdu J-10A has switched to the more modern J-10B and J-10C.

observability. However, these early prototypes and production aircraft are designed with frontal aspect stealth, with less effort made to reduce the rearaspect radar cross-section.

The first flight was followed by a rather lengthy program of flight testing with several prototypes to refine design before the start of low rate production.

The first aircraft were assigned to PLAAF operational testing units beginning in 2017. By late 2018 or early 2019 the first unit, the 9th Air Brigade at Wuhu in Anhui province, became the first active PLAAF unit to operate the new fighter. Currently, Chengdu is flight testing J-20s powered by the indigenous WS-10 engine fitted with stealthy serrated nozzles to improve rear-aspect stealth.

If the J-20 is the tip of the spear, then half of the shaft would be a variety of derivatives of the Russian Sukhoi Flanker family.

China has bought a number of Russian Flanker variants, starting with the Su-27SK interceptor in the 1990s followed by the twinseat Su-30MKK and then Su30MK2 in the 2000s. The latter two types are multi-role fighters, with the Su-30MK2 allocated to People’s Liberation Army Naval Air Force (PLANAF) units.

In the meantime, China started producing its own Su-27s under licence, calling them the J-11As. They soon moved on to modifying these with indigenous avionics and weapons, and these are designated J-11B. By 2011, China started powering them with locally developed WS-10 turbofans. Subsequent development has resulted in the J-16, a twin-seat indigenous Su-30 again fitted with local avionics,

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engines and weapons, now entering service in increasing numbers.

It is unclear how many J-11/J-16s China has produced, but it is believed to be several hundred.

Add to that another 400-odd Chengdu J-10s. The other half of China’s duo of mass-produced fighters, the J-10 looks like and is reputed to be closely based on the cancelled IAI Lavi, an attempt by Israel in the 1980s to produce an indigenous fighter that was eventually killed off by pressure from the US which wanted Israel to buy F-15s and F-16s.

In some respects, the J-10 does indeed look like the Lavi, and Russian sources have stated that the Israeli design served as an inspiration, at the very least for the Chinese jet. The J-10 is a single engine, delta wing that utilises forward canards for control.

Powered by the ageing AL31 engine, the J-10 can carry an array of air-to-air and air-toground ordnance on 11 hardpoints (six underwing, two under the forward intake and three in the rear fuselage). China has switched production to the J-10B and J-10C, which featured progressively improved avionics as well as a redesigned, diverterless supersonic intake for improved aerodynamics and reduced radar cross-section.

The Chengdu Aircraft Corporation is continuing to flight test the marriage of the indigenous WS-10 engine with the J-10, and flying testbeds fitted with the WS-10 recently gained a serrated, lowobservable engine nozzle. However, the fact the fighter is still rolling off the production line with the AL-31 suggests testing has some way to go.

‘If the J-20 is the tip of the spear, then the shaft would be a variety of derivatives of the Flanker... .’

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OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE

BOMBERS The primary bomber of the PLAAF is the Xi’an H-6 which started life as a licence-built version of the 1950s-era Soviet Tupolev Tu-16 Badger.

China received its first Tu-16s in 1958, and the Xi’an Aircraft Industrial Corporation (XAC) signed a licence production agreement with the USSR to build the type in the late 1950s. The first Chinese Tu-16 flew in 1959 and was deployed in a nuclear strike role until China’s ballistic missile force took on this role in the 1970s, leaving the H-6 as a conventional strike aircraft.

Its capability expanded from free-fall bombing to the anti-ship mission and, eventually, to landattack cruise missile missions, with the basic H-6 evolving through other sub-variants with a series of incremental upgrades to its sensors, navigation and defensive avionics. By the 1990s, the H-6G and H-6H models appeared off the production line as pure anti-ship/cruise missile carriers, with defensive armament deleted, and wing and fuselage pylons replacing the internal weapons bay.

Despite the weapons and avionics upgrades, these variants retained the basic airframe and were still powered by a pair of WP-8 turbojets, a licencebuilt copy of the original Mikulin AM-3 or RD-3M that powered the 1950-vintage Tu-16.

But by the turn of the millennium, China began a program to fit new engines to the type and to bring the bomber up to date with modern avionics. The result of this protracted program is the H-6K which made its first flight in 2017.

The most significant improvement over earlier versions of the H-6 is the replacement of the

elderly WP-8 engines with Russian Soloviev D-30 turbofans, similar to the Russian Ilyushin Il-76 and Chinese Xi’an Y-20 airlifter. Fitted within enlarged inlets in the aircraft’s wing roots, the D-30s give the H-6K a claimed combat radius of 3,500 kilometres, enabling the Chinese to reclassify the type as a strategic bomber and to reach out into the western Pacific.

Meanwhile, the nose section of the airframe has also been reworked, eliminating the glazed navigator’s station in favour of a powerful radar. The flight crew now have a modern glass cockpit, while the airframe has been reinforced using composite materials.

The H-6K reinstated the internal weapons bay, giving the type the ability to carry out conventional bombing missions, while a variant designated H-6J is entering service with the PLANAF. H-6M cruise missile carriers have also entered service, again without the internal weapons bay.

The most common and contemporary missile types carried by the various H-6 variants are the YJ-12 anti-ship and CJ-20 cruise missile. The former is a supersonic missile with a reported range of 400km, while the latter is a subsonic land attack cruise missile with a range of up to 1,500km.

The latest variant is the H-6N, which adds aerial refuelling capability to the H-6 with a nose-mounted refuelling probe. It also features a semi-recessed weapon bay in its belly with reports claiming it can carry the new CJ-100 supersonic cruise missile – an air-launched ballistic missile designated by the US DoD as the CH-AS-X-13 – and even the WZ-8 high-speed, high-altitude reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicle.

The H-6K introduced improved engines and avionics and wing pylons for large cruise missiles.

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TRANSPORT AND TANKERS For years the PLAAF’s largest airlifter was the Shaanxi Y-8, an unlicensed copy of the old Soviet An-12 Cub four-engine turboprop airlifter. Roughly analogous to older variants of the Lockheed-Martin C-130, China imported a number of An-12s from the Soviet Union in the 1960s before the Sino-Soviet split in the latter part of the decade. With the import source cut off, China decided to reverse-engineer the type.

The first Y-8 flew in 1972 and was built by the Xi’an Aircraft Corporation, with production later moving to its Shaanxi counterpart in 1975, and entering serial production in 1981. The Y-8 has since evolved into the Y-9, with both types finding additional utility for special missions such as airborne early warning, electronic and signals intelligence gathering, and long-range anti-submarine missions.

The Y-9 is a stretched, modernised Y-8, capable of carrying 25 tons in its main cabin – compared to the Y-8’s 20 tons – and featuring modern six-bladed composite constant-speed fully-feathering reversible propellers. The Y-9 first flew in November 2010, entering service with the PLAAF in 2012 and achieving full operational capability (FOC) in 2017.

Meanwhile, rapprochement following the end of the Cold War saw a renewal of Chinese and Russian co-operation to meet China’s needs for a strategic airlift capability. This came in the form of the Ilyushin Il-76 airlifter, with China eventually ordering 27, of

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which four have been converted to KJ-2000 Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft.

The transports serve with the PLAAF’s 13th Transport Division with two regiments based at Dangyang and Wuhan, in western Hubei province.

They have taken part in several humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) missions in the region in recent years, including the search for missing Malaysian Airlines flight MH370 off the coast of Western Australia in 2014.

The need for an increase in strategic airlift capacity meant China’s next push was to develop its own heavy airlifter. This eventually became the Y-20, a high-wing, low-slung undercarriage airlifter, powered by four Soloviev D-30 turbofans similar to the Il-76 and H-6K. Maximum takeoff weight is reported to be 220,000kg (485,000lbs) with a maximum cargo capacity of 66 tonnes.

