The Indo-Pacific Strategy and ASEAN

Thomas Daniel and Puteri Nor Ariane Yasmin

INTRODUCTION

This article aims to provide a compressive overview of the dynamics between the IndoPacific Strategy (IPS) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). To achieve this in a structured manner, the article will be organised into four main components.

First, it will explore ASEAN’s mechanisms in engaging with external and major powers, including the evolution of ASEAN’s relations with the United States and China. Second, it will explore the various iterations of the Indo-Pacific strategies and initiatives by various stakeholders and what they could mean for ASEAN. A contextual understanding of both is important to help readers, especially those from outside the region, understand the background from which ASEAN and its member states view and employ the IPS.

A key development in ASEAN’s engagement with the IPS has been the release of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP). The document, which caused a stir when it came out, will be the third component to be addressed in this paper. The AOIP indicates both the thinking of ASEAN as an organisation on the IPS and, also, how ASEAN might choose to engage with it.

Lastly, this article will conclude with potential opportunities and challenges for ASEAN in its engagement with the IPS.

ASEAN IN THE MIDDLE OF MAJOR POWER ENGAGEMENT ASEAN’s multilateral mechanisms

The founding members of ASEAN knew that, while there was no way to avoid major power influence in the region, they stood a better chance of navigating the great game of the Cold War by having a common grouping.

One of the ways that ASEAN sought to retain its strategic autonomy was to draw in all regional powers and engage them comprehensively as a regional grouping.1 Ten key external partners and stakeholders were recognised as Dialogue Partners (Australia, Canada, China, the European Union, India, Japan, South Korea, Russia, New Zealand, and the US) and four as Sectoral Dialogue Partners (Pakistan, Norway, Switzerland, and Turkey).2

ASEAN also worked to promote and grow various multilateral regional initiatives and mechanisms that were inclusive in nature and involved all major powers. The key element in all these was an ASEAN that was put at the centre, in the “driving seat.”

These initiatives and mechanisms include the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the East Asia Forum (EAF). The former, established in 1994, plays a key role in convening officials, academics, think-tankers, and other security and diplomatic practitioners for frank discussions on both longstanding and emerging security issues across the Asia-Pacific.3 The latter, first convened in 2005, is one of the few leaders-led dialogues which brings top leaders and policymakers together from across the Asia-Pacific to discuss broad strategic issues, focussing on the evolving regional architecture.

Other important mechanisms include the ASEAN Plus Three (ASEAN, China, Japan, and South Korea) and ASEAN Closer Economic Relations (ASEAN plus Australia and New Zealand). The ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ASEAN plus eight of its Dialogue Partners except Canada and the EU) is the only active high-level regional military multilateral mechanism. It aims to strengthen security and defence cooperation for peace, stability, and development in the wider Asia-Pacific region.

In a post–Cold War Asia-Pacific, having ASEAN in the “driving seat” of such regional mechanisms was beneficial to both the US

Canada

Japan

Vietnam

Malaysia Brunei

Singapore

Australia

Pacific Ocean

New Zeland United States

Mexico

Peru

Chile

and China. Both had much to gain from the arrangement and both were powerful enough to ensure that their interests could never be undermined by any ASEAN-led mechanism.

ASEAN’S EVOLVING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES

ASEAN–US relations have come a long way since the establishment of regular dialogues in 1977. The US is now a Strategic Partner with multiple levels of engagement across the three pillars of the ASEAN Community.4 The US Pivot to Asia, under the Obama administration, saw the deepening and broadening of relations with established US allies and Southeast Asian states. There were multiple high-level visits, including several by the president himself.

Nevertheless, questions about America’s commitment to this region resurfaced towards the end of President Obama’s second term when the US found itself drawn back to West Asia and Europe.5 The subsequent Trump administration has only seen such concerns grow and come under greater stress. Rightly or wrongly, Southeast Asian policymaking elites viewed the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) as the yardstick of US commitment to Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific at large as an economic–security alternative to China.6 The decision of the US to pull out of the TPP severely damaged that trust and the reputation of the US.

Additionally, the perception of a general lack of policy coherence from the White House when it comes to America’s commitment to the region, the increasing politicisation of the Department of State, and the language of key actors from both establishments—implying an “us or them” attitude when it comes to the criticism of China— have not gone down well in Southeast Asia. What is more, the noticeable lack of high-level representation by the US at ASEAN-led regional meetings just added a perceived insult to injury.

