american foreign policy January 2011
Volume X, Issue III
From the Editor-in-Chief
AFP
Staff Editor-in-Chief Taman Narayan ‘13
Dear Readers, Despite new leaders, new technology, and new circumstances, some global problems just never change. This past month represented a marked return to form in a wide array of international affairs, symbolized by the White House’s decision to halt its increasingly hopeless quest to have Israel impose another settlement freeze. With Palestinians remaining firm that no direct talks will occur until Israel ceases building, it looks like Barack Obama can add himself to the list of US presidents to have tried and failed to resolve the historic conflict.
Publisher Matthew Arons ‘13
This issue tackles a wide range of recurring policy problems. Chris Goodnow critiques the Federal Reserve’s QE2 policy in the context of an ongoing currency feud with China. Ben Foulon looks to Africa, where Ivory Coast strongman Laurent Gbagbo refuses to give up power after losing the election, defying Western Africa’s recent move towards democratization. Bennett Bernstein examines the recent international climate summit in Mexico and the string of less than successful summits before it, and ponders solutions to break out of this cycle. Further south, Dilma Rousseff finally takes power in Brazil in the shadow of her predecessor Luis Inacio de Silva; Christiana Renfro considers whether she really represents a third Lula term.
Editors
Other writers address issues that, absent firm action, could become lingering headaches. John Cappel, in our cover story, writes about needed changes in America’s information security with an eye on preventing the next WikiLeaks. Jeff Schwartz examines the foreign policy divide between President Obama and Republicans. And Cornelia Lluberes makes an impassioned plea for the Manhattan Islamic community center debate to stay in the past. On a personal note, I am very excited to take the reins of American Foreign Policy from Ben Cogan as the new editor-in-chief. This is an exciting time for the magazine. In the coming months, AFP will focus on improving and updating our online content to bring readers our insightful analysis in an increasing array of formats, while maintaining the quality of the long-form analysis that forms the core of our magazine. I hope that, whether in print or online, AFP can continue to provide engaging content to entertain you and enrich your understanding of the world.
Sincerely, Taman Narayan Editor-in-Chief
Cover Story
Managing Editors Matthew Arons ‘13 Jake Nebel ‘13 Aaron Abelson Brendan Carroll Vishal Chanani Katherine Gaudyn Rachel Jackson Addie Lerner Zayn Siddique Eric Stern Kit Thayer Oliver Bloom Yun Chung Sweta Haldar Jim Hao Natalie Kim Charlie Metzger
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Jay Parikh Peter Wang Don Butterworth Kristie Liao Jonathan Lin Andres Perez-Benzo Christiana Renfro Daniel Toker Emily VanderLinden Audrye Wong Rohan Bhargava Sunny Jeon Adam Safadi Rachel Webb
‘12 ‘12 ‘13 ‘13 ‘13 ‘13 ‘13 ‘13 ‘13 ‘14 ‘14 ‘14 ‘14 ‘14
Layout
Emily VanderLinden ‘13 Production Manager Kim Hopewell Shreya Murthy Grace Ma
‘13 Adam Safadi ‘13 Jenna Weinstein ‘14
‘14 ‘14
Copy Editors Christina Henricks ‘13 Ben Kotopka ‘13 Editors-in-Chief Emeriti Rush Doshi ‘11 Dan May ‘11 Ben Cogan ‘12
A merican F oreign P olicy January 2011, Volume X, Issue III
ta b l e o f co n t e n ts
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Recovering from WikiLeaks Reforming Information Policy John Cappel ‘11
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Brazil’s New Face The Election of Dilma Rousseff Christiana Renfro ‘13
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The Seoul G-20 Summit How QE2 Poisoned the Well Chris Goodnow ‘14
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AFP Quiz
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Global Update
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Changing of the Guard Foreign Policy in an Age of Divided Government Jeff Schwartz ‘14
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The Unrest in Cote d’Ivoire And Why it Matters Ben Foulon ‘14
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In Context
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A Better Way Circumventing the UNFCCC for Climate Progress Bennett Bernstein ‘13
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Is America at War with Islam? The Controversy over Park51 Cornelia Lluberes ‘14
Benjamin Cogan ‘12
Taman Narayan ‘13
Matt Arons ‘13
Business Staff
Kimberly Hopewell ‘13 American Foreign Policy is a student-written, student-run publication based at Princeton University. It was founded in the wake of September 11th to provide Princeton students with a forum to discuss the difficult problems and choices facing the United States in the world. American Foreign Policy magazine is sponsored by the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies, and the James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions. No part of this publication should be construed to promote any pending legislation or to support any candidate for office. The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Woodrow Wilson School, the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies, the James Madison Program, Princeton University, or American Foreign Policy. AFP gladly accepts letters to the editor, article proposals, and donations, which are fully tax-deductible.
AFP Advisory Board
Wolfgang Danspeckgruber: Director, Liechtenstein Institute for Self-Determination Robert P. George: Director, James Madison Program G. John Ikenberry: Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs Christina Paxson: Dean, Woodrow Wilson School
All correspondence may be directed to: American Foreign Policy, 5406 Frist Center, Princeton, NJ 08544 afp@princeton.edu www.afpprinceton.com
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Zara Mannan ‘13
American Foreign Policy
Photo Credits: Creative Commons images from Flickr
January 2011
Cover Image by Shreya Murthy ‘13
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Cover Story
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton with WikiLeaks symbol. Photo from veteranstoday.com
Recovering from Wikileaks Reforming Information Policy
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hristmas came early this year for policy wonks when WikiLeaks released a treasure trove of American diplomatic cables, some of which shed new light on the current state of international relations. Commentators have endlessly debated the ethics of Julian Assange’s actions and the consequences of this release for the United States’ ability to conduct foreign policy, but the fallout over WikiLeaks has largely overlooked how this incident illustrates the government’s need to seriously re-evaluate its policies on controlling information and protecting whistleblowers. While the scope of damage to American diplomacy will only be revealed in time, there can be no doubt that Wikileaks’ release has undermined faith in America’s ability to protect information. When a low-ranking soldier like Pfc. Bradley Manning can access 250,000 diplomatic cables and other classified materials, burn them onto CDs, and carry them out of a secure
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John Cappel ‘11 facility, there is an inherent flaw in the government’s information controls. Manning had unrestricted access to two massive networks of all-source secret and top secret information, which is typical for someone in his job. Efforts to avoid repeating pre-9/11 failures of communication within the intelligence community and the increasing importance of broad intelligence sources to modern warfare motivated this broad access for intelligence analysts. Manning may have been able to avoid detection by merely deleting server logs recording his activities, and a system designed to identify suspicious activity on classified servers covers only 60 percent of Department of Defense computers. The DoD now requires that information can be transferred between classified and unclassified computer systems only in a supervised setting, but the DoD and other government agencies should also expand monitoring systems to all computers handling