The Y-20 incorporated technological advances including the use of indigenously made composites in its construction. 3D-printed parts were also used elsewhere, helping speed up the production process.

Y-20s entered PLAAF service in late 2016, with the 4th Transport Division at Qinghai in China’s Western Sichuan province the first to receive the type. Production quickly ramped up and a satellite photo of Xi’an Aircraft Corporation’s production facility in Xi’an-Yanliang Airport, taken in late 2019, showed 20 airframes on-site in addition to about 10 already in service at the time.

‘...rapprochement following the end of the Cold War saw a renewal of Chinese and Russian cooperation...’

A special missions variant of the Y-9 transport.

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SPECIAL MISSIONS China is also developing the Y-20 as a tanker.

The PLAAF’s modest tanker fleet has been an Achilles heel as the force modernised, with just a small number of H-6 tanker versions in service.

These have limited fuel capacity due to the H-6’s relatively small size. The tanker ranks were bolstered slightly in 2014 with the acquisition of three Il-78 tankers from Ukraine.

As is often the case with China, it is likely this acquisition will be used in the development of its own manufacturing and operational capabilities, with several of the Y-20s seen in satellite photos carrying what appear to be wingtip refuelling pods.

China has not, however, officially admitted the existence of the Y-20 tanker, and no verifiable photos have been seen so far.

Tankers are just one of special mission types in which China has invested development effort.

Using the Y-8 and more recently the Y-9 airframe, it has put into service at least 12 different types of specialised aircraft for carrying out diverse missions, ranging from electronic and signals intelligence gathering, to long-range anti-submarine warfare and psychological operations.

Each of these uniquely configured aircraft come under the ‘High New’ – or GaoXin in Chinese – code name, and each type is given a unique numerical designation after the GaoXin or GX prefix. For example, the GX-3 is a standoff electronic warfare platform based on the standard Y-8 airframe, while the newer GX-6 is an anti-submarine/maritime patrol aircraft like the Lockheed P-3C Orion, based on the Y-9 airframe in service with the PLANAF. Several of these special mission types have actually been involved in operations in both the South and East China Seas, where the aircraft operating over the latter are regularly photographed by intercepting Japanese fighter jets.

The PLAAF also operates three different types of modern AEW&C aircraft. In Chinese service,

these are referred to as the KongJing which is shortened to KJ and which directly translates as ‘Sky Watch’. The first of these is the KJ-200, a Y-8-based system which carries a dorsal ‘balance beam’ radar, similar outwardly to the Saab Erieye.

Development of the KJ-200 took place in 2001, although the crash of a prototype in 2006 that killed 40 crew and engineers was a significant setback to the program.

The type eventually entered service by 2009, with aircraft assigned to the PLAAF’s 26th Special Missions Division at Wuxi in Jiangsu province, west of Shanghai. At least 10 KJ-200s are in service, although the type has since been complemented with a new AEW&C design. Based on the Y-9 airframe and designated the KJ-500, the type features a non-rotating circular radome in place of the balance beam radar, mounting an AESA radar in three separate arrays angled 120° to one other for all-round coverage.

The first KJ-500 entered service with the PLAAF in late 2014. Both the KJ-200 and KJ-500 are also assigned to the PLANAF, with that service having deployed both types of AEW&C to operate over the disputed South China Sea from bases in China’s southern island of Hainan.

In 1996 China signed a deal with Israel’s IAI for the conversion of three of its Il-76 fleet to AEW&C aircraft fitted with Israel’s PHALCON radar. The first aircraft had been converted but not delivered when intense US pressure pushed Israel to walk away from the deal in 2000. The radar and other components were removed from the aircraft before its return to China.

This forced China to develop its own KJ200 and a larger AEW&C platform called the KJ-2000.

Fitted with a phased array radar arranged in a similar configuration to the later KJ-500, the first of four KJ-2000s entered service in 2005. The radar is claimed to have a maximum detection range of 470km (290 miles).

The Y-20 is roughly analogous to the ILYshun IL76 or the Boeing C-17A.

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The KJ-500 is an AEW&C variant of the Shaanxi Y-9.

ENGINES AND FUTURE China’s reliance on Russian engines to power the PLAAF modernisation has always been a sticking point. An inability to reliably manufacture its own indigenous engine designs meant that China has been unable to boast of a fully indigenous military aircraft industry.

This has not been due to a lack of effort, and now a typically ambitious effort to develop its own modern aircraft engine industry to power its latest generation aircraft is underway.

At the forefront is the ShenyangLiming WS-10 turbofan – an afterburning engine intended to replace the Russian Saturn AL31 that powers most of China’s fleet of fighters. The WS-10 is reportedly rated at 27,000 to 31,000 lbs of thrust, but reliability and manufacturing problems have continued to dog the design throughout its extended development cycle. Despite being a mainstay of the twin-engine J-11 and J-16 fleets, starting in 2011, it is only in the past year or so that the WS-10 has found its way into production J-10s – a signal that China is finally happy enough with the engine to power its singleengine fighters.

China is also developing the more powerful WS15 for the J-20, but production is moving relatively slowly. A recent stock exchange filing by a subsidiary of China’s Central Iron and Steel Research Institute (CISRI) revealed that production of the WS-15 will only reach between three and five units a year by

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2026. Instead, production J-20s will likely continue using the WS-10 in the interim.

Imagery of test aircraft belonging to Chengdu also suggests that work in continuing on thrust vectoring versions of the WS-10, with J-10s and J-20s having been photographed with the distinctive thrust vectoring control (TVC) nozzles.

The design appears to be a three-dimensional TVC nozzle which will improve the jets’ manoeuvrability in the both the vertical and horizontal axis.

Development work is also continuing on the WS-18 and WS-20 high-bypass turbofans as alternatives for the Y-20 airlifter. An Il-76 test-bed based at the PLAAF’s primary flight test unit (CISRI) in Xi’an-Yanliang airbase, has been flying with a WS20 for a number of years, however production Y-20s are still being powered by the Russian D-30 engine. The CISRI subsidiary’s document referenced to above suggests that limited production of the WS-20 will only start in 2024, while WS-18 development is partially suspended as new manufacturing alloys are developed.

Development work on the next generation of Chinese combat aircraft is also ongoing. China is confirmed to be pushing ahead with the H-20 bomber, a new stealth type to replace the H-6.

It is still not known which of China’s state-owned aircraft manufacturers will be chosen to undertake this project, although models of a potential offering have been displayed at Chinese defence shows on a number of occasions.

‘China’s reliance on Russian engines has always been a sticking point..’

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OSINT

SAVAGE SKIES Surviving the next-generation of Chinese air-to-air missiles PART 1

BY DOUGAL ROBERTSON

T The likely target set for new generation Chinese AAMs are high-value airborne assets such as the E-3A AWACS. USAF

he narrative surrounding the US defense budget in late 2019 and early 2020 has been telling. Service chiefs are demonstrating an open willingness to trade near-term projects for longerterm capability development, in a move that looks set to better prepare the US military for high-end warfighting.

The cancellation or pausing of programs for airframes designed to fly in uncontested skies came as no surprise for those following the debate around the future role of the US military. The Pentagon is making no secret of its intent to fight an expansive, multi-domain war against a conventional adversary.

It needs Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps aircraft that can survive against hostile fighter aircraft – and lots of them.

This re-tooling of US air power has real and significant outcomes for the ADF, in dollars and in tactics, training and procedures (TTPs).

But how significant is the counter-air threat the US is preparing to deter and defeat?

COUNTER STEALTH Internet photographs of the Chinese PLA’s Very Long-Range Air-to-Air Missile (VLRAAM) first appeared in 2016. Speculation began that the missile – referred to as ‘PL-X’ – might be capable of ranges up to 300 nautical miles (550km).