ASEAN’S EVOLVING RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA

More than its evolving relationship with the US, however, it is the rise of China’s economic and strategic influence that has drastically changed the equation and status quo for ASEAN. While not unanticipated, the pace at which this has happened, and the effectiveness of China’s ability to utilise its capabilities, has caught some by surprise. No one country among ASEAN’s Dialogue Partners has had such a sway on the organisation and its member states as China. It is involved in almost every major ASEAN multilateral mechanism and is a major trade partner and investor for almost all ASEAN member states.

In 2018, China was ASEAN’s largest trading partner for nine consecutive years. By the first half of 2019, ASEAN overtook the US to be China’s second-largest trading partner.7 ASEAN member states are also enthusiastic partners in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Many are developing economies with a need for infrastructure and development to improve connectivity within existing markets and to broaden trade relations in the region. China, through the BRI, managed to tap into an acute desire in Southeast Asia for improved road, rail, and maritime connectivity.

The scale of China’s influence also means that ASEAN and its member states will have to delicately and strategically balance their disputes with China. Issues such as the South China Sea territorial dispute and the impact of Chinese activities upstream the Mekong in its basin region are complicated ones for ASEAN member states. China controls the pace of discussion in both matters.

Unlike the US, which has had a long regional presence but is an extraregional power, China is a major power that is a geographical reality for this region, and, for better or worse, Southeast Asia has had to and will have to live with it. Thus, having a relationship based on friendship, cooperation, and careful management of disputes is paramount.

MULTIPLE INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGIES

Analyses on the IPS and ASEAN’s role are difficult to string together without an understanding of the different concepts of the Indo-Pacific. While most observers often speak about the US IPS, others are no less important given the geographical definitions and terminology used to describe the various IPSs. The fact that there is no common understanding or authoritative definition even among its proponents further complicates the situation for ASEAN.8

Countries of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)

■ ASEAN ■ Other countries

The United States

The American concept of the Indo-Pacific is simple—it views itself as part of the region. Its geographical definition of the Indo-Pacific stretches from the west coast of the US right up to the west coast of India. Its Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy covers security, governance, and economics and is largely seen as containment of China alongside an axis of likeminded powers, namely, Australia, India, and Japan. Some have interpreted their quadrilateral meetings as “the quest to balance, dilute and absorb Chinese power,” as China’s rise threatens the rules-based existing order of shared (liberal) values.9

Australia

While Australia’s geographical definition of the Indo-Pacific is largely similar to that of the US, its terminology differs, as it is significantly more inclusive. Australia also places a premium on commitment to multilateralism, free trade, and adherence to a rules-based international order.10

India

India has spelt out its concept of the IndoPacific in similar terms. In his speech at the 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue, Prime Minister Modi noted that “inclusiveness, openness and ASEAN centrality and unity . . . lie at the heart of the new Indo-Pacific,” and that it is not to be seen as “a strategy or as a club of limited members. . . . Nor as a grouping that seeks to dominate.”11 India’s long-held maxim of strategic ambiguity and nonalignment means that, unless there is a major shift in New Delhi, it is unlikely to be part of an explicit alliance against any country.

Japan

Japan’s geographical definition of the IndoPacific has changed quite a few times. A map entitled Free and Open Indo-Pacific published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the end of 2018 explicitly mentioned ASEAN as the “hinge of two oceans” and that Japan would focus on “strengthening connectivity in (the) ASEAN region” and expanding “ASEAN success to other regions such as the Middle East and Africa.”12 The map also indicated that Japan’s FOIP had now included parts of China in its connectivity to ASEAN as well as the Pacific Ocean. It is also worth mentioning that cooperation between Japan and China increased in 2018, with fiftytwo signed memorandums of cooperation at the Japan–China Summit of the same year.

IMPLICATIONS TO SOUTHEAST ASIA

Unlike the US, which clearly identifies a rising China as a threat to regional order, Australia and India have pushed for “inclusive” strategies, while Japan has been cautious not to exclude China entirely. Nevertheless, the implicit concern of the impact of China’s rise is clear. Cooperation among these countries— particularly on strategic–security fronts—will be likely to continue for as long as China rises and threatens the existing order.

What all these strategies have in common is that the geographical scope expands throughout the Indian and Pacific oceans, although where it starts and stops in these oceans differs according to each country’s geographical definition. Southeast Asia is recognised as the epicentre of the Indo-Pacific, given its geographical location between the Indian and Pacific oceans and between India and China.

One must also take into account the history of the term “Indo-Pacific” and how it entered the modern-day vocabulary of strategic terminology in this region. While it may have had beginnings in academic discourse originating from Asia itself, its subsequent utilisation and adoption by extraregional states and like-minded regional stakeholders have seen the term take on more pronounced strategic dimensions—political, economic, diplomatic, and military.13

Thus, both the IPS and the “Indo-Pacific” have unfortunately become “loaded” terms, and, although more broadly utilised, they are still met with scepticism by some quarters in Southeast Asia.14 Interpretations, and thus implications, differ from one stakeholder to the other, which has resulted in differing policy positions by ASEAN member states.