American Foreign Policy
classified information and ensure that server logs cannot be deleted. While closing the holes Manning exploited should be a first step in improving protection of classified information, anything less than a government-wide review seems unlikely to diagnose different weaknesses in classified computer systems. In addition to raising concerns about the U.S. government’s ability to protect classified information, the WikiLeaks case illustrates another serious problem with current government policy: over-classification. Many of the leaked cables merely confirmed information that was already in the public realm, thus raising an interesting question: why was the information classified in the first place? In effect, by erring on the side of caution and protecting material that posed no threat to American security or interests if publicly known, the government has damaged the credibility of its classification procedures. Under the current system, information that would be embarrassing or unpleasantly complicating if released is placed in the same category as truly dangerous and damaging knowledge. The government also restricts access to a wide range of “controlled unclassified information,” which is not technically
classified but is nonetheless restricted in its distribution because of concern over the potential security risk of its release. Misuse of classified or controlled unclassified labels feeds a public perception that the government is merely trying to restrict access to information without any good reason. This lack of public faith is illustrated by the hacker group Anonymous’ recent invocation of “freedom of information” as a rallying cry for its attacks against “enemies” of WikiLeaks. If the government cannot become much more judicious in deciding what information to classify, this problem of public perception will only worsen. Even if the government is more careful in choosing what information to protect, there will always be room for abuse of classification powers. As the release of the Pentagon Papers clearly illustrated, the government is not above drastically misleading the public on life-and-death issues. Leaks can serve as an essential tool for exposing questionable activities, bringing serious problems to light, sparking policy debate, or ensuring that citizens are capable of making informed judgments about the activities of their government. However, leaks are worrisome because what information is released is ultimately at the sole discretion of the leaker, whose judgment may not be sound. To find a balance between a government stranglehold on information and a porous classification system prone to extensive information leaks, the federal government must address the woeful state of its systems for categorizing information, managing internal complaints, and protecting whistleblowers. The current weakness of these systems is vividly illustrated by the case of Robert MacLean, a former federal air marshal. In 2003, the TSA decided to remove air marshals from long-distance flights—the type of flights targeted by the 9/11 hijackers—in a cost-cutting measure. MacLean unsuccessfully raised concerns about this approach to TSA managers and a field agent of the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of the Inspector General. MacLean finally brought his case to the media, and Congressional outrage promptly led the TSA to reverse its decision. However, MacLean was fired after his release was retroactively cat-
Cover Story
egorized as Sensitive Security Information, a type of controlled unclassified information. As demonstrated by MacLean’s case, the current lack of internal protections and procedures for whistleblowers makes undesirable public disclosures more likely. When higher-ranking officials seem unwilling to solve problems or actually fail to address concerns that have been raised, employees are more likely to air grievances in public. In fact, instant messaging transcripts show that Bradley Manning viewed an officer’s refusal to address abuses by Iraqi police as a major turning point in his decision to leak documents. Furthermore, when wrongdoing goes unchecked, it is likely to worsen to the
“President Obama already made a move in the right direction on November 4th by signing Executive Order 13566, which imposes government wide standards for controlled unclassified information. ” point that someone will feel morally obligated to blow the whistle. Insufficient avenues and protections for whistleblowers consequently curtail internal reports of moderate wrongdoing while increasing the odds that severe abuses will be leaked to the public. If someone within the Army had listened to Bradley Manning’s concerns, 250,000 diplomatic cables might still be secure. President Obama already made a move in the right direction on November 4th by signing Executive Order 13566, which imposes governmentwide standards for controlled unclassified information. Congress also appeared on course to move towards enhancing protections for government whistleblowers after both the House and Senate passed different versions of The Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2010 in December. However, since the Senate version
January 2011
included protections for intelligence community whistleblowers while the House version did not, a version excluding intelligence community protections was returned to the Senate for passage, where it was killed by an anonymous Senator’s hold. Ironically, critics of the bill argued that it would lead to more WikiLeaks-type disclosures. What the WikiLeaks incident revealed, more than anything, is a crisis of confidence in the government’s control of information. The release itself has raised doubts among foreign partners about the United States’ ability to guard sensitive information, and the response to WikiLeaks has revealed a significant number of people who believe that the American government abuses its classification powers to keep its corruption and crimes away from criticism. To regain foreign confidence, America must improve its safeguards of classified information. To restore the faith of the American public, the government must become more judicious in assigning classified or controlled unclassified information labels while enhancing internal whistleblowing procedures and protections. If the government merely tightens its control over information, the public will become less likely to believe that the government ever has valid reasons for protecting information. In making sure that people like Bradley Manning and Julian Assange cannot ever again become the overlords of America’s classified information, the government needs to make sure that people like Robert MacLean have a way for their voice to be heard before they feel a need to go public. Failure to act will expose the United States to future disclosures that will complicate its ability to conduct foreign policy. It will take time for foreign partners’ broken confidence in the American government’s protection of information to recover, but whether it recovers quickly or continues deteriorating depends on how the government responds to its current situation. -Afp John may be reached at jcappel@princeton.edu
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South America
Dilma Rousseff, on left, celebrating her victory. Photo from Flickr.