Media commentators and bloggers correlated the PL-X with research papers showing VLRAAM performance based on a lofted launch to over 100,000ft, SATNAV and datalink updates in midcourse phase, then a dive in terminal phase at hypersonic speeds. One paper illustrated the intended target set: key USAF force enablers such as the E-3 AEW&C, tankers and potentially F-22 and B-2 stealth aircraft whose top-down planform shape would be visible from the missile’s look down angle in the thermosphere.

Clearly, the PLA was changing the game. The VLRAAM would force US and Allied high-value airborne asset (HVAA) aircraft to operate much farther from any battlespace, potentially negating advantages in airborne early warning and control.

The concept is identical to the Russian R-37M (designated AA-13 Axehead by NATO) supersonic missile program dating back to the 1980s, but this time it was fully funded and developed.

The stage-managed introduction of the PL-X came after internet pictures of the new PL-15 started appearing in 2012. The size of the PL-15 missile was revealing – small enough to fit inside the weapons bay of the new J-20 stealth interceptor, but large enough to pack a dual-pulse motor and an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar seeker.

The PL-15’s range put it in a similar or better class than the new US AIM-120D AMRAAM. The USAF Air Combat Command Chief GEN Herbert ‘Hawk’ Carlisle said in 2015 that outmatching the PL-15 was “an exceedingly high priority” and that “we’ve got to be able to out-stick that missile”.

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ALL BASES COVERED While the outline of the PLA air-to-air weapons program has been public knowledge since at least 2010, what is astonishing is the number and spread of the weapons in development.

The PLA radar-guided AAM programs began in earnest in the early 90s, when the Aviation Industry Corporation of China’s (AVIC) 607 Institute (officially known as the Leihua Electronic Technology Research Institute – LETRI) began testing an active radar-guided missile. The PL-12 used elements of Russian technology, including the 9B-1348 seeker from the AGAT Research Institute and possibly the one-way datalink from the R-77 RVV-AE (NATO codename AA-12 Adder) missile from Vympel (now the Tactical Missiles Corporation Joint Stock Company).

After the PLA certified the PL-12 in 2005 at least four PL-12 upgrade or follow-on programs were identified, including an upgraded PL-12B, a PL-12C with folding fins, and a PL-12D using a ramjet motor.

In addition, there was an anti-radiation export variant known as LD-10. The PL-12C was later identified as the PL-15, designed to fit in the internal weapons bay of the J-20 and with a claimed range of more than 100nm (185km).

The PL-12D may have become the PL-20, a 200nm (375km) range weapon based on a combined ramjet and solid motor (alternately there may be two PLA ramjet-based AAM programs) and referred to as the ‘Sino-Meteor’ in reference to the MBDA Meteor ramjet AAM. Then there is the PL-X, possibly designated the PL-17, a 300nm (550km) ramjet-based weapon with a dual-mode seeker and ballistic trajectory.

LAYERED APPROACH Like its growing ground-launched anti-access area denial (A2AD) capabilities, the PLA air-to-air missile complex is built on concentric range rings. This reflects the PLA’s plan to build an integrated air defence system, where aircraft and surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries cooperate to prevent US and Allied forces getting close to sensitive territories or being able to launch stand-off weapons.

At the outer ring are the anti-access weapons such as the PL-X that can target US and Allied tankers and AEW&C aircraft. Then comes the PL-15, probably designed to target counter-air fighters like the F-22 and F-15C. Closer still comes the upgraded PL-12, effective to around 50nm (90km). The inner rings are based on area denial.

The system becomes increasingly capable and dense with the addition of multiple advanced SAMs such as the Russian-made S-400 (NATO codename SA-21 GROWLER) and the Chinese HQ-9 (NATO codename CSA-21). This combined PLA air defence system could deny vital targeting information to strike and fighter aircraft, target these aircraft as they approach their weapon

launch baskets, then use the SAMs to shoot down incoming missiles and any aircraft that evade the PLA interceptors and fighters.

The Chinese system is defensive in nature, and is based on Soviet concepts of air defence that used long-range interceptors and fighters such as the MiG-31 FOXHOUND and Su-27S and Su-27P FLANKER variants as extensions of the SAM systems.

While the advantage of an integrated air defence system lies in the ability to provide persistence, mass and survivability by backing up fighter aircraft with the SAM systems, what is new is how far that air defence system can be extended.

The PLA air-to-air missile program may well already be a complete area denial system. This represents a big problem for the US and Allied nations because slow, non-stealthy airframes simply will not survive against an integrated air defence system. With the acquisition and integration of sophisticated airframes such as the F-35A, EA18G Growler, and E-7 Wedgetail AEW&C, the ADF will at least be able to compete. This is especially so when they are considered as part of a broader architecture including the new Aegis-equipped Hobart class destroyer and planned Hunter class frigates.

In the next issue of ADBR, we will examine what the US and Allied nations are doing to counter the long-range AAM threat. When Hawk Carlisle spoke about having to “out-stick” the PL-15, he might have been referring to a complete change in the US approach to counter air – and that new approach may come as a surprise to most, and not least China and other competitors.

And while the air-to-air weapons systems themselves and the associated technology are often the focus of conversation, it is the innovation in the TTPs which provides lethality and potency.

The J-20 / PL-15 combination will likely be a potent threat.

Dougal Robertson is the senior Executive Analyst at Felix Defence, with extensive joint operational experience as an intelligence officer and instructor in the Australian Defence Force.

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FEATURE TITLE

THE POWER OF WARGAMES

BY DOUGAL ROBERTSON

A

t the beginning of World War Two, German U-boat captains settled on a revolutionary new tactic when attacking against Allied ships.

“Otto Kretschmer, one of the leading U-boat aces, began to stage his attacks from point-blank range, instead of maintaining a distance of two to three kilometres from the target as recommended by the manufacturers of their torpedoes,” says Simon Parkin, author of A Game of Birds and Wolves, an engaging history of what became the Battle of the Atlantic.

“Kretschmer would approach a convoy of merchant ships from the rear, on the surface, at night, when it was far harder for the Royal Navy escorts to pick out the U-boat in the dark. Having snuck into the middle of the convoy Kretchmer would make his attack like a fox in a henhouse before diving to wait for danger to pass.” This pioneering tactic was adopted by many of the U-boat captains and was successfully used to evade Royal Navy ships tasked with protecting convoys.

How did the Royal Navy attempt to understand this problem? Parkin’s research led him to the Royal

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Navy’s Western Approaches Tactical Unit, or WATU. WATU was formed at the start of 1942 to identify why Navy escorts were failing to fend off U-boat attacks.

WATU’s founder, then-Commander Gilbert Roberts, re-staged a notorious battle from December 1941 using after-action reports. By reverse-engineering the battle via the wargame, he and the Women’s Royal Navy, or ‘Wrens’, who staffed WATU, exposed the secret U-boat tactic.

“This led to a fundamental change in Allied tactics,” Parkin notes. “WATU’s great contribution to the Battle of the Atlantic was in forcing Navy Captains to think not as autonomous individuals as they had for the early part of the war, but as a unified team working in co-ordination with one another. This shift in thinking had a profound effect on the Allied fortunes in the war against the U-boats.”

Central to WATU’s success was the creative application of wargaming. Much more than an attempt to validate existing tactics against a partially-known threat, Roberts’ and WATU’s approach was to explore a range of possible scenarios, trying to understand the enemy’s thinking by asking ‘what if?’.

Despite none of the Wrens at WATU having had direct experience in naval warfare, through careful study and analysis they began to place themselves in the position of the enemy and understand his thought process. They began to understand the decision-making of submarine commanders like Kretschmer.

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THE RISE AND FALL AND RISE OF WARGAMING Wargaming is central to military decision-making but is often undervalued.