THE ASEAN OUTLOOK ON THE INDO-PACIFIC

These narratives contributed to the formation of the AOIP. Being the largest member of ASEAN, and as a country that is straddled between both the Indian and Pacific Oceans, Indonesia took the lead in the initiative. Based on Indonesia’s concept of an “open” and “inclusive” IndoPacific, the AOIP was adopted at the 34th ASEAN Summit in June 2019. At its core, the AOIP is about ASEAN’s attempting to assert its independence in an environment of greater competition between China and the US.15

Besides the general discomfort of the tone of the various IPSs, especially the FOIP, there was also concern over the implications to ASEAN economies from the then-ongoing trade war between the US and China and wider geopolitical security anxieties. Many member states were concerned that ASEAN centrality was under threat and that, if they did not attempt to put an ASEAN stamp on this latest regional initiative by an extraregional power, tensions would further worsen. There was also a desire to take advantage of Southeast Asia’s central location in the Indo-Pacific to ensure that it could better position itself to maximise benefits from the various IPSs and the BRI at the same time.

It is worth saying that the AOIP was only adopted after some disagreement—negotiations on the final text continued to the eleventh hour. Some ASEAN member states felt it was too partisan in favour of the IPS while others felt it did not go far enough. It marks the first formal inclusion of the term Indo-Pacific in ASEAN’s discourse and has been described by ASEAN diplomats and observers alike as a guide, not a legally binding document. Hence the name “Outlook.”

While some analysts have perceived the AOIP as an endorsement of the IPS, it is more nuanced than that. An examination of the text indicates a very familiar language that runs through almost all ASEAN documents and statements about matters pertaining to the regional order— the emphasis on dialogue, cooperation, and peaceful settlement of disputes. In short, the ASEAN Way.16 Inclusivity is a major reoccurring theme in the AOIP.

It would, however, also be a mistake to take the AOIP as a repudiation of the IPS, or even FOIP. ASEAN has clearly recognised that the Indo-Pacific and its various strategies, no matter its iteration or name, is here to stay. The drivers of and political will for the IPS by its proponents are unlikely to wane anytime soon. In a sense, ASEAN could be hoping that a more toned down IPS would make it more palatable to its

members, and less risky in terms of offering an alternative to Chinese-driven regional initiatives.

ASEAN and its member states hope to use the AOIP as a basis to bolster the regional organisation as it navigates through strategic competition in the region. Besides attempting to stay relevant amidst the multiple concepts of the Indo-Pacific, ASEAN must also work to engage all proponents of the various IPSs using existing ASEAN-led multilateral mechanisms such as the EAF and ADMM Plus. Lastly, it must also ensure that member states are not dragged into greater US–China rivalry in the region, particularly if tensions continue to escalate in the postpandemic world order.

CONCLUSION: WHERE TO FOR ASEAN

There are both significant challenges and opportunities for ASEAN when it comes to the Indo-Pacific and its various strategies.

Southeast Asia’s position as the strategic and geographical epicentre of various IPSs and the adoption of the AOIP give ASEAN a unique opportunity to regain lost ground in the framing of narratives around the Indo-Pacific and the IPS. Besides the greater emphasis on inclusivity, ASEAN is hoping to capitalise on its longstanding position of non-alignment between major powers and a convenor of major regional mechanisms. There is some agency in this as similar sentiments have been expressed by Australia, India, and Japan. To this end, ASEAN should actively continue to pursue engagement with the IPS and ensure that their proponents remain fully engaged with Southeast Asia.

However, this ultimately depends on how ASEAN manages its relations with both the US and China and how the major powers choose to engage with or ignore ASEAN. While the argument that ASEAN has to choose between major powers and their initiatives is false, the reality is that both the US and China have a huge influence on the regional organisation and its member states. Unless ASEAN cohesiveness is guaranteed, its scope of action will only go as far as it is allowed by the latter. All that is needed is just one or two member states to be influenced. ASEAN, after all, is an association of ten member states that makes decisions by consensus, often the lowest common denominator. This means even one country can have a serious impact on the collective decision taken by the group.

The continuing pressure on ASEAN, or rather its member states, to bend strategically to one or the other will only keep hamstringing ASEAN. And despite some immediate gains for either the US or China, a hamstrung ASEAN will have negative impacts for the wider region and, indeed, the long-standing interests of major powers themselves in the long run.