Brazil’s New Face The Election of Dilma Rousseff
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n October 31, Workers’ Party candidate Dilma Rousseff handily defeated opponent José Serra in the runoff of Brazil’s presidential elections, making Rousseff the first female president of the country since its founding in 1822. She has joined the ranks of powerful female leaders in the region such as Argentina’s Cristina Fernández de Kirchner and Costa Rica’s Laura Chinchilla, and now presides over Latin America’s largest and most populous country. Brazilian expectations of her presidency are extremely elevated in the wake of the leadership of her popular political mentor and predecessor, former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who is known affectionately as “Lula” among many native Brazilians. To many within Brazil, Rousseff’s tenure will represent a continuation of da Silva’s time in office. Indeed, as a former advisor during Lula’s presidency, Rousseff does share his ideological
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Christiana Renfro ‘13 spirit. Da Silva, anointed by some as the “Bill Clinton of South America” and one of the most popular regional figures of the last few decades, raised the living standards of millions of impoverished Brazilians and elevated the country’s stature after years of stromg economic growth. Yet in order for Rousseff to truly distinguish herself, she will have to make a series of tough decisions unforeseen by those who expect her to be merely a continuation of her predecessor, particularly regarding how to address growing economic inequality and a foreign policy that allies with international pariah Iran. In her 62 years, Rousseff has led a life that has intrigued international spectators, perhaps for its reflection of the rapid political and economic evolution of her country. Born to a middle class family in 1947, Rousseff became involved as a teenager with a Marxist paramilitary group that robbed arms stockpiles in an attempt to fight the then-ruling military dicta-
American Foreign Policy
torship. After several years of participating in the organization, and a brief period of imprisonment, she trained as an economist and held bureaucratic positions within the government until 2003, when President da Silva appointed her as Minister of Mines and Energy, and later, as Chief of Staff. Since then, though she has been one of da Silva’s closest and most influential advisors, many Brazilians are unfamiliar with her as a political leader. Indeed, many Brazilian citizens were unsure of her political abilities even as they voted for her. The single greatest force behind her popularity was the support of the charismatic president. Rousseff was able to take advantage of this and ride on the wave of his supporters. As Brazilian sociologist Demétrio Magnoli commented, “[Da Silva] treated this campaign as a re-election campaign.” Indeed, one voter affirmed, “If it were only about experience I would never vote for her. But she has a good team behind her. Today the country is much better off because of the Lula government.” With time, Rousseff’s backing by supporters led on by Lula’s charisma will subside. When this happens, she will have a harder time achieving political success, especially given that many refer to her personality as aloof, brusque, and often intimidating. Additionally, her
Worker’s Party owes substantial political favors to several other parties within their coalition, and those factions may cash in on their political capital to the detriment of her own agenda. Domestic policy will undoubtedly be the top concern for Dilma Rousseff. Given Brazil’s simultaneously burgeoning economic potential and social inequality, there is no doubt that Rousseff faces a challenging task, as it will be difficult to follow da Silva’s impressive successes. Although he was derided by many as a leftist bent on instituting potentially damaging socialist economic reforms, da Silva exceeded the expectations of many by bringing the percentage of impoverished Brazilians down from 34% in 2002 to 23% in 2008 and lifting some 29 million of his countrymen from the working to the middle class in six years. Rousseff’s prospects will certainly benefit from the fact that Brazil suffered comparatively little and emerged relatively early from the recent financial crisis. The country currently maintains an annual growth rate of nearly 6.5% and is expected to become the world’s 5th largest economy by 2026. Along with Russia, India, and China, Brazil is part of “BRIC”, a widely-acknowledged group of fast growing and economically powerful developing nations. Even with its great economic potential, Brazil faces a series of challenges that Lula did not address during his tenure in office. Despite his efforts, Brazil remains one of the most socioeconomically unequal societies in the world. Much of the country’s wealth is located in the major coastal cities like São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, whereas the majority of central Brazil is still mired in poverty. Da Silva’s recent income redistribution program, La bolsa famila, is widely considered to have played a major role in lifting millions out of poverty, but new programs must be enacted in order to expand upon and monitor its progress. Furthermore, the nation’s taxation and pension systems, along with its union laws, are archaic and must be reformed to accommodate the rapidly growing new middle class. Perhaps most importantly, Brazil’s business regulations must be reformed, if not overhauled entirely. Brazil has some of the most arcane and restrictive requirements for new businesses in the world. The country ranks quite poorly, particularly in comparison to other BRIC nations, when it comes to ease of doing business, length of startup time, ease of getting credit, and ease of employing workers, according to a 2009 World Bank report. Additionally, Brazil now faces the obstacle of continuing the booming economic growth that is expected of a developing nation while implementing the “green”
South America
environmental reforms that are especially expected from the caretaker of over half of the Amazon rainforest. While Lula came to power in an era where economic growth was valued above all other priorities, Rousseff enters her office as Brazil becomes an established economic
“In the words of World Bank direction Maktar Dip, ‘Brazil is living in an exceptional moment.’”
power, with the heightened expectations that come with a more firmly entrenched global position. She must work within her party’s coalition in order to eliminate her country’s arcane business restrictions and provide the stimulus for the economic growth, something which she will most certainly need if she is to continue financing the welfare programs needed to deal with Brazil’s massive economic inequality. While domestic policy will be paramount, it would be dangerous for Rousseff to ignore the implications of the very bold foreign policy decisions Lula made during his tenure. Rousseff, it seems, is not concerned with establishing a reputation in diplomacy. According to former Brazilian ambassador Rubens Barbosa,
she “isn’t interested in international prestige; she doesn’t care if she is seen as a great world leader.” Yet in the final years of his tenure, Lula angered the international community by boldly brokering a uranium swap between Brazil, Turkey, and Iran, and by voting against a United Nations security council resolution to impose sanctions against Iran. Lula’s diplomatic leanings may make it impossible for his successor to push aside her country’s foreign affairs, as she will have to stem the fallout from Lula’s decisions to maintain relations with the western world while continuing to promote Brazilian interests abroad. These are difficult times for the presidentelect. At home, Rousseff faces economic and environmental problems that Lula swept aside during his term. Abroad, Rousseff carries with her the great responsibility of consolidating Brazil’s geopolitical position by clarifying the nation’s international outlook during her first few years in office. Faced with important domestic and international issues, Rousseff may be forced to focus on one at the expense of the other or else risk diluting the efficacy of her policies both at home and abroad. In the words of World Bank director Makhtar Diop, “Brazil is living in an exceptional moment.” To hold on to her country’s phenomenal streak, Rousseff must avoid simply maintaining the status quo of her predecessor, and also find the appropriate means to improve Brazil’s business environment and raise living standards while maintaining economic growth and expanding the nation’s influence worldwide. Afp Christiana may be reached at crenfro@princeton.edu
Rich and poor living side by side in São Paulo, Brazil. Photo from Wikimedia Commons.
January 2011
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Asia
The Seoul G-20 Summit How QE2 Poisoned the Well
W
hen President Obama left the country last November to attend the G-20 Summit in Seoul, the international community was anxiously anticipating a groundbreaking global strategy to address the current financial crisis. According to the G-20 Seoul Summit website, this meeting of the world’s 20 largest economies was convened to “take the necessary steps to reduce market volatility and move past the crisis, creating sustainable growth going forward.” South Korean President Lee-Myung Bak optimistically said that he had “high expectations for the expected outcome of the summit.” When news broke that the summit leaders decided to defer serious policy decisions to next year and to the IMF, however, the pundits who had themselves helped to raise expectations about the summit then proceed-
Chris Goodnow ’14
ed to criticize it mercilessly. The only tangible consensus was the need for greater consensus, and the summit produced few actionable solutions as to how the G-20 countries could and should lead the world out of the Great Recession. The question must be asked: Why did this heralded meeting fail so miserably? Unfortunately, the summit was doomed from the onset. This is because the U.S., while decrying Chinese currency policies, was also employing currency devaluation tactics of its own. While this “quantitative easing” is not only fiscally irresponsible and detrimental to global economic recovery, it also threatens the shaky foundation of trust between G-20 nations in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. Now, while the term “currency devaluation” has been prominent in the news, what does it exactly mean? Like all goods, currencies’ values are subject to the laws of supply
and demand. Chinese currency devaluation occurs when China purposefully prints more yuan to buy U.S. dollars and other currencies, thereby increasing the yuan’s supply in the market relative to others, decreasing the yuan’s value. This policy carries a potent drawback: as the yuan’s value decreases, the value of domestic Chinese savings also decreases. Therefore, many view currency devaluation as merely temporary. It leaves a country vulnerable to the caprices of the international market while rendering domestic consumers incapable of supporting their own economy. In an address to the G-20 countries, President Obama said that this current yuan devaluation was an “irritant” to the international community, and he forcefully called on China to end the policy. However, China has simply not budged. In light of QE2, the Federal Reserve’s recent decision to buy $600 billion of U.S. treasury bonds, China thought, reasonably, that the United States was devaluing its currency to obtain a marketable advantage. Even though Chinese devaluations are far more potent in scope and effect, the hypocrisy of the American position incited political rhetoric and unproductive fingerpointing. While many economists and financial experts agree that China’s yuan is substantially undervalued (by an estimated range of
Photo from Flickr.