During the Cold War, nearly all military planners knew the Red Army would attack through the Fulda Gap from East Germany. The operational plan was known; all that remained was to analyse the statistics of the Central Front and use computer models to determine the rate of effort that would lead to success. But with the end of the Cold War came an end to such narrow thinking. Warfare became increasingly complex, ambiguous and multifarious.

“In times of uncertainty people become more interested in wargaming,” says Major Tom Mouat, of the Technology School in the UK Defence Academy at Shrivenham. “The nature of warfare has changed, and understanding the problem is only part of the solution. Wargaming to understand a problem helps when the world is a dangerous place.”

Major Mouat runs wargames for the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD). Since the end of the Cold War the UK MoD has moved away from the statistical analysis of operational problems posed by the Red Army to dealing with complex, ambiguous threats such as the use of political warfare against treaty states. “Computer simulations often concentrate on qualitative analysis,” Major Mouat says. “It’s important to get multiple people around a table to understand decisions and how they are made.”

It is in the human dimension that wargames can provide the most value to military planners and

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WAR GAMES

commanders. Understanding why decisions are made – and preparing for the unexpected – is the real power of games. While games can be fictional, they often define reality by shaping the future.

Major Mouat notes that military organisations are often very good at measuring success, but less confident in understanding failure. “Sometimes lack of success and failure are the same thing, such as Operation EAGLE CLAW, the disastrous US attempt to rescue hostages held in the US Embassy in Tehran.

“But we can also have ‘unfortunate success’,” Mouat adds. “For example, what might have been the outcome of the raid to capture Bin Laden if several of his wives and children were killed and a Pakistani policeman shot during the raid? Would it have been considered decisive? Understanding the probability of something happening allows an intelligent discussion to occur about risk.”

DEFINING WARGAMES What then, is a wargame? Dr Peter Perla, writing in The Art of Wargaming defines it as a “a warfare model or simulation that does not involve the operation of actual forces, in which the flow of events is affected by decisions made during the course of events by players representing the opposing sides”.

Perla also first proposed the ‘cycle of research’, linking wargames, analysis and exercises. The cycle of research recognises the three components are not the same: wargaming focuses on human behaviour, a qualitative activity. Analysis or operational research provides a quantitative basis for decisions. And exercises test and adjust the theories and models developed during wargaming and analysis.

While all wargaming is about understanding decisions and helping decision-makers, wargames can be split into two broad categories: analytical – or research – games, and learning – or training and education – games.

According to Dr Robert Burks of the US Naval Postgraduate School, analytical wargames are “designed to collect and analyse information from wargame play. These results either feed directly into a decision or are used to develop other analytic products.”

Wargames of both types can establish multiple possible outcomes for a scenario while reducing the possibility of determinism or groupthink. Analytical games set limits and allow players to explore concepts where the cost of failure is unacceptable: for example, games were used during the Cold War to try and understand and control the possible use of nuclear weapons. Training with games allows decision-makers to practice operational art and become more familiar with ambiguity and friction in warfare.

WARGAME GENERATIONS Wargaming goes back much further than the Second World War and the early decades of the Cold War. Matthew Caffrey, of the US Air Force Research Laboratory, draws a distinction between ‘first generation’ wargames – such as chess – that are abstract strategy games, and second-generation wargames that introduced the simulation of warfare.

The Prussian military was the first to use second-generation wargames to solve operational problems in the aftermath of the defeat by Napoleon at Jena-Auerstadt in 1806.

The first ‘Kriegsspiel’ dedicated to operations and tactics was introduced in 1811 by Lieutenant Johan von Reisswitz. Von Reisswitz’s son Georg then simplified his father’s game in 1824, making use of paper topographic maps instead of ceramic terrain tables. By 1837 Chief of Staff of the Prussian army Helmuth von Moltke ordered increased wargaming, introducing innovations such as the ‘staff ride’ where war college students were taken to likely invasion corridors on the Prussian border and discussed their battle plan.

The development of second-generation wargaming spread across the world over the next 75 years, influenced both by Prussian success and the adoption of Prussian wargaming methods in the US, Russia, Europe and Japan.

In the period leading up to World War One civilian wargames also started to grow in popularity.

Jane’s Naval War Game was named for its designer, Frederick Jane. Initially the game only had detailed technical information on four British ships, and when Jane added information for the German Navy, it created a controversy. The next edition of the game then included All the World’s Warships, the first of hundreds of titles published by the Jane’s Group.

‘Third-generation’ wargaming, according to Matthew Caffrey, is the simulation of armed conflict depicting all elements of national power and examining all dimensions of conflict within a society. Caffrey notes the development of third

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about gambling – players can pause the game to try and increase the probability of success, based on their understanding of risk. Mouat believes technology in wargaming is best applied to enable games, such as using computer-based tools that assist play or help facilitate games.

Technology and computers will never change the fact that war is a human endeavour, and subject to the interplay between the Clauswitzian trinity of emotion, chance and reason. This is the strength of Perla’s ‘cycle of research’, where the outcomes of a wargame are fed into operations research simulations, and the likely outcomes tested against reality during exercises.

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UNDERSTANDING DECISIONS

generation wargaming was “motivated by the need for a strategy to preserve the independence of an interwar Germany too weak to defend itself through military means alone.”

Third generation wargaming seeks to understand the human dimension of warfare. While complex, drawing in the political context brings wargaming closer to understanding the nature of warfare beyond single engagements and operations.

INTEGRATING TECHNOLOGY

DOUGAL ROBERTSON IS AN EXECUTIVE ANALYST AT FELIX DEFENCE, WITH 13 YEARS’ EXPERIENCE AS A MILITARY INTELLIGENCE OFFICER. HE HAS WORKED IN TACTICAL, OPERATIONAL AND STRATEGIC COMMANDS AND DEPLOYED WITH THE ADF TO MULTIPLE LOCATIONS. HE IS A GRADUATE OF THE RAAF FIGHTER INTELLIGENCE INSTRUCTOR COURSE AND HOLDS MASTERS’ DEGREES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE & COUNTERTERRORISM.

The use of technology in wargaming has fluctuated with strategic circumstances. During the Cold War there was emphasis on quantifying solutions to a known problem – the Red Army striking through the Fulda Gap. But as Major Mouat notes, technology and artificial intelligence doesn’t help define the problem.

“There’s this idea that as artificial intelligence becomes more pervasive then human factors will become less important. Well, the day you can make Cortana lose its temper we are back to trying to understand human emotions.”

Mouat uses dice in the MoD wargames to get players to consider the human element. “It’s not

The types of future conflict involving the ADF will probably be complex and ambiguous, operating in what is termed the ‘grey zone’, short of declared or overt hostilities. In these contingencies full of doubt and traps, commanders and decision-makers must be comfortable with their own decision-making.

“Wargaming prepares the decision-maker for a broad situation, not a specific problem,” notes one ADF insider with extensive experience in game design. “The ADF training systems are often constructed as hurdles for people to gain a specific competency – and this means they aren’t designed to develop people’s mental attitudes.”

Wargames teach understanding: the structure within a game can limit a problem, so that human behaviour and events are seen as a chain of decisions, not the chaos and randomness that can appear to manifest in war.

The wargame developed by Roberts and the Wrens in 1942 was ideally suited to the problem it attempted to solve. The design of the game was tailored to the asymmetrical battlefield of the ocean.

But when fine-tuning his game, Roberts benefitted from the position of WATU’s office in Liverpool. It enabled him to interview in person naval officers fresh from action against U-boats. The reports meant he could refine the game so it was always relevant to the changing situation at sea.

“Roberts was a talented teacher and communicator, which accelerated the effects of the wargame as he was able to drive home the lessons to his audience,” says Simon Parkin. “These naval officers were fully aware of the gravity of the ‘games’ they were playing and their potential for life-saving tactics on the Atlantic.”