The impact of a rising and more assertive China on ASEAN is again a crucial factor. Several ASEAN member states are thought to be firmly within China’s economic “gravitational pull” given the past and current trends of economic exchange. Chinese investments, BRI or not, have made up a significant portion of their GDP growth in recent years. China’s growing dominance in the region in economic and military terms greatly expands its ability to exercise political influence over recipient countries. This factor, which shrinks possible strategic and diplomatic options, has caused ASEAN member states to diverge in their approach to dealing with China. It can also have an impact on how some of them perceive and engage with multiple IPSs.

Lastly, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on both ASEAN and the IPS is another consideration to keep in mind. Key proponents of the IPS, namely, the US and Australia, publicly traded barbs with China over the origin, responsibility, and management of the pandemic. The US, in particular, has taken a very hard line on China and has publicly accused it of using the pandemic to expand its sphere of influence and harassment of neighbours in territorial disputes like the one over the South China Sea.17

This deterioration, and the discomfort against the rhetoric coming out of Washington could impact greater willingness to work with the US within the Indo-Pacific framework. Especially if the FOIP takes on a more anti-China tone. This is further accentuated by the calculations of most Southeast Asian policymakers that trade with China will be an important part of surviving

the post-pandemic recession and kick-starting economic growth.18

In the longer run, the capacity of ASEAN as a regional organisation, its member states, and proponents of the IPS remain to be seen in a post-pandemic world, as is their appetite for extraregional engagement.19 Given the staggering human and economic costs, still ongoing at the time of writing, priorities and resources could see a shift inward. Ultimately, though, the impact of COVID-19 on ASEAN and its engagement with the IPS would depend on how badly countries are hit and on how long the pandemic will last.

ENDNOTES

1

About the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus). Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Defence Ministers Meeting. 6 February 2017. <https://bit.ly/2UUxUcU >

2

ASEAN Dialogue Coordinatorship July 2015–July 2024. Association of Southeast Asian Nations. <https://bit. ly/2YOwDFg > Accessed: 18 June 2020.

3

ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Australia. <https:// bit.ly/2UTVEhl > Accessed: 18 June 2020.

4

Overview of ASEAN–United States Dialogue Relations. Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 17 November 2019. <https://bit.ly/2N65t7q >

5

Premesha Saha: From ‘Pivot to Asia’ to Trump’s ARIA: What Drives the US’ Current Asia Policy? Observer Research Foundation, ORF Occasional Paper No. 236. February 2020. <https://bit.ly/2UTWniz >

6

Saxon Bryant: After TPP: Challenges for US–ASEAN Relations. Public Policy Initiative, University of Pennsylvania. 21 January 2019. <https://whr.tn/2zHEhc2 >

7

China–ASEAN trade continues to boom amid global growth slowdown, uncertainties. China Daily. 23 July 2019. <https://bit.ly/37EgAy1 >

8

Hoang Thi Ha: ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific: Old Wine in New Bottle? ISEAS Perspective. 2019/51. <https:// bit.ly/2N8Skun >

9

Jeremy Cliffe: The Rise of the Indo-Pacific. New Statesman. 3 May 2020. <https://bit.ly/2Y9LsTQ > 10 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Australia, Barton, 2017. <https://bit. ly/2ADF8Ly > 11 Prime Minister’s Keynote Address at Shangri La Dialogue. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. 1 June 2018. <https://bit.ly/3fBVXFn > 12 Towards Free and Open Indo-Pacific. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. November 2019. <https://bit.ly/2N6eBZT > 13 Melissa Conley Taylor: Different visions of the Indo-Pacific: China, India, the US and Australia. Lowy Institute, The

Interpreter. 9 January 2014. <https://bit.ly/316inuz > 14 Mercy A. Kuo: The Origin of ‘Indo-Pacific’ as Geopolitical Construct. The Diplomat. 25 January 2018. <https://bit. ly/30SyE5V > 15 Amitav Acharya: Why ASEAN’s Indo-Pacific Outlook Matters. Australian Strategic Policy Institute, The Strategist. 12 August 2019. <https://bit.ly/3ddXr7h > 16 “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo Pacific.” Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 22 June 2019. <https://bit. ly/2UTtAL2 > 17 Morgan Ortagus: PRC’s Reported Sinking of a Vietnamese Fishing Vessel in the South China Sea. U.S. Department of State. 6 April 2020. <https://bit.ly/30SKOf5 > 18 Anthony Rowley: Why China – not the US – remains key to Asia’s trade and economic recovery after Covid-19. South China Morning Post. 27 April 2020. <https://bit.ly/2YLvqib > 19 Patrick M. Cronin: Four Geostrategic Implications Of The Coronavirus In The Indo-Pacific. Hudson Institute. 17 March 2020. <https://bit.ly/37D9XMm >