american foreign policy March 2011
Volume X, Issue IV
From the Editor-in-Chief
AFP
Staff Editor-in-Chief Taman Narayan ‘13
Dear Readers,
Publisher Matthew Arons ‘13
We are in the midst of an exhilarating time in international affairs. After months of relative serenity, the wave of Arab protests against autocratic governments has captivated the entire world, earning daily front-page headlines from New York to Shanghai. What started with a frustrated fruit vendor setting himself on fire in Tunisia has spread like wildfire to encompass a wide swath of autocratic governments. Some, like Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, have already fallen. Others are brutally cracking down on their citizens, often with mercenary forces. Still others are desperately offering concessions to protestors, hoping to withstand the democratic wave. Like all democracy movements, these carry with them great uncertainty about the future and are subject to a whole host of differing interpretations. In recognition of the complexity of the geopolitical situation, this issue devotes a trio of articles to analyzing the ramifications of the protests thus far, with the full knowledge that fast-moving events could upend the status quo at any moment. Colleen McCullough argues that the protests reveal America’s flawed approach to the region for the past several decades. Dillon Smith sees more danger than opportunity, discussing the benefits that friendly Arab dictators have provided to the United States. Jeff Schwartz looks beyond the immediate protest sites and ponders whether the systemic uncertainty could actually aid the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Another pair of articles examines autocrats in Latin America who have escaped the news attention focused on their Middle Eastern counterparts. Neelay Patil turns his eye to Cuba, where recent moves by President Obama to weaken the embargo may chart a course forward for USCuban relations. Rohan Bhargava worries about Hugo Chávez’s recent political moves and calls for stronger US action. Completing our issue, SeongCheol Kim studies the aftermath of austerity measures across Europe and Ruey Hu points out pitfalls in China’s approach to investment in Africa. I hope you enjoy our most recent issue and have as much fun reading it as we did creating it.
Managing Editors Don Butterworth ‘13 Rachel Webb ‘14 Rohan Bhargava ‘14 Aaron Abelson Brendan Carroll Vishal Chanani Katherine Gaudyn Rachel Jackson Addie Lerner Zayn Siddique Eric Stern Kit Thayer Oliver Bloom Yun Chung Sweta Haldar Jim Hao Natalie Kim
Editors
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Charlie Metzger Jay Parikh Peter Wang Matt Arons Kristie Liao Jonathan Lin Andres Perez-Benzo Christiana Renfro Daniel Toker Emily VanderLinden Audrye Wong Sunny Jeon Adam Safadi
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Layout
Emily VanderLinden ‘13 Production Manager
Kim Hopewell Shreya Murthy Grace Ma
‘13 Adam Safadi ‘13 Jenna Weinstein ‘14
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Copy Editors Christina Henricks ‘13 Ben Kotopka ‘13 Sincerely, Taman Narayan Editor-in-Chief
Editors-in-Chief Emeriti Rush Doshi ‘11 Dan May ‘11 Ben Cogan ‘12
Business Staff
American Foreign Policy is a student-written, student-run publication based at Princeton University. It was founded in the wake of September 11th to provide Princeton students with a forum to discuss the difficult problems and choices facing the United States in the world. American Foreign Policy magazine is sponsored by the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies, and the James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions. No part of this publication should be construed to promote any pending legislation or to support any candidate for office. The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Woodrow Wilson School, the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies, the James Madison Program, Princeton University, or American Foreign Policy. AFP gladly accepts letters to the editor, article proposals, and donations, which are fully tax-deductible. All correspondence may be directed to: American Foreign Policy, 5406 Frist Center, Princeton, NJ 08544 afp@princeton.edu www.afpprinceton.com
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Kimberly Hopewell ‘13
Zara Mannan ‘13
AFP Advisory Board
Wolfgang Danspeckgruber: Director, Liechtenstein Institute for Self-Determination Robert P. George: Director, James Madison Program G. John Ikenberry: Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs Christina Paxson: Dean, Woodrow Wilson School
American Foreign Policy
A merican F oreign P olicy March 2011, Volume X, Issue IV
ta b l e o f co n t e n ts
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Egyptian Victory How the Protesters Proved America Wrong Colleen McCullough ‘12
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In Defense of Arab Dictators The Keys to Middle Eastern Stability Dillon Smith ‘14
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Israeli-Palestinian Peace An Unlikely Source of Hope Jeffrey Schwartz ‘14
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AFP Quiz
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Global Update
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Ending the Embargo Against Cuba Why Obama’s Baby Steps Aren’t Enough Neelay Patil ‘14
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A Dangerous Transition in Venezuela And Why the US Should Care Rohan Bhargava ‘14
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In Context
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The Politics of Austerity And Why it Matters SeongCheol Kim ‘14
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Chinese Investment in Africa A Dangerous Game Jiun-Ruey Hu ‘13
Taman Narayan ‘13
Rachel Webb ‘14
Don Butterworth ‘13
Photo Credits: Creative Commons images from Flickr
March 2011
Cover Image by Shreya Murthy ‘13
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Middle East
Egyptian Victory How the Protestors Proved America Wrong
T
he revolution in Egypt that began with protests on January 25th left 300 people dead. It also laid bare the consequences of America’s support for President Hosni Mubarak over the past 30 years. Though President Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton claim that they pressured Mubarak to end torture and allow free speech throughout his reign, America’s policy regarding Egypt has long consisted of staunchly backing the autocrat with little concern for human rights. This has been in large part due to fear that the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt’s Islamist group, might take over the country and impose its version of political Islam on Egyptian society. It will take months, maybe years, for Egypt to get back on its feet. But already the protesters have done more than simply topple the Mubarak regime; they have also dealt a serious blow to the motivations behind the United States’ meddlesome foreign policy. The lack of Islamist leadership in the protests shows that the United States has held false beliefs about support for the Muslim
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Colleen McCullough ‘12 Brotherhood because of Mubarak, a misunderstanding of Egyptian popular sentiment, and its own fear. This misconception about Egyptian citizens’ beliefs led to US support for yet another oppressive dictator, a mistake that has seriously weakened America’s position in the region. Founded in 1928 and banned 20 years later, the Muslim Brotherhood has long endorsed a harsh brand of Islam across the Muslim world while also providing basic services to the Egyptian people in areas where Mubarak’s government failed to do so. Until the protests in January, American officials seemed to think the Muslim Brotherhood commanded the support of the great majority of Egyptians. President Mubarak fueled this fear, as it helped him maintain leverage in negotiations with the United States. When President Bush’s rhetoric promoting democracy in the Middle East was running high in 2005, Mubarak allowed the Muslim Brotherhood to take 88 of Parliament’s 444 elected seats. The concession served as a warning to President Bush: advocating democracy
American Foreign Policy
Protestors gathering in Egypt. Photo from NY Times
in the Middle East will lead to the rise of Islamism. With the political and economic exhaustion that followed Iraq, Afghanistan, and the election results in Palestine, US advocacy for democracy in the Middle East seemed to be flagging, and in Egypt’s 2010 parliamentary elections, Mubarak’s National Democratic Party did not let the Brotherhood claim a single seat, which only served to reinforce the American sentiment that leaving Mubarak alone would prevent the rise of Islamism. But within Egypt, it was not at all obvious that the Muslim Brotherhood commanded as much support as the United States thought it did. For example, Kefaya, an alternative opposition group
“Contrary to expectations, the Muslim Brotherhood did not lead the recent protests; only weeks in did they finally attempt to piggyback on the youthfueled movement to press their own goals.”