Perhaps the most profound reason for playing wargames is they are not predictive.

A well-structured wargame isn’t about developing adversary courses of action or testing operational plans. Instead, it prepares the players to be surprised. We will never know the future, but wargames help us understand possible futures.

And applying creative endeavour to warfare may help us maintain the peace.

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FEATURE TITLE

JAPAN TIES Growing power tension in the Indo-Pacific region mean the time has come for Australia to consider broadening its security partnerships, with Japan at the forefront

BY PETER HUNTER

A

s Australia confronts an increasingly unstable Indo-Pacific security environment, it is time for Canberra to carefully cultivate security relationships with a range of regional partners. There is no doubt the US will remain a pivotal player in regional affairs, but in addition to that vital relationship Australia needs to broaden its security partnerships to create further opportunities.

The prevalence of coercive statecraft in the region begs tough questions about the application of our elements of national power, both in the way

we advance our security interests in the region and, when necessary, how we counter hostile behaviour, especially political warfare and grey zone actions.

All of this means we need to take a closer look at partnerships to help us meet those challenges.

Where once we counted on our military’s possession of an edge in capability, and our alliance with the US, to provide deterrence and influence in the region, in this new era of ‘winning without fighting’ it is increasingly clear that those models are a necessary but not sufficient response.

Defence needs to broaden its value proposition to government by being able to contribute its capabilities within a wider range of international influences. On top of its warfighter roles, this will mean closer collaboration with other government agencies and international partners to generate the access, influence and deterrence we need.

Success will, in part, depend on achieving the mutual benefits that will come from working more closely with our friends – and Japan is such a friend.

Australia and Japan already enjoy a close bilateral relationship in defence, so it stands to reason that both sides can profit by closely aligning their responses to these major shifts in geostrategic circumstances.

Australian and Japanese military forces have been cooperating for decades on joint military training exercises and in response to security

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challenges. Australia’s instant response to the Fukushima nuclear disaster after the 2011 tsunami not only confirmed a real and deep friendship but also showed the region that like-minded partners can actively support one another.

There are many other cases where Australia and Japan cooperate, whether in training for joint maritime warfare through exercises such as RIMPAC, or in training for air combat capability at exercises such as Bushido Guardian. And in Australia’s time of need in the recent bushfire crisis, the Japan Air Self Defense Force (JASDF) demonstrated the depths of the bilateral friendship through its provision of a C-130 transport aircraft.

Equally, both governments have shown an increasingly strong concern for bolstering stability and security in the South Pacific given the challenges posed by coercive statecraft. To that end, Tokyo and Canberra alike have looked to military and other means for the demonstration of persistent presence and commitment to the security and welfare of the Pacific Island Countries (PICs).

This is where air power can be of real and immediate benefit to our joint force and whole of government approaches to regional influence. For a start, both air forces share much in common. Not only will each have the same or similar platforms and equipment – from fighter forces equipped with the F35 to transport and surveillance aircraft – they also have shared interests in achieving interoperability and integration. And each force maintains first-rate professional and educational standards. Taken together, these all make it easier to broaden the aperture of cooperation. And the very positive tenor of the over-arching bilateral relationship makes for an environment in which to explore and build on that cooperation.

Of course, this should start from the premise that Australia well understands that Japan’s day-to-day security environment differs from that in the southern hemisphere, and that – in many ways – the security challenges it faces are more immediate and more concrete. We need only to look at the frequency of China’s incursions into Japan’s airspace and maritime domain to appreciate this.

But while from a Japanese perspective it may be tempting to think that Australia faces less urgent security risks (since, unlike the JASDF, the RAAF does not have to scramble its fighter squadrons) it is helpful to emphasise that Japan and Australia have a lot in common, particularly from the challenges of coercive statecraft.

Given these commonalities, both of strategic interest and of military operating systems, it makes sense that both sides should be exploring opportunities for information sharing and

cooperation on issues of air power strategy. It will help if both sides take a step-by-step approach to build on the trust and friendship that already exists.

By working together, both sides can start to explore new options for creative concepts around air power that will contribute to goals of influence, access and deterrence.

A tighter military relationship can be a significant contributor to the broader benefits that come from closer whole-ofgovernment relationships. In terms of countering political warfare and grey zone activities, defeating the ambiguity and divisiveness on which these methods depend requires a comprehensive model for Australia-Japan strategic alignment.

With the military-to-military relationship already in good shape, it makes sense to capitalise on that goodwill to extend the thinking out into how air power can broaden its value proposition to regional security.

‘...both governments have shown an increasingly strong concern for bolstering stability and security...’

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PETER HUNTER IS A SENIOR ADVISER FOR AIR POWER STRATEGY AT THE NATIONAL SECURITY COLLEGE OF THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY, AND DIRECTOR OF AIR FORCE STRATEGY IN AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS. HE HAS MORE THAN 25 YEARS’ EXPERIENCE IN NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCIES IN THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT. THE VIEWS IN THIS ARTICLE ARE HIS OWN.

JOIN T D ATA

ADF JOINT DATA NETWORK PROGRAM The ADF is modernising the datalinks that carry information between aircraft, ships, vehicles and ground nodes in a decade-long project costing up to $1 billion

BY MAX BLENKIN

A

ustralia recognises that the changing threat environment, and the growing capability of peer and near-peer adversaries, could erode a longstanding advantage – the secure real-time transfer of tactical data by way of Link 11, which operates in the high frequency (HF) band, and Link 16, which operates in the ultra-high frequency (UHF) band.

While these datalinks are the focus of Joint Project 9347 Phase 1, Defence takes a broader view. BRIG Warren Gould, Director-General for Joint Command and Control, prefers the term Joint Data Network rather than datalinks.

“Joint Data Networks is one of five lines of activity occurring in the Joint C4 program,” BRIG Gould told ADBR. “Joint Data Networks is fundamentally machine-tomachine formatted messaging … in the battlespace that we seek to automate to give us a decisive edge when on operations. Some of the examples out there include Link 16, Link 11, Integrated Broadcast Service and others.”

Link 11 and Link 16 are not actual hardware, rather they are protocols for transfer of data. Link 11 was developed in the 1950s and is mostly used in the HF band, though it can also function in UHF. The HF band gives Link 11 its major advantage – the ability to transmit data long-range, beyond-line-ofsight – a useful capability should the ADF ever need to operate in a satellite-denied environment. But Link 11 is also regarded as a legacy system that needs replacing.

The better-known Link 16 operates line-of-sight in the UHF band, specifically between 960 and 1,215 Megahertz, and is the primary datalink for the US military, ADF and many others. It provides jam-resistant, fast digital data transfer, enabling secure situational awareness and integrated fire control and command and control capabilities across a range of platforms.

For the ADF, these platforms include combat aircraft such as F-35A, F/A-18F Super and F/A18A/B classic Hornets as well as P-8A Poseidon, E-7A Wedgetail, MH-60R Romeo and C-130J. It is also installed on the Navy’s new Hobart class Aegis destroyers and will be a key enabler of Army’s new LAND 19 Phase 7B NASAMS short-range ground-based air defence system.

Integrated Broadcast Service (IBS) is a satellite-based service. It was developed in the 1990s in the US to replace legacy intelligence broadcast systems with a single system to transmit data to tactical users as quickly as possible. In Australia, IBS was delivered through Joint Project 2065 to disseminate tactically significant information and blue force tracking directly to deployed forces by way of the US Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) constellation, in which Australia is a partner.

That data is produced by Australian and allied intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. The next stage of IBS is to extend the capability, installing it on those ships where it’s not already in place.

‘The US remains extremely sensitive about this technology...’

