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Decolonisation and the Changing Political Geography of Southeast Asia Transforming Higher Education to Meet Future Challenges: The Experiences of NUS— Interview with Professor Tan Eng Chye
Bence Kocsev
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CONCEPTUALISING SOUTHEAST ASIA
In his comprehensive book, Daniel George Edward Hall, a distinguished expert of Southeast Asia, described the region as a “chaos of races and languages,” and it is true that this part of the world is exceptionally diverse in many regards (ethnically, culturally, linguistically, politically, religiously, geographically, and even ecologically) and has a complex and multilayered history.1 Despite this diversity, in the (so far) only monograph written in Hungarian on the history of Southeast Asia, András Balogh managed to identify certain historical, political, and economic factors that could be considered as the common heritage of the region. Among others, their traditional economies featured similar structures, and, later they all became part of the global colonial trading networks. From very early on, they possessed a certain degree of statehood; they developed characteristic cultural traditions that synthesised Buddhist, Hindu, Chinese, and Muslim elements; with the Mongol–Chinese and, later, European conquests, they share the common historical experience of colonial subjugation; and the humiliating defeat of the traditional colonial powers by Japan in World War II galvanised irreversible processes throughout the area, which led to the independence of these territories.2
One of the things that become evident from these similarities is how entangled the history of the region is with other world regions. Interestingly enough, despite the common features and its various global entanglements, the region was not regarded as an independent entity for a very long time. In fact, up until World War II, it was almost unable to develop an identity on its own, and only a few scholars and geopoliticians conceptualised it as a separate region with its own characteristics. Although a few attempts had been made to conceptualise Southeast Asia as a separate region since the 19th century, based on its distinct social and cultural character,3 it was not until the establishment of the so-called South East Asia Command under the leadership of Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten in 1943 that the term “Southeast Asia” gained widespread recognition.4 The new international geopolitical architecture that emerged in the direct aftermath of the war (and the admission of Southeast Asia into it) facilitated the foundation of a mushrooming number of new institutes and scientific boards embarking on research projects intended to transform the image of the region into a separate spatial–political–economic entity. Obviously, this newly found interest in the region was substantially stimulated by the new constellations that emerged at the moment of widespread decolonisation in the 1940s and 1950s, and— most importantly in this regard—by the fact that Southeast Asia was perceived to be an area where the communist threat emerging either from the Soviet Union or China should be contained.
THE PROCESSES OF DECOLONISATION IN THE REGION
To be sure, the region has played an important geopolitical role long before the Cold War. The water passages between the Indian and Pacific Oceans (most notably the Strait of Malacca and the Sunda Strait) and the continental crossroads were vital for shaping global commerce. Thus, Europeans have shown great interest in Southeast Asia where their enterprises engaged in commerce, such as the Dutch East Indies Company or its French and English counterparts, could quickly transform into global players. Therefore, possessions in Southeast Asia served
NEPAL
BHUTAN
INDIA BANGLADESH
MYANMAR (BURMA)
1948
CHINA
LAOS 1954
THAILAND VIETNAM
1954
CAMBODIA
1954
PHILIPPINES
1946
MALAYSIA
1957
BRUNEI
1984
SINGAPORE
1965 INDONESIA The European colonisation and dates of independence in Southeast Asia 1949 France (French Indochina) Netherlands (Dutch East Indies) Portugal (Portuguese Timor) Spain (Spanish East Indies) / US from 1898 United Kingdom (British Burma, Malaya and Borneo) Continuously independent
EAST TIMOR
1975/2002