founded in 2004, headed several major protests that posed a legitimate threat to the Mubarak government. Kefaya leaders repeatedly pleaded with Western powers to recognize that a moderate Egyptian government was an option, but to no avail. Even Western officials sympathetic to Kefaya’s arguments felt that its eventual fracturing over ideological differences was evidence that there was no moderate civil society possible in Egypt. The protest movement firmly discounts this theory. Contrary to almost all expectations, the Muslim Brotherhood did not lead the recent protests; only weeks in did it finally attempt to piggyback on the youthfueled movement to press its own goals. A variety of theories have attempted to explain this fact; some cynics argue that the protestors are feigning secularism in order to galvanize Western support. But this does not explain the throngs in Tahrir Square – over two million people on a given day – whom, all evidence suggests, are not following a hidden political strategy and are not directed by behindthe-scenes extremist leadership. While religious, protesters have adamantly chanted slogans of religious unity rather than division, even shouting down those who proclaim the time is ripe for Islamism. Furthermore, the major figures involved in the protest; such as Google executive Wael Ghonim and Nobel laureate Mohamed El-Baradei, are explicitly secular in their demands. It is foolish, naïve, and ultimately dangerous to assume that the Egyptian people will naturally support extremist Islamists for political office simply because they are devout Muslims themselves. Still, even those who recognize that the Brotherhood is unlikely to win office are wary that one of its main tenets—a firm opposition to Israel—will take hold in a new Egypt. The United States began its charitable contributions to Egypt’s military after the Camp David Accords in 1978, in which President Carter brokered an Egyptian alliance with Israel that endured both regional and domestic resentment. Before the Camp David Accords, Egypt had engaged in two wars with Israel, settling on the current 125-mile border. Egypt also shares a five-mile border with Gaza, which has been the site of recent controversy over arms smuggling into the Israeliblockaded region. Mubarak cooperated
Middle East
with US demands for stricter security in compliance with Israel’s blockade, and went along with the plan to bury an American-funded metal wall along the critical border. This sort of help, along with the steady maintenance of his nation’s peace treaty with Israel, made Mubarak very valuable to American interests. It is certainly true that the great majority of Egyptians – even those who don’t support the Muslim Brotherhood – are disgruntled, to say the least, with their government’s friendliness toward its northern neighbor and with the reputation the alliance has given Egypt throughout the Middle East. Israel’s popularity in the country is far lower than even the United States, which propped up a hated autocrat for 30 years. Still, notably, the protestors did not focus their criticism on Mubarak’s alliance with Israel. Attacking Israel seems to be a thing of the past, even for more conservative groups. Rather, they directed it at censorship, Mubarak’s brutality, and the lack of job opportunities. It is difficult to quantify the degree and scale of human rights violations in Egypt. The fear maintained by police violence has silenced many witnesses. Granted, the scale of violations does not compare to other regimes the United States has funded in the past few centuries. Mubarak was no Pinochet; in 2008, Amnesty International estimated that 20 people had died in Egypt as a consequence of torture. But numbers in cases of torture and unjust arrests are arguably not the relevant criterion, and comparison is not the relevant point; the brutality inflicted by the Egyptian police stomped out political opposition, religious expression, free speech, and fair trials.
America’s fear of Islamism has blinded it to all of these harms, greatly damaging its reputation in the region. Certainly, US aid cannot be blamed for Mubarak’s grip on power; it constituted only a small fraction of Egypt’s budget. US aid, however, was a symbol, both to the Egyptian people and to other Arab countries, that Western powers were more concerned over peace with Israel than they were with the human rights of eighty million Egyptians. US policy in Egypt made Bush’s “freedom agenda” look like a political gimmick, especially as the Bush administration used Egypt as a site for “rendition” of terrorist suspects. Preventing the rise of the Brotherhood made obsolete America’s purported strategy of winning hearts and minds in the region. The Muslim Brotherhood did not lead the eighteen days of protests in Egypt; by all accounts, the resistance was led by average Egyptians. Young and old, families and singles, Muslims, Christians, and secularists were all to be seen in the center of Tahrir Square, inspired by the successful “Jasmine Revolution” in Tunisia days before. If Egypt’s grassroots, nonIslamist movement can organize itself, it will reveal an embarrassing fact to the United States: The Muslim Brotherhood has not been the only alternative to a dictatorship. The United States bought Mubarak’s bluff, and now the protestors are calling it. It is only fitting that in the aftermath of the protests, Egyptians spent hours cleaning up trash from the streets of Cairo; the time has come for Egyptians to reclaim ownership of their country. Afp Colleen may be reached at cmccullo@princeton.edu
Campaign poster calling for Mubarka’s resignation. Photo from Flickr.com
March 2011
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Middle East
From the Left: Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali (Tunisia), Ali Abdullah Saleh (Yemen), Muammar Gaddafi (Libya), Hosni Mubarak (Egypt). Photo from Creative Commons
In Defense of Arab Dictators The Keys to Middle Eastern Stability
I
t is difficult not to be enthralled by the images of righteous resistance and gleeful triumph erupting from Tahrir Square and other heretofore obscure, dusty plazas across the Arab world. Yesterday, Tunis, Sana’a, and Amman were the oppressive lairs of unassailable and ruthless despotism. Today they are boiling cauldrons of democratic ferment, as the best ideals of our own American revolution echo from the broken pavement of central Cairo. A people famously silent before their political leaders have finally learned to roar, and democracy looks once again like a universal human aspiration rather than a deceitful device to co-opt smaller nations (such as Iraq) into our political orbit. While the protests began in Tunisia, they have spread like wildfire to Algeria, Jordan, Yemen, Syria, and even neighboring Iran. The dictators seem to be falling in step: first Tunisia’s Ben Ali, then Egypt’s Mubarak. Who could be next? Moreover, even if some of these dictators do not fall
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Dillon Smith ‘14 through revolution, they may fall through evolution, through a slow transition to democracy, as appears to be happening in Jordan and Yemen. However, if half a dozen Arab strongmen are swept from power, America may very well come to rue the day that Mohamed Bouazizi ignited both himself and this revolution, and pine instead for the days when Arabia was ruled by ruthless but reliable thugs. Simply put, a victory in the region for democracy and liberalism may be a disaster for American foreign policy, and we may soon wish we had come to the defense of our friends, the Arab dictators. First, even though democracy is nominally the objective of these revolutions, it will not necessarily be the result. Many observers in America held the same hopes for Iranian protesters seeking to oust the repressive American-backed Shah, yet the government that emerged was a brutal anti-Western theocracy that seized 400 American hostages and is today
American Foreign Policy
ruthlessly cracking down on protesters like its more distinctly autocratic counterparts. Nor is this the first popular revolution in modern Egyptian history. In 1952, an eerily similar revolt swept out another Western-backed dictator – King Farouk. That uprising similarly inspired other countries in the region to revolt. The result in Egypt was a brief period of semidemocracy, followed by nationalization of the Suez Canal, war with Britain and France, and an Egyptian alliance with Russia. Although we have high hopes for Egypt, we must remember that democracy is not an instinct; it is a learned habit. Civil service infrastructure and fair elections do not happen overnight. Even if democracy does succeed, we still may not be happy with the administrations that follow. One telling example is the Gaza Strip, which in 2006 had arguably the most free and fair elections in the Arab world, yet elected Hamas, an Islamist party that the US detests. To be clear, this does not mean that democracy would not be a better form of government for the Arab people than the dictators currently in place. Tunisia’s Zine El Abdine Ben Ali held down political opposition with sham elections for more
than 20 years, while his wife stole 1.5 tons of gold from the Central Bank before fleeing the country. Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak widely used torture and secret detention facilities and has kept Egypt in a state of emergency, suspending constitutional rights and giving security forces excessive power, for over 30 years. Yemen’s Ali Abdullah Saleh was a fervent supporter of Saddam Hussein, and had no qualms about waging a war against the northern Houthi tribe in 2004, killing more than 10,000 of his own citizens. Additionally, in a 2010 ranking of states by the freedom of their political and civil liberties by Freedom House, all but one of the 22 states in the Arab League are ranked “Not Free” (Morocco is “Partially Free”). Yet the now-crumbling Arab order has been a great American foreign policy success in dominating a critical part of the world. Over the last 40 years, the U.S. has brought to power, bought off, or twisted the arm of nearly every strongman in the region. This policy was so successful that up until now, the Southern Mediterranean, Red Sea, and Persian Gulf were mostly American lakes, where our interests were well-protected and enforced. In fact, the most untamed bits of shoreline on our
“A victory in the region for democracy and liberalism may be a disaster for American foreign policy.”