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DEFENCE

Both Link 11 and Link 16 have proved to be highly effective, although their age is showing. In order to maintain a high level of interoperability, Australia must follow the US and move to next generation systems. Under JP 9347 Phase 1, Link 11 will be upgraded to Link 22 and Link 16 to Enhanced Link 16.

US INTEROPERABILITY A PRIORITY Little has actually been disclosed, and much may never be, about weaknesses – real or perceived – that justify the very expensive upgrade program the US has mandated across its platforms and, by extension, on the platforms of every ally wanting to work with the US. It would follow that both Link 11 and Link 16 have been around long enough for potential adversaries within our region to have developed a good understanding of them and, potentially, countermeasures – despite the complexity of the task. Data transmitted on these systems is encrypted, while Link 16 systems are frequency-agile with frequency changing continuously according to a pre-set pattern to minimise the risk of interception and jamming.

The US remains extremely sensitive about this technology and, occasionally, reports emerge to indicate just how sensitive. In 2013 it was said that the Chinese military was using stolen US secrets to develop a capability to jam Link 16.

Then, in 2019 the US cut Turkey from the F-35 program over its insistence on proceeding with acquisition of a Russian S-400 air defence system.

The US Air Force Times said at the time that, for the Turkish Air Force to operate the F-35, it would need

to integrate an IFF and Link 16 interrogator into the S-400 which could open the way for all Link 16 and IFF tactical datalink equipment to be compromised.

How would we know if the Link series tactical datalinks had been compromised? Maybe not until ‘Hour One’ of a conflict when advanced systems which had worked perfectly well the day before suddenly did not. But the potential for a technologically-advanced adversary to develop a capability to jam or spoof a tactical datalink appears to be realistic enough to justify the need to upgrade.

WATCHING BRIEF “We keep watching briefs of our potential adversaries and their capabilities against our current capabilities,” Joint Project 9347 desk officer Mick Coad told ADBR. “We, in our assessment would need to counter that emerging effort and make sure we can still operate in our areas of operations. That fundamentally means maintaining the ability to communicate in a contested environment and, if signals are detected or intercepted, that the security of the messaging is protected.”

The new Link 22 will deliver enhanced cryptographic security and greater capacity for non-line-of-sight communications without the use of satellites.

In the meantime, Enhanced Link 16 will provide greater cryptographic security and enhanced capacity. But the basic architecture – with data transmitted in discreet chunks called messages – makes it ill-suited to transmission of streaming data such as ISR imagery or live video feeds. It was developed that way to gain maximum use of limited

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JOINT DATA

bandwidth. Therefore, it will remain best-suited to situational awareness functions, command and control, low data rate ISR, and weapon guidance.

Defence is adopting a programmatic approach to the update, seeking funding and rolling it out in two-year tranches. The government recently gave the go-ahead for tranche one, along with approving (unspecified) funding.

The 2016 Defence White Paper indicates the government’s vision for Defence’s vast and diverse communications and data networks.

It says, ‘Modern secure and highly effective information and communications technology is critical to maximise the combat effects of an integrated and networked ADF. This includes the dispersed, fixed, deployable and mobile networks that underpin ADF operations and the information that enables intelligence surveillance, reconnaissance, communications, logistics, command and control and enterprise management.’

But under-investment in information and communications technology over the past decade, coupled with lack of a coherent enterprise-level strategy for Defence’s complex and rapidly evolving information and communications requirements, had led to a serious degradation across Defence’s information and communications capabilities.

‘Key capabilities need urgent remediation’, the White Paper says.

‘Defence networks will be made more secure and key information management and operational communications and command and control systems will be upgraded. Priority will be given to strengthening the resilience and redundancy of satellite-based communications.’

DEFENCE

message sets with that particular device. The coordination matrix across platforms is quite detailed and it is a function of the program to coordinate that effort across all the platforms. We then need those radio systems to be sustained and we would seek industry involvement in sustaining those devices in Australia rather than being excessively reliant on a long US tail.”

In practice, that means minimal work on some platforms, more on others. For example, the new F-35 aircraft will require no work whatsoever as it comes from the factory with the necessary software enhancements already in place.

F-35 is also equipped with the Northrop Grumman Multifunction Advanced Data Link (MADL), a secure directional high-throughput link to other F-35s, and can also provide targeting information to warships equipped with the latest Baseline 9 Aegis combat system. Australia’s three Hobart class destroyers are planned to be upgraded to this standard, while the new Hunter class frigates will be from the outset.

For some other ADF platforms the datalink upgrade process will be straightforward as the initial integration task will be performed for the US military.

That would apply to RAAF Super Hornets and Growlers, and Navy’s Romeo helicopters.

The task will be more challenging on other platforms. The RAAF’s E-7A Wedgetail might feature a US airframe and radar, but many of the onboard command and control and sensor interface systems were developed in and for Australia, while the same principle applies to Navy’s ANZAC frigates and the Hobart class DDGs which have Australian-unique tactical interfaces.

Integration of the technology with European platforms such as the RAAF’s Airbus KC-30A tankers will be complex.

A similarly complex integration scenario would accompany an Army decision to retain its Airbus Tiger Armed Reconnaissance Helicopters with

‘Key capabilities need urgent remediation...’

MODERNISATION The 2016 Defence Integrated Investment Plan nominated an overall cost of $750 million to $1 billion over the period 2016-2031. Tranche one will involve some equipment acquisition, but no contractors have yet been chosen.

But for key components, there’s little choice. Just two US companies – Viasat and DLS – make the key boxes for Enhanced Link 16, while only Raytheon makes the Link 22 cryptographic device. This technology is rigorously controlled under the US International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITARS), and is only supplied through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program.

BRIG Gould told us that installing this across the ADF would be a platform-by-platform process.

“On some platforms it will be box-in, box-out and a very easy integration effort into the existing battle management system,” he said.

“Others will require some software coding changes within the platform to meet the new

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greater battlefield connectivity delivered via Enhanced Link 16.

“Clearly there are going to be some difficult platforms for us, which is the subject of the risk reduction activities we are doing with this first tranche of work,” BRIG Gould said. “We have identified where we see the more difficult platforms to integrate, and we will use this next period of time to get after those solutions.”

He said this was a platform-by-platform calculation. While some are ready now, “others you would see some prototyping over the next two years and then installation beyond two years, from 2022-23.”

BRIG Gould said the Army has its own battle management system developed by Israeli firm Elbit and its own data network, and is not reliant on Link for its command and control. But it would need Link to connect to the air and maritime environments, particularly for joint fires. “We have to work with Army to see what their solution is,” he said. “It wouldn’t be required for every vehicle.”

He said the program will require very close coordination with the System Project Offices (SPOs) within Defence’s Capability, Acquisition and Sustainment Group (CASG). “Almost all SPOs are touched with this and the solution within each SPO and their platform may vary.

“The governance over this is quite strong,” BRIG Gould added. “It needs to be … so that we can have a clear understanding of the solution required for each platform, the cost for each platform, and the timeline for the implementation. It is a whole-of-Defence undertaking to get this done, it is not just the JP 9347 project office.”

To this end, Defence has already had talks with industry. “We have done a few presentations on this particular project,” BRIG Gould said. “We have also released a request for information last year, for which we received responses.

“And the next step we are progressing towards an RFT for some element of work for the next two years. Industry, I would assess, is fully aware of this particular project and the activities that we are after.

They are well prepared for us to start engaging them on those activities.”

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SMART BUYER A further element of the Joint Data Network is the need to create an overall network management system. “Currently we don’t do that particularly well so one of the lines of activity is to bring a mature network management system into place so that we can, as a joint force, coordinate all of the joint data networks across a deployed joint taskforce,” BRIG Gould said.

The objective is to create a mature capability that is not US-dependent. “I would like to see our domestic capability in this space be expanded, and we would offer that opportunity to industry to pursue,” he added.