as strategic bridgeheads (both militarily and commercially) for various global colonial projects ever since Afonso de Albuquerque had conquered Malacca in 1511. While, initially, European expansion focussed on ports to maintain a broad web of international commercial relations, by the turn of the 20th century, the great majority of Southeast Asia had been under direct or indirect colonial rule, with Siam (from 1939, Thailand) being the only exception that has never been (formally) colonised by any European country.5 World War II and the short Japanese occupation (1942–1945) that served as a catalyst to Southeast Asian nationalist movements were arguably a watershed in this regard, which commenced the gradual collapse of the imperial order in the region.6
It is nonetheless difficult to exactly determine the date of independence in many of these countries. Although the declaration of independence took place almost everywhere during the last days of the war, this was not always accepted by the European colonial powers and the local political forces allied to them. As colonial powers sought to maintain a slightly modified status quo ante bellum in the territories they possessed, the de facto independence was usually delayed until national liberation struggles had managed to sweep the reluctant Europeans out of the region. For instance, while Sukarno (the leader of the Indonesian independence movement and the first president of Indonesia) unilaterally proclaimed the independence of Indonesia already in the morning of 17 August 1945, it took four years, many interim agreements (the Linggadjati, the Renville, and the Roem–Van Roijen Agreements), and a bloody conflict until
the Dutch government agreed to transfer sovereignty to Indonesia as a result of the Dutch–Indonesian Round Table Conference in 1949. Regardless of the four-year-long hostilities, the country celebrates its Independence Day in August to commemorate the Proklamasi of 1945. In the Philippines, on the other hand, independence is generally indicated even with three different dates. One is the independence they received from the Japanese, and the other is the day when the US, keeping its previous promise, awarded independence to the country in 1946. Nevertheless, currently, the country celebrates its Independence Day on 12 June, which marks the nation’s independence from Spain in 1898.7
The successes of the independence movements in the region were closely tied to global changes like the rise of the US, the victory of communism in China, or to processes of decolonisation elsewhere. Domestic political changes in France, England, Portugal, or the Netherlands substantially affected these struggles, as well. Therefore, whilst some of the countries such as the Philippines or Malaysia gained independence without any or minimal military efforts, others such as Indonesia or the French colonies in Indochina had to wage a war of liberation against their colonisers. Eventually, the first country that gained independence in the region was the Philippines which separated from the US and became an independent nation in 1946. Burma (present-day Myanmar), which was part of the British Raj for decades before becoming a colonial unit on its own, was next in line to achieve independence in 1948. The former Dutch East Indies, which comprised four main islands (Java, Sumatra, Borneo, and Celebes) and thousands of small ones, gained independence like Indonesia in 1949. The French possessions, Cambodia and Laos, became independent kingdoms in 1953, while
Member states of MAPHILINDO created in 1963
NEPAL
BHUTAN
INDIA BANGLADESH
MYANMAR (BURMA) CHINA
LAOS
THAILAND VIETNAM
CAMBODIA PHILIPPINES
Member states
Non-acceding countries
MALAYSIA
SINGAPORE BRUNEI
INDONESIA
EAST TIMOR
Vietnam fought a ten-year war and achieved independence after the decisive victory on the French in Ðiê . n Biên Phu and as a result of the following Geneva Conference in 1954. The resolutions of the settlement conference, especially the one that divided the country roughly along the 17th parallel into North Vietnam and South Vietnam, had, however, wide repercussions. The former British Malaya pursued a negotiated independence in 1957, and, with the incorporation of North Borneo, Sarawak, and Singapore, it formed the Malay Federation in 1963. (Due to political and economic differences, Singapore left the federation two years later and became a separate republic.) Brunei, which had also been invited to join the Malay Federation, chose a different path and remained a British protectorate for many decades and was granted independence as late as in 1984. Portuguese Timor (current East Timor) had remained under colonial rule until the Carnation Revolution and had a brief independent period before it was invaded by the neighbouring Indonesia in 1975 under the slogan of eliminating the communist threat in the newly independent country. Indonesia eventually relinquished East Timor at the end of the 1990s and its independence was fully restored in 2002.