ponds (Iran, Somalia, Lebanon) became so because of America losing heart partway through various campaigns to suppress unruly local factions. A driving factor of the U.S.’s Middle East policy has been securing a stable and cheap supply of oil for the domestic market. The U.S. imports more than 70 percent of its oil, of which more than 40 percent comes from the Middle East alone; Algeria, Tunisia, and Saudi Arabia are all big suppliers. Egypt, on the other hand,
Middle East
does not have much oil, but it does have one of the most important geopolitical assets in the entire world – the Suez Canal. Thirty-five thousand ships pass through the canal each year, and so keeping it in reliably friendly hands is essential. After all, the last time Egypt had a republic under Gamal Nasser, Egypt nationalized the Canal, causing a worldwide crisis. Simply the threat of closing the Canal to Westernfriendly ships would be a nightmare, and a less reliable Egypt might threaten to do that for any number of reasons: if Israel bombs Iran’s nuclear plants, for example. If a more intransigent Egypt starts using Canal access as a political tool, the West’s energy security will be extremely vulnerable. Another focal point of our Middle East foreign policy has been maintaining peace between Israel and its neighbors. The U.S. has been a stalwart ally of Israel for the past 40 years, and has gone to great lengths to ensure that the country is stable. More specifically in the case of Egypt, the 1979 Peace Accords that forestalled all-out war were agreed upon precisely because the U.S. was able to bribe Egyptian President Anwar El-Sadat (to the tune of $38 billion worth of military aid over 20 years) into accepting the deal. Although one may balk at the cost, American control over our regional dictators has guaranteed peace between Israel and its neighbors, even though according to a 2006 government poll, 92 percent of Egyptians view Israel as an “enemy state.” Although an Egyptian democracy is unlikely to unilaterally declare war, it would likely maintain far rockier relations with Israel, and since Egypt has been the bulwark that has shielded Israel from the wrath of other Arab states, the loss of that reliable shield will likely be keenly felt by the Jewish state. A final critical focus of our foreign policy in the region has been antiterrorism. While operations in Iraq are winding down, counterterrorism efforts against al-Qaeda and similar groups remain in their early stages and will be fought for many years on multiple fronts. Close information sharing in this war between the CIA and its Saudi, Egyptian, and Yemeni counterparts is crucial to preventing another terrorist attack (the October 2010 attempted package-bombings were stopped after tips from Saudi and UAE intelligence). Another area of support is direct military operations; Yemen, for example, has become a new haven for al-Qaeda, and
March 2011
the U.S. government has spent much effort twisting the arm of the President, Ali Abdullah Saleh into using his military (and, according to unconfirmed reports, even U.S. Special Ops teams) to eliminate the terrorists. Unfortunately however, the multilateral alliance cobbled together to fight al-Qaeda is losing some of its local adherents, our dictator allies. Democratic
“We may soon pine for the good old days when the Middle East was controlled by our friends, the Arab dictators.”
Arab states will not want to provide nearly the same amount of support in intelligence sharing, military and operations, and the hosting of bases. As their help is essential to winning this war, this is deeply troubling. As admirers of democracy across the world stare in awe at the bravery of the patriots who held out in Tahrir Square, one can hope that the result will resemble the triumphant “color” revolutions in Eastern Europe that threw out post-communist dictators and swept in vibrant and stable democracies. Unfortunately, however, in a region with little experience in democracy, it is entirely possible that allied autocrats will be replaced by thugs unfriendly to the U.S., as was the case in Iran 30 years ago. Moreover, even if democracy does result from these volatile protests, as Gaza demonstrates, there is no guarantee that such a government will be friendly to U.S. interests. Either way, we may soon pine for the good old days when the region was reliably controlled by our friends, the Arab dictators. Afp Dillon Smith may be reached at dillons@princeton.edu
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Middle East israeli-palistinian peace:
An Unlikely Source of Hope
T
he Israeli-Palestinian peace process needed a game-changer. Ever since the establishment of the Jewish state of Israel in 1948, the seemingly irresolvable conflict between the Israeli state and the Palestinian people has led to turmoil and violence in the Middle East. The 60-plus-yearlong peace process between these two sides can be summarized as stagnant, with small concessions and moments of progress significantly mitigated by the unwavering mistrust and deeply embedded resentment shared by both sides. However, the recent political upheavals in Tunisia and Egypt have introduced instabilities across the volatile Middle East, and may ultimately provide the impetus for progress in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The traditional obstacles towards a lasting Israeli-Palestinian peace remain potent. As leaders on both sides lack the will or political capital to institute any significant reforms,
Jeffrey Schwartz ‘14
the result is many failed talks and indefinitely suspended summits. An ardent nationalist, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu believes any significant land forfeited by Israel is a step towards the complete destruction of his homeland - a destruction which he believes is the ultimate goal of the Palestinian people. For support, Netanyahu points to the immediate election of Hamas in 2005 upon Israel’s cession of the Gaza Strip. Hamas repudiates Israel’s right to exist and has strong terrorist affiliations. This election caused Israel to further doubt the willingness of the Palestinian people to offer legitimate concessions. It also cast doubt on the viability of their moderate President, Mahmoud Abbas, and his centrist Fatah party, who, compared to Hamas, hold much less power. Abbas’ perceived lack of power has prompted Israel to view negotiations with him as a mere formality and as a means of appeasing the international community, rather than a step
towards progress. For these reasons, Israelis and Palestinians seemed unlikely to even reach the negotiating table to begin to tackle the fundamental divides and issues which have plagued them for generations. However, the democratic revolts in Egypt have completely transformed this status quo, enabling and encouraging both sides to overcome these obstacles and legitimately engage one another in a substantive peace process. While the recent political turmoil and upheaval in Egypt - which resulted in the departure of President Hosni Mubarak on February 11 - seems to have hindered the efforts of moderates on both sides, it has actually created a level of political uncertainty and fear that represents the only plausible facilitator of peace between these factions. It is unclear whether the Egyptian military will honor the democratic wishes of the protest movement, and it is also unknown who will fill the power vacuum created by Mubarak’s departure (an issue that may not be truly resolved for years). Israeli leaders will recognize that Egypt, which was once one of their most dangerous and adamant military and political opponents, could regress to its former active effort to ensure the annihilation of the Jewish State. While Mubarak was neither a benevolent leader to his own people nor a strong ally of Israel’s, Netanyahu could safely assume that if Israel continued to honor the terms of their 1967 peace treaty, Egypt would do
Israeli commanders were outraged when two Iranian warships crossed the Suez Canal on Feb. 22.
