The Role of ASEAN Nations

MARITIME COMPETITION IN THE INDO-PACIFIC— THE ROLE OF ASEAN NATIONS

Béla Háda

From an East and Southeast Asian perspective, the importance of maritime trade and security increased dramatically at the beginning of the 21st century. This phenomenon was not independent of the impressive economic development and growing great power competition in the Asia-Pacific region. Contemporary Southeast Asia is at the epicentre of these processes. The region, and primarily Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia, is a crossroads for key trade flows between East Asia and the Western areas (i.e., Africa, Europe, and the Middle East). Its unique geostrategic position has generated increased interest from the world’s leading powers. The uncertain sovereignty over both the Asia-Pacific and the Southeast Asian regions as well as the needs of fast-growing economies stimulate the intensive development of maritime security capabilities against not only conventional military challenges but piracy, too. Because of the extensive archipelago, the shallow sea areas, the high-level sea freight transport across the so-called maritime choke points (e.g., the Strait of Malacca1 or the Lombok Strait), and the nautical experiences of the population in the islands and coastal areas, Southeast Asia has become the primary area of activity of pirate groups. The strategic importance of maritime lines of communication resulted in the great powers’ increased presence in the region. Chinese, American, Indian, and Japanese naval exercises take place in the South China Sea and the nearby Indian Ocean regularly. In the light of the Southeast Asian nations’ historical experiences, this process seems detrimental to their security, territorial integrity, and sovereignty. The current maritime competition has been the result of these fears. This article aims to summarise the Southeast Asian nations’ answers to the great powers’ regional maritime ambitions.

IN THE SHADOW OF GIANTS—A SHORT HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN MARITIME SECURITY SITUATION

After decolonisation in the middle of the 20th century, the newly independent Southeast Asian countries faced the strategic environment of the Cold War world. Although colonisers had withdrawn from the region, new external powers—the Soviet Union and the United States of America—formulated their ambitions for the East Asian strategic sphere. Besides them, the proclamation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the new Beijing regime’s ideological views on the processes of modern history and the future of Chinese power position raised the risk that the historical tributary system would be restored in the nearby areas, primarily in continental Southeast Asia. From a wider historical perspective, it was not an unknown situation. Different external great powers appeared in Southeast Asia’s history, and, leaning on their past experiences, the newly independent states started to create their selfdefence capabilities—primarily in partnership with a stronger actor.

At the beginning of the Cold War, the naval capabilities of these potential external allies were different. Only the United States had a real blue-water navy, while the other two powers could only project their power into closed waters. In later decades, this situation gradually changed. The rapid build-up of the Soviet Fleet under the direction of Admiral Sergey Gorshkov brought a change to the maritime balance of power by the late 1970s. While the US Navy maintained its bases in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, the Soviet Union established a naval base in the Vietnamese Cam Ranh Bay in 1979. It was the largest Soviet naval

installation outside the Soviet Union, a vital element of the Eastern superpower’s power projection in Southeast Asia. Although regional allies on both sides got various military hardware from their superpower patrons, Southeast Asian countries’ naval power fundamentally remained weak in these decades. The only exception was Singapore which successfully built up a modern and effective maritime defence system. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Empire resulted in a completely new situation in the East Asian strategic sphere, as well. After the unipolar moment had passed, the weaknesses of Southeast Asian states became much more spectacular in the shadow of the massive development of Chinese naval capabilities. A logical answer to the challenges of the new era was the extension of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Since 1967, ASEAN has had security policy goals, and a closer alliance among the nations of the region offered the opportunity to step up as a stronger actor in the Asian strategic arena. The extension was successful: by 1999, almost every state in the region (except Timor Leste) had become a member of the organisation. However, until now, the Association could not become the foundation of a Southeast Asian security alliance against external great power ambitions. Its consensual decision-making mechanisms weaken its unity in judgement about some critical cases like China’s presence in the South China Sea.