One proposal under consideration is the creation of a new organisation called the Joint Network Integration Centre to replace the current system of centres attached to each service – for example, the Land Network Integration Centre (LNIC).

BRIG Gould said this would be an integration and testing laboratory for future technologies to ensure they properly integrated into the joint force.

A feasibility study is underway, but the process is in its earliest stages. No location for the LNIC has been chosen, but it would likely involve Defence and industry personnel.

Once fully implemented, the Link upgrades will allow full interoperability with US forces. But how about with other allied forces? BRIG Gould said all our coalition partners operated joint data networks.

“It might involve Link, it might involve other families, but if they do use the Link family they will all be undertaking this effort to upgrade.”

ITERATIVE APPROACH Meanwhile, it is accepted that, despite significant investment in upgrading the ADF datalinks, it won’t fully future-proof the ADF. This is simply because potential adversaries will continue to react to any technological changes.

“If we employ a new technology or a new method, of course our adversaries would seek to gain their own advantage over that,” BRIG Gould said in closing.

“And when a threshold is met, we would then need to look at adjusting our technologies.

“We are talking about computer processing power and software,” he added. “The analogy of how frequently you refresh your processing power and those applications in your home is not unlike what we are dealing with.”

He said this was exactly the reason Defence was using a program approach and rolling out JP9347 in two-year tranches. “It allows us to go back to government every two years and have a conversation about the assessed threat and what is it we need to address in the next two years of priorities.

“Projects of old would forecast out 10 years and do a big bang approach. We are taking a tranche iterative approach that is then able to respond to the threat environment we are facing.”

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INFORMATION ADVANTAGE - LINK 16

LINK 16

INFORMATION ADVANTAGE Tactical Data Link 16

BY FELIX ADVANTAGE

I

n this second of a series of articles, ADBR examines joint force integration through the data link lens. We analyse LINK 16 in detail and provide an explanation of how it works and why it remains a key enabler for operational capability and coalition interoperability. We highlight some of the challenges associated with Link 16 as part of a broader network, and the need to build a sovereign capability with the expertise to manage an increasingly complex network environment

TRUSTED NETWORKS Tactical data links (TDL) provide resilient and trusted networks that enable the ADF to generate joint force capability. Yet the complexities involved within each network, added to the continuous introduction of new networking technologies, significantly challenges the ADF in achieving its ambition of a truly interconnected joint data network (JDN).

A JDN is important because it is a network of communications and electronics systems that carry TDLs, multi-sensor early warning information, and intelligence data to support joint force operations. The ADF JDN is primarily composed of data from multiTDL networks (MTN), through to intelligence networks such as the Integrated Broadcast Service (IBS).

The ADF MTN currently uses Link 11, Link 16, satellite Link 16 (SAT-J), and the Joint Range Extension Application Protocol (JREAP). Link 16 remains the ADF’s primary TDL and is essential for tactical co-ordination across the five operational domains of air, land, maritime, space, and information and cyber.

LINK 16 FUNDAMENTALS ‘Link 16’ is the term generally applied to both the message standard used for exchanging information as well as the physical bearer system, commonly known as the terminal. Link 16 possesses many advantages over legacy data links such as Link 11.

Link 16 uses a system architecture known as Time Division Multiple Access which allows users to be assigned an opportunity to transmit or listen to data over a fixed period of time, known as a time slot (TS). At the operational level, there are 1,536 TSs spread across a 12-second frame that are then divided between users based upon their capabilities and information exchange requirements. The result is that some users get more TSs than others.

Dependent upon the network design, some TSs may be shared between users while others are dedicated to a single user.

Link 16 terminals operate within the ultrahigh frequency band 969-1206MHz and hop over 51 frequencies spaced 3MHz apart.

However, this band is shared with other civilian aeronautical radio navigation systems and consequently terminal transmissions could potentially interfere with national air navigation and the safety of flight. To avert any detrimental impact on these systems, every Link 16 terminal has an interference protection feature. Each user nation then decides how Link 16 shall be used by approving a frequency clearance agreement.

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LINK 16 TERMINALS There are a variety of Link 16 terminals in existence, ranging from the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) Class II, variants of the Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS), through to those that are software defined, specifically MIDS-Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS), and small form factor radios. Both the JTIDS Class II and MIDS variants are hardware defined with the latter the current terminal of choice for many users.

However, there is no doubt that while the software-defined radios provide the user with more flexibility and added capability, that capability carries with it the significant risk that terminal interoperability issues will soon affect the joint use of Link 16 in the battlespace.

NODELESSNESS

NEAR REAL TIME

INCREASED THROUGHPUT

LINK 16

ECM RESISTANCE

IMPROVED SECURITY

WHAT IS A NETWORK? One element of Link 16 that continues to cause confusion is the use of the terms network and nets.

To begin with, a network is a number of synchronised participants that know where the 12-second frame begins and ends. It is critical that all users correctly synchronise in order to successfully exchange data.

To support the synchronisation process a common Network Time Reference (NTR) must be established between all users. To support this, each terminal has a clock and users can only establish and maintain synchronisation by alignment of all user clocks.

The network time can be provided in two ways, either by a single user operating within the network or via an external source (External Time Reference).

The first method is where a single user is allocated

the duty of being the NTR and, as a result, the clock time within their terminal is used as the system time of the Link 16 network. This user NTR then periodically transmits a net entry message to help other units join the network, align their own terminal time and thus maintain synchronisation.

The second is where users utilise time from an external source, most commonly co-ordinated universal time (UTC). Some terminals are ETRcapable and as the time source is external, a Link 16 network can have multiple NTRs as they are all using and subsequently transmitting the same time. It is important to note that even if a user is not ETR-capable they can still operate in an ETR network, they simply need to be given the time.

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INFORMATION ADVANTAGE - LINK 16

LINK 16 NETWORK

128 Nets (0-127)

Frequency Hopping Patterns

Net 127

1200MHz

1053MHz

....

1119MHz

990MHz

984MHz

....

1143MHz

....

999MHz

....

Net 1

981MHz

1053MHz

....

1128MHz

1002MHz

1206MHz

....

1167MHz

....

1005MHz

....

Net 0

1203MHz

1166MHz

....

969MHz

984MHz

1140MHz

....

1185MHz

....

1059MHz

....

TS 1

TIME SLOT 2

.....

12 second frame

WHAT IS A NET? A net is defined by a discrete frequency-hopping pattern (FHP) and within each network there are 128 numbered 0-127. These 128 individual patterns are derived from the crypto-transmission security (TSEC). A Link 16 terminal hops over the 51 frequencies based on the net upon which it has been designed to operate.

To add flexibility, a terminal can jump between nets at the end of each TS. Thus, for a user to maintain synchronisation within the network, and correctly align their terminal to an FHP, they must align and maintain system time.

RIGHT PLACE AT THE RIGHT TIME Given the many variables involved, there can be a number of reasons why units are unable to join a network. The most common mistake is that users load the wrong crypto (TSEC) and consequently fail to be on the right FHP even if they have the right Link 16 network and time.

With a Link 16 network using 128 different Frequency Hopping Patterns spread across the 1,536 TS, the art is to ensure a user’s terminal is in the right place (TS) at the right time (FHP) to exchange data.

Having established a TS as the basic unit of access to the Link 16 network, we need to understand how much capacity each TS affords the user. Our 12-second frame consisting of 1,536 TS equates to each TS measuring a period of 7.8125 milliseconds. This period is further sub-divided and it is the data portion that allows users to transmit information. Once again, the network design

process is fundamental, as it is this process which determines the capacity (packing) available to the user within the data portion of the TS. As we explained in the November-December 2019 edition of ADBR, Link 16 uses J-Series messages to exchange data. There are various J-Series messages defined from messages that convey situational awareness information through to digital control and position, location and identification information.