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American Foreign Policy
the same. Although the Egyptian military has publicly expressed its support for the continuation of this treaty, there is no guarantee that the military will either remain in power or continue to honor its pledge. Recognizing the possibility that Israel could once again be facing a fierce enemy from the south will inspire a much greater sense of vulnerability in Netanyahu’s administration. Israel’s safety in the Middle East is already precarious, facing unceasing assault from terrorist organizations and the possibility that their largest sponsor, Iran, is in pursuit of nuclear weapons. Israel’s concern that Egypt will develop into yet another hostile, volatile and powerful enemy may cause even Netanyahu to recognize the prudence of arranging boundaries with the Palestinians. He may shift from his current delicate position of relative strength to avoid being forced to handle a militant Palestinian uprising sponsored by Egypt, Iran, and a myriad of other groups. While he may not now feel compelled to genuinely consider the serious efforts that Abbas has put forward towards reaching a peaceful settlement, there is a very realistic chance he might feel his position of leverage in the peace process weaken in coming months. For the Muslim Brotherhood, a once terroristaffiliated group in a position of considerable power in Egypt, to dominate Egyptian foreign policy is not necessary to cause such a change in Netanyahu - rather, the possibility of the Brotherhood doing so suffices. If the uncertainty caused by the Egyptian revolt is likely to create a change in Israel’s perspective on sincere concessions in the peace process, it will also impact the Palestinian perspective. Abbas’ government, like many across the Middle East, recognizes the strength and the contagious nature of such democratic reforms, and is also fully aware that if Mubarak’s iron-clad 30-year reign can be brought to an abrupt end, none are immune from a similar fate. This fear of a revolt across the Middle East, and the resulting shift in political dynamic, occurs at an ideal time for a moderate government. Abbas’ government was in danger of collapse prior to the events in Egypt. It recently suffered an extreme humiliation by the publication of the “Palestine papers,” a series of private memos and documents that suggested Abbas was willing to make far more severe concessions on territory, settlement, and Palestinian refugee status than ever previously indicated publicly. The offer of concessions, combined with Israel’s refusal to consider them, was a substantial humiliation for the government of Abbas. It was very plausible that prior to the Egyptian revolt, the moderate
Middle East
government of Abbas in the West Bank would be replaced by an extreme Hamas takeover by public demand. However, Abbas’ decision to call for democratic elections this coming September has changed everything. Also significant is Hamas’ unwillingness to participate in them; it is possible that Hamas recognizes it has little to gain compared to the pre-Egypt advantage it enjoyed. Hamas, by stating its unwavering refusal to participate in these upcoming elections, has portrayed itself as hostile to democracy, a decision that prior to the Egyptian revolts would have had few major consequences. However, if the Egyptian democratic wave does in fact spread to its neighbors in Gaza and the West Bank, the Palestinian people will crave a democratic process of their own and will be enraged by Hamas’ obstruction of such a progression in Palestinian politics. This could reverse public sentiment in favor of the moderate, somewhat more democratic government of Abbas. Such a result would strengthen Abbas’ hold in the Palestinian government and simultaneously weaken Hamas’ public support in Gaza, thus convincing the Israeli government that any arrangements reached with Abbas will translate into legitimate policy. This, combined with Israel’s new incentive to negotiate, may lead to a serious and potentially fruitful discussion between these two factions. The Israelis and Palestinians have a very long road ahead of them before achieving any significant peace. Even if the circumstances outlined above come to fruition in the manner described, they will only bring both parties to the table with sincere intention of negotiation; they will not suffice to solve the plethora of difficult issues surrounding the conflict. These include issues as complex and irresolvable as the borders of a Palestinian state; whether Israel should even recognize Palestine’s right to exist; the Palestinian claim to territory currently occupied by millions of Israeli citizens and Israel’s expansion of these settlements; the status of millions of Palestinian refugees; and the continuous acts of hatred and violence committed against Israeli citizens by Palestinian fundamentalists. And yet, in spite of these massive mountains that still need to be climbed, this is more than anyone could have hoped for a mere five weeks ago, and it demonstrates the potential of the volatility of Middle Eastern politics to promote peace in the region, rather than detract from it. Afp
AFP Quiz Multiple Choice Monthly Taman Narayan ‘13 1. From which country were over 2200 fossils recently stolen? a) South Africa b) Peru c) Russia d) Nicaragua 2. NASA’s Discovery space shuttle, which recently took off for the last time, made how many flights during its run? a) 23 b) 39 c) 10 d) 48 3. A major exhibition in Moscow compared Abraham Lincoln to which famous leader? a) Alexander II b) Peter the Great c) Vladimir Putin d) Josef Stalin 4. North Korea recently tried to purchase which animals to serve as sources of meat? a) Ostriches b) Wildebeests c) Llamas d) Giant rabbits 5. Muammar Gaddafi directly blamed which of these for the Libyan uprisings? a) Hallucinogens b) Hezbollah c) Christian extremists d) Canada
Answers on page 13
Jeffrey may be reached at jastwo@princeton.edu
March 2011
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A: Violent protests in LIBYA
against Muammar Gaddafi that have left thousands dead lead many nations to evacuate their citizens from the North African nation.
B:
Four Americans are fatally shot aboard their yacht off the coast of OMAN by pirates after a failed attempt by the U.S. Navy to rescue them. Over 50 pirate attacks have occurred since the beginning of 2011.
G: The government of ALGERIA H: Attempts to organize mass
declares an end to a 20-year-long state of emergency that restricted free speech and assembly in response to a wave of anti-government sentiment. Protestors demand the end of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s regime.
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protest in CHINA fizzle quickly, preceded by the dispatching of police forces and the filtering of Internet searches on “jasmine” and “Egypt.” Police reportedly detained lawyers and human rights activists a day before the planned protests.
American Foreign Policy
C:
D:
Julian Assange, facing extradition to SWEDEN on sex-crime charges, tells a Swedish newspaper that WikiLeaks is losing $600,000 a week, leading upstart whistle-blowing sites to vie for primacy.
Inspired by uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, opposition groups in CAMEROON call for the ousting of President Paul Biya. Later this year Biya will run for re-election after 30 years in office.