THE SHIFTING POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF SOUTHEAST ASIA DURING AND AFTER THE COLD WAR
After independence was achieved, tensions were rife in many of the newly established countries. Within the new postcolonial political framework, a number of problems emerged and, for decades, intraregional conflicts, civil and proxy wars, religious and political insurgencies seem to have been the defining features of the region. Being results of a combination of factors, including traditional disputes and previous (colonial) political agreements, the borders of the new states led to particular disagreements, rivalries, and conflicts. In the 1960s, Sukarno, for example, tried to jeopardise the merger of the Federation of Malaya with North Borneo, Sarawak, and Singapore and, thus, the formation of the Malay Federation, which he considered a neocolonial conspiracy, with his aggressive confrontation policy (Konfrontasi).8 This Malay–Indonesian conflict was further complicated by territorial disputes between Malaysia and the Philippines, which led to the breakdown of diplomatic relations between the two countries. At the peak of the confrontation, Sukarno, for his part, took another diplomatic step and even threatened to withdraw Indonesia from the United Nations if Malaysia would take a seat in the Security Council. Declaring that he was going to crush Malaysia, the Indonesian president announced his Ganyang Malaysia campaign which went beyond diplomatic and propaganda actions and escalated in smallscale cross-border raids in Borneo. Eventually, the tensions between the two countries came to a settlement with the removal of Sukarno by General Suharto whose New Order (Orde Baru) sought to maintain a friendlier policy towards neighbouring countries and was committed to restore good relations with Western powers. Apparently, the normalisation of Indonesian–Malaysian relations played a major role in the integration of the region and paved the way for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
Neighbourly relations in certain parts of the region were, for a long time, far from friendly, but, in addition to border disputes, other issues also continued to be sources of regional instability. Among others, governments of the newly independent countries had to face internal political challenges posed by ethnic or religious separatism, too. The distinct ethnic and religious identities that were constructed during the colonial times (and the political borders that sometimes separated them) proved to be particularly problematic after the state had gained independence and speeded up certain centrifugal tendencies. Consequently, during the first years of independence, the most difficult problem was to regulate interethnic relations in many of the countries. In this regard, the application of the uti possidetis principle (according to which newly found sovereign states should retain the internal borders that their preceding dependent area had before their
independence) provided fertile grounds for ethno-religious conflicts and led to the formation of a variety of secessionist movements or conflicts. With repercussion still apparent today, the Rohingya conflict, among others, is one of the long-lasting consequences of the application of this principle. On the other hand, the Indonesian claim to incorporate Western New Guinea (Irina Jaya) that remained under Dutch control until 1962 was based on the same principle.
The fragile unity of the new states was fractured in many other ways. On the one hand, the proliferation of the various Islamic radical movements, having their roots in the colonial era and gaining momentum in the aftermath of the newly attained independence, substantially affected the stability of the new countries. (Besides, they also provided reinforcement for international terrorist networks.) In order to maintain the unity of the state, governments have been coping with Islamic insurgencies of varying intensity in southern Thailand, in the Moro region of the Philippines, or in various parts of Indonesia (most notably in Aceh) since their countries gained independence. On the other hand, secessionist movements, other than religious separatism, also emerged in the aftermath of the colonial era. Interestingly, in a way, the early Moluccan secessionists, who claimed sovereignty on the island of Ambon and on some neighbouring islands in the Banda Sea, even affected the internal politics of the former (Dutch) colonial power for decades.
Obviously, the dynamics of the Cold War further exacerbated the fragile situation and substantially shaped the events in the region, as many of the conflicts escalated against the background of this global rivalry. In this respect, Southeast Asia, which has a long history of being a space for contesting imperial projects, yet again became a region where these conflicts would unfold. The rise of Mao’s China and its growing influence in the region, the massive Soviet aid for newly independent countries and for independence movements seeking to gain control in various countries shifted the foreign policy of the US more and more towards the region.9 Henceforth, the Americans did not only support the French efforts to reconquer Indochina but backed the British in Malaya and, initially, the Dutch to regain control over the Indonesian archipelago. As Southeast Asia was declared an important area for the containment of communism after the communist victory in China, the US concluded security treaties with the countries of the region either on a bilateral or on a multilateral basis (for the latter, the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization is a case in point).10
Being played out in the framework of the Cold War rivalry, the events in Indochina attracted close global attention. Besides the decadeslong military conflict in Vietnam (but also closely related to it), the civil wars in Cambodia and Laos also gained worldwide notoriety. Most notably, the seizure of power by Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge, their extremely brutal and radical regime, shocked the international public in particular. As part of the general communist victory in the region, the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (emerged from the communist movement, Pathet Lao) assumed political power and declared a people’s republic in Laos in the same year, 1975, when North Vietnamese forces occupied Saigon and the Khmer Rouge seized Phom Penh. Whereas communist movements were also active in other parts of the region and joined forces with other political parties to achieve independence, they could never acquire enough popular support to seize power.11 Here, it is also worthy to note that, within the communist “hemisphere,” and this holds especially true in the wake of the ideological rivalry between the Soviets and Chinese, Southeast Asian communists tended to side with China.