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American Foreign Policy
20 to 40 percent), the U.S. can no longer force other states into submission. Since the global financial crisis occurred under an Americandominated economic system, much of the non-Western world, most predominantly China, now questions the free-market neoliberal agenda that American economic leadership entails. Obama’s “just trust us” mentality carries less weight than it would have in the 1990s. Furthermore, the perceived duplicity of President Obama’s argument will only worsen relations with the United States’ East Asian neighbor. While it is certainly true that stabilizing trade imbalances would help put the U.S. and global economies on firmer footing in the long run, the United States’ perceived hypocrisy and harsh rhetoric has rendered China unwilling to acquiesce to Washington’s demands. After such a long and public battle with the U.S. on currency valuation, China is extremely unlikely to embarrass itself by unilaterally giving in on the heels of America’s own QE2 policy. Therefore, given China’s imprisonment within the confines of power politics, the United States must assume the mantle of leadership and prove to the international community that it is the engine of economic stability. Unfortunately, while the U.S. is still the greatest economic and military power in the world, it has not been acting that way. With soaring debt and fiscal irresponsibility pervading the U.S. political system, it is understandable that China is not eager to follow the U.S. model. This is especially true with respect to the constant use of monetary policy in lieu of meaningful fiscal reform. QE2 is merely the latest of the Federal Reserve’s attempts to prop up the entire economy by printing ever increasing sums of money. While President Obama has claimed that QE2 was a necessary component of his plan to decrease interest rates, increase capital flows, and ease consumer pain in a recession, this artificial money pump is merely a temporary bandage to cover a gushing wound. While the Federal Reserve contends that QE2 will cause inflation of about 2 percent, independent estimations have that number as high as 5 percent, a dangerously high figure that could mire the U.S. in stagflation. The German finance minister has called the policy “clueless,” while Kevin Warsh, a Federal Reserve governor, identified “significant risks that bear careful monitoring.” As inflation increases, U.S. purchasing power decreases on the international stage, thereby reducing the stimulating effect of the Ameri-
Asia
can consumer. While U.S. exports may also increase, the world economy still revolves around the American consumer propping up global demand. Therefore, U.S. purchasing power must be augmented in order to promote global recovery, not weakened by quantitative easing policies. Furthermore, QE2 has put considerable pressure on other countries to devalue their currencies. To avoid massive foreign capital outflows, other countries may devaluate their currencies relative to the dollar. The United States could then justify further reciprocal devaluation, and the ensuing beggar-thyneighbor behavior would leave the global financial system riddled with inflation and uncertainty. Even if this scenario did not occur, the mere fear of it happening would be sufficient to hamper any economic growth, for economic expectations themselves affect economic outcomes. Therefore, as a preliminary step to reach any consensus with China, the U.S. must commit to fiscal austerity measures that prove it is serious about lasting economic stability, not temporary and unsustainable spurts of negligible growth. While this round of quantitative easing may have little net effect, it seems possible that the Federal Reserve could implement QE3 in the near future. This possibility is the cornerstone of China’s current trepidations and resulting noncompliance. By stopping the inflationary spending and bringing its deficits under control, the U.S. will have an adequate bargaining position to begin negotiations with China. The U.S. will be able to tout its reforms and require similar ones as reciprocation, thereby increasing trust and stability in the international economic system. President Obama was absolutely correct when he wrote to the G-20 leaders, “When all nations do their part—emerging no less than advanced, surplus no less than deficit— we all benefit from higher growth.” However, “all nations” must do their part, including the United States, for any one nation to move forward. Therefore, as the world’s greatest power, the United States cannot ask for international reform and then cower behind a failed system. Instead, it must lead the charge and then require reciprocation. The world economy cannot recover without the U.S., but the U.S. cannot recover without the world economy. Afp Chris may be reached at cgoodnow@princeton.edu
January 2011
AFP Quiz Multiple Choice Monthly Benjamin Cogan ‘12 1. For how many years was Tariq Aziz, former Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, sentenced to prison? a. 1 year b. 10 years c. 25 years d. 100 years 2. Which European Prime Minster recently resigned or was forced from office? a. Brian Cowen b. Silvio Berlusconi c. Georgios Papandreou d. José Sócrates 3. The government of which Middle Eastern country recently collapsed? a. Syria b. Jordan c. Egypt d. Lebanon 4. How many known people have died in the recent Australian floods? a. 25 b. 100 c. 250 d. 1000 5. The leader of which nation was forced to step down from his position after the widespread protests in his country? a. Tunisia b. Sudan c. Ivory Coast d. Canada
Answers on page 13
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A: Salman Taseer, the liberal
governor of Punjab province in PAKISTAN, is assassinated by his own bodyguards for supporting reform of the nation’s strict blasphemy laws.
G:
Controversy follows FIFA’s awarding of the 2022 World Cup to QATAR after complaints of shady backroom deals, as well as the moral and practical concerns posed by the nation’s strict anti-homosexuality laws and extreme summer heat.
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B:
C:
D:
Good news emerges from North Africa’s battle with the rising tide of Al-Qaeda as MOROCCO announces the break-up of a major cell in Western Sahara.
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of IRAN sparks widespread protests after sharply cutting the country’s traditionally high oil subsidies. Previously, consumers could purchase oil for roughly 40 cents per gallon.
Former oil tycoon and oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky is sentenced to fourteen more years in jail in RUSSIA on what are widely believed to be trumped-up charges pushed by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.
H: Hugo Chavez further in-
I: The fiercely contested presiden-
J: Years of painstaking diplomacy
creases his power in VENEZUELA as the outgoing legislature grants him decree powers for the next 18 months, giving him the upper hand over the less friendly incoming parliament.
American Foreign Policy
tial election in HAITI heads to a runoff even as a majority of losing candidates demands its annulment on charges of irregularities. International monitors were skeptical, saying the process was largely fair.
bear fruit as southern SUDAN finally holds a vote on whether to declare independence from the rest of the country. President Omar al-Bashir agrees to abide by the referendum, which appears likely to pass.
E: HUNGARY takes over the
European Union’s rotating presidency amidst growing criticism that its ruling Fidesz party is dangerously centralizing power, including over monetary policy.
K:
President Robert Mugabe of ZIMBABWE steps up crackdowns on journalists and opposition party leaders in preparation for upcoming elections, threatening the fragile power-sharing deal with rival Morgan Tsvangirai.
January 2011
F:
A brutal suicide bomb at a Christian church in EGYPT on New Year’s Eve draws a powerful response, with thousands of Muslims attending Mass in the aftermath of the bombing as a show of solidarity and to act as human shields against further bombs.
L:
CHINA announces its intention to further reduce the export of rare-earth metals, which it has a near monopoly on in the status quo, panicking businesses and governments that need them for a wide range of advanced electronics and military equipment.