I: President Oman Al-Bashir of
J: Avoiding mention of domestic
SUDAN decides he will not run for re-election. A senior National Congress Party member announces that this decision is not related to unrest in Egypt or other parts of the region.
unrest, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of IRAN urges leaders of Middle Eastern nations to take into the account the opinions of their populations. Internet speed in Iran has reportedly been slowed in order to limit the organization of protests.
E: Students in VENEZUELA end
their 23-day hunger strike after reaching a deal with Huge Chavez’s government to release seven political prisoners and securing promises that other demands would be discussed at a roundtable with government officials.
K:
Evo Morales of BOLIVIA became the latest leader to suffer major political backlash after attempting to sharply reduce oil subsidies.
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F:
Interior Minister Roberto Maroni of ITALY expresses his fears that al-Qaeda would try to exploit the influx of migrants from North Africa in to Italy. More than a dozen Italian vessels are on patrol in the Mediterranean to prevent illegal immigration.
L:
In reaction to austerity measures, citizens in GREECE cover subway ticket machines, describing their actions as “total disobedience” in the face of governmental irresponsibility.
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US Foreign Policy ending the embargo against cuba:
Why Obama’s Baby Steps Are Not Enough
A
s the presidential election of 2012 approaches, more and more critics are deriding President Obama’s preelection vision of hope and change, targeting what they consider to be Obama’s naivete in foreign policy. This January, however, the president announced one significant foreign policy reform that he hopes will counter such criticism. In a memorandum entitled “Reaching Out to the Cuban People,” he detailed foreign policy changes between the United States and Cuba that will ease the fifty-year American embargo on Cuba. The three-part reform measure, which has gone largely unnoticed, attempts to create more contact with the citizens of Cuba, and the changes it implements are certainly admirable. As its failures over the past fifty years have shown, however, the embargo is a Cold War remnant of political tension that is hurting American industry, America’s reputation abroad, and most directly, the Cuban people. Analysis of the negative ramifications of the embargo reveals that President Obama should fully end the oppressive embargo and reconnect the United States with the Cuban citizenry. The economic embargo was first enacted in 1960 as the swift answer to communist President Fidel Castro’s seizure of American property in Cuba. Since then, every American president has maintained the embargo in some form, with a conditional promise to lift it when Cuba adopts a democratic system of government. Last year, President Obama ended restrictions on travel and cash remittances by family members of Cubans, but his newest move has forced politicians and citizens alike to reconsider the issue. Although Cuba is still not fully open to the public and businesses, the new policy aims “to enhance contact with the Cuban people and support civil society” by allowing approved licensed travelers for “purposeful travel.” Following the changes, a variety of groups can visit the communist state: religious organizations are now able to travel for mis-
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Neelay Patil ‘14 sionary purposes, academic institutions are able to sponsor study abroad programs, and cultural groups are encouraged to host conferences along with other forms of “educational exchange.” Additionally, reporters have been given more freedom to travel to Cuba for journalistic purposes. The new policy also allows remittances of $500 per quarter that can be sent by Americans to Cuban citizens (excluding senior Cuban government officials and members
“Increasing contact with the Cuban people is certainly not equivalent to accepting communism. Rather, it exposes Cubans to the democratic principles espoused by the United States...” of the Communist Party). The final part of the memorandum affects charter flights to Cuba, which had been previously restricted to Miami and a few other airports. Now, all international airports can apply for licenses allowing flights to Cuba for family members and others engaging in “purposeful travel.” The loosening of restrictions continues a series of recent improvements in AmericanCuban relations. Although Cuba is undoubtedly facing economic woes - 500,000 government workers were laid off last September - citizens are slowly approaching true political freedom. In February 2008, Fidel Castro resigned from his position as president of Cuba due to health reasons, and Cuba’s National Assembly selected his relatively moderate brother, Raul, as his successor. When taking office, Raul Castro suggested that Cuba may be headed “toward a
American Foreign Policy
more democratic society,” and Cuba is indeed showing signs of change. In 2009 Raul Castro offered to speak with President Obama, saying, “We have sent word to the U.S. government in private and in public that we are willing to discuss everything, human rights, freedom of the press, political prisoners, everything.” Citizens in Cuba are now allowed to own cell phones, and farmers can till their own land. Most recently, Cuba has been releasing political prisoners, some of whom had been sentenced to decades of imprisonment. The political buzz generated by the memorandum is to be expected, given that the embargo policy has been a part of American diplomacy for fifty years. Like most members of his party, Cornelius Mack (R-FL) had harsh feelings toward the president’s policy change, saying that the “dictatorship is one of the most brutal in the world. The U.S. economic embargo must remain in place until tyranny gives way to freedom and democracy.” In a statement that defied the Democratic party line, CubanAmerican Senator Robert Menendez (D-NJ) echoed the sentiments, calling the loosening of the embargo a “gift to the Castro brothers [that] will provide the regime with the additional resources it needs to sustain its failing economy.” Yet the changes are also receiving support from varied sources. Pepe Hernandez, head of the Cuban-American National Foundation, praised the shift for allowing impoverished Cubans to fight for economic independence from the Castro administration. Rev. Michael Kinnamon, speaking on behalf of the National Council of Churches, commended the move, saying, “We look forward to the day when the U. S. embargo of Cuba will be lifted completely.” Even some Republicans favor the change, including Senator Richard Lugar, who said last year that “the unilateral embargo on Cuba has failed to achieve its stated purpose of “bringing democracy to the Cuban people.” Those who still favor the use of the embargo see it as a way to pressure the communist regime of Cuba. The idea was that the embargo would inflict hunger and suffering among Cubans, weakening the regime and even spurring a revolt against the Castro regime. But Lugar is correct: the failed history of the embargo should disabuse us of this notion. Over the last five decades, American-Cuban relations have been characterized by stagnation and hostility. The country has certainly shown signs of hardship, but the Cuban people have not been able to organize and protest against the government. Instead, Fidel Castro was able to rule with an iron fist, before handing the presidency to his brother. Fidel Castro continues to issue regular
tirades in the newspaper Granma, which serves as the mouthpiece for the Cuban Communist Party. Clearly, the outdated embargo has served to strengthen the Castro regime, rather than create extreme instability. Perhaps most tragic has been the fate of the Cuban people, who continue to suffer economically, politically, and even emotionally: the nation has one of the highest suicide rates in the world. Although the president deserves praise for the diplomatic changes, they are not new. During the Carter and Clinton administrations, similar restrictions were lifted, but the changes were short-lived. Moreover, the embargo under the George W. Bush administration was very strictly enforced, effectively negating Clinton’s reforms. The recent changes loosen the restrictions, but the basic tenet of banned trade remains intact. American industries are still not permitted to engage in business with the communist nation. Although weakening the embargo is certainly a step in the right direction, the U.S. needs to take further steps to end the punitive policy. Increasing contact with the Cuban people is certainly not equivalent to accepting communism. Rather, it exposes Cubans to the democratic principles espoused by the United States and the benefits of capitalism. At the present time, Cubans are inundated with anti-American propaganda spewed by state-run media
US Foreign Policy