From very early on, however, the circumstances of the intensifying global Cold War and its impact on the struggles for decolonisation prompted many anticolonial leaders to rethink the terms of their engagement with the international system. While positioning themselves within the framework of the global Cold War, most of the newborn states were rather reluctant to join the military or economic alliances of any of the
■ Member states ■ Colonies of member states ■ Protocol states
superpowers. Convened by Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia, India, and Pakistan, in 1955, leaders from almost thirty newly independent states, along with observers from national liberation movements throughout the colonial world, gathered for a conference in Bandung, Indonesia. This was the grand opening event of a postcolonial movement that sought to create a separate international space free from any hegemonic pressures and upholding the principle of this ideological neutrality and cooperation—and it also influenced the way the later Southeast Asian cooperation, the Association of South East Asian Nations, functions and positions itself within the international system.
In addition to deciding on the political system and, thus, on the international orientation, the new states of Southeast Asia also had to choose the economic course they would follow. The economy of the region, profoundly damaged in the Great Depression, in World War II, and, in many cases, during the consecutive liberation struggles, was in a dreary condition. While, in the early period, the colonial model was pursued, i.e., national economies mainly focussed on increasing the export of agricultural products and raw materials, based on the various experiences deriving from the different loyalties, under the condition of the Cold War, countries of the region started to follow different paths to modernise their economies. In this regard, it is important to note that Southeast Asian nations did have a certain amount of agency, and, thus, they neither directly followed the Soviet or Chinese course nor the western capitalist path. In fact, they developed their modus vivendi to put either the planned economic or the free trade capitalist principles into practice. While in certain parts of the region greater social and political stability contributed to greater economic growth, other countries produced rather modest results. Since the late 1970s/1980s, some countries of this latter group have managed to overcome their political and social instability, which, in turn, have enhanced their economic performance. A few years later, political changes began to take shape in “communist Indochina,” and countries pursuing autarkic policies or suffering from various forms of embargoes started to open up their economies. In 1986, Laos introduced its “new economic management” programme; in the same year, Vietnam initiated reforms (the policy of Đô i Mó’i) to introduce socialist-oriented market economy, and, towards the end of the decade, Myanmar, which had pursued a strict isolationist policy, announced its modest “open-door policy.”12
Although, with the demise of the Cold War, Southeast Asia essentially vanished from defence maps, given its rapid economic growth and a relatively great social and political stability, it soon became a focus of various businessmen and investors.
At some point, the economic growth of a number of countries, their increasingly expanding relations with the world economy, and the recognition of the common interests required the establishment of an integrative organisation that would improve regional performance. From the early 1960s, the recognition of shared values and history led to some limited convergence in certain parts of the region. The foundation of the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) in 1961 and that of the MAPHILINDO (the cooperation of Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia) in 1963 were both rather unsuccessful examples of efforts to establish common organisations that would serve regional security goals and would strengthen intraregional economic, scientific, and cultural relations. A few years later, with the easing of tensions, confrontations, and hostilities, the way for the foundation of a more successful regional integration was finally cleared. In addition to the reconciliation between Malaysia and Indonesia, yet another unexpected partnership was forged between Malaysia and Singapore. Their leaders found creative ways to overcome their previous mutual distrust in order to focus on common interests. The formation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967 was driven by the uncertainties of the Cold War and was in this regard a response from the non-communist Southeast Asia; however, it was also a product of regional conflict resolution, which successfully created the prerequisites and conditions of regional prosperity and peace. In the coming decades, ASEAN became the most successful regional organisation in the non-Western world, and, by now, it is one of the largest trading bloc globally that has expanded even within and beyond the Southeast Asian region (just think of ASEAN Plus Three and the ASEAN Plus Six partnerships).13
CONCLUDING REMARKS
As it was showcased in this article, the countries of Southeast Asia have undergone a remarkable transformation as well as radical and substantial political and economic changes since the end of World War II. They reacted differently to the intensifying Cold War, and changes in the external geopolitical conditions forced the leaders of these nations to continuously rethink the terms of their engagement with the global system. Despite the severe human and social disasters of the previous decades and albeit at different paces, the societies of the region have become increasingly involved in the modern world economy and now are able to provide better living conditions for their citizens than ever before. The ever-changing international political and economic context seems to have attracted the states to the reality of regional networks and eventually focussed their attention on cooperation. Hence, political leaders of the region started to shepherd their countries away from the previous conflicts and oriented their economic policies towards further integration. In this regard, the development of the region in the decades after World War II and the foundation of ASEAN and its enlargement in particular are the best indications that the region is not only existing in the strategic considerations of great powers or in the imagination of geopoliticians and geographers but is able to show unity of vision, direction, and purpose.