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US Foreign Policy
Changing of the Guard Foreign Policy in an Age of Divided Government
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epublican leaders have consistently criticized President Obama’s efforts to move away from what he describes as the “misguided policies and impetuous actions” that characterized the Bush administration’s foreign policy. Until now, however, they were safely ensconced in the deep minority in Congress, giving the president free rein to conduct his foreign policy as he wished. With major Republican pickups in the midterm elections, this is no longer the case. While Republicans remain unable to significantly impact U.S. relations with other countries, primarily because the President wields the greatest power in terms of foreign policy as commander and chief, they do have sufficient inf luence to prevent some of Obama’s foreign policy initiatives. Republicans have demonstrated a willingness to use this power to advance what they view as the national interest; it is clear, however, that some of their opposition stems from their desire to tarnish the image of the President. They want the Republican base see the President as dangerous and the general public to see him as ineffective. Two issues that exemplify these often conf licting motivations are the START Treaty and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. If we examine the START treaty, it would seem that the Republicans oppose Obama’s initiatives for selfish political reasons; if we look at their stance on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, on the other hand, we see that their opposition stems from legitimate concerns. The recent near failure of the START treaty in the Senate provided an unfortunate preview of the next two years in American foreign policy. The treaty proposed that both the United States and Russia reduce their nuclear arms arsenals; specifically, it mandated
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Jeff Schwartz ‘14 a 30 percent reduction in warheads and a near 50 percent reduction in various nuclear launchers. Several aspects of this treaty drew praise from many military and foreign policy leaders outside the halls of Congress, including Republicans George H.W. Bush, Henry Kissinger, Condoleezza Rice, and Colin Powell. Nevertheless, it failed to garner the same level of support in the Senate, which needed to ratify it by a
“...a repeated failure to fund and ratify the President’s foreign policy initiatives ... will only weaken the United States abroad and hinder both sides’ ultimate objectives.”
two-thirds margin in order for it to go into effect, squeaking through with few votes to spare. Led by minority leader Mitch McConnell, Republican whip John Kyl, and former presidential candidate John McCain, many Senate Republicans feared the treaty would endanger the United States. They were supposedly wary of limiting American missile defense systems and reducing nuclear stockpiles while unable to ensure Russian compliance. Among those echoing these concerns were the emerging leaders of the Tea Party movement, who are commonly viewed as responsible for
American Foreign Policy
much of the anti-Obama enthusiasm that propelled the Republicans to political victory. Sarah Palin, Mitt Romney, Minnesota governor Tim Pawlenty, and others have emphasized what they see as the deleterious effects of the START treaty to U.S. national security: they believe it would hinder the U.S.’s ability to defend itself against nuclear powers other than Russia, even as the entire Republican foreign policy establishment disagreed. In many ways, the Senate Republicans’ opposition to START is even more astonishing than their opposition to other foreign policy initiatives that the Obama administration has set forth. In the recent vote over the treaty, Republican opposition could have gone beyond mere rhetoric and had tangible and direct implications on America’s relations abroad. The refusal of Republican Senate leaders to support such non-controversial legislation, similar to that of Republican icon Ronald Reagan himself, and their near success in uniting the Republican Senate behind this uncooperative mindset, seems to ref lect an unwillingness to forfeit ideological point scoring even when presented the opportunity to govern. Any further treaties that would give President Obama a major political victory are likely to face similar hurdles in the Senate. Since the Republican majority controls budget legislation in the House, Republicans can also effectively oppose the President’s initiatives regarding the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Republicans are skeptical of a two-state solution, and criticize the settlement freeze in the West Bank. In an extraordinary move, Republican majority leader elect Eric Cantor met with Prime Minister Netanyahu to assure him of the incoming Republican ‘check’ on Obama’s policy regarding both these issues. He even indicated his willingness to withhold the passage of the entire foreign operations budget to protect Israeli interests. Although unlikely to come to fruition, upcoming chairwoman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Representative Ileana RosLehtinen, supports cutting U.S. funding to the Palestinian Authority. She believes this to be essentially equivalent to refusing to fund those who condone
terrorist activities, yet it is a move that the president fears would only hinder our credibility in the Middle East peace process. But the Republican stance on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process is different than its position on START. In this case, they are perhaps right in proposing a fundamentally different approach to this complex issue, since all recent American presidents, including President Obama, have failed to achieve any sort of significant progress. Indeed, Obama faced a torrent of criticism from within the same establishment that praised the START treaty for his poor handling of the Israel-Palestinian peace process. Though there are undeniable risks in presenting a non-unified approach with respect to the Middle East, if the Republicans play their cards right they could do a lot of good in opening up the White House to new ideas and piercing the bubble that surrounds Obama’s foreign policy team. There are many other potential battlegrounds in the coming two years. While Republicans believe that issues like nuclear disarmament and humanitarian aid should be used to achieve other policy objectives, such as coercing
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Russia into cooperating with sanctions against Iranian nuclear development or wrangling political concessions from the Palestinians, the President believes these to be important objectives in their own right. This issue reflects conflicting philosophies regarding America’s role in the international community. Republicans base all their policy positions on the hope to restore America as superpower that uses military and political supremacy to protect its interests and values abroad. Democrats, on the other hand, wish to restore America’s role as the leader of international coalitions, as a leader that works toward consensus and compromise. With this fundamental conflict in agendas, it seems that the two parties will be in a perpetual political deadlock regarding foreign policy. While it is unlikely that Republicans will withdraw funding from the State Department or military over individual policy disputes, it is almost equally improbable that any significant advances will be made in either party’s direction for the next few years. One can only hope that some compromise between these contradictory ideologies can be achieved, perhaps in issues as
non-controversial as opposing Iranian nuclear development or North Korean military aggression. Certainly a repeated failure to fund and ratify the President’s foreign policy initiatives in the Republican Congress will only weaken the United States abroad and hinder both sides’ ultimate objectives. Afp
Jeff may be reached at jastwo@princeton.edu
AFP Quiz Answers Multiple Choice Monthly 1. C 2. A 3. D 4. A 5. A
Nancy Pelosi transitions power to a gleeful John Boehner. Photo from politico.com.
January 2011
13
Africa
The Unrest in Côte d’Ivoire And Why it Matters
L
Ben Foulon ‘14
ast November, Côte d’Ivoire held its first presidential election in ten years. It was supposed to help unify a country that had suffered through more than a decade of unrest and civil war. Instead, the election has done just the opposite. The current president, Laurent Gbagbo, nullified the victory—certified by independent international observers—of a longtime prominent opponent, Alassane Ouattara, and has vowed to stay in power by any means necessary, defying calls from the international community to step down. How the international community reacts to this flagrant abuse of power will have an impact throughout West Africa – a region only just beginning to emerge from civil war and political upheaval – and will speak volumes for how a rising Africa ranks as a global international issue in the 21st century. With President Gbagbo still commanding the loyalty of the military and Mr. Ouattara backed by the rebellious Northern provinces and the leader of the rebel New Forces militia, Gulliame Soro, Côte d’Ivoire is on the brink of renewed civil war. As one of the wealthier countries in West Africa and one of the largest sources of cocoa and coffee, instability in Côte d’Ivoire would have negative repercussions throughout Africa and the world.