sources. Even though funds from America may indeed benefit the Cuban economy, it is time to let diplomacy show American support for the Cuban people. By abandoning the Cuban people, the United States is leaving them at the mercy of a communist regime that continues to retain power. Forming economic, academic, and cultural connections will allow the United States to introduce American ideas to Cubans in a peaceful and effective way. In addition to aiding the Cuban people, ending the embargo would strengthen America’s own economic interests and improve her reputation abroad. American businesses currently yearn for the untapped potential present in Cuba, and the opening of trade would help the United States assert dominance during a difficult economic time. Furthermore, the negative global consequences of the embargo would be curbed. Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez called the present embargo a “cruel and aggressive policy absolutely contrary to international law,” and much of the international community agrees; in October 2010, the United Nations voted to end the U.S. embargo for the 19th consecutive year, with 187 members voting against the embargo and the only two votes supporting the embargo from the United States and Israel. President Obama has taken a step in the right direction with his modification of the
embargo against Cuba, but it is simply not enough. In the current, relatively moderate Cuban political environment, ending the fifty-year-old embargo would give the Cuban people the American economic and cultural connection they sorely need. If Obama limits his actions to the superficial changes of Carter and Clinton, both the president and his policies may be gone in 2012. Relations between the United States and Cuba cannot afford to wait another fifty years. Afp
Neelay may be reached at npatil@princeton.edu
AFP Quiz Answers Multiple Choice Monthly 1. B 2. B 3. A 4. D 5. A
Back in 2003, Helen III became the first US cargo ship to dock in a Cuban port since 1962. Photo from Flicr.com
March 2011
13
South America
A Dangerous Transition in Venezuela And Why the US Should Care
V
Rohan Bhargava ‘14
enezuelan President Hugo Chavez has never been one to shy away from enacting divisive measures. Indeed, his presidency has been marked by a series of controversial decisions that have infuriated the United States and its allies. Recently, Chavez has been involved in numerous questionable political maneuvers, most of which have focused on consolidating his own power within the government and developing alliances with other anti-Western nations, most notably Iran and Russia. If the United States seeks to maintain diplomatic legitimacy in Latin America, it must take a stronger stance against Venezuela’s path toward autocracy. Originally an elected official, Chavez has gradually consolidated his power within the government, turning Venezuelan “democracy” into nothing more than a farce. In the elections held last September for the National Assembly (the governing body in Venezuela), a majority of Venezuelans voted for opposition candidates, but Chavez
and his allies somehow won 98 seats while the opposition won only 67. Furthermore, Chavez used the final few months of the outgoing legislature to limit the powers of the incoming assembly. Now, for instance, the assembly can be restricted to meeting as little as four days a month. Within the Assembly, elected officials have a reduced voice – speeches on any topic cannot be any longer than fifteen minutes per member. Chavez also managed to pass legislation that bars assembly members from switching parties—the punishment for which is relinquishing their seat—thus forcing those in his party to remain loyal to him. The centerpiece of his efforts, however, is a proposition that allows his government to rule by decree for eighteen months. Because of this law, Chavez gains the ability to pass any measure he wants regardless of what the opposition does, blatantly undermining any sort of democratic legitimacy he might try to claim. Furthermore, through his control of state media coverage, both print and television, Chavez can
Hugo Chavez at a UN speech. Photo from Gothamist
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American Foreign Policy
ensure that only government-approved propaganda is disseminated to the public. Such has become the power dynamic within Venezuela, with any outward appearances of democracy being stripped away. The Obama administration has responded with critical rhetoric. State Department spokesman Phillip Crowley told reporters that Chavez is finding “new and creative ways to justify autocratic powers.” He added, “What he is doing here, we believe, is subverting the will of the Venezuelan people.” Like the Bush administration, however, Obama has done very little to back up his words in Latin America, especially with regards to limiting the scope of Chavez’s power. President Bush, for his part, made a half-hearted attempt in 2007 to unite Latin American nations against Chavez, but the proposal fell through, allowing Chavez to continue consolidating his control over Venezuela’s government. For an administration that needs more legitimacy in its Latin American foreign policy dealings, these events present a perfect opportunity for the White House to take a firm stance against an illegitimate government, thereby augmenting its foreign policy capital. Several policy experts have suggested, for example, recalling the ambassador to Venezuela. Such action would go beyond the normal trading of barbs to make a powerful diplomatic statement. Still, simply taking unilateral action against Venezuela is not enough to diminish Chavez’s stronghold on power. An effective approach would be to work in conjunction with the Organization of American States (OAS). The OAS was founded as a conglomeration of the Western hemisphere’s thirty-four democracies with the goal of fostering interstate communication and advocating democracy within the region. Venezuela is a member of the OAS, and must therefore abide by the organization’s guidelines or face repercussions. The laws enacted by Chavez are in direct violation of the Inter-American Democratic Charter (IDC), passed by the OAS on September 11, 2001. Its intended purpose was to protect OAS member countries from unconstitutional alterations of a democracy. Articles three and four of the Charter outline the need to respect the separation of powers, the independence of the branches of government, and the freedom of press and expression. Venezuela has clearly violated these conventions. Furthermore, the IDC provides an avenue through which
member countries can punish the offending nation through a series of diplomatic measures. Article Twenty states that “in the event of an unconstitutional alteration” of the democratic order, member states have the right to “undertake the necessary diplomatic initiatives…to foster the restoration of democracy.” In discussions thus far, states have proposed launching a joint electoral task force to analyze the failings of the Venezuelan system, or even approving the expulsion of Venezuelan ambassadors from their respective countries. Although there has been some support for economic sanctions against Venezuela, enacting such barriers would be a grave mistake. Placing sanctions would only aggravate the meager living standards of Venezuelan citizens and create ill will toward the United States. Ultimately, this move would transform Chavez into a national hero and further augment his campaign for power, thus undermining any influence the Obama administration previously held. Therefore, a strong diplomatic stance condemning Chavez is the best option for the United States and its allies within the OAS. Given this, it is the obligation of the United States, as a member of the OAS, to invoke Article Twenty and lead the diplomatic initiative to collectively censure the Chavez regime. Action on the part of the United States not only would bring Chavez’s unconstitutional measures into the spotlight and initiate the much needed discussion on the condition of Venezuela’s apocryphal democracy, but also serve as an ideal situation for the Obama administration to launch their Latin American diplomacy on firm footing, transferring the focus from its relatively unpopular drug policy to the clear overreaching of Hugo Chavez. Too many Latin Americans view the United States as a nation that reneges on its promises to advocate democracy. Therefore, it is crucial that President Obama, acting in conjunction with the OAS, take measures to condemn Chavez for his unilateral takeover of the government in Venezuela. Doing this is vital to the long-term interests of the United States in Latin America, especially in terms of increasing its foreign policy capital and reassuming the mantle of leadership in the Western hemisphere. Afp
South America
In Context
Compiled by Don Butterworth ‘13 “We should have a policy of urging old friends to do better and replacing old enemies.” Senator Lindsay Graham, discussing the U.S. reaction to the Middle East uprising
“It’s realistic to say that within 10 years, China will be roughly the same size as the U.S. Economy.”
Economist Tom Miller, commenting on China’s recently assumed place as the second-largest world economy, ahead of Japan
“Magic microbes consumed maybe 10 percent of the total discharge; the rest of it we don’t know...there’s a lot of it out there.” Marine scientist Samantha Joye of the University of Georgia, contradicting recent reports of a quicker than expected cleanup of the BP oil spill
“This bill is not an exercise in accounting. It’s about changing our culture.”