ENDNOTES
1
Daniel George Edward Hall: A History of South-East Asia. Macmillan, London, 1968. 5.
2
András Balogh: Délkelet-Ázsia történelme 1945-től napjainkig. Eötvös Kiadó, Budapest, 2016. 11–13.
3
The term “Southeast Asia” (or its variants) started to appear sporadically in English sources during the mid-19th century while, in a similar fashion, German-speaking academics started to describe the region as Südostasien. Moreover, the theorists of the Japanese geopolitical efforts in the interwar period treated the region (Tōnan Ajia) as a separate unit and as a resource area within the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (Dai tōa Kyōeiken) that was supposed to serve the needs of the Japan
economy. For more, see Donald K. Emmerson: Southeast Asia: what’s in a name? Journal of Southeast Asian Studies. 1984/1. 1–21.
4
It has, however, never been an undisputed term and a number of scholars still underline its problematic nature. As early as in the 1950s, the British colonial servant and historian Victor Purcell suggested the usage of “Indosinesia” to overcome the shortcomings of the already established but for him unacceptable term “Southeast Asia.” In his view, his neologism would not only acknowledge the Indian and Chinese influences, but, with the suffix “nesia,” which derives from the Greek word for island (nesos), it would also embrace the insular part of the region in its name.
5
Indirect rule was a mode of governance to control certain territories of the colonial empire and their inhabitants through the use of traditional rulers and traditional political institutions. The line between direct and indirect rule was, however, often blurred and colonial rulers sometimes exercised both forms within one colonial unit. While, e.g., Java was governed directly, other principalities in Borneo, Celebes, and elsewhere in the Dutch East Indies were under indirect rule. The same could be observed in Indochina, where the French imposed direct rule on Cochinchina (the southern part of the current day Vietnam), whilst Tonkin or Amman were set under indirect governance. For more, see Carl Trocki: Political Structures in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries. In: The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia, edited by Nicholas Tarling. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993. 79–130.
6
For a detailed overview, see, e.g., Anthony Stockwell: Southeast Asia in War and Peace: The End of European Colonial Empires. In: The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia, vol. 2., edited by Nicholas Tarling. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993. 325–386.
7 8
Balogh, 20.
For more about the neighbourly relations on Borneo and the Konfrontasi in particular, see Gregory Poulgrain: The Genesis of Konfrontasi. Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia 1945–1965. C. Hurst & Co., London, 1998.
9
Among others, in Indonesia, both the Chinese and the Soviets sought to exert their influence and supported the newly independent country with large quantities of aid. As Ragna Boden demonstrates, Indonesia was one of the first developing countries benefitting from Soviet support and, for many years, was second after Egypt to receive Soviet aid. Under the framework of economic and technical assistance, the Soviets even financed many of the military projects of Sukarno, such as the campaigns in Irian Jaya (West New Guinea) and the actions against Malaysia. Ragna Boden: Die Grenzen der Weltmacht. Sowjetische Indonesienpolitik von Stalin bis Brežnev. Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 2006. 10 Sara Lorenzini: Global Development. A Cold War History. Princeton University Press, Princeton–Oxford, 1990. 50. 11 From the late 1940s, the military wing of the Malaysian Communist Party fought a ten-year-long guerilla war against the British, but eventually they were unable to gain power. In Thailand, communists ignited a guerrilla war against the Thai government in the mid-1960s. In Indonesia, the Communist Party formed a united front (NASAKOM) with nationalists and religious parties to support Sukarno’s policies. In spite of their positions in the previous establishment, after Sukarno’s fall from power, Suharto banned the Partai Komunis. 12 P. P. Karan–W. A. Bladen: The Changing Political Geography of Southeast Asia. In: Southeast Asia: A Ten Nation Region, vol. 34., edited by Ashok K. Dutt. Springer, Dordrecht, 1993. 13 The founding treaty was signed by the foreign ministers of Indonesia (Adam Malik), the Philippines (Narciso R. Ramos), Malaysia (Tun Abdul Razak), Singapore (Sinnathamby Rajaratnam), and Thailand (Thanat Khoman) in Bangkok. Currently, the ASEAN also includes Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and Brunei. For a brief history of the organization, see ASEAN at 30. Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 9 July 2012. <https://bit.ly/31TAIeo >