THE MARITIME BOUNDARIES AND THE SOUTH CHINA SEA CONFLICT

Through long historical periods, the South China Sea was the area of sea communication between the Chinese Empire and the various Malay states in the Malay Peninsula and Nusantara.2 Maritime trade was the most important source of the richness and expansive dynamics of many historical states, like Srivijaya, the Majapahit Empire, or the Malacca Sultanate.3 After the arrival of European colonisers, the sovereignty over the sea areas became a vital question. In the 19th century, Vietnam and the Empire of China made their claims of sovereignty on the island groups of the South China Sea. However, until the 1970s, territorial disputes that existed in principle had no serious consequences. As it is well-known, because of its potentially rich hydrocarbon reserves and important strategic location, countries have since begun to claim islands and various zones of the South China Sea. It did not, however, remain a Southeast Asian matter. Beijing stepped up as a main interested party in the territorial dispute. Nowadays, the so-called South China Sea dispute has three layers: the dispute on the sovereignty over the Paracel Islands between Vietnam and the PRC, the dispute on the sovereignty over the Spratly Islands between the PRC and four Southeast Asian nations, and the nine-dash line problem. The nine-dash line is a virtual demarcation line used by Beijing for its claims, covering 80% of the South China Sea. It includes all the contested archipelagos and naturally, provoked criticism from the Southeast Asian countries concerned.

In 1974, during the last phase of the Vietnam War, China seized all the Paracel Islands from South Vietnam and has never given them back to the united Vietnamese state.4 Hanoi did not accept the Chinese territorial claims and began to defend Vietnamese interests in another disputed archipelago, the Spratly Islands. However, the situation in the Spratlys is more complicated. Overall, five nations (Brunei, the Philippines, China, Malaysia, and Vietnam) declared an overlapping claim for it. China was the last to establish its first bases in the region. In 1987, it carried out naval patrols in the archipelago; one year later, Chinese warships destroyed two Vietnamese ships in the region, and the PRC gained control over seven reefs. From 1974 to 2018, over thirty military clashes and standoffs occurred in the Spratlys.5 When China began to transform its smaller reefs into artificial islands and construct military installations on them in 2014, the South China Sea dispute arrived at a new phase. In its last Defence White Paper, the PRC admitted that it had “buil[t] infrastructure and deploy[ed] necessary defensive capabilities on the islands and reefs in the South China Sea.” According to

China’s maritime claim and UNCLOS exclusive economic zones in the South China Sea

China Taiwan

Philippines

Malaysia

Indonesia Vietnam

Malaysia

Brunei

Malaysia

The maximum extent of China’s island claims

UNCLOS 200 neutical mile exclusive economic zone

Disputed islands (separate from UNCLOS)

this 2019 strategic document, “the situation of the South China Sea is generally stable and is improving as regional countries are properly managing risks and differences.”6 Despite this message, Beijing’s power demonstration was a direct challenge to smaller Southeast Asian countries, with which their naval forces were far from sufficient to deal. Theoretically, possible answers to this challenge could be strengthening security cooperation inside ASEAN or modernising naval forces and searching for external great power supporters. As I wrote it above, the first solution seems problematic because ASEAN nations have different interests. The second option favours the United States’ regional presence, but historical experiences and openness towards this idea vary among Southeast Asian countries. Self-reliance seems a very desirable option, but the economic potentials of the Southeast Asian states are too weak to compete with China. All in all, the massive development of Chinese naval capabilities became the major factor in the changing Southeast Asian maritime strategic environment. As a result, the American naval activity in the region also increased in the last decade, in the spirit of the so-called “Pivot to Asia” strategy. Parallel to this, Southeast Asian nations also formulated their own strategic visions for their maritime security.

THE MARITIME DIMENSIONS OF THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN STRATEGIC CONCEPTS AND MILITARY MODERNISATION

Although there were some powerful indigenous maritime empires in the history of Nusantara and its societies have wide-ranging shipping experiences, the technical and financial bases for sea security in the region were very narrow in the second half of the 20th century. In their modern strategic documents, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia describe themselves as maritime nations. From a historical perspective, this may be a well-founded statement. Currently, however, it is rather related to growing challenges to their economic interests and security policies.

Indonesia, the giant of Nusantara, has the greatest economy and the heaviest dependency on maritime security in the region, and, in the long term, it has the conditions to become the strongest regional power in Southeast Asia. Logically, this should encourage significant naval developments. However, current processes do not live up to the expectations. Until a few years ago, Indonesia’s maritime strategy seemed to be based on the concept of Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF) by President Joko Widodo.7 He presented the GMF at the East Asia Summit in November 2014 and confirmed it in the Indonesian Defence White Paper of 2015.8 No doubt the maritime culture of the Indonesian and Malay people bolsters a grand strategy based on Nusantra’s geopolitical position which would be a great opportunity, especially for Indonesia. Originally, it prioritised the development of maritime defence forces. The primary goal was to create an effective naval power, able to reach and defend the outermost islands of the country. It is only a socalled green-water navy, so Indonesia cannot challenge the leading maritime powers with its help. Although the international reception of this idea was positive, real resources for a comprehensive Indonesian naval modernisation were lacking. The influential Army pushed the concept into the background, and its future seems uncertain today. Consequently, the country having the highest GDP in ASEAN remains a dwarf in the East Asian maritime arena.