UK Prime Minister David Cameron, commenting on proposed changes to decrease the cost of Briain’s welfare program
“My answer is clearly yes, it is a failure.” French President Nicholas Sarkozy, discussing multiculturalism as a national objective
“I had the chance to fabricate something to topple the regime.” Rafid Ahmed Alwan al-Janabi, Iraqi defector and former intelligence asset known as curveball, on his lack of regret for fabricating information on the possession of WMD’s by Saddam Hussein’s government
“I have always made it so that every woman feels, how should I say, special.” Silvio Berlusconi, Italian Prime Minister; Berlusconi is currently facing charges of corruption and criminal sexual misconduct
“We will need to produce as much food in the next 40 years as we have in the last 8,000.” Jason Clay of the World Wildlife Fund, on increasing global population
Rohan may be reached at rohanb@princeton.edu
Sources: New York Times, Time, Reuters, Associated Press.
March 2011
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Europe
negotiations. Predictably, the federal deficit rose by 129 percent in the first half of 2010, at which point the center-right coalition, in its quest to safeguard “business confidence,” responded by slashing public spending. The resulting austerity regime has led to circumstances in which pothole-ridden streets, dysfunctional rail lines, and empty communal treasuries are receiving national media attention. While overall economic growth has reached the highest rate (3.5 percent) since reunification,
“The justifications for austerity based on ‘economic necessity’ and the ‘there is no alternative’ line look increasingly absurd.” Photo from Europa.eu
The Politics of Austerity And the Response of the People SeongCheol Kim ‘14
A
s austerity programs across Europe begin to bite deep and hard, the potential for political backlash is immense – and electorates will have plenty of opportunities in 2011 to register their discontent. In Germany, where no fewer than seven state elections are scheduled for 2011, the “super election year” (Superwahljahr) is widely expected to catapult center-left coalitions back onto the political map in several states. In the UK, anticipation is building over a potential Liberal Democrat electoral collapse accompanied by Labor resurgence in Scotland and Wales. Due to the nature of the austerity cuts, however, this electoral backlash at a regional level is unlikely to have a meaningful impact. As a result, 2011 could very well lead to an intensification of the pro-
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tests and direct action that took form in the last several months. As electorates line up for one ballot after another, it remains unclear how regime change at either regional or local levels will translate into policy shifts – the noble aims of incoming regimes notwithstanding. How, for instance, do Social Democratic-Green state governments in Germany intend to fulfill their spending promises once they sweep to power? Austerity means that state and local governments must share the burden of spending cuts with the center-right federal government that initiated them. The latter has heavily slashed the flow of funds to the former, prompting grumblings even from states governed by the center-right hit hard by the cuts. Local governments across Germany are staring at a €9.8 bil-
American Foreign Policy
lion black hole, leaving already potholeridden roads and overflowing rail lines – let alone universities and childcare centers – severely threatened. Within the framework of austerity, then, there is simply too little money left for incoming center-left governments to enact their flagship policies, such as scrapping tuition fees and expanding the childcare infrastructure. In Germany’s North-Rhine Westphalia, the center-left minority government is already bogged down in a Constitutional Court battle after the center-right opposition alleged that debt increases in the 2010 state budget are unconstitutional. One could be forgiven for suspecting that the center-right regime in Berlin had planned the sequence of events out from the beginning. One of the first acts of the Christian Democratic-Free Democratic coalition was to enact substantial tax cuts for large businesses and hoteliers, among others, for which the coalition attracted accusations of “clientele politics.” At the time, many realized that tax cuts then would only translate into painful spending cuts later, sparking dissent even among Christian Democratic prime ministers that subsided only after backdoor
state and local governments remain paralyzed by federal cutbacks, hardly reaping a trickle from the vaunted boom. Even as popular discontent builds in the face of this gaping discrepancy, upcoming elections may not make much of a difference, because the apparatus of state and local government that the center-left hopes to steer has been left thoroughly sabotaged by a cut-happy center-right federal government. A somewhat parallel situation is developing in Britain. The ConservativeLiberal Democrat coalition differs from its Thatcherite predecessor in one fundamental sense. Thatcher sought to control spending-happy left-wing councils by regulating them with a heavy, centralizing hand (such as by capping local government spending and abolishing troublesome hotspots like the Greater London Council). The current government, by contrast, is handing local governments more powers at the same time that it is slashing the funds that they can work with. This is the meaning of the “Big Society”: the only sense in which local governments are being empowered by decentralization is that they are the
Europe
ones implementing massive spending cuts passed down from above. Pairing the cuts with decentralization provides a cover for the Con-Dem coalition, diffusing the political responsibility for the cuts while fostering the illusion of local democratic empowerment. If “we are all in this together,” as George Osborne insists, it is in the perversely narrow sense that Labor councils are increasingly sharing the unenviable purview of enforcing cuts passed in Westminster. The Con-Dem coalition claims that the outgoing Labor government cynically left the cupboard bare for posterity, as exemplified by Liam Byrne’s infamous note for his Treasury successor: “I’m afraid there is no money left – good luck!” Yet the Con-Dem coalition is sending this same message of scorched-earth cynicism to councils across the country. In the words of one journalist, massive cuts masquerading as “Big Society” localism are allowing the coalition to “localize the pain while decentralizing the blame.” Cuts to health and education, which lie within the purview of the invariably center-left Scottish and Welsh executives and, increasingly, local councils, will be particularly painful – for both the disaffected masses and the center-left opposition seeking to win them over. It was no coincidence that one of the earliest of the mass protests in fall 2010 was directed against the Labor-controlled council in Lewisham as it was about to pass millions of pounds of cuts. In a show of “Big Society” politicking at its finest, Tory and Liberal Democrat councilors voted against the Lewisham cuts, leaving Labour alone to face the wrath of local residents occupying the municipal center. What conclusions can be drawn from all this? For one, the justifications for austerity based on “economic necessity” and the “there is no alternative” line look increasingly absurd. As illuminated by the German case, austerity remains the result of a political choice by governments that prioritized certain interests over others, such as tax cuts for large businesses over funding for public infrastructure. Austerity for state and local governments continues while, in a different world, the German economy records the highest growth rates in two decades. Austerity has provided a framework for national governments pursuing this interest-based politics while passing down the human
March 2011
cost and political burden to lower levels of administration, leaving a resurgent center-left opposition immobilized by empty treasuries and redirecting the ire of a restless citizenry toward ineffectual center-left administrations. Within this framework, a string of center-left victories in regional elections in 2011 may well mean more of the same austerity enacted against a backdrop of diminishing public patience, except in the unlikely event that center-left administrations choose to take a more confrontational line. The memory of the ill-fated Liverpool City Council of the 1980s, which sparked massive intraLabor conflict with its attempt to pass a budget with deficit spending, might be lurking in the minds of some. Perhaps the wider implication will be the emergence of direct action as a logical political response to austerity. The Lewisham protest was a free-flowing expression of anger and impatience in the face of party politics’ failure to make a difference. As center-left administrations at regional and local levels become locked into the cuts agenda – whether it has more to do with the effectiveness of scorched-earth austerity or the lukewarm innards of center-left parties themselves – discontent citizens will look toward mass protests and strikes to give political expression to their discontent. In the past, mass outbursts of protest have occurred when a restless citizenry realized the gaping discrepancy between it and an ineffectual political society unable or unwilling to represent it. The aptly named Extra-parliamentary Opposition arose as a reaction to the condominium of 1960s parliamentary politics in Germany. The citizenry becomes politicized because the political world fails to play the political game for it; it is, in part, for the sake of democratic representation that citizens take politics into their own hands in these cases. If a string of center-left victories in 2011 fails to shift policy, direct action may increasingly arise as the most feasible political response to austerity. In fact, there may be no alternative. Afp