The situation has been deteriorating rapidly since the results were announced in December. Hundreds have died in clashes between President Gbagbo’s and Mr. Ouattara’s forces and between police and unarmed protestors. Thousands more have fled to neighboring countries, some of which, like Liberia and Sierra Leone, have only just recently emerged from their own civil wars and whose stability remains fragile at best. Moreover, the prices of cocoa and other commodities have skyrocketed in light of the current unrest and the potential for future civil war. Currently, President Gbagbo has the advantage on the ground, with thousands of Ivorian troops confining Mr. Ouattara and his rival government in a small section of Abidijan, the nation’s largest city. Only a a small force of UN peacekeepers prevent Mr. Ouattara and several hundred of his trapped forces from being overwhelmed. But despite having his opponent surrounded and outgunned, President Gbagbo’s hold on power is growing increasingly tenuous. The international community has universally recognized Mr. Ouattara as the new president and has strongly condemned President Gbagbo’s heavy-handed actions. The Central Bank of the West African Monetary Union has denied President Gbagbo
Laurent Gbagbo striking a pose after the recent election. Photo from Flickr. An American information systems technician uses the intrusion detection system, which protects the
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American Foreign Policy
access to Côte d’Ivoire’s state funds, and the World Bank has frozen $800 million in expected financing, both of which threaten to starve President Gbagbo of enough cash to pay the military and other loyal officials. UN forces refused to leave the country after being ordered to do so by President Gbagbo, and the UN continues to supply and reinforce its contingent protecting Mr. Ouattara’s position in Abidjan. Now, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a regional economic group with a military arm, is threatening to send an intervention force to remove President Gbagbo from power. Moreover, the New Forces remain at large and are poised to make a move should President Gbagbo escalate the situation further. The international community likely hopes that faced with dwindling cash reserves and the possibility of ECOWAS or rebel attack, the Ivorian army will abandon President Gbagbo, which would force him to step down. But this outcome is not so clearcut. Past ECOWAS interventions in conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and elsewhere have not been decisive, often getting bogged down for years and caused significant collateral damage to property and civilians. Moreover, Nigeria, the most powerful member of ECOWAS, is nearing highly-charged elections of its own, and so may be reluctant to commit wholeheartedly to an intervention force. An ineffectual ECOWAS intervention would produce a long, drawn-out stalemate at best and, if it doesn’t cause a full-fledged civil war, would exacerbate the divisions with Côte d’Ivoire that led to civil war in the first place. The causes of Côte d’Ivoire’s troubles are rooted in the tensions between the rich, cocoa-growing, urban, Christian, and coastal southern regions and the poorer, Muslim, more rural, and more foreign northern regions. Throughout the late 1900s, Côte d’Ivoire experienced significant immigration, especially from neighboring West African countries, due to its economic prosperity from cocoa and coffee exports and the political stability imposed by longtime dictator Félix Houphouët-Boigny. The tensions between the “native” Ivorians and the immigrants (especially the Burkinabé from neighboring Burkina Faso) came to a head during the last elections, in 2000, when Mr. Ouattara was barred from running due to suspicions of his nationality. President Gbagbo, following a chaotic disputed
election, emerged as president. He did little to alleviate the ethnic tensions, which provoked a mutiny of hundreds of soldiers from the north across the country in 2002, leading to the formation of the New Forces and the beginning of civil war. Whatever the outcome of the current standoff, such tensions have been stoked again. The situation is further exacerbated by the current economic woes the country is suffering as a result of the standoff, with movement in and out of the country hampered. The greatest fear of ECOWAS countries is for another civil war to break out, as that would mean reduced trade with and more refugees from Côte d’Ivoire. In addition, Liberia and Sierra Leone in particular are worried that renewed civil war in Côte d’Ivoire could prove a haven for militants seeking to destabilize either country, both of which went through their own civil wars that only ended in the last decade. For West Africa, then, the situation in Côte d’Ivoire is a looming disaster, but also an opportunity to demonstrate resolve and solidarity on the world stage. West Africa will need real leadership to transcend shortterm considerations in order to collectively address a threat that will negatively impact all of the countries in the region. If it are able to make good on its word and send a sizeable, well-funded, and well-equipped ECOWAS force, it will be an impressive, even inspiring, culmination of a decade’s worth of progress in the region: to have gone from being awash in civil wars – with many countries even funding and arming rebels in neighboring countries – to being able to collectively police their own region. For the rest of the world, the situation in Côte d’Ivoire is an issue that must be addressed adequately to show that the international community, when acting collectively, still has the teeth to uphold its interests abroad. But if it wants to ensure success, the international community will have to take an additional sweeping measure: a boycott of Ivorian cocoa and possibly other exports. Taxing exports is how President Gbagbo is getting most of his revenue from at the moment. It would hurt world markets too, but it could prove the decisive blow to President Gbagbo’s finances. Perhaps then the threat of an ECOWAS invasion will be enough to strip President Gbagbo of his remaining supporters and avert a full-fledged civil war. Afp
Africa
In Context
Compiled by Matt Arons ‘13 “But in too many places, in too many ways, the region’s foundations are sinking into the sand. The new and dynamic Middle East that I have seen needs firmer ground if it is to take root and grow everywhere.”
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on reform in the Middle East
“We want a strong eurozone, we want it to sort out its problems, we won’t stand in its way, but we are neither joining the euro nor are we going to be drawn into fresh and new mechanisms within the euro.”
UK Prime Minister David Cameron on the future of the euro
“Queensland is reeling this morning from the worst natural disaster in our history and possibly in the history of our nation.”
Premier of Queensland, Australia Anna Bligh, on the aftermath of floods in the region
“When Iran thought there was a credible military option from the United States, they temporarily suspended their nuclear weapons program.”
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on the Iranian nuclear program
“You know the situation well. Let’s admit that there are very few successes in this direction.”
Russian PM Dmitry Medvedev on efforts to combat corruption in his country
“President Hu said that the test had absolutely nothing to do with my visit and had been a preplanned test. And that’s where we left it.”
Defense Secretary Robert Gates on the test flight of the new J-20 fighter jet during his visit to Beijing
“My sense is that Mexico’s response has been ineffective and not always prudent. We don’t sit in judgment given the immense challenges they face, but they can’t bring the violence under control and it affects the day-to-day freedom that the Mexican people experience.”
Arch Puddington, director of research at Freedom House, on Mexico’s low rankings in the organization’s “Freedom of the World” index
“I think there was an excess of optimism.”
Ericq Pierre, Haiti’s representative to the Inter-American Development Bank, on postearthquake reconstruction Sources: New York Times, Time, Reuters, Associated Press.
Ben may be reached at bfoulon@princeton.edu
January 2011
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Environmental Policy
Photo from Flickr.