Vietnam, on the western coast of the South China Sea, is one of the traditional regional powers in the Indochinese Peninsula, with strong historical and cultural ties to China. However, Chinese influence and hegemonic ambitions pose the strongest dilemmas for the Vietnamese elite, which have been further strengthened by the intensification of territorial disputes between the two countries. Although it has maintained its claims on the Paracel and the Spratly Islands against Beijing, Hanoi has a far weaker position regarding maritime defence capabilities. Consequently, the modernisation of its naval hardware and infrastructure is one of the country’s primary defence policy goals. Not surprisingly, the country’s capability development efforts are nowadays particularly focussed on the navy and the air force.9 The current Vietnamese National Defence White Paper was released in 2019.10 This document shows high respect (or excessive optimism) for ASEAN’s role in the Asia-Pacific security architecture.11 Parallel to this, it states that the dispute between Vietnam and the PRC regarding sovereignty in the South China Sea is of historical nature,12 and it is still an unsolved dilemma. Hanoi maintains its position in the territorial dispute and considers the Paracel and Spratly Islands its own domain. Strategic documents like this are always a sophisticated sign for the issuing country’s friends and potential rivals (or enemies). Vietnam remains cautious to balance its relations with the two major powers, the United States and the PRC. The White Paper sticks to the traditional principles of the Vietnamese security policy,13 but it is scarcely enough to protect the country’s territorial sovereignty and deter China from expanding in the South China Sea. Regarding defence acquisition, along with Singapore, Vietnam has made the most successful efforts in the region to enhance its military capabilities to defend itself against external threats.14 New Gepard-class frigates, Pohang-class corvettes, and Kilo-class submarines were put into service for this purpose.

Countries

Indonesia

Malaysia

Philippines

Singapore

Thailand

Vietnam Naval personnel

65000

18000

23750

4000

44000

40000 Medium aircraft carriers and landing ships

0

0

0

0

1

0 Destroyers

0

0

0

0

0

0 Frigates

11

10

0

6

9

Countries Corvettes

Indonesia

Malaysia

Philippines

Singapore

Thailand 20

4

1

11

8 Submarines

4

2

0

0

0 Amphibious vessels 4

23

0

6

4

3 Other ships

180

49

81

39

119

Malaysia has a special position in the region and the South China Sea dispute, as well. Besides economic interests, there is another reason why the status of the South China Sea is so important for this country: it is constituted by two areas, the Malay Peninsula and Northern Borneo (i.e., Sarawak and Sabah). The uninterrupted contacts between these two areas are of fundamental national security interest,15 which also strongly determines the expectations related to the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF). For example, the MAF will establish an Amphibious Force equipped with a new Multi-Role Support Ship. Parallel to this, the navy will acquire and deploy Littoral Mission Ships, Fast Interceptor Crafts, Special Force Boats, Autonomous Underwater Vehicles, and Mine Disposal Vehicles.16 The sensitive balance between various strategic interests (trade, maritime security, the role of Malaysian Chinese) makes Malaysia cautious about the US–China regional contest.

From Singapore’s perspective, maritime security is essential for the smooth running of trade, which is the primary source of its richness. Therefore, though the city state is not a party of the South China Sea dispute, it has deep concerns about its potential consequences. Besides, ensuring Singaporean independence is also a central goal of its security policy, not just against an external great power but against its neighbours, as well. Thus, Singapore has the highest military spending and the most effective defence force in the region. The city state is the largest arms importer and the only country in Southeast Asia with a well-developed arms industry capable of producing some advanced weapons of its own design, albeit often with foreign help.17 For example, the most powerful surface units of the fleet, the six Formidable-class Multi-Role Frigates, are the derivatives of the French La Fayette-Class Frigates. Nowadays, the Singaporean navy seems strong enough to protect the maritime boundaries of the city state, but, not surprisingly, it cannot substantially affect the strategic balance in the Asia-Pacific. Fortunately, not just Singapore but all East Asian actors have an interest in maintaining a smooth maritime trade.