All these messages are subsequently allocated a label and sub-label, for example the J3.2 is the Air Track message where 3 is the label and 2 is the sub-label. However, it is how these messages have been defined that we need to understand in order to identify how many J-Series messages a user can fit within each TS.

CONSTRUCTING MESSAGES United States (US) Military Standard-6016 explicitly describes how each J-Series message is constructed and transmitted. Each J-Series message consists of a number of 70-bit words and these words are described as initial, extension and continuation. Every J-Series message starts with an initial word, and one or more extension words may be required depending upon the purpose of the message,. And finally, one or more continuation words may be necessary.

In the case of the J3.2 Air Track message, this has one initial word, one extension word and five continuation words defined. The rules within the US standard dictate that a minimum of two words shall be transmitted for each Air Track message.

TS 1536

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Therefore, if the network design process had packed the data portion of a TS to support only three words, a user would be limited to a single Air Track.

Whereas, if a TS was packed to support 12 words a user could potentially transmit up to six Air Tracks.

When packing a TS this way there is a considerable difference to the capacity of the TS, and while this is an obvious advantage it also carries disadvantages such as reduced electronic countermeasure (ECM) resistance and range.

EXTENDING RANGE Another disadvantage of Link 16 is that it operates over ultra-high frequency and thus communications is line-of-sight (LOS) only. Considering the extent of many operational Link 16 networks, there is a potential that users are unable to exchange data.

Joint Range Extension Application Protocol (JREAP) enables a user to overcome this, but not all users are equipped with this capability. Furthermore, Link 16 was in use well before JREAP and so to overcome the issue of beyond LOS (BLOS) a feature known as Relay can be employed within any Link 16 network, as long as it is included within the network design process. Unfortunately, like many features of Link 16, there is always a downside: relay costs, and it costs the network design process TS. We already know that a user is allocated TS to transmit their data but what if the receiver is BLOS? Basically, a third party known as a relay unit has to be in LOS with both the sender and receiver and operating on the right net at the right time. Added to this, the relay unit has to be allocated a relay TS for every TS of data the sender needs relaying, otherwise known as paired slot relay. The result is

that the 1,536 time slots can very quickly be used up, and they certainly will if every unit wants to relay all of their data. Accordingly, network planning and design ensure that a balanced approach is applied across all users within the network while accommodating each user’s individual information exchange requirements.

DESIGN AND PLANNING Simply viewing Link 16 in terms of technology underplays the importance of building the team of people able to plan, design and manage the Link 16 network. On top of that there are the other TDLs within the MTN and that is only part of a broader JDN. The TDL community has well-established procedures in place to meet the challenges involved in establishing the MTN. However, the major challenge for the ADF and other nations using the TDLs is how to ensure the right data reaches the right people at the right time across the whole of the JDN. In Australia, we can achieve this by continuously cooperating with our allies, enhancing knowledge delivery, and building upon the positive relationship that already exists between the Commonwealth and industry.

In our next article, we will continue to explore how Link 16 will fundamentally change over the next 10 years. We will discover that the introduction and operational use of softwaredefined radios will add another level of complexity to the Link 16 network. This will require careful management and a much broader working knowledge of data links across the Australian defence and industry community.

7.8125ms TIME SLOT 2

TS 1

JITTER PERIOD

SYNC

TIME REFINEMENT

HEADER

7.8125ms

71

.....

DATA 3, 6 OR 12 WORDS

TS 1536

PROPAGATION /GUARD PERIOD

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ON TARGET - SIR RICHARD WILLIAMS FOUNDATION

On Target

A

Australia’s ‘First Island Chain’

By Brian Weston

continuing theme in Chinese strategic thinking is the concept of island chains.

China’s first island chain (map opposite, yellow line) stretches from the Kuril Islands of southern Japan, through the northern archipelago of the Philippines, to northern Borneo. A second island chain (map opposite, red line) extending through the Marianas, including Guam, lies beyond the first island chain, with a third island chain in the central Pacific. Of these three chains, the first island chain - which includes Taiwan - is of prime economic, strategic, military and geo-political significance to China.

With many archipelagos lying to the north of Australia, the concept of island chains might also have application to Australian strategic thinking.

Certainly, the first Chief of the Air Staff of the RAAF Sir Richard Williams showed keen interest in the archipelagos to the north of Australia. In 1926

he conducted an extensive familiarisation flight up the east coast of Australia, through Papua, New Guinea and on to Tulagi in the Solomon Islands.

Williams departed Point Cook on 25 September 1926 in a de Havilland DH50, a civil version of the DH9 bomber with an enclosed cabin for four passengers and a pilot in an open cockpit at the rear of the cabin. The biplane, powered by a single Siddeley Puma water-cooled engine, was fitted with metal floats. On the flight, Williams was accompanied by pilot Flight Lieutenant McIntyre, and mechanic Corporal Trist.

The DH50 returned to Point Cook on 7 December, having flown some 10,000 miles, visited 23 locations outside of mainland Australia, and logged 126 flight hours, an aviation feat not only of considerable historical significance to Australia, but also a flight of great value to Williams in his role as Chief of the Air Staff.

A DH50 floatplane.

ADF-SERIALS IMAGE GALLERY

ADBR

More significantly, Williams’ 10 weeks in the floatplane was further evidence that he had already turned his mind to the implications of the disposition of the archipelagos to the north of Australia. The flight was a pragmatic way of investigating how the evolving capabilities of the aeroplane could exploit the archipelagic disposition to the betterment of Australia’s defence.

Today, and given the recent surge in Australia’s interest in its South Pacific neighbours, is the concept of island chains of relevance to Australian strategic thought?

The geography of the archipelagos remains largely unchanged, although a new strategic and geo-political framework has evolved to replace the sub-servient colonies of former colonial powers. Also, Australia’s regional interests are now Indo-Pacific in nature. Therefore, a 21st century concept of Australia’s first island chain (map, white line) should be more appropriately defined as stretching from Sri Lanka, along the Indonesian archipelago from Sumatra and Java to Irian Jaya, through Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, and on to Vanuatu and Fiji.

From a strategic perspective, that extensive region – from mainland Australia and its island territories to the southern shores of Australia’s first island chain – might be described, in academe strategic terms, as Australia’s sphere of influence.

Or, from a national security perspective, as Australia’s Red Zone, with the consequential theatre of military operations predominantly maritime.

Significantly, military operations within this area play to Australia’s strengths of high levels of professional military mastery, and an aptitude for the exploitation of technologically advanced capabilities. Australia’s continuing investment in surveillance, reconnaissance, information and intelligence capabilities is key to the successful conduct of sub-surface, surface and above-surface maritime operations.

So, although this theatre of operations is vast, and provided government continues to grow defence funding to two per cent of GDP with a little more to fund some further capability augmentation, Australia’s defence forces can be expected to operate with military credibility throughout this ‘red zone’.

On the other hand, operations into and beyond Australia’s first island chain will involve other nation

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states and their sovereign territories. They also come with difficult island and littoral geography and, almost certainly, will require access to forward basing. This will have to be undertaken with the support of allies, together with a Pandora’s box of strategic, geopolitical and operational scenarios which can complicate and bog down both conceptual force structure and operational contingency planning.

In contrast, the notion of Australia’s first island chain brings a clearer conceptual basis for force development and operational planning, and a reduced dependence on the complexities and national interests of partners and allies, while remaining of critical relevance to Australia’s security.

So, is Australia capitalising on these realities by devoting enough effort to the detail of how Australia can defend and dominate the nation’s ‘red zone’?

Brian Weston is a Board Member of the Sir Richard Williams Foundation

GOOGLE EARTH/ADBR

‘Operations within this area play to Australia’s strengths of high levels of ... military mastery.’

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