A Better Way Circumventing the UNFCCC for Climate Progress
O
n December 10th, the 16th annual Conference of the Parties (COP 16) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) wrapped up in Cancun, Mexico. Much like its ballyhooed predecessor in Copenhagen, Denmark, COP 16 concluded with an international agreement that few claim will avert the looming climate crisis. The “Cancun Accord” made strides in combating forest degradation, funding sustainable infrastructure in developing and undeveloped nations, and establishing mechanisms for green technology transfer from rich to poor countries, but included only a legally nonbinding call for states to increase and uphold prior greenhouse emissions reduction pledges – an abject mitigation failure. Pundits have responded optimistically to the results of Cancun, citing the
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Bennett Bernstein ‘13 relative success of these multi-party negotiations so soon after the complete multilateral paralysis of COP 15. Some have suggested that the international community rely on the UNFCCC to produce comprehensive emission reductions as soon as COP 17 in December 2011. This faith is misplaced. COP 16 was able to achieve several of its aims because it focused on less contentious, lower profile objectives; few foreign heads of state even bothered to attend the conference. The complex, multilateral UNFCCC forum has proven effective for oft ignored constituencies like small island states and underdeveloped regions to air concerns. The layered bureaucracy of negotiations, however, has perversely stymied progress on the commission’s preeminent focus: emissions reductions. Rather than working solely through
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the thicket of the UNFCCC, the U.S. should pursue bilateral negotiations with the key parties – specifically, top emitters China, India, and the EU – and then return to the COP, with agreements in hand, to face global scrutiny and establish truly multilateral solutions. The parties that might suffer from future climate change are as diverse as they are numerous; offending polluters, however, are easily identified. Seven sovereignties, the U.S., EU, China, India, Canada, Russia, and Japan, produced nearly three quarters of global CO2 emissions in 2007, according the UNFCCC; sixty percent came from America, Europe, China, and India alone. Evident, too, is the future emissions landscape: non-Annex B Kyoto (developing) states surpassed developed ones in annual CO2 output in 2005 and their emissions share continues to grow. Rapidly industrializing China and India have seen their emission outputs grow an astounding 250 percent since 1990. Developing South Africa and Brazil, lightweight polluters today, will contribute the same emissions impact as Canada and Japan by 2040. Clearly, any new scheme to curtail anthropogenic emissions must include concessions from developing
and developed states alike. The trouble with past and present climate negotiations has been a collective action problem over the use of a common-pool resource, or CPR. With binding regulation absent, nation-states faced with a CPR (the atmosphere), which they can exploit for profit, opt to continue unencumbered CO2 emissions growth rather than cooperate. Each country refuses to hamstring itself unilaterally, instead waiting for assurances that others will limit emissions first. As collective action is central to fundamental climate problems, so has it been instrumental in early negotiations breakdowns. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol sought to address greenhouse buildups through emissions quotas for developed states only; these nations, receiving no guarantee that developing countries would abet such an effort by limiting their own growth, each refused to ratify the treaty or failed to meet their emissions guarantees. COP 15 faced a similar problem: with so large a cohort comprising each negotiating faction at the forum, agitator states were quick to fault opposition by raising failed obligations or regulatory asymmetries, and only trivial legislation advanced. Meanwhile, defector states continued to enjoy unencumbered economic growth. The swiftest means to end this climate gridlock is through bilateralism. If the U.S. cannot trust the collective to negotiate in decorous good faith, it must work with specific influential states, from across the pollution spectrum, to expedite an accord. By focusing on China, India and the EU in particular the US may streamline negotiations. Since these few actors contribute so greatly to the greenhouse crisis, they can circumvent the collective action shortfall by acknowledging their respective responsibilities and accordingly accepting regulation. The US should negotiate to this end bilaterally and through direct diplomatic channels, rather than via international institutional forums, to cut bureaucratic delay. America’s first focus for co-opting must be China. Responsible for 22.3 percent of global carbon output, China’s rapid economic expansion has have made it the most egregious emitter in the world. The 9.5 percent annual emissions growth of China’s huge industrial sector cannot be married with any initiative to limit anthropogenic carbon. It is not, however, unreasonable to assume that China would be receptive to a climate treaty, especially one that would restrict the developing with the developed
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(namely, America itself). China has shown itself capable of bold environmental rhetoric and aggressive action: days before COP 15, Beijing committed to reducing “carbon intensity” (carbon output per unit GDP) 40 to 45 percent by 2020, and China’s 34.6 billion dollar green investment sector, the largest in the G20, grew over 50 percent from 2008 to 2009. Similarly, India, which itself has pursued an ambitious pre-Copenhagen carbon
“America should proceed piecewise, starting from the top. By securing bilateral pacts from India and China ... the U.S. could all but guarantee that an agreement would hold up in a multilateral forum.” intensity pledge, would agree to a bilateral pact with western powers for both sides to cut emissions were it confident that China would not continue aggressive ‘dirty’ expansion at its expense. Smaller developed polluters like Japan, Russia, and Canada, and developing ones like South Africa and Brazil each refuse to hinder their own economies with carbon regulation until the others act. To wit, America itself rejected the Kyoto protocol and partially obstructed COP 15, refusing to commit to act without assurances from the developing world. Thus America should proceed piecewise, starting from the top. By securing bilateral pacts from India and China – roping in the largest and fastest growing polluters at the outset – the U.S. could all but guarantee that an agreement would hold up in a multilateral forum. Such treaties should stress mutual interest, featuring investment in each nation’s already sizable sustainable technology sectors to ameliorate inevitable businesses losses from carbon restriction.
January 2011
Negotiating with developing states, America must demand the concession of binding emissions ceilings, and not carbon intensity commitments to ensure that carbon reductions will be substantive and meaningful. In recompense, the developed world should offer to expand green financing for sustainable development in industrializing states, as has begun with the “Green Fund” from COP 16. America would need to domestically soften its harsh stance towards hard emissions caps, a reasonable development to expect in a scheme encompassing developing and developed polluters. With China and India in the fold, it is reasonable to assume that the EU would fall in line with an agreement: the economic union has already committed to reduce carbon emissions unilaterally by 20 percent from 1990s levels by 2020, even offering to increase reductions to 30 percent with similar commitments from the international community. Only once the key players are all in agreement ought an accord advance to the UNFCCC. A truly multinational conference like the COP is appropriate and necessary for smaller interest groupings to voice their objections to a potential accord – however, these parties must not be allowed to paralyze negotiations altogether, as at prior climate conferences. Climate change, being natural rather than humanistic in nature, is an intrinsically temporal phenomenon: human attitudes and positions may soften and coalesce over time, but the warming timetable is less forgiving. Progress is imperative. Finding a viable agreement must take priority over achieving a perfect one. The U.S. should look to the UNFCCC to formally legalize the next major global climate agreement, but it should not wait for the COP to decide the terms of the arrangement. Rather, it should pursue a series of bilateral treaties with influential high-volume polluters, and then bring those accords forward for international inspection. In this fashion, America can catalyze the creation of a tenable, balanced climate pact to credibly curtail anthropocentric greenhouse emissions. Afp
Bennett may be reached at bgbernst@princeton.edu
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US Foreign Policy
Photo from Wikicommons.