Besides Vietnam, the Philippines also faced direct Chinese pressure on its interests in the South China Sea during the last decade. Despite this, Manila has sought to maintain a balanced relationship with Beijing, particularly with economic cooperation in mind. Although, on July 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled that China has no legal basis for claiming “historic rights” within its nine-dash line in a case brought by the Philippines, President Rodrigo Duterte’s government shows openness to dialogue with Beijing based on mutual interests. Parallel to this, the island country maintained its traditional alliance with the United States. This is not surprising, since the Philippine navy has very limited combat capabilities. In the 2012 Defence White Paper, Manila’s future goal was the so-called threetiered navy, with effective surface, subsurface, and air warfare capabilities.18 After eight years and a change of government, these objectives are yet to be fulfilled. Although the development of its armed forces is slow, the stable control on the Philippine maritime domains and Exclusive Economic Zone remains an unquestionable national security interest.

ASEAN COOPERATION—WEAK COLLECTIVE SECURITY EFFORTS

Although ASEAN is the primary form of integration in the region, its military dimensions are weak. That is the reason why it cannot serve as a counterbalance to Chinese expansion in the South China Sea. Countries concerned, such as Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia, need effective support for their maritime security efforts, but they cannot get it from other member states which strive to secure their economic ties with China. The Chinese “divide et impera” strategy against the ASEAN is particularly effective because of the consensual decisionmaking process of the community. There are some ASEAN countries (e.g., Cambodia) which show strong dependency on Chinese bilateral trade and investments while having no territorial disputes with Beijing. Despite the weaknesses

in the defence cooperation of the member states, ASEAN has collective security efforts. An example of these is the planned ASEAN–China code of conduct on the South China Sea. The parties may reach an agreement by 2021,19 but the Chinese tactic of division remains dominant. Therefore, ASEAN countries should put aside their maritime disputes to build a new ASEAN consensus on their vital collective interests.

CLOSING THOUGHTS

In the last decade, Southeast Asia saw the fast development of conventional armed forces; however, compared with similar processes in South Asia and Northeast Asia, this armament seems very moderate. The naval capabilities of the major Southeast Asian countries have vast room for further modernisation, but the strategic landscape remains obscure for them. It is important to underscore that, despite their rapid military development, the Southeast Asian countries cannot stand the arms race with the PRC. Therefore, if ASEAN cooperation does not prove to be effective enough, its members need a great power’s support for their defence policy goals in the maritime sphere. This inevitably strengthens the regional influence of the United States. At the same time, it hardly seems possible to prevent the de facto Chinese occupation of the South China Sea, which will cause serious damages to the security and economic interests of the states in the region.

China’s National Defense in the New Era. The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, Beijing, 2019.

7

Evan Laksmana: Indonesia as “Global Maritime Fulcrum”: A Post-Mortem Analysis. Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. 8 November 2019. <https://bit.ly/3dv5YTX >

8

Defence White Paper. Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Indonesia, Jakarta, 2015. 27.

9

The Military Balance 2020. IISS–Routledge, London, 2020. 224. 10 Pham Chi Thanh: 2019 Viet Nam National Defence. National Political Publishing House, Hanoi, 2019. 11 Pham, 12. 12 Pham, 16. 13 Thoi Nguyen: The Trouble With Vietnam’s Defense Strategy. The Diplomat. 17 January 2020. <https://bit. ly/2z0lqIP > 14 The Military Balance 2020, 223. 15 Defence White Paper. A Secure, Sovereign and Prosperous Malaysia. Ministry of Defence, Kuala Lumpur, 2020. 48. 16 Defence White Paper (2020), 49. 17 Siemon T. Wezeman: Arms Flows to South East Asia. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Solna, 2019. 37. 18 PDT White Paper. Department of National Defense. 23 July 2012. <https://bit.ly/2Y2UBfP > 10. 19 Laura Zhou: ASEAN members up the ante on South China Sea amid code of conduct talks. South China Monitoring Post. 29 December 2019. <https://bit. ly/2U8qW3k >

ENDNOTES

1

Today more than 30% of global seaborne trade passes through the Straits of Malacca.

2

Nusantara is the Malay/Indonesian name of the large Southeast Asian archipelago.

3

Balogh András: Délkelet-Ázsia történelme. Eötvös Kiadó, Budapest, 2018. 72–81.

4

For more, see Stein Tønnesson: The Paracels. The ‘Other’ South China Sea Dispute. International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, 2001.

5

Royal Malaysian Navy. #15to5 Transformation Programme. Royal Malaysian Navy, Kuala Lumpur, 2018. 11.