SeongCheol Kim may be reached at seongche@princeton.edu
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Asia
Jacob Zuma with Hu Jintao. Photo from Wikicommons
Chinese Investment in Africa A Dangerous Game
I
n February of this year, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi initiated a tour of five African countries by signing a $7.6 million aid grant to Zimbabwe. Yang’s trip came a year after similar visits last January to various African countries, including Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Algeria. These recent developments underscore China’s rapidly increasing influence on the African continent. Over the last decade, China has signed a string of multibillion-dollar deals to build highways, schools, hospitals, and other infrastructure in return for rights to African minerals and oil reserves. Sino-African bilateral trade topped $115 billion last year, and it continues to grow at a rate of 44 percent each year. Chinese aid to African countries has grown so much in recent years that it has already surpassed aid provided by the World Development Bank. Many African leaders have wel-
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Jiun-Ruey Hu ‘13 comed and hailed Chinese investment as a savior that, as Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe proclaimed during Yang’s visit, “demolishes colonialism.” African nations are happy to find an alternative to Western nations that have exercised unrivalled influence in the region since the fall of the Soviet Union. Despite the economic fruits of Chinese influence in Africa, however, Chinese leaders must consider the deeper problems with current investment practices. Local policies and attitudes that neglect worker welfare, crowd out employment, and collude with dictatorial regimes are fostering grassroots resentment that may undermine China’s ability to continue business with Africa in the long term. On the surface, China seems to be playing its cards well. The ChinaAfrica relationship is in many respects worlds away from colonialism. In contrast to European colonialists of the 19th and 20th centuries, China does
American Foreign Policy
not forcibly acquire resources from African nations, enslave local people, or artificially break apart populations by drawing territorial lines. China treats its African partners as diplomatic equals, with officials from Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi to Premier Wen Jiabao repeatedly stressing its “winwin” rhetoric of a partnership with “mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit.” In the face of lingering concerns, China has also been able to successfully deflect criticism, especially from the West, that China’s relations with Africa are characteristic of a neocolonialist relationship. Neocolonialism may refer to a form of contemporary economic imperialism, where powerful nations behave like colonial powers of imperialism in a post-colonial world. Critics point to China’s economic support of African regimes that violate human rights as evidence that China is leveraging its economic relationships to gain a political hold on the continent. The Chinese government has repeatedly rejected this view, asserting that human rights are relative to cultures and countries. While America has hardly been blameless on the issue of human
rights, China’s disregard for it is not so easily resolved. Self-interested Chinese policies and attitudes that show scarce concern for worker welfare have already generated resentment in local African communities. Many infrastructure deals signed by Chinese firms mandate that the majority of labor for the project must be Chinese, precluding Africans from fully benefitting from the inflow of Chinese investment. This deprives locals of jobs and fosters discontent, as workers cannot reap the expected benefits of the influx of new projects. Limited employment opportunities for African workers have also become synonymous with bad working conditions, low pay, or abusive practices. Managers exploiting the cheap labor available in African nations have reportedly dishonored pay contracts and prohibited unions and protests, both of which are actions that reveal a disregard for the rights of workers. In recent years, numerous examples of poor worker treatment have surfaced. Last year, Chinese coal mine managers in Sinazongwe, Zambia shot and wounded 11 of their local employees during a protest about pay and working conditions, putting Zambian politicians under intense public pressure to shut down the mine and arrest the managers. In 2007, the Nigerian government leased to China Nuclear International Uranium Corporation a tract of land belonging to ethnic Tuaregs, displacing the local Tuaregs without compensation. With preagreed stipulations on the division of labor, few jobs were available for the Tuaregs, and those available were described as hazardous and poorly paid. In addition to concerns over the protection of workers’ rights, China has partnered with corrupt governments eager to place foreign economic investment over the well-being of their people. On some occasions, Chinese corporations in Africa that have violated local labor laws have repeatedly ignored communication from regionally elected leaders because of existing relationships with the central government. For example, in 2005, an explosion due to unsafe working conditions in a Chinese copper mine in Chambishi, Zambia killed 46 workers. Zambian presi-
Asia
dent Rupiah Banda and the Ministry of Commerce, Trade, and Industry stood behind the Chinese corporation, leading trade unions, workers, politicians,
“China has partnered with corrupt governments eager to place foreign economic investments over the well-being of the people.” and ordinary Zambians to protest that President Banda was “taking sides” with the Chinese. In the long run, such a policy of disregard may trigger a political backlash. In the event that dictatorial governments are overthrown by their people, as has been seen in cases such as Egypt and Syria, China would be seen as an accomplice that helped to sustain and perpetuate the ruthless regimes. Ultimately, this complicity could prove counterproductive for Chinese interests in Africa. Dissatisfaction with China’s close ties to corrupt African authorities also extends to other countries in an international context. Because China grants aid packages with “no strings attached,” oppressive dictatorial regimes have been able to subvert and survive Western efforts to initiate political reform. While Western nations have attempted to pass a UN arms embargo on the Sudanese government to stop the genocide in Darfur, China has sold $24 million worth of arms and $57 million worth of vehicles and equipment to Sudan. In Zimbabwe, Western sanctions to bring about reform were likewise undermined by China’s support to President Robert Mugabe’s regime in the form of $200 million worth of military vehicles and equipment. Moral argument aside, the longterm political consequences of current
March 2011
Chinese investment practices in Africa will also be adverse. Already, signs of malcontent indicate that China needs to change its ways if it is to sustain its investment interests in Africa. In 2006, an opposition presidential candidate in Zambia ran his campaign on the idea of “Zambia for Zambians,” a platform in favor of expelling Chinese influence from the country. The disconnect between the official Chinese government rhetoric of “win-win” agreements and local realities will only entrench and perpetuate distrust of the Chinese. It will not take long for the common public to see through the veiled Chinese rhetoric of win-win situations that belies its real quest for natural resources and political control. China’s support of these rogue governments will inevitably harm its reputation on the global stage, reduce its credibility in international affairs, and degrade relations with its neighbors. While China’s relationship with the countries of Africa may not strictly not qualify as neocolonialism, there are critical problems in the way it deals with local populations that alienates them and generates resentment. In order to maintain its international credibility and support with local populations, China should discontinue supporting dictatorial regimes that overtly repress their people, especially in terms of the sale of military weapons and equipment. At the local level, China should encourage or mandate Chinese firms working in Africa to hire more local labor, improve working conditions, and respect local laws. It is ultimately in China’s own interest to review its involvement in Africa in order to sustain its economic growth and maintain its international credibility. If China fails to recognize these mistakes, it will ultimately find itself in the same position as America, grappling with its own brand of anti-Americanism. Afp
Jiun-Ruey Hu may be reached at rueyhu@princeton.edu
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