Is America at War with Islam? The Controversy over Park51
A
t a Ground Zero ceremony to honor the ninth anniversary of September 11th, President Obama took a detour from the traditionally commemorative rituals of prayer and mourning to address a threat to our country—the frightening, increasingly pertinent problem of Islamophobia. With a strong voice and assertive spirit, he conclusively maintained that, as Americans, “We are not, and never will be, at war with Islam.” Yet with the emerging dichotomy between American Muslims and their more radicalized counterparts, one must ask, does America agree with her president? Does she remember her principled foundations of justice and equality, that all men are endowed with unalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness? Or have these foundations been obscured by fear? The people of America, nevertheless, cannot allow themselves to be governed by fear, for it inevitably leads to intolerance, hatred, and bigotry.
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Cornelia Lluberes ‘14 In 2009, Feisal Rauf, the Imam of a mosque in New York’s financial district, and his wife, Daisy Khan, announced plans to construct an Islamic community center (commonly referred to as “Park51”) in Lower Manhattan. Although the building will be located two blocks away from the location of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the “Ground Zero controversy” has generated enormous tension among thousands of Americans and has enraged Muslims around the world. Opponents of the $100 million project argue that such a center will offend the families of the 3,000 people murdered in the devastating attacks on the World Trade Center. Former Republican vice presidential candidate Sarah Palin effectively embodies this opposition, demanding that the center be moved elsewhere out of sensitivity for the victims, labeling Park51 an “unnecessary provocation.” On the other hand, the project’s supporters, including New York City’s Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg, defend the
American Foreign Policy
construction of Park51, contending that the building will be no different from a YMCA or a Jewish community center, and will serve as “a symbol of America’s religious tolerance.” The particular nature of the 9/11 terrorist attacks makes the “Ground Zero controversy” a complicated one at best. To be sure, the sentiments of fear, honor, and patriotism surrounding September 11th are ones that should never be violated or defamed. It remains a day that will be forever memorialized in our hearts, woven into the fabric of America’s past, present, and future. In their endeavor to respect the victims’ families and preserve the sanctity of Ground Zero, the opponents of Park51 have a legitimate claim to their argument and thus have every right to vocalize their opinions. The real problem emerges, nevertheless, when Islam as a religion—as opposed to Al Qaeda as its distorted, largely extraneous affiliate—becomes a threat to these endeavors to preserve the sanctity of Ground Zero, when hatred and intolerance, instead of respect and sensitivity, become the root of our opposition to Park51. As President Obama declared on this year’s anniversary of the terrorist attacks, “It was not a religion that attacked
us that September day; it was Al Qaeda, a sorry band of men which perverts religion.” When those opponents of Park51, who have been persuaded and radicalized by Islamophobia, dogmatically render Islam a scapegoat, they distort their constitutional right to freedom of speech into a vehicle of hatred and aggression. Perhaps the most notable example of such radicalization is the Reverend Terry Jones. An evangelical pastor from Gainesville, Florida, Jones threatened to commemorate the anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and retaliate against the plans for Park51 by destroying, with members of his congregation, more than 200 copies of the Koran. Although his threats never materialized, Jones maintains that his “bonfire” has been merely “suspended.” Indeed, with the increasing feasibility of Rauf and Khan’s project, Jones believes that his intended desecration of an Islamic symbol is critical, even necessary, to preserve the sanctity of Ground Zero, declaring that, as an American and Christian, he holds an unequivocal right to burn the Koran. After hearing of Jones’s bonfire, General David Petraeus issued a public statement that “images of the burning Koran [will] undoubtedly be used by extremists…to inflame public opinion and incite violence.” Petraeus’s words proved to be true as Jones’ threats of Koran desecration fostered enormous friction here and across the Middle East, endangering innocent civilians and American soldiers alike. In Iraq, extremist gunmen, in response to Jones’ threats, stormed a church filled to capacity during a Sunday service, taking close to 100 hostages and killing at least 37. Nearly a week after the date of the proposed bonfire and the subsequent church raid, several Afghans in Kabul were killed in another protest involving the alleged Koran burnings. In light of its domestic and international repercussions, we as a country must consider whether Jones’s bonfire should be permitted. To be sure, the lives of hundreds of people have been adversely affected by Jones’s threats and other similar manifestations of Islamophobia. Although Jones continues to maintain that he holds an unequivocal right to burn the Koran, we cannot deny that the nature of a right significantly changes when its procurement compro-
US Foreign Policy
mises the lives or freedoms of other individuals. In the 1942 case, Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, the United States Supreme Court arrived at this very point,
“With every right comes responsibility. As Americans, we hold not only a natural claim to the rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, but also an obligation to protect and preserve them for all of our country’s people, regardless of race, gender, sexual orientation, or religion.” reasoning that certain “fighting words” fall outside the protection of the First Amendment. Words that do not constitute an “essential part of any exposition of ideas”—words “which by their very utterance inflict injury”—do not merit constitutional protection. In 1969 in Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Supreme Court confirmed this ruling, holding that the government can punish “inflammatory speech” when “it is directed to inciting” or “likely to incite lawless action.” Inarguably, the objective of Jones’s bonfire is to “inflict injury,” injury that will generate and nourish “lawless action.” Considering this, how can we, as a people who pride ourselves on ideals of freedom and equality, as a people whose very creed encourages us to adopt a more comprehensive outlook and overcome the fears that all too often pave the way for narrow-minded dogmatism, condone his actions? How can we permit such a demonstration of hatred and in-
January 2011
tolerance? In the Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson wrote, “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights…Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness.” Jefferson did not write these words with the hope that they would one day be obscured by ignorance or perverted by hatred and bigotry—or that such hatred and bigotry would be permitted by moderate observers. He wrote them to create a better world defined by respect, freedom, and mutuality. Ultimately, what Jones, his intransigent adherents, and, to a certain extent, all opponents of Park51 need to understand is that American citizenship entails a unique duality. With every right comes responsibility. As Americans, we hold not only a natural claim to the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, but also an obligation to protect and preserve them for all of our country’s people, regardless of race, gender, sexual orientation, or religion. Taking this into consideration, we should be protecting Rauf and Khan’s project, a project neither rooted in hateful sentiments nor insensitivity for the victims of September 11th, but rather in a dream to provide the Muslims of New York with a venue for celebrating their religion and culture. Whatever their opinions may be concerning the “Ground Zero controversy,” the people of America need to listen to their president and his words of wisdom: “Just as we condemn intolerance and extremism abroad, so will we stay true to our traditions here at home as a diverse and tolerant nation.” Indeed, the people of America need to realize that we are not at war with Islam. The people of America need to realize that we must protect the “unalienable rights” of all of our country’s citizens, and not the misconstrued, demoralized actions of hateful perpetrators of intolerance and bigotry. Afp
Cornelia may be reached at lluberes@princeton.edu
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Filled with Emotion?
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